ORIGINAL LIST:

People v. Molas, GR 97437-39 (1993)

FACTS:
-Josue Molas (accused-appellant) and Dulcesima Resonable (Dulcesima, victim)
were sweethearts and were engaged to be married. Dulcesima was the daughter
of Bernardo and Soledad Resonable, and the sister of Nicolas and Abelardo
Resonable
-on Feb 2, 1983, at about 6:00 pm after farm work, Bernardo arrived at their
house and found 8-y.o. Abelardo at the doorway of their house bathed in his own
blood. Bernardo carried Abelardo into their house. Abelardo informed his father
that Josue Molas was the person who not only inflicted his injuries but also
stabbed Dulcesima and Soledad. Bernardo then looked for Dulcesima, who he
found dead in a dried carabao mud pool 3-arms length from the house, and
Soledad, who he found near the bench by the door of the house. Bernardo ran to
the barangay captain and sought help from authorities. Abelardo was brought to
the Provincial hospital but died the next day.
-dawn of Feb 3, Josue Molas, with blood-stained clothes, surrendered to
Patrolman Geronimo Vallega, together with the hunting knife I used in killing the
mother, the daughter and the boy. Patrolman Vallega then lodged Molas in jail.
Molas was transferred to Valencia Police Station later.
-next morning, after being informed of his Constitutional rights, refused to give
any statement to the police. Eventually, Molas freely and voluntarily related the
whole story, as taken down by Patrolman Fetalvero. The following are
contained in Molas sworn statement: In our arrival to their house at sitio Inas,
Barangay Dobdob, from Kabangogan, * this Soledad Resonable lighted a gas
lamp in their store and said, "maayo kay naabot na ta walay makaboot nako ug
patyon nako ang akong anak." [It's good that you have arrived, no one can stop
me if I kill my own daughter] at the same time went near Dulcesima, her
daughter and grabbed her hair and boxed her to the different parts of her body.
Because of faith and sympathy, I stopped Solidad by holding her hands to
prevent her boxing Dulcesima, but on my intervention, Soledad boxed me hitting
my head and arms. Due to blocks I made she was tired and again went back to
Dulcesima and again boxed her to the different parts of her body. Because I was
hurt on the part of Dulcisima, my wife-to-be and no other means to prevent
Solidad, I was able to grab the weapon on my waist and stabbed Solidad hitting
her first on the breast, then on the back after which I saw Abelardo, Dulcisima's
younger brother at my back holding and boxing my buttock. I stabbed him on the
breast and followed again at the back causing him to fall down on the ground,
leaving therein the weapon I used causing incised wound on my right little finger
and ran away but Dulcisima stopped me by holding my left hand and said,
"puslang nabuhat sa akong ginikanan, patya lamang ko ug layhan ka mag onong
ta sa kamatayon." [How could you do this to my parent, kill me also so we'll all
die together]. Hearing such words, I responded, "papatay ka diay kanako," [You'll
kill me after all?] I went back where Abelardo was and pulled the penetrated
weapon and stabbed Dulcisima who at that time was following me hitting her
breast and caused her life to end. When I saw Solidad her mother walking
towards the seat of their store and sat down, I followed her and slashed her neck
and stabbed her stomach and immediately ran home. The said confession was
signed before Judge Tayrosa of the MTC fo Valencia after it was translated to

Cebuano. Molas did not object to any of the contents of his affidavit as
translated. He signed the document willingly.
-3 separate information for murder were filed against Molas, to which he pleaded
not guilty.
-for the defense, only Molas was presented. In essence, he testified that at about
6 pm on Feb 2, he saw his fianc lifeless beside the dried mud pool 3 fathoms
away from the store/house. He hugged Dulcesima but she was dead so he ran
to the store. There, he saw Soledad wounded in the neck and bathed with blood.
He also saw Abelardo under a table with a hunting knife in his back which he
pulled from Abelardo. He shouted for help then suddenly a voice from behind the
store said Dont shout, Bay, if you dont want to die! 3 unidentified men started
chasing him afterwards. During the said flight he stumbled, causing the injury in
his hands. He informed his mother regarding what happened, and with his bloodstained clothes, he proceeded to the police station. While he was being
investigated, Patrolman Vallaga arrived and informed Patrolman Renzal that
Abelardo tagged him as the killer. He also alleged, though unsubstantiated, that
Patrolman Quitoy manhandled him. He denied knowing the contents of the
affidavit because it was written in English and was not translated to him.
-RTC: GUILTY
ISSUES
1. WON the court erred in giving credence to Abelardos dying declaration
2. WON his extrajudicial admission was validly admitted by the court
HELD
1. NO. Correct in giving credence to it as a dying declaration.
Ratio. To be admissible, a dying declaration must: (1) concern the cause and
surrounding circumstances of the declarant's death; (b) that at the time it was
made, the declarant was under a consciousness of impending death; (c) that he
was a competent witness; and (d) that his declaration is offered in evidence in a
criminal case for homicide, murder or parricide in which the declarant is the
victim (Sec. 31, Rule 130, Rules of Court; People vs. Saliling, 69 SCRA 427).
Reasoning. Abelardo's statement that it was Josue Molas who inflicted his
injuries and also stabbed his mother and sister was given to his father, while he
(Abelardo) lay at death's door, bleeding from stab wounds in his colon and spinal
cord, as a result of which he expired a few hours later. It was indubitably a dying
declaration. All of the circumstances required were present when Abelardo made
his dying declaration.
2. YES
Ratio. While it is true that the appellant's extrajudicial confession was made
without the advice and assistance of counsel, hence, inadmissible as evidence,
it could be treated as a verbal admission of the accused established through the
testimonies of the persons who heard it or who conducted the investigation of
the accused (People vs. Carido, 167 SCRA 462; People vs. Feliciano, 58 SCRA
383; People vs. Fontanosa, 20 SCRA 249).
Reasoning. The Valencia Police Station investigator, Patrolman Paquito
Fetalvero, testifying before the trial court on October 16, 1984, quoted the
admissions of the accused. The trial court, which observed his deportment on
the witness stand, found him credible.

- the trial court did not rely solely on the extrajudicial confession of the accused.
Even if that confession were disregard, there was more that enough evidence to
support his conviction. His act of giving himself up to the police of Pamplona with
the murder weapon, his blood-stained clothing at the time of the surrender only
hours after the killings, Abelardo's dying declaration, and the testimonies of the
policemen in the police stations in Pamplona and Valencia to whom he admitted
his guilt constitute an unbroken chain proving beyond reasonable doubt that it
was he who murdered Abelardo, Dulcesima and Soledad Resonable.
Disposition. WHEREFORE, the appealed judgment convicting Josue Molas for
the murders of Dulcesima Resonable, Soledad Resonable and Abelardo
Resonable and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua for
each of said murders is AFFIRMED, with modification of the death indemnity
which is hereby increased to P50,000.00 for each case. SO ORDERED.
People v. Baloloy, GR 140740 (2002)
FACTS: The dead body of 11-year-old Genelyn Camacho was found by the
accused-appellant in a nearby creek, whilehe was catching some frogs. Those
who arrived at the scene also found a black rope. During the wake,
Brgy.Captain Ceniza asked the visitors if any one of them owned the
black rope found on the crime scene. The accused-appellant claimed it was
his.The Brgy. Captain took the accused-appellant and asked him why
his rope was found on the scene. The accused-appellant then confessed
that he was the one who raped and killed Genelyn. When she announced thisto
everyone at the wake, they became unruly so she turned over the accusedappellant to the police for his own protection.On the day of the trial, after
Judge Dicon read the affidavit of Brgy. Captain Ceniza, he asked the
accused-appellant if he was indeed guilty of the crime charged. The accusedappellant replied that he was demonizedwhen he committed the crime. He was
convicted of the crime of rape with homicide based on his extrajudicial
confession to Brgy. Captain Ceniza and Judge Dicon and sentenced to death.
ISSUE: Whether the accused's extrajudicial confession to Brgy. Captain
Ceniza and Judge Dicon violated his right against self-incrimination.
HELD: NO, as far as his confession to Ceniza is concerned. When the
accused admitted ownership of the rope and confessed the
commission of the crime to Ceniza, he did so voluntarily, free of
coercion or control from the authorities. He also confessed before he was
arrested or placed under investigation. What is prohibited by
theConstitution is the compulsory disclosure of information that would
incriminate the accused while he is in thecustody of the authorities.As for
his confession to Judge Dicon, it was deemed inadmissible as evidence because
Judge Dicon failed toinform him of his rights before he made the confession.
Moreover, it was done without the assistance of counsel.It was held that the
rights of the accused become operative once custodial investigation starts,
which actually begins from the time the accused is arrested or voluntarily
surrenders to the police. The accused was already inthe custody of the police at
the time he made his confession to Judge Dicon. Furthermore, even if no
complaint was yet filed against the accused at that time, the judge

should still have honored the rights of the accused under the Bill
of Rights.However, his confession to the judge is not entirely useless as
those who witnessed the confession may still testify to this verbal
admission by the accused
People v. Buntag, GR 123070 (2004)
FACTS: Before February 8, 1992, Berno Georg Otte,[3] a German national and a
tourist, checked in at the Alona Ville Beach Resort located in Panglao,
Bohol. The resort manager, Herma Clarabal Bonga,[4] assigned Otte to Room
No. 9[5] and gave the latter his room key. On February 8, 1992, Otte took his
dinner at the resorts restaurant. Bonga talked to him regarding the disco which
was about to unfold that night in lower Tawala near the Catibo Chapel. At about
10:00 p.m., Bonga went to the disco party where she saw Otte seated at one of
the tables.[7] She noticed that he had some companions whom she failed to
recognize.[8]
Isidro A. Mihangos, a 19-year-old student, and Benigno Ninoy Guigue were also
at the disco. At around 2:00 a.m. of February 9, 1992, Mihangos and Guigue
decided to call it a night and walked home, with their respective bicycles at their
sides.[9] At the crossing to the Alona Beach, they saw a man lying on the road
but did not recognize him. They walked past the prostrate man. When they were
about twenty-five meters[10] away from the body by the road, they met Casiano
Buntag and Diego Bongo, their barriomates.[11]Suddenly, Buntag and Bongo
jointly and simultaneously lunged at them. Afraid for their lives, Mihangos and
Guigue fled and sought refuge in the house of Guigues uncle, Aquilino Bongo.
[12] In the process, they left their bicycles behind. Aquilino Bongo then
accompanied Mihangos and Guigue to where they left their bicycles. Mihangos
and Guigue retrieved their bicycles, but Buntag and Bongo were no longer there.
At around 5:30 a.m. of February 9, 1992, the police station of Panglao, Bohol,
received a report by radio call about a man, believed to be dead, lying at the side
of the crossroad near the Alona Beach.[13] PO1 Yolando E. Hormachuelos,
together with PO1 Mauro Sumaylo and PO1 Dominie Ragusta,[14] proceeded to
the crime scene. They were accompanied by the Municipal Health Officer, Dr.
Julita L. Cogo, who confirmed that the man died due to a stab wound.[15] The
policemen found a hunting knife about one meter away from the body.
[16] Constancio Geoivencal took pictures of the cadaver. Hormachuelos took
custody of the knife.[17] In the course of their investigation, the policemen
learned that Mihangos and Guigue had seen the dead body by the
road. Hormachuelos fetched Mihangos and Guigue from their houses and
brought them to the road where the body of Otte was found. Mihangos and
Guigue narrated how they found the body at around 2:00 a.m. that day, as well
as their encounter with Bongo and Buntag. At about 1:00 p.m. that day,
Hormachuelos took appellant Bongo to the police station and investigated him
without the assistance of counsel. Bongo admitted that he took Ottes key to
Room No. 9 and hid it near their house. He then drew a sketch showing the
place where he hid the key, at the back of their house. Bongo also admitted that
he was with appellant Casiano Buntag. The policemen went to Bongos house
and recovered the key to Ottes room as indicated by Bongo in his sketch. At
2:00 p.m., Guigue arrived at the police station and gave his statement to
Hormachuelos.[18] At 3:00 p.m., Mihangos gave his statement to SPO1 Proculo

Bonao.[19]Hormachuelos then took custody of Casiano Buntag and brought him

to the police station where he was asked about his involvement in the killing of
Otte without the assistance of counsel. However, Buntag opted to keep
silent. When apprised that Diego Bongo had implicated him, Buntag, this time
with the assistance of his counsel, Atty. Nerio G. Zamora, gave a statement on
February 13, 1992 to a police investigator. He stated that at 1:00 a.m. on
February 9, 1992, he was walking back home from the disco place where he
caught up with Diego Bongo and Otte at the crossing of Alona Beach. He saw
Bongo poke a knife at Otte. Bongo then ordered him to box Otte but he refused,
and moved back about three meters. Bongo himself then boxed Otte three times
on the face. When Otte fell to the ground, Bongo stabbed him on the
chest. Buntag also stated that he then ran back home, but Bongo followed him
and cautioned him not to reveal the incident to anybody or else he would be
implicated.[20] Buntag subscribed and swore to the truth of his statement on
February 21, 1992 before Judge Antonio Sarce of the Municipal Circuit Trial
Court. Municipal Health Officer Dr. Julita Lood-Cogo performed an autopsy on
the cadaver of Otte and submitted her Post-Mortem Report which contained the
following findings: Stab wound, anterior chest, right, at the level of the 4th rib,
approx. 2 cms. x 1 cm. in size, with a depth of approx. 12 cms., directed
upwards and medially, with a complete fracture of the 4th rib, right, involving a
portion of the right lung and base of the heart. // Cause of death:
CARDIORESPIRATORY ARREST DUE TO HEMORRHAGE, SECONDARY TO
STAB WOUND, ANTERIOR CHEST, RIGHT. On March 7, 1992, a criminal
complaint for murder was filed against appellants Bongo and Buntag with the
Municipal Circuit Trial Court. Only appellant Bongo submitted his counteraffidavit on February 27, 1992, subscribed and sworn to before Judge Antonio
Sarce,[22]where he confirmed (a) Buntags account in his sworn statement
before Judge Sarce that they were with Otte at 1:00 a.m. on February 9, 1992 at
the crossing towards Alona Beach Resort, and (b) that he was armed with a
hunting knife. He further stated therein that while at the crossing, Buntag and
Otte, who were both drunk, had an altercation and that he tried to pacify them
but in the process, Buntag pulled out his (Bongos) hunting knife from his waist
and stabbed Otte with it. After the requisite preliminary investigation, the MCTC
issued a resolution finding probable cause against the appellants for murder and
issued warrants for their arrest. The court found Buntags sworn statement and
Bongos counter-affidavit self-serving.
Issues: (a) whether or not the prosecution proved beyond reasonable doubt that
they conspired to kill the victim Otte and that they, in fact, killed him; (b) whether
or not the appellants are guilty of murder; and, (c) whether or not the appellants
are liable for moral damages to the heirs of the victim.
Held: We agree with the appellants that the prosecution failed to adduce direct
evidence that they conspired to kill Otte and that they, in fact, stabbed and killed
the victim. However, we find and so hold, after an incisive review of the records,
that the prosecution adduced sufficient circumstantial evidence to prove the guilt
of the appellants beyond reasonable doubt.
Article 8 of the Revised Penal Code provides that there is conspiracy when two
or more persons agree to commit a crime and decide to commit it. Direct proof is

not essential to establish conspiracy, and may be inferred from the collective
acts of the accused before, during and after the commission of the crime.
[36] Conspiracy can be presumed from and proven by acts of the accused
themselves when the said acts point to a joint purpose and design, concerted
action and community of interests.[37] It is not necessary to show that all the
conspirators actually hit and killed the victim. Conspiracy renders all the
conspirators as co-principals regardless of the extent and character of their
participation because in contemplation of law, the act of one conspirator is the
act of all.[38]
The crime charged may also be proved by circumstantial evidence, sometimes
referred to as indirect or presumptive evidence. Circumstantial evidence is
sufficient on which to anchor a judgment of conviction if the following requisites
are established: (a) there is more than one circumstance; (b) the facts from
which the inferences are derived have been established; and, (c) the
combination of all the circumstances is such as to warrant a finding of guilt
beyond reasonable doubt.[39]
In People v. Delim,[40] we held, thus:
The prosecution is burdened to prove the essential events which constitute a
compact mass of circumstantial evidence, and the proof of each being confirmed
by the proof of the other, and all without exception leading by mutual support to
but one conclusion: the guilt of the accused for the offense charged. For
circumstantial evidence to be sufficient to support a conviction, all the
circumstances must be consistent with each other, consistent with the
hypothesis that accused is guilty and at the same time inconsistent with the
hypothesis that he is innocent, and with every other rational hypothesis except
that of guilt. If the prosecution adduced the requisite circumstantial evidence to
prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt, the burden of evidence
shifts to the accused to controvert the evidence of the prosecution.[41]
In convicting the appellants of the crime charged, the trial court relied not only on
the counter-affidavit of appellant Bongo[42] and appellant Buntags sworn
statement,[43] but also on the other evidence on record, namely, the knife used
in killing the victim,[44] the key to Ottes room,[45] and the collective testimonies
of the other witnesses of the prosecution.
The general rule is that the extrajudicial confession or admission of one accused
is admissible only against the said accused but is inadmissible against the other
accused.[46]The same rule applies if the extrajudicial confession is made by one
accused after the conspiracy has ceased. However, if the declarant/admitter
repeats in court his extrajudicial confession during trial and the other accused is
accorded the opportunity to cross-examine the admitter, such confession or
admission is admissible against both accused.[47] The erstwhile extrajudicial
confession or admission when repeated during the trial is transposed into judicial
admissions.
In criminal cases, an admission is something less than a confession. It is but a
statement of facts by the accused, direct or implied, which do not directly involve
an acknowledgment of his guilt or of his criminal intent to commit the offense
with which he is bound, against his interests, of the evidence or truths charged.
[48] It is an acknowledgment of some facts or circumstances which, in itself, is
insufficient to authorize a conviction and which tends only to establish the

ultimate facts of guilt.[49] A confession, on the other hand, is an

acknowledgment, in express terms, of his guilt of the crime charged.[50]
In this case, appellant Buntag made extrajudicial admissions against his interest
in his sworn statement, and not a confession. So did appellant Bongo in his
counter-affidavit.Such admissions in the form of affidavits, made in the Municipal
Trial Court in the course of its preliminary investigation, are high quality
evidence.[51] MCTC Judge Antonio Sarce testified on the said sworn statement
and counter-affidavit and was cross-examined.[52] Moreover, some of the
extrajudicial inculpatory admissions of one appellant are identical with some of
the extrajudicial inculpatory admissions of the other, and vice versa. This
corroborates and confirms their veracity. Such admissions, made without
collusion, are akin to interlocking extrajudicial confessions. They are admissible
as circumstantial evidence against the other appellant implicated therein to show
the probability of his participation in the commission of the crime and as
corroborative evidence against him.[53] The Court rejects the appellants
contention that they were deprived of their right to cross-examine the other on
the latters admissions against the other. Through their common counsel, they
opted not to testify and be cross-examined on their respective statements by the
prosecution. They opted to file a motion to acquit. Besides, they had opportunity
to cross-examine Judge Sarce before whom they swore to the truthfulness of
their statements.[54]
In this case, the prosecution adduced the following circumstantial evidence
which constitutes proof beyond reasonable doubt that the appellants, indeed,
conspired to kill and did kill the victim:
1. Appellant Buntag admitted, in his sworn statement,[55] that, at about 1:00
a.m. on February 9, 1992, he was in the company of appellant Bongo and the
victim Otte at the crossing of Alona Beach, and that appellant Bongo was armed
with a hunting knife. Appellant Buntag identified the victim through the latters
picture, as well as the hunting knife used in the killing.[56] Appellant Bongo, in
his counter-affidavit, confirmed the truth of appellant Buntags admissions and
also admitted that on the said date, time and place, he was with appellant
Buntag and the victim, and that he was armed with a hunting knife which was
tucked on his waist.
2. The appellants admitted in their respective statements that on the said
occasion, Otte died from a stab wound caused by a hunting knife.
3. Appellant Bongo admitted in his counter-affidavit that he took the key to the
victims room and hid it near their house where the policemen found it.
4. While both appellants were within the periphery of the situs criminis, Mihangos
and Guigue sauntered by with their bicycles at their sides. Suddenly, the
appellants jointly and simultaneously lunged at them, causing Mihangos and
Guigue to believe that their lives were in peril, impelling them to run for their lives
and seek sanctuary in the house of Guigues uncle, Aquilino Bongo. By the time
Mihangos and Guigue returned to the situs criminis to retrieve their bicycles, the
appellants had already left.
5. In his sworn statement, appellant Buntag admitted that after the victim was
stabbed, he and appellant Bongo fled from the situs criminis. This was
corroborated by the testimony of Mihangos. The presence of both appellants at
the situs criminis and their flight from the scene are strong indicia of their

participation in the commission of the crime and their complicity therein.

