LIBI VS IAC

Posted by kaye lee on 3:00 AM

G.R. No. 70890 September 18 1992
FACTS:
Wendell Libi shot his lover Julie Ann Giotong, both minors, before he turned the firearm on
himself. As a result, the parents of Julie Ann filed against Wendell's parents to recover
damages. The trial court rendered judgment dismissing the complaint for insufficiency of
evidence. CA reversed the decision.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the parents of Wendell Libi liable for vicarious liability.
RULING:
Yes. The subsidiary liability of parents for damages cause by their minor children is imposed
by Article 2180 of the New Civil Code, which covers obligations arising from both quasidelicts and criminal offenses. The parents' liability as being primary and not subsidiary and
liability shall ceased if the parents can prove that they observe all the diligence of a good
father to prevent damage.
In this case, the parents had not exercised due diligence in supervising the activities of their
son. It was only at the time of Wendell's death that they allegedly discovered that he was
drug informant of CANU and that the gun used in the shooting incident was missing from the
safety deposit box. Having been grossly negligent in preventing Wendell from having access
to said gun, the Libis are subsidiary liable for the natural consequence of the criminal act of
said minor who was living in their company.
Categories: G.R. No. 70890, Libi vs Intermediate Appellate Court, Philippine Civil Code

Salen vs. Balce

SEVERINO SALEN and ELENA SALBANERA vs. JOSE BALCE
G.R. No. L-14414. 27 April 1960.
Appeal from a judgment of the CFI of Camarines Norte.

Facts: Plaintiffs are the legitimate parents of Carlos Salen who died from wounds caused by Gumersindo
Balce, a legitimate son of defendant who was then single, 18 yrs old and was living with defendant. As a
result of C. Salen's death, G. Balce was accused and convicted of homicide and was sentenced to
imprisonment and to pay the amount of P2,000.00. Plaintiffs brought this action against defendant
before CFI to recover the sum of P2,000.00, with legal interest. Defendant, in his answer, set up the
defense that the law upon which plaintiffs predicate their right to recover does not here apply for the
reason that law refers to quasi-delicts and not to criminal cases. CFI sustained the theory of defendant.
Issue: WON appellee can be held subsidiary liable to pay the indemnity in accordance with Art. 2180 of

the CC.
Ruling: Judgment reversed.
Art 2180 CC applies in the case at bar. To hold otherwise would result in the absurdity that while for an
act where mere negligence intervenes the father or mother may stand subsidiarily liable for the damage
caused by his or her son, no liability would attach if the damage is caused with criminal intent. Verily, the
void that apparently exists in the RPC (art.101) is subserved by this particular provision of our CC, as may
be gleaned from some recent decisions of the SC which cover equal or identical cases.

YHT Realty Corp, et al vs. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 126780. February 17, 2005
Facts: MAURICE McLaughlin is an Australian national who comes to the Philippines for business. During
his trips he stays in Tropicana, a hotel recommended to him by Brunhilda Tan. McLaughlin deposited
cash and jewelry to the safety deposit box of the Hotel. The safety deposit box cannot be opened unless the
key of the guest and that of the management are present. Lainez and Payam are employees of Tropicana
who is charged with the custody of the keys. Thereafter, McLaughlin found out that some of the money
and jewelry he deposited were missing. Lainez and Payam admitted that they assisted Tan to open his
deposit box. Tan admitted that she stole McLaughlins keys. Tan executed a promissory note to cover the
amount of the stolen money and jewelry. McLaughlin wanted to make the management liable.
Issue: Whether or not a hotel may evade liability for the loss of items left with it for safekeeping by its
guests, by having these guests execute written waivers holding the establishment or its employees free
from blame for such loss in light of Article 2003 of the Civil Code which voids such waivers.
Held: The issue of whether the Undertaking For The Use of Safety Deposit Box executed by McLoughlin
is tainted with nullity presents a legal question appropriate for resolution in this petition. Notably, both
the trial court and the appellate court found the same to be null and void. We find no reason to reverse
their common conclusion. Article 2003 is controlling, thus:
Art. 2003. The hotel-keeper cannot free himself from responsibility by posting notices to the effect that he
is not liable for the articles brought by the guest. Any stipulation between the hotel-keeper and the guest
whereby the responsibility of the former as set forth in Articles 1998 to 2001[37] is suppressed or
diminished shall be void.
Article 2003 was incorporated in the New Civil Code as an expression of public policy precisely to apply to
situations such as that presented in this case. The hotel business like the common carriers business is
imbued with public interest. Catering to the public, hotelkeepers are bound to provide not only lodging for
hotel guests and security to their persons and belongings. The twin duty constitutes the essence of the
business. The law in turn does not allow such duty to the public to be negated or diluted by any contrary
stipulation in so-called undertakings that ordinarily appear in prepared forms imposed by hotel keepers
on guests for their signature.

