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1 Introduction
Sunday, April 24, 2016
1:12 PM
Consolidation
When 2 companies, A and B, come together and form a whole new company [C]
Merger
When 2 companies, A and B, come together and B gets sucked into [A] which is all that remains, usually A
and B are of completely different sizes, one big, one small
Enterprise Value
= Base Equity Price of Acquirer + Total of Target's Debt + Target's Preferred Stock - Target's Cash
Base Equity Price
= Total Price - Total Debt
Types of Mergers
Horizontal
When 2 direct competitors combine
Vertical
When 2 companies, in a supply chain relationship, combine
Conglomerate
When 2 vastly different, non-related companies combine
Merger Payment Plans
All Cash
The company might have to take on debt to get the cash to buy the target.
All Stock
Acquirer's Stock [Common or Preferred, Registered [freely tradeable] or Restricted [unable to be
publicly sold on an exchange]
Fixed or Floating
Floating: Bidder offers a dollar value to the target for its shares, the exact number of
shares the target receives is based on the BIDDERS trading price over the "pricing
period" which is a predetermined amount of time
Collar: Also adds a maximum and minimum number of shares to the contract that
can be exchanged after the pricing period
Fixed: Bidder offers to buy a certain number of the target's shares
Debentures
A secured loan certificate issued by the Bidder
All stock transactions provide tax benefits.
Stock & Cash Mix
Earn Out
Provides incentive for the target to keep performing after the deal closes, giving them extra
compensation if they keep performance up
Contingent Value Rights [CVR's]
CVRs guarantee some future value if the acquirer's shares that were given in exchange for the
target's shares fall below some agreed-upon threshold
Holdback Provisions
Holds back some compensation unless pre-specified targets are met
M&A Arbitrage
When arbitragers buy stock of a company that might be a target and wait for the takeover premium to
come through if the company gets bought; the risk lies in not knowing whether a deal will close or not
Leveraged Buyout
When the buyer uses debt to buy a target
Corporate Restructuring
Selling off of assets, like divestitures, spin outs, and equity carve outs
Mergers and Acquisitions Page 1
Selling off of assets, like divestitures, spin outs, and equity carve outs
Material Adverse Change Clause
Allows either party to withdraw from the deal if a major change in circumstances arises that would alter
the value of the deal
Auctions historically led to higher takeover premiums.
Confidentiality Agreements (NDA's: Non-Disclosure Agreements)
Important when the target doesn't want to make a big fuss that it is selling itself
Standstill Agreement
Lays out what moves a potential bidder can take, comes from the perspective of the target, for example
saying that the Bidder can only offer all cash
Term Sheet
What the buyer prepares that lays out their offer for the target
Can also come from the target to potential buyers if there is an auction, laying out the boundaries of a
sale by auction
Letter of Intent
What the buyer puts out to the seller with even more details than the term sheet, usually not binding
Basic v. Levinson Case
U.S. Supreme Court ruled that a company can NOT deny the fact that merger negotiations are taking
place if they really are. A company's hand can be forced to admit the merger negotiations if market
speculation is strong enough (and a reporter, for example, asks).
Asset Deal
When a bidder only buys certain assets of a target, thereby avoiding certain liabilities that the whole
entity of the target might possess
Asset Basis Step Up
When the buyer raises the assets of the target to fair market value rather than the value currently
on the seller's balance sheet, allows the buyer to have more time to depreciate the line item which
LOWERS taxable income and therefore the amount of taxes needing to be paid
Third Party Consents
If the target has contractual clauses regarding the financing of an asset that they are potentially selling to
another buyer; the more third parties there are with claims to an asset that is getting sold, the less likely
consent from all parties will come through and the deal will close
Whole Entity Deals
Stock Deal v. Merger
Stock Deal
The buyer goes DIRECTLY to the shareholders of the target and makes a bid, works well for
companies with few shareholders.
No conveyance issues: the assets of the target stay with the target, not the acquirer aka no
third party consent is needed.
No appraisal rights: no shareholder can go to the Delaware courts, for example, and argue
that their investment's management (the target's management) didn't get a high enough
value for the company
Merger
Constituent Companies: the term for both parties entering into a deal
If A merges with B, then A is called the survivor
Requires voting approval of shareholders (a simple majority for Delaware)
Forward Merger aka Statutory Merger
A + B = A; then the assets of B are liquidated and transferred over to A
Voting approval from both buyer and target's shareholders is necessary.
