Auraria’s Inception: Urban Renewal and Higher Education in Downtown Denver, 1965-1976. Term Paper Urban History Fall 2010 December 7, 2010 University of Colorado at Denver ‘The first day of classes at the Auraria campus began on January 7, 1976. After over a decade of planning, the Community College of Denver (CCD) became the first institution to operate on campus. The other two institutions that operate on the Auraria campus currently, the University of Colorado at Denver (UCD) and the Metropolitan State College (MSC), had not yet relocated to the campus because their buildings were still under construction. The muddy lawns lacked grass and other landscaping. When classes began CCD occupied the only two completed buildings, one administrative, the other for vocational classes Although this event did not receive much fanfare, it marked the culmination of years of redevelopment efforts from higher-education officials, urban planners, and state politicians. ‘The plan to construct the Auraria Higher Education Center (AHEC) required approval from the federal government, the Denver City Council, Denver voters, as well as the Colorado state legislature and court system. Before the conclusion of the approval process, displaced business owners and residents launched legal challenges against the project. Historic preservationists also fought to obtain landmark-status protection for some of the more culturally significant buildings in 1 Pat McGraw, “CCD Faculty Begins Move to New Auraria Campus,” Denver Post, December 8, 1975, 4.the Auraria neighborhood. While the business owners and residents were unsuccessful, historic preservationists managed to save two churches, one synagogue, and the Tivoli Union brewery. The educational and renewal motives of the college planners changed numerous times before the first shovel broke ground in the project. From its inception, however, the project called for a campus that served the Community College of Denver (CCD), the Metropolitan State College (Metro, or MSC}, and the University of Colorado at Denver (UCD). All three of these institutions had different educational objectives, degree programs, admissions policies, and institutional curricula. ‘The original Auraria plan used the California Master Plan for Higher Education as a model. Auraria’s plan called for institutions that served all students with a high school diploma or its equivalent whom wished to attend college, regardless of their socio-economic status, and offered programs ranging from two- year associate's degrees to postgraduate degrees. The Colorado Commission on Higher Education (CCHE) had also intended for UCD to function as a temporary, stopgap measure and for MSC to offer two-year degrees before transitioning into a four year degree granting college and replacing UCD, which complicated matters further. Additionally, the CCHE intended for alf three institutions to have separate admissions, programs, and curricula while offering degrees that transferred from institution to institution. In the end college planners were successful because they implemented a flexible, dynamic, decision-making process. Political infighting among college officials in addition to above-budget costs, declining admission numbers, and a reduction in federal funds threatened to derail the project.However, college officials, urban redevelopers, and state legislators worked together to create the Auraria Higher Education Center. Examined in a larger urban-planning context, the Auraria project occurred during a time of large-scale social change. The G.{. Bill and postwar “baby boomers” led to a drastic increase in college enrolment in the United States. At the same time higher-education officials were questioning the effectiveness of college campuses physically and psychologically separated from the surrounding community. Some urban college planners, such as the ones who established MSC, began to experiment with the concept of a campus integrated with its adjacent urban area, This time period, the late 1960 and early 1970s, also marked the beginning of the end of large-scale, federally funded, urban-renewal project. In the 1970s it became increasingly difficult for municipal governments to receive federal funds and use eminent domain to remove people and businesses from redevelopment sites In addition federal “block grants” alowed state governments to allocate the funds to improvement projects that they deemed to be appropriate, instead of the older method of federal grants in which municipalities had to apply for funds for a specific project. The Auraria campus’ construction occurred because university officials, urban planners, and state politicians worked together to create a cogent system of campus governance that met the objectives of the urban planners while functioning within the confines of Colorado's political context. An examination of the actions of 2 Michael Hunt, The World Transformed: 1945 to the Present (Boston: Bedford/St. Martin's, 2004), 176-17. 