G.R. No. 157906

November 2, 2006

Lessons Applicable: Res ipsa loquitur (Torts and Damages)

Laws Applicable: Art. 2176 Art. 2180 and Art. 1869 of the Civil Code

FACTS:

April 4, 1984: Natividad Agana was rushed to the Medical City General
Hospital because of difficulty of bowel movement and bloody anal
discharge. Dr. Miguel Ampil diagnosed her to be suffering from cancer of the
sigmoid.

April 11, 1984: Dr. Ampil performed an anterior resection surgery on

Natividad and found that the malignancy in her sigmoid area had spread
on her left ovary, necessitating the removal of certain portions of it

Dr. Ampil obtained the consent of Natividads husband, Enrique

Agana to perform hysterectomy.

After a couple of days, Natividad consulted both Dr. Ampil and Dr.
Fuentes about the excruciating pain in her anal region. Dr. Ampil
recommended that she consult an oncologist.

May 9, 1984: The Aganas went to the United States to seek further
treatment and was told she was FREE from cancer.

August 31, 1984: Natividad's daughter found a piece of gauze

protruding from her vagina. Dr. Ampil proceeded to her house and
extracted by hand a piece of gauze measuring 1.5 inches in width and
assuring that the pain will vanish.

When the pain intensified, Nativided went to Polymedic General

Hospital where Dr. Ramon Gutierrez found a foul-smelling gauze
measuring 1.5 inches in width which badly infected her vaginal vault
which formed a recto-vaginal fistula forcign her stool to excrete through
the vagina.

October 1984: Natividad underwent another surgery to remedy the

damage

February 16, 1986: Natividad died so she was substituted by her

children

RTC: PSI solidarily liable with Dr. Ampil and Dr. Fuentes for damages for
negligence and malpractice

CA: absolved Dr. Fuentes upon the same advise from the PRC Board of
Medicine for failure to show that he placed the guages or concealed the
fact from Natividad
ISSUE: W/N Dr. Fuentes may be held liable under the principle of res ipso
loquitor

HELD: NO. CA affirmed

Dr. Ampil as the negligent party

surgeons used gauzes as sponges to control the bleeding of the

patient during the surgical operation
immediately after the operation, the nurses who assisted in the
surgery noted in their report 2 sponges lacking
2 gauzes were extracted from the same spot of the body of Mrs.
Agana
element 3 "control and management of the thing which caused the
injury" to be wanting
Dr. Fuentes performed the surgery and thereafter reported and
showed his work to Dr. Ampil who allowed Dr. Fuentes to leave the
operating room
Under the "Captain of the Ship" rule, the operating surgeon is
the person in complete charge of the surgery room and all personnel
connected with the operation

res ipsa loquitur

not a rule of substantive law, hence, does not per se create or constitute

an independent or separate ground of liability, being a mere evidentiary rule

mere invocation and application of the doctrine does not dispense with the

requirement of proof of negligence

Art. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being
fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence,
if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasidelict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter.
ART. 2180. The obligation imposed by Article 2176 is demandable not only for

ones own acts or omissions, but also for those of persons for whom one is
responsible.
The owners and managers of an establishment or enterprise are likewise responsible for
damages caused by their employees in the service of the branches in which the latter
are employed or on the occasion of their functions.
Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and household
helpers acting within the scope of their assigned tasks even though the former are not
engaged in any business or industry.
x

The responsibility treated of in this article shall cease when the persons herein
mentioned prove that they observed all the diligence of a good father of a family to
prevent damage.

failed to adduce evidence showing that it exercised the diligence of a

good father of a family in the accreditation and supervision
private hospitals, hire, fire and exercise real control over their
attending and visiting consultant staff
control test is determining
for the purpose of allocating responsibility in medical negligence
cases, an employer-employee relationship in effect exists between
hospitals and their attending and visiting physicians
ART. 1869. Agency may be express, or implied from the acts of the principal,
from his silence or lack of action, or his failure to repudiate the agency, knowing
that another person is acting on his behalf without authority.