Solution: A creates a subsidiary to buy B.
This becomes a forward triangular merger.
The liabilities of the target are assumed not by the entire buyer but only by
its subsidiary. No shareholder vote is needed from the buyers side UNLESS
the buyer is using more than 20% of its own stock to finance the deal.
Reverse Triangular Merger
Mergers and Acquisitions Page 2
Control
However, it is not necessary to own all of a company's stock to exert control over it. In fact, even a
51% interest may not be necessary to allow a buyer to control a target. For companies with a
widely distributed equity base, effective working control can be established with as little as 10% to
20% of the outstanding common stock.
However, if the holding company owns 80% or more of a subsidiary's voting equity, the Internal
Revenue Service allows filing of consolidated returns in which the dividends received from the
parent company are not taxed. When the ownership interest is less than 80%, returns cannot be
consolidated, but between 70% and 80% of the dividends are not subject to taxation.
Mergers and Acquisitions Page 3
consolidated, but between 70% and 80% of the dividends are not subject to taxation.
3:19 PM
Waves
1897 and 1904
Mining and Manufacturing
Horizontal Mergers --> Monopolies
1916 and 1929
Oligopolies
1965 and 1969
Conglomerates: management has private interests in diversifying, less risk of company failure
as one division may support another in times of need. Most successful deals leave the Target's
management in place during a conglomerate merger.
Mergers for the P/E Ratio
EPS of the Higher P/E firm rise after an acquisition.
Another Tactic: Debentures
Acquiring firms would issue convertible debentures in exchange for common stock
of the target firm. This allowed them to receive the short-term benefit of adding
the target's earnings to its EPS valuation while putting off the eventual increase in
the acquirer's shares outstanding.
1984 and 1989
Megamergers
Corporate Raiders: goal was to profit off of takeover ATTEMPTS (deal doesn't need to close)
Lots of debt financing for deals
International deals
1990 and 2000
Roll Ups and Consolidation
Emerging Market Acquirers
2003 and 2007
Thriving Private Equity
Shocks that cause merger waves
Economic
Technology
Regulatory
Capital liquidity must also be there.
12:30 AM
4 Regulatory Categories:
Friendly Merger, Cash
The bidder is required to file a proxy statement with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC)
that describes the deal.
Usually, the bidder has to file a preliminary statement first. If the SEC makes comments, the
preliminary statement may be changed before it is finalized. The finalized proxy statement is then
mailed to shareholders along with a proxy card that they fill out and return.
Following this, the deal has to be approved at a shareholders' meeting, whereupon the deal can
then be closed.
Hostile Merger, Cash
The bidder initiates the tender offer by disseminating tender offer materials to target shareholders.
Such offers have to be made pursuant to the requirements of the Williams Act.
However, unlike the friendly transactions just described, the SEC does not have an opportunity to
comment on the materials that are sent to shareholders prior to their dissemination. The SEC may
do so, however, during the minimum offer period.
Friendly Merger, Stock
This process is similar to a cash-financed merger except that the securities used to purchase target
shares have to be registered. The bidder does this by filing a registration statement. Once this is
approved, the combined registration/proxy statement can be sent to shareholders.
Hostile Merger, Stock
The bidder first needs to submit a registration statement and wait until it is declared effective prior
to submitting tender offer materials to shareholders.
The SEC may have comments on the preliminary registration statement that have to be resolved
before the statement can be considered effective. Once this is done, the process proceeds similar
to a cash tender offer.
3 Categories of Law
Securities Law
State Corporation Law
Anti-trust Law
8K Form
Must be filled within 15 days of the acquisition of more than 10% of a target firm's assets
S1 Form
IPO filing form
S4 Form
If a Bidder is acquiring another company using stock, it must register the shares with this form. For
acquisitions using more than 20% of a Bidder's stock, the Bidder's shareholders must be given the
opportunity to vote.
Required to be sent 10 days in advance to the SEC before being mailed to shareholders
Williams Act [1968]
4 Goals
To regulate tender offers, specifically which were becoming more popular
To add disclosure requirements
To give shareholders enough time to make a sound decision
To boost confidence in the securities markets
Tender off must be kept on the table for 20 days minimum. No maximum period.
If shares are tendered by the target's shareholders, but a majority approval is not received, the
bidder can still buy the tendered shares. The bidder has 3 days to make this decision and act after
the vote has taken place.