[57] Appellant Bongo opted not to testify or adduce evidence to controvert the
testimony of Mihangos and the admissions of the appellant prejudicial to him.
6. The hunting knife of appellant Bongo which was used to kill the victim was left
at the scene of the crime where the policemen recovered it shortly thereafter.
7. The appellants admitted in their respective sworn statements that the victim
was stabbed once with a hunting knife. These admissions were corroborated by
Dr. Julita Cogos finding that the victim was stabbed once on the anterior chest
area.[58] The doctor testified that the stab wound could have been caused by a
sharp-edged weapon.[59]
8. Neither of the appellants brought the victim to the hospital for immediate
medical attendance and operation.
9. Although the appellants pointed to the other as the assailant in their
respective statements, neither of them reported the stabbing to the police
authorities and claimed that the other killed the victim.
10. Neither of the appellants took the witness stand to deny any involvement in
the killing of the victim. The evidence of the prosecution, thus, stands
unrebutted.
The appellants cannot rely on the exculpatory portions of their respective
statements as basis for their acquittal of the crime charged. In the case of
appellant Buntag, he avers in his sworn statement that he was ordered by
appellant Bongo to box the victim and when he refused, appellant Bongo himself
boxed and stabbed the victim with the hunting knife. When appellant Buntag fled
from the scene and went back home, appellant Bongo followed and warned him
not to divulge the incident so that he would not be implicated.For his part,
appellant Bongo turned the tables on appellant Buntag and claimed in his
counter-affidavit that the latter snatched the hunting knife from his waist and
stabbed the victim in the heat of their altercation. The stabbing was so sudden,
he insists, that he was unable to stop appellant Buntag from stabbing the victim.
We are not persuaded by the claims of the appellants for the following reasons:
First. Contrary to the claim of appellant Buntag that appellant Bongo boxed the
victim, the necropsy report of Dr. Cogo failed to show that the victims body
sustained hematoma, bruises or contusions. The findings of the doctor must
prevail as against the bare statements of the appellants.
Second. Appellant Buntag admitted in his sworn statement that before he and
appellant Bongo could leave the situs criminis after the victim was stabbed,
Mihangos
and
Guigue
arrived. The
appellants
lunged jointly
and
simultaneously at the two teenagers which so terrified the latter that they fled for
their lives. If, as appellant Buntag claims, he had nothing to do with the stabbing
of the victim, he should have sought the help of the teenagers, brought the victim
to the hospital and reported to the police authorities that it was appellant Bongo
who stabbed the victim. Appellant Buntag failed to do so. Neither did appellant
Bongo seek the help of the two teenagers and report the stabbing to the police
authorities. Both appellants unexplained omission is another indication of their
conspiracy and complicity in the crime charged.
Third. Appellant Bongo took the key from the body of the victim and hid it near
their house where the policemen found it. The appellant has not explained why

he had the key to the victims room and hid it near their house. He owned the
hunting knife used in stabbing the victim. He knew or should have known that
sooner or later, the policemen would trace the knife to him; and yet, appellant
Bongo failed to report the incident to the police authorities and surrender the
knife to them.
Fourth. Appellant Bongo denied involvement in the killing and pointed to
appellant Buntag as the assailant only after the latter had executed his own
sworn statement pointing to appellant Bongo as the victims assailant. We are
convinced that appellant Bongos denial of any involvement in the killing is but a
belated afterthought to escape criminal liability for the victims death.
The trial court convicted the appellants of murder under Article 248 of the
Revised Penal Code, as amended, and sentenced each of them to reclusion
perpetua. We note, however, that the trial court, in its amended decision, made
no finding on any attendant circumstance which would qualify the killing to
murder. It bears stressing that under the Rules of Criminal Procedure, any
qualifying circumstance attendant to the commission of a crime must be alleged
in the Information and proved by the prosecution, conformably to the
constitutional right of an accused to be informed of the nature of the charges
against him.
In this case, the Information alleged that treachery was attendant in the
commission of the crime. The prosecution was burdened to prove beyond
reasonable doubt, not only the crime itself, but also the qualifying circumstance
of alevosia.[60] Treachery cannot be based on speculations and surmises. In
order that treachery may be appreciated as a qualifying circumstance under
Article 14 of the Revised Penal Code, the prosecution is burdened to prove that
(a) the malefactor employed means, method or manner of execution affording
the person attacked no opportunity to defend himself or to retaliate and, (b) the
means, method or manner of execution was deliberately or consciously adopted
by the offender. In this case, there was no eyewitness to the crime.
On the other hand, appellant Buntag, in his sworn statement, claimed that before
the victim was stabbed, appellant Bongo and the victim had an altercation;
appellant Bongo, in his counter-affidavit, stated that it was appellant Buntag and
the victim who had an altercation before the victim was killed. There is no
evidence that the appellants deliberately or consciously adopted a method or
means of execution to insure the death of the victim.
In fine then, the appellants are guilty only of homicide, punishable under Article
249 of the Revised Penal Code with reclusion temporal in its full range, which is
twelve (12) years and one (1) day to twenty (20) years. There being no
modifying circumstance attendant to the crime, the maximum of the
indeterminate penalty should be in its medium period.
The trial court awarded moral damages to the heirs of the victim, although the
prosecution failed to present any heir of the victim as witness. The trial court,
likewise, failed to award civil indemnity ex delicto to the heirs of the victim. The
decision of the trial court shall, thus, be modified accordingly.
People v. Tuniaco, GR 185710 (2010)
FACTS: The city prosecutor of General Santos City charged the accused
Romulo Tuniaco, Jeffrey Datulayta, and Alex Aleman with murder before the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of General Santos City in Criminal Case 8370. Based

on the findings of the RTC, in the morning of June 13, 1992 some police officers
from the Lagao Police Sub-Station requested police officer Jaime Tabucon of the
Central Police Station of General Santos City homicide division to take the
statement of accused Alex Aleman regarding the slaying of a certain Dondon
Cortez. On his arrival at the sub-station, Tabucon noted the presence of Atty.
Ruperto Besinga, Jr. of the Public Attorneys Office (PAO) who was conversing
with those taken into custody for the offense. When queried if the suspects
would be willing to give their statements, Atty. Besinga said that they were. Some
other police officer first took the statement of accused Jeffrey Datulayta. Officer
Tabucon next took the statement of accused Aleman, whom he observed to be in
good physical shape. Before anything else, officer Tabucon informed accused
Aleman in Cebuano of his constitutional right to remain silent and to the
assistance of counsel of his own choice and asked him if he was willing to give a
statement. Aleman answered in the affirmative. When asked if he had any
complaint to make, Aleman said that he had none. When Aleman said that he
had no lawyer, Tabucon pointed to Atty. Besinga who claimed that he was
assisting all the suspects in the case. Tabucon warned Aleman that anything he
would say may be used against him later in court. Afterwards, the police officer
started taking down Alemans statement. Accused Aleman said that in the course
of a drinking bout with accused Datulayta and Tuniaco at around 9 p.m. on June
6, 1992, Dondon Cortez threatened to report his drinking companions illegal
activities to the police unless they gave him money for his forthcoming marriage.
According to Aleman, Datulayta and Tuniaco had already planned to kill Cortez
in Tupi, South Cotabato, for making the same threats and now they decided to
do it. They got Cortez drunk then led him out supposedly to get the money he
needed. The three accused brought Cortez to Apopong near the dump site and,
as they were walking, accused Aleman turned on Cortez and stabbed him on the
stomach. Accused Datulayta, on the other hand, drew out his single shot
homemade M16 pistol1 and shot Cortez on the head, causing him to fall.
Datulayta handed over the gun to Aleman who fired another shot on Cortezs
head. Accused Tuniaco used the same gun to pump some bullets into Cortezs
body. Then they covered him with rice husks. After taking down the statement,
Tabucon explained the substance of it to accused Aleman who then signed it in
the presence of Atty. Besinga. On June 15, 1992 the police brought Aleman to
the City Prosecutors Office where he swore to his statement before an assistant
city prosecutor. In the afternoon, accused Datulayta and Aleman led Tabucon,
the city prosecutor, and a police inspector, to the dump site where they left their
victims body. After some search, the group found a spot covered with burnt rice
husks and a partially burnt body of a man. About a foot from the body, they found
the shells of a 5.56 caliber gun and an armalite rifle. On being arraigned, all
three accused, assisted by Atty. Besinga, pleaded not guilty to the murder
charge. After the prosecution rested its case, accused Tuniaco filed a demurrer
to evidence which the Court granted, resulting in the dismissal of the case
against him. On being re-arraigned at his request, accused Datulayta pleaded
guilty to the lesser offense of Homicide. The trial court sentenced him to
imprisonment of six years and one day and to payP50,000.00 to the victims
family. For some reason, the trial court had Aleman subjected to psychiatric
examination at the Davao Mental Hospital. But, shortly after, the hospital sent
word that Aleman had escaped. He was later recaptured. When trial in the case

resumed, Alemans new PAO lawyer raised the defense of insanity. This
prompted the court to require the Provincial Jail Warden to issue a certification
regarding Alemans behavior and mental condition while in jail to determine if he
was fit to stand trial. The warden complied, stating that Aleman had been
observed to have good mental condition and did not commit any infraction while
in jail. Although the prosecution and defense stipulated that Atty. Besinga
assisted accused Aleman during the taking of his extrajudicial confession, the
latter, however, recanted what he said to the police during the trial. He testified
that sometime in 1992, some police officers took him from his aunts house in
Purok Palen, Labangal, General Santos City, and brought him to the Lagao
police station. He was there asked to admit having taken part in the murder of
Cortez. When he refused, they tortured him until he agreed to sign a document
admitting his part in the crime. Accused Aleman also testified that he could not
remember having been assisted by Atty. Besinga during the police investigation.
He even denied ever knowing the lawyer. Aleman further denied prior
association with accused Tuniaco and Datulayta. He said that he met them only
at the city jail where they were detained for the death of Cortez. On October 8,
2001 the RTC rendered judgment, finding accused Aleman guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime charged, and sentenced him to suffer the penalty
of reclusion perpetua. The court also ordered him to pay death indemnity
of P70,000.00 and moral damages of P50,000.00 to the heirs of Cortez. On
appeal to the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-HC 00311, the court
rendered judgment on January 21, 2008, affirming the decision of the RTC with
the modification that directed accused Aleman and Datulayta to indemnify the
heirs of Cortez, jointly and severally, in the amounts of P50,000.00 as civil
indemnity; P50,000.00 as moral damages; P25,000.00 as temperate damages;
and P25,000.00 as exemplary damages. Aleman appealed to this Court.
ISSUE: a) whether or not the prosecution was able to present evidence
of corpus delicti; and b) whether or not accused Alemans extrajudicial
confession
is
admissible
in
evidence.
HELD: 1. Corpus delicti has been defined as the body, foundation, or substance
of a crime. The evidence of a dead body with a gunshot wound on its back would
be evidence that murder has been committed.2 Corpus delicti has two elements:
(a) that a certain result has been established, for example, that a man has died
and (b) that some person is criminally responsible for it.3 The prosecution is
burdened to prove corpus delicti beyond reasonable doubt either by direct
evidence or by circumstantial or presumptive evidence.4The defense claims that
the prosecution failed to prove corpus delicti since it did not bother to present a
medical certificate identifying the remains found at the dump site and an autopsy
report showing such remains sustained gunshot and stab wounds that resulted
in death; and the shells of the guns used in killing the victim.But corpus
delicti need not be proved by an autopsy report of the dead victims body or even
by the testimony of the physician who examined such body.5 While such report
or testimony is useful for understanding the nature of the injuries the victim
suffered, they are not indispensable proof of such injuries or of the fact of
death.6 Nor is the presentation of the murder weapons also indispensable since
the physical existence of such weapons is not an element of the crime of

murder.7Here, the police authorities found the remains of Cortez at the place
pointed to by accused Aleman. That physical confirmation, coming after his
testimony of the gruesome murder, sufficiently establishes the corpus delicti of
the crime. Of course, that statement must be admissible in evidence.
2. There is no reason for it not to be. Confession to be admissible must be a)
voluntary; b) made with the assistance of a competent and independent counsel;
c) express; and d) in writing.8 These requirements were met here. A lawyer, not
working with or was not beholden to the police, Atty. Besinga, assisted accused
Aleman during the custodial investigation. Officer Tabucon testified that he saw
accused Aleman, before the taking of his statement, conversing with counsel at
the police station. Atty. Besinga did not dispute this claim. Aleman alleges torture
as the reason for the execution of the confession. The appellate court is correct
in ruling that such allegation is baseless. It is a settled rule that where the
defendant did not present evidence of compulsion, where he did not institute any
criminal or administrative action against his supposed intimidators, where no
physical evidence of violence was presented, all these will be considered as
indicating voluntariness.9 Here, although Aleman claimed that he bore torture
marks on his head, he never brought this to the attention of his counsel, his
relatives, or the prosecutor who administered his oath. Accused Aleman claims,
citing People v. Galit,10 that long questions followed by monosyllabic answers
do not satisfy the requirement that the accused is amply informed of his rights.
But this does not apply here. Tabucon testified that he spoke to Aleman clearly in
the language he knew. Aleman, joined by Atty. Besinga, even signed a
certification that the investigator sufficiently explained to him his constitutional
rights and that he was still willing to give his statement.
Further, Aleman asserts that he was lacking in education and so he did not fully
realize the consequences of a confession. But as the CA said, no law or
jurisprudence requires the police officer to ascertain the educational attainment
of the accused. All that is needed is an effective communication between the
interrogator and the suspect to the end that the latter is able to understand his
rights.11 This appears to have been done in this case. Moreover, as the lower
court noted, it is improbable that the police fabricated Alemans confession and
just forced him to sign it. The confession has details that only the person who
committed the crime could have possibly known.12 What is more, accused
Datulaytas confession corroborate that of Aleman in important details. Under the
doctrine of interlocking confessions, such corroboration is circumstantial
evidence against the person implicated in it.13 The Court notes that, when it
modified the award of civil damages to the heirs of Cortez, the CA made both
accused Aleman and Datulayta, jointly and severally liable, for the damages as
modified. But the appeal by one or more of several accused cannot affect those
who did not appeal, except if the judgment of the appellate court is favorable and
applicable to them.14 Here accused Datulayta pleaded guilty to the lesser
offense of homicide and the trial court ordered him to pay only P50,000.00 in civil
indemnity to the heirs of Cortez. The CA erred in expanding that liability when he
did not appeal from his conviction.15
People v. Andan, GR 116437 (1997)

Facts: On 19 February 1994 at about 4:00 P.M., in Concepcion Subdivision,

Baliuag, Bulacan, Marianne Guevarra, 20 years of age and a second-year
student at the Fatima School of Nursing, left her home for her school dormitory
in Valenzuela, Metro Manila. She was to prepare for her final examinations on 21
February 1994. Marianne wore a striped blouse and faded denim pants and
brought with her two bags containing her school uniforms, some personal effects
and more than P2,000.00 in cash. Marianne was walking along the subdivision
when Pablito Andan y Hernandez invited her inside his house. He used the
pretext that the blood pressure of his wife's grandmother should be taken.
Marianne agreed to take her blood pressure as the old woman was her distant
relative. She did not know that nobody was inside the house. Andan then
punched her in the abdomen, brought her to the kitchen and raped her. His lust
sated, Andan dragged the unconscious girl to an old toilet at the back of the
house and left her there until dark. Night came and Andan pulled Marianne, who
was still unconscious, to their backyard. The yard had a pigpen bordered on one
side by a 6-foot high concrete fence. On the other side was a vacant lot. Andan
stood on a bench beside the pigpen and then lifted and draped the girl's body
over the fence to transfer it to the vacant lot. When the girl moved, he hit her
head with a piece of concrete block. He heard her moan and hit her again on the
face. After silence reigned, he pulled her body to the other side of the fence,
dragged it towards a shallow portion of the lot and abandoned it. At 11:00 a.m. of
the following day, the body of Marianne was discovered. She was naked from
the chest down with her brassiere and T-shirt pulled toward her neck. Nearby
was found a panty with a sanitary napkin. Marianne's gruesome death drew
public attention and prompted Mayor Cornelio Trinidad of Baliuag to form a crack
team of police officers to look for the criminal. Searching the place where
Marianne's body was found, the policemen recovered a broken piece of concrete
block stained with what appeared to be blood. They also found a pair of denim
pants and a pair of shoes which were identified as Marianne's. Andan's nearby
house was also searched by the police who found bloodstains on the wall of the
pigpen in the backyard. They interviewed the occupants of the house and
learned from Romano Calma, the stepbrother of Andan's wife, that Andan also
lived there but that he, his wife and son left without a word. Calma surrendered
to the police several articles consisting of pornographic pictures, a pair of wet
short pants with some reddish brown stain, a towel also with the stain, and a wet
T-shirt. The clothes were found in the laundry hamper inside the house and
allegedly belonged to Andan. The police tried to locate Andan and learned that
his parents live in Barangay Tangos, Baliuag, Bulacan. On February 24 at 11:00
P.M., a police team led by Mayor Trinidad traced Andan in his parents' house.
They took him aboard the patrol jeep and brought him to the police headquarters
where he was interrogated. Initially, Andan denied any knowledge of Marianne's
death. However, when the police confronted him with the concrete block, the
victim's clothes and the bloodstains found in the pigpen, Andan relented and said
that his neighbors, Gilbert Larin and Reynaldo Dizon, killed Marianne and that he
was merely a lookout. He also said that he knew where Larin and Dizon hid the
two bags of Marianne. Immediately, the police took Andan to his house. Larin
and Dizon, who were rounded up earlier, were likewise brought there by the
police. Andan went to an old toilet at the back of the house, leaned over a flower
pot and retrieved from a canal under the pot, two bags which were later

identified as belonging to Marianne. Thereafter, photographs were taken of

Andan and the two other suspects holding the bags. By this time, people and
media representatives were already gathered at the police headquarters
awaiting the results of the investigation. Mayor Trinidad arrived and proceeded to
the investigation room. Upon seeing the mayor, Andan approached him and
whispered a request that they talk privately. The mayor led Andan to the office of
the Chief of Police and there, Andan broke down and said "Mayor, patawarin mo
ako! I will tell you the truth. I am the one who killed Marianne." The mayor
opened the door of the room to let the public and media representatives witness
the confession. The mayor first asked for a lawyer to assist Andan but since no
lawyer was available he ordered the proceedings photographed and videotaped.
In the presence of the mayor, the police, representatives of the media and
Andan's own wife and son, Andan confessed his guilt. He disclosed how he
killed Marianne and volunteered to show them the place where he hid her bags.
He asked for forgiveness from Larin and Dizon whom he falsely implicated
saying he did it because of ill-feelings against them. He also said that the devil
entered his mind because of the pornographic magazines and tabloid he read
almost everyday. After his confession, Andan hugged his wife and son and asked
the mayor to help him. His confession was captured on videotape and covered
by the media nationwide. Andan was detained at the police headquarters. The
next two days, February 26 and 27, more newspaper, radio and television
reporters came. Andan was again interviewed and he affirmed his confession to
the mayor and reenacted the crime. Pablito Andan y Hernandez alias "Bobby"
was charged with rape with homicide. On arraignment, however, Andan entered
a plea of "not guilty." In a decision dated 4 August 1994, the trial court convicted
Andan and sentenced him to death pursuant to Republic Act 7659. The trial court
also ordered Andan to pay the victim's heirs P50,000.00 as death indemnity,
P71,000.00 as actual burial expenses and P100,000.00 as moral damages.
Hence, the automatic review.
Issue: Whether Andans confession to the police, the mayor, and the newsmen
may be admitted as evidence against Andan.
Held: Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have
the right (1) to remain silent; (2) to have competent and independent counsel
preferably of his own choice; and (3) to be informed of such rights. These rights
cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel. Any
confession or admission obtained in violation of this provision is inadmissible in
evidence against him. The exclusionary rule is premised on the presumption that
the defendant is thrust into an unfamiliar atmosphere and runs through
menacing police interrogation procedures where the potentiality for compulsion,
physical and psychological, is forcefully apparent. The incommunicado character
of custodial interrogation or investigation also obscures a later judicial
determination of what really transpired. When the police arrested Andan, they
were no longer engaged in a general inquiry about the death of Marianne.
Indeed, Andan was already a prime suspect even before the police found him at
his parents' house. Andan was already under custodial investigation when he
confessed to the police. It is admitted that the police failed to inform appellant of
his constitutional rights when he was investigated and interrogated. His