By accrediting Dr. Ampil and Dr. Fuentes and publicly advertising their
qualifications, the hospital created the impression that they were its
agents, authorized to perform medical or surgical services for its patients
doctrine of corporate negligence or corporate responsibility
knowledge of any of the staff of Medical City Hospital constitutes
knowledge of PSI
It is worthy to note that Dr. Ampil and Dr. Fuentes
operated on Natividad with the assistance of the Medical City Hospitals
staff, composed of resident doctors, nurses, and interns

SPS. BUENAVENTURA JAYME AND ROSARIO JAYME, petitioners,

vs.
RODRIGO APOSTOL, FIDEL LOZANO, ERNESTO SIMBULAN, MAYOR
FERNANDO Q. MIGUEL, MUNICIPALITY OF KORONADAL (NOW CITY OF
KORONADAL), PROVINCE OF SOUTH COTABATO, represented by the
MUNICIPAL TREASURER and/or MUNICIPAL MAYOR FERNANDO Q.
MIGUEL, and THE FIRST INTEGRATED BONDING AND INSURANCE
COMPANY, INC., respondents.
G.R. No. 163609

[November 27, 2008]

FACTS:
On February 5, 1989, Mayor Miguel of Koronadal, South Cotabato was on board the
Isuzu pick-up truck driven by Fidel Lozano, an employee of the Municipality of
Koronadal. The pick-up truck was registered under the name of Rodrigo Apostol, but it

was then in the possession of ErnestoSimbulan. Lozano borrowed the pick-up truck
from Simbulan to bring Miguel to Buayan Airport at General Santos City to catch his
Manila
flight.
The pick-up truck accidentally hit Marvin C. Jayme, a minor, who was then crossing the
National Highway in South Cotabato. The intensity of the collision sent Marvin some 50
meters away from the point of impact, a clear indication that Lozano was driving at a
very high speed at the time of the accident. Marvin sustained severe head injuries.
Despite medical attention, Marvin expired six (6) days after the accident.
ISSUE:
MAY a municipal mayor be held solidarily liable for the negligent acts of the driver
assigned
to
him
MAY an LGU be held liable for the tortuous act of a government employee.
RULING:
1. It is uncontested that Lozano was employed as a driver by the municipality. That he
was subsequently assigned to Mayor Miguel during the time of the accident is of no
moment.
The
Municipality
of
Koronadal
remains
to
be
Lozanos employer notwithstanding Lozanos assignment to Mayor Miguel. Even
assuming arguendo that Mayor Miguel hadauthority to give instructions or directions to
Lozano, he still cannot be held liable. In Benson v. Sorrell, the New England Supreme
Court ruled that mere giving of directions to the driver does not establish that the
passenger has control over the vehicle. Neither does it render one theemployer of the
driver.
Mayor Miguel was neither Lozanos employer nor the vehicles registeredowner. There
existed no causal relationship between him and Lozano or the vehicle used that will
make him accountable for Marvins death. Mayor Miguel was a mere passenger at the
time
of
the
accident.
2. The municipality may not be sued because it is an agency of the State engaged in
governmental functions and, hence, immune from suit. This immunity is illustrated in
Municipality of San Fernando, La Union v. Firme, where the Court held that municipal
corporations are suable because their charters grant them the competence to sue and be
sued. Nevertheless, they are generally not liable for torts committed by them in the
discharge of governmental functions and can only be held answerable only if it can be

shown that they were acting in proprietary capacity. In permitting such entities to be
sued, the State merely gives the claimantthe right to show that the defendant was not
acting in governmentalcapacity when the injury was committed or that the case comes
under
the
exceptions recognized by law. Failing this, the claimant cannot recover.
Liability attaches to the registered owner, the negligent driver and his direct employer.
Settled is the rule that the registered owner of a vehicle is jointly and severally liable
with the driver for damages incurred by passengers and third persons as a consequence
of injuries or death sustained in the operation of said vehicles. Regardless of who the
actual owner of the vehicle is, the operator of record continues to be the operator of the
vehicle as regards the public and third persons, and as such is directly and primarily
responsible
for
the consequences incident
to
its
operation.
The petition is DENIED.

SPOUSES FONTANILLA VS HON.

MALIAMAN, digested
GR # 55963 and 61045, Feb. 27, 1991 (Constitutional Law Government Agency, Proprietary Functions)
FACTS: National Irrigation Administration (NIA), a government agency, was held liable for damages resulting to the
death of the son of herein petitioner spouses caused by the fault and/or negligence of the driver of the said agency.
NIA maintains that it is not liable for the act of its driver because the former does not perform primarily proprietorship
functions but governmental functions.
ISSUE: Whether or not NIA may be held liable for damages caused by its driver.
HELD: Yes. NIA is a government agency with a corporate personality separate and distinct from the government,
because its community services are only incidental functions to the principal aim which is irrigation of lands, thus,
making it an agency with proprietary functions governed by Corporation Law and is liable for actions of their
employees.