Strategy notes

This generic includes add-on modules that affs of nearly any sort
could read about why US China relations are good. Weve included
a couple of reasons those relations are bad including a mini India DA
and a more mini-South Korea DA that could be a good foundation for
additional research. Weve also included a wide variety of
uniqueness and internal links and answers that should help you as
you are writing advantages frontlines for your case negs.
For a few turns, we did not do specific answers because they were
being covered by other generics or starter files. So, for example
although there is a US China relations good for the economy module,
you can find answers in the Chinese Economy DA. For other
arguments, like Climate change, you can find answers in the
preinstitute files.

Impacts US China Relations

Good

Laundry List

2ac module/1nc module

US-China cooperation is key to solve climate change,
nuclear prolif, disease, terrorism, drugs
Jianmin 15 (Wu Jianmin, Former President of China Foreign Affairs
University, 4-16-2015, "Cooperation on Curbing Nukes and Climate Change
Strengthens U.S.-China Link," Huffington Post,
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/wu-jianmin/china-us-nukes-climatechange_b_7079932.html DDI - JT)
The common challenges facing mankind have never been so
daunting as they are today climate change, nuclear weapons
proliferation, terrorism, pandemics, natural disasters, drug
trafficking, just to name a few. No country, no matter how powerful
it is, is able to meet these challenges alone. Common challenges bring
people together. Mankind is bound to unite for its survival. When China and
the US, two largest economies in the world, cooperate, it makes a
difference. In November 2014, President Xi Jinping and President Obama
made a joint pledge on reducing pollution and carbon-gas emissions. As a
result, the upcoming United Nations conference on climate change to be held
in Paris from Nov. 30th to Dec. 10th this year looks much more promising.
Nuclear weapons proliferation also poses a serious threat to
international peace and security. Of all the global challenges it is the
most complicated. The North Korean nuclear issue is the other major
concern along with Iran. The Six-Party Talks on this issue have so far stalled
for six years and at present show no sign of resuming any time soon. Even so,
the fact that China and the US have agreed to pursue the goal of
denuclearization on the Korean Peninsula has kept the issue from
getting out of control. The year 1950 witnessed violent confrontation
between China and the US in the Korean theater, but 2015 is not 1950. ChinaUS cooperation has been a significant factor in keeping the lid on this conflict.
Such cooperation, whether on Iran, North Korea or climate change,
is an important building block for the new model of the major
countries relationship. The way to conceive of this relationship is as a big
house. It has to be built gradually block by block. The more building blocks
laid, the faster that house will be built. As President Xi Jinping has put it: A
sound China-US cooperation can become a ballast stone of world
stability and a booster of world peace.

*insert impact card of your choice or just read this as a

launchable that then gets more impact later in the debate

2ac cooperative model of relations solve

laundry list
US-China great power conflict is not inevitable and
improved cooperation can help to reduce regional
tensions
Fingar and Garrett 13 (Thomas Fingar, Stanford University and
Banning Garrett, Atlantic Council, September 2013, China-US Cooperation:
Key to the Global Future, Atlantic Council,
http://www.atlanticcouncil.org/images/publications/ChinaUS_Cooperation_Key_to_the_Global_Future_WEB.pdf) DDI JT
This report points to a number of trends in US-China relations that could
imperil the prospects for cooperation on global issues. Although we
strongly believe that the United States and China do not need to
repeat the history of conflict between major powers, we are
concerned that the narrative about the inevitability of such
conflict has become popular, especially among realists, on both sides of
the Pacific. There is substantial danger that this could become a selffulfilling prophecy. China and the United States could come to regard each
other as strategic adversaries or even enemies and thus devote increasing
resources to unnecessary and counter-productive geopolitical and military
competition. This danger is compounded by the unsettled territorial
disputes, aggravated by historical grievances that threaten
prolonged tension if not conflict in East Asia, Southeast Asia, and
South Asia. These disputes involve US allies and friends in the
region as well as China, thus threatening to embroil both
Washington and Beijing in regional crises. Failure to manage these
disputes effectively will not only impede US-China cooperation and
deepen mutual suspicions but also make global cooperation more
difficult as Asian nations will be unable to overcome mistrust. While
providing solutions to this set of problems is outside the scope of this report,
military competition between the United States and China can have
no positive outcome for either country. The deepening strategic
mistrust produced by such a strategically unnecessary competition
will further aggravate suspicions of each others intentions, which
could impede the ability of the two countries, including their militaries,
to cooperate effectively to meet global challenges. Thus, it is
imperative for China and the United States to develop an
understanding of their respective interests in the Asia-Pacific region,
de-escalate their military competition, and to further develop their nascent
military-to-military cooperation. We recognize that such a regional
understanding will not be easy and that it involves many other parties
besides China and the United States and many issues not controlled by either
Washington or Beijing. Nevertheless, the two countries need to place high
priority on not allowing tensions in the region to impede responding to long-

term, common strategic challenges. It is important to underline that the

United States and China are not starting from zero in building
successful cooperation. There are more than ninety institutionalized
mechanisms of cooperation between the two national governments,
covering such topics as economics, environment, energy, science and
technology, counterterrorism, regional and global security issues. Moreover,
the USChina Strategic and Economic Dialogue brings together cabinet and
minister-level officials annually for bilateral discussions and, despite its name,
focuses on a wide range of near-term and largely tactical issues. While these
and other mechanisms for dialogue and cooperation often have been
ineffectual and have not halted the drift to increasing strategic mistrust, they
provide a foundation for building robust strategic collaboration. To go
beyond the current short-term, tactical focus of US-China dialogues and
cooperation will require sustained commitment of the top leadership
of both countries. That leadership must be informed and guided by
strategic foresight and vision and determined that bilateral differences and
strategic suspicions will not be allowed to derail efforts to collaborate. But
there is also a potential payoff for Chinese and US leaders facing
public and elite skepticism about US-China relations. Significantly
enhancing cooperation between the United States and China to meet
global challenges would demonstrate to the publics of both nations
that these serious challenges can indeed be met through
cooperation. This, in turn, would lead to substantial improvement in
the overall China-US relationship and likely facilitate the
management and resolution of many bilateral differences.

Extensions relations solve laundry list

US China relations key to complex world challenges
strategic vision and diplomacy required
Kerry, 2014
(John Kerry, Remarks on U.S.-China Relations, speech at the Johns Hopkins
School of Advanced International Studies, State Department Documents and
Publications, http://www.state.gov/secretary/remarks/2014/11/233705.htm
DDI TM)
But there should be no doubt that a key component of our rebalance
strategy is also about strengthening U.S-China relations. Why?
Because a stronger relationship between our two nations will benefit
not just the United States and China, not just the Asia Pacific, but
the world. One of the many very accomplished alumni of this school is China's Ambassador to the United States
Cui Tiankai, and we're delighted that he's here today. Thank you, Mr. Ambassador, for being here with us. Ambassador Cui
spoke at SAIS about one year ago and he described the U.S.-China relationship as, quote, "the most important as well as
the most sensitive, the most comprehensive as well as the most complex, and the most promising as well as the most

The U.S.-China
relationship is the most consequential in the world today , period, and it will do
much to determine the shape of the 21st century. That means that we have to get it right.
challenging." All of those attributes are true, but I would respectfully add one more to that list:

Since President Obama first took office, that's exactly what he has focused on doing. What he has worked to build over the
past six years and what we are committed to advancing over the next two as well is a principled and productive
relationship with China. That's why he and I have both met each with our Chinese counterparts in person dozens of times.
It's why President Obama hosted the Sunnylands summit last June, shortly after President Xi took office. It's why a couple
of weeks ago, I invited Chinese State Councilor Yang Jiechi and the ambassador and others in his delegation to my
hometown of Boston, where we spent a day and a half together charting new opportunities for our bilateral relationship.
And it's why I will join the President in China next week on what will be my fourth trip to the country since I became

The sheer size of China and its economy,

coupled with the rapid and significant changes that are taking place
there, means that our relationship by definition has vast potential.
As two of the world's major powers and largest economies, we have
a profound opportunity to set a constructive course on any number
of issues, from climate change to global trade, and obviously, we have a fundamental
interest in doing so. For that reason, our relationship has to be carefully managed
and guided -- not by news hooks and grand gestures, but by a long-term strategic vision,
by hard work, by good diplomacy, and by good relationships. It's important to
Secretary of State less than two years ago.

remember that not too long ago U.S.-China ties were centered on a relatively narrow set of bilateral and regional matters.

thanks to focused diplomacy on both sides, the leadership

President Obama and President Xi have displayed, our nations are
collaborating to tackle some of the most complex global challenges
that the world has ever seen. And we're able to do that because
together our nations are working closely in order to avoid the historic pitfall of strategic
rivalry between an emerging power and an existing power. Instead, we're focused on the steps
that we need to ensure that we not only coexist, but that we
cooperate.
But today,

US China cooperation solves a laundry list of issues- North

Korean proliferation, extremism and other global threats
Kerry, 2014

(John Kerry, Remarks on U.S.-China Relations, speech at the Johns Hopkins

School of Advanced International Studies, State Department Documents and
Publications, http://www.state.gov/secretary/remarks/2014/11/233705.htm
DDI TM)
Our cooperation also makes a difference when it comes to nuclear
proliferation. We are very encouraged by China's serious
engagement on the Iran negotiations as a full partner in the P5+1, and
we're very hopeful that working more closely together the United
States and China will ultimately bring North Korea to the realization
that its current approach is leading to a dead end, and the only path
that will bring it security and prosperity is to make real progress
towards denuclearizing the Korean Peninsula. Our cooperation there also can make a difference.
It can also make a difference in countering violent extremist groups
like ISIL, which seek to harm people in every corner of the globe.
And it can help in bringing stability to places like Afghanistan , where today
we are partnering to support political cohesiveness and prevent Afghanistan from again becoming a safe haven for terrorists. We welcome China's role as
a critical player in the Afghan region. And just last week, in fact, President Ghani, our Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan Dan Feldman,
and President Obama's counselor John Podesta all traveled to Beijing to participate in a conference focused on supporting Afghan peace and
reconstruction. And as we've seen recently with the Ebola epidemic, China has also shown that it is prepared to take on a bigger role in addressing
international crises -- including those that emerge far from Asia, even those on the opposite side of the globe. We're very grateful that China has
committed more than $130 million to date in aid and supplies to help address the Ebola crisis. And last week, China announced its plans to dispatch a unit
from the People's Liberation Army to Liberia to help manage the crisis. That's global leadership, and it's important, and that cooperation with us is more
than welcome. We all need to do more, and fast. But

the kind of support from China that we've

seen is critical, and it speaks to China's understanding of global
interests and responsibilities. The fact is that among the major
threats and crises that face the world today, there really isn't one
that couldn't be addressed more effectively with expanded U.S.China cooperation.

US China relations pivotal to geopolitical stability must

have good relations
Ash 2015
(Timothy Garton Ash If US relations with China turn sour, there will probably
be war 16 October 2015
https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2015/oct/16/us-relations-chinawar-america accessed DDI ND)
The
relationship between the emerging and the enduring superpower is
the greatest geopolitical question of our time. If Washington and
Beijing do not get it right, there will probably be war somewhere in
Asia some time over the next decade. Vladimir Putins neo-imperialist Russia and the brutality
of Islamic State are medium-sized regional challenges by comparison. Climate change and the
world economy cannot be managed without American-Chinese
cooperation. All this demands a bipartisan American grand strategy for the next 20 years, but US politics seems
What is the biggest challenge facing the next president of the United States? How to deal with China.

incapable of generating anything more than a partisan soundbite for the next 20 minutes.

Despite periodic difference, recent US-China relations key

to energy security, climate change, economy, counter
terror and disease
Initiative for U.S.-China Cooperation on Energy and Climate,
2009
(Asia Society Center on U.S.-China Relations and Pew Center on Global
Climate Change, January 2009 A Roadmap for U.S.-China Cooperation on
Energy and Climate Change http://www.c2es.org/docUploads/US-ChinaRoadmap-Feb09.pdf accessed July 16 DDI TM)
China and the United States are closely linked through a vast web of
economic, political, and security interests and social networks that have
deepened and broadened through government-to-government collaboration
and through the process of globalization. The result is an interdependent,
bilateral relationship in a world in which the fates of all nations are tied ever
closer together, as evidenced by the rapid internationalization of the 2008
financial crisis. China and the United States face similar strategic challenges
in seeking to strengthen energy security, combat climate change, and ensure
economic growth and prosperity. However, neither can fully meet these
challengesnor can the worldwithout the full engagement of the other.
Nearly four decades ago, a historic rapprochement between the United States
and China set in motion the most far-reaching transformation of the
international economic, political, and security order since the aftermath of
World War II. In opening the door to a new strategic relationship in 1972,
China and the United States overcame more than 20 years of mutual
isolation, ideological rivalry, and intense hostility, inflamed by a hot war in
Korea, a nearconflict over Taiwan, and a proxy war in Vietnam. The initial
objective of this rapprochement was the containment and strategic isolation
of the Soviet Union, and one effect was, indeed, to hasten the peaceful
demise of the Soviet Union and its Eastern European empire, thereby ending
the Cold War and creating the conditions for a more integrated world
economy. The subsequent normalization of U.S.-China relations in 1979
created the international conditions for Chinas successful opening to the
outside world and its market-based economic reforms, leading not only to the
extraordinary reemergence of China on the global stage, but to the
acceleration of globalization. Despite periodic bilateral tensions and
differences, the U.S.-China relationship has contributed significantly to global
economic growth and strategic stability, as well as to solving many pressing
political and security problems. As China has grown immensely more
powerful over the last thirty years, the United States and China have not
engaged in a destabilizing strategic competition for regional and global
dominance. Rather, leaders in both nations have recognized their increasing
strategic interdependence and have effectively collaborated to solve or
manage regional and global threats and challenges. For example, since 9/11,
the two countries have cooperated quietly and extensively on a wide range of
counter-terrorism measures. They have also engaged in sustained and

effective collaboration on proliferation, including the Six Party Talks, to

eliminate North Koreas nuclear weapons program; establishing collaborative
bilateral and international measures, stimulated by the 2003 SARS epidemic
and the later emerging danger of avian flu, to prevent and contain
pandemics; and consulting at a high level on a daily basis in response to the
fall 2008 global financial crisis. In addition, they have effectively handled the
volatile Taiwan issue, leading to more hopeful prospects for long-term peace
and stability in cross-Strait relations.

US-China cooperation key to global issues including

climate change, trade, cyber and prolif
Patrick and Thaler 10
(Stewart M. Patrick and Farah Faisal Thaler, China Institutes of Contemporary
Internat ional Relations (CICIR) and the C ouncil on F oreign R elations March
15-17 2010, Council on Foreign Relations,China, the United States, and
Global Governance: Shifting Foundations of World Order
http://www.cfr.org/content/thinktank/CFR_CICIR_MeetingNote.pdf accessed 715-16 DDI TM)
Prospects for effective multilateral cooperation on global and transnational
problems in the twenty first century will inevitably reflect the distinct national
interests and international visions of the great powers. But the identity and number
of the worlds leading states is changing, creating new challenges and opportunities
for global governance. The world order that ultimately results from this transition
period will reflect difficult negotiations between established powersincluding the
United States, European Union, and Japanand emerging onesincluding China,
India, and Brazil. No relationship will be more important in shaping prospects
for a cooperative world order than that between the United States and
China. Yet the past year has witnessed Sino-American tensions and mutual
disillusionment, including acrimony over climate change, currency manipulation,
Internet censorship, and arms sales to Taiwan. It was against this backdrop that the
Council on Foreign Relations convened a workshop in Beijing on March 15 17, 2010,
with the China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations. The two-day event
brought together more than thirty experts from both countries to discuss Chinas rise
and the evolving world order. The purpose of the meeting was to identify points of
Sino-American divergence and potential areas of bilateral cooperation in addressing a
daunting global agenda and in updating the existing institutional architecture of
multilateral collaboration. The workshop underscored the deep and growing
interdependence between the United States and China. Indeed, given their systemic
impact, Sino-American bilateral relations have in a sense become global
relations. Whether the issue is climate change, global trade, international
finance, nuclear proliferation, or cybersecurity, no global challenge can be
successfully addressed without some degree of Sino-U.S. cooperation. At the
same time, the workshop revealed differences in the world order visions, national
interests, and foreign policy priorities of the two countries that unless carefully
managed could hamstring effective collaboration on this global agenda, as well as
domestic constraints on the constructive exercise of U.S. and Chinese global
leadership.

Extensions failure of relations bad

Failure of US China relations results in intensifying
international problems multiple factors. Only a
cooperative relationship between the US and China can
avoid great power wars, resource scarcity, economic
collapse, environmental degradation, and increased
carbon emissions
Fingar and Garrett 13 (Thomas Fingar, Stanford University and
Banning Garrett, Atlantic Council, September 2013, China-US Cooperation:
Key to the Global Future, Atlantic Council,
http://www.atlanticcouncil.org/images/publications/ChinaUS_Cooperation_Key_to_the_Global_Future_WEB.pdf) DDI JT
As the megatrends and uncertainties evolve over the coming two
decades and beyond, China and the United States, along with the
rest of the world, will face unprecedented challenges and
unpredictable, disruptive change. We offer three global scenarios to
illustrate how the complex megatrends, key uncertainties, and
disruptive changes could play out, depending in large part on
whether the relationship between China and the United States is
primarily cooperative or conflictual. Global Drift and Erosion: This
scenario is characterized by the inability of China and the United States to
work together effectively, if at all, to address key global challenges and to
resolve regional conflicts. Problems created or exacerbated by the
megatrends, key uncertainties, and their interactions worsen, creating a
world that is less peaceful, less stable, and less prosperous. The debacle of
the 2009 Copenhagen UN climate change conference demonstrated the
global impact of the failure of the United States and China to agree on farreaching steps to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. In this future, the US
and China again fail to respond adequately to continuing problems
such as economic imbalances associated with the efforts of many
countries to break into and then move from middle income status to that of
high income. There is disruptive socio-political change related in part
to both economic and demographic transitions, and environmental
problems involving inadequate energy, water, and food resources.
Washington and Beijing could be too preoccupied with political and military
competition and territorial disputes in the Western Pacific, as well as by
bilateral differences over intellectual property and other trade issues, to
tackle these pressing problems. Among possible developments, US-China
tensions could adversely affect global responses to energy
challenges. These range from threats to security of supplies
resulting from conflict in the Middle East and Persian Gulf to the
need for a global energy transition away from fossil fuels to
minimize carbon emissions and the impact of energy price volatility
on global economic growth. Further, China and the United States also

could fail to cooperate in efforts to mitigate the potentially

disruptive impact of greatly increased demand for food, water, and
other resources created by the addition of more than one billion
people to the global population by 2030 as well as possibly two billion or
more people to the developing world middle class. Without adequate
international cooperation and global governmental mechanisms, this
could lead to deeper economic crises, unresolved political conflicts,
and worsening environmental conditions. Zero-Sum World: A second
possible trajectory could lead to the emergence of an even more
competitive and dangerous zerosum world, in which nations pursue
narrow national interests. For example, the world could experience intense
monetary and trade protectionism, with countries seeking geopolitical
advantage at the expense of international cooperation for the common good.
It could see intensifying rivalries, creating hostilities and rendering
cooperation on global challenges nearly impossible as global
governmental mechanisms break down or are marginalized. In this
scenario, the impact of megatrends and critical challenges on global
developments is overwhelmingly negative. The world economy is in
a tailspin, brought on, perhaps, by a deepening European recession followed
by a new meltdown of the global financial system and then a worse recession
than that sparked by the 2008 financial crisis. Regional conflicts and
disputes in East Asia intensify suspicions and threaten to ignite
conflict among the major powers. The United States and China not only
fail to cooperate on longer-term global issues but also fail to work together to
resolve immediate regional tensions which spin out of control, leading to
military conflict that threatens to drag the US and China into direct
confrontation. Global Revitalization and Cooperation: A third possible
trajectory could lead to a world in which sustained and effective
cooperation builds/rebuilds key institutions to address old and
emerging challenges as well as black swans. Globalization and global
integration continue apace with more successful efforts to mitigate or
prepare for negative consequences. This scenario is characterized by
greater strategic stability among major powers and by sustained
prosperity and economic growth in China, the United States, and most other
countries. Through cooperative development and deployment of new
technologies countries implement effective measures to manage
energy, water, governance, and other challenges. The result would be a
wide range of win-win outcomes for all nations. It is difficult to find any
credible path to such global revitalization and cooperation that
does not include a cooperative US-China relationship. This makes
efforts to achieve such an outcome imperative for the leaders of
both countries, despite the differences and suspicions between them.

To address global challenges and disruptions, immediate

US China cooperative action is imperative
Fingar and Garrett 13 (Thomas Fingar, Stanford University and
Banning Garrett, Atlantic Council, September 2013, China-US Cooperation:
Key to the Global Future, Atlantic Council,
http://www.atlanticcouncil.org/images/publications/ChinaUS_Cooperation_Key_to_the_Global_Future_WEB.pdf) DDI JT
The report and recommendations of the Joint Working Group are intended to
serve as a call to action, not as a comprehensive blueprint or roadmap to the
future. The reports most important messages are these: Clearly
discernible demographic, economic, technological, social, and other
megatrends will challenge national governments and global
institutions in unprecedented ways with potentially disruptive and
dangerous consequences for people and governments everywhere. It
is both possible and imperative for political leaders to anticipate and prepare
for coming challenges in order to shape the future rather than merely cope
with its consequences. These megatrends are global in scope and can
be harnessed only through effective collective action. No country,
including China and the United States, can meet the resulting challenges
on its own, and no consequential challenge can be managed in ways
that yield positive results with minimum negative consequences unless
China and the United States pursue compatible approaches. There is
no credible pathway to a prosperous, stable, and secure future that
does not include sustained and comprehensive US-China cooperation
working with other nationsto meet long-term global challenges
and threats. Meeting global challenges requires leadership by the major
powers. Neither China nor the United States can or should attempt to lead on
its own, and the two together alone cannot meet the challenges successfully.
But fundamental agreement between the worlds two largest
economies is a prerequisite for success and for enlisting the active
participation of other nations in ways that do not exacerbate fears of
the United States and China establishing a G-2 condominium.
Providing joint leadership that reassures and attracts the active participation
of other nations critical to meeting global challenges is critical to the success
of that endeavor. It is also crucial to the continuing prosperity and security of
China and the United States as well as other nations. Therefore, it is
imperative that both countries continue to work hard to resolve bilateral
disagreements while at the same time not insisting that resolution of such
disputes be a prerequisite for moving forward urgently to address global
issues threatening to overwhelm people everywhere. The need for joint
action is clear. The time to act is now. Joint action will not be easy, and
success will require constant adjustments to correct defects and address
unanticipated developments. But the alternatives to cooperation and
urgent action are also clear and so clearly disadvantageous to both
the United States and China and to the rest of the world that it

would be irresponsible to delay the start of joint work on this

endeavor.

US-China coop checks multiple hotspots like new military

capabilities, Taiwan, Korea, maritime security, nuclear
modernization and militarization of outer space
Lieberthal and Wang 12
(Kenneth Lieberthal and Wang Jisi, Kenneth Lieberthal is Senior Fellow in Foreign

Policy and in Global Economy and Development and is Director of the John L.
Thornton China Center at the Brookings Institution. Wang Jisi is Director of the
Center for International and Strategic Studies and Dean of the School of
International Studies at Peking University, March 2012 Addressing U.S.-China
Strategic Distrust, John L. Thornton China Center Monograph Series Number4,
http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/papers/2012/3/30%20us%20china
%20lieberthal/0330_china_lieberthal.pdf accessed 7-16-16 DDI -TM)
When it comes to mutual strategic distrust, the military/security sphere is
both important and pernicious. We therefore focus especially on ideas to reduce
distrust in this realm. Strategic postures The United States and China are now
making significant decisions regarding both doctrine and investments in
military capability. Broadly, the U.S. is reducing anticipated military expenditures
and at the same time reconfiguring forces to assure that American goals in the AsiaPacific can be met. China is in the midst of a significant buildup of its military
capabilities to be commensurate with its increasing regional and global activities and
interests. Their respective efforts are likely to contribute to increased strategic
mistrust unless the two sides address a central question: what array of military
deployments and normal operations will permit China to defend its core security
interests and at the same time allow America to continue to meet fully its obligations
to its allies and friends in the region? The answer will not be completely comfortable
for either sideChinas military is already developing capabilities to force changes in
American platforms and plans, and Beijing cannot realistically hope to achieve the
capacity to dominate the surrounding seas out to the first island chain against
determined American efforts to prevent that domination. As of now, each side is
developing doctrines that are ill-understood by the otherChina talks about
securing the near seas and the U.S. talks in terms of an Air-Sea Battle
doctrine that is now evolving into a Joint Operational Access Concept
(JOAC). These doctrines both reflect and shape threat perceptions. Almost
unique to the military sphere, moreover, is that decisions are made in
anticipation of requirements 10-20 years from now, as it generally takes
that long to move from initial agreement to develop a major new weapons
system to integration of the actual system into combat capability and
doctrine. Each side, in addition, as best it can monitors the decisions the
other side is making about this long-term future and reacts accordingly.
While the specific concerns and operational assumptions behind each
doctrine are opaque, each is increasingly being couched in terms that can
easily justify escalating military expenditures as both militaries attempt to
achieve basically unattainable levels of certainty. U.S. analysis regards China
as having adopted an anti-access and area denial strategy, but many details about
Chinese aspirations are very unclear. The Chinese side is anxious over its lack of
understanding of either the Air Sea Battle Concept or the new JOAC. There is,
therefore, now a pressing need for a serious discussion of the respective doctrines

and their relationship to various decisions about deployment of military capabilities

as pertains to Asia. This cries out for top political leaders to step in and,

along with their militaries, discuss principles and accommodations

that give each side reasonable certainty about its core security
interests through a set of understandings and agreements that
include steps embodying mutual restraint on development and
deployment of particularly destabilizing weapons systems and
platforms. Such discussions also need to probe each sides goals and expectations on such sensitive issues as the Korean peninsula and Taiwan in order to
improve mutual understanding and build greater trust. Specifically, such discussions might fruitfully address: Mutual restraint on new
capabilities: This is a particularly important topic because many
capabilities are being developed in direct response to what the other
side is doing. Demonstration of the viability of commitments to mutual
restraint may in turn increase mutual trust . The history of international arms control agreements highlights that this is
an area worth pursuing. Anticipating future possibilities in Korea: Mutual discussion of potential long-term
futures for the Korean peninsula can elucidate each others goals
and possibly engender new ideas about how to achieve mutually
agreed upon outcomes. Even the process of holding such discussions may
create better mutual understanding and reduce the bases for strategic
distrust. This is not a suggestion to try to develop a U.S.-China agreement that can be used to dictate to the governments in North and South Korea or to impinge
upon their sovereign rights, which is not a feasible or desirable objective. Reducing distrust over Taiwan: Both sides want to work
toward a peaceful resolution of existing differences between the two
sides of the Taiwan Strait. U.S. weapons sales to Taiwan are viewed in
Washington and Taipei as a necessary ingredient for sustaining the
confidence of U.S. support in Taipei necessary for Taipei to continue to
develop wide ranging cross-Strait relations. Those same sales in Beijing are
viewed as confirming American arrogance and determination to interfere in
Chinas domestic affairs and to prevent peaceful unification from occurring,
thereby harming a clearly-articulated Chinese interest . Washington and
Beijing should engage in serious discussion of the overall security
situation surrounding the Taiwan Strait. Lack of such discussion has
contributed to having each side make worst case assumptions in
their acquisition and deployment of military resources, enhancing
mutual distrust and ultimately potentially reducing the chances of
maintaining the peace in the Taiwan Strait that both sides desire . Maritime security:
Maritime security discussions already take place and have produced
a U.S.-China Military Maritime Consultative Agreement, but there
remains significant room for expansion and enhancement of those
discussions.8 It is worth considering whether there are steps that might
address U.S. security concerns in a way that reduces Washingtons perceived
need to conduct reconnaissance and intelligence activities just beyond
Chinas territorial waters and air space. Nuclear modernization and
militarization of outer space: Each of these spheres exhibits all of the
characteristics of a classic security dilemma, where measures taken
to enhance defensive capabilities by one side are seen as
threatening and requiring commensurate measures by the other.
These are spheres in which greater mutual transparency, potential
agreements on specific areas of mutual restraint, and deeper
understanding of respective concerns and doctrines can potentially
reduce the chances of destabilizing changes occurring in these
technologically dynamic realms.

Relations key to solving global issues through

institutional dialogue
Russel 14

Daniel R. Russel, Assistant Secretary, Bureau of East Asian and Pacific

Affairs 6-25-2014, "The Future of U.S.-China Relations," Testimony
Before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, (DDI AGH)
We view Chinas economic growth as complementary to the regions
prosperity, and Chinas expanded role in the region can be complementary to the
sustained U.S. strategic engagement in the Asia-Pacific. We and our
partners in the region want Chinas rise to contribute to the stability and continued development of the
region. As President Obama and Secretary Kerry have made very clear, we do not seek to contain China; to
the contrary, we welcome the emergence of a stable, peaceful, and prosperous China. We believe all
countries, and particularly emerging powers like China, should recognize the self-benefit of upholding basic
rules and norms on which the international system is built; these are rules and norms which China has
participated in formulating and shaping, and they are rules and norms that it continues to benefit from. In
this context, we are encouraging China to exercise restraint in dealing with its neighbors and show respect
for universal values and international law both at home and abroad. A key element of our approach to the

the rebalance, is strengthening Americas alliances and

contributes directly to the stable security
environment that has underpinned the regions and Chinas
dramatic economic growth and development. A second element is working to
build up regional institutions in order to uphold the international
rules-based system and create platforms for the countries and leaders to work on priority
strategic, economic, and other issues. These institutions help develop habits of
cooperation and promote respect for the interests of all parties. A
third key element has been expanding and deepening our relationships with
important emerging countries such as China, including through regular and
high-level dialogue. In just two weeks, our countries will hold the sixth round of the U.S.-China
Asia-Pacific region, often called

partnerships in the region. This

Strategic and Economic Dialogue the S&ED in Beijing. This annual dialogue is unique in its level and
scope. It is led on the U.S. side by Secretaries Kerry and Lew and brings a number of Cabinet-level and
other senior U.S. government officials together with their Chinese counterparts to work on the major issues
facing us. The breadth of the agenda in the two tracks strategic and economic reflects the breadth of

The S&ED is an important vehicle for making

progress in the pursuit of a cooperative and constructive
relationship; for building a new model that disproves the thesis
that the United States and China are somehow destined for strategic
rivalry and confrontation. The S&ED is an important forum for the United
States and China to take stock of and set goals for the bilateral relationship,
to review regional and international developments and explain our respective
policies, to coordinate and seek practical areas of cooperation on important
issues of mutual interest, and to constructively manage areas of difference
through candid, high-level discussions. Let me preview of some of the topics
for upcoming discussions at this years S&ED: We will exchange views and
explore prospects for progress on regional challenges, including Sudan,
Afghanistan, Iran, North Korea, Ukraine, Iraq, and maritime disputes in the
South and East China Seas; The worlds two largest economies will work on
strengthening the global economic recovery; The worlds two biggest energy
consumers and carbon emitters will work on combating climate change, and
modern U.S.-China relations.

expand cooperation on clean energy; We will discuss global challenges

ranging from cyber security to counterterrorism to wildlife trafficking, and the
United States will raise our concerns over human rights; Secretary Kerry will
co-chair the annual U.S.-China High-Level Consultation on People-to-People
Exchange, which supports exchange programs that build the foundation for
mutual understanding and trust; And Deputy Secretary of State Bill Burns and
his Chinese counterpart will hold the U.S.-China Strategic Security Dialogue
(SSD), our highest-ranking joint civilian-military exchange with China, where
we will conduct frank discussions on some of the most sensitive strategic
issues in the relationship. The S&ED and our numerous other dialogues and
official exchanges with the Chinese each year reflect the importance we
attach to managing this relationship. This level and pace of engagement
show the commitment of both sides to producing tangible benefits for our two
peoples, the Asia-Pacific region, and the global community. The United
States and China have a vital stake in each others success. That is
why we maintain an intensive schedule of engagement ; President Obama
and President Xi met in Sunnylands, California, a year ago and have met twice more since then. The
President plans to visit Beijing in November when China hosts APEC. Secretary Kerry, as well as numerous
Cabinet and sub-Cabinet officials, have visited China already in 2014 and have met with Chinese

We work with China in virtually

all important international arenas, including the UN, the G20, the
East Asia Summit, and APEC where we are cooperating closely on
regulatory transparency, supply chain efficiencies, promoting clean
and renewable energy, cross-border education, and combatting
corruption and bribery. Our relationship touches on nearly every regional and global issue,
and, as such, requires sustained, high-level attention. Moreover, few of these issues can be
effectively addressed if China and the United States do not
cooperate.
counterparts in the United States or at international fora.