Mergers and Acquisitions Page 6
Most offers have a stipulation that if successful, the bidder will re-elect a new board. The bidder can do this
without a shareholder vote if they hold 50% or more of the company.
Form 25
The bidder must file a Form 25 to end the sale of the target's securities on the open market
Multiple Offers and Timing
Bidder 1 sends an offer, waits 16 days.
Bidder 2 jumps into the ring on the 16th day.
Shareholders must be given at least 10 days to consider this second offer.
Therefore, Bidder 1's offer period gets extended naturally to 26 days total = 16 + 10.
Convertible Debt is considered equity for tender offer rules.
Business Judgment Rule (U.S.)
If a shareholder files suit against a company for not retrieving the full value of their investment, the
burden of proof shifts to the directors who must prove that the transaction was "entirely fair."
Unocal Standard
Reasonableness Test
An inadequate price is considered a danger to corporate policy. It would be reasonable here to
reject a takeover offer.
Proportionality Test
Any defensive actions taken by the board to rid itself of an offer must be proven to be
"proportional" to the scale of the danger to their corporate strategy.
Edgar v. MITE
Concerned an Illinois law that was extraterritorial in nature in that it permitted the state to block a
nationwide tender offer for a state-affiliated target corporation if the bidder failed to comply with the
disclosure laws of Illinois.
The government said this violated the interstate commerce clause.
Second Generation Laws
Mergers laws that hit the books as questions of constitutionality and shareholder fairness emerged.
4 Categories:
Fair Price Provision
Shareholders who decide NOT to sell must receive the same price as those who DID agree to
sell, an attempt to prevent two-tier offers.
Business Combination Provision
The bidding company cannot enter into business contracts with the target company for some
period of time; prevents leveraged buyouts from running rampant amongst low-risk capital
structure companies who can easily be extorted by private equity for their consistent assets.
Control Share Provision
Says that if a bidder starts creeping up in the percentage of stock it owns in a target, it must
gain the approval of other large block shareholders.
Cash Out Statute
If a bidder starts creeping up in the percentage of stock it owns in a target, it must finish the
entire entity purchase at the same price that it bought the original stock for; this prevents
companies from constantly creeping up the percent they own in another company because
they most likely don't have the capital on hand to buyout the whole thing at once.
Delaware State Anti-Takeover Law
The law stipulates that an unwanted bidder who buys more than 15% of a target company's stock may
not complete the takeover for three years except under the following conditions:
If the buyer buys 85% or more of the target company's stock. This 85% figure may not include the
stock held by directors or the stock held in employee stock ownership plans.
If two-thirds of the stockholders approve the acquisition.
If the board of directors and the stockholders decide to waive the antitakeover provisions of this
law.
Sherman Antitrust Act of 1890
Section 1: Prohibits contracts that restrain trade
Section 2: Prohibits industry monopolies
Mergers and Acquisitions Page 8
Efficiency Gains/Losses
Failing Firm Defense
Will the either party fail as a firm if the merger doesn't go through?
European Competition Policy
Merger Regulation
Adopted by the EU in 1989
Says the European Commission must approve megamergers in Europe
90% of mergers pass EC regulatory inspection
Collective Dominance
Reviews the impact that a merger has on competition within the EU
Market shares can be as low as 40% and draw scrutiny from European regulators; in the U.S.
market share is typically above 60% before the government steps in. Europe is stricter on
monopolistic control.
8:25 AM
M&A Motives
"External" Growth
Diversification
Industry Market Share Gain
International Growth
Breaking into a much needed foreign distribution network
Only a good idea if the firm is completely new to the market, else wise diminishing returns
of foreign acquisitions
Organic, internal growth is often to slow for companies to wait for.
Synergy
"2 + 2 = 5;" the sum of two factors is more than what their sums would be individually added up
Net Acquisition Value [NAV]
Va is the Value of Firm A
Vb is the Value of Firm B
P is the premium paid for B, the target
E are the expenses of the acquisition process
NAV = Vab - [Va + Vb] - P - E; or for example (see above) NAV = 5 - [4] - P - E
If NAV is positive, the firm's merger was a wise choice; if negative, they overpaid for the target.
Operating Synergy
Revenue Enhancements (hardest to achieve)
Combination of functional strengths (one firm's R&D with another firm's marketing)
Cost Reductions
Due to economies of scale, spreading overhead
Economies of scope, being able to provide more products and services
Financial Synergy
Lower cost of capital possible post-merger
Synergistic gains can be discounted to their present value.