2 Amanda | Siligman, Block by Block: Neighborhoods and Public Policy on Chicago's West Side (The University of Chicago Press, 2005); John Kromer, Fixing Broken Cities: The implementation of Urban Development Strategies (New York: Routledge Press, 2010).the parties involved with the Auraria project provides an understanding of the project's success and the relationship between higher education and urban planning in the postwar United States. Itis no coincidence that urban planners and higher- education officials came together to build a university campus at this time, Both parties benefited from the project and it was conducive to the political context. ‘There are not enough peer-reviewed, secondary-source historical works that examine the inception of universities as a form of urban redevelopment in the mid- twentieth century. Perhaps one reason why few sources analyze institutions like Auraria is because few institutions like Auraria exist. Many of the works focus on the educational, economic, or political aspects of universities in the late 1960s and the early 1970s, Works that address all three aspects, however, tend to examine events that occurred after the inception and opening of the Auraria Campus. One common analytical approach to the historical discussion of this topic appears in Amanda J. Seligman’s Block by Block: Neighborhoods and Public Policy on Chicago's West Side. Seligman discusses an attempt to build a college campus as a form of urban renewal. While she examines the political context of the situation, she does not discuss university governance because the project never materialized. Scholarly writings that address university governance from this period examine the California Master Plan for Higher Education. Even Clark Kerr, who was President of the University of California when he wrote the Master Plan, has critiqued it, Regarding higher education, Kerr asserts, “History moves faster than the observer'spen.”* In the early 1980s, historians and other scholarly observers began to address the connection between higher education and urban renewal. In doing so they created the analytical framework necessary to examine the inception of the Auraria Campus. In Beyond the Campus: How Colleges and Universities Form Partnerships with their Communities, David J. Maurrasse examines urban-renewal initiatives San Francisco State University (SFSU) at the end of the twentieth century. While SFSU has similarities to Auraria, SPSU existed as an institution before World War Il, unlike CCD, MSC, and UCD, An amalgamation of these three analytical approaches provides a more comprehensive understanding of the events leading to the day that the first semester of classes began at the Auraria Campus. In the postwar United States, urban planners began to view the construction of higher education campuses asa form of urban renewal. At the same time, the number of students enrolled in postsecondary education skyrocketed. Downtown areas lost jobs, residents, and capital to the suburbs, while institutions of higher education struggled to meet the burgeoning needs of their students. These two trends caused urban planners and education officials to realize that they could both benefit from urban renewal via campus construction. The national political context facilitated urban renewal endeavors by subsidizing education through the G.. Bill and other types of financial aid, increasing research funding for the burgeoning military-industrial-university complex, and funding the construction of institutions of higher education asa form of urban renewal. * Clark Kerr, The Uses of the University Fifth Edition (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2001), 5,One explanation for the rise urban-renewal-based campus construction is thatit was mutually beneficial to the powerful parties involved while coinciding with the national political environment. While descriptions of actors and the national context explain the campus’ inception, they do not say much about why the project was a success. Successful implementation required a coherent system of university governance. An examination of the coalescence of all these factors ~ committed planners from the public and private sphere, an accepting national political context, and coherent university governance - explains why the Auraria campus project fulfilled the expectations of those who envisioned it. In the spring on 1965 the Platte River flooded. One area that the flood affected greatly was the Auraria neighborhood. This neighborhood was one of the first areas where whites settled in Denver. Near the end of the nineteenth century, German immigrants were the predominant inhabitants. This, however, changed in the early-twentieth century when Latinos began to move in and the Germans began to move out of the neighborhood. By the mid-1920s Auraria’s Latinos had constructed their own church, St. Cajetan’s, Eventually the church ran a parochial school, a credit union, a soup kitchen, and a health center. Shortly after the church began offering services to the Spanish-speaking Aurarians, the neighborhood began to decline. In 1925 the city rezoned the area as a businessand light industry manufacturing zone.5 No one could build new dwelling units and due to the low-income levels of the residents, it was difficult to 5 Donna McEneroe, Denver Renewed: A History of the Denver Urban Renewal Authority, ed. Dick Johnson (Denver, CO: The Denver Foundation and Alex B. Holland Memorial Fund, 1992), 501.repair existing houses. There is also a distinct possibility that Federal Housing Authority policies resulted in a “redlined” designation for the neighborhood, which meant that Aurarians could not receive bank loans for housing because a white, “racially homogeneous” population did notinhabit the neighborhood From 1940 