Climate Change

2ac/1nc module
US-China cooperation also spills over to working together
to combat climate change- only this can spur reducing
pollution and catalyze global movement towards clean
energy
The Conversation 15
(US News, Why China and the U.S. Have Found Common Purpose on Climate
Change, 12-10-2015, http://www.usnews.com/news/articles/2015/12/10/whychina-and-the-us-have-found-common-purpose-on-climate-change accessed
7-15-16 DDI GR)
the United States and China forged a climate change
partnership that would have been almost unthinkable not long ago.
Not only have both countries committed to emissions reduction and
sustainable energy goals of substantial ambition, they are pursuing
those goals in concert. This bilateral climate cooperation has been
crucial to the UN climate summit in Paris and will continue to be so
after any agreements are signed. Following years at loggerheads , the
converging positions of the worlds two largest emitters are
becoming invaluable components of future climate response actions .
Over the past year,

So why is this happening? A combination of domestic, bilateral and international forces help explain the transformation, and reveal its

In China, conventional pollution has

moved environmental issues up the list of development priorities
and made them part of the countrys core national strategic
calculations. The scale and scope of protests against air pollution
and environmental decline which by some measurements lead to
1.6 million deaths per year are on the rise, and Chinese leadership
is responding through rhetoric and practice. President Xi called poor air quality
potential and continuing challenges. China's Pollution Crisis

Beijings most prominent challenge in 2014, while a top climate adviser deemed an acute pollution
episode in the capital unbearable. [READ: Primer: The UN Climate Summit in Paris] In response, the
metrics for measuring local bureaucratic success and promotions through party ranks emphasize
environmental performance more than ever before. Punitive measures against polluters are gaining
strength, and efforts to transform energy systems are accelerating through rapid expansions in solar, wind
and nuclear sectors. Such measures have the corollary effect of reducing greenhouse gas emissions, which
has changed the ways that Chinese leadership views international pressure to act on climate change.
Outside pressures to reduce Chinas carbon emissions used to be viewed as anathema to the countrys
development needs, and a distraction from its core business of wealth generation and societal
development. They are now seen as opportunities for gaining partnerships, technical support and finance
to help China transition toward a cleaner energy future. This includes expanding Chinas manufacturing
and export of clean-energy technologies, which have strong economic growth potential. Xis China thus
looks to the international climate arena for help addressing its domestic energy transition and pollution
reduction goals. That the measures taken will also reduce climate risks is an added bonus. U.S. Executive
Action RELATED CONTENT FILE - In this Aug. 10, 2010, file photo, Rep. Lamar Smith, R-Texas speaks during
a news conference on Capitol Hill in Washington. With a re-election campaign looming, President Barack
Obama is pushing Congress to overhaul the immigration system, but lawmakers seems to have little
appetite to take on the issue. GOP Digs in Heels on Climate Action In the US, executive branch boldness
has the Obama administration toeing the line of what is politically and legally tenable to advance some
form of the environmentally progressive agenda the president campaigned on in 2008. Frustrated with
congressional intransigence and international inertia, the administration has opted for executive regulation
at home and bilateral partnerships abroad. Obamas Clean Power Plan places new emissions standards on
power plants and vehicles, mandates and supports clean energy expansion, and seeks to cut energy waste
and improve infrastructure. On the first day of the Paris summit, the U.S. announced Mission Innovation

and officials touted the potential for technologies to lower emissions and further encourage private-sector
investment in clean energy innovation. And in defending its Clean Power Plan, the White House
emphasizes public health dividends, job creation, economic growth and long-term energy security. Like
China, U.S. leadership sees these measures as being in the countrys long-term economic and strategic
interests, and not merely as a ticket out of climate pariah status. Federal actions suggest this is not
bluster, but a key part of the Obama administrations vision for the countrys future. Some Welcome
Common Ground Bilaterally, American and Chinese diplomats have come to see climate change
cooperation as low-hanging fruit in an agenda otherwise brimming with strategic tension. From currency
markets and competitive free trade groupings to maritime navigation and the rise of Chinas military, the
relationship does not lack for wicked problems. Climate change used to be just another avenue for
strategic posturing, with China clinging to its status as a developing country with little culpability for the
problem, and the U.S. justifying its inflexibility through Chinas inaction. Those days have passed, at least
for now. Beijing and Washington now see opportunity in the climate problem, and view it as a refreshingly
non-zero sum game. They recently formed and now cofund the U.S.-China Clean Energy Research Center,
with a mandate extending through 2020, and are pursuing technical cooperation on issues from carbon
capture and sequestration to sustainable urban infrastructure. These connections feed into growing
business ties, manifested most publicly through the annual U.S.-China Clean Energy Forum. Such ties
create incentives that are likely to keep climate cooperation from being a flash in the pan. Global Enablers
and Implications This

growing US-China alignment has accelerated because

of changes in the direction of international climate change
diplomacy. UN-centric approaches have largely abandoned the holy
grail of an encompassing and binding global agreement that
covers an exhaustive range of climate issues. Disaggregated and largely voluntary approaches
now rule the day, which allows the U.S. and China to chart their own paths without feeling overly constrained or dictated to by international
accords. This shift also presents challenges. The US, China and their partners in Paris are searching for acceptable ways to transparently report
and verify what emissions reductions are taking place where. This issue is taking on renewed urgency in the wake of Chinas revelations that it

. The U.S.
insists upon enhanced international norms and practices around
verification, which it sees as essential to prevent the approach of
voluntary commitments from becoming a house of cards. The two
countries' ability to extend their cooperation to this issue will help
determine the Paris outcome. [ALSO: Obama Pressures China's Xi Jinping on Cybersecurity] The U.S.
and China can likewise drive efforts to lubricate the gears of global
commerce and reduce barriers to cooperation in clean energy
sectors. Complex intellectual property and trade regulation
challenges currently keep clean energy trade from reaching its full
potential. These hurdles will not disappear overnight, but Paris is an
appropriate forum for developing strategies to address them. More
fundamentally, the U.S. and China are in a position to ensure that
moves toward the flexible and voluntary do not devolve into reduced
ambition and the shirking of loose commitments. If these two
economic and polluting behemoths show earnestness and ambition
in Paris and beyond, the world is likely to follow.
underreported past coal consumption, and that it may resist including strong verification protocols in the Paris agreement

And, the impacts of climate change are happening now

global food insecurity, political instability, and war will
only get worse must act
The Guardian, 2014 (Suzanna Goldenberg, staff writer, Climate
change a threat to security, food and humankind IPCC report, March 31,
http://www.theguardian.com/environment/2014/mar/31/climate-changethreat-food-security-humankind, DDI TM)

A United Nations report raised the threat of climate change to a

whole new level on Monday, warning of sweeping consequences to life
and livelihood. The report from the UN's intergovernmental panel on
climate change concluded that climate change was already having
effects in real time melting sea ice and thawing permafrost in the
Arctic, killing off coral reefs in the oceans, and leading to heat
waves, heavy rains and mega-disasters. And the worst was yet to
come. Climate change posed a threat to global food stocks, and to
human security, the blockbuster report said. Nobody on this planet is
going to be untouched by the impacts of climate change, said
Rajendra Pachauri, chair of the IPCC. Monday's report was the most sobering
so far from the UN climate panel and, scientists said, the most definitive. The
report a three year joint effort by more than 300 scientists grew to 2,600
pages and 32 volumes. The volume of scientific literature on the effects of
climate change has doubled since the last report, and the findings make an
increasingly detailed picture of how climate change in tandem with
existing fault lines such as poverty and inequality poses a much
more direct threat to life and livelihood. This was reflected in the
language. The summary mentioned the word risk more than 230 times,
compared to just over 40 mentions seven years ago, according to a count by
the Red Cross. At the forefront of those risks was the potential for
humanitarian crisis. The report catalogued some of the disasters that
have been visited around the planet since 2000: killer heat waves in
Europe, wildfires in Australia, and deadly floods in Pakistan. We are
now in an era where climate change isn't some kind of future
hypothetical, said Chris Field, one of the two main authors of the report.
Those extreme weather events would take a disproportionate toll on poor,
weak and elderly people. The scientists said governments did not have
systems in place to protect those populations. This would really be
a severe challenge for some of the poorest communities and poorest
countries in the world, said Maggie Opondo, a geographer from the
University of Nairobi and one of the authors. The warning signs about
climate change and extreme weather events have been accumulating over
time. But this report struck out on relatively new ground by drawing a
clear line connecting climate change to food scarcity, and conflict.
The report said climate change had already cut into the global food
supply. Global crop yields were beginning to decline especially for
wheat raising doubts as to whether production could keep up with
population growth. It has now become evident in some parts of the world
that the green revolution has reached a plateau, Pachauri said. The
future looks even more grim. Under some scenarios, climate change
could lead to dramatic drops in global wheat production as well as
reductions in maize. "Climate change is acting as a brake. We need
yields to grow to meet growing demand, but already climate change is
slowing those yields," said Michael Oppenheimer, a Princeton professor and
an author of the report. Other food sources are also under threat. Fish
catches in some areas of the tropics are projected to fall by between

40% and 60%, according to the report. The report also connected
climate change to rising food prices and political instability, for
instance the riots in Asia and Africa after food price shocks in 2008.
"The impacts are already evident in many places in the world. It is
not something that is [only] going to happen in the future," said
David Lobell, a professor at Stanford University's centre for food security, who
devised the models. "Almost everywhere you see the warming effects have a
negative affect on wheat and there is a similar story for corn as well. These
are not yet enormous effects but they show clearly that the trends are big
enough to be important," Lobell said. The report acknowledged that there
were a few isolated areas where a longer growing season had been good for
farming. But it played down the idea that there may be advantages to climate
change as far as food production is concerned. Overall, the report said,
"Negative impacts of climate change on crop yields have been more
common than positive impacts." Scientists and campaigners pointed to
the finding as a defining feature of the report. The report also warned for
the first time that climate change, combined with poverty and
economic shocks, could lead to war and drive people to leave their
homes.

Extension relations solve climate

US-China climate coop key to solve emission and
implement structural reforms
Zhang Hongzou 2015

(Zhang Hongzhou is an Associate Research Fellow with the China

Programme at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University,
Singapore.http://thediplomat.com/2015/10/china-us-climate-change-cooperation-beyond-energy/ accessed
7-15-16 GR)

Climate change presents the world with massive and potentially

devastating challenges. As the worlds two leading economic
powerhouses, China and the United States are jointly responsible for
nearly 40% of global carbon emissions. Consequently, both countries are
central to any successful global effort to mitigate climate change. The
international community attributes the incremental progress successes at the Copenhagen and Cancun

cooperation between China and the United

States. As the international society works to build effective global climate
change governance during the forthcoming 2011 Durban Climate Change Conference, its time
to improve China-US climate cooperation to a situation of coprogress. Ecologically speaking, China and the United States are among the countries that will suffer
climate conferences to enhanced

the worst effects of climate change, and both view climate change and energy security as two of the
greatest challenges of our time as stated in their leaders joint statement in January 2011. Just before the
Copenhagen Climate Change Conference, President Hu Jintao addressed the 2009 UN Climate Summit and
said, Climate change is one of the serious challenges to the survival and development of mankind.
Chinas 2008 White Paper on Climate Change stated that, China is vulnerable to the adverse effects of
climate change, like droughts, disruptive storms, and inundation of coastal zones and decreased
agricultural production. The US National Intelligence Council (NIC) concluded in 2008 that, Climate
change will have wide-ranging implications for national security interests over the next 20 years, including
destructive storm activity, increased water scarcity, reduced agricultural yields, disease and pandemics,
mass migration, increased conflict and destabilized states. During his remarks on the Cancun Climate
Conference, President Obama asserted that, No nation, however large or small, wealthy or poor, can
escape the impact of climate change. Economically speaking, China and the United States both face
unprecedented opportunities to shift the traditional economic mode to low carbon development associated
with mitigating climate change. President Hu Jintao recently encouraged low carbon growth to the 2010
APEC Summit; Chinas National Peoples Congress passed the Renewable Energy Law; before the
Copenhagen Convention China set the goal that, by 2020, carbon emission intensity per unit of GDP will be
reduced by 40% 45% compared to that in 2005; and Shanghai Expo 2010 took low carbon as its core
theme. In his 2011 State of the Union address, President Obama announced a target of generating 80% of
electricity from clean energy sources by 2035 (presently it is less than 40%) and become the first country
to have a million electric vehicles on the road by 2015. Politically speaking, global climate change
governance needs the full engagement of China and the United States. The United States, the worlds
largest carbon emitter, is not a member of the Kyoto Protocol and even opposes the Kyoto regime with
Japan and Russia. As the main global energy organization, the International Energy Agency (IEA) doesnt
include China as a full member. Global governance on climate change is notably becoming more and more
fragmented: the divergences among developing countries, particularly on emissions targets and
timetables, are becoming larger, while the inherent conflicts on the Kyoto Protocol between the umbrella
group (Japan, Russsia, and the US) and the EU continue to reduce the Kyoto regimes effectiveness.
Concurrently, the climate change governance landscape is evolving and there are new mechanisms such
as the G20 and WTO that will replace to some extent the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate

United States and China are both

prioritizing the issue of climate change and low carbon growth, As
U.S. Secretary of Energy Steven Chu has pointed out, both countries
have a chance to lead the world in solutions on climate change . Thus we
Change (UNFCCC). As discussed above, the

should improve China-US cooperation to a position of co-progress in three ways: Global Accountability,

China and the United States

should demonstrate their global accountability and take all-round
diplomatic efforts to make a breakthrough at the Durban Climate Conference. At the Cancun
Win-Win Cooperation, and Co-progressive Collaboration:

Climate Conference, it was resolved that any decisions on the future of the Kyoto Protocol will be deferred
until Durban, particularly the global goal for substantially reducing global emissions by 2050, and the
implementing the regime for financial, technological and capacity-building support to developing countries.

To begin with,

China and the United States can help to work out the
unequivocal commitments on global emission vision associated with
common but differentiated principle(s), and they also should shift
global attention from mitigation to adaptation measures to cope
with climate change by technology and market measures which are
the preferred ways to address climate-induced social economic
impacts. China and the United States both face unprecedented
extensive business opportunities for win-win cooperation. The
burgeoning new energy and low carbon business will create a carbon
economy worth thousands of billions of dollars . In his 2011 State of the Union
address, President Obama maintained clean energy issues as a high priority for his administration which
has been associated with jobs, competitiveness and the future. China will spend $293 billion in clean and
alternative energy investment before 2020, and the clean energy market will likely amount to $555 billion
in 2020. In cooperation with China the largest global market the US can certainly achieve economic
growth and enhanced competitiveness. Coal made up about 70% of Chinas electricity generation over the
past year. In the clean coal area, GE and the Chinese company Shenhua have signed a joint venture
agreement on coal-gasification technology. Since 2006, Chinas installed capacity of wind power has
doubled over the past four consecutive years and brings extensive market business. In January 2011,
American UPC Renewables and China Guodian signed an agreement on wind-power projects in China
involving about $1 billion in investment. In 2010, China planned to start construction of more than 20
nuclear power generators, accounting for 40% of the worlds installations. During President Hu Jintaos visit
in 2011, Westinghouse Electric and China State Nuclear Power Technology Corp. worked together on

low carbon society is both the US and

Chinas common and progressive vision, and requires both mutual
support and concerted action. Clearly, the U.S. economy is built on a consumptionAP1000 and AP1400 nuclear power plants. A

intensive fossil fuel energy infrastructure. Chinas economy, however, is also dependent on exported
services and goods with extensive energy consumption. U.S. Secretary of Energy Steven Chu stressed that
China and the United States consume 15% and 25%, respectively, of global energy supplies, but that the

As the leading country in clean

energy, the US can share its expertise and experience with China,
and help in the transformation and relocation of Chinas energy
structure in the following areas: energy cutting-edge know-how,
fossil fuel efficiency, developing renewable energy, and building
carbon markets, technology innovation and green education. It also
seems very likely that bilateral regime projects can institutionalize
China-US Co- progress, such as a Clean Energy Research Centre,
Renewable Energy Partnership, Energy Cooperation Program, and
the China-US Ten Year Framework on Energy and Environment
Cooperation. By developing a co-progressive cooperation, both
countries will enjoy complementary business advantages, push
domestic economic structure reform, and achieve breakthroughs in
climate negotiations. Most important of all, both countries can
evolve jointly into a low carbon society. Urgent tasks at the Durban Climate Change
U.S. consumes about 8 times as much energy as China.

Conference, such as agreeing to the 2050 global mitigation reduction target and solidifying developed
countries second commitment period in the Kyoto Protocol offer solutions to a more harmonious
relationship between man and nature.

Achieving these outcomes should be built

on the cooperation and co-progress developed between China and
the US. In the long run, clean energy, associated only with
technological know-how, will help make the world independent of
fossil fuel resources which have contributed to many geo-political
wars and conflicts in human history. Global permanent peace can
start from China-US co-progress on climate change and low carbon.

US-China cooperation on climate change is key- sets

international norm and eases commercial barrier
US News 15
(US News, 12.10.2015, Why China and the U.S. Have Found Common Purpose on Climate Change,
http://www.usnews.com/news/articles/2015/12/10/why-china-and-the-us-have-found-common-purpose-onclimate-change, accessed 7-16-16 DDI TM)

Bilaterally, American and Chinese diplomats have come to see climate change
cooperation as low-hanging fruit in an agenda otherwise brimming with strategic
tension From currency markets and competitive free trade groupings to maritime navigation and the rise
.

of Chinas military, the relationship does not lack for wicked problems. Climate change used to be just
another avenue for strategic posturing, with China clinging to its status as a developing country with little
culpability for the problem, and the U.S. justifying its inflexibility through Chinas inaction. Those days have
passed, at least for now. Beijing and Washington now see opportunity in the climate
problem, and view it as a refreshingly non-zero sum game . They recently formed and now
cofund the U.S.-China Clean Energy Research Center, with a mandate extending through 2020, and are
pursuing technical cooperation on issues from carbon capture and sequestration to sustainable urban
infrastructure. These connections feed into growing business ties, manifested most publicly through the
annual U.S.-China Clean Energy Forum. Such ties create incentives that are likely to keep

climate cooperation from being a flash in the pan This growing US-China alignment has
.

accelerated because of changes in the direction of international climate change diplomacy. UNcentric approaches have largely abandoned the holy grail of an encompassing and binding
global agreement that covers an exhaustive range of climate issues. Disaggregated and
largely voluntary approaches now rule the day, which allows the U.S. and China to chart their
own paths without feeling overly constrained or dictated to by international accords. The U.S.
insists upon enhanced international norms and practices around verification, which it sees as
essential to prevent the approach of voluntary commitments from becoming a house of cards.
The two countries' ability to extend their cooperation to this issue will help determine the Paris
outcome. The U.S. and China can likewise drive efforts to lubricate the gears

of global commerce and reduce barriers to cooperation in clean energy

sectors Complex intellectual property and trade regulation challenges currently keep clean
.

energy trade from reaching its full potential. These hurdles will not disappear overnight, but
Paris is an appropriate forum for developing strategies to address them. More fundamentally,

the U.S. and China are in a position to ensure that moves toward the
flexible and voluntary do not devolve into reduced ambition and the
shirking of loose commitments. If these two economic and polluting
behemoths show earnestness and ambition in Paris and beyond, the world
is likely to follow.

Chinese economy
Chinas goals of modernization mean good US-China are
relations are imperative
Xin 12 (Qiang, Professor and Deputy Director of the Center for American
Studies @ Fudan University, Cooperation Opportunity or Confrontation
Catalyst? The implication of Chinas naval development for ChinaUS
relations, Journal of Contemporary China, Taylor and Francis)
Chinas intentions. Following Chinas adoption of its Reform and Open Door policy in 1979, China has witnessed a great
30-year economic boom. Unanimously and repeatedly, Chinese leaders have pledged their determination to fulfill the twophase development roadmap by achieving fundamental modernization, or a Xiaokang (well-to-do) society by 2020, then

Modernization instead of hegemony

has been pursued as Chinas first and foremost priority on its national
strategic agenda. In the communique issued by the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China (CPC)
in October 2010, China reaffirmed that it would continue to seize and take advantage of Chinas
important, strategic developmental period of opportunity and promote long-term,
steady and relatively speedy economic development .8 Consequently, a peaceful
and stable environment, both regionally and globally, is of vital significance
for Chinas modernization ambition. In the coming decades, China must endeavor to develop and
reaching the level of medium-developed countries by 2050.

maintain a network of friendly and constructive bilateral and multilateral relationships with peripheral countries and global

A positive, cooperative and comprehensive China US relationship

reaffirmed by Chinese and US presidents on various occasions is
unquestionably Chinas most essential and decisive foreign objective . The
implications of the China US relation for Chinas modernization agenda
include, but are not limited to, the following points: (1) as the key player in the regional and
global security arena, the US has the ability to influence or even shape the
security situation of China in various areas , such as the Middle East, the South China Sea and the
Korean Peninsula etc.; (2) as Chinas biggest source of trade surplus , second biggest export
market and trade partner, and important source of investment and high technology, the US will remain an
irreplaceable engine for Chinas economic growth ; (3) as the most important
provider of global public goods, exemplified by the SLOCs security on the high seas, the US could play a
positive or negative role, nonetheless both are vital for Chinas economic development. Given the paramount
importance inherent in friendly ChinaUS relations and the negative impact a
conflict would have on Chinas development, cooperation with the United
States is always of great concern for Chinas diplomatic and development
strategy.9
powers.

Global Economy

2ac module
US China economic relations key to global growth
Bwambale 16

Bwambale, Taddeo,Uganda journalist, China, US set for talks on economy, maritime differences,
June 5th 2016, Sunday Vision http://www.newvision.co.ug/new_vision/news/1426167/china-us-settalks-economy-maritime-differences (DDI AGH)
BEIJING - Top officials from China and the US are this week scheduled to meet in Beijing to discuss economic and bilateral ties that have in
recent months been fraught with tension. Officials from the two countries will meet under the Eighth Round of China-US Strategic and

The dialogue is a high-level platform for

the two states to discuss regional, global strategic and economic
issues between both countries. It was established in 2009 by U.S. President Barack Obama and former
Chinese President, Hu Jintao to improve cooperation in economic and bilateral ties .
Top on agenda will be economic and foreign policy discussions among the two biggest economic powers, Zheng
Zeguang, Chinas vice foreign minister told journalists at a briefing in Beijing. Also on the agenda is a review
of commitments on climate change, economic cooperation as well as
important and sensitive issues including maritime and cyber
security, Zeguang stated. In 2015, trade volumes between China and the US exceeded $550b and bilateral investment was above
Economic Dialogue, to be held on Monday and Tuesday.

over $440b, highlighting potential for stronger ties, Zeguang added. In recent weeks, the US has announced plans to sanctions on 'cheap'
steel exports from China while China describes the move as an act of 'protectionism'. Around the same time, China and the US have had close
encounters in the South China Sea, an area claimed by China, subject to overlapping claims by her neighbours. The US accuses China of
militarizing the sea by reclaiming and erecting outposts on it, while China blames the US for interfering in a regional dispute and deploying

Guangyao, Chinas vice finance minister said the

dialogue targets to cultivate good relations between China and the
US, push for more open markets and enable entrepreneurs make
business. Last year, the global economy grew at slower 1.2% while international trade grew at 2.1%. The minister
predicts global trade grow 3.2%, although the World Trade Organization predicts 2.8%. The
global market faces downward pressure. China and Us biggest
economies and their relations can produce positive impact on
economy, Guangyao said. The minister said the meeting was expected to
help ease anxiety in financial markets, share experience on
structural reform and policy measures needed to stabilize global
growth. The economic dialogue mechanism is important and
constructive way to contribute to mutual trust and understanding,
and preventing misjudgment, he explained. According to Hao Ping, Chinas vice education minister, USChina relations are improving in education and culture, with a
growing number of people-to-people exchanges. China will support
50,000 Chinese and American students to study in both countries
while Obama has pledged to have one million American students to
study mandarin by 2020 - See more at: http://www.newvision.co.ug/new_vision/news/1426167/china-us-set-talksmilitary vessels to there. Zhu

economy-maritime-differences#sthash.jRpp8SBv.dpuf

And, Global economic war leads to extinction

Kemp, 10, The East Moves West: India, China, and Asias
Growing Presence in the Middle East, [Director of Regional
Strategic Programs at The Nixon Center, served in the White
House under Ronald Reagan, special assistant to the president for
national security affairs and senior director for Near East and

South Asian affairs on the National Security Council Staff, Former

Director, Middle East Arms Control Project at the Carnegie
Endowment for International Peace, Geoffrey], p. 233-4
The second scenario, called Mayhem and Chaos, is the opposite of the first scenario; everything that can

The world economic situation weakens rather than strengthens,

India, China, and Japan suffer a major reduction in their growth
rates, further weakening the global economy. As a result, energy demand falls and the price
of fossil fuels plummets, leading to a financial crisis for the energy-producing states, which
go wrong does go wrong.
and

are forced to cut back dramatically on expansion programs and social welfare. That in turn leads to

political unrest: and nurtures different radical groups, including, but not limited to,
Islamic extremists. The internal stability of some countries is challenged, and there are
more failed states. Most serious is the collapse of the democratic government in Pakistan and
its takeover by Muslim extremists, who then take possession of a large number of
nuclear weapons. The danger of war between India and Pakistan
increases significantly. Iran, always worried about an extremist Pakistan, expands and
weaponizes its nuclear program. That further enhances nuclear proliferation in the
Middle East, with Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Egypt joining Israel and Iran as nuclear states. Under these

the possibility of a nuclear

terrorist attack in either the Western world or in the oil-producing states may lead to a
further devastating collapse of the world economic market, with a tsunami-like impact on
stability. In this scenario, major disruptions can be expected, with dire
consequences for two-thirds of the planets population.
circumstances, the potential for nuclear terrorism increases, and

Link extensions economic growth

US China key to global growth wealth centers of the
world
Lew 16
( Jacob J., Secretary of the Treasury and graduate of Harvard University,
Prepared Remarks: Treasury Secretary Jacob J. Lew remarks on U.S.-China
economic relations at the American Enterprise Institute, June 16, 2016,
America Enterprise Institutehttps://www.aei.org/press/prepared-remarkstreasury-secretary-jacob-j-lew-remarks-on-u-s-china-economic-relations-atthe-american-enterprise-institute/ (DDI AGH)
The United States and China are the two largest economies in the
world, accounting for roughly one-third of total global output, and in
recent years our countries have been the primary engines of global
economic growth. Just as China benefits when our economy does
well, America benefits as a growing China becomes a larger market
for our goods and services. U.S. exports to China have roughly doubled since early 2009substantially faster than in any other
region of the world. As the worlds second-largest economy, disruptions in China can have negative consequences for the rest of the world, including here in the United
States. Over the past year, China rattled global markets as exchange rate policy changes raised questions about how it would manage the transition to a more sustainable
growth rate. And as China continues to grow, it is more important than ever that U.S. companies have the ability to compete on a level playing fieldboth within China and
globally. We need to challenge Chinas policies that disadvantage our firms and workers, whether they are currency practices, trade barriers, or excess capacity in

U.S. and Chinese leadership can

be a catalyst to drive higher global standards and promote growth,
fair trade, global development, and efforts to protect the
environment. When our nations reach agreement, it becomes a
magnet for others to join. Finally, a strong U.S.-China relationship
has been integral to increasing the effectiveness of tools like
financial sanctions. Close cooperation was critical in implementing
sanctions on Iran and continues to be essential in responding to
North Koreas nuclear provocations.
industrial sectors. But our relationship is important beyond sheer market size and GDP.

US ties to region necessary for global economic

development
Pollman 16
Mina, Bachelor of Science in Foreign Service from Georgetown Universitys Edmund A. Walsh School
of Foreign Service, majoring in International Politics with a concentration in Foreign Policy, Experts
Imagine an Asia Without the US, June 23, 2016, The Diplomat
http://thediplomat.com/2016/06/experts-imagine-an-asia-without-the-us/ (DDI AGH)

A panel of Asia experts recently conveyed to American audiences the

alarm that Asian observers feel about U.S. withdrawal from the
region.
the experts
discussed a wide range of divisive issues in Asias security landscape
from the Korean peninsula to the East and South China Seas.
Despite covering Asian power politics from different geographical
lenses, all the speakers agreed on the importance of U.S.
commitment to maintaining a stable balance of power in Asia,
especially in light of Chinas reemergence as a major player. Chisako
Gathering in New York on Monday for a panel hosted by NTT and Kinokuniya a Japanese publishing company and book store, respectively

Masuo, an associate professor at the Graduate School of Social and

Cultural Studies at Kyushu University, warned that the Asian power
balance is more vulnerable than Americans believe. Because of
concerns about U.S. withdrawal, Asian countries are preparing for
the worse case scenario: An Asian regional order without U.S.
leadership would not be a rules-based order, but a China-based
order. Other Asian countries wouldnt be happy with that
development, but they would have no choice but to go along if the
United States will not help provide balance

, Masuo explained. In this sense, the U.S.-Japan alliance is an important pillar

to maintain an open, liberal, rules-based order in Asia. This is not containment of China, Masuo was quick to point out. If the game board is transparent and fair, China can play a mutually beneficial game with
other Asian countries. One example Masuo highlights is how the creation of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) spurred the Asian Development Bank (ADB) to do better. But, she adds, such friendly
competition requires a quiet U.S. military presence in the background. And despite a much-touted rebalance to Asia, experts on the panel remain unconvinced of U.S. commitment to the region. In dealing with
China not only Japan, but Vietnam and the Philippines, in a way, were all disappointed about Obamas actions towards [China] reclaiming islands [in the South China Sea]. He sent naval vessels only three times so

This
sentiment is echoed by Kan Kimura, a professor at Kobe Universitys
Graduate School of International Cooperation Studies, who explains,
American people have to understand how [strongly Asian peoples
fear the] withdrawal of U.S. troops. For reassuring nervous Asian
partners, U.S. commitment isnt enough U.S. messaging is also
important. This is easier said than done, of course. Putting aside the
isolationist sentiment that the bombastic presumptive Republican
nominee Donald Trump has resurrected during this campaign
season, even official Obama administration messaging can be
received, or interpreted, differently based on any given audience
states own preoccupations.
As a
maritime power, the United States has expected more from Japan,
demanding that Japan play a larger role in recent disputes in the
East and South China Seas. Because of this, Japan has seen the more
hard-line elements of U.S. China policy, leading to expectations that
the United States will be around to stand up to China for decades.
far, and its just too weak, Masuo lamented. And if Trump was going to succeed him, maybe [Trump wouldnt] do anything, but then, this Asian power balance is gone.

In geopolitics, a countrys placement in a particular geographic circumstance will shape their assessment of potential threats

and other countries intentions. Kimura expanded on this concept to explain why Japan and South Korea have such different perceptions of the tenor of U.S.-China relations.