Debt Coinsurance
The less correlated two firm's streams of revenues are, the lower the likelihood of bankruptcy.
Lerner Index
Looks at price and marginal cost
Lerner Index = P - MC/P
A way of measuring market power aka how a firm can keep prices high in the market
Market Power
3 Factors
Product Differentiation
Barriers to Entry
Market Share
Roll Up Acquisitions
When a growing company goes through a series of buying multiple small companies
Hubris Theory
Managers execute M&A for their own personal pride.
Winner's Curse
Happens in oil asset auctions, the winner gets screwed over by possibly overpaying for an asset
Redomicile Deals
When a merger happens so that the buyer an relocate its headquarters and change its tax structure
5:33 PM
Antitakeover Methods
Preventative Methods
Active Methods
Management Entrenchment Hypothesis
Managers defend against takeovers to solidify their positions of leadership.
Shareholder Interests Hypothesis
Companies with low bargaining power can improve shareholder gains by adopting antitakeover
measures.
Preventative Methods
Company Profile
Looks at the inner workings and likelihood of a corporate takeover
Need to analyze the "type" of shareholder base that a firm has
Institutional Investors
Hold the company's stock as an investment, may be interested in earning a
return from a takeover
Employees
Not likely to cede to a takeover
Poison Pills
Preferred Stock Plans
The first generation of poison pills.
Allows existing target shareholders to purchase more shares of the BIDDER company
at a discount; gives them an incentive to not go for the takeover
Flip Over
The second generation of poison pills
Instead of allowing target shareholders to buy more BIDDER shares at a discount,
the firm issues a "warrant" which doesn't mess with leverage calculations
Flip In
Only works if the bidder is acquiring 100% of the target
Instead of allowing target shareholders to buy more TARGET shares at a discount,
the firm issues a "warrant" aka a form of option which doesn't mess with leverage
calculations
Back End Plans
aka Note Purchase Rights Plans
Under a back-end plan, shareholders receive a rights dividend, which gives
shareholders the ability to exchange this right along with a share of stock for cash or
senior securities that are equal in value to a specific back-end price stipulated by
the issuer's board of directors. These rights may be exercised after the acquirer
purchases shares in excess of a specific percentage of the target's outstanding
shares. The back-end price is set above the market price, so back-end plans establish
a minimum price for a takeover.
Voting Plans
Under these plans the company issues a dividend of preferred stock. If any outside
entity acquires a substantial percentage of the company's stock, holders of
preferred stock become entitled to supervoting rights. This prevents the larger block
holder, presumably the hostile bidder, from obtaining voting control of the target.
The Numbers of a Poison Pill
Let us consider a very simplistic example of the mechanics of flip-in poison pills.
Assume that Corporation A makes a bid for Company B and the target has a poison
pill. Let us further assume that the pill has an exercise price (Pe) of $60, while the
target's stock price (Ps) is $10. Then the number of shares that can be purchased are
as follows:
Pe = $60 and Ps = $10, so the number of shares that can be purchased are
Pe/(Ps/2) = $60/($10/2) = $60/5 = 12 shares.
It is important to note that when the board sets the exercise price, often with the
assistance of a valuation firm, it is not putting forward an appropriate transaction
value of acquisition price. It tries to consider the long-term value of the stock over
the life of the plan. Often a range of three to five times the current value of the
Mergers and Acquisitions Page 12
the life of the plan. Often a range of three to five times the current value of the
stock may be a norm, but it can be higher for growth companies and lower for
mature firms. So our example is of a firm that may be more growth-oriented.
Let us also assume that there are 1,000 shares outstanding (SO) prior to the bid and
that the bidder has purchased 200 of them, so the remaining 800 shares are not in
the hands of the bidder. Then the poison pill allows each of these 800 shares to be
used to purchase 12 new shares, for a total of 9,600 shares. If all of the warrants are
exercised, then the total shares outstanding will be 1,000 + 9,600 = 10,600 shares.
In this simplistic analysis the value of the target's equity prior to the exercise of the
warrants was $10 1,000 shares or $10,000. The exercising of the warrants adds to
this equity in the amount of $60 800 shares or $48,000. At this point total equity
capital is $10,000 + $48,000 or $58,000. There are 10,600 shares outstanding so the
per share equity value is $58,000/10,600 or $5.47.