to 1968 — the year in which urban planners choose Auraria as the future site of the campus, the number of housing units in the neighborhood declined by approximately seventy-five percent.” During the middle third of the twentieth century, businesses came and went leaving behind abandoned buildings and vacant lots in addition to deteriorating houses® These three conditions created an environment that urban planners called a “blighted sium.” Shortly after the flood, the Denver Urban Renewal Authority (DURA) - a government-created redevelopment organization comprised of local business leaders ~ embarked upon an ambitious plan of downtown renewal via the construction of a three-institution, higher education campus. Urban planners hoped that displaced Aurarians might move into the then-soon-to-be-completed Skyline public housing located a few blocks away in lower downtown in a nine-square-block area between 17% and 18% Streets, They also wanted campus to blend in with downtown and be visually pleasing to view from a future conventions center. They argued thata centrally © Thomas Sugrue, “Crabgrass-Roots Politics: Race, Politics, and the Reaction against Liberalism in the Urban North,” Journal of American History 82, no. 2 (September 1995): 564. 7 Denver Public Library, Western History Collection, Denver Urban Renewal Authority manuscripts, Box 4, File Folder 4, “Panning, Studies, Surveys, 1969-1970.” 8 Robert Kronewitter, “Auraria Higher Education Center and Denver Inner-City Development,” in The University as Urban Developer: Case Studies and Analysis, ed, by David C. Perry and Wim Wiewel (Cambridge, MA: ME. Sharpe, 2005), 99-100.located, downtown, commuter campus could also create impetus for rapid, mass transit, which did not exist at the time? The Auraria campus was product of its political context. There was very little opposition from the Denver electorate, the city and state politicians, the judicial system, or higher education administrators.*° There was bipartisan support for the bill. In the state legislature, Eisenhower Republicans and Establishment Democrats supported the legislation. Politicians on the Right accepted tax-funded infrastructure projects while politicians on the Left expressed little concern for the displaced minority residents. A few rural representatives questioned the merits of the project because it used state funds to pay for an urban project. Supporters of the project swayed the recalcitrant representatives by promising that the envisioned campus could serve approximately twenty percent of college and university students in Colorado and save money by consolidating three institutions onto one campus. In addition, the mayor's office and the governor's administration supported the proposed AHEC project. Cooperation between elected officials and the public contributed to Auraria’s success. Declining downtown retail revenue was one impetus for the construction of the Auraria campus. In the mid-1950s Downtown Denver, Inc (DDI), a group of downtown Denver business owners, approached urban renewal asa way to reverse the downtown merchants’ “heavy financial losses...due to the lure of new suburban ° __ Kronewitter, “Auraria Higher Education Center and Denver Inner-City Development,” 99-100. 19 “The federal government also provided financial support.shopping centers." The DDI obtained consultation services from the Urban Land Institute (ULD), a non-profit organization dedicated to planned urban development, which recommended “urgent action” in the lower downtown area.!? The ULI recommended that redevelopers seck federal grants for “sweeping clearance” of blighted areas, rather than “piecemeal” redevelopment? In hindsight itis not difficult to see that federal funds played an important role in the Auraria campus project. In the project's early planning phase, however, business leaders were reluctant to apply for federal funds. The Denver Chamber of, Commerce, initially, balked at the idea of seeking federal assistance. The Chamber reversed its position after Charles Phelan, executive director ofa Memphis, Tennessee-based organization similar to the DDI, gave Denver urban planners a presentation about a redevelopment project in Memphis that received both federal and municipal funds few years prior.* Phelan also argued that regional funding could diffuse the tax burden to the surrounding county. A real-estate mogul, William Zeckendorf, convinced Denver's urban planners to seek state-level financial support for redevelopment projects. Zeckendorf, the president of a New York-based firm that build the United Bank building at Seventeenth Street and Broadway presented himself as a community member with a vested interest in downtown and rhetorically attacked suburbanites as “free leading and carpetbagging” individuals 31 Harmon Kallman, DP, November 23, 1954, 1. 12 “Learn about ULI,” The Urban Land Institute Official Website, 33 Ed Olsen, DP, March 12, 1955, 1. 1* Ed Olsen, DP, March 12, 1955, 1.who “live off the mother city and fail to contribute a fair share to her tax base."