Jose Cangco vs. Manila Railroad Co.

Fisher, J.
October 14, 1918
G.R. No. L-12191
Doctrine
Nature and Basis of liability
1) The foundation of the legal liability of the defendant is the contract of carriage, and that the obligation to
respond for the damage which plaintiff has suffered arises, if at all, from the breach of that contract by
reason of the failure of defendant to exercise due care in its performance.
2) The contract of defendant to transport plaintiff carried with it, by implication, the duty to carry him in
safety and to provide safe means of entering and leaving its trains (civil code, article 1258). That duty,
being contractual, was direct and immediate, and its non-performance could not be excused by proof that
the fault was morally imputable to defendant's servants.
3) Every obligation must necessarily be contractual or extra contractual.
Contractual: The vinculum exists independently of the breach of the voluntary duty assumed by the parties
when entering into the contractual relation. Proof of the contract and of its non-performance is
sufficient prima facie to warrant a recovery. Proof of exercise of the utmost diligence and care in this regard
does not relieve the master of his liability for the breach of his contract.

Summary

Facts

Ratio/
Issues

Extra-contractual: The wrongful or negligent act or omission itself creates the vinculum juris. The
legislature has limited extra contractual liability to persons who are in a position to exercise an absolute or
limited control over them.
Cangco, an employee of Manila Railroad, was on board the train one night and as it was slowly coming to a
halt at the station, he stepped out and tripped on a sack of watermelons on the platform. He went under the
train and his right arm was lacerated and later amputated. He sued the respondent, claiming that its employees
were negligent in placing an obstruction in the platform. The latter countered that Cangcos contributory
negligence led to his accident. The trial court ruled in favour of the respondent. The Supreme Court reversed it
and held that, considering the circumstances, including his age and his familiarity with the said practice,
Cangco acted without imprudence in alighting from the train.
- Cangco was an employee of respondent and he used the latters trains to commute daily to work from
his house in Mateo, Rizal, having a free pass to ride the same.
- The Accident: Between 7:00 - 8:00 pm, as the train was slowly coming to a halt at the station, he
stepped off from the second-class car, but his feet landed on a stack of watermelons placed on the
cement platform. He landed violently on the platform and went under the train, its wheels crushing his
right arm. At the time, the station was dimly lit.
- Expenses: His right arm was amputated, incurring P790.25 as medical expenses. (His monthly
salarys only P25)
- Damages suit: Filed against respondent, founding his action upon the negligence of the servants and
employees of the defendant in placing the sacks of melons upon the platform. Respondent countered
that he was guilty of contributory negligence so he couldnt recover. The trial court ruled in favor of
the respondent.
1. Whether petitioner could recover damages from respondent (YES)
COURT: A. It (the Court) admitted that respondents employees were negligent in placing the sack of
watermelons on the platform and that it is liable for the damage thereby occasioned unless recovery is barred
by the plaintiff's own contributory negligence.
B. Respondents primary responsibility CONTRACT of CARRIAGE (See doctrine no.1).
C. Said liability must be distinguished from the presumptive responsibility for the negligence of its servants in
Art. 2180 which can be rebutted by proof of the exercise of due care in their selection and supervision.
Said provision is inapplicable to obligations arising ex contractu (culpa contractual) and only applies to extracontractual obligations (culpa aquiliana).
Two things are apparent from the provision: 1) That when an injury is caused by the negligence of a

servant or employee there arises a presumption of law that there was negligence on the part of the
master or employer either in the selection or in supervision, or both; and (2) that presumption is juris
tantum and not juris et de jure, and may be rebutted.
D. (See doctrine no.3 for the distinction) Since its not necessary for the plaintiff in an action for the breach of
a contract to show that this was due to the negligent conduct of defendant or of his servants, its obvious that
proof on the part of defendant that the negligence or omission of his servants or agents caused the breach of
the contract would not constitute a defense to the action.
If the negligence of servants or agents could be invoked as a means of discharging the liability arising
from contract, the anomalous result would be that person acting through the medium of agents or
servants in the performance of their contracts, would be in a better position than those acting in
person.
E. In a long line of cases, the Court has never decided that the negligence of the defendant's servants can
constitute a defense to an action for damages for breach of contract. The true explanation for this is found in
the relative two concentric fields of contractual and extra-contractual obligations.
The field of non- contractual obligation is much more broader than that of contractual obligations. It
shows that the mere fact that a person is bound to another by contract does not relieve him from extracontractual liability to such person. When there is a contract, the obligor may still break it under such
conditions that the same act will constitute as a source of extra contractual obligation (as if theres no
contract at all).
Thus, the duty to transport the plaintiff safely, being contractual, was direct and immediate, and its
non-performance could not be excused by proof that the fault was morally imputable to defendant's
servants. (See doctrine no. 2)
2. Whether Cangco was guilty of contributory negligence (NO)
COURT: A. Citing Thompsons work on Negligence, the test by which to determine whether the passenger
has been guilty of negligence in attempting to alight from a moving railway train, is that of ordinary or
reasonable care.1
B. Cangco had a right to assume, in the absence of some circumstance to warn him to the contrary, that the
platform was clear. The place, being dimly lit, is a proof of its failure in the performance of its duty towards
the plaintiff.
C. In holding that he was not imprudent in acting the way he did, the Court took note of the following facts:
that the platform was constructed higher than that of the roadbed and the surrounding ground (decreasing the
risk incident of stepping off), that is was made of cement, that the plaintiff was a young man with vigor and
vitality, and that the place was familiar to him.
HELD

Decision reversed. Judgment rendered for plaintiff.

Dissenting
opinion,
Malcolm, J.

An attempt to alight from a moving train is negligence per se.

Prepared by: Eunice V Guadalope [Transpo]

1 Or, as restated in the case of Picart vs. Smith, was there anything in the circumstances
surrounding the plaintiff at the time he alighted from the train which would have admonished a
person of average prudence that to get off the train under the conditions then existing was
dangerous?