confession is therefore inadmissible in evidence. So too were the two bags

recovered from Andan's house. The victim's bags were the fruits of Andan's
uncounselled confession to the police. They are tainted evidence, hence also
inadmissible. On the other hand, however, Andan's confession to the mayor was
not made in response to any interrogation by the latter. In fact, the mayor did not
question Andan at all. No police authority ordered Andan to talk to the mayor. It
was Andan himself who spontaneously, freely and voluntarily sought the mayor
for a private meeting. The mayor did not know that Andan was going to confess
his guilt to him. When Andan talked with the mayor as a confidant and not as a
law enforcement officer, his uncounselled confession to him did not violate his
constitutional rights. Andan's confessions to the media were properly admitted.
The confessions were made in response to questions by news reporters, not by
the police or any other investigating officer. Statements spontaneously made by
a suspect to news reporters on a televised interview are deemed voluntary and
are admissible in evidence. The records show that Alex Marcelino, a television
reporter for "Eye to Eye" on Channel 7, interviewed Andan on 27 February 1994.
The interview was recorded on video and showed that Andan made his
confession willingly, openly and publicly in the presence of his wife, child and
other relatives. Orlan Mauricio, a reporter for "Tell the People" on Channel 9 also
interviewed appellant on 25 February 1994. Andan's confessions to the news
reporters were given free from any undue influence from the police authorities.
The news reporters acted as news reporters when they interviewed Andan. They
were not acting under the direction and control of the police. They were there to
check Andan's confession to the mayor. They did not force Andan to grant them
an interview and reenact the commission of the crime. In fact, they asked his
permission before interviewing him. They interviewed him on separate days not
once did Andan protest his innocence. Instead, he repeatedly confessed his guilt
to them. He even supplied all the details in the commission of the crime, and
consented to its reenactment. All his confessions to the news reporters were
witnessed by his family and other relatives. There was no coercive atmosphere
in the interview of Andan by the news reporters. Thus, Andan's verbal
confessions to the newsmen are not covered by Section 12 (1) and (3) of Article
III of the Constitution. The Bill of Rights does not concern itself with the relation
between a private individual and another individual. It governs the relationship
between the individual and the State. The prohibitions therein are primarily
addressed to the State and its agents. They confirm that certain rights of the
individual exist without need of any governmental grant, rights that may not be
taken away by government, rights that government has the duty to protect.
Governmental power is not unlimited and the Bill of Rights lays down these
limitations to protect the individual against aggression and unwarranted
interference by any department of government and its agencies.
ADDITIONAL:
Dra. dela Llana v. Biong, GR182356, Dec. 4, 2013 (opinion of ordinary witness);
FACTS: On March 30, 2000, Juan dela Llana was driving a car along North
Avenue, Quezon City. His sister, Dra. dela Llana, was seated at the front
passenger seat while a certain Calimlim was at the backseat. Juan stopped the
when the signal light turned red. A few seconds after the car halted, a dump
truck owned by Rebecca Biong and driven by Joel Primero containing gravel and

sand suddenly rammed the car's rear end, violently pushing the car forward. Due
to the impact, the car's rear end collapsed and its rear windshield was shattered.
Glass splinters flew, puncturing Dra. dela Llana. Apart from these minor wounds,
Dra. dela Llana did not appear to have suffered from any other visible physical
injuries. In the first week of May 2000, Dra. dela Llana began to feel mild to
moderate pain on the left side of her neck and shoulder. The pain became more
intense as days passed by. Her injury became more severe. Her health
deteriorated to the extent that she could no longer move her left arm. On June 9,
2000, she consulted with Dr. Rosalinda Milla, a rehabilitation medicine specialist,
to examine her condition. Dr. Milla told her that she suffered from a whiplash
injury, an injury caused by the compression of the nerve running to her left arm
and hand. Dr. Milla required her to undergo physical therapy to alleviate her
condition. Dra. dela Llana's condition did not improve despite three months of
extensive physical therapy. She then consulted other doctors in search for a
cure. Dr. Flores, a neuro-surgeon, finally suggested that she undergo a cervical
spine surgery to release the compression of her nerve. On October 19, 2000, Dr.
Flores operated on her spine and neck, between the C5 and the C6 vertebrae.
The operation released the impingement of the nerve, but incapacitated Dra.
dela Llana from the practice of her profession since June 2000 despite the
surgery. Dra. dela Llana, on October 16, 2000, demanded from Rebecca
compensation for her injuries, but Rebecca refused to pay. Thus, on May 8,
2001, Dra. dela Llana sued Rebecca for damages before the Regional Trial
Court of Quezon City (RTC). She alleged that she lost the mobility of her arm as
a result of the vehicular accident and claimed P150,000.00 for her medical
expenses (as of the filing of the complaint) and an average monthly income of
P30,000.00 since June 2000. She further prayed for actual, moral, and
exemplary damages as well as attorney's fees. At the trial, Dra. dela Llana
presented herself as an ordinary witness and Joel as a hostile witness. Dra. Dela
Llana reiterated that she lost the mobility of her arm because of the vehicular
accident. To prove her claim, she identified and authenticated a medical
certificate dated November 20, 2000 issued by Dr. Milla. The medical certificate
stated that Dra. dela Llana suffered from a whiplash injury. It also chronicled her
clinical history and physical examinations. Meanwhile, Joel testified that his truck
hit the car because the truck's brakes got stuck. In defense, Rebecca testified
that Dra. dela Llana was physically fit and strong when they met several days
after the vehicular accident. She also asserted that she observed the diligence of
a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of Joel. The RTC ruled
in favor of Dra. dela Llana and held that the proximate cause of Dra. dela Llana's
whiplash injury to be Joel's reckless driving. The CA reversed the RTC ruling.
ISSUES:
1. Who has the burden of proving the proximate causation between Joel's
negligence and Dra. dela Llana's whiplash injury?
2. WON the medical certificate has no probative value for being hearsay.
3. WON Dra. dela Llana's medical opinion cannot be given probative value for
the reason that she was not presented as an expert witness.
4. WON the Supreme Court cannot take judicial notice that vehicular accidents
cause whiplash injuries.

HELD:
1. In civil cases, a party who alleges a fact has the burden of proving it. He who
alleges has the burden of proving his allegation by preponderance of evidence
or greater weight of credible evidence. The reason for this rule is that bare
allegations, unsubstantiated by evidence, are not equivalent to proof. In short,
mere allegations are not evidence. In the present case, the burden of proving the
proximate causation between Joel's negligence and Dra. dela Llana's whiplash
injury rests on Dra. dela Llana. She must establish by preponderance of
evidence that Joel's negligence, in its natural and continuous sequence,
unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produced her whiplash injury, and
without which her whiplash injury would not have occurred.
2. The medical certificate has no probative value for being hearsay. It is a basic
rule that evidence, whether oral or documentary, is hearsay if its probative value
is not based on the personal knowledge of the witness but on the knowledge of
another person who is not on the witness stand. Hearsay evidence, whether
objected to or not, cannot be given credence except in very unusual
circumstance that is not found in the present case. Furthermore, admissibility of
evidence should not be equated with weight of evidence. The admissibility of
evidence depends on its relevance and competence, while the weight of
evidence pertains to evidence already admitted and its tendency to convince and
persuade. Thus, a particular item of evidence may be admissible, but its
evidentiary weight depends on judicial evaluation within the guidelines provided
by the Rules of Court.
3. Under the Rules of Court, there is a substantial difference between an
ordinary witness and an expert witness. The opinion of an ordinary witness may
be received in evidence regarding: (a) the identity of a person about whom he
has adequate knowledge; (b) a handwriting with which he has sufficient
familiarity; and (c) the mental sanity of a person with whom he is sufficiently
acquainted. Furthermore, the witness may also testify on his impressions of the
emotion, behavior, condition or appearance of a person. On the other hand, the
opinion of an expert witness may be received in evidence on a matter requiring
special knowledge, skill, experience or training which he shown to possess.
However, courts do not immediately accord probative value to an admitted
expert testimony, much less to an unobjected ordinary testimony respecting
special knowledge. The reason is that the probative value of an expert testimony
does not lie in a simple exposition of the expert's opinion. Rather, its weight lies
in the assistance that the expert witness may afford the courts by demonstrating
the facts which serve as a basis for his opinion and the reasons on which the
logic of his conclusions is founded. In the present case, Dra. dela Llana's
medical opinion cannot be given probative value for the reason that she was not
presented as an expert witness. As an ordinary witness, she was not competent
to testify on the nature, and the cause and effects of whiplash injury.
Furthermore, we emphasize that Dra. dela Llana, during trial, nonetheless did
not provide a medical explanation on the nature as well as the cause and effects
of whiplash injury in her testimony.
4. Indeed, a perusal of the pieces of evidence presented by the parties before
the trial court shows that Dra. dela Llana did not present any testimonial or
documentary evidence that directly shows the causal relation between the
vehicular accident and Dra. dela Llana's injury. Her claim that Joel's negligence

caused her whiplash injury was not established because of the deficiency of the
presented evidence during trial. We point out in this respect that courts cannot
take judicial notice that vehicular accidents cause whiplash injuries. This
proposition is not public knowledge, or is capable of unquestionable
demonstration, or ought to be known to judges because of their judicial
functions. We have no expertise in the field of medicine. Justices and judges are
only tasked to apply and interpret the law on the basis of the parties' pieces of
evidence and their corresponding legal arguments. In sum, Dra. dela Llana
miserably failed to establish her case by preponderance of evidence. While we
commiserate with her, our solemn duty to independently and impartially assess
the merits of the case binds us to rule against Dra. dela Llana's favor. Her claim,
unsupported by preponderance of evidence, is merely a bare assertion and has
no leg to stand on.
Hernandez v. San Juan-Santos, GR116470, August 7, 2009 (opinion of ordinary
witness);
FACTS: Maria Lourdes San Juan Hernandez (or Lulu) was born on February 14,
1947 to the spouses Felix Hernandez and Maria San Juan Hernandez.
Unfortunately, the latter died due to complications during childbirth. After Maria's
death, Felix left Lulu in the care of her maternal uncle, Sotero C. San Juan. On
December 16, 1951, Felix married Natividad Cruz. The union produced three
children, petitioners Cecilio C. Hernandez, Ma. Victoria C. Hernandez-Sagun
and Teresa C. Hernandez-Villa Abrille.
Meanwhile, as the only child of Maria and the sole testate heir of Sotero, Lulu
inherited valuable real properties from the San Juan family (conservatively
estimated atP50 million in 1997). Sometime in 1957, Lulu went to live with her
father and his new family. She was then 10 years old and studying at La
Consolacion College. However, due to her violent personality, Lulu stopped
schooling when she reached Grade 5. In 1968, upon reaching the age of
majority, Lulu was given full control of her estate.[3] Nevertheless, because Lulu
did not even finish her elementary education, Felix continued to exercise actual
administration of Lulus properties. Upon Felix's death in 1993, petitioners took
over the task of administering Lulu's properties. During the period of their
informal administration (from 1968 until 1993), Felix and petitioners undertook
various projects involving Lulus real properties. In 1974, Felix allegedly
purchased one of Lulus properties for an undisclosed amount to develop the
Marilou Subdivision.[4] In 1995, Ma. Victoria informed Lulu that her 11-hectare
Montalban, Rizal property[5] was under litigation. Thus, Lulu signed a special
power of attorney[6] (SPA) believing that she was authorizing Ma. Victoria to
appear in court on her behalf when she was in fact unknowingly authorizing her
half-sister to sell the said property to the Manila Electric Company
for P18,206,400.[7]Thereafter, Cecilio asked Lulu to authorize him to lease her
45-hectare property in Montalban, Rizal to Oxford Concrete Aggregates
for P58,500 per month so that she could have a car and driver at her disposal. In
September 1998, Lulu sought the assistance of her maternal first cousin,
respondent Jovita San Juan-Santos, after learning that petitioners had been
dissipating her estate. She confided to Jovita that she was made to live in the
basement of petitioners Montalban, Rizal home and was receiving a measly
daily allowance of P400 for her food and medication. Respondent was appalled

as Lulu was severely overweight, unkempt and smelled of urine. She later found
out that Lulu was occupying a cramped room lit by a single fluorescent lamp
without running water. Since she had not been given a proper toilet, Lulu
urinated and defecated in the garden. Due to Lulu's poor hygiene, respondent
brought her to several physicians for medical examination. Lulu was found to be
afflicted with tuberculosis, rheumatism and diabetes from which she was
suffering several complications.[8] Thereafter, the San Juan family demanded an
inventory and accounting of Lulus estate from petitioners.[9] However, the
demand was ignored. On October 2, 1998, respondent filed a petition for
guardianship[10] in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of San Mateo, Rizal, Branch
76. She alleged that Lulu was incapable of taking care of herself and managing
her estate because she was of weak mind.
Subsequently, petitioners moved to intervene in the proceedings to oppose the
same. Natividad denied that Marilou Subdivision belonged to Lulu. Since she
and her late husband were the registered owners of the said property, it was
allegedly part of their conjugal partnership. Cecilio, Teresa and Ma. Victoria, for
their part, claimed that the issue of Lulus competency had been settled in 1968
(upon her emancipation) when the court ordered her legal guardian and
maternal uncle, Ciriaco San Juan, to deliver the properties for her to manage.
They likewise asserted that Lulu was literate and, for that reason, aware of the
consequences of executing an SPA. Furthermore, whether or not Cecilio and
Ma. Victoria acted within the scope of their respective authorities could not be
determined in a guardianship proceeding, such matter being the proper subject
of an ordinary civil action. Petitioners also admitted that the property developed
into the Marilou Subdivision was among those parcels of land Lulu inherited from
the San Juan family. However, because the sale between Felix and Lulu had
taken place in 1974, questions regarding its legality were already barred by the
statute of limitations. Thus, its validity could no longer be impugned, or so they
claimed.
During the hearing, Lulu was presented and asked to testify on her genealogy
and experiences with the San Juan and Hernandez families. Lulu identified and
described her parents, stepmother, half-siblings and maternal relatives. She
claimed inheriting tracts of land from the San Juan family. However, these
properties were dissipated by the Hernandez family as they lived a luxurious
lifestyle. When asked to explain this allegation, Lulu said that her stepmother
and half-siblings rode in cars while she was made to ride a tricycle. Medical
specialists testified to explain the results of Lulus examinations which revealed
the alarming state of her health.[11] Not only was Lulu severely afflicted with
diabetes mellitus and suffering from its complications,[12] she also had an
existing artheroselorotic cardiovascular disease (which was aggravated by her
obesity). Furthermore, they unanimously opined that in view of Lulus intelligence
level (which was below average) and fragile mental state, she would not be able
to care for herself and self-administer her medications. In a decision dated
September 25, 2001,[13] the RTC concluded that, due to her weak physical and
mental condition, there was a need to appoint a legal guardian over the person
and property of Lulu. Thus, it declared Lulu an incompetent and appointed
respondent as guardian over the person and property of Lulu on a P1 million
bond. Petitioners moved for reconsideration asserting that the P1 million bond
was grossly insufficient to secure Lulus P50-million estate against fraudulent loss

or dissipation.[14] The motion, however, was denied.[15] On July 2, 2002,

petitioners appealed the September 25, 2001 decision of the RTC to the Court of
Appeals (CA).[16] The appeal was docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 75760. On
December 29, 2004, the CA issued a decision affirming the September 25, 2001
decision of the RTC (in the petition for guardianship) in toto.[17] It held that
respondent presented sufficient evidence to prove that Lulu, because of her
illnesses and low educational attainment, needed assistance in taking care of
herself and managing her affairs considering the extent of her estate. With
regard to the respondents appointment as the legal guardian, the CA found that,
since Lulu did not trust petitioners, none of them was qualified to be her legal
guardian. Because guardianship was a trust relationship, the RTC was bound to
appoint someone Lulu clearly trusted. Petitioners now assail the December 29,
2004 decision of the CA in this Court in a petition for review on certiorari
docketed as G.R. No. 166470.[18] Meanwhile, Lulu moved into 8 R. Santos St.,
Marikina City (Marikina apartment) and was provided with two housemaids
tasked to care for her. Sometime in November 2003, Lulu was abducted from
her Marikina apartment. Jovita immediately sought the assistance of the Police
Anti-Crime Emergency Response (PACER) division of the Philippine National
Police. The PACER subsequently discovered that petitioners were keeping Lulu
somewhere in Rodriguez, Rizal. Despite their initial hostility to the investigation,
Ma. Victoria and Cecilio subsequently contacted the PACER to inform them that
Lulu voluntarily left with Natividad because her guardian had allegedly been
maltreating her.[19] On December 15, 2003, respondent filed a petition
for habeas corpus[20] in the CA alleging that petitioners abducted Lulu and were
holding her captive in an undisclosed location in Rodriguez, Rizal. On April 26,
2005, the CA granted the petition for habeas corpus, ruling that Jovita, as her
legal guardian, was entitled to her custody. [21] Petitioners moved for the
reconsideration of the said decision but it was denied in a resolution dated July
12, 2005.[22] Aggrieved, they filed this petition for review on certiorari docketed
as G.R. No. 169217. This was consolidated with G.R. No. 166470.
Petitioners claim that the opinions of Lulu's attending physicians[23] regarding
her mental state were inadmissible in evidence as they were not experts in
psychiatry. Respondent therefore failed to prove that Lulu's illnesses rendered
her an incompetent. She should have been presumed to be of sound mind
and/or in full possession of her mental capacity. For this reason, Lulu should be
allowed to live with them since under Articles 194 to 196 of the Family Code,
[24] legitimate brothers and sisters, whether half-blood or full-blood are required
to support each other fully.
Respondent, on the other hand, reiterated her arguments before the courts a
quo. She disclosed that Lulu had been confined in Recovery.com, a
psychosocial rehabilitation center and convalescent home care facility in Quezon
City, since 2004 due to violent and destructive behavior. She also had delusions
of being physically and sexually abused by Boy Negro and imaginary pets she
called Michael and Madonna.[25] The November 21, 2005 medical
report[26] stated Lulu had unspecified mental retardation with psychosis but
claimed significant improvements in her behavior.

HELD: We find the petition to be without merit. Under Section 50, Rule 103 of
the Rules of Court, an ordinary witness may give his opinion on the mental
sanity of a person with whom he is sufficiently acquainted.[27] Lulu's attending
physicians spoke and interacted with her. Such occasions allowed them to
thoroughly observe her behavior and conclude that her intelligence level was
below average and her mental stage below normal. Their opinions were
admissible in evidence. Furthermore, where the sanity of a person is at issue,
expert opinion is not necessary.[28] The observations of the trial judge coupled
with evidence establishing the person's state of mental sanity will suffice.
[30] Here, the trial judge was given ample opportunity to observe Lulu personally
when she testified before the RTC. Under Section 2, Rule 92 of the Rules of
Court,[31] persons who, though of sound mind but by reason of age, disease,
weak mind or other similar causes are incapable of taking care of themselves
and their property without outside aid, are considered as incompetents who may
properly be placed under guardianship. The RTC and the CA both found that
Lulu was incapable of taking care of herself and her properties without outside
aid due to her ailments and weak mind. Thus, since determining whether or not
Lulu is in fact an incompetent would require a reexamination of the evidence
presented in the courts a quo, it undoubtedly involves questions of fact. As a
general rule, this Court only resolves questions of law in a petition for review. We
only take cognizance of questions of fact in exceptional circumstances, none of
which is present in this case.[32] We thus adopt the factual findings of the RTC
as affirmed by the CA. Similarly, we see no compelling reason to reverse the trial
and appellate courts finding as to the propriety of respondent's appointment as
the judicial guardian of Lulu.[33] We therefore affirm her appointment as such.
Consequently, respondent is tasked to care for and take full custody of Lulu, and
manage her estate as well.[34] Inasmuch as respondents appointment as the
judicial guardian of Lulu was proper, the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus in
her favor was also in order. A writ of habeas corpus extends to all cases of illegal
confinement or detention or by which the rightful custody of person is withheld
from the one entitled thereto.[35]Respondent, as the judicial guardian of Lulu,
was duty-bound to care for and protect her ward. For her to perform her
obligation, respondent must have custody of Lulu. Thus, she was entitled to a
writ of habeas corpus after she was unduly deprived of the custody of her ward.
[36] WHEREFORE, the petitions are hereby DENIED. Petitioners are
furthermore ordered to render to respondent, Lulus legal guardian, an accurate
and faithful accounting of all the properties and funds they unlawfully
appropriated for themselves from the estate of Maria Lourdes San Juan
Hernandez, within thirty (30) days from receipt of this decision. If warranted, the
proper complaints should also be filed against them for any criminal liability in
connection with the dissipation of Maria Lourdes San Juan Hernandezs estate
and her unlawful abduction from the custody of her legal guardian.
Agustin v. CA, GR162571, June 15, 2005 (expert opinion-Dr. C de Ungria);
FACTS: Respondents Fe Angela and her son Martin Prollamante sued Martins
alleged biological father, petitioner Arnel Agustin, for support and
support pendente lite before the Quezon City RTC. In their complaint,
respondents alleged that Arnel courted Fe, after which they entered into an
intimate relationship. Arnel supposedly impregnated Fe on her 34th birthday but

despite Arnels insistence on abortion, Fe decided to give birth to their child out
of wedlock, Martin. The babys birth certificate was purportedly signed by Arnel
as the father. Arnel shouldered the pre-natal and hospital expenses but later
refused Fes repeated requests for Martins support despite his adequate
financial capacity and even suggested to have the child committed for adoption.
Arnel also denied having fathered the child. On January 2001, while Fe was
carrying five-month old Martin at the Capitol Hills Golf and Country Club parking
lot, Arnel sped off in his van, with the open car door hitting Fes leg. This incident
was reported to the police. Several months later, Fe was diagnosed with
leukemia and has, since then, been undergoing chemotherapy. Fe and Martin
then sued Arnel for support. Fe and Martin moved for the issuance of an order
directing all the parties to submit themselves to DNA paternity testing, which
Arnel opposed by invoking his constitutional right against self-incrimination and
moving to dismiss the complaint for lack of cause of action. The trial court denied
the MTD and ordered the parties to submit themselves to DNA paternity testing
at the expense of the applicants. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court,
thus this petition. Petitioner refuses to recognize Martin as his own child and
denies the genuineness and authenticity of the childs birth certificate which he
purportedly signed as the father. He also claims that the order and resolution of
the trial court, as affirmed by the Court of Appeals, effectively converted the
complaint for support to a petition for recognition, which is supposedly
proscribed by law. According to petitioner, Martin, as an unrecognized child, has
no right to ask for support and must first establish his filiation in a separate suit
under Article 283 in relation to Article 265 of the Civil Code and Section 1, Rule
105 of the Rules of Court.
ISSUES: W/N the court erred in directing parties to subject to DNA paternity
testing and was a form of unreasonable search?
HELD: In People v. Yatar,[27] we affirmed the conviction of the accused for rape
with homicide, the principal evidence for which included DNA test results. We did
a lengthy discussion of DNA, the process of DNA testing and the reasons for its
admissibility in the context of our own Rules of Evidence: Deoxyribonucleic Acid,
or DNA, is a molecule that encodes the genetic information in all living
organisms. A persons DNA is the same in each cell and it does not change
throughout a persons lifetime; the DNA in a persons blood is the same as the
DNA found in his saliva, sweat, bone, the root and shaft of hair, earwax, mucus,
urine, skin tissue, and vaginal and rectal cells. Most importantly, because of
polymorphisms in human genetic structure, no two individuals have the same
DNA, with the notable exception of identical twins.
xxx xxx xxx
In assessing the probative value of DNA evidence, courts should consider, inter
alia, the following factors: how the samples were collected, how they were
handled, the possibility of contamination of the samples, the procedure followed
in analyzing the samples, whether proper standards and procedures were
followed in conducting the tests, and the qualification of the analyst who
conducted the tests.
In the case at bar, Dr. Maria Corazon Abogado de Ungria was duly qualified by
the prosecution as an expert witness on DNA print or identification techniques.