!5 Zeckendorf’s statements contributed to the Auraria’s project’s success because they convinced the Denver Chamber of Commerce to seek financial assistance from the federal government and the state of Colorado. By 1956 some urban planners realized that federal- and state-level tax dollars increased the chances of successful urban redevelopment. There were many urban-renewal organizations in Denver, some public and some private, with overlapping objectives, ambiguous hierarchy, and - at times - leaders who questioned their own legal authority and overall objectives, As a whole the organizations lacked strong leadership. Although redevelopers had realistic, obtainable goals, their lack of organizational direction and questions regarding the constitutionality of some urban-renewal projects resulted in the loss of federal funding for renewal projects in Denver in the late 1950s. Around this time the city’s urban renewal endeavors slowed. However in 1962 the federal government began to accept non-cash “grant- in-aid” from cities in exchange for funds for public and “semi-public” improvements and offered to pay up to two-thirds of urban renewal costs. Under this scenario cash-strapped cities could pledge parcels of land or services in exchange for federal funding for public projects, such as Auraria, or privately owned, publicly funded projects like entertainment arenas. Shortly before the changes to federal funding procedures, in the late 1950s, Denver University began to move classes to its 15 pP, June 14, 1956, 34; Robert L. Perkin, Rocky Mountain News, April 5, 1957, 10. 16 Robert L. Perkin, RMN, April 5, 1957,10. 10present-day University Boulevard campus, creating the need for a four-year, downtown college campus.” Initially DURA Commissioner Alex Holland scoffed at the idea of a non-retail, renewal project because the federal government had not reserved urban renewal funding for higher education. He also opposed the idea of the city providing land for a state educational facility. The prospect of federal funding for renewal influenced Holland's reversal of opinion. After Zeckendorf's statements caused Holland to gain. an understanding of the importance of government funds in urban redevelopment, Denver'splanners began to embark on the campus approval process. Initially the CCHE selected thirteen potential campus sites. In the fall of 1968, the Colorado Springs-based Lamar Kelsey Associates determined that the Auraria site was feasible for the Auraria Higher Education Center (AHEC). Lamar Kelsey advocated “developmental sharing” arguing “building spaces as well as the basic site should be so planned as to permit flexibility and to create the opportunity for sharing as desired by the institutions.” At this point DURA Chairman Alex Holland stil expressed skepticism. Holland explained “although application had been made” to HUD, the Auraria project - an urban college campus - was not one of the types of projects toward which HUD had explicitly allocated funding”? Despite Holland's uncertainty, DURA applied to HUD for federal funds. Fortunately for Holland and DURA, the HUD accepted the request to build the 17 McEncroe, Denver Renewed, 115-117. = RMN, October 4, 1969, SS. 39 Martin Moran, “US. States Conditions for Auraria Site,” RMN, September 30, 1969, 5, iAuraria campus. The federal government attached two stipulations to the allocated funds. First, federal law required the “safe, decent, and adequate” relocation of all the people that the project displaced before developers could receive federal funds2° The second federal stipulation required that displaced people receive first priority for low-income public housing. In addition the state legislature had to approve funds after Denver's voters approved a bond initiative to provide $5.25 million for the campus’ construction. Before Denver's voters could vote on the issue, the city council had to approve it for the ballot. After voters approved the bond initiative the Colorado court system had to determine the bond's constitutionality. Additionally, the city initiative required the state to agree to allocate funds before the city could begin to sell bonds. By achieving a consensus, Denver's voters, state politicians, and urban planners created an environment that facilitated the successful completion of the Auraria project. A quick examination of the failed attempt to construct a University of Illinois campus in Chicago's Garfield Park conveys the significance of public and political cooperation. Striking similarities exist between Auraria’s inception and the unsuccessful Garfield Park campus project. In 1954 the University of Illinois’ ‘Trustees decided to relocate the temporary Navy Pier campus. For eight years Chicagoans had attended classes on a mile-long pier in Lake Michigan that shipping companies utitized simultaneously. Sometimes lost truck drivers stuck their heads through windows into classrooms to ask for directions. Students and faculty had to Moran, “U.S. States Conditions for Auraria Site,” 5. 12walkin narrow corridors to travel the pier in between classes. In Denver Metro students had similar experiences before moving to the Auraria campus. Inrecent yearsat freshman orientation, incoming MSC students hear a story claiming that the school mascot, the Road Runner, originates from a time when students and faculty had to run through the roads and streets of downtown Denver to get from class to class, In both cases the construction of an urban university campus was the first phase of an ambitious urban-redevelopment plan. ‘The Auraria campus project's successes are more apparent compared to the failed University of Mlinois’ Garfield Park campus. In 1959 Chicago Mayor Richard J. Daley created an urban renewal committee to choose a permanent location for the Navy Pier campus. Most neighborhoods adopted a “not in my backyard” approach but white, working-class residents in West Garfield Park suggested the adjacent, deteriorating park as a possible location. The residents thought the campus could act asa barrier to racially segregate black East Garfield Park residents. In a manner similar to Auraria, residents of East and West Garfield Park had minimal political influence. Unlike Auraria, a politically connected ornithological group used Garfield Park. This organization constituted a part of the Garfield Park campus opposition.?