Meanwhile, as a land power, South Korea has not had to deal with the same sort of U.S. expectations and has mostly sat out the disputes in the East and South China Seas. Not having seen the hard-line elements
that Japan interacts with, South Korea expects the United States to take a softer policy tack, and believes Washington will give them a hall pass when it comes to leaning on China. The challenge for the United
States, Kimura concluded, is to send a clearer message to Asian countries. Its a typical Goldilocks dilemma: while Japan overestimates how hard-line U.S. China policy will be, South Korea underestimates it. There is
some strength to the argument that ambiguity serves U.S. interests, however. As Kimura noted, from the U.S. perspective, a clear commitment could raise concerns about moral hazard; countries such as the
Philippines might be willing to take unnecessary risks if they believe Washington will have their back. Amid all this concern about the strength of U.S. commitment, there is a bright spot, as Tuong Vu, a political
science professor at University of Oregon, points out: the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) is a good example of the U.S.s biggest efforts to involve Vietnam, to help Vietnam deal with the Chinese threat.

While in popular discourse the military dimension of the American

rebalance might have gotten the most attention, it is really this
economic dimension that underpins why the United States for its
own interest should stay committed to Asia. Responding to
questions about why the U.S. ought to care about Asia and its thorny
maritime issues, Masuo rebutted: But think about it, Asia is the
center of economic development. And if the U.S. chooses not to
establish stronger relations with Asia, how is it going to maintain
prosperity for its own people?
Asian observers are much more comfortable when the United States understands that it should be engaged with

Asia for its own narrow economic interests. The only interest a country can reliably be expected to defend is its own. In the long-term, [including Vietnam in the TPP] will pay off for the U.S., Vu predicts. The
Obama administration knows of these concerns and has been trying to assiduously address them. And his preferred successor, the presumptive Democratic nominee Hillary Clinton, is also known for her lucid
understanding of the important role that American leadership plays in the Asia-Pacific region. But with Trumps candidacy, all bets are off, and Asian leaders are scrambling to plan for a future where the United
States is no longer interested in being the preeminent balancer in Asia.

US China cooperation prerequisite for global economic

growth
Jianmin 16

(Wu Jianmin, Former President of China Foreign Affairs University; Member,

Berggruen Institutes 21st Century Council, 3/31/2016, HERES WHATS ON
THE TABLE FOR THE CHINA-U.S. RELATIONSHIP THIS YEAR, Huffington Post
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/wu-jianmin/china-us-relationship2016_b_9568060.html (DDI AGH)
Xi pointed out: Ive
emphasized several times, when China and U.S. strengthen
cooperation, we can do big things for the benefit of the world.
President Xi is right. Look at the Paris Climate Change Agreement, the
Iranian nuclear deal and the U.N. Security Councils resolution on
North Korea China-U.S. cooperation played a pivotal role in each.
Sluggish economic growth is a major issue facing both China and the U.S., as well as the rest of the world . If we
want to give a strong boost to economic growth, we must, first of all,
further grow China-U.S. cooperation.
On Jan 27, when President Xi Jinping met with Secretary of State John Kerry in Beijing,

US China relations key to economic stability and conflict

resolution
Whyte 15
(Leon Whyte, second year masters candidate at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts
University as well as the Senior Editor for the Current Affairs section of the Fletcher Security Review, May
26, 2015, US-China: Mutually Assured Economic Destruction? The
Diplomat, http://thediplomat.com/2015/05/u-s-china-mutually-assured-economic-destruction/ (DDI AGH)

Angells work can provide insight into the possibility of conflict between the United
States and China. According to a 2011 RAND study, conflict between the United
States and China would likely lead to a global contraction greater than the one
that occurred in 2008. For the United States, the economic losses would likely
be even higher given the interdependent nature of the U.S.-Chinese
economies. In 2014, total U.S.-China trade was worth &592 billion, China was
the United States second largest trading partner, third largest export market, biggest
source of imports, and the largest foreign holder of American debt, with $1.24 trillion
worth of U.S. Treasury bonds in December 2014. According to Angells theory, if the
United States cares about prosperity, it should avoid a war with China, from
which it can only suffer economic losses. This potential for economic loss can act as a
deterrent for both the United States and China, so the United States should not
consider reducing economic dependence on China as a way to increase its own
security, as some pundits have suggested. Beyond economic ties between the
United States and China, the United States should encourage Chinas
further integration into the world economic system. The United States
should not oppose Chinese efforts to join, or create, multilateral economic
institutions, such as the new Chinese led Asia Infrastructure Investment Bank. In
addition, the United States should not attempt to persuade allies from increasing
economic ties with China, as it will reduce the chance of an ally dragging the United
States into a war with China. It would be hard to find anyone in either China or
America who would argue that a conflict would increase prosperity. Both
economies are too big to fail without having severe effects on the entire
international economic system. Because of this, there exists a state of
mutually assured economic destruction between the two countries. Despite
this, as John Mearsheimer point out, states value security over economic prosperity,
because without security they cannot ensure their survival. This is not to say that the
United States should break its economic ties with China, or try to slow Chinas
economic growth. That would hurt the United States economically and would have

little utility for increasing security. In addition, the more economically integrated
China and the United States are, the higher the cost is for China to
challenge the current system, reducing the chance of war. However, if China
perceives that it can benefit from conflict with the United States, Chinas action will
be the same whether its perception is correct or not.

Military Cooperation
US China good relations facilitates military cooperation
and absence of good relations, more military tension
emerges
Glaser, Senior Adviser for Asia, Freeman Chair in China Studies,
Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2014 (Bonnie S. "USCHINA RELATIONS Managing Differences Remains an Urgent Challenge."
Southeast Asian Affairs (2014): 76-82. DDI TM)
In the military realm, there are other factors that are already driving the US
and China towards greater strategic competition. China is developing
capabilities that are aimed at denying the US Navy easy access in a crisis to
its near seas - the Yellow Sea, the East China Sea, and the South China Sea which occupy significant portions of the Western Pacific. From China's
perspective this is a defensive strategy that is referred to in Chinese
writings as aimed at "counter-intervention". The US views the
development of these capabilities, which it terms "anti-access/area
denial", as threatening its ability to protect its interests in the AsiaPacific, including defending its allies. To ensure that it can maintain
freedom of access and manoeuvre in the waters around China, the US is
applying operational concepts such as Air-Sea Battle. Although this competition is already
underway, the two countries are so far able to effectively isolate the military competition from the broader political and

Even US-China military exchanges and joint exercises have

increased despite their growing competition for sea control in the waters
around China. However, if this competition becomes more intense, US-China
cooperation in the Asia-Pacific may become impossible. And if China were to
employ its anti-accs s/area-denial weapons to warn or intimidate the US, the
US would likely respond, and tensions could escalate rapidly.
economic relationship.

North Korea

2ac module
High level coop between US and China solves North Korea
nuclear prolif
Dingli 16 (Dr. Shen Dingli is a professor and Vice Dean at the Institute of
International Studies, Fudan University. He is also the founder and director of
Chinas first non-government-based Program on Arms Control and Regional
Security at Fudan University. Dialogue Represents the Way Forward, China
US Focus. March 14. http://www.chinausfocus.com/foreign-policy/dialoguerepresents-the-way-forward/, DDI-PN)
The fact that the defiance of the DPRK drives a wedge between China & US
and China & ROK lays bare the vulnerabilities of these bilateral relations. To
overcome this challenge, the three countries must rise above a flurry
of diplomatic rhetoric and engage in high-level dialogue for
pragmatic outcomes. During his visit to the US, Minister Wang Yi put forth a
strategy whereas it hardens the stick and sweetens the carrot of the deal
to up the ante for continued defiance, and entice the DPRK back to the
negotiating table. For the stick, the newly adopted UN Security Council
resolution demands aviation fuel embargo against the DPRK, which may well
serve to ground the entire fleet in the DPRK. For the carrot, the goal is to
promote denuclearization in tandem with transition from armistice to peace
on the Korean Peninsula and realize enduring peace and security on the
Peninsula. The high-level dialogue between China and the US led to
speedy progress and final consensus on the UN resolution after
weeks of prolonged negotiations. Minister Wang Yi reiterated that
the new resolution would effectively deter the nuclear programs in
the DPRK, which bodes well for China-US and China-ROK cooperation
in this regard. The international community is closely watching if the
resolution can be effectively implemented. But the high-level interaction
between China and the US, in and of itself, helps both sides to
understand each others stance better, and ultimately has led to an
outcome acceptable to both sides. China agrees to toughen
sanctions because it is determined to realize denuclearization on the
Korean peninsula and ensure the security of China. The US
understands Chinas concerns thanks to the dialogue and subscribes
to the parallel track of solutions seeking denuclearization and
replacement of armistice with peace agreements, which opens the
door to negotiations of a peace agreement with the US when the
DPRK is committed to abandoning nuclear programs.

*Insert NK war from regional security generic

Link extension cooperation solves escalation

Strong US China relations are key to check North Korean
escalation and manage the Korean Peninsula- that checks
nuclear escalation, chemical warfare, drone deployment,
and cyberwarfare
Gady 16 (Franz-Stefan Gady is an Associate Editor with The Diplomat. His
interests include civil-military relations, revolution in military affairs, and
cyber diplomacy. He also is a Senior Fellow with the EastWest Institute where
he edits the Policy Innovation Blog. Sino-US Cooperation Over North Korea Is
Now More Important Than Ever, The Diplomat, 3/19/16 accessed 7/15/16 at
http://thediplomat.com/2016/03/sino-us-cooperation-over-north-korea-is-nowmore-important-than-ever/; DDI- NB)
China and the United States share the same short-term interests on
the Korean Peninsula, perhaps best summarized in Beijings longstanding policy vis--vis North Korea of no war, no instability, no
nukes. () Neither side is interested in a military solution to ongoing tensions between North and South Korea. Neither
party, despite US rhetoric to the contrary, wants to topple the Kim Jong-un regime and see the North descend into chaos amid a succession or
unification crisis. And neither Beijing nor Washington desire a nuclear-armed North Korea further fueling tensions in an already volatile region
of Asia. China and the United States continue to disagree on the right tactical approach to achieving these three objectivesthe former
preferring quiet diplomacy and continuous engagement with Pyongyang, the latter favoring publicly pressuring the regime with sanctions to
change its behavior and both countries also pursue markedly different long-term strategic goals on the Korean Peninsula. However, the
Obama administrations policy of strategic patience (putting pressure on the regime while calling for North Korea to return to the Six-Party
Talks) is a de facto acceptance of the unlikelihood of the reunification of North and South Korea in the near future. As a consequence, there will
be no way around Kim Jong-un in the years ahead, and Beijing and Washington will have to find a way to deal with the regime, no matter how
distasteful. Apart from this apparent confluence of Chinese and US interests, there are three reasons why both countries need to cooperate
more tightly than ever on managing the ongoing crisis on the Korean Peninsula. First, given the Republic of Korea (ROK) governments
uncompromising stance with respect to North Korean provocations, there will be an increased chance of more severe inter-Korean crises
occurring over the next two years. (There will be little chance of a Korean-led dtente initiative until the end of the presidency of Park Geunhye in 2018, given the governments current policies.) Second, notwithstanding repeated calls for putting a military option back on the table,

ongoing
tensions on the Korean Peninsula have the potential to undermine
trust and increase military competition between China and the
United States, a development that is set to detrimentally affect
overall Sino-US relations and cannot be in the interest of either
party. Enjoying this article? Click here to subscribe for full access. Just $5 a month. Seoul, under the government of Park Geun-hye and
a large-scale joint US-ROK military operation against North Korea is increasingly becoming less realistic. Third,

after repeated provocations from the North, has abandoned engagement and stepped up its bellicose rhetoric and uncompromising stance
against North Korea. Over the last decades, both sides have mastered the game of bringing tensions to the precipice and then pulling back.
However, as tensions rise, there is less and less flexibility in this perennial brinkmanship with both sides in danger of losing control during a
future confrontation as martial propaganda and provocations will reach unprecedented heights. In addition, there is little understanding how
much control Kim Jong-un genuinely exercises over the military and the party and whether they would stand down in the face of South Korean
provocations when given the order by the supreme leader. Certain South Korean policies have also helped to further fuel tensions. For
example, ever since 2010, South Korea has implemented a disproportional response theory of deterrence. As John Delury, a professor at
Yonsei University, explained in an interview with The Diplomat: Seoul has proclaimed that for every one shot fired by the North, the South will
hit back with 3 to 5 times greater force. That principle for deterring the North along the contested maritime border seems to apply to the DMZ
[Demilitarized Zone] as well. This concept of deterrence increases the chance of an escalating spiral of attacks and counter-attacks that could
eventually lead to full-scale war. A military confrontation on the Korean Peninsula has the potential to once more draw in both the United
States and China. Beijing is committed to the defense of the North under the 1961 Sino-North Korean Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and
Mutual Assistance, whereas the United States and South Korea have kept a mutual defense treaty since 1953. However, China has repeatedly
said that in a conflict provoked by the North, it would not uphold its treaty obligations. (Indeed, according to a US scholar, China has tried to
have the clause requiring it to defend North Korea revoked.) Any type of large-scale military operation on the Korean Peninsula will almost
certainly involve large-scale destruction of human life and property. As the commander of US forces in South Korea, General Curtis Scaparrotti
recently testified: Given the size of the forces and the weaponry involved, this would be more akin to the Korean War and World War IIvery
complex, probably high casualty. North Korean artillery could shell Seoul with thousands of rounds within the first hour of a full-scale war. Yet,

Next to an arsenal of
approximately 700 (potentially nuclear-armed) Soviet-designed
short-range ballistic missiles (and an unknown number of
intermediate-range and long-range missiles), North Korea also has
one of the worlds largest chemical weapons stockpiles including
certain weapon systems could make a confrontation even worse than the Korean War.

mustard, phosgene, and sarin gas. According to a RAND study cited

by the Congressional Research Service, One ton of the chemical
weapon sarin could cause tens of thousands of fatalities.
Pyongyang has also made substantial investments in special
operations forces, cyber weapons, and unmanned aerial vehicles to
offset the Souths conventional military advantage. Even short of full-scale war, the
tensions on the Korean Peninsula have the potential to derail the Sino-US relationship. For example, China vehemently is opposing the
deployment of Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) to South Korea. Yet, Pyongyangs nuclear and missile tests over the last couple of
weeks, finally convinced Seoul to move forward with plans to station the US missile defense system in the South. China sees the deployment
of THAAD as an outright provocation not only designed to thwart North Koreas missiles but also its own military power. We are firmly
opposed to the deployment of the THAAD system on the Korean Peninsula and urge relevant parties to act cautiously. No harm shall be done
to Chinas strategic security interests, Chinas Foreign Ministry spokesperson said in March 2016. While Washington and Seoul could have
used the potential deployment of THAAD merely as a threat to obtain Chinas cooperation on imposing tougher UN sanctions on North Korea
(something US diplomats have denied), the diplomatic consequences of stationing THAAD in South Korea could hobble the Sino-US strategic
relationship and cause China to retaliate in other areas, for example in the South China Sea or in cyberspace, where it feels threatened by US

This could further fuel the ongoing US-China arms race in the
Asia-Pacific region. Consequently, given ongoing inter-Korean
political dynamics, the disastrous consequences of full-scale war on
the Korean Peninsula, and the potential of ongoing inter-Korean
crises to disrupt and damage the China-US relationship, it is of vital
interest to both Beijing and Washington to craft a more constructive
approach towards North Korea, centered around dialogue and
persistent diplomatic initiatives and despite a new set of UN
sanctions. As John Delury noted in an email exchange with The Diplomat: Sanctions work best when implemented and more
military power.

important lifted in the context of negotiation, and a robust diplomatic process backed by political will on both [all] sides. This does not
necessarily mean the resumption of Six-Party Talks, but rather quiet backdoor channel diplomacy laying the groundwork for future
negotiations. A diplomatic deal with the United States and South Korea might be useful for Kim Jong-un at this juncture given that it would

We should stop
fighting the idea of his [Kim Jong-uns] existence, and instead use
our leverage inherent in helping him deepen his legitimacy to get
things we want, according to Delury. One sign that the United
States would be open to such a dialogue, presumably spearheaded
by China, is that US Secretary of State John Kerry on February 23rd
did not outright dismiss the suggestion of Chinese Foreign Minister
Wang Yi to pursue in parallel tracks the denuclearization of the
Korean Peninsula and the replacement of the Korean armistice with
a peace agreement. For the time being and no matter how
unpleasant, Beijing and Washington have a vested interest in stable
relations with Pyongyang and the timing might just be right for a
concerted Sino-US diplomatic effort. Indeed, it is a political
necessity.
cement his legitimacy in the upcoming Seventh Korean Workers Party Congress in May 2016.

Link Extension cooperation solves North

Korea
Only US-China coop can solve North Korea threatalienating China risks increasing Chinese aid to North
Korea
Avery, Rinehart, and Nikitin 16 [Emma Chanlett (specialist in Asian
affairs), Ian E. (analyst in Asian Affairs), Mary Beth D. (specialist in
nonproliferation), Congresstional Research Service, North Korea: U.S.
Relations, Nuclear Diplomacy, and Internal Situation, 1-15-2016,
https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/nuke/R41259.pdf DDI TM)
U.S. policy to pressure North Korea depends heavily on Chinas
influence. In addition to being North Koreas largest trading partner
by faraccounting for about 70% of North Koreas total tradeChina
also provides food and energy aid that is an essential lifeline for the
regime in Pyongyang. Chinas overriding priority appears to be to
prevent the collapse of North Korea. Analysts assess that Beijing
fears the destabilizing effects of a humanitarian crisis, significant
refugee flows over its borders, and the uncertainty of how other
nations, particularly the United States, would assert themselves on
the peninsula in the event of a power vacuum. Beijing is supporting joint industrial projects
between Chinas northeastern provinces and North Koreas 14 See, for example, Jonathan D. Pollack, No Exit: North Korea, Nuclear Weapons,
and International Security (New York: Routledge, 2011); North Korea: Beyond the Six-Party Talks, International Crisis Group, Asia Report No.
269, June 16, 2015. 15 Choe Sang-hun, North Korea Vows to Keep Nuclear Arms and Fix Economy, New York Times, March 31, 2013. 16
DPRK NDC Issues Statement Refuting UNSC Resolution, Korean Central News Agency (North Korea), January 24, 2013. Congressional
Research Service 9 northern border region. Some Chinese leaders also may see strategic value in having North Korea as a buffer between

since 2010 an increasing number of

Chinese academics have called for a reappraisal of Chinas friendly
ties with North Korea, citing the material and reputational costs to
China of maintaining such ties. The rhetorical emphasis Chinese leaders now place on denuclearization of the
Korean Peninsulareportedly even in meetings with North Korean officialsmay suggest that Beijings patience
could be waning. In what is viewed by many observers as a
diplomatic snub, Chinese President Xi Jinping has had several
summits with South Korean President Park Geun-hye but has yet to
meet with the North Korean leader Kim Jong-un. Despite this
apparent cooling in relations, Beijing remains an obstacle to many
U.S. policy goals. Imposing harsher punishments on North Korea in
international fora, such as the United Nations, is hindered by Chinas
seat on the UNSC. However, Chinese trade with and aid to North Korea is presumed to be a fraction of what it might be if
Beijing decided to fully support Kim Jong-un. This assumption is a key factor driving the U.S.
and South Korean approach, which seeks to avoid pushing China to a
place where it feels compelled to provide more diplomatic and
economic assistance to North Korea.
China and democratic, U.S.-allied South Korea. However,

Impact extensions conflict escalations

North Korean has weaponized chemical weapons for use
against South Korea and Japan
Avery, Rinehart, and Nikitin 16 [Emma Chanlett (specialist in Asian
affairs), Ian E. (analyst in Asian Affairs), Mary Beth D. (specialist in
nonproliferation), Congresstional Research Service, North Korea: U.S.
Relations, Nuclear Diplomacy, and Internal Situation, 1-15-2016,
https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/nuke/R41259.pdf DDI TM)
According to congressional testimony by Curtis Scaparrotti, Commander of U.S. Forces Korea, North Korea has one of the worlds largest

North Korea is widely reported to possess a large

arsenal of chemical weapons, including mustard, phosgene, and
sarin gas. Open source reporting estimates that North Korea has
approximately 12 facilities where raw chemicals, precursors, and
weapon agents are produced and/or stored, as well as six major
storage depots for chemical weapons.31 North Korea is estimated to
have a chemical weapon production capability up to 4,500 metric
tons during a typical year and 12,000 tons during a period of crisis ,
chemical weapons stockpiles.30

with a current inventory of 2,500 to 5,000 tons, according to the South Korean Ministry of National Defense.32 A RAND analysis says that 1

if North Korea at some

point decides to attack one or more of its neighbors, South Korea
and Japan would be the most likely targets.33 North Korea is not a signatory to the Chemical
ton of the chemical weapon sarin could cause tens of thousands of fatalities and that

Weapons Convention (CWC) which bans the use and stockpiling of chemical weapons. North Korea is suspected of maintaining an ongoing

The United States intelligence community

continues to judge that North Korea has a biotechnology
infrastructure to support such a capability, and has a munitions
production capacity that could be used to weaponize biological
agents.34 South Koreas Ministry of National Defense estimated in 2012 that the DPRK possesses anthrax and smallpox, among other
biological weapons production capability.

weapons agents.35

Impact extensions nuclear war

US Korea War escalates quickly
Karlin 10 (Anatoly, independent writer, author, analyst, educated at UC
Berkeley, How a Second Korean War will be Fought, March 28.
http://akarlin.com/2010/03/korean-war-2/)
Crossing the DMZ with the intention of toppling the DPRK and
replacing it with a government allied with or integrated into South
Korea will put a whole set of new dynamics into play. Though China
has no intention of aiding North Korea in aggression, it views the
establishment of an American bridgehead on its Manchurian border
with trepidation and may intervene under extreme circumstances,
such as an all-out American and South Korean drive for regime
change in Pyongyang. If this were to happen, all bets are off. China
will probably be able to roll back the invasion forces to the DMZ. After all, it
managed to do this in the 1950s, when it was much more militarily
backwards relative to the US. Now, it will have a big preponderance over
land, while its new carrier-killing ballistic missiles, submarines, cruise
missiles, and Flanker fighters are now, at some level, able to deny the seas
off China to the US Navy, while its anti-satellite tests and cyberwar prowess
means that the American dominance in space and information ought not be
taken for granted either. Now I am not saying that the Peoples Liberation
Army comes anywhere close to matching the American military; however, it
might well already have the ability to defeat it in a local war on Chinas
borders. If China is successful, it will re-establish North Korea as its
own protectorate, although under someone more rational and reliable than
Kim Jong-il (though needless to say this will also completely sever its
economic relationship with the US and cause a severe, but
temporary, economic contraction due to the collapse of its export
sector). There will be a cascade of consequences elsewhere. Taiwan
may use the opportunity to declare independence, provoking a
second war in the region. Though the US says that it will not come to
Taiwans aid if it does this unilaterally, America will probably change
its mind if it is simultaneously embroiled in an intense local war with
China on the Korean peninsula! Other actors opposed to American
hegemony may view this as a chance to undermine the overstretched
superpower. For instance, Russia could orchestrate a new war against Georgia
and China may even persuade Iran to mine the Strait of Hormuz in exchange
for security guarantees and technology transfer. All these dominoes going
down may even precipitate the collapse of the increasingly fragile Pax
Americana.

Nuclear war/US China Conflict =

war
US China relations averts nuclear war
Wittner, 2011
(Lawrence S, Emeritus Professor of History at the State University of New
York/Albany. "COMMENTARY: Is a Nuclear War with China Possible?"
Huntington News November 28, 2011 http://www.huntingtonnews.net/14446
accessed 7-12-16 DDI - TM)
To avert the enormous disaster of a U.S.-China nuclear war, there are
two obvious actions that can be taken. The first is to get rid of nuclear
weapons, as the nuclear powers have agreed to do but thus far have resisted
doing. The second, conducted while the nuclear disarmament process is
occurring, is to improve U.S.-China relations. If the American and
Chinese people are interested in ensuring their survival and that of
the world, they should be working to encourage these policies.

US China nuclear war escalation kills millions, nuclear

winter leads to chaos and destruction
Wittner, 2011
(Lawrence S, Emeritus Professor of History at the State University of New
York/Albany. "COMMENTARY: Is a Nuclear War with China Possible?"
Huntington News November 28, 2011 http://www.huntingtonnews.net/14446
accessed 7-12-16 DDI - TM)
Of course, the bottom line for those Americans convinced that nuclear weapons safeguard them from a Chinese nuclear
attack might be that the U.S. nuclear arsenal is far greater than its Chinese counterpart. Today, it is estimated that the
U.S. government possesses over five thousand nuclear warheads, while the Chinese government has a total inventory of
roughly three hundred. Moreover, only about forty of these Chinese nuclear weapons can reach the United States. Surely

A nuclear
attack by China would immediately slaughter at least 10 million
Americans in a great storm of blast and fire, while leaving many
more dying horribly of sickness and radiation poisoning. The Chinese
death toll in a nuclear war would be far higher. Both nations would
be reduced to smoldering, radioactive wastelands. Also, radioactive
debris sent aloft by the nuclear explosions would blot out the sun
and bring on a nuclear winter around the globedestroying
agriculture, creating worldwide famine, and generating chaos and
destruction. Moreover, in another decade the extent of this catastrophe
would be far worse. The Chinese government is currently expanding
its nuclear arsenal, and by the year 2020 it is expected to more than
double its number of nuclear weapons that can hit the United States.
The U.S. government, in turn, has plans to spend hundreds of
billions of dollars modernizing its nuclear weapons and nuclear
production facilities over the next decade.
the United States would win any nuclear war with China. But what would that victory entail?

AT NO US China nuclear war

US China conflict could go nuclear
Wittner, 2011
(Lawrence S, Emeritus Professor of History at the State University of New
York/Albany."COMMENTARY: Is a Nuclear War with China Possible?"
Huntington News November 28, 2011 http://www.huntingtonnews.net/14446
accessed 7-12-16 DDI - TM)
While nuclear weapons exist, there remains a danger that they will
be used. After all, for centuries national conflicts have led to wars, with nations employing their deadliest weapons.
The current deterioration of U.S. relations with China might end up
providing us with yet another example of this phenomenon . The gathering
tension between the United States and China is clear enough. Disturbed by
Chinas growing economic and military strength, the U.S. government recently challenged Chinas claims in the South
China Sea, increased the U.S. military presence in Australia, and deepened U.S. military ties with other nations in the
Pacific region. According to Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, the United States was asserting our own position as a

But need this lead to nuclear war? Not necessarily. And yet,
there are signs that it could. After all, both the United States and
China possess large numbers of nuclear weapons. The U.S. government threatened
Pacific power.

to attack China with nuclear weapons during the Korean War and, later, during the conflict over the future of Chinas
offshore islands, Quemoy and Matsu. In the midst of the latter confrontation, President Dwight Eisenhower declared
publicly, and chillingly, that U.S. nuclear weapons would be used just exactly as you would use a bullet or anything else.

Now that it does, perhaps the behavior

of national leaders will be more temperate. But the loose nuclear
threats of U.S. and Soviet government officials during the Cold War,
when both nations had vast nuclear arsenals, should convince us
that, even as the military ante is raised, nuclear saber-rattling
persists.
Of course, China didnt have nuclear weapons then.

AT they say China war good

China rise not threat and US China good relations key to
peaceful rise
US China relations peaceful defensive realism relieves
pressures in the international system
Glaser, 2015 (Charles L., Professor in the Elliott School of International Affairs
and the Department of Political
Science at George Washington University., International Security, Spring
2015, google scholar UT)
U.S. beliefs about Chinas motives and vice versa further favor
Chinas peaceful rise. If the United States believes that China is
likely driven by concern for its own security, then the United States
may be willing to pursue cooperative policies that communicate its
own benign motives. In contrast, if the United States believes that China is a greedy state that values
changing the status quo for nonsecurity reasons, then the United States should pursue more competitive policies, which

The fact that U.S.- China relations are much

better than U.S.-Soviet relations were during the Cold War bodes
well for Chinas rise. The strains that have grown in the U.S.-China relationship over the past decade,
will strain U.S.-China relations.

however, reduce the prospects for avoiding a negative political spiral and increase the probability of war. In short,

international conditions should enable both the United States and

China to be highly secure; they greatly moderate the security
dilemma, which reduces the competitive pressures generated by
the international system. Although Northeast Asia is not fully primed for peace,7 defensive
realism is relatively optimistic about the prospects for Chinas
peaceful rise. In contrast, other well-established strands of structural realist theory provide a far more
pessimistic assessment of the future of U.S-China relations.8 Standard structural realism, focusing only on power, argues
that Chinas military buildup is designed to overwhelm U.S. military advantages in Northeast Asia. The overall result will
be intense Sino-American competition that resembles the Cold War; nuclear weapons will keep the peace, but competition
and insecurity will be the defining features of the relationship.9 Offensive realism envisions a still more competitive
outcome. China, acting in accordance with the theorys call for states to maximize their power, will attempt to become
the hegemonic power in Northeast Asia.10 Achieving regional hegemony will require China to build military forces
capable of defeating its neighbors and pushing the United States out of the region. Threatened by Chinese pursuit of
regional hegemony, the United States will compete intensely to maintain its position in Northeast Asia, leaving both

Grounding my analysis in
defensive realism and its more general rational variant therefore
has significant implications for U.S. policy. Because defensive
realism finds that the pressures generated by international structure
will allow China to rise peacefully, regional issues that could derail
this promising trajectory become more important.
states less secure and major power war a not unlikely outcome.11

Proliferation nuclear weapons

2ac module/1nc module

Coop key to prolif
Lieberthal and Wang 12
(Kenneth Lieberthal and Wang Jisi, Kenneth Lieberthal is Senior Fellow in
Foreign Policy and in Global Economy and Development and is Director of the
John L. Thornton China Center at the Brookings Institution. Wang Jisi is
Director of the Center for International and Strategic Studies and Dean of the
School of International Studies at Peking University March 2012 Addressing
U.S.-China Strategic Distrust, John L. Thornton China Center Monograph
Series Number4,
http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/papers/2012/3/30%20us
%20china%20lieberthal/0330_china_lieberthal.pdf DDI TM)
U.S. and China have a wide-ranging, deep and relatively mature
relationship. The presidents of both countries have repeatedly indicated the
value of developing a cooperative relationship for the future . Both sides have a
The

pragmatic awareness of the issues on which they disagree, and both appreciate the importance of not permitting those
specific disagreements to prevent cooperation on major issues where cooperation can be mutually beneficial. In addition,
the leaders and top working-level officials on both sides have gained substantial experience in dealing with each other
and, in many cases, have come to know each other fairly well.1 The above are promising dimensions of U.S.-China

There is no more important bilateral relationship,

and thus its future direction is of enormous importance to each country, the
region, and the world. For regional and global issues such as
nonproliferation and climate change, active U.S.-China cooperation
or at least parallel actions makes issues more manageable ; having
the U.S. and China work at cross purposes makes those issues more
difficult, or even impossible, to manage. Despite both sides tacit agreement on the above, there
relations and should bode well for the future.

are grounds for deep concern about the future. As of early 2012 the U.S. has withdrawn its forces from Iraq and is on
schedule to draw down its involvement in the Afghan conflict, and Washington is rebalancing its policy in the direction of
Asia and the Pacific. This shift reflects President Obamas basic perspective, as Americas self-described first Pacific

because Asia is the most important region of the world for

the future of the United States, it is vitally important that America maintain and enhance its leadership
president, that

role there. In November 2011 the Obama Administration publically committed to devote the necessary resources to
sustain this leadership role in Asia, even as its domestic fiscal challenges threaten substantial cuts in the overall defense

China is
expanding its roles in the Asia-Pacific region. Since 2000, virtually every Asian country,
budget and make funding of major overseas commitments potentially more controversial at home.2

as well as Australia, has shifted from having the U.S. as its largest trade partner to having China as its largest trade
partner. Most of these countries have also invested directly in Chinas economy. In short, almost every Asian country now
builds continued participation in Chinas economic growth into its own strategy for future prosperity. Although Chinas
economic and political interests are increasingly reaching around the world, its geoeconomic and geopolitical center of

Chinas military
capabilities are improving substantially as a result of double-digit annual
growth in its defense expenditures nearly every year since the mid-1990s . A
gravity remains in Asia, or what the leaders of China refer to as its periphery. In addition,

significant portion of that growth has been in force projection capabilities, especially in the navy and also in the air and
missile forces. The Peoples Liberation Army (PLA) is still many years away from being a global military power, but its
capabilities in the Asia-Pacific region have expanded markedly over the past fifteen years.