Based on Dr. de Ungrias testimony, it was determined that the gene type and
DNA profile of appellant are identical to that of the extracts subject of
examination. The blood sample taken from the appellant showed that he was of
the following gene types: vWA 15/19, TH01 7/8, DHFRP29/10 and CSF1PO
10/11, which are identical with semen taken from the victims vaginal canal.
Verily, a DNA match exists between the semen found in the victim and the blood
sample given by the appellant in open court during the course of the trial.
Admittedly, we are just beginning to integrate these advances in science and
technology in the Philippine criminal justice system, so we must be cautious as
we traverse these relatively uncharted waters. Fortunately, we can benefit from
the wealth of persuasive jurisprudence that has developed in other jurisdictions.
Specifically, the prevailing doctrine in the U.S. has proven instructive.
In Daubert v. Merrell Dow (509 U.S. 579 (1993); 125 L. Ed. 2d 469) it was ruled
that pertinent evidence based on scientifically valid principles could be used as
long as it was relevant and reliable. Judges, under Daubert, were allowed
greater discretion over which testimony they would allow at trial, including the
introduction of new kinds of scientific techniques. DNA typing is one such novel
procedure.
Under Philippine law, evidence is relevant when it relates directly to a fact in
issue as to induce belief in its existence or non-existence. Applying
the Daubert test to the case at bar, the DNA evidence obtained through PCR
testing and utilizing STR analysis, and which was appreciated by the court a
quo is relevant and reliable since it is reasonably based on scientifically valid
principles of human genetics and molecular biology.
Significantly, we upheld the constitutionality of compulsory DNA testing and the
admissibility of the results thereof as evidence. In that case, DNA samples from
semen recovered from a rape victims vagina were used to positively identify the
accused Joel Kawit Yatar as the rapist. Yatar claimed that the compulsory
extraction of his blood sample for DNA testing, as well as the testing itself,
violated his right against self-incrimination, as embodied in both Sections 12 and
17 of Article III of the Constitution. We addressed this as follows: The contention
is untenable. The kernel of the right is not against all compulsion, but against
testimonial compulsion. The right against self-incrimination is simply against the
legal process of extracting from the lips of the accused an admission of guilt. It
does not apply where the evidence sought to be excluded is not an incrimination
but as part of object evidence.
Over the years, we have expressly excluded several kinds of object evidence
taken from the person of the accused from the realm of self-incrimination. These
include photographs,[28] hair,[29] and other bodily substances.[30] We have
also declared as constitutional several procedures performed on the accused
such as pregnancy tests for women accused of adultery,[31] expulsion of
morphine from ones mouth[32] and the tracing of ones foot to determine its
identity with bloody footprints.[33] In Jimenez v. Caizares,[34] we even
authorized the examination of a womans genitalia, in an action for annulment
filed by her husband, to verify his claim that she was impotent, her orifice being
too small for his penis. Some of these procedures were, to be sure, rather

invasive and involuntary, but all of them were constitutionally sound. DNA testing
and its results, per our ruling in Yatar,[35] are now similarly acceptable.
Nor does petitioners invocation of his right to privacy persuade us. In Ople v.
Torres,[36] where we struck down the proposed national computerized
identification system embodied in Administrative Order No. 308, we said: In no
uncertain terms, we also underscore that the right to privacy does not bar all
incursions into individual privacy. The right is not intended to stifle scientific and
technological advancements that enhance public service and the common
good... Intrusions into the right must be accompanied by proper safeguards that
enhance public service and the common good.
Historically, it has mostly been in the areas of legality of searches and seizures,
[37] and the infringement of privacy of communication[38] where the
constitutional right to privacy has been critically at issue. Petitioners case
involves neither and, as already stated, his argument that his right against selfincrimination is in jeopardy holds no water. His hollow invocation of his
constitutional rights elicits no sympathy here for the simple reason that they are
not in any way being violated. If, in a criminal case, an accused whose very life
is at stake can be compelled to submit to DNA testing, we see no reason why, in
this civil case, petitioner herein who does not face such dire consequences
cannot be ordered to do the same. DNA paternity testing first came to
prominence in the United States, where it yielded its first official results
sometime in 1985. In the decade that followed, DNA rapidly found widespread
general acceptance.[39] Several cases decided by various State Supreme
Courts reflect the total assimilation of DNA testing into their rules of procedure
and evidence. For too long, illegitimate children have been marginalized by
fathers who choose to deny their existence. The growing sophistication of DNA
testing technology finally provides a much needed equalizer for such ostracized
and abandoned progeny. We have long believed in the merits of DNA testing and
have repeatedly expressed as much in the past. This case comes at a perfect
time when DNA testing has finally evolved into a dependable and authoritative
form of evidence gathering. We therefore take this opportunity to forcefully
reiterate our stand that DNA testing is a valid means of determining paternity.
Civil Service Commission v. Belagan, GR132164, Oct. 19, 2004 (character
evidence-administrative case; relevance);
Nature:
petition
for
review
on
certiorari
of
CA
decision
Doctrine: When the credibility of a witness is sought to be impeached by proof of
his reputation, it is necessary that the reputation shown should be that which
existed before the occurrence of the circumstances out of which the litigation
arose,[1] or at the time of the trial and prior thereto, but not at a period remote
from the commencement of the suit.[2] This is because a person of derogatory
character
or
reputation
can
still
change
or
reform
himself.
FACTS:
-2 separate complaints for sexual harassment and various malfeasances were
filed
against
Dr.
Belagan,
the
Superintendent
of
DECS.

1st (MAGDALENAs): She was applying for a permit to operate a pre-school and
during the inspection of the pre-school, Belagan placed his arms around her
shoulders and kissed her cheeks. Magdalena kept mum about the incident but
when she followed up her application, Belagan replied, Mag-date muna tayo.
She only told her husband about the incident when he asked for the status of
their application. Belagan forwarded their application, with a recommendation for
the approval of the pre-school. When Magdalena found out that some DECS
employees were suing Belagan, she decided to complain to DECS secretary
Gloria.
Belagan
was
placed
under
suspension.
2nd (LIGAYA ANNAWI): She alleged in her complaint that on four separate
occasions, respondent touched her breasts, kissed her cheek, touched her
groins, embraced her from behind and pulled her close to him, his organ
pressing the lower part of her back. Ligaya also charged respondent with: (1)
delaying the payment of the teachers salaries; (2) failing to release the pay
differentials of substitute teachers; (3) willfully refusing to release the teachers
uniforms, proportionate allowances and productivity pay; and (4) failing to
constitute the Selection and Promotion Board, as required by the DECS rules
and
regulations.
DECS joint investigation: Belagan denied sexual harassment accusations.
Presented
evidence
against
admin
acts.
*DECS Sec: GUILTY of 4 counts of sexual indignities or harassments
committed against Ligaya; and two (2) counts of sexual advances or indignities
against Magdalena; DISMISSED from service. Absolved of admin malfeasance
and
dereliction
of
duty.
Appealed
to
CSC
*CSC: affirm DECS Sec BUT dismissed complaint of Ligaya. Transgression
against Magdalena constitutes grave misconduct. MR (raised that he has never
been charged of any offense in his 37 years of service while Magdalena was
charged with 22 offenses before MTC Baguio and 23 complaints before brgy
captains of Brgy Silang and Hillside in Baguio. (in general, these charges
concern grave threats or slander) STILL DENIED. Appealed before CA.
*CA: dismissed Magdalenas complaint, reversed CSC Resolutions.
Why? Magdalena is an unreliable witness, her character being questionable.
Given her aggressiveness and propensity for trouble, she is not one whom any
male
would
attempt
to
steal
a
kiss.
ISSUE:

WON

complaining

witness,

Magdalena

Gapuz,

is

credible

HELD
Preliminary
matters:
GR: Factual findings of the Court of Appeals, if supported by substantial
evidence, are conclusive and binding on the parties and are not reviewable by
this Court. This Court is, after all, not a trier of facts.
X: when the findings of the Court of Appeals are contrary to those of the trial
court
or
a
quasi-judicial
body,
like
petitioner
herein.
Rules on character evidence (R130.51.a.3): the provision pertains only to
criminal cases, not to administrative offenses. Even if it is applicable to admin
cases, only character evidence that would establish the probability or
improbability of the offense charged may be proved. Character evidence must be

limited to the traits and characteristics involved in the type of offense charged.
>>>IN THIS CASE: no evidence bearing on Magdalenas chastity. What were
presented were charges for grave oral defamation, grave threats, unjust
vexation, physical injuries, malicious mischief, etc. filed against her.
Rules of evidence for establishing lack of credibility of the witness: Credibility
means the disposition and intention to tell the truth in the testimony given. It
refers to a persons integrity, and to the fact that he is worthy of belief. A witness
may be discredited by evidence attacking his general reputation for truth,
honesty,
or
integrity.
SEC. 11. Impeachment of adverse partys witness. A witness may be
impeached by the party against whom he was called, by contradictory evidence,
by evidence that his general reputation for truth, honesty, or integrity is bad, or
by evidence that he has made at other times statements inconsistent with his
present testimony, but not by evidence of particular wrongful acts, except that it
may be shown by the examination of the witness, or the record of the judgment,
that
he
has
been
convicted
of
an
offense.
>>>Magdalena testified so shes considered a witness. Her character/reputation
is
a
proper
subject
of
inquiry.
HOWEVER
(1) the charges and complaints happened way back in the 70s and 80s while the
act complained of happened in 1994, thus, the said charges are no longer
reliable
proofs
of
Magdalenas
character
or
reputation.
*evidence of ones character or reputation must be confined to a time not too
remote from the time in question. In other words, what is to be determined is the
character or reputation of the person at the time of the trial and prior thereto, but
not at a period remote from the commencement of the suit.
It is unfair to presume that a person who has wandered from the path of moral
righteousness can never retrace his steps again. Certainly, every person is
capable
to
change
or
reform.
(2)
no
evidence
of
conviction
of
the
offenses
charged.
The general rule prevailing in a great majority of jurisdictions is that it is not
permissible to show that a witness has been arrested or that he has been
charged with or prosecuted for a criminal offense, or confined in jail for the
purpose of impairing his credibility. This view has usually been based upon one
or more of the following grounds or theories: (a) that a mere unproven charge
against the witness does not logically tend to affect his credibility, (b) that
innocent persons are often arrested or accused of a crime, (c) that one accused
of a crime is presumed to be innocent until his guilt is legally established, and (d)
that a witness may not be impeached or discredited by evidence of particular
acts of misconduct. Significantly, the same Section 11, Rule 132 of our Revised
Rules on Evidence provides that a witness may not be impeached by evidence
of particular wrongful acts. Such evidence is rejected because of the confusion
of issues and the waste of time that would be involved, and because the witness
may not be prepared to expose the falsity of such wrongful acts. As it happened
in this case, Magdalena was not able to explain or rebut each of the charges
against
her
listed
by
respondent.
(3) CSC resolution was supported by substantial evidence. Magdalenas
testimony was given weight by CSC plus corroborated by affidavit of Ngabit re:
complaint
by
Magdalena.

ON ALLEGED MOTIVE (TO PRESSURE BELAGAN TO ISSUE PERMIT): none.

Permit
was
already
issued
when
complaint
was
filed.
ON
Penalty:
*Misconduct: intentional wrongdoing or deliberate violation of a rule of law or
standard of behavior, especially by a government official. To constitute an
administrative offense, misconduct should relate to or be connected with the
performance of the official functions and duties of a public officer.
>grave misconduct: the elements of corruption, clear intent to violate the law or
flagrant
disregard
of
established
rule,
must
be
manifest.
>>Corruption as an element of grave misconduct consists in the act of an official
or fiduciary person who unlawfully and wrongfully uses his station or character to
procure some benefit for himself or for another person, contrary to duty and the
rights
of
others.
>>> This is apparently present in respondents case as it concerns not only a
stolen kiss but also a demand for a date, an unlawful consideration for the
issuance of a permit to operate a pre-school. Respondents act clearly
constitutes
grave
misconduct,
punishable
by
dismissal.
***SC Considered length of service (37 years) + analogous cases: suspension
for
1
year
w/o
pay
Disposition:

Granted.

Affirm

CSC

resolution.

Suspend

Belagan.

People v. Noel Lee, GR139070, May 29, 2002 (character evidence of victim,
criminal
case);
FACTS: Joseph Marquez and his mother, Herminia, were in the living room
watching television when suddenly, Noel Lee shot Joseph twice through their
living room window. This was all witnessed by Herminia who eventually dragged
her sons body and shouted for help. Joseph was brought to the hospital but
expired thereat. Noel Lee is a well-known figure in their neighborhood and has
several criminal cases pending against him in Caloocan City. He was charged
with frustrated homicide in 1984 and attempted murder in 1989. He has known
Joseph since childhood and their houses are only two blocks apart. Joseph had
a bad reputation in their neighborhood as a thief and drug addict. Six days
before his death, on September 23, 1996, accused-appellant caught Joseph
inside his car trying to steal his car stereo. Joseph scampered away. As proof of
the victims bad reputation, Noel presented a letter handwritten by his mother,
Herminia, addressed to Mayor Reynaldo Malonzo of Caloocan City, and sent
through PO3 Willy Tuazon and his wife, Baby Ruth. In the letter, Herminia was
surrendering her son to the Mayor for rehabilitation because he was hooked on
shabu, a prohibited drug, and was a thief. Herminia was scared that eventually
Joseph might not just steal but kill her and everyone in their household because
of his drug habit. The accused-appellant likewise explained the two criminal
cases filed against him in 1984 and 1989. The information for attempted murder
was dismissed as a result of the victims desistance while in the frustrated
homicide case, the real assailant appeared and admitted his crime.

ISSUE: Whether or not the pieces of evidence Noel Lee presented are
admissible in evidence.
RULING: Character evidence is governed by Section 51, Rule 130 of the
Revised Rules on Evidence, viz:
Section 51. Character evidence not generally admissible; exceptions:
(a) In Criminal Cases:
(1) The accused may prove his good moral character which is pertinent to the
moral trait involved in the offense charged.
(2) Unless in rebuttal, the prosecution may not prove his bad moral character
which is pertinent to the moral trait involved in the offense charged.
(3) The good or bad moral character of the offended party may be proved if it
tends to establish in any reasonable degree the probability or improbability of the
offense charged.
In the instant case, proof of the bad moral character of the victim is irrelevant to
determine the probability or improbability of his killing. Accused-appellant has
not alleged that the victim was the aggressor or that the killing was made in selfdefense. There is no connection between the deceaseds drug addiction and
thievery with his violent death in the hands of accused-appellant. In light of the
positive eyewitness testimony, the claim that because of the victims bad
character he could have been killed by any one of those from whom he had
stolen, is pure and simple speculation.
Moreover, proof of the victims bad moral character is not necessary in cases of
murder committed with treachery and premeditation. In People v. Solimana
murder case, the defense tried to prove the violent, quarrelsome or provocative
character of the deceased. Upon objection of the prosecution, the trial court
disallowed the same. The Supreme Court held:
x x x While good or bad moral character may be availed of as an aid to
determine the probability or improbability of the commission of an offense
(Section 15, Rule 123), such is not necessary in the crime of murder where the
killing is committed through treachery or premeditation. The proof of such
character may only be allowed in homicide cases to show that it has produced a
reasonable belief of imminent danger in the mind of the accused and a justifiable
conviction that a prompt defensive action was necessary (Moran, Comments on
the Rules of Court, 1952 ed., Vol. 3, p. 126). This rule does not apply to cases of
murder.
In the case at bar, accused-appellant is charged with murder committed through
treachery and evident premeditation. The evidence shows that there was
treachery. Joseph was sitting in his living room watching television when
accused-appellant peeped through the window and, without any warning, shot
him twice in the head. There was no opportunity at all for the victim to defend
himself or retaliate against his attacker. The suddenness and unexpectedness of
the attack ensured his death without risk to the assailant. Following the ruling
in People v. Soliman, where the killing of the victim was attended by treachery,
proof of the victims bad character is not necessary. The presence of this
aggravating circumstance negates the necessity of proving the victims bad
character to establish the probability or improbability of the offense charged and,
at the same time, qualifies the killing of Joseph Marquez to murder.

People v. Concorcio, GR 121201-02, Oct. 19, 2001 (character evidence of

accused, criminal case);
FACTS: That on or about May 24, 1987, in the City of Davao, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-mentioned accused,
armed with a knife, conspiring, confederating together and helping one another,
with intent to kill, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with
treachery and evident premeditation, and during nighttime, suddenly attacked,
assaulted and stabbed one Jernie Sumagaysay and one Oscar Celis, with the
use of said bladed instrument, thereby afflicting [upon] the latter stabbed (sic)
wounds which directly caused his immediate death. Accused-appellants, Edwin
Yungot and Rommel Magpatoc were arrested on September, 19917 and
February, 1993,8 respectively. The two (2) other accused remained at large.
When arraigned on October 21, 1991, Yungot pleaded not guilty to both charges.
Immediately, a joint trial for the two counts of murder ensued against him. On the
other hand, subsequent to his arrest in 1993, Magpatoc also pleaded not guilty
to both charges upon his arraignment.9 An urgent motion for bail was filed by
Magpatoc on March 1, 1993. After the hearing10 on the said motion, the trial
court issued an Order dated June 16, 1993, denying the motion for bail.11 Since
the prosecution had already finished presenting its evidence-in-chief against
Yungot, and had rested its case against Yungot at the time of Magpatocs arrest,
Magpatoc was given a separate trial whereupon the prosecution presented its
evidence-in-chief against Magpatoc. After the prosecution rested its case against
Magpatoc, a joint trial was conducted for the defense, rebuttal and surrebuttal.
The prosecution presented the following witnesses against Yungot: Delilah Celis
Banderado, Sgt. Virgilio Jaranilla, Romeo Sumagaysay, SPO4 Leonor Sonza,
P/Cpl. Dionisio Erispe, Jonathan Abellana, Jose Lagamon, Jr. and Dr. Jose
Pagsaligan. The following witnesses testified against Magpatoc: Jose Oyson and
Jose Lagamon, Jr.,12 SPO4 Leonor Sonza, P/Cpl. Dionisio Erispe, Sgt. Virgilio
Jaranilla, Delilah Celis Banderado and Dr. Jose Pagsaligan. Notably, except for
Jose Oyson, the foregoing witnesses also testified against Yungot. On rebuttal,
the prosecution recalled witnesses Jose Oyson and Sgt. Virgilio Jaranilla, and in
addition, presented Ruth Dionson and Democrito Madiclum as witnesses. On
surrebuttal, Yungots defense counsel presented Lorna Surbito as a witness.
On the other hand, in his defense, Magpatoc presented Allen Ledesma, Noel
Cahiwat, Ysmael Cahiwat and himself as witnesses; while Yungot, along with
Bernardo Bajenteng and Leovigildo Bautista testified in court.
The prosecution adduced the following evidence against Yungot during his trial.
Prosecution witness Jose Lagamon, Jr. testified that he knew the deceased
Oscar Celis, who was his former classmate and the other deceased, Jernie
Sumagaysay,13 whom he had met at school. According to Lagamon, Jr., on May
24, 1987, he had a drinking spree with Oscar Celis, Jernie Sumagaysay and Ben
Hur Barol at the Davao Fiesta.14 Around 9 or 10 p.m.,15 after consuming four
(4) or five (5) bottles of beer, Lagamon, Jr. and his companions paid their bill and
proceeded home. While walking along Claveria St., Lagamon, Jr., who was
walking alongside Ben Hur Barol some five (5) to six (6) meters ahead of Oscar
Celis and Jernie Sumagaysay, heard a commotion at his back.16 He
immediately turned around and saw accused-appellant Edwin Yungot stab Oscar
Celis two (2) or three (3) times at the left side of his chest, while three (3) or four
(4) other persons were holding Celis.17 He also saw "another person" thrust a