* Another significant difference between Denver and Chicago was the cooperation between branches of government in Denver, which Chicago lacked. In Chicago Mayor Daley undermined the prospect of a Garfield Park campus by continuing negotiations for other sites during a court proceeding to determine the whether the park site project was constitutional, 2% Seligman, Black by Block, 99. 2% Seligman, Block by Block, 113. 13Differing approaches to university governance provide some of the explanation of why the proposed Garfield Park campus failed while the Auraria campus project succeeded, From the early stages of development, officials from all three institutions in Denver worked with the urban planners as well as state and local politicians. Specifically college and university officials supported the proposed Auraria site whereas University of Hlinois’ Trustees did not. In Illinois the trustees lacked consensus and continued to examine other proposed sites in the early stages of campus development. This lack of consensus contributed to the failure of the Garfield Park campus. Perhaps the lack of. comprehensive, master plan for higher education in Chicago contributed partially to the lack of consensus. In Colorado the various institutions of higher education adopted a statewide master plan for higher education during the construction phase of the Auraria project. Although higher- education officials had differing views on which academic program each school should offer, they pledged unified support for the Auraria site. An examination of the available information suggests that the University of Hlinois system lacked a similar master plan around this time While it is difficult to state with certainty that Illinois’ lack of a master plan prevented an academic consensus, which caused the Garfield Park campus project to fail, tappears that Colorado's master plan facilitated the success of the Auraria campus project. The Colorado master plan led to the inception of Auraria because it reduced conflict between the three institutions 2 Seligman, Block by Block, 112. 14and created a framework for college and university official to work with the soon- to-be-displaced Latinos in the Auraria neighborhood. ‘The AHEC project was successful, in part, due to cooperative university governance, College and university officials based their model on the California Master Plan for Higher Education. An examination of California's plan and its inception provides a basis for explaining Colorado's plan and Auraria’s successful inception. California adopted the plan in 1960, in response to postwar changes in the social role of higher education. Shortly after World War IL, US. universities experienced a spike in enrollment in terms of absolute numbers as well as relative percentage of the college-age population. In addition the definition of “college-age population” expanded to include students older than the typical prewar college student * At this time student enrolment and federal funding skyrocketed. From 1940to 1960, federal funding for higher education increased by a hundred fold to $1.5 billion25 Immediately after WWH thousands of returning veterans took advantage of the Gl. Bill of Rights, especially its tuition-payment aspects. At the same time, the returning veterans started families, had many children, and produced a huge, demographical cohort, the “baby boomers." This caused a second spike in college-enrollment numbers in the mid-to-late 1960s. In the aftermath of Sputnik, the Soviet-launched satellite, but before the baby boomers ever set foot inside a campus classroom as students, the federal government 24 Hunt, The World Transformed, 176-77. 25 Kerr, Uses of the University, 112. 2 Hunt, The World Transformed, 176-177. 15adopted a more active role in higher education. The cold-war era “space race” and “arms race” resulted in federally funded research projects at universities, oftentimes the universities worked in close conjunction with the defense industry. California’s postwar impetus for higher education reform was twofold. In addition to the skyrocketing enrollment rates, the state had a “long established principle” of tuition-free higher education for all qualified in-state students” In the late 1950s, there was a “growing concern that competition and unnecessary, ‘wasteful duplication between the state colleges and the University of California mightcost the taxpayers millions of dollars."