And, proliferation causes nuclear war

Kroenig, 2012
(Matthew Kroenig, Nonresident Senior Fellow, Brent Scowcroft Center on
International Security, "The History of Proliferation Optimism: Does It Have a
Future?", May 26 2012 http://www.npolicy.org/article.php?aid=1182&rtid=2
DDI TM)

The greatest threat posed by the spread of nuclear weapons is

nuclear war. The more states in possession of nuclear weapons, the

greater the probability that somewhere, someday, there is a
catastrophic nuclear war. A nuclear exchange between the two
superpowers during the Cold War could have arguably resulted in
human extinction and a nuclear exchange between states with
smaller nuclear arsenals, such as India and Pakistan, could still
result in millions of deaths and casualties, billions of dollars of
economic devastation, environmental degradation, and a parade of
other horrors.

extension key to prolif

US-China alliance key to stopping nuclear prolif
Fingar and Jishe 2013 (Thomas Fan Ties that Bind: Strategic Stability in the U.S.
China Relationship THE WASHINGTON QUARTERLY & FALL 2013 accessed google
scholar 7/11/16 ddi HC)

China and the United Statesdonothaveacommonenemy,buttheydohavemany common

interests and challenges. Examples includeinternationalterrorism,proliferation of
nuclear weapons and other dangerous technologies,failingstates,consequencesofclimate
change,andotherthreatstogrowthandprosperity.SuchchallengesarelesscompellingthanthethreatofSoviethegemony,andthereforemoredifficulttoselltopublics,

But the challenges are

serious and cannot be solved by Washington or Beijing acting alone.
They sometimes cannot even be managed effectively without U.S.China cooperation .33 The
proliferation and complexity of non-traditional security challenges
requiring cooperative responses by the United States and China
create numerous opportunities for dialogue, coordinated policies,
34
and joint leadership. Workingtogetheronsuchproblemswillrequireovercomingdisagreementsaboutcausation,consequences,relative
politicians,andvestedinterestsskepticalaboutcooperationwiththerisingorhegemonicpower.

priorities,andoptimalsolutions,butthenetresultislikelytobeenhancedunderstanding,morecommongoals,andgreaterstrategicstability.

Space

2ac module
Good US China relations solve space conflicts
Weeden 15 (Providing National, 9-9-2015, "An Opportunity to Use the
Space Domain to Strengthen the U.S.-China Relationship," NBR ,
http://nbr.org/research/activity.aspx?id=602, DDI NB)
U.S.-China relationship in space has the potential to be a stable foundation
for a stronger overall relationship between the two countries. Space was arguably a
The

stabilizing element in the relationship between the United States and Soviet Union during the Cold War by providing national capabilities to
reduce tensions and an outlet for collaboration. Although the future of the U.S.-China relationship will be characterized by both competition

taking concrete steps to stabilize relations in space can be part of

the solution to avoiding the Thucydides trap, where an established powers
fear of a rising power leads to conflict. Space is a critical domain to the security of the United States. Space
and cooperation,

capabilities enable secure, hardened communications with nuclear forces, enable the verification and monitoring of arms control treaties, and
provide valuable intelligence. Such capabilities are the foundation of the United States ability to defend its borders, project power to protect
its allies and interests overseas, and defeat adversaries. The space domain, however, is currently experiencing significant changes that could
affect the United States ability to maintain all these benefits in the future. A growing number of state and nonstate actors are involved in
space, resulting in more than 1,200 active satellites in orbit and thousands more planned in the near future. Active satellites coexist in space
along with hundreds of thousands of dead satellites, spent rocket stages, and other pieces of debris that are a legacy of six decades of space
activities. As a result, the most useful and densely populated orbits are experiencing significant increases in physical and electromagnetic
congestion and interference. Amid this change, China is rapidly developing its capabilities across the entire spectrum of space activities. It has
a robust and successful human spaceflight and exploration program that in many ways mirrors NASAs successes in the 1960s and 1970s and
is a similar source of national pride. Although it still has a long way to go, China is developing a range of space capabilities focused on national
security that one day might be second only to those of the United States. Some of Chinas new capabilities have created significant concern
within the U.S. national security community, as they are aimed at countering or threatening the space capabilities of the United States and
other countries. The massive changes in the space domain and Chinas growing capabilities have affected the U.S.-China relationship in space.
There is growing mistrust between the two countries, fueled in part by their development and testing of dual-use technologies such as
rendezvous and proximity operations and hypervelocity kinetic kill systems. This mistrust is compounded by a misalignment in political and
strategic priorities: China is focused on developing and increasing its capabilities in the space domain, whereas the United States is focused on
maintaining and assuring access to its space capabilities. Despite these challenges and concerns, there are concrete steps that the United
States and China can take to manage tensions and possibly even work toward positive engagement. In 2011, President Barack Obama and
then Chinese president Hu Jintao issued a joint statement on strengthening U.S.-China relations during a visit by President Hu to the White
House. As one of the steps outlined in the statement, the two presidents agreed to take specific actions to deepen dialogue and exchanges in
the field of space and discuss opportunities for practical future cooperation. President Xi Jinpings upcoming visit presents an opportunity to
build on the 2011 agreement and take steps toward these goals. The first step should be to have a substantive discussion on space security.
President Obama should clearly communicate the importance that the United States places on assured access to space, U.S. concerns with

Both countries
should exchange views on space policies, including their interpretations of
how self-defense applies to satellites and hostile actions in space. Doing so
can help avoid misunderstandings and misperceptions that could lead either
country to unwittingly take actions that escalate a crisis. Second, Presidents Obama and Xi
recent Chinese counterspace testing, and the potential negative consequences of any aggressive acts in space.

should discuss specific ideas for cooperation in civil and scientific space activities and the use of space for peaceful applications on earth.
Continuing to exclude China from civil space cooperation will not prevent it from developing its own capabilities; this approach will only ensure

Space weather,
scientific research, exploration, capacity building for disaster response, and
global environmental monitoring are all areas where the United States and
China share joint interests and could collaborate with each other and other
interested countries to help establish broader relationships outside the
military realm. In addition, the United States should take steps on its own to stabilize the relationship. First and foremost, it should
that China cooperates with other countries in space in a way that advances its own national interests and goals.

get serious about making U.S. space capabilities more resilient. Increasing resilience would support deterrence by decreasing the benefits an
adversary might hope to achieve and also help ensure that critical capabilities can survive should deterrence fail. While resilience has been a
talking point for the last few years, the United States has made little progress toward achieving the goal. Radical change is thus needed in how
Washington develops and organizes national security space capabilities. Moreover, the United States should embrace commercial services to
diversify and augment governmental capabilities, while encouraging allies to develop their own space capabilities. Second, the United States
should continue to bolster the transparency of space activities by increasing the amount of space situational awareness (SSA) data available to
satellite operators and the public. Greater transparency reinforces ongoing U.S. and international initiatives to promote responsible behavior in
space and also helps mitigate the possibility for accidents or naturally caused events to spark or escalate tensions. Shifting responsibility for
space safety to a civil agency that can share and cooperate more easily with the international community and working with the international
community to develop more publicly available sources of SSA data outside the U.S. government are two steps that would enhance trust,
improve data reliability, and reinforce norms of behavior. The consequences of not addressing the current strategic instability in space are real.

A future conflict in space between the United States and China would have
devastating impacts on everyone who uses and relies on space. Both the
United States and China have acknowledged the dangers of outright conflict

and have pledged their interest in avoiding such an outcome. Taken together,
the initial steps outlined here could help stabilize the U.S.-China strategic
relationship in space, mitigate the threat of the worst-case scenario, and
work toward a more positive outcome that benefits all.

And, U.S. China space war causes extinction

Broder, 16
(Jonathan Broder writes about defense and foreign policy May 4, 2016. WHY THE
NEXT PEARL HARBOR COULD HAPPEN IN SPACE Newsweek
http://www.newsweek.com/2016/05/13/china-us-space-wars-455284.html)

A war in space would have staggering implications. If conflict were to erupt , say,
over Chinas territorial claims to the South China Sea or Russias aggression in Eastern Europe,
Americas military satellites wouldnt be the only space assets at risk.
Fighting would also likely cripple the civilian satellites that control so much of
modern life, from cellphone networks to ATMs and personal GPS units. And although
such a conflict might start in space, experts say it could easily turn into full-scale war on
Earth. If war does extend into space somedayand I hope it never doesthe first [nuclear]
response is not going to be in space , warns General John Hyten, head of the U.S. Air Force Space Command.
This year, the Pentagon will spend $2 billion on measures to counter threats to its national security satellites. That amount is expected to soar
as part of the $22 billion set aside to maintain U.S. superiority in space in 2017. Senior U.S. officials explain such large investments reflect the
Pentagons recognition of a major shift in U.S., Chinese and Russian capabilities. For the first 25 years after the Cold Wars end, they note,
Americas conventional forces were unmatched, thanks largely to the advantages their satellites gave them on the battlefield. Making their

satellites have guided American precision munitions,

provided U.S. commanders with worldwide communications and helped
American forces navigate the globe ever since. But over the past 15 years, a period in which
U.S. defense dollars were diverted to pay for the wars in the Middle East, China and Russia have developed
advanced weapons that challenge our advantages...especially in cyber,
electronic warfare and space, says Deputy Defense Secretary Robert Work. As a result, our margin of
technological superiority is slowly eroding . Today, Beijing and Moscow can no
longer be ignored. With their ability to deny, disrupt and degrade Americas
hard-to-defend satellites, warns Lieutenant General David Buck, commander of the 14th Air Force, there isnt a
single aspect of our space architecture that isnt at risk .
debut in the 1991 Persian Gulf war,

Link cooperation key to space

Cooperation and transparency stops space mil and helps
the global economy containment policies dont stop the
arms race
Turner 15 (Ronald E., 5-6-2015, "Should the United States Cooperate
with China in Space?," ANSER, http://www.anser.org/babrief-us-china-spacecoop, DDI, NB)
The Chinese military is indeed investing heavily in space-based systems. It certainly makes sense to carefully restrict access to technologies

excessive
efforts to restrict all U.S. cooperation is not in the interests of the
United States. Denying the Chinese access to U.S. know-how will not
reduce the threat of Chinese military space ventures: the Chinese
will continue to acquire the necessary capabilities either from the
international space community or by developing the capabilities
themselves. (Note that most space technology applications are neutral to whether the application is overtly military or civilian.)
that would uniquely and substantially increase the capabilities of systems that pose a significant military threat, but

This path has resulted in the expansive capability they have fielded over the past decade and the advances we anticipate in the decades

the Chinese can become

increasingly competitive in the world market. China is increasingly
cooperating with other nations, particularly Russia and European
nations. This supports the technological advancements and
economies of those countries, to the detriment of U.S. industry,
which is hurt in two ways: it cannot compete for bilateral U.S.Chinese opportunities, and its contributions to international
missions are restricted if there is the possibility of Chinese
participation in or access to those missions. As the Chinese increase
their reliance on space systems, they will be less inclined to employ
counterspace attacks, thus reducing the Chinese threat to U.S.
military space systems. Attacks that destroy all space systems (via
orbital debris or other means) will also take out their own systems . The
ahead. Indeed, by developing their own space manufacturing infrastructure,

Chinese may be less inclined to develop more sophisticated counterspace methods, such as covert co-orbital intercept, since this could lead to
a counterspace arms race, which, the Chinese recognize, the United States is in a better technological position to win.

Impact Extensions space war likely

China developing counterspace capabilities now
Turner 15 (Ronald E., 5-6-2015, "Should the United States Cooperate
with China in Space?," ANSER, http://www.anser.org/babrief-us-china-spacecoop, DDI, NB)
The Chinese are also developing counterspace capability: the
ability to destroy or render inoperative the space assets of opposing
forces. The most prominent example of this was the destruction of
one of their own retired weather satellites (Fengyun-1C) to test an
antisatellite weapon in January 2007. That test by a kill-vehicle launched from the Earth to destroy the
target spacecraft on orbit resulted in the largest single production of long-lived space debris.[6] That was the only
instance of a full kinetic kill test, but the Chinese continue to
develop counterspace options, including co-orbital spacecraft that
can rendezvous with target spacecraft and ways to blind or
incapacitate satellites using lasers or other covert means.

Trade

2ac module/1nc module

Stable US China relations significantly enhance global
economic growth through trade and investments like BIT
Multiple reasons.
Jianmin 15 (Wu Jianmin, Former President of China Foreign Affairs
University, 4-16-2015, "Cooperation on Curbing Nukes and Climate Change
Strengthens U.S.-China Link," Huffington Post,
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/wu-jianmin/china-us-nukes-climatechange_b_7079932.html DDI - JT)
The new phase of the China-U.S. relationship is one of simultaneous friction
and cooperation, a new normal, as the Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi
described at his press conference on March 8. There is both cooperation and
friction between us, he said. This might be the normal state of affairs.
Undoubtedly, were seeing more and more friction between China and the
U.S. on a range of issues, such as the South China Sea, cybersecurity, trade
disputes, human rights and intellectual property rights. China and the U.S. have different
histories, cultures and political systems and are at different stages of development. Naturally, they may have differences.

In 2010, Chinese GDP overtook that of Japan to become the second-largest

economy in the world. This fact added a new dimension to the China-U.S.
relationship: rivalry between an established power and a rising power. The
year 2016 is a very sensitive year for the China-U.S. relationship ,
because this is the election year in the U.S.. The presidential candidates may
have a big mouth and say whatever they deem helpful to their campaign.
Other sensitive issues include U.S. arms sales to Taiwan and the
Democratic Progressive Partys victory in the election in Taiwan . How
to best manage the China-U.S. relationship is a major challenge to both China
and the U.S.. There are two competing agendas in the relationship:
cooperation and friction. If the cooperation agenda fails to move forward, the friction agenda may take over.
That would be a very bad scenario. Given the importance of China-U.S. relations to world peace and development, this

Therefore, to advance
the cooperation agenda is the best way to manage the China-U.S.
relationship. To advance the cooperation agenda, we have first to identify the
convergent interests between China and the U.S.. In 2016, what is the most
important convergent interest between the two countries? Economy. If you read
scenario would be bad not only for our two countries, but also for the whole world.

Premier Li Keqiangs government work report and watch the U.S. economic performance in the 4th quarter of 2015, you
can see that economic growth tops the agenda of both the Chinese and American governments. On Jan 27, when
President Xi Jinping met with Secretary of State John Kerry in Beijing, Xi pointed out: Ive emphasized several times,

when China and U.S. strengthen cooperation, we can do big things

for the benefit of the world. President Xi is right. Look at the Paris Climate
Change Agreement, the Iranian nuclear deal and the U.N. Security Councils
resolution on North Korea China-U.S. cooperation played a pivotal role in
each. Sluggish economic growth is a major issue facing both China
and the U.S., as well as the rest of the world. If we want to give a strong boost to
economic growth, we must, first of all, further grow China-U.S.
cooperation. What can China and the U.S. do in this area? Two things
come to my mind: 1. To speed up and conclude BIT negotiation. China and

the U.S. are negotiating a bilateral investment treaty. If concluded, this treaty
will be another milestone in China-U.S. economic cooperation, taking our
economic cooperation to a higher stage. Chinese companies, both public and
private, are going global. The U.S. is one of their most coveted investment markets. The Chinese economy is
going through a restructuring process. To fix the problem of pollution and upgrade the Chinese industry, American
companies can do a lot in China. BIT will open up a new phase of
China-U.S. economic and investment cooperation and give a push to
Chinas badly needed economic reform. 2. To work together to ensure the
success of the G20 Summit scheduled for Sept. 4-5 in Hangzhou. China-U.S.
cooperation can play a crucial role in making this summit a success, which is
very important to boost confidence and stimulate growth.It takes two to
tango. China and the U.S. have to take every opportunity to strengthen
cooperation in the economic area for the benefit of the two countries and the
global economy.

AT India DA

Answers to they say US China

Relations Bad India DA

NO link not zero sum

Relations arent zero sumSino Indian coop increasing
reject their authors hype
Maini 16 (Tridivesh Maini, The Diplomat, 3-13-2016, "What the US Gets
Wrong About India's Relationship With China," Diplomat,
http://thediplomat.com/2016/03/what-the-us-gets-wrong-about-indiasrelationship-with-china/, DDI NB)
The India-China relationship is a far more complex and multi-layered
one than many U.S. analysts realize. Both countries are trying to find
common ground in a number of areas. It was surprising to discover that the views of
many U.S. analysts mirror skeptics in the strategic community in
India. Both tend to view the India-China relationship solely from the
prism of security issues and territorial disputes while ignoring key
state-level economic ties. I met off-the-record with about 40 strategic analysts and policymakers in Washington,
D.C., during a SAV visiting fellowship at the Stimson Center. Some Americans, I found, had a good grasp of South Asian politics, while others
were way off the mark. Perhaps the greatest misconception I came across in D.C. concerns the India-China relationship. Most conversations
focused on the contentious aspects of the relationship, and ignored an unnoticed transformation taking place between Beijing and Delhi. If
Americans fail to recognize the nuances in the relationship between China and India, their Asia policy is bound to be heavy-handed and
Washington could lose an opportunity to shape regional politics in a positive way. I found that there are a handful of reasons why U.S. analysts

a focus on hard security

issues and territorial disputes detracts from serious analysis of the
India-China economic relationship and progress in other areas. While
there are certainly major divergences in the strategic sphere apart from territorial disputes
between the two countries, the strongest stress on the relationship does relate to
Chinas inroads into South Asia. Many strategic analysts in India believe that China has designs of encircling
are out of sync with the changes taking place in the Beijing-New Delhi relationship. First,

India; they often cite the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) to buttress this point. Indias increasing role in Southeast Asia, specifically
in the South China Sea, also puts pressure on the relationship. One clear instance of this is the decision of Vietnam to award exploration
projects to Indias state-owned Oil and Natural Gas Company in the South China Sea, an action which China has raised objections to time and
again. In May 2015, a Chinese foreign ministry spokesman categorically stated that Any oil and gas exploration work should get approval first

New Delhi and Washington have found common ground

on both strategic and economic issues. However, this does not necessitate a skeptical view of the
New Delhi-Beijing relationships potential. Beijing and Washington have dissonance on many strategic issues, but still
share a robust economic relationship. Neither India nor the United
States should look at Sino-Indian relations as a zero-sum game. Former
Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao wisely stated that the world is big
enough for both India and China to grow. Indian Prime Minister
Narendra Modi has emphasized that India and China will need to
work jointly in the 21st century. China and India both understand the
need for connectivity. In this context, both countries seem to have made
some progress on the Bangladesh, China, India, Myanmar (BCIM) Corridor, an important component of
from China. Meanwhile,

Chinas One Belt, One Road project. A number of U.S. analysts told me that India should focus on the BCIM Corridor instead of worrying over

Efforts are also being made

to increase connectivity between both countries by increasing the
number of flights. In the economic sphere, there is much room for improvement between New Delhi and Beijing. The
Chinas investment in Pakistan through the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC).

balance of trade is presently skewed in favor of China. For the period April 2015-January 2016, Indias trade deficit was $44.7 billion, with
Indias exports to China standing at a mere $7.56 billion while imports stood at $52.26 billion. For 2014-2015, the trade deficit for New Delhi

India-China relations are

no longer restricted to New Delhi and Beijing; interactions between
the two countries states and provinces are also increasing. India is
seeking to reach out to Chinese provinces with whom it did not have
was estimated at $48.48 billion. However, Chinese investments in India are increasing.

links previously. Increasing ties between Indian states and Chinese

provinces enriches and supports high-level diplomatic ties. Already, a
number of Indian chief ministers have visited China . During Modis visit last year to
China, an annual State and Provincial Leaders forum was inaugurated. Speaking at the launch, the Indian prime minister made a significant
point: A number of decisions can be taken quickly by the State governments. These interactions also make the State governments more
sensitive and aware of the international dynamics and requirements. Liberalizing visa regimes will also help strengthen people-to-people
contacts and trade. India has bolstered the relationship by beginning an e-visa facility for Chinese citizens. This improvement is evident in the
increase in number of tourists arriving in India on e-visas, which has gone from a little over 2,700 in October 2014 to 56,477 in October 2015.
It is important for members of the strategic community and the government in the United States who study India to interact with analysts

It is also critical to understand the increasing links between a

India and China. Finally, U.S. and Indian analysts alike will
benefit from realizing that there is no contradiction between India
strengthening its ties with the United States while also keeping a
reasonable and open relationship with China.
outside Delhi.

number of state governments in

India seeks better relations with China and doesnt want a

partnership with the US assumes border clashes
Boggs and Burns 15 (Robert Boggs and Nicholas Burns, ROBERT
BOGGS is Professor of South Asia Studies at the Near East South Asia Center
for Strategic Studies, in Washington, D.C., and previously worked for the U.S.
State Department for 32 years. January/February 2015, "Friends Without
Benefits," Foreign Affairs, Heinonline Database) DDI JT
Burns suggests that an increasingly powerful China may spur a stronger U.S.Indian nexus in Asia. But even though border clashes with China have
aggravated security concerns in New Delhi, Modi openly admires
China's development model and may prefer to engage China
diplomatically and economically rather than try to contain it. And
many Indian analysts do not believe that the United States would come to
India's defense if a U.S.-Indian military partnership provoked Chinese
aggression. Modi still remains a mystery to U.S. policymakers. He appears to
want the United States to help revitalize India's economy, but it is unclear if
he wants the longer-term political and defense partnership that the United
States seeks in South Asia. A staunch Hindu nationalist, Modi likely
wants to continue India's quest for regional dominance, a move that
would not endear him to the United States. His endorsement of his
party's vision of Akhand Bharat, or "undivided India," which sees
most of South Asia as belonging to India, does not bode well for a
more accommodative regional foreign policy. Of course, India is firmly
within its rights to define its own interests and chart its own strategies. But
U.S.-Indian relations-and U.S. strategic interestswould be best served by a
realistic appraisal of Indian values and goals, which Burns fails to provide.
Contrary to Burns' assertions, India is unlikely to become a "critical
partner" to the United States anytime soon. New Delhi will strengthen
its ties with Washington only if doing so serves its interests; Washington
should do the same.

India focused internally not on US policy to other

countries AND dont care about competition with China
Rovere 15 (Crispin Rovere, 3-16-2015, "India is no ally of the US," No
Publication, http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post/2015/03/16/India-is-no-allyof-the-US.aspx, DDI NB)
In the continuing debate between Hugh White and Shaskank Joshi regarding US-India
strategic cooperation, I would associate myself closely with the views of White and what he sees as the
eventual limits of the relationship. But I would take it one step further. In the long-term, an anti-US
coalition consisting of China, Russia and India cannot be discounted. India presently fears China's
growing power. Accordingly, India hedges by deepening relations
with the US and status quo middle powers such as Australia.
However, India does not perceive itself as a status quo power, but as
an emerging great power. As India's confidence grows it will be
acting in its own interests, not those of the collective West. Of course there
are clear areas of strategic tension in the bilateral China-India relationship. These include unresolved border disputes, China's patronage of
Pakistan and China's growing maritime presence in the Indian Ocean region. But these issues are being managed between the parties and
may well be resolved, probably in that order, over the next 10 to 20 years. It is very hard to see a similar outcome between China and the US.
Last September, Prime Minister Modi and President Xi said they would 'seek an early settlement to the boundary question,' with both countries

negotiations continue,
and there is no reason to believe they will not ultimately succeed . After
subsequently appointing new envoys to help manage the dispute. Despite a recent setback,

all, China has settled its land border with 12 of the 14 countries on its periphery, sitting in stark contrast with increasing Chinese maritime
assertiveness in the East and South China seas. As for Pakistan, India's view of China's patronage is complicated. India holds grievances over
such issues as China's support for Pakistan's nuclear program, yet it is dangerous for India if Pakistan feels overly threatened. Making Pakistan
feel secure is extremely challenging, especially as India's power grows. Thus a transparent Chinese role in Pakistani affairs is in India's longterm interest transparency that will depend highly on India improving bilateral relations with China. Finally, China's naval presence in the
Indian Ocean is another major concern for India; an expansion due mainly to China's dependency on energy imports from the Middle East. The
long-term trajectory of this issue depends on a combination of China reducing its reliance on sea-borne oil imports, and on the improving
strength and assertiveness of India. As China has no maritime claims in the Indian Ocean, maritime tension will likely be a consequence of

As for India and the US, I find it astonishing

that after more than 50 years of being repeatedly burned, some
Americans still have not learned their lesson (though many have),
and continue insisting that China and India are 'natural competitors'.
This is false. China and India are historical competitors, but such
competition is not necessarily 'natural' and certainly nothing like the
strategic competition that exists between China and the US. After
all, any Chinese expansion in the Western Pacific will be at America's
expense. It is hard to argue that India's expansion into the Indian
Ocean is being actively resisted by China. India is not a pro-Western
democratic bulwark, and never will be. India has one true strategic
partner Russia. That relationship is deep, multifaceted and as old as
ANZUS. Modi calls Russia 'a pillar of strength' and India's 'most
important defence partner.' Russia has supplied a significant portion
of India's military hardware, is supplying most of India's nuclear
reactors, and continues to play a significant role in India's militaryindustrial complex, including submarine and ballistic missile
programs. Likewise, Russia's relationship with China is 'the best it's
been in 450 years.' Once you remove the immediate barnacles in the China-India relationship, an interesting coalescence
fissures in the broader relationship, not a cause.

of interests emerge between China, India and Russia. All three countries have a strong preference for a multipolar world order and the dilution
of American hegemony. All three countries consider the principle of state sovereignty to be the pre-eminent norm of international relations,
have a mercantile bent to their economic policies and already cooperate on many of these issues through the BRICS grouping. There are
certainly significant pitfalls and risks in the China-India relationship. But should those be navigated successfully, the US may well find itself
with a worse relationship with India, Russia and China than the three have with each other. This is because strategic tension between India and
China is finite, while their shared interests are broad and enduring.

China and India cooperation beyond military means that

relations not zero sum
Maini 16 (Tridivesh Maini, The Diplomat, 3-13-2016, "What the US Gets
Wrong About India's Relationship With China," Diplomat,
http://thediplomat.com/2016/03/what-the-us-gets-wrong-about-indiasrelationship-with-china/, DDI NB)
The India-China relationship is a far more complex and multi-layered
one than many U.S. analysts realize. Both countries are trying to find
common ground in a number of areas. It was surprising to discover that the views of
many U.S. analysts mirror skeptics in the strategic community in India. Both tend to view
the India-China relationship solely from the prism of security issues
and territorial disputes while ignoring key state-level economic ties . I
met off-the-record with about 40 strategic analysts and policymakers in Washington, D.C., during a SAV visiting fellowship
at the Stimson Center. Some Americans, I found, had a good grasp of South Asian politics, while others were way off the

Most
conversations focused on the contentious aspects of the
relationship, and ignored an unnoticed transformation taking place
between Beijing and Delhi. If Americans fail to recognize the nuances in the relationship between
mark. Perhaps the greatest misconception I came across in D.C. concerns the India-China relationship.

China and India, their Asia policy is bound to be heavy-handed and Washington could lose an opportunity to shape
regional politics in a positive way. I found that there are a handful of reasons why U.S. analysts are out of sync with the
changes taking place in the Beijing-New Delhi relationship. First,

a focus on hard security issues

and territorial disputes detracts from serious analysis of the IndiaChina economic relationship and progress in other areas. While there are
certainly major divergences in the strategic sphere apart from territorial disputes between the two countries, the
strongest stress on the relationship does relate to Chinas inroads into South Asia. Many strategic analysts in India believe
that China has designs of encircling India; they often cite the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) to buttress this
point. Indias increasing role in Southeast Asia, specifically in the South China Sea, also puts pressure on the relationship.
One clear instance of this is the decision of Vietnam to award exploration projects to Indias state-owned Oil and Natural
Gas Company in the South China Sea, an action which China has raised objections to time and again. In May 2015, a
Chinese foreign ministry spokesman categorically stated that Any oil and gas exploration work should get approval first
from China. Meanwhile, New Delhi and Washington have found common ground on both strategic and economic issues.
However, this does not necessitate a skeptical view of the New Delhi-Beijing relationships potential. Beijing and

Neither
India nor the United States should look at Sino-Indian relations as a
zero-sum game. Former Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao wisely stated that the world is big
enough for both India and China to grow. Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi has
Washington have dissonance on many strategic issues, but still share a robust economic relationship.

emphasized that India and China will need to work jointly in the 21st century. China and India both understand the need
for connectivity. In this context, both countries seem to have made some progress on the Bangladesh, China, India,
Myanmar (BCIM) Corridor, an important component of Chinas One Belt, One Road project. A number of U.S. analysts told
me that India should focus on the BCIM Corridor instead of worrying over Chinas investment in Pakistan through the
China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC). Efforts are also being made to increase connectivity between both countries by
increasing the number of flights. In the economic sphere, there is much room for improvement between New Delhi and
Beijing. The balance of trade is presently skewed in favor of China. For the period April 2015-January 2016, Indias trade
deficit was $44.7 billion, with Indias exports to China standing at a mere $7.56 billion while imports stood at $52.26
billion. For 2014-2015, the trade deficit for New Delhi was estimated at $48.48 billion. However, Chinese investments in
India are increasing. India-China relations are no longer restricted to New Delhi and Beijing; interactions between the two
countries states and provinces are also increasing. India is seeking to reach out to Chinese provinces with whom it did not
have links previously. Increasing ties between Indian states and Chinese provinces enriches and supports high-level
diplomatic ties. Already, a number of Indian chief ministers have visited China. During Modis visit last year to China, an
annual State and Provincial Leaders forum was inaugurated. Speaking at the launch, the Indian prime minister made a
significant point: A number of decisions can be taken quickly by the State governments. These interactions also make the
State governments more sensitive and aware of the international dynamics and requirements. Liberalizing visa regimes
will also help strengthen people-to-people contacts and trade. India has bolstered the relationship by beginning an e-visa
facility for Chinese citizens. This improvement is evident in the increase in number of tourists arriving in India on e-visas,
which has gone from a little over 2,700 in October 2014 to 56,477 in October 2015. It is important for members of the
strategic community and the government in the United States who study India to interact with analysts outside Delhi .

It
is also critical to understand the increasing links between a number

of state governments in India and China. Finally, U.S. and Indian

analysts alike will benefit from realizing that there is no
contradiction between India strengthening its ties with the United
States while also keeping a reasonable and open relationship with
China.

US India relations resilient

No link and no impact economic interdependence makes
US India relations inevitable
Delisle 11 (Jacques Delisle, director of the Asia Program at FPRI and
professor of law and political science at the University of Pennsylvania., 1-162011, "The Elephant in the Room: Summitry and China's Challenging
Relations with Great Powers in Asia," Foreign Policy Research Institute,
http://www.fpri.org/article/2011/01/the-elephant-in-the-room-summitry-andchinas-challenging-relations-with-great-powers-in-asia/) DDI - JT
But the most decisive disanalogies between U.S.-China-India
relations today and the Cold War strategic triangle stem from the
positive and dense ties between the U.S. and China and between
China and India that had no parallel in the thin and hostile relations
between the U.S. and the USSR and between China and the Soviet
Union. During an era of high international economic
interdependence, U.S.-PRC trade and investment relations are
among the very largest globally-with China ranking as the U.S.s second
largest, and the U.S. ranking as Chinas largest, trading partner in goods, and
the U.S. being among Chinas top sources of foreign investment and China
among the U.S.s largest creditors. China-India economic connections
have been developing rapidly from low baselines, with trade having
grown from less than $2 billion at the beginning of the decade to
over $60 billion now and with China having become Indias biggest trading
partner. Their expansion and deepening was a focus of Wens visit, including
announcements of a goal of $100 billion in bilateral trade by 2015 (a figure
consistent with recent trends), $16 billion in business deals, and plans to
expand Chinese investment and economic activity in India, particularly in the
fast-growing area of infrastructure construction. Such patterns contrast
sharply with the low and often near-zero levels of economic
engagement between the U.S. and USSR and between the USSR and
the PRC during an earlier era. Although they also spawn conflicts, the
large and growing economic linkages between the U.S. and China
and between India and China have created national interests and
powerful domestic political constituencies that favor good relations
and weigh against strongly adversarial stances toward China in Washington
and New Delhi. Such economic considerations are likely all the more
central at this moment, when India has an economist prime minister
and the U.S. has a president whose political fortunes hinge on
improvement in a recently dismal national economy.