knife at the right side of the chest of Jernie Sumagaysay while riding at the
latters back.18 He tried to assist his "friend" but the latters assailant threatened
to stab him as well.19 His companion, Ben Hur Barol did nothing because he
was in shock. In his estimation, about five (5) to six (6) persons were involved in
the stabbing incident, three (3) or four (4) of whom were armed.20 He was then
about a meter away from Celis and Sumagaysay. He further testified that the
place was well-lighted. After the incident, the assailants scampered away.
Lagamon, Jr. and Barol flagged down a jeepney and brought Celis to the Davao
Doctors Hospital.21 Lagamon, Jr. did not notice where Jernie Sumagaysay had
gone after the latter was stabbed. On cross-examination, he testified that he is a
member of the Philippine National Police (PNP) and that he joined the Philippine
Constabulary in 1988; but in 1987, when the stabbing incident occurred, he was
a "bet-taker."22 He insisted that he saw the assailants of Celis and Sumagaysay
because the place where the stabbing incident occurred was well-lighted with
fluorescent lamps.23 He could not remember what kind of knife was used by
Yungot in stabbing Celis but recalled that it was about six (6) to seven (7) inches
long.24 He was not summoned by the police authorities for an investigation;
neither did he report what he had witnessed to the police authorities.
Jonathan Abellana, who was serving sentence for murder,25 testified that on
May 24, 1987, at around 9 p.m., he was at a dance in Roxas St., in front of the
Holy Child School, and between Roxas and Claveria Sts., with Dodong Lanay,
Allen Ledesma, Jun-jun Oyson, Edwin Yungot and Omi Magpatoc.26 They
proceeded to Barrio Fiesta for a drinking spree upon the invitation of a certain
Jun. After the group consumed two (2) cases of beer, Abellana went back to the
dance. Later, the rest of the group27 also returned to the dance.
P/Cpl. Dionisio Erispe, a member of the Philippine National Police (PNP),
assigned at the Homicide and Arson Section of the San Pedro Patrol Station,
testified that on May 24, 1987, at around 12 midnight, he received information
regarding a stabbing incident which took place at Claveria St. Together with the
members of the Mobile Patrol, he went to the San Pedro Hospital and Davao
Doctors Hospital, where the stabbed victims were brought, and conducted an
investigation. From the said hospitals, they proceeded to the scene of the crimes
and continued with the investigation. Based on his investigation, P/Cpl. Erispe
learned that one (1) of the victims was stabbed near RCBC while the other victim
was able to run towards the Martinez Pawnshop. From the hospital records, he
was able to identify the stabbed victims as Oscar Celis and Jernie
Sumagaysay.28
SPO4 Leonor Sonza, of the Criminal Record Branch, Metrodiscom, PNP,
brought the Record of Events of the San Pedro Patrol Station, dated May 24,
1987,29 showing the entry of the stabbing incident involving Celis and
Sumagaysay.
Dr. Jose Pagsaligan, Medical Specialist II, Regional Health Office No. XI,
Department of Health (DOH), Davao City, performed the autopsy on the victims
cadavers on May 25, 1987 and issued Autopsy Report Nos. N-039-87 and N040-87, showing the following findings:
"Autopsy Report No. N-039-8730
"POSTMORTEM FINDINGS
" 1. STABBED WOUND 3.5 cm. long, gaping, running medially and slightly
upward, edges cleancut, sharp edge inferiorly, located in the left chest, 10 cm.

from the anterior median line, 4 cm. from the left nipple at the level of the 3rd
intercostal space, penetrating the skin and muscles and the heart through and
through.
" 2. Contusion-abrasion 3 cm. x 1.5 cm. in diameter below the right eye along
the outer canthus of the right eye, 7 cm. from the anterior median line and 6 cm.
from the right ear.
" 3. Contusion-abrasion 3 cm. x 1.5 cm. in diameter, slightly above the right
mandible, 2 cm. from the anterior median line and 10 cm. from the right ear.
"CAUSE OF DEATH: SHOCK SECONDARY TO SEVERE HEMORRHAGE DUE
TO STAB WOUND, CHEST, LEFT."31
"Autopsy Report No. N-040-8732
"POSTMORTEM FINDINGS
" 1. STABBED WOUND 1.5 cm. long, gaping, running medially downward,
edges cleancut, sharp edge inferiorly medially, located in the right side of the
chest, 4 cm. from the anterior median line, 12 cm. from the right nipple,
penetrating the skin and muscles in the 2nd intercostal space, right, cutting the
pulmonary artery.
"CAUSE OF DEATH: SHOCK SECONDARY TO SEVERE HEMORRHAGE DUE
TO STAB WOUND, CHEST, RIGHT."33
In Dr. Pagsaligans opinion, each stab wound which caused the death of Celis
and Sumagaysay was inflicted using a single-bladed weapon.34 He further
opined that the assailants might have used two (2) weapons.35
Delilah Celis Banderado, sister of Oscar Celis, presented the death certificate of
Celis36 and testified on the actual expenses amounting to P13,990.00, which
they incurred due to the death of Celis.37 She further testified that at the time of
his death, her brother was 24 years old and had just graduated from an
Electrical Engineering course at the University of Mindanao.38
Romeo Sumagaysay, father of Jernie Sumagaysay, proffered the death
certificate of Jernie,39 and testified that he incurred P12,000.00 as funeral and
burial expenses arising from the death of Jernie. He also testified that at the time
of Jernies death, Jernie was a second year college student at the University of
Mindanao.40
As pointed out earlier, after the prosecution rested its case against Yungot, the
other accused, Rommel Magpatoc was arrested and given a separate trial only
insofar as the presentation of the prosecutions evidence-in-chief against him. A
joint trial, however, was subsequently conducted for the defense of both
accused-appellants as well as for rebuttal and surrebuttal.
Subsequent to his arrest and arraignment, accused-appellant Rommel Magpatoc
filed a motion for bail dated March 1, 1993.41 At the hearing42 on the said
motion, the prosecution presented as witnesses, Jose Oyson and Jose
Lagamon, Jr. The defense, however, did not present any evidence.43
At the said hearing, Lagamon, Jr. claimed that he came to know Sumagaysay at
the Davao Fiesta where they started drinking at around 8 p.m., on May 24,
1987.44 He was with Celis, Sumagaysay and Ben Hur. He reiterated his
testimony at Yungots trial that they left Davao Fiesta between 9 and 10 p.m.;
and walked towards RCBC, with himself and Ben Hur about two (2) meters
ahead of Celis and Sumagaysay. Upon hearing footsteps behind them, he turned
around and saw Celis being stabbed.45 When asked by the trial judge if he
knew the person who stabbed Celis, Lagamon, Jr. answered that he "could not

recognize the person who stabbed Celis because it happened so

suddenly."46 But when asked by the prosecutor if he could identify the assailants
if he were to see them again, he answered, "I could recognize them by
face."47 He further recalled that about four (4) persons attacked his companions,
two (2) or three (3) of whom were armed with knives. He also declared that
Sumagaysay was stabbed in the same manner that Celis was stabbed, i.e., the
assailants left hand was placed on the victims shoulder, while the formers right
hand stabbed the victim.48 He admitted that he could not clearly recognize
Sumagaysays assailant because the incident happened suddenly;49 however,
he maintained that Magpatoc was one of those who killed his companions.50 On
cross-examination and upon query by the trial court, Lagamon, Jr. pointed to
Magpatoc as the person who stabbed Celis,51 contrary to his testimony during
Yungots trial that Yungot was the one who stabbed Celis. When asked if he
could recognize the person who attacked Sumagaysay if in court, he replied,
"[h]e is not here."52
The prosecution also presented Jose Oyson as a witness at the hearing on
Magpatocs motion for bail.53 Oyson testified that on May 24, 1987, at about
8:30 p.m., he was drinking at the Davao Fiesta in Claveria St., along with Jun
Concorcio, Jun Laos, Edwin Yungot, Omie Magpatoc,54 Allen Ledesma, Joe
Dalman alias Idi, Jun Suaner alias Siquio and Jose Dodong Cahiwat.55 He
recounted that Jun Concorcio pointed at the group of Celis, Sumagaysay and
two (2) others, who were laughing at him.56 Corsiga57 told them to "birahan" (to
do some harm to) Celis, Sumagaysay and the two (2) others.58 At about 10
p.m., when Celis, Sumagaysay and their two (2) companions left Barrio Fiesta,
Oysons group followed them.59 Celis, Sumagaysay and their two (2)
companions went towards Land Bank in Claveria St. Celis and Sumagaysay
were walking behind their two (2) companions. Edwin Yungot, Josel Ayala alias
Bobong Lanay60 and Omie Magpatoc rushed towards Celis and Sumagaysay.
Edwin Yungot stabbed Oscar Celis.61 Oyson could not ascertain who between
Magpatoc and Ayala actually stabbed Jernie Sumagaysay.62 Yungot, Ayala and
Magpatoc were armed with knives.63 One (1) of the stabbed victims fell on the
ground while the other victim was able to run away. Oyson was about seven (7)
meters away from the place where the stabbing incident occurred. The said
place was lighted with a fluorescent bulb. After the incident, Oyson and his
companions ran away and proceeded to the dance on Roxas Avenue.64 On
cross-examination, Oyson testified that the group which followed Celis,
Sumagaysay and their two (2) companions from Barrio Fiesta, included himself,
accused-appellants, Edwin Yungot and Omie Magpatoc, Joe Dalman, Allen
Ledesma, Josel Ayala, Jun Laos, Edic, Jun Suaner alias Siquio, and Dodong
Cahiwat.65 They were all members of the Looban Young Killer (LYK)
gang.66Oyson recalled that three (3) among his companions on the night of May
24, 1987, were armed with knives, namely, Yungot, Ayala and Magpatoc,
because "they were [walking] ahead" of the group.67 They followed Celis,
Sumagaysay and their two (2) companions in order to "do harm to them."68
As pointed earlier, the prosecution adopted the foregoing testimonies of Jose
Oyson and Jose Lagamon, Jr. during the hearing on Magpatocs motion for bail,
as part of its evidence-in-chief against Magpatoc. In addition to the foregoing
testimonies, the prosecution presented anew five (5) witnesses, namely, P/Cpl.
Dionisio Erispe, SPO4 Leonor Sonza, Sgt. Virgilio Jaranilla, Dr. Jose Pagsaligan

and Delilah Celis Banderado, whom it had earlier presented during Yungots trial.
These five (5) witnesses respective testimonies at Magpatocs trial were
substantially identical with their testimonies at Yungots trial.
At Magpatocs trial, P/Cpl. Dionisio Erispe further testified that while he was at
the Davao Doctors Hospital, he was able to talk with the two (2) companions of
the stabbed victim who was brought there. He identified these two (2)
companions as Ben Hur and Joe Lagamon.69 At the San Pedro Hospital,
hospital employees gave him two (2) identification cards of Jernie Sumagaysay
for safekeeping, which he subsequently turned over to the desk officer at the
station.70
Dr. Jose Pagsaligan, the medical specialist from the Regional Health Office No.
XI of the Department of Health (DOH), Davao City, who performed the autopsy
on the two victims cadavers on May 25, 1987, and issued Autopsy Report Nos.
N-039-87 and N-040-87, also testified that because of the trajectory of the
wound which Sumagaysay sustained, his assailant was most probably at his
back, holding the bladed weapon.71
Delilah Celis Banderado, sister of Oscar Celis, testified anew on the actual
expenses amounting to P13,990.00, which they incurred due to the death of
Celis.
With leave of court, accused-appellants, Yungot and Magpatoc filed their
respective Demurrers to Evidence,72which, however, were denied by the trial
court in an Order dated November 10, 1993.73
Subsequently, a joint trial was conducted for the presentation of evidence for the
defense. Rommel Magpatoc, in his defense, testified along with Allen Ledesma,
Noel Cahiwat and Ysmael Cahiwat; while Edwin Yungot, also in his defense,
presented Bernardo Bajenteng, Leovigildo Bautista and himself as witnesses.
According to accused-appellant Magpatoc, on May 24, 1987, at about 7:30-8:00
p.m., he went with his girlfriend to the dance held at the back of the Aldevinco
building.74 Together with three (3) others, namely, his girlfriend, Noel Cahiwag
and the latters friend, Magpatoc left the dance at around 11 p.m. and went
home.75 He denied having gone to Barrio Fiesta on that night.76
Allen Ledesma, a friend of Magpatoc, testified that on May 24, 1987, at 10 p.m.,
he was "inside the disco house" at Aldevinco Shopping Center with Magpatoc
and Dodong Abellana.77 At around 10:30 p.m., he went to the Davao Fiesta with
Dodong Abellana upon the latters invitation, leaving behind Rommel Magpatoc,
who stayed in the "disco house."78 Ledesma and Abellana joined six (6) others
at the Davao Fiesta. After consuming three (3) bottles of beer, Ledesma left
Davao Fiesta with a certain Anak,79 bought some cigarettes and went back to
the "disco house." Among the six (6) persons left behind at the Davao Fiesta
were Dodong Cahiwat, a certain Caloy and a certain Lanay.80 Jose Oyson was
later identified as one of the six (6) persons,81 whom Ledesma and Abellana
joined at the Davao Fiesta. Likewise, Edwin Yungot was at the Davao Fiesta
when they arrived there.82
Noel Cahiwat testified that on the night of May 24, 1987, he was at the dance
held behind the Aldevinco Shopping Center, with Rommel Magpatoc, Allen
Ledesma and several others. At about 9:30 p.m., a certain Jun Driver invited
them to drink at the Davao Fiesta. He went to the Davao Fiesta with Dodong
Siquio and another person whose name he could not remember.83 Rommel
Magpatoc and the others were left at the "disco house."84 At 10 p.m., Noel

Cahiwat left the Davao Fiesta with a companion and went back to the "dance
hall."85 At the "dance hall," Dodong Lanay told him that Jun Driver stabbed
somebody.86 On cross-examination, he admitted that in the evening of May 24,
1987, Jose Oyson was at the Barrio Fiesta with his group.
Ysmael Cahiwat, barangay captain of 33-B Poblacion, Davao City, testified to
prove the good moral character of accused-appellant Magpatoc. He stated that
Magpatoc had been active in community activities and had demonstrated
leadership in the youth activities for the "IKP" chapel. According to Cahiwat, at
the time of Magpatocs arrest, the latter was an elected Sangguniang
Kabataan member.
On the other hand, in his defense, Edwin Yungot testified that in the evening of
May 24, 1987, he operated the "radio phono" at the benefit dance held at the
back of the Aldevinco Center.87 He operated the said "radio phono," without
anybodys assistance, until the benefit dance ended at 1 a.m. of the following
day. He confirmed that Magpatoc was at the benefit dance and that Magpatoc
left when the dance ended at 1 a.m.88
Bernardo Bajenteng, a neighbor of Yungot and former president of the Pagasa Youth Movement, corroborated Yungots testimony that on May 24, 1987, he
(Yungot) operated the sound system from 8 p.m. until 1 a.m. of the following
day.89 However, according to Bajenteng, Yungot was assisted by the son of the
owner of the sound system. Furthermore, Bajenteng insisted, on crossexamination, that Yungot did not leave the benefit dance from 8 p.m. until 1 a.m.
of the following day, except at one instance, that is, at about 9 p.m., Yungot left,
but after five minutes, he returned back to the dance.90 Bajenteng acted as the
emcee at the dance.
Leovigildo Bautista,91 a youth organizer associated with the Department of
Social Welfare and Development (DSWD), issued a certification confirming that
Yungot was a bonafide member of the Pag-asa Youth Movement.
On rebuttal, the prosecution presented Jose Oyson, who refuted Yungots
testimony that he was the operator of the "phonograph system" used at the
benefit dance held on the night of May 24, 1987; and declared that it was Ruth
Dionson, granddaughter of the owner of the "phonograph system," who operated
the said system.92 Oyson further claimed that Yungot and Magpatoc were at the
Davao Fiesta in the evening of May 24, 1987.93 He maintained that he saw
Yungot, Magpatoc and Ayala stab Celis and Sumagaysay.94 On crossexamination, he asserted that at 7:30 p.m., on May 24, 1987, he left the dance
and went to the Davao Barrio Fiesta with accused-appellants, Edwin Yungot and
Rommel Magpatoc, Jossel Ayala, Jun Laos, Allen Ledesma, Jun Suaner, Edi
(Edic in footnote 65), Jose Dalman and Dodong Cajiwat.95 After three (3) hours,
all of them left the Barrio Fiesta, and returned to the dance after the stabbing
incident had occurred.96
Still on rebuttal, Ruth Dionson disputed Yungots testimony that he operated the
sound system at the benefit dance held on May 24, 1987, and claimed she
operated the said sound system with her aunt, Melanie Guinagao.97
The prosecution also recalled Sgt. Virgilio Jaranilla who testified that a week
after May 24, 1987, as investigator, he went to the house of Yungot but failed to
find Yungot.
On April 17, 1995, the trial court promulgated its joint decision dated March 28,
1995, finding both Yungot and Magpatoc guilty beyond reasonable doubt of

murder in both Criminal Cases Nos. 15,377-87 and 15,378-87, imposing upon
them two terms of reclusion perpetua, and the payment of actual, compensatory
and moral damages, and costs.
HELD: Accused-appellant Edwin Yungots arguments, in fine, revolve on the
matter of credibility of the prosecution witnesses. In particular, Yungot cites
several instances of inconsistencies in the testimony of prosecution witness Jose
Lagamon, Jr. For instance, on direct examination at Yungots trial, Lagamon, Jr.
claimed that Yungot stabbed Celis. However, during the hearing on Magpatocs
motion for bail at Magpatocs trial, Lagamon, Jr. asserted on both direct and
cross-examinations that he could not recognize the person who stabbed Celis
because the incident happened suddenly; but immediately thereafter, he
declared that he could recognize Celis assailants only by face,100 and in open
court pointed at accused-appellant Rommel Magpatoc as the person who
stabbed Celis.101Yungot argues that the "[s]aid inconsistencies in the testimony
of Jose Lagamon, Jr. should not have been overlooked by the trial court, for it
not only puts to doubt the identity of the assailant[s] in the crime[s] but likewise
casts doubt as to the credibility of the said witness, the very foundation of the
crime for which ... [he] stand[s] to lose his liberty."102
The argument is plainly unmeritorious. Well-settled to the point of being
elementary is the rule of procedure that in rendering its judgment, the court must
consider only such evidence, duly presented during the trial, for or against any
party to the action, and made the sole basis of the decision therein.103 Thus,
Lagamon, Jr.s testimony in the separate trial of Magpatoc cannot, at this stage,
be used by Yungot to exculpate himself. Under Section 1(f), Rule 115 of the
Rules of Court, "xxx xxx. [e]ither party may utilize as part of its evidence the
testimony of a witness who is deceased, out of, or cannot, with due diligence be
found in the Philippines, unavailable or otherwise unable to testify, given in
another case or proceeding, judicial or administrative, involving the same parties
and subject matter, the adverse party having had the opportunity to crossexamine him. Thus, the only instance when Lagamon, Jr.s testimony at the
separate trial of Magpatoc could have been utilized as part of Yungots evidence
was if the said witness was deceased, out of or cannot with due diligence be
found in the Philippines, unavailable or otherwise unable to testify, which was not
proved at all in this case. The trial court found Lagamon, Jr.s testimony to be
"clear, straightforward, convincing and rigning (sic) with sincerity." The above
findings of the trial court are fully supported by the records as shown by the
transcripts of Lagamon, Jr.
Even assuming arguendo that Lagamon, Jr.s testimony at Magpatocs trial could
be considered as part of Yungots evidence, we have previously ruled that
"[c]ourts are not bound to accept or reject the whole of the testimony of a
witness. They may believe one part and disbelieve the other part of the
testimony. If there are conflicts in the testimony which cannot be so reconciled as
to admit every witness swearing the truth, the Court adopts that testimony which
it believes to be true, taking into consideration the general character of the
witness, his manner and demeanor on the stand while testifying, the consistency
or inconsistency of his statements, their probability or improbability, his ability
and willingness to speak the truth, his intelligence and means of knowledge, his
motive to speak the truth or swear a falsehood."107 As it were, the trial court

aptly found the testimony of Lagamon, Jr. to be clear, straightforward, convincing

and ringing with sincerity. Nonetheless, even if we were to consider Lagamon,
Jr.s entire testimony as unreliable, unworthy of belief and undeserving of
credence because of some inconsistency in his testimony, particularly regarding
the identity of Celis assailant, Yungots active participation in the crimes charged
was positively asserted by another eyewitness for the prosecution, Jose Oyson.
In other words, Yungots conviction was based not only on Lagamon, Jr.s
testimony but also on the testimony of another eyewitness, Jose Oyson.
Furthermore, the following circumstances, duly established by the evidence for
the prosecution, which Yungots defense of alibi could not surmount, proved that
Yungot was one of those who participated in the killing of Celis and Sumagaysay
and is, therefore, guilty beyond reasonable doubt:
"1. Yungot was positively identified by his companions on the night of May 24,
1987, Jonathan Abellana and Jose Oyson, as one of those who were drinking
with them at the Davao Barrio Fiesta; and by Jose Lagamon, Jr. who was also
drinking at the Davao Barrio Fiesta with Celis and Sumagaysay.
2. Yungot and his companions left the Davao Barrio Fiesta after three hours.
3. Celis, Sumagaysay, Lagamon, Jr. and Barol left the Davao Barrio Fiesta and
walked towards Claveria St.
4. Yungot was one of the five or six persons involved in the stabbing incident,
three or four of whom were armed.
5. Celis and Sumagaysay each died of a stab wound inflicted using a singlebladed weapon.
6. Immediately after the commission of the crimes, Yungot and Magpatoc
resorted to flight.
7. Prosecution witnesses Jose Oyson, Jose Lagamon, Jr. and Jonathan
Abellana were not shown to have any cause to testify falsely against Yungot."
The inconsistencies between the testimony of Lagamon, Jr. and Jose Oysons
testimony, particularly, the manner how Celis and Sumagaysay were
attacked,109 and the number of persons involved in the stabbing incident,110 as
further pointed out by Yungot, are more apparent than real, if not altogether
immaterial and insignificant. Concededly, some inconsistencies may be noted;
they are, however, not so material and substantial as to affect the credibility of
the said witnesses; thus there is no compelling reason to disturb the findings of
the trial court in this regard.
We now tackle the issue of whether treachery and conspiracy attended the
commission of the crimes. Yungots allegation that the trial court erred in
appreciating the presence of treachery and conspiracy, is not supported by the
records. Indeed, the foregoing requisites were evidently present in the case at
bar. Accused-appellant Yungots attack, coming from behind, on the unarmed
Oscar Celis, was sudden, unprovoked, unexpected and deliberate. To ensure or
afford impunity, three (3) other persons were holding Celis while he was being
stabbed by Yungot. Clearly, under these circumstances, Celis was in no position
and without any means to defend himself. The attack was done in a manner
which directly and specially insured the execution of the act without any risk to
Yungot arising from the defense which Celis might have made. Thus, as
correctly held by the trial court, treachery was present in this case, qualifying the
crime to murder.