* In response to the potential budgetary issue, university officials sought to create a coherent, statewide system. ‘The Master Plan had four main goals: to create a “system that combined exceptional quality with broad access for students”; to transform “uncoordinated and competing colleges into a coherent system”; to establish a higher-education framework that “encourages each of the three public higher education segments to concentrate on creating its own kind of excellence within its own particular set of responsibilities”; and to establish a “single continuum of educational opportunity” that included institutions ranging from small private colleges to large public universities An understanding of the California Master Plan helps to explain, in part, why the plan that the Colorado Commission on Higher Education adopted was so successful, a “A Master Plan for Higher Education in California, 1960-1975,” University of California Website, 14. 2 “A Master Plan for Higher Education in California, 1960-1975,” xi. 2% “California Master Plan for Higher Education: Major Features,” University of California Website. 16In the same year of the Platte River flood, the Colorado Commission on Higher Education (CCHE) established the Metropolitan State College (MSC). College planners viewed this move as necessary given Denver University’s (DU) exodus from downtown, Before CCHE created MSC, a majority of DU’s student body consisted of in-state students. That trend, however, reversed in the decade after WWIL Around this time a wealthy Denver family donated a parcel of land near DU's present-day University Boulevard campus, which caused DU to shiftits attention away from downtown.** Metro's “in-city campus” occupied various buildings in the downtown area. Asa result students had to dash through the streets to get from class to class. In addition to the logistical inconvenience for students, rent for classroom space cost $1.4 million dollars per year and left little reom for expansion. Asa result urban planners and representatives from CCD, MSC, UCD sought to share a campus while using their own facilities. Ultimately official from the three institutions established a plan that their oversight committee, the Auraria Board of Directors approved. On November 26, 1973 a local newspaper announced that the AHEC Board approved draft legislation to govern the new downtown campus. Although the state legislature had yet to approve of the Board’s plan, college planners had overcome much tension before reaching this point of agreement. After federal and municipal approval in 1969, but before the state’s legislature and courts could finalize the campus’ approval in late 30 McEncroe, Denver Renewed, 250. 171973, members of the CCHE and regents from CU found themselves in disagreement? Although the three institutions had approved governing legislation, they still had areas of disagreement to address. On December 30, 1970, CU officials released a “position paper.” In the paper officials expressed two concerns with the AHEC project: the first claim asserted that CCHE, the board that governed higher education in Colorado, was ignoring CU's request for a “$1.1 million land acquisition adjoining the Auraria campus,” which, from their perspective, stymied the project; the second expressed concern for the statewide method of funding institutions of higher education. CCHE Chairman Donald C. McKinlay dismissed the first claim by stating, “at two separate hearings” the CHE “carefully explained” that CU's land request “had been endorsed by [CCHE] as a number one priority."? The second claim proved more difficult to address. In the second area, CU regents were concerned that the multimillion-dollar downtown campus would receive a disproportionately large amount of state funding for higher education. They were especially concerned with the flagship campus in Boulder.3 However critics of CU regents argued that CU’s consternation over Auraria campus is part of a larger “political conflict” A Rocky Mountain News writer claimed that CU's downtown Denver “expansion center...was originally a stop-gap measure” that CCHE had established temporarily to serve college students who could not attend classes at the Boulder campus “until these duties in education could be 31 “Auraria governing proposal approved,” RMN, November 27, 1973, 29. 3 “Education unit disputes regent's paper,” RMN, February 1, 1970, 8. 3 “Education unit disputes regent’s paper,” RMN, February 1, 1970, 8, 18assumed by other institutions." The journalist implied the Auraria could function without UCD and argued that MSC and CCD should takeover CU’s downtown educational duties. CU’s intransigence caused CCHE to claim that the university saw itself “as above and beyond the Colorado system of higher education.”*5 Before the three institutions could assume effective governance of the campus, they had to work out their differences. CUregents appeared at odds with other downtown, higher-education institutions and the CHE in the early 1970s. Regents, trustees, and other university officials fromall three institutions, with the CCHE, nevertheless, formed a governing board anda technical committee to replace the Auraria working committee in May of 1970. Although the governing board planned to meet monthly, Lawrence Hamilton, director of the Denver Area Higher Education Center Project for the Commission on Higher Education, said the technical committee was “meeting almost daily....Because this is a unique approach to campus construction, it’s going to take a good deal of time and many decisions to determine just exactly how it should be done.” Although the college planners did not agree on some issues, they increased Auraria’s chance for success when they established a deliberative framework with which to address the conflicts of the campus’ construction and utilization. Officials from the three institutions also realized that the project presented them with unique and complex issues. As a result, in June of 1970, the CCHE hired a x Fasquate Marranzino, “This song is a little bit off key,” RMN, February 7, 1970, 37. 