Non-unique other disputes

Disputes over Pakistan and mismatches in capacity have
killed US-Indian terror coop
Joshi et al 13 (Sunjoy, C. Raja Mohan, Vikram Sood, Rajeswari Pillai
Rajagopalan, Ph.D., James Jay Carafano, Ph.D., Walter Lohman, Lisa Curtis
and Derek Scissors, Ph.D. "Beyond the Plateau in U.S. India Relations,"
Heritage Foundation, April 26,
http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2013/04/beyond-the-plateau-in-usindia-relations, DDI-PN)
Despite the successes in U.S.Indian counterterrorism cooperation,
the true potential of this relationship remains unfulfilled. There are
several reasons for this gap between expectations and achievementsome
of them are historical, a few because of divergent perceptions, and the rest
caused by structural mismatch. Indian policymakers, strategists, and
analysts are unable to reconcile their perception of U.S. policy on
terrorism and its attitude toward Pakistan. Washington's overeagerness to accommodate Pakistani demands and perceptions
accompanied by an inability or unwillingness to penalize Pakistan,
despite the harsh reality of Pakistan's continued support for
terrorism, remains inexplicable to most Indians. This continued
support by the U.S. has emboldened Pakistan to resist demands to
dismantle its terrorist infrastructure. The U.S. handling of the case
of Pakistani-American David Headley, who conspired with LeT in the
2008 Mumbai attacks, also disappointed Indian counterterrorism
professionals. The U.S. reluctance to allow India free access to
Headley only strengthened Indian doubts about U.S. credibility in
prosecuting terrorism cases linked to Pakistan. The alacrity with which
Headley was allowed a plea bargain and the refusal to facilitate Indian
investigation of his links to LeT and his role in the Mumbai attacks remain
sore points in New Delhi. Finally, there is a mismatch in structure and
capacity of Indian and U.S. nodal agencies of cooperation. Capacity
deficiencies, archaic methods of training, and poor instructors within
the police force have made it difficult for India to raise a strong and
capable security bulwark against terrorism. Indian institutions
remain ill-equipped to make full use of cooperation from the U.S.,
which has led to less than optimal results from bilateral cooperation.

India consistently opposes US objectives and interests

and shows no interest in cooperation
Boggs and Burns 15 (Robert Boggs and Nicholas Burns, ROBERT
BOGGS is Professor of South Asia Studies at the Near East South Asia Center
for Strategic Studies, in Washington, D.C., and previously worked for the U.S.
State Department for 32 years. January/February 2015, "Friends Without
Benefits," Foreign Affairs, Heinonline Database) DDI JT

Like many advocates of stronger U.S.- Indian ties, Burns fails to recognize
that two countries with the same system of government do not
necessarily develop similar interests or policies. In the case of India,
the burdens of colonialism and economic underdevelopment have
led it to oppose much of the U.S. agenda. Like China, India continues to
view the United States as a presumptuous superpower and competitor. And if
India realizes its goal of becoming an economic powerhouse with global
influence, New Delhi's rivalry with Washington, particularly in South
Asia, will likely intensify. Although Burns writes that "the United States
and India should continue to strengthen their defense and political
coordination in the Asia-Pacific region," he neglects to mention that India
appears uninterested in cooperating on this front. The United States has
included India in multilateral strategic discussions on the AsiaPacific region, such as the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue, with
Australia and Japan, which sought to respond to increased Chinese
power, but India has not made such meetings a priority. New Delhi
has also been conspicuously absent from the two combined naval
task forces the United States assembled to combat terrorism and
piracy in the Indian Ocean. And despite providing development assistance
to Afghanistan, India has refused to participate in the International
Security Assistance Force, NATO'S security mission in Afghanistan. When
India does participate in multilateral organizations, it routinely
opposes initiatives proposed by the United States and other Western
powers. India's opposition to interfering in other countries' domestic affairs
has led New Delhi to vote against human rights resolutions in the UN General
Assembly and to openly criticize UN involvement in such crises as the civil
wars in Libya and Syria. New Delhi has also opposed the West on many
economic issues, working with the other so-called BRICS nations Brazil, Russia, China, and South Africa to create alternatives to the
World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, and other Bretton
Woods institutions. Still, Burns holds out hope that Obama and Indian
Prime Minister Narendra Modi will "work together to promote stability in
India's South Asian neighborhood." If India's actions are anything to go on,
however, it appears that the country prefers to work alone to
maintain its regional dominance-and it views the United States as a
threat. As a U.S. diplomat serving in South Asia from 1985 to 2004, I
watched Indian officials repeatedly pressure neighboring countries
not to cooperate with Washington, often because New Delhi
believed, erroneously, that such cooperation would raise the U.S.
military's profile in South Asia. In early 2014, India protested U.S. calls
for fair and inclusive elections in Bangladesh because it feared that
voters would not elect a pro-India party. To gain leverage over its
neighbors, India has had its foreign intelligence agency provide
financial support to antigovernment insurgencies in Bangladesh,
Nepal, and Sri Lanka. Two of the insurgent groups India has backedMaoist militants in Nepal and Tamil separatists in Sri Lanka-have killed

thousands of civilians and been designated as terrorists by the U.S.

government.

Impact US China Relations

Bad/Defense Versus
Relations Good

Laundry List

Answers to they say Relations solve diseases

US-China cooperation on disease cant solve- different
ideological goals and China looks like a hypocrite
Miller 14.
[Travis Is There Room for U.S.-China Cooperation on the Ebola Crisis? (Part
I) US-China Perception Monitor US-China Young Scholars Forum Travis M.
Miller October 13th, 2014 URL: http://www.uscnpm.org/blog/2014/10/13/isthere-room-for-u-s-china-cooperation-on-the-ebola-crisis-part-one/]
While both China and the U.S. share an interest in containing the
spread of infectious disease in Africa, their intentions for doing so may
perhaps remain ideologically at odds. Such circumstances are hardly unique within this complex
relationship, and with U.S.-China relations come decades of misperceptions and
distrust of intentions. However, the scope of potential reasons on behalf of both states for desiring a cessation to the
outbreak of Ebola and other deadly disease in Africa still each arrive at a conclusion that involves humanitarian action in some capacity.

The presence of Chinese investment on the continent of Africa is

becoming increasingly difficult to ignore. Last year marked a fifth
consecutive year that China remained Africas largest trade partner,
and foreign direct investment from China to Africa was measured at
US$15 billion in 2012. As trade and investment by the Chinese in Africa continues to increase immensely on an annual
basis, such interdependency has established a need in fostering a stable
environment for economic growth to persist. Funding and construction of infrastructure (China
pledged US$20 billion for such activities alone in 2013) has created a two-fold benefit for the Chinese by both creating opportunities to earn
government contracts from African states while also strengthening the means by which Chinese resource industries based out of the African

Some in the West, such as the European Parliament,

have rushed to declare these practices as neo-colonialist, but the opposite end of
continent can transport materials.

the spectrum would cite an interest by the Chinese in forging stronger relations with unique and untapped foreign markets for the exportation

Chinas approach is not

solely focused on resource extraction but on developing business in
the region. This process of the spread of capitalism is remarkably
reminiscent of the Western economic ideologies advocated for
hundreds of years; it is simply being conducted in exclusion of nonWestern nations. While infrastructure is crucial for industry to prosper, just as necessary are safe living conditions in which
of goods. As Deborah Brautagam notes in The Dragons Gift: The Real Story of China in Africa,

companies and workers are willing to brave thousands of miles to relocate to. With estimates of over one million Chinese currently living
across the African continent, the push to attract greater business initiatives will require migrants to believe that they will prosper relatively
uninhibited overseas. The Ebola crisis in West Africa has affected the ability of Chinese companies to conduct business in the region. A Chinese
diplomat was quoted as claiming that while the nearly 1,500 Chinese workers in Liberia face little risk of exposure to Ebola, the disease has
negatively impacted the operations of many Chinese businesses. Xue Xiaoming, vice-chairman of the Chinese Chamber of Industry and
Commerce in Nigeria, stated that many potential Chinese companies looking to invest in what has become Africas largest economy have put
existing plans on hold in response to international airlines suspending flights to Ebola-affected countries. This economic interest may have
stirred up humanitarian aid by China in combating Ebola in West Africa. The relief efforts mark a rare action on their behalf when referring to

While China has quickly developed into the

worlds second largest economy, the state ranked 29th in 2012 in
international monetary humanitarian aid, remaining in stark contrast
from its Western economic equivalents in terms of assistance. The
continent of Africa represents a historical anomaly in traditional
Chinese humanitarian efforts. For China, the state has dispatched over 20,000 medical practitioners to Africa
overall global Chinese humanitarian aid.

dating back to Mao Zedongs regime. Chinese workers worldwide administered over 240 million medical treatments in 71 countries, 45 of
which located in Africa. These efforts were curbed under Deng Xiaoping when the state turned its efforts towards intensive economic
development, perhaps a signal that the previous decades of work was not simply mercantilist policy but the result of humanitarian inspiration.

From the American perspective, the amount China has donated still
reflects only a fraction of U.S. humanitarian monetary assistance . Even in

West Africa, the U.S. (ranked 1st in 2012 in humanitarian assistance donations) allocated US$100 million to aid in the Ebola crisis through
U.S.A.I.D. (United States Agency for International Development) as of September 2014, with congress assessing whether to send an additional
amount in the form of C.D.C. personnel and equipment that would bring the overall total of U.S. aid to US$250 million. This is despite not
possessing the same breadth of business interests as China in the region (only trading at a rate of nearly half that of China within the
continent). However, the organizational purposes of U.S.A.I.D., to end extreme poverty and to promote resilient, democratic societies while
advancing our security and prosperity, reflect the myriad of intentions behind humanitarian aid donations backed by the U.S. government.

criticism has been levied against the American government from

multiple angles, accusing the U.S. of overseeing the distribution of
aid only to favorable regime-types or attaching political structural
adjustment requirements in order to become a recipient . Still, regardless of
Indeed,

motivations, both states have seemingly formed a stake in aiding the West African nations.

No US China Nuclear war

Impact defense China US conflict wont escalate to
nuclear war NFU and strategic incentives, PLA planning
prove
Cunningham and Fravel, 2015
(Fiona S. Cunningham, M. Taylor Fravel; Ph.D. candidate in the Department of
Political Science and member of the Secu- rity Studies Program at the
Massachusetts Institute of Technology. M. Taylor Fravel is Associate Professor
of Political Science and member of the Security Studies Program at the
Massachusetts Institute of Tech- nology. Assuring Assured Retaliation: China's
Nuclear Posture and U.S.-China Strategic Stability International Security,
Volume 40, Number 2, Fall 2015, accessed project use 7/12/16 ddi tm)
Second, Chinese strategists are relatively and perhaps unexpectedly opti- mistic
about U.S.-China crisis stability, now and in the future. Recent interna- tional relations scholarship has warned that
the combination of mutual possession of nuclear weapons and conventional military asymmetry creates both risks of unintentional
nuclear escalation and incentives for China and the United States to manipulate the risk of nuclear escalation for bargaining purposes
during a crisis. By contrast, Chinas

strategists believe that the inter- ests at stake would be too

low in any U.S.-China scenario for either side to cre- ate risks of nuclear escalation.
Moreover, Chinas no-first-use policy means that only the United States would
escalate to the nuclear level, which is un- likely, given its conventional military
superiority over China. In addition, China is allowing limited ambiguity over its
no-first-use policy to deter the United States from attacking Chinas nuclear forces
with conventional weap- ons. With some exceptions, Chinese strategists are not worried that
this ambi- guity could be mistaken for Chinese preparations to actually use nuclear
weapons first. Chinese strategists also dismiss U.S. concerns that implement- ing the AirSea Battle Concept could result in
escalation, because they dismiss the possibility that Chinas nuclear capabilities could be unintentionally com- promised by U.S.

Doctrinal materials suggest that the Peoples Liberation Army (PLA)

has been planning to protect its nuclear forces and its command and control
facilities from conventional attacks for at least a decade , which suggests that if the AirSea Battle
conventional attacks.

Concept threatens Chinas nu- clear weapons, it is not a novel threat.

Conflicts general

AT they say Relations solve conflicts and war

Domestic considerations drive Chinese actions plan cant
change that
Ash 2015
(Timothy Garton Ash If US relations with China turn sour, there will probably
be war 16 October 2015
https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2015/oct/16/us-relations-chinawar-america accessed DDI ND)
the Chinese
Communist party does face a long-term legitimation crisis. For
decades, it has derived political legitimacy from impressive
economic growth, which is now slowing down. I believe Xi is making a massive Leninist
All this is bubbling up while Xi is firmly in control at home, with no immediate domestic crisis. But

gamble that reasserted single-party rule can manage the development of a complex, maturing economy and satisfy the
growing expectations of an increasingly educated, urban and informed society. The Chinese leaderships crude attempt to
command the Chinese stock markets to rally earlier this year, reminiscent of King Canutes confrontation with the

They can almost certainly keep the lid on for

several years but, as always happens when necessary reform is
postponed, the eventual crisis will be larger. At that point, the temptation for the
incoming tide, is not encouraging.

Communist party leadership to play the nationalist card, perhaps with an actual military move, Galtieri-style, against one
of Chinas Malvinas/Falkland Islands, would be very strong. Probably this would not be a direct confrontation with a formal

With angry, nationalist public

opinion in both countries, neither the Chinese nor the American
leader could be seen to lose, and both sides have nuclear weapons.
This is not idle scaremongering; its something the US military,
intelligence and thinktank communities think about all the time, in
order to avoid it. Precisely because Chinas future course will mainly
depend on forces within the country, beyond Washingtons control,
the United States needs a wise, consistent, strategic deployment of
all the instruments at its disposal. This should be something like the twin track strategy
US ally, but the risks of miscalculation and escalation would be high.

adopted by the west during the last two decades of the cold war (although obviously not expecting it to end the same

there should be no room for doubt in Chinese minds

about what the US will accept militarily. US policy should be the opposite of what Barack
Obama did over Syria (declare a red line and then allow Bashar al-Assad to walk across it with impunity). In
Chinas case, the US should declare no public red lines but in private
communication, and through deeds that speak louder than words,
make it clear that they exist. At the same time Washington should
redouble its attempts at constructive engagement. There should be intensive
way). On the one hand,

efforts to find shared ground on climate change, the world economy and geopolitical issues from North Korea to Syria. The
intensive business ties that already exist should buttress the relationship. There is already an extraordinary people-topeople relationship, embracing many millions of better-off Chinese who have studied, worked and lived in the west.

This strategy should be coordinated with key US allies who have their own major
relationships with China, such as Australia, Germany and Britain, which will welcome Xi on a state visit next week.

Internal turmoil and lack of navy capabilities means China

is not a threat to the US
Xin 12 (Qiang, Professor and Deputy Director of the Center for American
Studies @ Fudan University, Cooperation Opportunity or Confrontation

Catalyst? The implication of Chinas naval development for ChinaUS

relations, Journal of Contemporary China, Taylor and Francis)
China is still the worlds largest
developing country and faces a series of domestic challenges. First, as Premier Wen
Jiabao announced at the Copenhagen Climate Change Summit, China has 150 million people living
below the poverty line in 2009, according to the UN standard.17 Second, there are about 200
million unemployed people in China.18 Third, a series of formidable imbalances, such as the
dangerous gaps between rural and urban areas, the coastal area and the
inland area, and rich and poor, imposes immediate pressure upon economic
and social stability. Fourth, environmental degradation and other domestic
problems, including political corruption, all threaten Chinas economic
prospects. Because of the fragile economic and social structure, China cannot
afford expansive strategies which could trigger an intense conflict or even
war. In addition, as a historically continental power bordered by dozens of countries, China will always face a hard
choice over resource allocation between land defense and the establishment of sea power. This dilemma and
the army-dominant structure of the PLA will constrain the navys budget and
further restrain the dynamics of capability building .19 Since the end of the Second World
Chinas capabilities. Despite the glittering economic accomplishments,

War, the US has established and always maintained the worlds strongest naval power. On 3 May 2010, US Defense
Secretary Robert Gates detailed the multilayered supremacy of the US navy in terms of nuclear- powered carriers, largedeck amphibious ships, nuclear-powered submarines, Aegis- class combatants and the displacement of battle fleets.
Thereby, Secretary Gates announced confidently that the United States stands unsurpassed on, above, and below the
high seas.20 By contrast, confined by the availability of a limited budget and the weakness of industrialtechnological

the PLAN capabilities lag behind those of the US navy in

almost every, if not all, key aspect . This formidable power asymmetry ranges from hardware,
scientific infrastructure,

including strategic nuclear submarines, long-range force-projection capabilities, anti-air capabilities, and anti-submarine
capabilities, to software, characterized by the intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance capabilities, level of
sophistication in joint warfighting, and mature operational proficiency across the board.21 Impressed by the sophistication
of US military equipment during his visit to the US in May 2011, General Chen Bingde, the Chief of the General Staff of the
PLA, said frankly that China does not have the capability to challenge the United States.22 Additionally, but of great
importance for a blue-water navy, the existence of the US navys widespread military bases and facilities, as well as their
network of global allies, further dwarfs the PLAN. The inferiority of the PLAN is evident both in quality and quantity, which
prevents the PLAN from becoming an elite naval power at present.23

Cyber security
Increased relations mean we let down our guard - theyll
just attack us
Gertz 16 (Bill, senior editor of the Washington Free Beacon. Prior to joining
the Beacon he was a national security reporter, editor, and columnist for 27
years at the Washington Times. March 18, 2016. China Continuing Cyber
Attacks on U.S. Networks The Washington Free Beacon
http://freebeacon.com/national-security/china-continuing-cyber-attacks-on-us-networks/)
Six months after China pledged to halt cyber espionage against the United
States, Beijings hackers continue to conduct cyber attacks on government
and private networks, the commander of U.S. Cyber Command told Congress. Despite a formal
pledge made by Chinese leader Xi Jinping in September, cyber operations from China are
still targeting and exploiting U.S. government, defense industry, academic,
and private computer networks, Adm. Mike Rogers, the Cybercom chief, said in prepared
testimony to a House Armed Services subcommittee on Wednesday. Rogers echoed comments on
continued Chinese cyber attacks made by Director of National Intelligence James Clapper in February.
Clapper said in Senate testimony that it

remains to be seen if China will abide by the

informal pledge made during a summit meeting in Washington with President
Obama. Rogers said he agreed with Clapper that Chinas commitment to halt cyber espionage attacks
remains an open question. China has been linked by U.S. intelligence agencies to
wide-ranging cyber attacks aimed at stealing information and mapping
critical computer networks for future attacks in a crisis or conflict. Despite the
Chinese hacking activity, the Obama administration has taken no action against
China for years of large-scale cyber attacks that officials say have cost the
nation billions of dollars in stolen intellectual property and compromised
networks. Rogers also warned that nation states with advanced cyber warfare capabilities are taking
steps to mask their cyber attacks by cooperating with non-government hackers. Unspecified nation states
are expanding cooperation with a much broader range of hackers in a bid to hide the source of
sophisticated cyber attacks. I think this is in no small part an attempt to obscure what the real originator of the activity is, he said. The use of surrogate
hackers makes it more difficult for the U.S. government to confront foreign states about cyber attacks. And they say, Its not us. Its some criminal group; we dont control
all that, Rogers said. Rogers also disclosed new details about cyber attacks against the email system used by the militarys Joint Chiefs of Staff, an attack that officials
have blamed on Russia. The July attack shut down an unclassified email server for 10 days and disrupted an email system used by 4,000 users on the network. Pentagon
officials believe the attack came from Russian government hackers. Ultimately we were able to defeat the [intrusion] attempt in almost 60 other networks simultaneously
except in this one particular network, Rogers said, noting that the final defense against cyber attacks is the user of a computer. In this case we had a user who clicked on
a link that I said What would lead you to do this? Read this. It doesnt make any sense. Because computer users in the Joint Staff clicked on an email link that
downloaded a virus, the Pentagon was forced to spend time and money and limit use of the system. We cant afford to have this sort of thing, Rogers said. Under
questioning from Rep. Elise Stefanik (R., N.Y.), Rogers said he is comfortable that Cyber Command has enough military capabilities to counter cyber threats from Russia,
China, and other states and entities. Ive yet to run into a threat scenario that we couldnt deal with, he said. But Rogers voiced worries about his command having
enough forces to deal with the threats. What concerns me is capacityhow much of it do you have and as the threats proliferate, our ability to deal with high-end,
simultaneous complicated threats, thats probably the biggest limiting factor right now, he said. The four-star admiral testified before the House Armed Services
subcommittee on emerging threats and capabilities, which oversees the command. The command spends around $500 million annually and is in the process of creating
cyber mission teams that are deployed with warfighting commands and other military units. The teams conduct both defensive and offensive cyber operations. The
command is based at Fort Meade, Md., and works closely with the National Security Agency, the electronic spy agency that Rogers also leads. Separately, Defense
Secretary Ash Carter testified before the Senate Armed Services Committee on Thursday and revealed the Pentagon is adding $900 million for cyber defenses and
operations in fiscal 2017. Much of that sum is focused on countering advanced threats from states like China and Russia. Reflecting our renewed commitment to deterring
even the most advanced adversaries, the budget also invests in cyber deterrence capabilities, including building potential military response options, Carter said. Rogers
said he is concerned that evolving cyber attacks are being used to acquire large databases that can be used for future cyber attacks or for foreign intelligence operations.
Two recent examples were the cyber attacks against the Office of Personnel Management, which obtained records on more than 22 million federal workers, and the Anthem
Healthcare cyber attacks that obtained some 80 million health records. OPM, Anthem, those are good examples to use of data now [being] a commodity that have value

counterintelligence, whether it be social engineering and helping to refine cyber

activity. Youll see increased attacks against Big Data concentrations in the future, Rogers said.
Ransomware attacksmalicious cyber attacks that encrypt data on a targeted computer and then extort
for a variety of purposes, whether that be

Security researchers this

week traced ransomware attacks to China, Reuters reported on Tuesday,
noting that cyber tools used in the attacks were associated with earlier
Chinese-linked cyber attacks. If you watch over the next year, youll see a lot
the owners of the data to have it decryptedalso pose a growing threat.

more ransomware activity, Rogers said. In his prepared testimony to the subcommittee, Rogers
said cyber attacks by a range of nations and non-state actors are intensifying.
While North Korea has not conducted a repeat of its November 2014 cyber attack against Sony Pictures
Entertainment, we have seen a wide range of malicious cyber activities aimed against American targets
and victims elsewhere around the world, and thus we are by no means sanguine about the overall trends
in cyberspace, he said. Cyber attacks are ubiquitous. Literally every American who has connected to a
network has been affected, directly or indirectly, by cyber crime, Rogers said. By this point millions of us
have had personal information stolen, or seen our accounts or credit compromised. Some 300 American
companies involved in critical infrastructure, such as electrical power, finance, communications and
transportation, are working with Cybercom to study ways to protect against major cyber attacks, Rogers
noted. We

remain vigilant in preparing for future threats, as cyber attacks

could cause catastrophic damage to portions of our power grid,
communications networks, and vital services, he said. Coordinated cyber attacks in
Ukraine last December disrupted the power grid and damaged electricity control systems. If directed at
the critical infrastructure that supports our nations military, cyber attacks could hamper our forces,
interfering with deployments, command and control, and supply functions, in addition to the broader impact such events could have across our society, Rogers
said, adding that the major cyber threats remain Russia, China, Iran, and North Korea. Rogers said cyber attackers from several nations have explored computer networks
used to control critical infrastructure and can potentially return at a time of their choosing to disrupt or damage the infrastructure. Russia has very capable cyber
operators who can and do work with speed, precision, and stealth, Rogers said. Iran and North Korea represent lesser but still serious challenges to U.S. interests, he
said. Although both states have been more restrained in this last year in terms of cyber activity directed against us, they remain quite active and are steadily improving
their capabilities, which often hide in the overall worldwide noise of cybercrime. Both Iran and North Korea work against the United States in cyberspace but direct most of
their malicious hacking against regional states. On ISIS, Rogers said he is concerned about the terror groups cyber capabilities. Most ISIS cyber activity involves
propaganda, recruiting, radicalization, and fundraising. ISIS-affiliated cyber operators a year ago publicized online personal data of more than 100 American service
members, including many in the United States. Not only did the hackers for ISIL publicize the personal details on these Americans, but ISIL also called for jihad against
them, urging followers in the United States to assassinate them and their family members, Rogers said. While there was no direct link between the activity and the recent
terrorist shootings in the United States and France, ISIL wants its followers on the Internet to take inspiration from such attacks, Rogers said. Cyber Command attacks
against ISIS make it more difficult for ISIL to plan or conduct attacks against the U.S. or our allies from their bases in Iraq and Syria, he said. Rogers said Cybercom also
has begun to think more about strategic deterrence in cyber space by creating capabilities that would dissuade foreign hackers from considering attacks. Cybercom
currently has set up 123 cyber mission teams staffed by 4,990 people. Twenty-seven of the teams are fully operational and 68 are in early stages of deployment. The
teams include combat mission teams that work with warfighters, like those in U.S. Central Command waging cyber war against ISIS. The command also has a national
mission team that defends U.S. critical infrastructure. Cyber protection teams are devoted to defending defense networks from attack. The cyber protection teams were
called in last year to help with the cyber attack on the Pentagons Joint Staff computer system.

India Relations DA

1nc module
Link - India perceives strong US-China relations as zerosum. Close Us China ties erodes India and US relations
Madan 2015 (Tanvi ,ellow in the Project on International Order and
Strategy in the Foreign Policy program at the Brookings Institution, The U.S.India Relationship and China, January 20, 2015, 7/14/2016
http://www.brookings.edu/research/opinions/2015/01/20-us-india-relationshipand-china-madan; DDI AH)
Today, both India and the U.S. have relationships with China that
have elements of cooperation, competition and, potentially, conflict
though in different degrees. Each country has a blended approach
of engaging China, while preparing for a turn for the worse in
Chinese behavior. Each sees a role for the other in its China strategy. Each thinks a good relationship with
the other sends a signal to China, but neither wants to provoke Beijing or be forced to choose between the other and
China. Each also recognizes that Chinaespecially uncertainty about its behavioris partly what is driving the India-U.S.
partnership. Arguably, there have been three imperatives in the U.S. for a more robust relationship with India and for
supporting its rise: strategic interest, especially in the context of the rise of China; economic interest; and shared
democratic values. Indian policymakers recognize that American concerns about the nature of Chinas rise are responsible
for some of the interest in India. New Delhis own China strategy involves strengthening India both security-wise and
economically (internal balancing) and building a range of partnerships (external balancing)and it envisions a key role for
the U.S. in both. Some Indian policymakers highlight another benefit of the U.S. relationship: Beijing takes Delhi more
seriously because Washington does.

But India and the U.S. also have concerns

about the other when it comes to China. Both sides remain uncertain
about the others willingness and capacity to play a role in the AsiaPacific. Additionally, Indian policymakers worry both about a ChinaU.S. condominium (or G-2) and a China-U.S. crisis or conflict. There is
concern about the reliability of the U.S., with the sense that the U.S.
will end up choosing China because of the more interdependent
Sino-American economic relationship and/or leave India in the
lurch. Some in the U.S. also have reliability concerns about India.
They question whether the quest for strategic autonomy will allow
India to develop a truly strategic partnership with the U.S. There are
also worries about the gap between Indian potential and
performance. Part of the rationale for supporting Indias rise is to help demonstrate that democracy and
development arent mutually exclusive. Without delivery, however, this rationaleand Indias importancefades away.
As things stand, neither India nor the U.S. is interested in the others relationship with China being too hot or too coldthe

New Delhi, a too-cosy Sino-U.S. relationship is seen as

freezing India out and impinging on its interests. It would also
eliminate one of Washingtons rationales for a stronger relationship
with India. A China-U.S. crisis or conflict, on the other hand, is seen as potentially destabilizing the region and
Goldilocks view. For

forcing India to choose between the two countries. From the U.S. perspective, any deterioration in Sino-Indian relations
might create instability in the region and perhaps force it to choose sides. Too much Sino-Indian bonhomie, on the other
hand, would potentially create complications for the U.S. in the bilateral, regional and multilateral spheres.

Strong US India Relations by allow for pressure for

restraint saves millions of lives India Pakistan most
likely conflict for escalation
Barno and Bensahe 15

(David and Nora, THE PINK FLAMINGO ON THE SUBCONTINENT: NUCLEAR

WAR BETWEEN INDIA AND PAKISTAN, War on the Rocks, NOVEMBER 3 2015,
online:http://warontherocks.com/2015/11/the-pink-flamingo-on-thesubcontinent-nuclear-war-between-india-and-pakistan/, DDI TM)
A pink flamingo is the term recently coined by Frank Hoffman to describe
predictable but ignored events that can yield disastrous results . Hoffman
argues that these situations are fully visible, but almost entirely ignored by policymakers. Pink flamingos stand in stark contrast to black

The tense nuclear

standoff between India and Pakistan may be the most dangerous
pink flamingo in todays world. The Indian subcontinent home to both India and
Pakistan remains among the most dangerous corners of the world, and
continues to pose a deep threat to global stability and the current world order. Their 1,800-mile
border is the only place in the world where two hostile, nucleararmed states face off every day. And the risk of nuclear conflict has
only continued to rise in the past few years, to the point that it is now a very real
possibility. India and Pakistan have fought three wars since they gained
independence in 1947, including one that ended in 1971 with Pakistan losing approximately half its territory (present-day Bangladesh).
Today, the disputed Line of Control that divides the disputed
Kashmir region remains a particularly tense flash point. Both the
Kargil crisis of 1999 and the 2001 attack on the Indian Parliament by
Pakistan-supported militants brought both nations once again to the
brink of war. Yet unlike earlier major wars, these two crises occurred
after both India and Pakistan became nuclear-armed states. Quick
and forceful diplomatic intervention played a pivotal role in
preventing a larger conflict from erupting during each crisis. These
stakes are even higher, and more dangerous, today. Since 2004, India has
been developing a new military doctrine called Cold Start, a limited
war option designed largely to deter Islamabad from sponsoring
irregular attacks against New Delhi. It involves rapid conventional
retaliation after any such attack, launching a number of quick
armored assaults into Pakistan and rapidly securing limited
objectives that hypothetically remain below Pakistans nuclear
threshold. In accordance with this doctrine, the Indian military is meant to mobilize half a million troops in less than 72 hours. The
problem is, unlike its neighbors India and China, Pakistan has not renounced the first use of
nuclear weapons. Instead, Pakistani leaders have stated that they
may have to use nuclear weapons first in order to defend against a
conventional attack from India. Therefore, both to counter Cold Start
and help to offset Indias growing conventional superiority, Pakistan
has accelerated its nuclear weapons program and begun to field short-range, low yield
tactical nuclear weapons (TNW). Some observers now judge this nuclear program to be the fastest growing in the world. Pakistan
will reportedly have enough fissile material by 2020 to build more
than 200 nuclear warheads more than the United Kingdom plans to have by that time. It is not simply the
swans the unpredictable, even unforeseeable shocks whose outcomes may be entirely unknown.

pace of the buildup that should cause concern. Pakistans arsenal of short-range tactical nuclear weapons is a game-changer in other ways.