After a careful and thorough review of the evidence on record, particularly the
testimonies of the witnesses, the Court notes that these alleged inconsistencies
refer, at best, only to trivial, minor, and insignificant details and slight variations.
The alleged inconsistencies bear no materiality to the commission of the crimes
imputed against accused-appellants. As pointed out by the Solicitor General,
"xxx xxx. [t]hese [seeming] discrepancies may be attributed to the fact that the
witnesses were called to relate the incident almost five years after it transpired. It
is not unusual for a witness to a startling occurrence, not to vividly and exactly
remember minute details of the occurrence, such as [the] number and location of
the wounds inflicted on the victim[s] especially, when he was called to
testify only after a lapse of almost five years. xxx xxx."122 Trivial incongruities
within a testimony and between testimonies likewise do not impair the credibility
of the witness/witnesses. Minor lapses are to be expected when a person is
recounting details of a traumatic experience too painful to recall. In fact, the
discordance in the testimonies of witnesses on minor matters heightens their
credibility and shows that their testimonies were not coached or rehearsed,
especially where there is consistency in relating the principal occurrence and
positive identification of the assailant. Moreover, accused-appellant Magpatoc
bewails the supposed failure of prosecution witness Jose Lagamon, Jr. to
promptly report the crimes to the authorities; and assails the delay of prosecution
witness Jose Oyson in testifying before the trial court.
The contention is untenable.
This Court has already taken judicial notice of the actuality that witnesses in this
country are usually reluctant to volunteer information about a criminal case or
are unwilling to be involved in or dragged into criminal investigations.124 The
initial reluctance to volunteer information about a criminal case and/or the
unwillingness to be involved in a criminal investigation due to fear of reprisal are
common and have been judicially declared to have no effect on credibility.125
Finally, Magpatoc alleges that the trial court erred in disregarding evidence of his
good moral character. The allegation has no merit. In People vs.
Cerelegia,126 we ruled that "xxx xxx. [i]t is true that the good moral character of
an accused having reference to the moral trait involved in the offense charged
may be proven by him. But an accused is not entitled to an acquittal simply
because of his previous good moral character and exemplary conduct if the
Court believes he is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged. The
affirmance or reversal of his conviction must be resolved on the basic issue of
whether the prosecution had discharged its duty of proving his guilt beyond
peradventure of doubt."127 After reviewing the evidence in this case, we are
convinced that the prosecution has satisfactorily overcome the presumption of
innocence accorded to every accused and that accused-appellants, Yungot and
Magpatoc are guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged; thus,
evidence of good moral character will not prevail.
Regarding accused-appellants mutual defense of alibi, we rule that the trial court
correctly rejected their alibi since it was not physically impossible for both
accused-appellants to be at the scene of the crime at the time of its commission.
We have ruled, time and again, that alibi is the weakest of all defenses and
cannot stand against strong and positive identification, as in this case.128

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs.

FERDINAND SUAREZ, alias "Jojo", LORETO REYES, alias "Dondon" and
"Larry" WILFREDO LARA alias"Cortal" and Willy"; MARIA VICTORIA G.
SUAREZ; NOLI LICSI, alias "Nio"; VICENTE RODRIGUEZ, alias"Waway"; and
MORRIS SANTOS, alias. "Wanky", accused,
WILFREDO LARA, accused-appellant.
G.R. No. 111193
January 28, 1997
REGALADO, J.:
FACTS: On or about the 8th day of December, 1987 in the Municipality of Pasig,
Estrelita Guzman was robbed and was killed in her own house.
Suarez wanted his aunt killed so that he and his wife, Marivic Suarez, also the
victims adopted daughter, could get at once any property that Marivic might
inherit from Estrellita upon the latter's death. In exchange for the job, Suarez
would allow the other accused to steal what they wanted from the house, in
addition to giving them P100,000.00 after one month from the killing of Estrellita.
Two of the accused, Reyes and Lara, gave their sworn statement detailing what
transpired from the planning until the execution of the crime.
Relying on the extrajudicial confessions of the accused and on the circumstantial
evidence adduced by the prosecution, the trial court found Suarez, Reyes and
Lara guilty beyond reasonable doubt of robbery with homicide.
While Suarez and Reyes have already accepted the trial court's verdict, Lara
now questions the lower court's decision by challenging the admissibility of their
extrajudicial declarations. He claims that their extrajudicial confessions were
obtained through force and intimidation and without the benefit of an effective
counsel.
ISSUES: WON accused Laras extrajudicial confessions were freely and
voluntary given and without the benefit of an effective counsel.
HELD: After a thorough review of the records of the case, we agree with the
lower court's factual finding and conclusion that the extrajudicial confessions of
accused Reyes and appellant Lara were freely and voluntarily given and that
their retraction and claims of violence and coercion were merely belated
contrivances and efforts at exculpation. Their claim that they were forced to sign
their respective statements was sufficiently refuted by the witnesses for the
prosecution who were present on the day and time the duo gave and signed
their sworn statements.

We find no merit in herein appellant's contention that Atty. Saunar was not
Reyes' own choice as counsel for the interrogation. While the initial choice of the
lawyer in cases where a person under custodial investigation cannot afford the
services of a lawyer is naturally lodged in the police investigators, the accused
really has the final choice as he may reject the counsel chosen for him and ask
for another one. A lawyer provided by the investigators is deemed engaged by
the accused where he never raised any objection against the former's
appointment during the course of the investigation and the accused thereafter
subscribes to the veracity of his statement before the swearing officer. 37
Here, while the lawyers of the accused were provided by the NBI, the accused
never signified their desire to have a lawyer of their own choice. Thus, we also
disagree with appellant's claim that the lawyer who assisted him in his waiver
came in only after he had executed his waiver. His own statements show that he
waived his rights in the presence and with the advice of Atty. Rodolfo Dahiroc.
ESTRADA v. DESIERTO (2001)
Estrada v. Desierto (Angara diary);
Evidentiary Issues

Petitioner devotes a large part of his arguments on the alleged improper use by
this Court of the Angara Diary. It is urged that the use of the Angara Diary to
determine the state of mind of the petitioner on the issue of his resignation
violates the rule against the admission of hearsay evidence.
We are unpersuaded. To begin with, the Angara diary is not an out of court
statement. The Angara Diary is part of the pleadings in the cases at bar.
Petitioner cannot complain he was not furnished a copy of the Angara Diary. Nor
can he feign surprise on its use. To be sure, the said Diary was frequently
referred to by the parties in their pleadings. [if !supportFootnotes][3][endif] The three parts of
the Diary published in the PDI from February 4-6, 2001 were attached as
Annexes A-C, respectively, of the Memorandum of private respondents Romeo
T. Capulong, et al., dated February 20, 2001. The second and third parts of the
Diary were earlier also attached as Annexes 12 and 13 of the Comment of
private respondents Capulong, et al., dated February 12, 2001. In fact, petitioner
even cited in his Second Supplemental Reply Memorandum both the second
part of the diary, published on February 5, 2001, [if !supportFootnotes][4][endif] and the third
part, published on February 6, 2001. [if !supportFootnotes][5][endif] It was also extensively
used by Secretary of Justice Hernando Perez in his oral arguments. Thus,
petitioner had all the opportunity to contest the use of the Diary but unfortunately
failed to do so.
Even assuming arguendo that the Angara Diary was an out of court statement,
still its use is not covered bythe hearsay rule. [if !supportFootnotes][6][endif] Evidence is
called hearsay when its probative force depends, in whole or in part, on the
competency and credibility of some persons other than the witness by whom it is
sought to produce it.[if !supportFootnotes][7][endif] There are three reasons for excluding
hearsay evidence: (1) absence of cross examination; (2) absence of demeanor
evidence, and (3) absence of the oath. [if !supportFootnotes][8][endif] Not at all hearsay
evidence, however, is inadmissible as evidence. Over the years, a huge body of
hearsay evidence has been admitted by courts due to their relevance,

trustworthiness and necessity. [if !supportFootnotes][9][endif] The emergence of these

exceptions and their wide spread acceptance is well-explained by Weinstein,
Mansfield, Abrams and Berger as follows:
xxx
On the other hand, we all make decisions in our everyday lives on the basis of
other persons accounts of what happened, and verdicts are usually sustained
and affirmed even if they are based on hearsay erroneously admitted, or
admitted because no objection was made. See Shepp v. Uehlinger, 775 F 2d
452, 454-455 (1st Cir. 1985) (hearsay evidence alone can support a verdict).
Although volumes have been written suggesting ways to revise the hearsay rule,
no one advocates a rule that would bar all hearsay evidence. Indeed, the
decided historical trend has been to exclude categories of highly probative
statements from the definition of hearsay (sections 2 and 3, infra), and to
develop more class exceptions to the hearsay rule (sections 4-11, infra).
Furthermore, many states have added to their rules the residual, or catchall, exceptions first pioneered by the Federal Rules which authorize the
admission of hearsay that does not satisfy a class exception, provided it is
adequately trustworthy and probative (section 12, infra).
Moreover, some commentators believe that the hearsay rule should be
abolished altogether instead of being loosened. See, e.g., Note, The
Theoretical Foundation of the Hearsay Rules, 93 Harv.L.Rev. 1786, 1804-1805,
1815 (1980) (footnotes omitted):
The Federal Rules of Evidence provide that [a]lthough relevant, evidence may
be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of
unfair prejudice. Under this structure, exclusion is justified by fears of how the
jury will be influenced by the evidence. However, it is not traditional to think of
hearsay as merely a subdivision of this structure, and the Federal Rules do not
conceive of hearsay in that manner. Prejudice refers to the jurys use of evidence
for inferences other than those for which the evidence is legally relevant; by
contrast, the rule against hearsay questions the jurys ability to evaluate the
strength of a legitimate inference to be drawn from the evidence. For example,
were a judge to exclude testimony because a witness was particularly smooth or
convincing, there would be no doubt as to the usurpation of the jurys function.
Thus, unlike prejudices recognized by the evidence rules, such as those
stemming from racial or religious biases or from the introduction of photographs
of a victims final state, the exclusion of hearsay on the basis of misperception
strikes at the root of the jurys function by usurping its power to process quite
ordinary evidence, the type of information routinely encountered by jurors in their
everyday lives.
Since virtually all criteria seeking to distinguish between good and bad hearsay
are either incoherent, inconsistent, or indeterminate, the only altenative to a
general rule of admission would be an absolute rule of exclusion, which is surely
inferior. More important, the assumptions necessary to justify a rule against
hearsay seem insupportable and, in any event, are inconsistent with accepted
notions of the function of the jury. Therefore, the hearsay rules should be
abolished.
Some support for this view can be found in the limited empirical research now
available which is, however, derived from simulations that suggests that

admitting hearsay has little effect on trial outcomes because jurors

discount the value of hearsay evidence. See Rakos & Landsman,
Researching the Hearsay Rule: Emerging Findings, General Issues, and Future
Directions, 76 Minn.L.Rev. 655 (1992); Miene, Park, & Borgidas, Jury Decision
Making and the Evaluation of Hearsay Evidence, 76 Minn.L.Rev. 683 (1992);
Kovera, Park, & Penrod, Jurors Perceptions of Eyewitness and Hearsay
Evidence, 76 Minn.L.Rev. 703 (1992); Landsman & Rakos, Research Essay: A
Preliminary Empirical Enquiry Concerning the prohibition of Hearsay Evidence in
American Courts, 15 Law & Psychol. Rev. 65 (1991).
Others, even if they concede that restrictions on hearsay have some utility,
question whether the benefits outweigh the cost:
The cost of maintaining the rule is not just a function of its contribution to justice.
It also includes the time spent on litigating the rule. And of course this is not just
a cost voluntarily borne by the parties, for in our system virtually all the cost of
the court salaries, administrative costs, and capital costs are borne by the public.
As expensive as litigation is for the parties, it is supported by an enormous public
subsidy. Each time a hearsay question is litigated, the public pays. The rule
imposes other costs as well. Enormous time is spent teaching and writing about
the hearsay rule, which are both costly enterprises. In some law schools,
students spend over half their time in evidence classes learning the intricacies of
the hearsay rule, and enormous academic resources are expended on the rule.
Allen, Commentary on Professor Friendmans Article: The Evolution of the
Hearsay Rule to a Rule of Admission, 76 Minn.L.Rev. 797, 800 [1992] (but would
abolish rule only in civil cases). See also Friedman, Toward a Partial Economic,
Game-Theoretic Analysis of Hearsay, 76 Minn. L. Rev. 723 (1992).[if !supportFootnotes][10]
[endif]

A complete analysis of any hearsay problem requires that we further

determine whether the hearsay evidence is one exempted from the rules of
exclusion. A more circumspect examination of our rules of exclusion will
show that they do not cover admissions of a party and the Angara Diary
belongs to this class. Section 26 of Rule 130 provides that the act, declaration
or omission of a party as to a relevant fact may be given in evidence against
him.[if !supportFootnotes][11][endif] It has long been settled that these admissions are
admissible even if they are hearsay. Retired Justice Oscar Herrera of the
Court of Appeals cites the various authorities who explain why admissions are
not covered by the hearsay rule:[if !supportFootnotes][12][endif]
Wigmore, after pointing out that the partys declaration has generally the
probative value of any other persons asssertion, argued that it had a special
value when offered against the party. In that circumstance, the admission
discredits the partys statement with the present claim asserted in pleadings and
testimony, much like a witness impeached by contradictory statements.
Moreover, he continued, admissions pass the gauntlet of the hearsay rule,
which requires that extrajudicial assertions be excluded if there was no
opportunity for the opponent to cross-examine because it is the opponents own
declaration, and he does not need to cross examine himself. Wigmore then
added that the Hearsay Rule is satisfied since the party now as opponent has
the full opportunity to put himself on the stand and explain his former assertion.
(Wigmore on evidence, Sec. 1048 (Chadbourn Rev. 1972), cited in Sec. 154,
McCormick)

According to Morgan: The admissibility of an admission made by the party

himself rests not upon any notion that the circumstances in which it was made
furnish the trier means of evaluating it fairly, but upon the adversary theory of
litigation. A party can hardly object that he had no opportunity to crossexamine himself or that he is unworthy of credence save when speaking
under sanction of an oath.
A mans acts, conduct, and declaration, wherever made, if voluntary, are
admissible against him, for the reason that it is fair to presume that they
correspond with the truth, and it is his fault if they do not. (U.S. vs. Ching Po, 23
Phil. 578, 583).
The Angara Diary contains direct statements of petitioner which can be
categorized as admissions of a party: his proposal for a snap presidential
election where he would not be a candidate; his statement that he only wanted
the five-day period promised by Chief of Staff Angelo Reyes; his statements that
he would leave by Monday if the second envelope would be opened by Monday
and Pagod na pagod na ako. Ayoko na, masyado nang masakit. Pagod na ako
sa red tape, bureaucracy, intriga. (I am very tired. I dont want any more of this its
too painful. Im tired of the red tape, the bureaucracy, the intrigue). I just want to
clear my name, then I will go. We noted that days before, petitioner had
repeatedly declared that he would not resign despite the growing clamor for his
resignation. The reason for the meltdown is obvious - - - his will not to resign has
wilted.
It is, however, argued that the Angara Diary is not the diary of the
petitioner, hence, non-binding on him. The argument overlooks the doctrine
of adoptive admission. An adoptive admission is a partys reaction to a
statement or action by another person when it is reasonable to treat the partys
reaction as an admission of something stated or implied by the other
person.[if !supportFootnotes][13][endif] Jones explains that the basis for admissibility of
admissions made vicariously is that arising from the ratification or adoption
by the party of the statements which the other person had made. [if !supportFootnotes][14]
[endif]
To use the blunt language of Mueller and Kirkpatrick, this process of
attribution is not mumbo jumbo but common sense. [if !supportFootnotes][15][endif] In the
Angara Diary, the options of the petitioner started to dwindle when the armed
forces withdrew its support from him as President and commander-in-chief.
Thus, Executive Secretary Angara had to ask Senate President Pimentel to
advise petitioner to consider the option of dignified exit or resignation.
Petitioner did not object to the suggested option but simply said he could never
leave the country. Petitioners silence on this and other related suggestions can
be taken as an admission by him.[if !supportFootnotes][16][endif]
Petitioner further contends that the use of the Angara diary against him violated
the rule on res inter alios acta. The rule is expressed in section 28 of Rule 130
of the Rules of Court, viz: The rights of a party cannot be prejudiced by an act,
declaration, or omission of another, except as hereinafter provided.
Again, petitioner errs in his contention. The res inter alios acta rule has several
exceptions. One of them is provided in section 29 of Rule 130 with respect to
admissions by a co-partner or agent.
Executive Secretary Angara as such was an alter ego of the petitioner. He was
the Little President. Indeed, he was authorized by the petitioner to act for
him in the critical hours and days before he abandoned Malacaang Palace.