3 Marranzino, “This song is a little bit off key,” 37. 36 “Two Groups Named For Auraria Project,” Denver Post, May 5, 1970, 50. 19Denver planning firm “to calculate space needs for joint educational facilities.”2” Early estimates predicted a three-million-dollar reduction in construction costs due to the building-sharing plan3* Higher-education officials were taking the necessary steps for campus construction when the project experienced a potential setback in late in 1971. Ata hearing before the Colorado Legislature's Joint Budget Committee, State Representative Don Friedman, an opponent of the Auraria project, cited a recent, decline in enrollment in post-secondary education in Denver and “suggested current plans for Auraria might result in overbuilding,”® In response, Shelby F. Harper, a member of the Auraria Board of Directors, an AHEC oversight committee, argued the need fora campus, She explained that it was “increasingly difficult to obtain existing space for lease” in which to expand classroom space. Even without expansion Harper estimated the annual rent for the buildings that the institutions used had the potential to increase by over four fold in less than fifteen years due to inflation and increased demand for downtown real estate. She explained that the institutions could save money in the long run if they shared facilities on a common campus.” After averting the potential loss of state funding that Friedman had tried to implements, CU official still took issue with the Auraria campus-funding process. ‘The CCHE addressed this situation in its educational report, “Planning for the #7 “Space Planner Hired For Auraria Center,” DP, June 28, 1970, 27. 38 “Space Planner Hired For Auraria Center,” DP, June 28, 1970, 27. Martin Moran, “Backers, opponents debate possible Auraria cutback,” DP, December 17, 1971, 87. *© Moran, “Backers, opponents debate possible Auraria cutback,” DP, December 17, 1971, 87. 2070’s."** In conjunction with legislative action in 1971, the report enacted an “enrolment lid” for CU's Boulder campus. The Rocky Mountain News argued that the report was a message to CU stating that the only way the university could expand its power and influence was through expanding in downtown. Dr. Frederick Thieme, the president of CU, responded that UCD could offer two-year-degree programs and proposed an Auraria campus without Metro. MSC supporters retorted that although tuition rates at UCD were comparable to Metro's, the latter served students with lower academic qualifications, which was an integral part of the master plan. However, from 1968 to 1971, the percentage of Metro’s entering freshman from the upper-third of their high-school graduating class increased.” By late 1971 Denver's higher education needs had shifted somewhat and it created a sense of uncertainty among higher-education officials. As a result higher-education officials, who did not always agree on issues of governance and finance, had to reevaluate their objectives and strategies continually. They each wanted to ensure the construction of a ‘campus at Auraria and they each wanted to secure a place for their respective institution. Atthis point there were two critical questions: Was Metro a college for “low- achieving’ students? And, if so, was ita “model for some new form” of higher education?# A California-style master plan provided some answers to their questions. Critics of Auraria asked how the campus might implement its policy of ‘\_ALKnight, “Auraria dream - still in trouble? — first ofa series: Educational center at critical juncture,” RMN, December 26, 1971, 5. ‘2 Knight, “Auraria dream - still in trouble 2 — first ofa series: Educational center at critical juncture,” RMN, December 26, 1971, 5. 8 Knight, “Auraria dream - still in trouble?” 5. 21credits that transfer from institution to institution while maintaining three separate admission policies. The answers to these questions shaped the future of the Auraria campus. Critics also pointed out “{a]s with any large project there isa danger that it will be obsolete the minute it is opened, unless planning is constantly revised.” In order to avoid obsolescence, higher-education officials had to reevaluate their plan constantly in light of budgetary changes, decreasing enrolment, and political infighting among university officials. Higher-education officials realized that a flexible, comprehensive plan was necessary for the completion of the Auraria campus project. Jacques Calmon Brownson, the director of planning and development for the Auraria Board of Directors, sought to address the dynamic issues by proposing that the campus buildings “be flexible so they can be adopted to the changing needs of the users.”*5 Although CU regents were at odds with officials from the other two institutions, in February of 1972 CU’s president and presidents from the other two institutions announced a plan for a “comprehensive higher educational program.” Under this plan both Metro and the UCD offered undergraduate programs while the Community Collegeand Metro served new freshman. In an attempt to answer the separate-admission, transferable-credit problem, the two latter institutions adopted reciprocal enrollment policies. 