Pakistan clearly intends to use these weapons on its own soil if

necessary to counter Cold Starts plan for sudden Indian armored
thrusts into Pakistan. The introduction of these weapons has altered
the long-standing geometry between the two nuclear powers, and

increases risk of escalation to a nuclear exchange in a crisis. Beyond

the risks of runaway nuclear escalation, Pakistans growing tactical
nuclear weapons program also brings a wide array of other
destabilizing characteristics to this already unstable mix: the necessity to position
these short-range weapons close to the border with India, making them more vulnerable to interdiction; the need to move and disperse these

the prospects of local commanders

being given decentralized control of the weapons a use it or lose
it danger if facing an Indian armored offensive. Furthermore, large
numbers of small nuclear weapons scattered at different locations
increases the risk that some will fall into the hands of violent
extremists. A terrorist group gaining control of a nuclear weapon
remains one of the most frightening potential spinoffs of the current
arms race. Perhaps the most dangerous scenario that could lead to
catastrophe is a replay of the 2008 Mumbai terrorist attacks. In
November 2008, 10 terrorists launched attacks that left 166 people
dead before the last of attackers were finally killed by Indian security forces almost 60 hours after the attacks began. By that time, there
weapons during a crisis, thereby signaling a nuclear threat; and

was strong evidence that the attackers were Pakistani and belonged to a Pakistan-supported militant group. Indian public outrage and

Only through the combination of diplomatic pressure

from the United States and immense restraint exerted by thenIndian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh was an Indian retaliatory
strike averted. The chances of such Indian government restraint in a
similarly deadly future scenario are unlikely. Experts such as Stephen Cohen of the Brookings
humiliation were overwhelming.

Institution and former U.S. Ambassador to India Robert Blackwill agree that if there were another Mumbai, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi
would not step back from using military force in response, unlike his predecessors. Indian public opinion would demand retaliation, especially
after the unpopular degree of restraint exercised by the Singh government after the Mumbai attacks. But there remains no meaningful seniorlevel dialogue between the two states last Augusts planned meeting between the two national security advisers was cancelled after
disagreements about Kashmiri separatists. There may be little the United States or the world can do to forestall this conflict still looming just
over the horizon. Nevertheless, the tremendous dangers of this situation require U.S. policymakers to devote more time and energy in trying
to do so, and some small steps may help. The United States should work hard to catalyze confidence-building measures between the two
sides, seeking to open more peacetime channels to create dialog and potential conflict mediation options for the future. Neither nations
military currently has any direct communications. Quiet, off-the-record meetings between senior military leaders would help lessen tensions
and establish some degree of mutual dialog and understanding before a crisis erupts. The United States should also sponsor unofficial tabletop
exercises involving representatives of each side to explore how escalation in a nuclear conflict could unfold. The United States should also
reach out to current (and former) civil and military decision-makers on both sides to develop and grow bilateral relationships that could prove
vital in the next crisis. Both the United States and NATO should also emphasize the limited battlefield utility of TNW, as well as their wellresearched estimates of the damage that would have been wrought by using them to defend Western Europe from a Soviet armored invasion.
And the United States should continue to encourage Pakistan to slow its fielding of tactical nuclear weapons, and keep them under tight
central control well away from vulnerable forward-deployed positions. The lack of any tangible results from the U.S. governments recent

A nuclear war between India and

Pakistan would dramatically alter the world as we know it. The
damage from fallout and blast, the deaths of potentially millions,
and the environmental devastation of even a few weapons
detonations would suddenly dwarf any other global problem. There
are no shortage of conflicts and crises around the world demanding
the attention of policymakers in Washington and other capitals. But
the stakes of a war between two of the worlds most hostile nuclear
powers deserves attention before the next inevitable flare-up. Taking a
outreach to Pakistan on this topic should only encourage renewed efforts.

series of modest steps now to try to avert the worst outcomes from this dangerous pink flamingo hiding in plain sight is an investment well
worth making.

Link extensions perception tradeoff

Shift to closer US China ties undermines Indias
perception of its security
Mohan, 2012 (C. Raja, Distinguished Fellow at the Observer Research
Foundation, The New Triangular Diplomacy: India, China and America at Sea,
November 05, 2012, 7/14/2016 http://thediplomat.com/2012/11/the-newtriangular-diplomacy-india-china-and-america-on-the-high-seas/1/; DDI - AH )
While Indias main interest is in securing its primacy in the Indian Ocean littoral, its navy is making frequent forays into
the Western Pacific. Delhis deepening bilateral naval engagement with Vietnam, which is mired in territorial disputes
with China, its support to the principle of freedom of navigation in the South China Sea, and its frequent joint naval
exercises with Japan and the United States do raise eyebrows in Beijing. Even as China and India build up their naval
capabilities and step on each others toes in the Indo-Pacific, neither of them is in a position to supplant the United States

The U.S. military rebalance towards

Asia is marked by a profound wariness of Chinas growing power and
great enthusiasm to strengthen the partnership with India. This has
set in motion what could be a consequent triangular dynamic in the
Indo-Pacific. Like everyone else in Asia, India wants to benefit from Chinas economic growth but would like
as the dominant maritime power in both the oceans.

to limit the prospects for Beijings dominance of the region. As the strategic gap between India and China growsfor
China is rising much faster than IndiaDelhi can only bridge it through a combination of internal and external balancing.

India is concerned about the

inconstancy of American policy towards China, the fiscal and political
sustainability of the pivot to Asia in Washington. Delhi is acutely
aware of the dangers of a potential Sino-U.S. rapprochement that
could leave India exposed. It therefore seeks simultaneous
expansion of security cooperation with the United States while
avoiding a needless provocation of Beijing. China, clearly, has the
upper hand in the current triangular dynamic with India and the
United States. It could accommodate either Delhi or Washington to
limit the depth of a prospective India-U.S. strategic partnership.
Given the current ambiguities in Washington, Beijing and Delhi,
there is much uncertainty surrounding the direction of the triangular
dynamic between them. One thing, though, is certain. The emergence of China and India as naval
An alliance with Washington, then, would seem natural for Delhi. But

powers and the intersection of their maritime policies with those of the United States are bound to churn the security
politics of the Indo-Pacific for decades to come.

$U.S. India relations are Goldilocks nowplan leaves India

in the lurch with concerns about China
Madan 15 (Tanvi Madan is a fellow in the Project on International Order
and Strategy in the Foreign Policy program at the Brookings Institution, and
director of The India Project. The U.S.-India Relationship and China,
http://www.brookings.edu/research/opinions/2015/01/20-us-india-relationshipand-china-madan , January 20, 2015 )
both India and the U.S. have relationships with China that have
elements of cooperation, competition and, potentially, conflictthough in different
degrees. Each country has a blended approach of engaging China, while preparing for a turn for the worse in Chinese behavior. Each
sees a role for the other in its China strategy. Each thinks a good
relationship with the other sends a signal to China, but neither
Today,

wants to provoke Beijing or be forced to choose between the other and China.
Each also recognizes that Chinaespecially uncertainty about its behavioris partly what is driving the India-U.S. partnership. Arguably, there
have been three imperatives in the U.S. for a more robust relationship with India and for supporting its rise: strategic interest, especially in the
context of the rise of China; economic interest; and shared democratic values. Indian policymakers recognize that American concerns about
the nature of Chinas rise are responsible for some of the interest in India. New Delhis own China strategy involves strengthening India both
security-wise and economically (internal balancing) and building a range of partnerships (external balancing)and it envisions a key role for
the U.S. in both. Some Indian policymakers highlight another benefit of the U.S. relationship: Beijing takes Delhi more seriously because
Washington does. But India and the U.S. also have concerns about the other when it comes to China. Both sides remain uncertain about the

Indian policymakers worry

both about a China-U.S. condominium (or G-2) and a China-U.S. crisis or conflict. There is
concern about the reliability of the U.S., with the sense that the U.S.
will end up choosing China because of the more interdependent Sino-American economic relationship
and/or leave India in the lurch. Some in the U.S. also have reliability concerns about India. They question
others willingness and capacity to play a role in the Asia-Pacific. Additionally,

whether the quest for strategic autonomy will allow India to develop a truly strategic partnership with the U.S. There are also worries about
the gap between Indian potential and performance. Part of the rationale for supporting Indias rise is to help demonstrate that democracy and

As things
stand, neither India nor the U.S. is interested in the others relationship with China being too
hot or too coldthe Goldilocks view. For New Delhi, a too-cosy Sino-U.S.
relationship is seen as freezing India out and impinging on its
interests. It would also eliminate one of Washingtons rationales for a stronger relationship with India. A China-U.S. crisis or conflict,
development arent mutually exclusive. Without delivery, however, this rationaleand Indias importancefades away.

on the other hand, is seen as potentially destabilizing the region and forcing India to choose between the two countries. From the U.S.
perspective, any deterioration in Sino-Indian relations might create instability in the region and perhaps force it to choose sides. Too much
Sino-Indian bonhomie, on the other hand, would potentially create complications for the U.S. in the bilateral, regional and multilateral spheres.

both India and the U.S. do share an interest in managing

Chinas rise. Neither would like to see what some have outlined as President Xi Jinpings vision of Asia,
with a dominant China and the U.S. playing a minimal role . India and the U.S.
However,

recognize that China will play a crucial role in Asiait is the nature of that role that concerns both countries. Their anxiety has been more
evident since 2009, leading the two sides to discuss Chinaand the Asia-Pacific broadlymore willingly. They have an East Asia dialogue in
place. There is also a trilateral dialogue with Japan and talk of upgrading it to ministerial level and including Japan on a more regular basis in

The Obama administration has also repeatedly stated

that it sees India as part of its rebalance strategy. In November 2014, President
Obama, speaking in Australia, stressed that the U.S. support[ed] a greater role
in the Asia Pacific for India. The Modi government, in turn, has made the region a foreign policy priority. Prime
India-U.S maritime exercises.

Minister Modi has implicitly criticized Chinese behavior in the region (and potentially in the Indian Ocean), with his admonition about countries
with expansionist mindsets that encroach on others lands and seas. In a departure from its predecessor, his government has shown a
willingness to express its support for freedom of navigation in the South China Sea in joint statements with Vietnam and the U.S. In an op-ed,
the prime minister also stated that the India-U.S. partnership will be of great value in advancing peace, security and stability in the Asia and

Obama and he reaffirm[ed] their shared

interest in preserving regional peace and stability, which are critical
to the Asia Pacific region's continued prosperity.
Pacific regions and, in September, President

Link extensions - abandoment

$Increased US-China engagement will be perceived by
India as abandonment
Madan, 15 fellow in the Project on International Order and Strategy in
the Foreign Policy program at the Brookings Institution, and director of The
India Project (Tanvi, 1/20. The U.S.-India Relationship and China.
http://www.brookings.edu/research/opinions/2015/01/20-us-india-relationshipand-china-madan)
Chinaespecially uncertainty about its behavioris partly what is driving
the India-U.S. partnership. Arguably, there have been three imperatives in the U.S. for a more robust
Each also recognizes that

relationship with India and for supporting its rise: strategic interest, especially in the context of the rise of China;

Indian policymakers recognize that

American concerns about the nature of Chinas rise are responsible
for some of the interest in India. New Delhis own China strategy involves strengthening India both
economic interest; and shared democratic values.

security-wise and economically (internal balancing) and building a range of partnerships (external balancing)and it
envisions a key role for the U.S. in both. Some Indian policymakers highlight another benefit of the U.S. relationship:
Beijing takes Delhi more seriously because Washington does.

India and the U.S. also have concerns about the other when it
comes to China. Both sides remain uncertain about the others willingness and capacity to play a role in the
But

Asia-Pacific.

Indian policymakers worry both about a China-U.S.

condominium (or G-2) and a China-U.S. crisis or conflict. There is concern about the
reliability of the U.S., with the sense that the U.S. will end up
choosing China because of the more interdependent Sino-American
economic relationship and/or leave India in the lurch.
Additionally,

Some in the U.S. also have reliability concerns about India. They question
whether the quest for strategic autonomy will allow India to develop a truly
strategic partnership with the U.S. There are also worries about the gap
between Indian potential and performance. Part of the rationale for
supporting Indias rise is to help demonstrate that democracy and
development arent mutually exclusive. Without delivery, however, this
rationaleand Indias importancefades away.
neither India nor the U.S. is interested in the others
relationship with China being too hot or too coldthe Goldilocks view. For
New Delhi, a too-cosy Sino-U.S. relationship is seen as freezing India
out and impinging on its interests. It would also eliminate one of
Washingtons rationales for a stronger relationship with India. A ChinaAs things stand,

U.S. crisis or conflict, on the other hand, is seen as potentially destabilizing the region and forcing India to choose between
the two countries. From the U.S. perspective, any deterioration in Sino-Indian relations might create instability in the
region and perhaps force it to choose sides. Too much Sino-Indian bonhomie, on the other hand, would potentially create
complications for the U.S. in the bilateral, regional and multilateral spheres.

US China cooperation and relations alienates India

FEIGENBAUM, 15 (EVAN A., Nonresident Senior Associate Asia Program, U.S.India Ties in the Age of Xi Jinping, September 22, 2015, 7/15/16

http://carnegieendowment.org/2015/09/22/u.s.-india-ties-in-age-of-xijinping/ii7f; DDI - AH )
These are just some of the issues on the agenda for Xis state visit to
Washington. But heres the catch: some issues on that agenda could bring
Washington and New Delhi closer, but others could drive them apart as
American coordination with Beijing risks creating wedges between
the United States and India. One example of the former involves
domestic investment rules in China. Beijing has deployed regulations
and standards as a non-tariff barrierto the detriment of U.S. and
Indian investment alike. But an example of the latter involves intensifying
climate change coordination in the run-up to Decembers multilateral
negotiations in Paris: the United States and China are moving into alignment
on climate, even as New Delhi stands apart and flirts with seeking
exceptional treatment. That points to a challenge that the United
States and India must now confront: At the strategic level, Chinas
rise has brought Washington and New Delhi closer. But at the
tactical leveland sometimes, even at the strategic levelU.S. and
Indian goals and choices are not always in alignment. One problem is
political. It is difficult to imagine a major East Asian security contingency
Taiwan, Korea, the South or East China Seasto which U.S.-India operational
coordination would be relevant. India would almost certainly keep itself aloof,
influenced by many of the same Indian voices that helped to scuttle refueling
support of the United States in the 1991 Persian Gulf War. Another problem
involves Indian perceptions of American ambivalence about India-China
security tensions. The United States, for its part, would likely try to remain
aloof from a blowup on the India-China border, not wishing to be caught in
the middle. That would, predictably, raise hackles in New Delhi about
U.S. unreliability, further fueling Indian skepticism of Americas
China policy. Washington encountered precisely this suspicion full force in
2009, when it issued a U.S.-China joint statement that included references to
South Asia. Many in India choked on this statementfirst, because they
suspected a U.S.-China condominium on New Delhis security
equities; second, because few, if any, in India regard Beijing as a
neutral party in South Asia; and third, because many fret that
Washington could sideline New Delhi, working against Indian
interests in pursuit of expanded U.S.-China cooperation.

Link extensions zero sum

US relations with china and India are zero-sum
Varadarajan, 13 Editor, The Hindu. He covers a broad range of
international issues, such as the relationship between India and China in Asia
and India's foreign policy. Prior to joining The Hindu, he worked at The Times
of India for nine years. In May 2011, he was appointed editor in chief, as the
first non-family, professional editor (Siddharth, 3/28. India's Foreign and
Strategic Policy in Asia The India-China-U.S. Troika and Japan.
http://www.wochikochi.jp/english/relayessay/2013/05/india-in-asia.php)

The India-U.S. relationship has recovered considerably in this past

decade. During the second term of the George W. Bush
administration, the United States made a decision to try and
influence, or even limit, the kind of strategic choices that India
could make at a given moment in time. The United States was
conscious of the need to have India as a partner to hedge against
China's rise. And the nuclear deal it offered in July 2005 was

leveraged as a means to, in a way, accomplish this. There were

other calculations on the U.S. side too but it is not accidental that
India-China relations, which had recovered from the dip which
happened after the 1998 nuclear tests, suffered as a
consequence of the new India-U.S. relationship. In the U.S.
Congress, and among U.S. strategic analysts, this was a constant
theme -- that we are befriending India, we are building a partnership
with India, as a hedge against China. But such a framing was not
healthy for India. After all, if the American reaching out to India is a
function of its relationship with China and is contingent in some way
on Washington's desire to hedge against Beijing, what happens if
tomorrow the United States decides for reasons of its own that it
now needs to strengthen its relationship with China? The India
relationship would be a casualty.

Link - Diplomatic engage

$The plans diplomatic engagement has a far-reaching
impact on US-Sino-China relationship
Chatterjee 11 (Ananya Chatterjee-Sessional Lecturer, School of
Continuing Education at University of Oxford, Research/Teaching and Learning
Support at University of Reading, formerly a Sessional Lecturer University of
Reading. India-China-United States: The Post-Cold War Evolution of a
Strategic Triangle http://www.politicalperspectives.org.uk/wpcontent/uploads/Evolution-India-China1.pdf )
Diplomatic meetings between the leaders of India, China and the United States in
recent years have drawn worldwide attention. Although critics said that the visits were more symbolic in
nature, few would question their far-reaching impact on reshaping the
bilateral relationships between America and the two rising global
powerhouses: China and India. Therefore, it can be concluded that the United States remains
a major factor in the evolving India-China-U.S. triangle and both
India and China seeks to maximise the benefits from this bilateral
relationship with the United States in the context of the present international political system. On the other hand,
Washington's engagement of the world's two most populous nations ,
each experiencing strong economic growth and a raised profile on the international stage, is strategically
significant. As the U.S. Government's National Intelligence Council pointed out earlier in 2005 in its report Mapping the Global
Future, the likely emergence of China and India as new major global players will transform the geopolitical landscape in the early 21st
century (US National Intelligence Council [online]). The Report predicting a rising Asia by 2020 points out that China will continue to
strengthen its military through developing and acquiring modern weapons, including advanced fighter aircraft, sophisticated submarines, and
increasing numbers of ballistic missiles. China will overtake Russia and others as the second largest defence spender after the United States
over the next two decades and will be, by any measure, a first-rate military power. With regards to India, the Report outlines that as Indias
economy grows governments in Southeast AsiaMalaysia, Singapore, Thailand, and other countriesmay move closer to India to help build a
potential geopolitical counterweight to China. At the same time, India will seek to strengthen its ties with countries in the region without
excluding China.

Link climate policies

$ India feels sidelined by US-China cooperation on global
warming
Feigenbaum, NONRESIDENT SENIOR ASSOCIATE-ASIA PROGRAM, 2015
(Evan A., U.S.-India Ties in the Age of Xi Jinping, Carnegie Endowment for
International Peace, September 22, 2015,
http://carnegieendowment.org/2015/09/22/u.s.-india-ties-in-age-of-xijinping/ii7f, accessed: 7-6-16, IP)
When Chinese President Xi Jinping visits Washington this week, the
United States and India will have an opportunity to assessand then bolstertheir nascent
cooperation in Asia. The fact is, this triangular relationship matters. It has
often been argued that the United States and India dont need
China as a rationale for cooperation. Two continental-sized countries, with deep maritime traditions and
a diverse array of energy, economic, and security interests, have numerous reasons to cooperate and coordinate. But there can
be no denying that China looms large in the strategic calculations of
both countries. Feigenbaums work focuses principally on China and India, geopolitics in Asia, and the role of the United
States in East, Central, and South Asia. His previous positions include deputy assistant secretary of state for South Asia, deputy assistant
secretary of state for Central Asia, and member of the secretary of states policy planning staff with principal responsibility for East Asia and
the Pacific. Evan A. Feigenbaum Nonresident Senior Associate Asia Program More from this author... China as a Responsible Stakeholder? A
Decade Later The New Asian Order And How America Can Compete Why America No Longer Gets Asia Lenins Chinese Heirs For one thing,

Chinas growing strength confronts Washington and New Delhi with

sometimes distinct, but increasingly shared, strategic and economic
challenges. So too does the prospect of Chinese weaknessfor example, if Beijing fails to shift toward a new economic model as
its current approach runs out of steam. The good news is that the United States and India have recognized the potential for cooperation in Asia
partly, it should be acknowledged, because they share interests and concerns about what kind of power China might become. Much has
been made of the joint statement on cooperation in the Asia-Pacific issued during President Obamas January visit to India. But that emphasis
on the Pacific is not new. It dates back over a decade, so there is depth and longevity to the issues and concerns that have fostered a growing
alignment of interests. As early as November 2001, U.S.-India joint statements emphasized common goals in Asia. A landmark 2002 speech
by then-Ambassador to India Robert Blackwill positioned Asian geopolitics squarely at the center of the argument for strengthened
partnership: Peace within Asiaa peace that helps perpetuate Asian prosperityremains an objective that a transformed U.S.-India

China is important to U.S. and Indian calculations

about the Pacificand to their calculations about one anothers
interests, intentions, and goals. Why is China so central? Start with economics. Asias relationship to the
relationship will help advance. So

world economy has changed dramatically since the mid-2000s. For decades, G-7 countries beat a path to Asias door. But the other foot now
wears the shoe as many economies, including Western economies, increasingly rely on Asian industrial and household consumers. Asian
countries have become much more than traders. They are investors, builders, lenders, and, in some areas, a growth engine. China is a central
player in this Asian drama. Indeed, for all its challenges, including a pronounced economic slowdown, China is the top trading partner of more
than sixty countries, many of them in Asia. Overcapacity and slackening Chinese demand have rocked numerous economies, especially
commodity producers. But If China succeeds in rebalancing its economy toward a new model, it will foster some new demand drivers, for
example through the accelerated growth of household consumption. Nor is Chinas slowdown, or its recent stock market turbulence, likely to
alter its increasingly central role as an investor and builder of infrastructure. These could ultimately change Asias economic face, not least in
South Asia, as Beijings One Belt, One Road infrastructure initiative converges with other efforts, including a $40 billion Silk Road Fund and
the new Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank and BRICS Bank, both of which India has joined as a founding member. Chinas foreign and
economic policies are converging in unprecedented ways. Beijing burned a sizeable chunk of its $4 trillion in foreign exchange reserves amid
the summers market turbulence. But it retains reservessome now being recycled into investments offshorelarger than the nominal GDPs
of India, South Korea, and Thailand combined, and equivalent in size to the worlds fourth-largest economy. Chinas abundance of capital is an
extension of Beijings foreign policy: it will continue to leverage state-backed financial vehicles for economic and strategic ends. Now, take
security. From the maritime commons to the cyber domain, U.S.-China security competition has become increasingly intense. But India, along
with some others in Asia, shares elements of these American concerns. Washington and Beijing have some clashing security concepts in Asia,
not least in the South China Sea. So too do New Delhi and Beijing in Southeast Asia and the Indian Ocean. These are just some of the issues on

issues on that agenda could bring

Washington and New Delhi closer, but others could drive them apart
as American coordination with Beijing risks creating wedges
between the United States and India. One example of the former involves domestic investment rules
the agenda for Xis state visit to Washington. But heres the catch: some

in China. Beijing has deployed regulations and standards as a non-tariff barrierto the detriment of U.S. and Indian investment alike. But an

intensifying climate change coordination in the run-up

to Decembers multilateral negotiations in Paris: the United States
example of the latter involves

and China are moving into alignment on climate, even as New Delhi
stands apart and flirts with seeking exceptional treatment .

Link space cooperation

US China space cooperation represents a realignment in
policy that alienates India
Pakhomov 15
(Evgeniy, The Dragon vs. the Elephant, Brics Magazine, 7/15/16
http://bricsmagazine.com/en/articles/the-dragon-vs-the-elephant; DDI AH)
It is hard to imagine now that New Delhi and Beijing were once considered
good friends, and even spoke amiably of a close partnership. In 1951, India turned
a blind eye to the Chinese armys takeover of Tibet and limited its reaction to formal
statements bilateral relations seemed to be more important to New Delhi. The
famous slogan, Hindi-Chini bhai-bhai! (Indians and Chinese are brothers!), that
remained popular for many years first appeared during that period. However, the
Chinese dragon and the Indian elephant soon abandoned that brotherly
sentiment each country started taking decisive steps to assert their right
to leadership in Asia. As early as 1962, the first armed conflict broke out on the
Chinese-Indian border when each country began to carve up the Himalayan foothills
and it became clear that the bhai-bhai era had run its course. Military forces on both
sides of the border even now continue to monitor each other nervously. From time to
time, there are reports of border violations in mountainous areas by troops from both
sides. At the official level, India and China still speak of cooperation, but in
reality, it is the Peoples Republic and not Pakistan that India views as its
most serious potential adversary. Yet in recent years, neither of these two Asian
heavyweights has ventured to sever relations entirely, and the standoff has
extended to the economic domain. After becoming the worlds biggest assembly
line, China moved ahead, owing to its ability to copy nearly any Western
technological novelty. India, on the other hand, has left China behind in offshore
programming, thanks to its successes in the IT sector. Meanwhile, both countries
are making a great effort to maintain the image of a superpower they
have both acquired nuclear weapons and aircraft carriers and are now building
their own supersonic fighter jets and ballistic missiles, each with a watchful eye on
the other. And now, the dragon and the elephant are poised to move their
rivalry into space.

Indias space rivalry with China means it perceives

changes in US China cooperation
Rajagopalan, 2016
(Rajeswari, Senior Fellow and Head of the Nuclear and Space Policy Initiative
at the Observer Research Foundation in New Delhi., n Interview with
Rajeswari Rajagopalan by Xiaodon Liang India's Space Program: Challenges,
Opportunities, and Strategic Concerns, The National Bureau of Asian
Research, http://www.nbr.org/research/activity.aspx?id=651; DDI - AH)
The wake-up call for India came when China conducted its first antisatellite (ASAT) missile test in January 2007. The test clearly
illustrated the challenges right in India's own neighborhood. Beijing
came under a huge amount of criticism on two counts: one, for not

announcing the test, and two, and more importantly, for creating long-lasting
debris in low-earth orbit. While the test generated anger and public outcry, it
did not result in any real punitive measures. The informal moratorium on
ASAT tests, which had lasted for two and a half decades, was broken by the
Chinese ASAT test. Thereafter, the United States tested an ASAT missile in
2008, which the international community was much more comfortable with
because it was done openly and did not lead to the creation of long-lasting
debris. For India, however, China has been of particular concern.
Beijing's activities in recent years have been driven by competition with the
United States, so the capabilities it is developing are much more advanced
than what are necessary to deter India. Nonetheless, India has to be
mindful of Chinese advances. Following China's ASAT test, the scientific
and technical communities and the Indian Air Force leadership, as
well as sections of the political leadership, started debating whether
India should be developing its own ASAT capability, and whether this
capability should be demonstrated or simulated. India has a missile
defense system under development, and the potential for India to acquire an
ASAT capability is linked to its missile defense capabilities. The Indian
Defence Research and Development Organisation has been developing
missile defense capabilities independently but is also increasingly looking
to partner with the United States and other countries. In contrast,
China has followed the route of developing an ASAT capability first and later
developing missile defense based on its ASAT capability. How do China's
space capabilities play into the regional politics of the subcontinent? India is
closely monitoring China's space cooperation initiatives in South
Asia. China launched a satellite for Pakistan in 2011, and another for Sri
Lanka in 2012. Our concerns are informed by the nuclear precedent;
cooperation with China was critical for the Pakistani program. India
feels that if Pakistan, which today has very limited space
capabilities, cooperated with China, it could become a capable power
in the space realm. The two major concerns are an independent Pakistani
ASAT capability and further development of Pakistan's long-range missile
capabilities. An ASAT capability is not quite as simple as rocket technology,
but it would not be the hardest thing for Pakistan to achieve either. For
China, Sri Lanka is extremely important in the maritime security context, and
for the Maritime Silk Road program. IndiaSri Lanka relations have gone
through ups and downs, but the new president, Maithripala Sirisena, and new
prime minister, Ranil Wickremesinghe, both have a friendly disposition
toward India. Nonetheless, there are strict limits to Indian influence in
Colombo. Critically, Sri Lanka is in dire need of economic opportunities and
faces huge developmental challenges. Even if India had all the goodwill to
support and help Sri Lanka, it does not have the deep pockets that China
does. India is concerned that space cooperation may become yet
another path for China to make inroads in Colombo.

Impact economy
US-India relations key to increased economic liberalization
Joshi et al 13 (Sunjoy, C. Raja Mohan, Vikram Sood, Rajeswari Pillai
Rajagopalan, Ph.D., James Jay Carafano, Ph.D., Walter Lohman, Lisa Curtis
and Derek Scissors, Ph.D. "Beyond the Plateau in U.S. India Relations,"
Heritage Foundation, April 26,
http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2013/04/beyond-the-plateau-in-usindia-relations, DDI-PN)
If the IndiaU.S. relationship was imagined in the past decade in abstract
terms and lofty possibilities, the reality today is that both New Delhi and
Washington need each other even more than before. In the 2000s, the
United States was at the peak of the unipolar moment. What drove
Washington to re-craft the relationship with New Delhi was not the
prospect of immediate gain or an urgent need for Indian
partnership, but the perceived value of a long-term strategic
investment in India. For New Delhi, the affections of George W. Bush
and the civil nuclear initiative constituted an unexpected and
significant political bonus at a moment when India's international
trajectory was on an upward trend. Today, when Washington and
New Delhi find themselves in more difficult circumstances, their
bilateral partnership acquires greater salience. It is no longer
aspirational, but an important mutual need. At the core of the
revitalized relationship must be a strengthened economic
engagement. The economic crisis in the United States and the
slowdown in India's growth have increased the value of a deepening
partnership. Plenty of good ideas are around; these include the
conclusion of a bilateral investment treaty, the negotiation of a free
trade agreement, promotion of energy security at a moment the U.S.
is likely to emerge as a major exporter of natural gas, and
liberalization of American work visas for Indian service
professionals. These proposals, however, must be related to a
renewed commitment to economic liberalization on both sides.
Despite the intense politicization of economic policy in both
countries, it should be possible to find many convergences and work
on them. At the political and strategic level, India, like so many other nations
after the Cold War, has often worried about unconstrained American power.
At this juncture, though, India must concern itself more with the
consequences of a potentially precipitous decline in American power or the
loss of U.S. political will.

Internal link Indo Pak war

A political transformation of Pakistan can only be
accomplished through US-India coop
Joshi et al 13 (Sunjoy, C. Raja Mohan, Vikram Sood, Rajeswari Pillai
Rajagopalan, Ph.D., James Jay Carafano, Ph.D., Walter Lohman, Lisa Curtis
and Derek Scissors, Ph.D. "Beyond the Plateau in U.S. India Relations,"
Heritage Foundation, April 26,
http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2013/04/beyond-the-plateau-in-usindia-relations, DDI-PN)
This concern is rooted in India's historic wariness about the U.S.Pakistan
relationship. While Washington's policy of de-hyphenation (developing
separate policies toward India and Pakistan) has helped ease these
concerns, the time has come for New Delhi and Washington to
construct a new approach. Despite their strong interests in the
stability of Pakistan, India and the United States have never
engaged in a productive dialogue on Pakistan itself. During the Cold
War, the two sides argued endlessly about Pakistan, and in the last decade
chose to put it aside. There is now, however, an opportunity to begin a
productive IndiaU.S. dialogue on Pakistan's future. The current,
profoundly negative, trends in Pakistan demand that India and the
U.S. find ways to work together to promote political moderation,
economic modernization, and democratic transformation in Pakistan.
There is no divergence between New Delhi and Washington on these
goals, and neither has the power to unilaterally alter Pakistan's
current trajectory. It is only by coordinating their respective
approaches toward Islamabad that New Delhi and Washington can
help engineer a positive evolution of Pakistan.

Indo pak war impacts

india Pakistan risks nuclear war empirics
Wittner, 2011
(Lawrence S, "COMMENTARY: Is a Nuclear War with China Possible?"
Huntington News November 28, 2011 http://www.huntingtonnews.net/14446
accessed 7-12-16 TM)
Some pundits argue that nuclear weapons prevent wars between
nuclear-armed nations; and, admittedly, there havent been very manyat least not yet. But the
Kargil War of 1999, between nuclear-armed India and nuclear-armed
Pakistan, should convince us that such wars can occur. Indeed, in
that case, the conflict almost slipped into a nuclear war. Pakistans
foreign secretary threatened that, if the war escalated, his country
felt free to use any weapon in its arsenal. During the conflict, Pakistan did
move nuclear weapons toward its border, while India, it is claimed, readied its own nuclear
missiles for an attack on Pakistan.