The loss of the value of the shares to the control shareholder is as follows:
($10.00 $5.47) = 0.453 or 45.3%
The loss of the value of the shares does not fully capture the control shareholder's
total loss. In addition to losing a significant portion of the value of its shares, the
control shareholder has also lost a very significant amount of its control in the target
company. After the warrants are exercised, we have 10,600 shares outstanding.
Prior to the exercise of the warrants, the control shareholder owned 20% of the
company (200/1,000). After the warrants are exercised, this control shareholder
now owns 1.89% of the firm (200/10,600).
Poison Pills do NOT have to be voted on by shareholders to be implemented by a
company.
Chewable Pill: shareholders can mull the takeover deal over before enacting the
poison pill, prevents management entrenchment
TIDE: 3 Year Independent Director Evaluation Plan; poison pill plan must be
reviewed every 3 years by the firm's independent directors
Blank Check Preferred Stock
Used with a white squire defense
The target company is able to issue preferred stock to an outside investor not
interested in control, giving them additional voting rights, protecting from a
takeover
Dead Hand Provisions
Poison pills can only be deactivated by the target's board of directors that ENACTED
the antitakeover plan to begin with. Not liked by Delaware
Slow Hand Provisions
Poison pills can only be deactivated by the target's board of directors that ENACTED
the antitakeover plan to begin with for a certain period of say 180 days.
Shadow Pill
Bidders cannot know definitively whether a firm has an antitakeover plan in place;
ie. some firms have the ability via their corporate governance to wait for a takeover
offer and incite an antitakeover measure the very same day, effectively pop up
blocking it
Net Operating Loss Poison Pill [NOL]
NOL's are tax losses that can be used to offset other income in the future and lower
tax obligations. NOL's provide excuses for target management to reject a hostile
takeover offer. Effectively, these mangers have the "rights" to see out the
company's performance, protected against potential losses.
Triggered by an investor going above a 5% stake within a three year period
Corporate Charter Agreements
Supermajority positions
A supermajority provision provides for a higher than majority vote to approve a
mergertypically 80% or two-thirds approval. The more extreme versions of these
provisions require a 95% majority. Supermajority provisions may be drafted to
require a higher percentage if the size of the bidder's shareholding is larger.
Board Out Clauses
Allows the firm to cancel the supermajority provision, ie. if the firm
thinks the takeover value is actually a good offer, approval can be
dropped back down to 50+%
Mergers and Acquisitions Page 13
oftentimes have to promise not to disassemble the company or lay target workers off.
White squire. The target may place shares or assets in the hands of a friendly firm or investor.
These entities are referred to as white squires.
Capital structure changes. Targets may take various actions that will alter the company's capital
structure. Through a recapitalization, the firm can assume more debt while it pays shareholders
a larger dividend. The target can also simply assume more debt without using the proceeds to
pay shareholders a dividend. Both alternatives make the firm more heavily leveraged and less
valuable to the bidder. Targets may also alter the capital structure by changing the total number
of shares outstanding. This may be done through a new offering of stock, placement of shares in
the hands of a white squire, or an ESOP. Instead of issuing more shares, some targets buy back
shares to ensure they are not purchased by the hostile bidder.
Litigation. Targets commonly sue the bidder, and the bidder often responds with a countersuit.
It is unusual to see a takeover battle that does not feature litigation as one of the tools used by
either side.
Pac-Man defense. One of the more extreme defenses occurs when the target makes a
counteroffer for the bidder. This is one of the more colorful takeover defenses, although it is
seldom used.
Incentives for White Nights and White Squires
Lockup Options
When the target leaves assets in the hands of a friendly squire, rather than stock.
Topping Up Fees
Aka Breakup Fees
When the target promises to cover the expenses of the bidder should the target not
follow through with the deal
Reverse Termination Fees
Allow the BIDDER to break up with the TARGET and walk away for a fee
No Shop Provisions
An agreement that the target will NOT actively solicit other bidders
Bustup Fees
Leveraged Recap
The firm substitutes a chunk of its equity for debt; stockholders receive 'stubs' which
represent their new share of ownership in the firm
Defeats hostile bidders; allows companies to act as their own white knight; by adding debt
to their capital structure, bidders become less interested; think of it like an internal LBO
Debt can come through a lender (bank) or the issuance of bonds but if it chooses to issue
bonds it will have to take the risk of waiting for the SEC to approve the bond issuance
Shelf Registration Rule
The SEC allows firms to plan ahead and gain initial approval for all bonds it
plans to issue within the next 2 years; some corporations "shelf" the potential
use of bonds for a leveraged recap in case they need it.