Thus, according to the Angara Diary, the petitioner told Secretary Angara: Mula
umpisa pa lang ng kampanya, Ed, ikaw na lang pinakikinggan ko. At hanggang
sa huli, ikaw pa rin. (Since the start of the campaign, Ed, you have been the only
one Ive listened to. And now at the end, you still are.) [if !supportFootnotes][17][endif] This
statement of full trust was made by the petitioner after Secretary Angara
briefed him about the progress of the first negotiation. True to this trust, the
petitioner had to ask Secretary Angara if he would already leave Malacaang after
taking their final lunch on January 20, 2001 at about 1:00 p.m. The Angara
Diary quotes the petitioner as saying to Secretary Angara: ed, kailangan ko na
bang umalis? (Do I have to leave now?)[if !supportFootnotes][18][endif] Secretary Angara told
him to go and he did. Petitioner cannot deny that Secretary Angara headed his
team of negotiators that met with the team of the respondent Arroyo to discuss
the peaceful and orderly transfer of power after his relinquishment of the powers
of the presidency. The Diary shows that petitioner was always briefed by
Secretary Angara on the progress of their negotiations. Secretary Angara acted
for and in behalf of the petitioner in the crucial days before respondent Arroyo
took her oath as President. Consequently, petitioner is bound by the acts and
declarations of Secretary Angara.
Under our rules of evidence, admissions of an agent (Secretary Angara)
are binding on the principal (petitioner). [if !supportFootnotes][19][endif] Jones very well
explains the reasons for the rule, viz: What is done, by agent, is done by the
principal through him, as through a mere instrument. So, whatever is said by an
agent, either in making a contract for his principal, or at the time and
accompanying the performance of any act within the scope of his authority,
having relation to, and connected with, and in the course of the particular
contract or transaction in which he is then engaged, or in the language of the old
writers, dum fervet opus is, in legal effect, said by his principal and admissible
in evidence against such principal.[if !supportFootnotes][20][endif]
Moreover, the ban on hearsay evidence does not cover independently
relevant statements. These are statements which are relevant independently
of whether they are true or not. They belong to two (2) classes: (1) those
statements which are the very facts in issue, and (2) those statements which are
circumstantial evidence of the facts in issue. The second class includes the
following:[if !supportFootnotes][21][endif]
a. Statement of a person showing his state of mind, that is, his mental
condition, knowledge, belief, intention, ill will and other emotions;
b. Statements of a person which show his physical condition, as illness and the
like;
c. Statements of a person from which an inference may be made as to the
state of mind of another, that is, the knowledge, belief, motive, good or bad
faith, etc. of the latter;
d. Statements which may identify the date, place and person in question; and
e. Statements showing the lack of credibility of a witness.
Again, Jones tells us why these independently relevant statements are not
covered by the prohibition against hearsay evidence:[if !supportFootnotes][22][endif]
1088. Mental State or Condition Proof of Knowledge.- There are a number of
comon issues, forming a general class, in proof of which hearsay is so obviously
necessary that it is not customary to refer to its admissibility as by virtue of any
exception to the general exclusionary rule. Admissibility, in such cases, is as of

course. For example, where any mental state or condition is in issue, such
as motive, malice, knowledge, intent, assent or dissent, unless direct testimony
of the particular person is to be taken as conclusive of his state of mind, the only
method of proof available is testimony of others to the acts or statements
of such person. Where his acts or statements are against his interest, they are
plainly admissible within the rules hereinabove announced as to admissions
against interest. And even where not against interest, if they are so closely
connected with the event or transaction in issue as to constitute one of the very
facts in controversy, they become admissible of necessity.
As aforediscussed, The Angara Diary contains statements of the petitioner
which reflect his state of mind and are circumstantial evidence of his intent to
resign. It also contains statements of Secretary Angara from which we can
reasonably deduce petitioners intent to resign. They are admissible and they are
not covered by the rule on hearsay. This has long been a quiet area of our law
on evidence and petitioners attempt to foment a belated tempest cannot receive
our imprimatur.
Petitioner also contends that the rules on authentication of private writings
and best evidence were violated in our Decision, viz:
The use of the Angara diary palpably breached several hornbook rules of
evidence, such as the rule on authentication of private writings
xxx
A. Rule on Proof of Private Writings Violated
The rule governing private documents as evidence was violated. The law
provides that before any private writing offered as authentic is received in
evidence, its due execution and authenticity must be proved either: a) by anyone
who saw the document executed or written, or b) by evidence of the
genuineness of the signature or handwriting of the maker.
xxx
B. Best Evidence Rule Infringed
Clearly, the newspaper reproduction is not the best evidence of the Angara diary.
It is secondary evidence, of dubious authenticity. It was however used by this
Honorable Court without proof of the unavailability of the original or duplicate
original of the diary. The Best Evidence Rule should have been applied since the
contents of the diary are the subject of inquiry.
The rule is that, except in four (4) specific instances, [w]hen the subject of inquiry
is the contents of a document, no evidence shall be admissible other than the
original document itself.[if !supportFootnotes][23][endif]
Petitioners contention is without merit. In regard to the Best Evidence rule, the
Rules of Court provides in sections 2 to 4 of Rule 130, as follows:
Sec. 2. Documentary evidence. Documents as evidence consist of writings or
any material containing letters, words, numbers, figures or other modes of
written expressions offered as proof of their contents.
Sec. 3. Original document must be produced; exceptions. When the subject of
inquiry is the contents of a document, no evidence shall be admissible other than
the original document itself, except in the following cases:
(a) When the original has been lost or destroyed, or cannot be produced in court,
without bad faith on the part of the offeror;
(b) When the original is in the custody or under the control of the party against
whom the evidence is offered, and the latter fails to produce it after reasonable

notice;
(c) When the original consists of numerous accounts or other documents which
cannot be examined in court without great loss of time and the fact sought to be
established from them is only the general result of the whole; and
(d) When the original is a public record in the custody of a public officer or is
recorded in a public office.
Sec. 4. Original of document. (a) The original of a document is one the contents
of which are the subject of inquiry.
(b) When a document is in two or more copies executed at or about the same
time, with identical contents, all such copies are equally regarded as originals.
(c) When an entry is repeated in the regular course of business, one being
copied from another at or near the time of the transaction, all the entries are
likewise equally regarded as originals.
It is true that the Court relied not upon the original but only copy of the Angara
Diary as published in the Philippine Daily Inquirer on February 4-6, 2001. In
doing so, the Court, did not, however, violate the best evidence rule.
Wigmore, in his book on evidence, states that:
Production of the original may be dispensed with, in the trial courts discretion,
whenever in the case in hand the opponent does not bona fide dispute the
contents of the document and no other useful purpose will be served by
requiring production.[if !supportFootnotes][24][endif]
xxx
In several Canadian provinces, the principle of unavailability has been
abandoned, for certain documents in which ordinarily no real dispute arised. This
measure is a sensible and progressive one and deserves universal adoption
(post, sec. 1233). Its essential feature is that a copy may be used
unconditionally, if the opponent has been given an opportunity to inspect it.
(empahsis supplied)
Franciscos opinion is of the same tenor, viz:
Generally speaking, an objection by the party against whom secondary evidence
is sought to be introduced is essential to bring the best evidence rule into
application; and frequently, where secondary evidence has been admitted, the
rule of exclusion might have successfully been invoked if proper and timely
objection had been taken. No general rule as to the form or mode of objecting to
the admission of secondary evidence is set forth. Suffice it to say here that the
objection should be made in proper season that is, whenever it appears
that there is better evidence than that which is offered and before the
secondary evidence has been admitted. The objection itself should be
sufficiently definite to present a tangible question for the courts consideration. [if !
supportFootnotes][25][endif]

He adds:
Secondary evidence of the content of the writing will be received in evidence if
no objection is made to its reception.[if !supportFootnotes][26][endif]
In regard to the authentication of private writings, the Rules of Court provides
in section 20 of Rule 132, viz:
Sec. 20. Proof of private document. Before any private document offered as
authentic is received in evidence, its due execution and authenticity must be
proved either:
(a) By anyone who saw the document executed or written; or

(b) By evidence of the genuineness of the signature or handwriting of the maker.

Any other private document need only be identified as that which it is claimed to
be.
On the rule of authentication of private writings, Francisco states that:
A proper foundation must be laid for the admission of documentary evidence;
that is, the identity and authenticity of the document must be reasonably
established as a pre-requisite to its admission. (Rouw v. Arts, 174 Ark. 79, 294
S.W. 993, 52 A.L.R. 1263, and others) However, a party who does not deny
the genuineness of a proffered instrument may not object that it was not
properly identified before it was admitted in evidence. (Strand v. Halverson,
220 Iowa 1276, 264 N.W. 266, 103 A.L.R. 835).[if !supportFootnotes][27][endif]
Petitioner cites the case of State prosecutors v. Muro,[if !supportFootnotes][28][endif] which
frowned on reliance by courts on newspaper accounts. In that case, Judge Muro
was dismissed from the service for relying on a newspaper account in dismissing
eleven (11) cases against Mrs. Imelda Romualdez Marcos. There is a
significant difference, however, between the Muro case and the cases at bar.
In the Muro case, Judge Muro dismissed the cases against Mrs. Marcos on the
basis of a newspaper account without affording the prosecution the basic
opportunity to be heard on the matter by way of a written comment or on oral
argument. . .(this is) not only a blatant denial of elementary due process to the
Government but is palpably indicative of bad faith and partiality. In the instant
cases, however, the petitioner had an opportunity to object to the
admissibility of the Angara Diary when he filed his Memorandum dated
February 20, 2001, Reply Memorandum dated February 22, 2001, Supplemental
Memorandum dated February 23, 2001, and Second Supplemental
memorandum dated February 24, 2001. He was therefore not denied due
process. In the words of Wigmore, supra, petitioner had been given an
opportunity to inspect the Angara Diary but did not object to its admissibility. It is
already too late in the day to raise his objections in an Omnibus Motion, after the
Angara Diary has been used as evidence and a decision rendered partly on the
basis thereof.
FRANCISCO N. VILLANUEVA vs. VIRGILIO P. BALAGUER
INTERCONTINENTAL BROADCASTING CORPORATION CHANNEL-13

and

Petitioner Francisco N. Villanueva, then Assistant Manager for Operations of

IBC-13 was dismissed from employment on the ground of loss of confidence for
purportedly selling forged certificates of performance. Contesting his termination,
petitioner filed a complaint for illegal dismissal before the National Labor
Relations Commission.
During the pendency of the labor case, news articles about irregularities in IBC13 were published in the Manila Times and the Philippine Star.
In these news articles, respondent Virgilio P. Balaguer, then President of IBC-13,
was quoted to have said that he uncovered various anomalies in IBC-13 during
his tenure which led to the dismissal of an operations executive for selling forged
certificates of performance.

In a letter, petitioner urged respondents to confirm or deny if he was the person

alluded to in the news article as the operations executive of IBC-13 who was
dismissed for selling forged certificates of performance. None of the respondents
replied to the letter.
Petitioner filed before the RTC a complaint for damages against Balaguer, which
was later amended by impleading IBC-13 as additional defendant.
ISSUE: Whether or not the respondents failure to reply to the letter sent to them
by petitioner constitutes a valid admission by silence.
RULING: No. Petitioners argument lacks merit. One cannot prove his claim by
placing the burden of proof on the other party. Indeed, "(a) man cannot make
evidence for himself by writing a letter containing the statements that he wishes
to prove. He does not make the letter evidence by sending it to the party against
whom he wishes to prove the facts stated therein. He no more can impose a
duty to answer a charge than he can impose a duty to pay by sending goods.
Therefore a failure to answer such adverse assertions in the absence of further
circumstances making an answer requisite or natural has no effect as an
admission."
Moreover, the rule on admission by silence applies to adverse statements in
writing if the party was carrying on a mutual correspondence with the declarant.
However, if there was no such mutual correspondence, the rule is relaxed on the
theory that while the party would have immediately reacted by a denial if the
statements were orally made in his presence, such prompt response can
generally not be expected if the party still has to resort to a written reply.
In the same manner, we also cannot assume an admission by silence on the
part of Balaguer by virtue of his failure to protest or disclaim the attribution to him
by the newspapers that he is the source of the articles. As explained above, the
rule on admission by silence is relaxed when the statement is not made orally in
ones presence or when one still has to resort to a written reply, or when there is
no mutual correspondence between the parties.
Republic v. Sandiganbayan
GR. No. 152154 July 15, 2003
EN BANC
Corona, J.
The PresidentPrivileges and Salary
Facts:
Republic (petitioner), through the Presidential Commission on Good
Government (PCGG), represented by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG),
filed a petition for forfeiture before the Sandiganbayan pursuant to RA 1379i.
o
declaration of the aggregate amount of US$ 356M deposited in escrow
in the PNB, as ill-gotten wealth.

The funds were previously held by 5 account groups, using various

foreign foundations in certain Swiss banks.

In addition, the Republic sought the forfeiture of US$25 million and US$5
million in treasury notes which exceeded the Marcos couple's salaries ii iii iv v,
other lawful income as well as income from legitimately acquired property. The
treasury notes are frozen at the Central Bank of the Philippines, now Bangko
Sentral ng Pilipinas, by virtue of the freeze order issued by the PCGG.
Before the case was set for pre-trial, a General Agreement and the
Supplemental Agreement dated December 28, 1993 were executed by the
Marcos children and then PCGG Chairman Magtanggol Gunigundo for a global
settlement of the assets of the Marcos family.
o
The General Agreement/Supplemental Agreements sought to identify,
collate, cause the inventory of and distribute all assets presumed to be owned by
the Marcos family under the conditions contained therein. The General
Agreement specified in one of its premises or "whereas clauses" the fact that
petitioner "obtained a judgment from the Swiss Federal Tribunal on December
21, 1990, that the Three Hundred Fifty-six Million U.S. dollars (US$356 million)
belongs in principle to the Republic of the Philippines provided certain
conditionalities are met x x x."
Hearings were conducted by the Sandiganbayan on the motion to
approve the General/Supplemental Agreements.
In a resolution dated 31 January 2002, the Sandiganbayan denied the
Republic's motion for summary judgment.
o
"The evidence offered for summary judgment of the case did not prove
that the money in the Swiss Banks belonged to the Marcos spouses because no
legal proof exists in the record as to the ownership by the Marcoses of the funds
in escrow from the Swiss Banks. The basis for the forfeiture in favor of the
government cannot be deemed to have been established and our judgment
thereon, perforce, must also have been without basis."
The Republic filed the petition for certiorari.
ISSUE:
W/N petitioner Republic was able to prove its case for forfeiture in accordance
with the requisites of Sections 2vi and 3vii of RA 1379.

HELD:
RA 1379 raises the prima facie presumption that a property is unlawfully
acquired, hence subject to forfeiture, if its amount or value is manifestly
disproportionate to the official salary and other lawful income of the public officer
who owns it.
o
The following facts must be established in order that forfeiture or seizure
of the Swiss deposits may be effected:
(1) ownership by the public officer of money or property acquired during his
incumbency, whether it be in his name or otherwise, and
(2) the extent to which the amount of that money or property exceeds, i. e., is
grossly disproportionate to, the legitimate income of the public officer.

(3) that the said amount is manifestly out of proportion to his salary as such
public officer or employee and to his other lawful income and the income from
legitimately acquired property.
The Republic was able to establish a prima facie case for the forfeiture
of the Swiss funds pursuant to RA 1379.
o
Ferdinand and Imelda Marcos were public officers.
o
Ferdinand and Imelda Marcos had acquired and owned properties
during their term of office, as evidenced by their admittance regarding the
ownership of the Swiss accounts.
o
The Swiss accounts of the Marcoses had balances amounting to US
$356 million, a figure beyond the aggregate legitimate income of $304,372.43.
The Petition was granted.
The Swiss deposits which were transferred to and are now deposited in
escrow at the Philippine National Bank in the estimated aggregate amount of
US$658,175,373.60 as of January 31, 2002, plus interest, are hereby forfeited in
favor of petitioner Republic of the Philippines.
RATIO DECIDENDI: (1973 CONST)
Article VII, Sec. 4(2) The President and the Vice-President shall not,
during their tenure, hold any other office except when otherwise provided in this
Constitution, nor may they practice any profession, participate directly or
indirectly in the management of any business, or be financially interested directly
or indirectly in any contract with, or in any franchise or special privilege granted
by the Government or any other subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof,
including any government owned or controlled corporation.
Article VII, Sec. 11 No Member of the National Assembly shall appear
as counsel before any court inferior to a court with appellate jurisdiction, x x
x. Neither shall he, directly or indirectly, be interested financially in any contract
with, or in any franchise or special privilege granted by the Government, or any
subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof including any government owned
or controlled corporation during his term of office. He shall not intervene in any
matter before any office of the government for his pecuniary benefit.
Article IX, Sec. 7 The Prime Minister and Members of the Cabinet shall
be subject to the provision of Section 11, Article VIII hereof and may not appear
as counsel before any court or administrative body, or manage any business, or
practice any profession, and shall also be subject to such other disqualification
as may be provided by law.

ii Paragraph 4 of the petition for forfeiture as to the personal circumstances of Ferdinand E. Marcos as a public official who served
without interruption as Congressman, Senator, Senate President and President of the Republic of the Philippines from 1 December 1965
to 25 February 1986.

iii Paragraph 5 of the petition as to the personal circumstances of Imelda R. Marcos who once served as a member of the Interim
Batasang Pambansa from 1978 to 1984 and as Metro Manila Governor, concurrently Minister of Human Settlements, from June 1976 to
February 1986.

iv Paragraph 11 of the petition as to the Official Report of the Minister of Budget, the total salaries of former President Marcos as
President form 1966 to 1976 was P60,000 a year and from 1977 to 1985, P100,000 a year; while that of the former First Lady, Imelda R.
Marcos, as Minister of Human Settlements from June 1976 to February 22-25, 1986 was P75,000 a year xxx.
v Respondent Mrs. Marcos admitted in Paragraph 10 of her answer the allegations of paragraph 11 of the petition for forfeiture which
referred to the accumulated salaries of Ferdinand Marcos and Imelda Marcos. That the said amount totaled to P2,319,583.33 or
$304,372.43.

vi Section 2. Filing of petition. Whenever any public officer or employee has acquired during his incumbency an amount or property
which is manifestly out of proportion to his salary as such public officer or employee and to his other lawful income and the income from
legitimately acquired property, said property shall be presumed prima facie to have been unlawfully acquired.
vii Information that should be included in the Petition
7. Concepcion Chua Gaw v. Suy Ben Chua, GR160855, April 16, 2008 (hostile/adverse witness);
FACTS
Spouses Chua Chin and Chan Chi were the founders of 3 business enterprises, one of which is Hagonoy Lumber. The couple
had 7 children, among them were Concepcion Chua, Suy Ben Chua and Chua Sioc Huan. Chua Chin died and left his wife and children
as the only surviving heirs.
The surviving heirs executed a Deed of Partition, wherein the heirs settled their interest in Hagonoy Lumber as follows: to Chan
Chi, as her share in the conjugal partnership; and the other half will be divided among Chan Chi and the seven children in equal pro
indiviso shares. In said document, Chan Chi and the six children likewise agreed to voluntarily renounce and waive their shares over
Hagonoy Lumber in favor of their co-heir, Chua Sioc Huan.
Petitioner Concepcion Chua Gaw and her husband, Antonio Gaw (Spouses Gaw), borrowed P200,000 from Suy Ben Chua to be
used for the construction of their house. Suy Ben Chua issued a check for the amount. The parties agreed that the loan will be payable in
6 months without interest.
Chua Sioc Huan executed a Deed of Sale over all her rights and interests in Hagonoy Lumber for P255,000 in favor of respondent
Suy Ben Chua.
Spouses Gaw failed to pay the amount they borrowed within the designated period. Suy Ben Chua filed a Complaint for Sum of
Money against the Spouses Gaw.
In their Answer, the Spouses Gaw contend that the P200,000 was not a loan but Concepcions share in the profits of Hagonoy
Lumber
In his Reply, Suy Ben Chua explained that pursuant to the 14 Candice See Deed of Partition, their sister Chua Sioc Huan became the
sole owner of Hagonoy Lumber. Suy Ben Chua became the owner of Hagonoy Lumber when he bought the same from Chua Sioc Huan
as evidenced by a Deed of Sale.
Spouses Gaw countered that the documents on which Suy Ben Chua anchors his claim of ownership over Hagonoy Lumber were
not true and valid agreements and do not express the real intention of the parties. They claimed that these documents are mere paper
arrangements which were prepared only upon the advice of a counsel until all the heirs could reach and sign a final and binding
agreement, which, up to such time, has not been executed by the heirs.
RTC ruled in favor of Suy Ben Chua and ordered Concepcion Gaw (her husband Antonio had passed away) to pay P200,000. RTC
held that the validity and due execution of the Deed of Partition and the Deed of Sale were never impugned. Although Suy Ben Chua

failed to produce the originals of the documents, Concepcion judicially admitted the due execution of the Deed of Partition, and even
acknowledged her signature thereon, thus constitutes an exception to the best evidence rule. The contents of the Deed of Sale have not
been put in issue, the non-presentation of the original document is not fatal so as to affect its authenticity as well as the truth of its
contents. Also, the parties to the documents themselves do not contest their validity.
CA affirmed the decision of the RTC. Since Concepcion did not dispute the due execution and existence of the Deed of Partition and
the Deed of Sale, there was no need to produce the originals of the documents in accordance with the best evidence rule.
ISSUE & HELD
WON the RTC erred in admitting in evidence a mere copy of the Deed
of Partition and the Deed of Sale in violation of the Best Evidence
Rule. The best evidence rule is not applicable to the case at bar.
RATIONALE
The best evidence rule in Rule 130, Section 3 applies only when the content of the document is the subject of the inquiry. Where the
issue is only as to whether such document was actually executed, or exists, or on the circumstances relevant to or surrounding its
execution, the best evidence rule does not apply and testimonial evidence is admissible. Any other substitutionary evidence is likewise
admissible without need to account for the original.
Production of the original may be dispensed with, in the trial courts discretion, whenever the opponent does not bona fide dispute the
contents of the document and no other useful purpose will be served by requiring production.
There was no dispute as to the terms of either deed; hence, the RTC correctly admitted in evidence mere copies of the two deeds.
Concepcion never even denied their due execution and admitted that she signed the Deed of Partition. As for the Deed of Sale,
Concepcion, in effect, admitted its genuineness and due execution when she failed to specifically deny it in the manner required by the
rules (Rule 8, Section 8).
o Concepcion merely claimed that said documents do not express the true agreement and intention of the parties since they were only
provisional paper arrangements made upon the advice of counsel.
Apparently, Concepcion does not contest the contents of these deeds but alleges that there was a contemporaneous agreement that the
transfer of Hagonoy Lumber to Chua Sioc Huan was only temporary.
An agreement or the contract between the parties is the formal expression of the parties rights, duties and obligations. It is the best
evidence of the intention of the parties. When the terms of an agreement have been reduced to writing, it is deemed to contain all the
terms agreed upon and there can be, between the parties and their successors in interest, no evidence of such terms other than the
contents of the written agreement.