Even a limited war leaves billions dead from famine, ruin

the atmosphere and the end of civilization
ASGHAR 16
[Rizwan ,"Rethinking deterrence stability," The News
https://www.thenews.com.pk/print/132512-Rethinking-deterrence-stability,
January 21 2016 DDI TM)
A nuclear war between India and Pakistan would set off a global
famine that could kill two billion people and effectively end human
civilization, a study said . Even if limited in scope, a conflict with nuclear
weapons would wreak havoc in the atmosphere and devastate crop
yields, with the effects multiplied as global food markets went into
turmoil, the report said. The Nobel Peace Prize-winning International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War and Physicians for Social
Responsibility released an initial peer-reviewed study in April 2012 that predicted a nuclear famine could kill more than a billion people. In a second edition, the
groups said they widely underestimated the impact in China and calculated that the world's most populous country would face severe food insecurity.

"A

billion people dead in the developing world is obviously a

catastrophe unparalleled in human history. But then if you add to
that the possibility of another 1.3 billion people in China being at
risk, we are entering something that is clearly the end of civilization ,"
said Ira Helfand, the report's author. Helfand said that the study looked at India and Pakistan due to the longstanding tensions between the nuclear-armed states,
which have fought three full-fledged wars since independence and partition in 1947. But Helfand said that the planet would expect a similar apocalyptic impact
from any limited nuclear war. Modern nuclear weapons are far more powerful than the US bombs that killed more than 200,000 people in Hiroshima and Nagasaki

In
this kind of war, biologically there are going to be people surviving
somewhere on the planet but the chaos that would result from this
will dwarf anything we've ever seen," Helfand said. The study said that the black carbon aerosol particles kicked
in 1945. "With a large war between the United States and Russia, we are talking about the possible, not certain, but possible, extinction of the human race. "

into the atmosphere by a South Asian nuclear war would reduce US corn and soybean production by around 10 percent over a decade. The particles would also
reduce China's rice production by an average of 21 percent over four years and by another 10 percent over the following six years. The updated study also found

China's wheat production

would plunge by 50 per cent the first year after the nuclear war and would
still be 31 per cent below baseline a decade later, it said. The study said it was impossible to estimate the exact impact of nuclear war. He called for
further research, voiced alarm that policymakers in nuclear powers were not
looking more thoroughly at the idea of a nuclear famine. But he said, ultimately, the
only answer was the abolition of nuclear weapons. "This is a disaster so massive in scale that
really no preparation is possible. We must prevent this, " he said. President Barack
severe effects on China's wheat, which is vital to the country despite its association with rice.

Obama pledged in 2009 to work toward abolition but said that the United States would keep nuclear weapons so long as others exist. Nine countries are believed
to possess nuclear weapons, with Russia and the United States holding the vast majority.

War between India and Pakistan would be catastrophic,

even a limited war kills millions and spills over
Korb & Rothman 12
(Lawrence J. & Alexander No first use: The way to contain nuclear war in
South Asia, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 68(2) 2012 3442 DDI TM
even a relatively small skirmish
could escalate into a nuclear conflict. For example, earlier this year, Pakistan announced it had tested a small
nuclear warhead designed to be used against invading troops on Pakistani soil . A nuclear war between India and
Pakistan would be an absolute catastrophe. A Natural Resources Defense Council study
found that even a limited nuclear exchange consisting of as few as
10 warheads could result in about three million casualties (Natural Resources
Defense Council, 2002). Moreover, the effects of such a conflict would not be
confined to South Asia: According to a recent article in Scientific American, a major regional nuclear
conflict could spark a global nuclear winter, with worldwide
implications for agriculture (Robock and Toon, 2010). Given the terrible effects of a
nuclear exchange, much ink has been spilled articulating policies to
prevent war, particularly a nuclear war, between India and Pakistan.
As these countries develop more advanced nuclear capabilities, chances increase that

However, little has been written about how the United States should respond if diplomacy fails that is, if a nuclear war breaks out between India and Pakistan, how can the
United States contain the conflict so it does not come to involve other nations with alliances or interests in the region and significantly larger nuclear arsenals?

Impact Asian stability

Sino-US relations disrupt trilateral cooperation kills
Indias participation in Asia
Chaulia, 2011 (Sreeram, Professor and Vice Dean at the Jindal School of
International Affairs in Sonipat, India, Talking without the elephant 5/17/2011,
http://www.atimes.com/atimes/South_Asia/ME17Df04.html 7/15/16; DDI AH )
The recently concluded round of United States-China Strategic and Economic
Dialogue in Washington covered the entire gamut of bilateral and global
problems concerning the world's two most formidable powers, trade, market
access, currency valuation, regional security in the Asia-Pacific, military
strategy and human rights. In terms of the high-level attendance of
American and Chinese government and business officials as well as
the breadth of issues under the scanner, this annual dialogue stood
out as ground zero of global policymaking. Yet, the elephant in the
room of this most consequential of all diplomatic forums was
literally the elephant. There was no seat for India at the table, even
though all prognoses indicate that India will join China and the US
in a triumvirate of the world's largest economies in the coming
decades. The purely bilateral framing of the whole event in
Washington belied awareness that changes to contemporary
strategic relations among China, India and their traditional thirdparty interlocutor - the United States - militate towards engagement
in trilateral dialogue. The parallel rises of China and India and the global
implications of their problematic relations require three-way dialogue
channels, instead of plain bilateralism, involving the two Asian principals and
their chief global reference point, the US. During the presidency of George
W Bush, India relied on antagonism between the US and China for
competitive strategic advantage. In its relations with Washington, Delhi often
acted on expectations that the former favored alliance with a democracy and
remained wary of an authoritarian and faster-growing Beijing. But this
reading is now obsolete, as the Barack Obama administration has softened its
predecessor's approach to China, showing a willingness to overlook humanrights violations and crafting a bilateral re-engagement with China. The US
helplessly rests on Chinese shoulders to keep East Asia's black sheep, North
Korea, in check. The financial meltdown since 2008 introduced delicate edges
into China-US interdependence, premised on extensive Chinese holdings of
US Treasury bonds. American author and economist Zachary Karabell sees
"superfusion" between the Chinese and American economies and contends
that this holds the symbiotic union key to anchor the shaky global economy.
Since the Sino-Indian relationship had long been
mediated/buffered/wedged by favoritism on one side or the other on
the part of the US, and this trend has now changed, vulnerabilities
emerge with which India must reckon. Dependence on US counterbalancing tactics against China is no longer a viable option for New

Delhi. The zero sum assumptions of the Sino-US-Indian triangle are

giving way to complex three-way dynamics in which it is in the best
interests of the three countries to engage in comprehensive
strategic dialogue about major world issues. India must prevent the
dreaded "Group of 2" formation (joint governance of the world by
China and US) from materializing and hindering its own position as a
global player that is worth consulting on all major international
policies.

Increased US-China coop kills US-India relations- border

conflict has left India and China in tension
Curtis 14 (Lisa, Senior Research Fellow at the Asian Studies Center,
Priorities for Prime Minister Modis Visit: U.S. and India Must Cooperate for
Asian Stability, The Heritage Foundation. September 24.
http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2014/09/priorities-for-primeminister-modis-visit-us-and-india-must-cooperate-for-asian-stability, DDI-PN)
Against this backdrop, Chinese President Xi Jinpings three-day visit to
India last week did not go as well as anticipated, largely due to a
flare-up in border tensions. Chinese leaders had put on a charm
offensive toward India shortly after the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP)
came to power. Recognizing that Indias clout on the world stage is likely to
grow under Modi, the Chinese sought to focus on cooperation, not
competition. President Xis decision to skip Pakistan on his visit to South Asia
even though it was likely due to concerns about the internal security
situationplayed well in India. As the Chinese Presidents visit
approached, however, SinoIndian border tensions intensified. About
1,000 Chinese Peoples Liberation Army (PLA) troops set up camps in
mountainous regions in Ladakh on the Indian side of the Line of
Actual Control (LAC), and an equal number of Indian troops deployed
to forward positions in the area. The border standoff was reported in
the Indian press and took the sheen off of Xis visit. PM Modi called
on China to demarcate the LAC, which further dampened the
atmosphere and took the focus away from the economic and trade
agenda. SinoIndian border tensions previously had flared in April
2013 when Chinese troops camped for three weeks several miles
inside Indian territory in the Ladakh region. That border spat was
defused when India agreed to destroy some military structures along
the border and both sides withdrew their troops, clearing the way
for a planned visit to India by Chinese Premier Li Keqiang.

Strong India-United States relations are key to stability in

Asia
Curtis 14 (Lisa, Senior Research Fellow at the Asian Studies Center,
Priorities for Prime Minister Modis Visit: U.S. and India Must Cooperate for
Asian Stability, The Heritage Foundation. September 24.

http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2014/09/priorities-for-primeminister-modis-visit-us-and-india-must-cooperate-for-asian-stability, DDI-PN)
Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modis visit to the United States next
week provides an opportunity to strengthen U.S.India ties, which
stagnated during the second term of Modis predecessor, Manmohan
Singh. During the visit, President Barack Obama should demonstrate
the importance the U.S. attaches to the bilateral relationship and
offer cooperation on economic, defense, and security issues. The Obama
Administration has at times relegated the relationship with India to a lower category of priority than it merits, but both sides have shown
interest in moving beyond negative atmospherics and specific irritants, like the revocation of Modis U.S. visa over the 2002 Gujarat riots and
last years arrest of a U.S.-based Indian diplomat. The visit will be observed closely by other Asian powers: namely, China and Japan, both of

It is important that the Obama

Modi summit demonstrate the strength of U.S.India ties at a time
when the power dynamics in Asia are shifting. Warm Welcome President Obama is scheduled
which recently held high-level bilateral visits of their own with Modi.

to meet Prime Minister Modi on September 29 and 30 following a major speech that Modi will give the day before to around 20,000 people,
most of them Indian Americans, in Madison Square Garden. In an official announcement of the ObamaModi meetings, a U.S. National Security
Council official said that Modis White House engagements over a two-day period are a sign of the importance the Administration attaches to
its relations with India. Although Modi will not address a joint session of Congress (as the Indian American community had earlier hoped)
because Congress is out of session, the U.S. Senate passed a bipartisan resolution last week designating September 30 as U.S.India
Partnership Day and noting that the relationshipmade up of a special and permanent bondwill continue to define the 21st century. Busy
Foreign Policy Agenda Modis visit to the U.S. is part of a hectic foreign policy schedule. In early September, Modi made a successful five-day
visit to Japan, where he and Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe agreed to elevate their dialogue to a Special Strategic and Global
Partnership. Japan committed to investing $35 billion in Indian projects over the next five years, and the two sides agreed to explore elevating
their trilateral dialogue with the U.S. to the foreign minister level, a step that Washington would welcome. Many viewed Modis remark that
Japan and India were focused on economic development, not expansionism, as an oblique criticism of China and its approach to territorial

Modi appears to be interested in improving strategic ties with

Japan as a hedge against China. Border disputes between India and
China continue to simmer, despite a substantial improvement in
their trade and economic ties (bilateral trade has increased from around $5 billion in 2002 to over $66 billion
in 2013). Modi and his senior advisers may calculate that cooperating
more closely with Japan in areas like maritime cooperation, nuclear
issues, and stronger economic and investment ties will strengthen
New Delhis hand in dealing with Beijing and help to deter any
potential Chinese border aggression. Against this backdrop, Chinese President Xi Jinpings three-day
disputes.

visit to India last week did not go as well as anticipated, largely due to a flare-up in border tensions. Chinese leaders had put on a charm
offensive toward India shortly after the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) came to power. Recognizing that Indias clout on the world stage is likely to
grow under Modi, the Chinese sought to focus on cooperation, not competition. President Xis decision to skip Pakistan on his visit to South
Asiaeven though it was likely due to concerns about the internal security situationplayed well in India. As the Chinese Presidents visit

SinoIndian border tensions intensified. About 1,000

Chinese Peoples Liberation Army (PLA) troops set up camps in
mountainous regions in Ladakh on the Indian side of the Line of
Actual Control (LAC), and an equal number of Indian troops deployed
to forward positions in the area. The border standoff was reported in the Indian press and took the sheen off
approached, however,

of Xis visit. PM Modi called on China to demarcate the LAC, which further dampened the atmosphere and took the focus away from the

SinoIndian border tensions previously had flared in

April 2013 when Chinese troops camped for three weeks several
miles inside Indian territory in the Ladakh region. That border spat was defused when
economic and trade agenda.

India agreed to destroy some military structures along the border and both sides withdrew their troops, clearing the way for a planned visit to

It is in the U.S. interest to build closer

ties with India, for numerous reasons. India is an emerging economy that provides
opportunities for U.S. trade and investment, a strategically important country in
maintaining a stable balance of power in the Asia Pacific, and a democratic nation
India by Chinese Premier Li Keqiang. Build IndoU.S. Ties

with a large Muslim minority that provides a model of an ethnically and religiously diverse society that maintains freedom for its citizens.

The recent shifting power dynamics in the region characterized by

Modis successful Japan visit and simmering SinoIndian border

tensions drive home the important role that India plays in the U.S.
Asia rebalance strategy. During Modis visit, the U.S. should: Highlight the opportunity to expand economic and
business relations so long as Modi remains committed to a pro-liberalization agenda. A major part of the visit will consist of Modi interacting
with the U.S. business community in New York and Washington in an effort to encourage greater U.S. investment, especially in Indias
infrastructure sector. U.S. leaders must make clear to Modi that U.S. businesses are looking for signs that India will maintain momentum on
economic reform and provide a stable and private-sector-friendly business environment. Emphasize defense cooperation in an atmosphere of
strategic understanding, building on steps announced by U.S. Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel during his visit to India in August. Modi has
highlighted the need to modernize Indias armed forces, and the U.S. is poised to play a significant role in helping to fill Indian defense
requirements. During his August visit to India, Secretary Hagel discussed dozens of proposals for India to consider with regard to co-production
of defense items and transfer of technology. Hagel said that the U.S. is willing to be patient while India considers its security needs and would

It is important that both sides continue to

demonstrate understanding of the strategic context in which each is
operating. While BJP leaders may calculate that it is in Indias interest to draw closer to
the U.S., they also will point out that India shares a border with
China and thus must be cognizant of Chinese perceptions of Indias
foreign policy. Coordinate on strategies to counter terrorist movements in South Asia, especially in Afghanistan as U.S. and
respect Indias desire for strategic autonomy.

NATO forces draw down. Given al-Qaeda leader Ayman al-Zawahiris recent pledge to launch a South Asia wing and the Islamic State gaining
ground in Iraq, the imperative for close U.S.India counterterrorism cooperation has never been stronger. Obama and Modi must coordinate
their responses to these brewing threats and seek ways to cooperate in preventing the Taliban from staging a comeback in Afghanistan.
Manage expectations on visit outcomes to avoid a sense of disappointment. In the past, the relationship has suffered from each side having
overly optimistic expectations of what the other side can deliver to solidify ties. While the two sides have largely convergent strategic
interests, the fact that they are both large democracies means that institutional change can be complex and slow. For this reason, initiatives
like the Defense Trade and Technology Initiative aimed at breaking down bureaucratic obstacles to defense cooperation are particularly
important, but these initiatives also require patience and persistence and take time to bear fruit. Conclusion The stage is set for a successful
Modi visit to Washington, but the White House must guard against allowing the myriad international crises happening around the globe to

Engaging with a strategically like-minded

partner such as India takes on greater importance as the U.S.
grapples with multiple global challenges. U.S.India cooperation is
particularly important when it comes to countering international terrorism and
maintaining a stable balance of power in the Asia Pacific.
overshadow the visit and weaken IndoU.S. bilateral ties.

Impact laundry list

US-India relations key to increase ethnical diversity,
improve the economy, and fight terror
Curtis 14 (Lisa, Senior Research Fellow at the Asian Studies Center,
Priorities for Prime Minister Modis Visit: U.S. and India Must Cooperate for
Asian Stability, The Heritage Foundation. September 24.
http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2014/09/priorities-for-primeminister-modis-visit-us-and-india-must-cooperate-for-asian-stability, DDI-PN)
It is in the U.S. interest to build closer ties with India, for numerous
reasons. India is an emerging economy that provides opportunities
for U.S. trade and investment, a strategically important country in
maintaining a stable balance of power in the Asia Pacific, and a
democratic nation with a large Muslim minority that provides a
model of an ethnically and religiously diverse society that maintains
freedom for its citizens. The recent shifting power dynamics in the
region characterized by Modis successful Japan visit and simmering
SinoIndian border tensions drive home the important role that India
plays in the U.S. Asia rebalance strategy. During Modis visit, the U.S.
should: Highlight the opportunity to expand economic and business
relations so long as Modi remains committed to a pro-liberalization agenda.
A major part of the visit will consist of Modi interacting with the U.S. business
community in New York and Washington in an effort to encourage greater U.S.
investment, especially in Indias infrastructure sector. U.S. leaders must make
clear to Modi that U.S. businesses are looking for signs that India will
maintain momentum on economic reform and provide a stable and
private-sector-friendly business environment. Emphasize defense
cooperation in an atmosphere of strategic understanding, building on
steps announced by U.S. Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel during his visit to
India in August. Modi has highlighted the need to modernize Indias
armed forces, and the U.S. is poised to play a significant role in
helping to fill Indian defense requirements. During his August visit to
India, Secretary Hagel discussed dozens of proposals for India to consider
with regard to co-production of defense items and transfer of technology.
Hagel said that the U.S. is willing to be patient while India considers its
security needs and would respect Indias desire for strategic autonomy. It is
important that both sides continue to demonstrate understanding of
the strategic context in which each is operating. While BJP leaders
may calculate that it is in Indias interest to draw closer to the U.S.,
they also will point out that India shares a border with China and
thus must be cognizant of Chinese perceptions of Indias foreign
policy. Coordinate on strategies to counter terrorist movements in
South Asia, especially in Afghanistan as U.S. and NATO forces draw
down. Given al-Qaeda leader Ayman al-Zawahiris recent pledge to
launch a South Asia wing and the Islamic State gaining ground in
Iraq, the imperative for close U.S.India counterterrorism

cooperation has never been stronger. Obama and Modi must

coordinate their responses to these brewing threats and seek ways
to cooperate in preventing the Taliban from staging a comeback in
Afghanistan.

Impact Middle East war

US-India relations opens up opportunity for coop on
nuclear prolif in Iran and overall stability in the Middle
East
Joshi et al 13 (Sunjoy, C. Raja Mohan, Vikram Sood, Rajeswari Pillai
Rajagopalan, Ph.D., James Jay Carafano, Ph.D., Walter Lohman, Lisa Curtis
and Derek Scissors, Ph.D. "Beyond the Plateau in U.S. India Relations,"
Heritage Foundation, April 26,
http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2013/04/beyond-the-plateau-in-usindia-relations, DDI-PN)
There was much misunderstanding in Washington of the nature of India's
relationship with Iran, and insufficient appreciation in New Delhi of President
Obama's attempt to craft a different American approach to Iran. Washington
appreciates New Delhi's need to maintain a reasonable relationship
with Iran, which shares borders with Afghanistan and Pakistan, is a
major source of hydrocarbons, provides India access to Western
Afghanistan and Central Asia, and is a potential partner for New Delhi in
coping with the consequences of internal change in Afghanistan after the
withdrawal of American combat troops. New Delhi in turn appreciates
American concerns about the consequences of a nuclear Iran for the
balance of power in the Gulf and the Middle East. India has
implemented the United Nations sanctions against Iran and has decreased its
imports of Iranian oil. As a result, it has avoided American sanctions. Unlike
Russia and China, India has not sought to use Iran as a bargaining chip
in its relations with the United States. While the sanctions have been
effective and put Iran's economy under considerable strain, Iran is unlikely
to surrender its nuclear weapons program easily. While the use of
force must remain an option of last resort, negotiation with Tehran is
the preferable way of halting it and establishing a stable balance of
power in the Gulf and the Middle East. The problem that Iran poses
is not just one of nuclear proliferation. As the Middle East faces the
turbulence generated by the Arab awakening and the schism
between the Shia and Sunni communities is exacerbated across the
region, both Washington and New Delhi will benefit from framing the
Iran challenge within this larger context. Focusing on the regional
balance of power would open a much broader template and generate
new possibilities for collaboration between New Delhi and
Washington. Because the use of force will greatly complicate the
prospects for forging this balance of power, a mature U.S.India
partnership on the issue puts the onus on both countries to facilitate
a peaceful end to Iran's nuclear program. For the sake of U.S.India
cooperation, it is necessary for New Delhi to understand that the U.S. will not
tolerate a nuclear-armed Iran.

Impact- Terrorism
US-India cooperation has been crucial in developing the
counterterrorism groups on both sides
Joshi et al 13 (Sunjoy, C. Raja Mohan, Vikram Sood, Rajeswari Pillai
Rajagopalan, Ph.D., James Jay Carafano, Ph.D., Walter Lohman, Lisa Curtis
and Derek Scissors, Ph.D. "Beyond the Plateau in U.S. India Relations,"
Heritage Foundation, April 26,
http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2013/04/beyond-the-plateau-in-usindia-relations, DDI-PN)
IndiaU.S. cooperation in counterterrorism increased significantly
after 9/11. The U.S.India Cyber Security Forum was set up in 2002,
but experienced setbacks that have dampened some of the enthusiasm for
cooperating in this particular arena. The 2008 terrorist attacks in
Mumbai and the extent of help sought and given by the U.S. in the
investigations, as well as diplomatic efforts by India, culminated in
the Bilateral Counterterrorism Cooperation Agreement in 2010.
Other joint initiatives include interactions between security and
intelligence officials, exchange visits of senior leadership of security
and intelligence units, joint training exercises, and U.S. assistance
to India in enhancing critical investigation skills. A key component of
this cooperation has been the State Department's Anti-Terrorism
Country Assistance Plan for India for training more than 2,000
officials from various intelligence, police, paramilitary, and security
agencies. These Indian officials have undergone training in forensic
analysis, evidence gathering, bomb blast investigations, human
rights, extradition, and prosecution. In 2012, training capsules
widened to include air and seaport security. There is now a strong
working relationship between the U.S. Computer Emergency
Readiness Team and India's Computer Emergency Response Team.

US-India coop solves the Middle Eastern and Pakistani

nuclear terrorism threat
Joshi et al 13 (Sunjoy, C. Raja Mohan, Vikram Sood, Rajeswari Pillai
Rajagopalan, Ph.D., James Jay Carafano, Ph.D., Walter Lohman, Lisa Curtis
and Derek Scissors, Ph.D. "Beyond the Plateau in U.S. India Relations,"
Heritage Foundation, April 26,
http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2013/04/beyond-the-plateau-in-usindia-relations, DDI-PN)
One promising area for expanded U.S.India cooperation is the
prevention of nuclear terrorism. Given the level of terrorist activity
in the region and India's vulnerability to Pakistan-based and statesupported terrorism, as well as the question of the safety of
Pakistan's nuclear assets, there is strong concern in New Delhi about
the possibility of nuclear terrorism. Furthermore, New Delhi is

concerned about partial state support to terrorist groups that might

be interested in gaining access to Pakistan's nuclear arsenal. The
vulnerability of Pakistan's nuclear arsenal is a growing concern, especially
given the number of Pakistani Taliban attacks on Pakistan's military facilities.
A few years ago, the U.S. had put in place contingency plans for the recovery
of Pakistan's nuclear weapons in the event of a crisis of governance or,
worse, an extremist takeover of the country. India and the U.S. must
institute measures that would ensure that nuclear weapons are in
responsible hands. Helping to strengthen Pakistan's command-andcontrol structure is an important task. In the unlikely event of a
Taliban takeover, India and the U.S. would have to work with both
the civilian and military institutions to gain complete control of the
weapons, failing which, India and the U.S. would have to physically
take control of the weapons and neutralize them. With the U.S. set to
draw down forces in Afghanistan, India's concerns about the potential for
nuclear terrorism in the region will only grow. The U.S., and India to a lesser
extent, are also concerned about the possibility that Iran might transfer its
emerging nuclear capabilities to terrorist groups, such as Hezbollah. There is
strong potential for India and the U.S. to increase their cooperation
to deal with this common threat, including establishing certain
contingency measures in the event of a catastrophic development,
as well as preparing means to secure vulnerable nuclear facilities.

US India relations necessary for combatting terror and

checking Chinese power in the region
Political Perspectives 2011(India-China-United States: The Post-Cold
War Evolution of a Strategic Triangle, 7/15/16
http://www.politicalperspectives.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/Evolution-IndiaChina1.pdf; DDI - AH )
The Indo-U.S. defence agreement signed in Washington on June 28, 2005
between the Defence Ministers of the two countries has significant
ramifications for the strategic framework involving China, India and the
United States. India has an obvious interest in enhancing cooperation
with the world's sole superpower, as India strives to become a major
regional power and eventually a powerful global entity. To achieve this goal,
India seeks American support to join the Security Council as a permanent
member, and also to acquire high technology from the United States and its
G-8 partners, including military technology and civilian nuclear energy. The
operationalization of the 123 Agreement between India and US on
October 10, 2008 marked a watershed achievement in the history of
their bilateral relations. The American interest in enhancing IndoU.S. ties is two-fold. It seeks that India join the coalition forces in
their counter-terrorism efforts as India is one of the very few
nations in the world that has the trained manpower and logistics to
contribute effectively to the cause of uprooting the seeds of

violence. U.S. interest also lies in encouraging India to counter

China to establish a new balance of power in Asia that would better
serve American interests. However, the U.S. Ambassador in India Robert
Blackwill had stated that U.S.-India friendship will not be directed against
any third party (Blackwill, 2001). Although both the United States and
India share certain common interests, it is not imperative that they
codify their commitments toward each other. In todays era of open
boundaries and economies, states have diffuse interests and threats
and need to maintain fluid foreign relations.

North korea

AT they say we solve north korea

N/U China and North Korea relations strained now
Avery, Rinehart, and Nikitin 16 [Emma Chanlett (specialist in Asian
affairs), Ian E. (analyst in Asian Affairs), Mary Beth D. (specialist in
nonproliferation), Congresstional Research Service, North Korea: U.S.
Relations, Nuclear Diplomacy, and Internal Situation, 1-15-2016,
https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/nuke/R41259.pdf DDI TM)
Chinas reaction to the testa strongly-worded criticism that
stressed the need for North Korea to denuclearizeseemed to
confirm Beijings strained relations with Pyongyang. Under Kim Jongun, now entering
his fifth year in power, Chinas role as North Koreas benefactor and protector
appears to have diminished. Yet China still provides critical assistance and trade to the isolated nation and does
not appear to have adjusted its fundamental strategic calculus that opposes a collapse of the regime, fearing a flood of refugees and
instability on its border. Following the test, U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry said that China could not continue business as usual and that
its approach to North Korea had not been successful.3 Chinese officials retorted that U.S. policy bore much of the blame for North Koreas

that this testy exchange exposed a

stark gap between Beijing and Washingtons approach to North
Korea, a development that may have pleased Pyongyang.
moves toward a nuclear capability. Some analysts pointed out

US-China relations cant affect North Korea- lack of

flashpoints means China always leans North Korea
Chunshan 16.
(Mu Chunshan is a Beijing-based journalist (Why China-North Korea Relations
Cant Be Broken The Diplomat: China Power March 10 th 2016 URL:
http://thediplomat.com/2016/03/why-china-north-korea-relations-cant-bebroken/ DDI TM)
North Koreas nuclear development has been all over the headlines lately. Accordingly, some Western media and Chinese observers seem to

In view of
their real national interests, however, China and North Korea will not
turn away from each other, despite their cooling relations. From a
long-term, historical viewpoint, ties between the two countries will
eventually stabilize and strengthen, but under one condition North
Koreas nuclear impasse must not drag on forever. Among all of
Chinas diplomatic ties with its various neighbors in Northeast Asia,
relations between China and North Korea have been relatively
stable, with plenty of flexibility. Geographic proximity, a condition
neither party is able to change, makes it unrealistic for the two sides
to break off relations. As part of his foreign policy, President Xi
Jinping has been vigorously looking for allies among Chinas
neighbors, and has even approached Japan and the Philippines in
order to bridge differences. Why should he abandon North Korea and
create a large flashpoint right along Chinas northeast border ? The
believe that it would be within Chinas strategic interests to cool down, or even break off, its relationship with North Korea.

significance of China-North Korean relations can be better appreciated when one looks at Chinas relations with the Asia-Pacific powers.

China and the United States disagree in many areas Internet

security, human rights, trade, and the South China Sea, just to name a few. China is
in dispute with Japan over the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands and the interpretation of history (symbolized by Yasukuni Shrine). China and South
Korea have thorny issues between them as well, such as competing claims over Ieodo/Suyan Rock, the U.S. military presence in South Korea,

No major bilateral flashpoint exists between China

and North Korea. The exception is North Koreas nuclear and missile
development, which is actually a multilateral dispute that goes
beyond bilateral ties between China and North Korea and involves
South Korea and the United States as well. China is aware that North Koreas possession of
and defectors from North Korea.

nuclear weapons would severely threaten the security environment of China and all of Northeast Asia. Thus, as North Koreas closest friend,
Beijing proposed the six-party talks to allow the parties involved to negotiate and resolve the dispute. The six-party talks are in fact Chinas
attempt at testing the water as a responsible player in regional and international affairs. The West is aware of this. This is why every time

Historically, however, ChinaNorth Korean relations have never been significantly affected by
North Koreas nuclear programs. When North Korea launched the
Taepodong-1 missile in 1998, an international outcry for sanctions
ensued. Less than two years later, Kim Jong-il visited China in secret .
Chinese President Jiang Zemin paid a reciprocal visit to Pyongyang
in 2001, and was received by Kim with great ceremony. When North Korea dropped
the Korean nuclear issue rears its head, the United States points fingers at China.

out of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty* in 2003 and was determined to develop nuclear weapons, China promptly hosted a six-party talk.
In October of that same year, National Peoples Congress Standing Committee Chairman Wu Bangguo visited North Korea and was welcomed

. President Hu
Jintaos state visit to Pyongyang in 2006, one year prior to a North
Korean nuclear test, was not only an endorsement of the friendly
and positive relations between the two countries, but also intended
to show concern over the escalation of North Koreas nuclear
program. Confidential diplomatic talks between China and North
Korea continued after the nuclear test, with Beijing becoming the
de-facto key to engaging North Korea. Kim Jong-il visited Beijing again in secret in January 2006, three
months after Hus state visit. In October 2006, North Korea detonated a nuclear device. Ties between China and
North Korea continued to develop in the aftermath of the nuclear
test. One indicator was Xis first visit to North Korea in 2008, after
he was elected the vice president of China at the plenary sessions of
the National Peoples Congress and the National Peoples
Consultative Conference. Xi was also the first high-ranking Chinese
official to visit North Korea after the National Congress of the
Communist Party of China in 2007. After North Koreas second nuclear test in April 2009, and the
with unchanging hospitality. This was followed by another visit by Kim Jong-il to China in April 2004

announcement shortly afterwards that it would quit the six-party talks, Premier Wen Jiabao still managed to visit the country in October 2009.
Interestingly, 2009 was also the year of China-North Korean Friendship. In the same year, North Korean Premier Kim Yong-il was
ceremoniously received in China. Kim Jong-il visited China another three times in a row over the period of one year, in May and August of 2010

From these
visits it is obvious that high-level contact between the two countries
was not affected by North Koreas nuclear programs. Relations between the two
and later in May 2011. Then-Vice Premier Li Keqiang (now Chinas premier) also visited North Korea in October 2011.

countries only started to show signs of deterioration after the sudden death of Kim Jong-il. Since Kim Jong-un took power, North Korea has
carried out two nuclear tests, in February 2013 and February 2016. In between these two dates, North Koreas military second-in-command
Choe Ryong-hae showed up in China twice; and on the Chinese side, Vice Chairman of the National Peoples Congress Li Jianguo, Vice President

Although less
intense and frequent, top-level contact between China and North
Korea has continued despite the two countries cooling relations.
Xis policy toward North Korea does show a subtle departure from
policy under Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao. But in essence, the bilateral
ties between China and North Korea are not challenged by any
major, hard-to-bridge differences, especially ideological differences,
such as those China has with the United States, South Korea, and
Japan. Relations between the two countries are only beset by North Koreas nuclear development a multilateral dispute. China
and North Korea will not turn away from each other over North
Li Yuanchao, and Politburo Standing Committee member Liu Yunshan have all paid visits to North Korea.