Scorched Earth Defense
If the firm goes through with a leveraged recap, and then can't pay down the new debt
they took on, they might go bankrupt.
Share Issuance Defense
By issuing more shares, the bidder is less able to gain majority control (there's more to
buy). Oftentimes, shares are issued right into a friendly person's hands, like a white
squire, further preventing the takeover.
Employee Stock Option Plan [ESOP]
Stock can be issued into an ESOP, employees generally don't want to be taken over.
Share Repurchase Defense
The company can suck back up the shares on the market, preventing the hostile bidder
from getting enough shares to have control.
Corporate Restructuring Defense
If the firm sells off massive amounts of assets, it is less attractive to a bidder.
Going Private
A drastic way to end a hostile takeover
Liquidation
Another drastic option
Litigation (Lawsuit Defense)
Targets first request an injunction to prevent the takeover from happening.
Just Say No Defense
Literally the target just says "No" publicly and sometimes the bidder walks away
Shareholder Wealth
Effects of Standstill
Agreements
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5:15 AM
Casual Pass
When a bidder tries to casually alert the target that they are interested in a deal
Toehold
The initial accumulation of the target's stock
Short Term Toeholds
Purchased less than 6 months before an offer
Long Term Toeholds
Purchased a long time ago, more than 6 months before an offer
Fiduciary Out Clause
Allows the target to still receive other bids (as they are required to in their responsibilities to
shareholders)
Bear Hug
When a bidder goes to the target and kindly threatens that the offer will be taken to
shareholders to vote on if it's not well received first by management; this move forces
management to respond publicly to the offer with a stance
Teddy Bear Hug
Doesn't include a set price but is made publicly known that an offer was made
Premium = Run-up of Stock (before the deal) + Markup
Bypass Offer
An "out of the blue" offer; no previous talks
8 Parts of a Tender Offer: Is it a Tender Offer?
9:09 AM
Bondholders frequently claim to lose large sums of money after firm's go private (often through a
P/E firm's LBO), however, it is not statistically significant.
Covenant Agreements
Now, creditors ask for guarantees that their full principal will be returned to them in
the case of a buyout that lowered the value of their debt holdings.
Poison PUTS
Allows bondholders to sell the bonds/"put" the bonds back to the issuer at an agreed
upon price
Because the mega LBO has been around for some time now, risk premiums in
corporate bonds now account for the potential of bondholder loss through an LBO
deal.
7:42 AM
3 Types of Businesses
Sole Proprietorships
Limited Partnerships
Corporations
Owners personal assets NOT at risk
Corporate Structure
Shareholders > Board of Directors > Management
Agency Costs
How motivated is management in making progress for shareholders?
Agency Costs are the costs that shareholders must bear if management is pursuing their
own self-interests rather than shareholder interests.
Compensating CEO's with stock options is one tactic to get around agency costs.
Golden Parachutes
The ability of managers at the target firm to negotiate their own special arrangements at the
post-takeover company alongside the actual merger talks
Prevents management from getting distracted by their own job security in the event of a
merger, they should be focused on getting the highest value for shareholders
Evergreen Agreement
Says that the term of the parachute is 1 year from the completion of the merger
Typical parachutes are a lump sum payment to managers in the event that they choose to
leave or are fired; either way they get money.
Rabbi Trusts
A special account set aside to prove to management that no matter what
happens after the merger, the money for their parachute will be there to
deploy.
Silver Parachutes
For lesser employees beneath top-tier management
Single Trigger Parachute
Kicks in with a change of control
Double Trigger Parachute
Kicks in with a change of control AND termination of a manager
Parachutes do NOT require shareholder approval
Golden Handcuffs
The belief that golden parachutes handcuff management to the company at the
expense of shareholders
Competition Effect
The higher the takeover threat, the less managers are paid statistically.
Risk Effect
CEO's who take more risks statistically are more effective in creating returns for
shareholders.
Interlocking Boards
When director's/CEO's sit on each other's boards
Inside Board v. Outside Board
Inside Board: members of the BOD who are also employees of the company
Outside Board: any member of the BOD who is NOT an employee
Bright Line Board Standards
Came into play after Enron's collapse
Says that a majority of the board must be 'independent'
Mergers and Acquisitions Page 20
Ch. 15 Valuation
Tuesday, April 26, 2016
9:15 AM