4 Al Knight, “Auraria dream — still in trouble? - last of series: Several serious questions on project unanswered,” RMN, December 28, 1971, 5. 45 Martin Moran, “Auraria director cites challenges,” RMN, September 26, 1972, 6 ‘6 Martin Moran, “3 institutions in cooperative endeavor: CU Regents approve education plan,” RMN, February 24, 1972, 6. 22CU regents approved the comprehensive higher education plan, which said much about what UCD could not do. In response to the comprehensive plan's restrictions the University of Colorado Board of Regents issued a statement seeking to establish a dual-level administrative system in which individual institutions were responsible for “admissions, curriculum requirements, and course content.”*” CU's proposal also allowed the three institutions to maintain a system in which credits and degrees transferred from one institution to another.‘* Two months later governing boards from all three institutions meet and pledged both “cooperation [between institutions] and the insistence on academic contro!” within the individual institutions.” ‘This agreement provided the basis for the CCHE-approved Master Plan for the Auraria campus. This plan called for a three-phase implementation. Phase | called for the construction of 200,000 gross square feet to house CCD facilities and 40,000 gross square feet of “unassigned classroom and laboratory space” for the three institutions to share. The CCHE intended for this phase’s completion to occur in time for students to attend classes in 1974. The second phase called for 400,000 ‘square feet of shared facilities by 1975. The final phase added 370,000 square feet of shared space by 1976. With a comprehensive plan that state legislators, college officials, and urban planners agreed upon, Phase I groundbreaking occurred on October 4, 1973.5° #7 Martin Moran, “CU’s Auraria role examined,” RMN, January 25, 1973, 56. 48 Martin Moran, “CU’s Auraria role examined,” RMN, January 25, 1973, 56. * “Auraria Genter institutions meet,” RMN, March 27, 1973, 101. 50 Martin Moran, “Auraria education plan gains approval,” RMN, May 26, 1973, 23Although the CCHE had intended for classes to begin in 1974, construction took longer than planned. CCD was the first institution to move to Auraria, they held the first classes on Auraria on January 7, 1976. MSC and UCD moved on campus later in that calendar year. Although the campus opened in 1976, it took twelve more years for urban planners and higher-education officials to complete the street modifications and other urban renewal projects that incorporated the Auraria campus into downtown Denver. Although, with pre-construction phases included, the project took roughly twenty-five years to complete! Nonetheless, the project functioned as the starting point for other urban-redevelopment projects that renewed downtown Denver greatly, such as the 16" Street Mall, and the Colorado Convention Center. ‘When examining the procession of urban areas in the postwar United States, it is not surprising that institutions of higher education have taken a more active role in urban affairs. An examination of San Francisco State University's (SFSU) urban-outreach program provides some explanation of why higher-education institutions have incentive to establish community relations in urban areas. For example, if the urban area surrounding the university declines and crime rates increase, universities may experience a decline in enrollment in conjunction with an increase in safety expenses. Additionally, in the postwar era of urban capital flight, institutions of higher education do not have the same impetus for relocation as, private corporations. Unlike production-based industries, institutions of higher education cannot relocate overseas because faculty and students need the ability to st Kronewitter, “Auraria Higher Education and Inner-City Denver,” 112. 52 Maurrasse, Beyond the Campus, 5. 24live on campus or commute to campus from a nearby location on nearly a daily basis, Capital flight, in both Denver and San Francisco, created potential benefits for higher education by opening up downtown property and creating a large, low- skilled workforce? Members of this work force were potential students and ‘employees for the university, The businesses that remained downtown had the potential to benefit from the presence of institutions of higher education as well because the students and faculty were both potential customers and potential employees. ‘The Auraria campus project was successful because urban planners, state politicians, and higher-education officials worked together. While they did not always agree on every aspect of campus construction and utilization, they compromised with one another to reach a working consensus. They were willing to join forces because they both saw the potential benefits and the public supported the project, as did state and federal politicians. There was a large supply of college students and the federal government was willing to contribute funding. Shortly after the campus’ completion, the federal government reduced greatly the funding available for projects like the Auraria campus. The Auraria campus product was a product of its political context. S Maurrasse, Beyond the Campus, 4. 25