8. People v. Palacio, G.R. L-13933, May 25, 1960 (exclusion of witnesses);

FACTS:
A case of murder was filed against 5 accused for the death of Jaime Salinel. The information as filed before the CFI of Camarines Sur.
The defense counsel asked the Court to order the prosecution to furnish the defendants at least all the names of the witnesses for the
prosecution. However, the prosecution failed to comply with the order so that the defense objected during the trial the prosecutions
presentation of witnesses to testify alleging that their names were not included in the information; and which the Court granted the
motion.
ISUUE:
Whether or not the prosecution may still be allowed to present witnesses whose names were not included in the information?
RULING:
YES. Under Rule 112 Section 1, it provides that:
The defendant must be arraigned before the court in which the complaint or information has been filed unless the cause shall have been
transferred elsewhere for trial. The arraignment must be made by the court or clerk, and shall consist in reading the complaint or

information to the defendant and delivering to him a copy thereof, including a list of witnesses, and asking him whether he pleads guilty or
not guilty as charged. The prosecution may, however, call at the trial witnesses other than those named in the complaint or information.
The defendant is entitled as a matter of right to be furnished by the prosecution with a list of the witnesses to be presented against him
during the trial. But the prosecution may call at the trial witnesses other than those named in the complaint or information. Therefore, the
prosecution need not furnish the defendant with a list of all its witnesses. That is the meaning of the last sentence of the above quoted
provision of the Rule. While the accused in a criminal prosecution is entitled to know the nature and cause of the accusation against
him, yet it does not mean that he is entitled to know in advance the names of all the witnesses for the prosecution. The success of the
prosecution might be endangered if such right be granted to an accused, for the known witnesses might be subjected to pressure or
coerced not to testify. The time for the accused to know all the witnesses against him is when they take the witness stand.
The fact that some of the witnesses for the prosecution who are not listed in the information were present in the courtroom and heard the
testimony of the other witnesses does not disqualify them from being witnesses. Counsel for the defense should have asked for the
exclusion of all the witnesses who have not testified under and pursuant to section 14, Rule 115.
9. People v. Rivera, GR98376, Aug. 16, 1991 (recall of witnesses);
FACTS: The special civil action of certiorari at bar instituted in this Court to annul an order rendered by the Regional Trial Court at
Kalookan City, Branch 129, in a prosecution for arson docketed in that Court as Criminal Case No. 28820 (87).
Accused in that case of arson is Wilfredo L. Sembrano. It is the prosecution's theory that he wilfully caused the fire in the early morning of
May 21, 1987 which totally burned and destroyed the second and third floors of the "I Love You Restaurant and Sauna Bath" owned by
Juanita L. Tan, located at No. 2 L. Bustamante St. Kalookan City. 1
Among the witnesses presented by the Government to demonstrate Sembrano's culpability was Benjamin Lee, a room boy of the
restaurant and bath. Lee testified on direct examination at the hearing of December 8, 1987. His testimony was essentially that
Sembrano had run out of the VIP room where the fire had started and refused to heed his (Lee's) call to stop. Lee took the witness stand
again on April 26, 1987 during which he was cross-examined by defense counsel, gave additional evidence on redirect examination, was
again questioned on recross-examination by the same defense counsel, and thereafter allowed to step down. 2
The prosecution completed presentation of its evidence-in-chief in due course. But before it could rest its case, and two (2) months or so
after Benjamin Lee had completed his testimony, the defendant's original counsel, Benjamin Formoso, withdrew his appearance and was
substituted by another attorney, Eduardo S. Rodriguez. 3 The latter then filed a motion on June 8, 1988 to recall Benjamin Lee for further
examination. 4 The ground relied upon by Atty. Rodriguez was simply that after he had reviewed the record of Benjamin Lee's testimony,
he came to the conclusion that " there seems to be many points and questions that should have been asked but were not profounded
(sic) by the other defense counsel who conducted.. (the cross-examination). It was on this averment, and counsel's reference to "the
gravity of the offense charge (sic)" and the need "to afford the accused full opportunity to defend himself," that Lee's recall for further
cross examination was sought to be justified. Over objections of the prosecution, the Court 5 granted the motion.
Efforts were thereafter exerted to cause witness Benjamin Lee to again appear before the Court for further cross-examination. These
efforts met with no success; and the trial had to be postponed several times. It appears that Lee had terminated his employment and
moved elsewhere without indicating his new address.
So, on October 1, 1990 the private prosecutor filed a "Manifestation and Motion" drawing attention to the inability to procure the reappearance of witness Lee for which "the prosecution could not be held liable," and to the fact that "Lee has already been thoroughly
examined by the former defense counsel," and praying upon these premises "that the farther examination of Benjamin Lee be dispensed
with and ... the prosecution ... allowed to terminate the presentation of its evidence."
By Order dated October 2, 1990, 6 the Trial Court denied the motion to dispense with the recall of Benjamin Lee. In fact, it ordered the
testimony of Benjamin Lee for the prosecution xx stricken off the record for lack of complete cross-examination" because the witness
could no longer be found, and "the failure of counsel for the accused to further cross-examine the witness is not the fault of the defense. 7
In the same order, the Court also set the "reception of further evidence for the prosecution, if any, ... on October 23, 1990 xx as earlier
scheduled." Subsequently, it denied the private prosecutor's motion for reconsideration of the order. 8 Hence, the action at bar, instituted
by the Office of the Solicitor General.

ISSUE: W/N the TC acted with grave abuse of discretion in authorizing the recall of witness Benjamin Lee over the objections of the
prosecution, and in later striking out said witness testimony for want of further examination.
HELD: Yes.
There is no doubt that a Trial Court has discretion to grant leave for the recall of a witness. This is clear from a reading of Section 9, Rule
132 of the Rules of Court, as amended, 9 viz.:
SEC. 9. Recalling witness. After the examination of a witness by both sides has been concluded, the witness cannot be recalled
without leave of the court. The court will grant or withhold leave in its discretion, as the interests of justice may require.
But obviously that discretion may not be exercised in a vacuum, as it were, entirely, isolated from a particular set of attendant
circumstances. The discretion to recall a witness is not properly invoked or exercisable by an applicant's mere general statement that
there is a need to recall a witness "in the interest of justice," or "in order to afford a party full opportunity to present his case," or that, as
here, "there seems to be many points and questions that should have been asked" in the earlier interrogation. To regard expressed
generalities such as these as sufficient ground for recall of witnesses would make the recall of witness no longer discretionary but
ministerial. Something more than the bare assertion of the need to propound additional questions is essential before the Court's
discretion may rightfully be exercised to grant or deny recall. There must be a satisfactory showing of some concrete, substantial ground
for the recall. There must be a satisfactory showing on the movant's part, for instance, that particularly identified material points were not
covered in the cross-examination, or that particularly described vital documents were not presented to the witness whose recall is prayed
for, or that the cross-examination was conducted in so inept a manner as to result in a virtual absence thereof. Absent such particulars, to
repeat, there would be no foundation for a trial court to authorize the recall of any witness.
In the case at bar, the respondent Trial Court granted the defendant's motion for recall on nothing more than said movant's general claim
that certain questions unspecified, it must be stressed had to be asked. In doing so, it acted without basis, exercised power
whimsically or capriciously, and gravely abused its discretion.
So, too, the respondent Court acted whimsically, capriciously, and oppressively, in other words, gravely abused its discretion, in ordering
the striking out of the entire testimony of Benjamin Lee after it appeared that he could no longer be found and produced for further
examination. In the first place, the Court acted unilaterally, without any motion to this effect by the defense and thus without according the
prosecution a prior opportunity to show why the striking out should not be decreed. More importantly, the striking out was directed without
any showing whatever by the defense of the indispensability of further cross-examination, what it was that would have been elicited by
further cross-examination rendering valueless all that the witness had previously stated. It should be stressed that Lee was subjected
both to cross-examination and recross-examination by former counsel of the accused Sembrano. Obviously the latter was satisfied that
there had been sufficient cross-examination of the witness. Absence of cross-examination may not therefore be invoked as ground to
strike out Lee's testimony (as being hearsay). And there is no showing whatever in this case that it was the prosecution that placed the
witness beyond the reach of the Court, much less of the expected nature or tenor of his additional testimony which, because not
presented, would necessarily cause the evidence earlier given by Lee to become hearsay or otherwise incompetent, and therefore,
amenable to being stricken from the record.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and the respondent Court's challenged Order dated October 2, 1990 is NULLIFIED AND SET
ASIDE, with costs against private respondent.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
10. Spouses Afulugencia v. MetroBank, GR185145, Feb. 5, 2014 (hostile/adverse witness);
FACTS: Spouses Vicente and Leticia filed a complaint for nullification of mortgage, foreclosure, auction sale, certificate of sale and other
documents against Metrobank and Emmanuel before the RTC of Malolos. After submission of the parties pleadings and termination of
pre-trial, the spouses filed a Motion For Issuance of Subpoena Duces Tecum Ad Testificandum against Metrobank officers to testify during
the August 31, 2006 for the presentation of their evidence-in-chief and to bring documents relative to their loan with Metrobank. The bank
opposed the motion. According to them, the motion lacked a notice of hearing, thus a pro-forma motion because it did not set the time
and date of hearing. Further, pursuant to Section 1 and 6 of Rule 25, the bank officers who are adverse parties cannot be compelled to
testify in the absence of prior service of written interrogatories to them; and the spouses have not shown the materiality and relevance of
their motion, hence they were merely fishing for evidence. In their reply, the spouses argued that the filing of the opposition by Metrobank
cured the lack of hearing; the motion was not unreasonable, since the officers will be presented just the same by the bank later on; that
the documents are relevant and material because it will settle the issue of validity or invalidity of the foreclosure proceedings. The trial

court ruled in favour of the bank, holding that the motion was pro forma for lack of notice of hearing; the bank officers, who were not
previously served written interrogatories, cannot be compelled to testify since they are adverse witnesses. The ruling was affirmed by the
Court of Appeals, hence the spouses elevated their case to the Supreme Court.
ISSUES:
I. THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERRORS IN REQUIRING NOTICE AND HEARING (SECS. 4 AND 5, RULE
15, RULES OF COURT) FOR A MERE MOTION FOR SUBPOENA OF RESPONDENT BANKS OFFICERS WHEN SUCH
REQUIREMENTS APPLY ONLY TO DEPOSITION UNDER SEC. 6, RULE 25, RULES OF COURT.
II. THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED (REVERSIBLE) ERROR IN HOLDING THAT THE PETITIONERS MUST FIRST SERVE
WRITTEN INTERROGATORIES TO RESPONDENT BANKS OFFICERS BEFORE THEY CAN BE SUBPOENAED.
HELD: The Court denies the Petition.
On the procedural issue, it is quite clear that Metrobank was notified of the Motion for Issuance of Subpoena Duces Tecum Ad
Testificandum; in fact, it filed a timely Opposition thereto. The technical defect of lack of notice of hearing was thus cured by the filing of
the Opposition.
Nonetheless, contrary to petitioners submission, the case of Adorio cannot apply squarely to this case. In Adorio, the request for
subpoena duces tecum was sought against bank officials who were not parties to the criminal case for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg.
22. The situation is different here, as officers of the adverse party Metrobank are being compelled to testify as the calling partys main
witnesses; likewise, they are tasked to bring with them documents which shall comprise the petitioners principal evidence. This is not
without significant consequences that affect the interests of the adverse party, as will be shown below.
As a rule, in civil cases, the procedure of calling the adverse party to the witness stand is not allowed, unless written interrogatories are
first served upon the latter. This is embodied in Section 6, Rule 25 of the Rules, which provides
Sec. 6. Effect of failure to serve written interrogatories.
Unless thereafter allowed by the court for good cause shown and to prevent a failure of justice, a party not served with written
interrogatories may not be compelled by the adverse party to give testimony in open court, or to give a deposition pending appeal.
One of the purposes of the above rule is to prevent fishing expeditions and needless delays; it is there to maintain order and facilitate the
conduct of trial. It will be presumed that a party who does not serve written interrogatories on the adverse party beforehand will most
likely be unable to elicit facts useful to its case if it later opts to call the adverse party to the witness stand as its witness. Instead, the
process could be treated as a fishing expedition or an attempt at delaying the proceedings; it produces no significant result that a prior
written interrogatories might bring.
Besides, since the calling party is deemed bound by the adverse partys testimony, compelling the adverse party to take the witness
stand may result in the calling party damaging its own case. Otherwise stated, if a party cannot elicit facts or information useful to its case
through the facility of written interrogatories or other mode of discovery, then the calling of the adverse party to the witness stand could
only serve to weaken its own case as a result of the calling partys being bound by the adverse partys testimony, which may only be
worthless and instead detrimental to the calling partys cause.
Another reason for the rule is that by requiring prior written interrogatories, the court may limit the inquiry to what is relevant, and thus
prevent the calling party from straying or harassing the adverse party when it takes the latter to the stand.
Thus, the rule not only protects the adverse party from unwarranted surprises or harassment; it likewise prevents the calling party from
conducting a fishing expedition or bungling its own case. Using its own judgment and discretion, the court can hold its own in resolving a
dispute, and need not bear witness to the parties perpetrating unfair court practices such as fishing for evidence, badgering, or altogether
ruining their own cases. Ultimately, such unnecessary processes can only constitute a waste of the courts precious time, if not pointless
entertainment.
In the present case, petitioners seek to call Metrobanks officers to the witness stand as their initial and main witnesses, and to present
documents in Metrobanks possession as part of their principal documentary evidence. This is improper. Petitioners may not be allowed,
at the incipient phase of the presentation of their evidence-in-chief at that, to present Metrobanks officers who are considered adverse
parties as well, based on the principle that corporations act only through their officers and duly authorized agents as their main
witnesses; nor may they be allowed to gain access to Metrobanks documentary evidence for the purpose of making it their own. This is

tantamount to building their whole case from the evidence of their opponent. The burden of proof and evidence falls on petitioners, not on
Metrobank; if petitioners cannot prove their claim using their own evidence, then the adverse party Metrobank may not be pressured to
hang itself from its own defense.
It is true that under the Rules, a party may, for good cause shown and to prevent a failure of justice, be compelled to give testimony in
court by the adverse party who has not served written interrogatories. But what petitioners seek goes against the very principles of justice
and fair play; they would want that Metrobank provide the very evidence with which to prosecute and build their case from the start. This
they may not be allowed to do.
Finally, the Court may not turn a blind eye to the possible consequences of such a move by petitioners. As one of their causes of action in
their Complaint, petitioners claim that they were not furnished with specific documents relative to their loan agreement with Metrobank at
the time they obtained the loan and while it was outstanding. If Metrobank were to willingly provide petitioners with these documents even
before petitioners can present evidence to show that indeed they were never furnished the same, any inferences generated from this
would certainly not be useful for Metrobank. One may be that by providing petitioners with these documents, Metrobank would be
admitting that indeed, it did not furnish petitioners with these documents prior to the signing of the loan agreement, and while the loan
was outstanding, in violation of the law.
With the view taken of the case, the Court finds it unnecessary to further address the other issues raised by the parties, which are
irrelevant and would not materially alter the conclusions arrived at.
11. Suarez v. Tengco, GR L-17113, May 23, 1961 (hostile/adverse witness);
FACTS: Juanito Suarez petitions for a writ of prohibition against the Honorable Damaso S. Tengco, as Judge of the Court of First
Instance of Batangas, to restrain him from compelling petitioner to testify in Civil Case No. 1058 of said court.
It would appear that a jeep in which plaintiffs in the civil case (the other respondents herein De la Roca and Umali) were riding, had
collided with an automobile driven by petitioner, and as a sequel thereto, Criminal Case No. 1458 was filed against petitioner in the Court
of First Instance of Batangas. On August 28, 1959, Civil Case No. 1058 was also filed against petitioner to collect damages allegedly
suffered by the plaintiffs as a result of his reckless negligence in the same incident involved in the criminal case. On the first day of trial of
the civil case, and while Criminal Case No. 1458 was also pending in the same court, plaintiffs therein required defendant Suarez
(petitioner herein) to take the stand and testify as their first witness. Petitioner objected, averring that there was a pending criminal case
(Criminal Case No. 1458) against him for the very acts upon which the civil action was based; that the purpose of plaintiffs was merely to
fish for evidence to be utilized in the pending criminal suit; and that for him to be compelled to testify in the civil case was violative of the
constitutional guaranty against self-incrimination. Petitioner's objections, which were later set in writing in a motion for reconsideration,
were overruled by the respondent judge, who directed petitioner to take the stand and testify.
ISSUE: W/N the lower court erred in directing petitioner to take the witness stand.
HELD: NO. No legal impediment exists against a litigant calling any of the adverse parties to be his witness. In fact, Section 83, Rule 123
of the Rules provides
A party may interrogate any unwilling or hostile witness by leading questions. A party may call an adverse party . . ., and interrogate him
by leading questions and contradict and impeach him in all respects as if he had been called by the adverse party, and the witness thus
called may be contradicted and impeached by or on behalf of the adverse party also, and may be cross-examined by the adverse party
only upon the subject-matter of his examination in chief. (Emphasis supplied)
True, an accused in a criminal case may not be compelled to testify, or to so much as utter a word, even for his own defense (U.S. vs.
Junio, 1 Phil. 50; U.S. vs. Luzon 4 Phil. 344; U.S. vs. Binayoh, 35 Phil. 23; See. 1 (c), Rule 111, Rules of Court). But while the
constitutional guaranty against self-incrimination protects a person in all types of cases, be they criminal, civil, or administrative (Art. 111,
Sec. 1, No. 18, Phil. Constitution; Bermudez vs. Castillo, 64 Phil. 483), said privilege, in proceedings other than a criminal case against
him who invokes it, is to answer incriminating considered an option of refusal question, and not a prohibition of inquiry.
Except in criminal cases, there is no rule prohibiting a party litigant from utilizing his adversary as witness. As a mater of fact, section 83
of Rule 123, Rules of Court expressly authorizes a party to call an adverse party to the witness stand and interrogate him. This rule is, of
course, subject to the constitutional injunction not to compel any person to testify against himself. But it is established that the privilege
against self-incrimination must be invoked at the proper time, and the proper time to invoke it is when a question calling for a criminating
answer is propounded. This has to be so, because before a question is asked there would be no way of telling whether the information to
be elicited from the witness is self- incriminating or not. As stated in Jones on Evidence (Vol. 6, pp. 4926-4927), a person who has been

summoned to testify 'cannot decline to appear, nor can he decline to be sworn as a witness' and 'no claim of privilege can be made until a
question calling for a criminating answer is asked; at that time, and, generally speaking, at that time only, the claim of privilege may
properly be interposed.'(Gonzales v. Sec. of Labor, L-6409, February 5, 1954, cit. in Navarro, Criminal Procedure, p. 302).
Here, petitioner invoked the privilege even prior to any question, and simply declined to take the witness stand, Note that in the Gonzales
case, above-cited, the adverse party was directed to take the witness stand in proceedings to investigate an alleged failure to pay
overtime compensation, which, under the corresponding special laws, carries a penal sanction. Here, petitioner was being directed to
take the stand, not in a criminal case where he is an accused, but in an independent civil action which, although arising from the same
facts involved in a criminal case pending before the same court, is still regarded by law as an "entirely separate and distinct" action,
governed by a corresponding different set of rules (Civil Code of the Phil., Art. 2177).
WHEREFORE, the petition to prohibit the respondent judge from directing petitioner to take the witness stand and testify is denied,
without prejudice to petitioner's properly invoking the guaranty against self-incrimination when and as question are propounded to him on
the stand. Costs against petitioner.
12. Lezama v. Rodriguez, GR L-25643. June 27, 1968 (hostile/adverse witness);
Facts: Jose Dineros, as receiver of the La Paz Ice Plant & Cold Storage Co., filed an action for the annulment of a judgment rendered
against La Paz in favor of Marciano Roque and the Spouses Lezama. It was alleged that, due to the mismanagement by the Lezamas,
La Paz was placed under receivership, during which, Roque brought an action against La Paz for the collection of P150,000.00, which
was supposedly loaned to La Paz. Dineros accused the Sps. Lezama of entering into collusion with Roque in obtaining a judgment by
default against La Paz. The Sps. Lezama denied this, claiming that they did not contest Roques complaint, knowing it to be a legitimate
obligation pursuant to a resolution of the board of directors.
During trial, Dineros prayed for Mrs. Lezama to be issued a subpoena to testify as a witness. Such subpoena indicated that Mrs. Lezama
was to do no more than testify as an adverse party in the case and that she would be doing so as secretary of the company who signed
the minutes of the meeting where her husband was authorized to negotiate the loan.
Issue: Does the marital disqualification rule apply in this case?
Held: Yes. The complaint charges fraudulent conspiracy on the part of the Spouses and Roque to make it appear that La Paz was
indebted to Roque. Mrs. Lezama was being called to testify as an adverse party witness on the basis of her participation in the alleged
fraudulent scheme, which was as secretary of the company who signed the minutes of the meeting during which her husband was
allegedly authorized to negotiate the loan, and who made the entry in the books of the corporation.
Evidently, Mrs. Lezama will be asked to testify on what actually transpired during the meeting and will be asked questions on the amtter
of the veracity or falsity of the entry in the books of the corporation. Whether her testimony will turn out to be adverse or beneficial to her
interest, the inevitable result would be to pit her against her husband. The interests of husband and wife in this case are necessarily
interrelated. Testimony adverse to the wifes own interests would tend to show the existence of collusive fraud between the spouses and
would then work havoc upon their common defense that the loan was not fictitious. There is the possibility, too, that the wife, to soften her
own guilt, if guilty she is, may unwittingly testify in a manner entirely disparaging to the interests of the husband.
It is argued that, when the spouses are parties to an action, there is no reason why either may not be examined as a witness for or
against himself or herself alone, and his or her testimony could operate only agianst himself or herself. Even if such view were accepted
as an exception to the marital disqualification rule, or even as a separate doctrine, it would be inapplicable in this case where the main
charge is collusive fraud between the spouses and a third person and the evident purpose of examination of the wife is to prove that
charge.
Doctrine: A husband cannot be examined for or against his wife

An Act Declaring Forfeiture In Favor of the State Any Property To Have Been Unlawfully Acquired By Any Public Officer or
Employee and Providing For the Procedure Therefor.