Koreas nuclear programs. In fact, the political and pragmatic logic

behind China-North Korean relations remain unchanged. Xis
intention to develop normal relations with North Korea, something
beneficial to both countries, is perfectly understandable . Some Chinese observers
believe China should not develop relations with North Korea, a country that is not democratic, is closed to the outside world, and has no
human rights. In fact, American pundits would sometimes use the same rhetoric about China, but the official ties between United States and

National interests are rational, something very

different from value judgments. China cannot afford to turn away
from North Korea. Keeping a distance is part of diplomacy between
two countries with normal relations. Turning completely away from
North Korea, however, is not in line with Xis policy of developing
normal relations with Chinas neighbors. Normal relations involve a willingness to negotiate and
resolve differences. The two parties might be displeased with each other, but
they should not damage their basic diplomatic contact or their
mutual interests. Whether during the era of Jiang and Hu or under
the leadership of Xi, Chinas basic policy toward North Korea should
be to navigate the balance between intimacy and antipathy . The apparent
China continue to strengthen.

difference of Xis approach to North Korea from his predecessors goes no further than strategic adjustments toward one of the two poles,
without actually breaking the balance. A move toward outright enmity is an unlikely scenario within the foreseeable future. Another analogy is
the love-and-hate relations between the United States and its major ally in the Middle East Saudi Arabia. Many Americans are furious over
the Saudi elements involved in the 9/11 attack, but the U.S. government kept on friendly terms with its ally. The United States did not turn
away from or criticize Saudi Arabia because of its monarchial regime, nor did it compromise the common strategic interests it shares with the
Saudis in the region, despite domestic outrage. The Sunni rulers, meanwhile, are apprehensive about American animosity, but they continued
to regard the United States as the most reliable friend in the Middle East. If one day, China and North Korea can develop a partnership like that
between the United States and Saudi Arabia, their relationship will have reached a true balance. *Corrected. The original stated that North
Korea dropped out of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test Ban Treaty. In fact, North Korea was never a signatory.

US-China relations cant solve- differing ideologies in

containing North Korea
Wenjing 16 (Yang Wenjing is Chief of American Foreign Policy at the Institutes of Contemporary
International Relations. Chinese Way vs. U.S. Way: North Korea Issue and Its Prospect, China US Focus,
February 2nd, 2016 accessed 7/15/16 at http://www.chinausfocus.com/foreign-policy/chinese-way-vs-u-sway-north-korea-issue-and-its-prospect/; DDI- NB)

bomb test conducted by North Korea

recently has once again put China and the US in hot
water. The US and its northeast Asia allies, Japan and South Korea, would like to see a
stronger opposition coming from China against North
Korea, and different pressure has been imposed as usual on China in this regard, especially
The so-called hydrogen

from the US and South Korea, with an aim to further isolate North Korea by new sanctions.

Chinas
possibility to really give North Korea a lesson, since China, in
Expectations have become higher across both the US and South Korea on

their eyes, is the sole patron of the country, especially in the economic sense. The China card,

has always been counted as a panacea to cure

the North Korea syndrome every time anything occurred
unexpectedly. It has almost become a political discourse in the West that China
should shoulder more responsibility when it comes to
North Korea and that it is Chinas inactivity that has led to
todays impasse with a nuclear North Korea. Yet a more thorough
and deep investigation of this narrative may reveal the fact that its the different
underlying interests and unreasonable expectation from
the US side that have made the situation what it is today.
as in the past,

Looking back on history, North Koreas nuclear issue had once almost been resolved in the
1990s with the agreed framework being reached between the US and North Korea
themselves. That should have been a historical legacy for the Clinton administration, if it could
have overcome the domestic obstacles made by the Republican Congress. (There is similar

the ineptitude for the US

part to fulfill the obligation on providing light reactors on
time made it discreditable to North Korea; that ruined the
agreement and resulted in a vicious cycle that still
evolves till today. During the Bush years, the US had accepted Chinas suggestions
for six-party talks and the September 19th agreement reached in
2005 laid out a concrete and thorough roadmap for
resolving not only the nuclear issue but also the entire
North Korea issue. Yet the subsequent worsening of bilateral
ties due to various US allegations against North Korea
(such as export of missile and making counterfeit dollars,
which had never been proved) ultimately spent the
opportunity. After Obama took office, strategic patience, a strategy
of only granting talks under the precondition of a
comprehensive, verifiable and irreversible
denuclearization process agreed upon by North Korea has
become the main guidelines of US policy; otherwise, the US and its
potential for Obama on the Iran nuclear deal.) Yet

allies would resort to military deterrence, sanctions and isolation as the main tools to deal
with the country, so as to make it yield under pressure.

China, as the countrys

closest friend, has been relied upon to make all the tough
measures.
China doesnt want to take a hardline stance on North
Korea
Lankov 16 (Andrei, professor of Korean Studies at Kookmin University,
Seoul. He is the author of "The Real North Korea: Life and Politics in the Failed
Stalinist Utopia". Don't expect China to ice North Korea, Al-Jazeera-Asia.
January 28. http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2016/01/don-expectchina-ice-north-korea-160128061357218.html, DDI-PN)
China is far from happy about North Korea's nuclear ambitions. For
the past three years, the Chinese put a remarkable level of pressure on
North Korea. However, things have changed. The reason becomes
obvious from talks I had in the Chinese capital - a significant intensification of
the Sino-US imperial rivalry. Indeed, if China follows US suggestions and
introduces comprehensive economic sanctions against North Korea,
it might virtually knock the economy out cold because roughly three
quarters of North Korea's economic exchanges are now with China.
Even the decision to stop subsidised trade - above all, the shipment
of oil to North Korea at artificially low prices - will deal a serious
blow to Pyongyang. China can take such measures, but why would
they? After all, the North Korean state is not well known for caring
about its level of economic development. Sanctions have to be strong
enough to seriously endanger North Korea's domestic political stability.
However, China would clearly not welcome a political crisis on the northern
half of the Korean peninsula. If North Korea is to plunge into Syria-style
domestic chaos, China is likely to be hit hardest.

China has no interest in the unification of the Korean

peninsula because Seoul is an enemy
Lankov 16 (Andrei, professor of Korean Studies at Kookmin University,
Seoul. He is the author of "The Real North Korea: Life and Politics in the Failed
Stalinist Utopia". Don't expect China to ice North Korea, Al-Jazeera-Asia.
January 28. http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2016/01/don-expectchina-ice-north-korea-160128061357218.html, DDI-PN)
Equally, China has no enthusiasm for the most likely final outcome of
such a crisis: German-style unification under the control and
tutelage of a powerful, wealthy and US-allied South Korea. Such a
unified Korean state might create trouble for China - more so now as
Seoul's alliance with Washington is increasingly seen in Beijing as an
alliance with its major adversary. Thus, it appears that at some point
last August or September the Chinese leadership decided to
abandon the tough approach that they had sought back in 2013. As a
sign that they were in a mood to mend relations, they dispatched Liu
Yunshan, a top Beijing decision-maker, to Pyongyang. It seems that none of

the subsequent events has made them decide to reverse course. Beijing
appears to consider North Korea as a buffer zone against greater US
influence in the region. Recently, the Chinese resolve has been tested
twice: in mid-December when the North Koreans suddenly cancelled a highprofile performance of a North Korean musical group (because Chinese
officials strongly objected to paeans to nuclear weapons that were to be
sung), and the beginning of January when the nuclear test was conducted.

US-Chinese officials disagree on methods used to solve

North Korean proliferation
Kleine-Ahlbrandt, 2014 (Stephanie T., Former Director, Asia-Pacific
Program, U.S.-China Cooperation on North Korea: What are the Options?, June
9, 2014, http://www.usip.org/olivebranch/us-china-cooperation-north-koreawhat-are-the-options 7/16/16; DDI - AH )
United States policy towards North Korea aims at achieving
verifiable steps toward denuclearization -- which China says it wants,
too. The U.S. believes that the best way to accomplish this is
through targeted financial measures and conditional engagement.
Beijing disagrees. It argues that Pyongyang needs security
assurances and encouragement for economic reform, and that this
might produce a willingness in the long term on Pyongyangs part to
revisit its nuclear weapons program. Meanwhile, Pyongyangs
nuclear stockpile continues to expand, missile delivery systems are
being improved, the danger grows of spreading nuclear weapons
technology, and the threat to U.S. allies increases. Clearly the U.S.
tactic of trying to persuade China to come over to its approach isnt
having the desired effect. The idea that China can and will compel
Pyongyang to give up its nuclear weapons cannot be the basis of sound U.S.
policy. Following North Koreas 3rd nuclear test [in February 2013], Western
officials and analysts interpreted President Xi Jinpings stronger emphasis on
denuclearization as a sign of a policy shift and greater convergence between
U.S. and Chinese national interests. But this shift in rhetoric did not translate
into any measures to press North Korea to denuclearize or in any sense
change Chinese priorities on the [Korean] Peninsula. While China does not
want a nuclear North Korea, what it wants even less are scenarios such as
war, the collapse of the regime, or a reunited Peninsula [that] allows a U.S.
presence on [Chinas] border . Even when Chinese analysts believe
North Koreas weapons buildup damages Chinas strategic interests,
they think that North Korea is simply trying to guarantee its security
in the face of existential threats from the United States. In this
regard, they cite examples such as Iraq, the NATO operation in Libya
and now Ukraine as evidence that renunciation of weapons of mass
destruction would only result in regime change. Beijing arguably
maintains an interest in the survival of the North Korean regime for its own
domestic legitimacy. At a time when President Xi is working to bolster
his [Chinese Communist] Partys standing through ambitious anti-

corruption measures and a bold economic reform program, the last

thing he needs is the failure or collapse of a communist regime next
door. And these fears are [exacerbated] by the fact that the Chinese see the
fall of Myanmar to western values as a country on Chinas border that is now
falling into the western camp. China sees the nuclear issue as just one
component of its broader bilateral relationship with North Korea,
which is based on a policy of sustaining the country to integrate it
more fully into the international economy. Chinese officials see
economic engagement as part of a long-term process that will
ultimately change North Koreas strategic calculations with regard
to nuclear weapons.

Laundry list of why US-China cooperation over North

Korean proliferation is impossible
Kleine-Ahlbrandt, 2014 (Stephanie T., Former Director, Asia-Pacific
Program, U.S.-China Cooperation on North Korea: What are the Options?, June
9, 2014, http://www.usip.org/olivebranch/us-china-cooperation-north-koreawhat-are-the-options 7/16/16; DDI - AH )
As a result of this mismatch [of] strategic views between the U.S.
and China, the very tools being used by both sides are arguably
contradictory. Whereas Washington sees diplomatic isolation as
essential, China sees diplomatic engagement and dialogue as
necessary. Where Washington sees economic sanctions as the
best way to deal with the Peninsula, China sees economic
cooperation and support as the best way to move forward. And
finally, where the U.S sees deterrence as important, China sees
security assurances as necessary. So in this situation, what can actually
be done? Well, there are no good options, only a series of trade-offs.
The basic choice for U.S. policymakers is [among]: trying to
change Chinas perception of its self interest, which is highly
unlikely; applying more pressure on China in return for its [reacting] more
strongly to things like any new long-range missile launches or nuclear tests -Beijing could agree, conceivably, to some new increment of punishment after
any nuclear test, ballistic missile flight-test or space launch; or attempting to
find a more collaborative approach that draws on Chinas interest in engaging
North Korea alongside continued U.S.-led multilateral pressure. An option
being debated in Washington is whether the U.S. could impose Iran-style
sanctions on North Korea and whether the United States could at least fully
implement the range of existing measures that it already has against
Pyongyang and are not being fully exploited. The problem with this is
[that], if we think we can pressure China to do the right things
through sanctions that seriously harm Chinas interests, it could
easily make the breach between the U.S. and China on North Korea
and other issues even worse. There should be more pushback when
China does not deliver on sanctions instead of downplaying differences, an
approach that has not resulted in better cooperation from China. So for

example, when the U.S. starts with a list of 40 entities to sanction and China
whittles it down to three, Washington could choose to point out that gap and
work with other countries to try to sanction those entities, instead of
declaring victory. Washington could also increase criticism of China for
permitting North Korea to use its airspace, land border, and waters to transfer
illicit items to other countries--clearly in violation of UN Security Council
resolutions.

No ROK escalation US and China no incentive

Gady, Senior Fellow at EastWest Institute, 2016 (Franz-Stefan, SinoU.S. Cooperation Over North Korea Is Now More Important Than Ever, The
Huffington Post, March 28, 2016, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/franzstefangady/sinous-cooperation-over-n_b_9548182.html, accessed June 02, 2016)
China and the United States share the same short-term interests on the
Korean Peninsula, perhaps best summarized in Beijings long-standing policy
vis--vis North Korea of no war, no instability, no nukes . () Neither
side is interested in a military solution to ongoing tensions between
North and South Korea. Neither party, despite US rhetoric to the contrary,
wants to topple the Kim Jong-un regime and see the North descend into
chaos amid a succession or unification crisis. And neither Beijing nor
Washington desire a nuclear-armed North Korea further fueling tensions in an
already volatile region of Asia.

Space
Impact defense they say we solve space
No space war China wants peaceful space use
McKenzie, 15
David McKenzie is an award-winning international correspondent for CNN based in
Johannesburg, South Africa. May 29, 2015. Chinese astronaut calls for cooperation, access to
International Space Station CNN http://www.cnn.com/2015/05/28/asia/china-space-mckenzie/
(DDI AGH)

China wants greater cooperation with other nations in space, particularly the United States, the
country's most experienced astronaut has told CNN in an exclusive interview. Fifteen nations including the United States, Russia and Japan

China's involvement has always been a nonstarter because of longstanding resistance from U.S. legislators. "As an astronaut, I have
cooperate on International Space Station missions, but

a strong desire to fly with astronauts from other countries. I also look forward to going to the International Space Station," Commander Nie

Space is a family affair, many countries are developing their

space programs and China, as a big country, should make our own
contributions in this field." The comments came during a wide-ranging and exclusive interview with the three-person crew
Haisheng told CNN. "...

of the Shenzhou-10 mission inside Space City, the center of China's space program, near Beijing last month. In 2011, Congress passed an act
to bar NASA from having any bilateral contact with individuals of the Chinese space program because of national security fears. "Every time it
gets mentioned at all anywhere near Congress, it gets shut down immediately," space analyst Miles O'Brien told CNN. "There is tremendous
skepticism there about China. It is viewed as a foe, it is viewed as a government that seeks to take our intellectual property -- our national

China said that outer space had become an

area of "strategic competition." "The Chinese government has always
advocated the peaceful use of outer space, it opposes space weaponization
and an arms race in outer space. This position will not be changed ," Wang Jin, a
spokesman for the Ministry of Defense, said. A recent report for the U.S.-China Economic and
Security Review Commission said China's improving space capabilities had
"negative sum consequences for U.S. military security." But Nie discounted those fears. "The
secrets and treasure." In a white paper released Tuesday,

United States and Russia started their space programs early. They are the pioneers," he said. He says foreign astronauts are welcome to visit

Chinese expect to finish their space station by

2022 -- around the time International Space Station runs out of funding,
potentially leaving China as the only country with a permanent presence in
space. China launched its manned space program in 1992. It initially borrowed and bought a great deal of Russian technology, primarily
China's own space station once it is launched. The

by replicating their Soyuz space craft -- which they dubbed the Shenzhou. But it has been steadily checking off the boxes in manned space
flight. In 2003, it put its first man in space. In 2008, it completed its first space walk. And in 2013 Nie and his crew completed the country's

With support from the highest

echelons of the ruling Chinese Communist Party and exceptionally deep
pockets, most analysts believe China's space program could become a world
leader.
longest space mission to date and twice docked with the Tiangong-1 space lab.

US wants space milalt causes other than China threat

RCW 14 (Reaching Critical Will, thinktank for Women's International
League for Peace and Freedom (WILPF), Outer Space,
reachingcriticalwill.org, October 2014,
http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/resources/fact-sheets/critical-issues/5448outer-space DDI TM)
the US policy on outer
space is concerning. Under the Bush administration, the 2006 US
National Space Policy explained that the US will preserve its rights,
capabilities, and freedom of action in space; dissuade or deter others from either
While as far as anyone knows there are currently no weapons deployed in space,

impeding those rights or developing capabilities intending to do so; take those actions necessary to protect its space

and deny, if necessary, adversaries the use of space

capabilities hostile to US national interests. At that point, the United States
rejected treaties limiting its actions in outer space and its space policy firmly
opposed the development of new legal regimes or other restrictions that seek to prohibit or
limit US access to or use of space, and insisted that proposed arms control agreements or
restrictions must not impair the rights of the United States to conduct research, development,
testing, and operations or other activities in space for US national
interests. In July 2010, the Obama administration released the new
US National Space Policy. It states that the US shall pursue bilateral and multilateral transparency and
capabilities; respond to interference;

confidence-building measures to encourage responsible action in, and the peaceful uses of, space. The new policy also
notes that the US will consider proposals and concepts for arms control measures if they are equitable, effectively
verifiable, and enhance the national security of the US and its allies. The language in this new policy suggests that this is

the actual implications of this change

are still unknown. While claiming that it is open to considering
space-related arms control concepts and proposals, the US argues that such
proposals must meet the rigorous criteria of equitability, effective verifiability, and enhance the
national security interests of the US and its allies. The RussianChinese joint draft treaty on the Prevention of the Placement of Weapons in Outer Space (PPWT)
would not meet these criteria according to the US , as it is fundamentally flawed
and would not provide any grounds for commencing negotiations. The United States Department of Defense
continues to invest in programs that could provide anti-satellite and space-based
weapons capabilities. While the technology itself is highly controversial, it presents major
business opportunities to companies that know how to overcome moral, logistical, and
financial roadblocks. War has always been highly profitable, and dominance of outer space
leads to further profits in conventional warfare. As the Air Force Space
Command stated in its 2003 Strategic Master Plan, the ability to gain space
superiority (the ability to exploit space while selectively disallowing it to
adversaries) is critically important and maintaining space superiority is an essential
prerequisite in modern warfare. Superiority in conventional warfare
relies on military assets in space, especially satellites, which are used for
a significant departure from its predecessor. However,

intelligence, remote sensing, navigation, and monitoring, among other things. Since the US currently asserts its political

protection of its own space assets and disturbance of

others is key to guaranteeing US dominance.
will through force,

International agreements solve and US resistant to

agreements proves the plan cant solve
Bodner 15
(Matthew, journalist for The Moscow Times, UN approves Russia-led
proposal to limit militarization of space, The Moscow Times, 12/8/2015,
http://www.themoscowtimes.com/news/article/un-approves-russia-ledproposal-to-limit-militarization-of-space/552230.html (DDI AGH)
United Nations General Assembly has approved a Russian-led resolution calling
for nations to refrain from being the first to deploy weapons into
outer space, in spite of U.S. resistance and European silence on the proposed measure, the Foreign
Ministry said in a statement. The resolution was first drafted by Russia in 2014, but
was rejected by the United States and other nations last year, and then again this
The

year, when the draft resolution was considered by a GA committee focusing on issues of arms control. On Tuesday, 129
nations represented in the General Assembly voted to adopt the measure, which was cosponsored by 40 nations including China and Syria and is known as the
no first placement initiative. It is noteworthy that the only government
objecting to the substance of our initiative is the United States, which for many years
has stood in almost complete isolation trying to block successive efforts of the international community to prevent an arms race in outer

The initiative calls on nations to refrain from being

the first to place military weapons in outer space, thereby preventing a
new and potentially devastating arms race between the world's leading space-faring nations Russia,
China and the United States, who are all working on space weapons. Europe, which has an effective
multi-national space program of its own, has consistently abstained from ruling on the Russian
space, the Foreign Ministry said.

proposal.

South China Sea

Impact defense they say we solve south china

sea
South China Sea conflict does not lead to war.
Aranvi Mehta, October 24, 2015, SOUTH CHINA SEA CRISIS AND INTENSIFYING US-CHINESE RELATIONS, McGill
International Review, http://mironline.ca/?p=5612

neither the US nor China would go to war upon the first

chance. Threats would be exchanged, but negotiations and mediation
would ensue in the background. In this way, the South China Sea Crisis can
be compared to the the Cuban Missile Crisis, when it was in both
countries best interests to not attack each other. Although the notion of nuclear
With all said,

annihilation in the Cuban Missile Crisis was the primary deterrent, the South China Sea Crisis has deterrents of its own. US
and China putting economic sanctions on each other would be catastrophic for both countries due to their
interdependence. Other powers in the world would also prioritise US-Chinese mediation as sanctions would affect their
economies too. As long as American diplomacy is geared towards preventing Chinas zero sum game in the region without
overstepping its own legal and military boundaries,

stable region.

the South China Sea will be a relatively

Teeney-tiny

South Korea DA

1nc module
A nuclear armed South Korea will destabilize the region and cause
nuclear prolif
Kuzminski 16 (Frank, Kuzminksi is an active duty Army officer and currently serves
as a strategic planner on the Army Staff at the Pentagon. A graduate of West Point and
Harvard University, Major Kuzminski served as an infantry officer for 10 years, including
two years with the U.S. Armys Second Infantry Division in South Korea. No Nukes in
South Korea, 3/10/16 accessed 7/15/16 at
http://www.realcleardefense.com/articles/2016/03/01/no_nukes_in_south_korea_109090.html;
DDI-NB)

In a recent article, U.S. Army Major Christopher Lee argues that the United
States should allow South Korea to obtain its own nuclear arsenal, stating
that it is the only way for the South to prevent Kim Jong-Un from furthering
his nuclear and ballistic missile program. This argument is a false dichotomy
and fails to consider, or at least properly weigh, the global and strategic
consequences of such an outcome. First of all, the United States does not
dictate which countries can and cannot pursue nuclear weapons; South Korea
is party to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) and remains committed
to not developing a nuclear arsenal. Moreover, a nuclear-armed Republic
of Korea (ROK) will, in fact, make the region less secure, and threaten
to turn the South into a pariah state like its errant, northern neighbor.
Additionally, Seoul going nuclear would undermine the Nuclear
Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), and lead to a collapse of the delicate
nonproliferation regime. By encouraging a nuclear-armed South Korea, the
United States risks seriously eroding the credibility of its extended
deterrent, and the strength of its alliances. South Korea acquiring its
own nuclear arsenal will achieve little beyond destabilizing the region. While
North Korea defiantly continues its nuclear and ballistic missile programs, it
keeps the bulk of its military positioned forward and able to attack the South
with little or no warning; North Koreas long range artillery and known stocks
of chemical and biological weapons are just as threatening as, if not more
destructive than, North Koreas nascent nuclear arsenal. Kim Jong-Un does
not need a nuclear-tipped Unha-3 ballistic missile, or even a submarine
launched ballistic missile to turn Seoul into a sea of fire. The real purpose
behind Pyongyangs nuclear program is to ensure the regimes long-term
survival, and to convince the world that North Korea be taken seriously.
According to the U.S. Director of National Intelligence, James R. Clapper,
North Koreas ballistic missile threat is aimed at the United States, and a
nuclear South Korea will not neutralize this threat. Instead, it will dramatically
alter the regional balance of power and incense China, which already
strongly opposes the deployment of a U.S. Terminal High Altitude
Area Defense (THAAD) battery to South Korea. China will likely consider
its interests directly threatened, leading to further polarization over the North
Korean issue, and a costly breakdown in Sino-South Korean relations. China is
South Koreas top trading partner by far South Korea can only lose in a

strategic contest with China. One can also speculate that Japan, which
forswears nuclear weapons largely due to being the only country ever
attacked by them, will not tolerate being left out of a North East Asian nuclear
arms race, especially given the recent security reforms championed by Prime
Minister Shinzo Abe. These effects may spill over into other regions, such as
the Middle East, where the potential for nuclear proliferation exists. If
countries perceive the United States is ceding its leadership in preventing the
spread of nuclear weapons, in favor of the parochial interests of a regional
power like South Korea, one can easily envision that other countries, such as
Saudi Arabia, will withdraw from the NPT and develop their own nuclear
weapons. The potential for a nuclear arms race among second-tier
powers will not make the world a safer place. At stake is not only the
viability of the global nonproliferation regime, which has kept the total
number of nuclear-armed states to nine, but also other agreements, such as
the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, which limits Irans capacity to
produce fissile material in exchange for sanctions relief, and is predicated on
the enduring strength of the NPT. Controlling the worlds most dangerous
weapons is founded on global consensus and confidence in the international
communitys commitments to keeping the costs of acquiring nuclear
weapons prohibitively high. If the U.S. suddenly reverses its long-standing
policies, and encourages South Korea to develop nuclear weapons, the
whole system is at risk of collapsing. The subsequent finger-pointing and
accusations by those opposed to a nuclear-armed South Korea will also seal
the growing perception that Americas global leadership on important matters
is waning towards irrelevance.

Insert ROK rearm bad impact

Internal link - ROK prolif

Loss of alliance credibility increases risk of ROK prolif
militarization incentives
Phinkston 15 (Daniel A. Pinkston, Ph.D. is visiting fellow at the Conflict
Studies Center, Babes-Bolyai University, Cluj-Napoca, Romania. Clint Work is
a Ph.D. student at the Jackson School of International Studies University of
Washington, Seattle, U.S.A., Moral Hazard and the US-ROK Alliance, The
Diplomat, 11/10/15 accessed 7/15/16 at
http://thediplomat.com/2015/11/moral-hazard-and-managing-the-us-rokalliance/; DDI- NB)
the possibility of a weaker
alliance partner exploiting the stronger partner . In the case of the U.S. alliance with
South Korea, Washingtons status as a global power gives it certain
bargaining advantages with Seoul, but at the same time the bilateral
relationships importance to Washingtons larger geo-strategic
interests, particularly in the context of the rebalance to Asia,
creates moral hazard that gives Seoul greater leverage in other
areas. Put simply, the U.S. presence and ironclad security commitment allows South Korean to
slack on defense because it knows the U.S. will ultimately bear the burden , due
In our previous piece, we noted the issue of moral hazard that creates

to its own strategic considerations and concerns over the safety of United States Forces Korea (USFK)

South Korea could be described as relatively dependent

upon its superpower patron, and leveraging this dependence to its own
advantage. From Seouls perspective, this behavior is rational and provides concrete material benefits,
and helps the ROK avoid costs that it might incur if it were compelled to
implement alternative policies in the political, diplomatic, fiscal, and
budgetary realms. Additionally, moral hazard problems are related to fears of abandonment and
forces. From another angle,

entrapment, and potentially are linked to problems surrounding escalation and crisis management. As John
Power noted in a recent piece, the more extreme critics of moral hazard and alliance exploitation, such as
Republican presidential candidate Donald Trump,

accuse the ROK of free-riding on U.S.

protection without paying for it. Others, such as Doug Bandow, offer a far more informed and
nuanced analysis of the alliance, yet still suggest the U.S. should remove its troops from South Korean soil

U.S. alliances with Japan

and the ROK are disincentives for Seoul and Tokyo to reconcile and
improve bilateral security cooperation. Some analysts push Kellys reasoning to
and end military welfare for the ROK. Robert Kelly believes that

argue that Japan and the ROK would quickly become close allies to balance against China and the DPRK if
the U.S. were to withdraw from East Asia. We disagree both with Trumps factually baseless rhetoric and

domestic
politics in South Korea would push Seoul to choose internal
balancing through increased defense spending, or even to acquire its own
nuclear deterrent, before reaching out to Tokyo to replace a terminated alliance with
the U.S. While we support South Koreas efforts to take on an increasingly
independent role for its own national defense, we are skeptical regarding proposals for a
Bandows overall conclusions. Although we are sympathetic with Kellys views, we believe

sudden or fundamental change to such a long-standing and relatively successful security architecture.
With this in mind, we hope a critical analysis of the role that moral hazard plays in the alliance, can provide

alliance management and the maintenance of peace and stability in

Northeast Asia.
insight for

ROK proliferation bad impact

South Korea develops nuclear weapons, US strength and cred are
damaged and the region destabilized, sparking an arms race
Kuzminski 16 (Frank, Kuzminksi is an active duty Army officer and currently serves
as a strategic planner on the Army Staff at the Pentagon. A graduate of West Point and
Harvard University, Major Kuzminski served as an infantry officer for 10 years, including
two years with the U.S. Armys Second Infantry Division in South Korea. No Nukes in
South Korea, 3/10/16 accessed 7/15/16 at
http://www.realcleardefense.com/articles/2016/03/01/no_nukes_in_south_korea_109090.html;
DDI-NB)

Perhaps the most dangerous impact of the United States allowing South
Korea to obtain nuclear weapons is the erosion of confidence in
Americas nuclear umbrella, or extended deterrent, which underwrites its
seven military alliances, including the North Atlantic Treaty Organization
(NATO). Such a move would represent a striking policy reversal by the United
States, as articulated in President Obamas Prague speech in 2009, and
violate security commitments made by the U.S. to its allies. At the 47th ROKU.S. Security Consultative Meeting (SCM) held in Seoul on November 2nd,
2015, ROK Minister of National Defense Han Min-koo and U.S. Secretary of
Defense Ash Carter affirmed the continued U.S. commitment to provide and
strengthen extended deterrence for the ROK using the full range of military
capabilities, including the U.S. nuclear umbrella. The United States has
led the global security order since the end of World War II, largely on
the premise of a credible, extended deterrent afforded by its nuclear
arsenal. Indeed, NATOs Strategic Concept, adopted in November of 2010,
clearly defines nuclear deterrence as a core element of the Alliances overall
strategy. Any indication that Washingtons nuclear umbrella is somehow
imprecise, as Major Lee suggests, would raise serious doubts about
Washingtons commitment to its allies. Given Russias revanchism in Ukraine
and on NATOs flank in Eastern Europe, as well as Chinas coercive behavior
in the South China Sea, such doubts will surely invite further aggressive
behavior by these countries, lead to a more dangerous world, and
reinforce the narrative of a declining and retrenched United States.
Major Lee does correctly point out, however, that the international
community is not doing enough to curb North Koreas nuclear ambitions.
Although the recently announced dialogue on basing a U.S. Army THAAD
battery on the Korea peninsula is a positive step, this capability is aimed at
defending both South Korea and the U.S. homeland from North Korean
ballistic missiles, and it doesnt really prevent North Korea from developing
more nukes. Its no secret that China, Pyongyangs sole benefactor, has
grown weary of Kim Jong-Uns belligerence. The U.S. and ROK must work
together to convince Beijing that a unified Korea run from Seoul is a better
alternative to the status quo. This will require a lot of effort to address the
potential for millions of North Korean refugees fleeing north into China in the
event of regime collapse, not to mention U.S. troops presence in Korea post

unification, and the disposition of North Koreas nuclear weapons. China

clearly values its relationship with South Korea, and vice versa, and President
Park and her government should work with China on resolving the North
Korean issue, rather than isolating themselves with nuclear arms. If South
Korea withdraws from the NPT, it would likely draw stiff opposition
from China and the rest of the world, much like North Korea did in the
wake of its own withdrawal from the NPT in 2003. The only way South Korea
can affect North Koreas nuclear program, short of military action, is to
undermine the Kim regime and precipitate a collapse by penetrating the
hermit kingdom with information. Consider North Koreas panicked reaction
when South Korea used loudspeaker broadcasts last summer to blast news
and K-Pop music across the Demilitarized Zone. Kim Jong-Un fears being
exposed for the fraud that he is. South Korea should do everything it can
to unravel North Koreas isolation from the outside world. Theres no
question that North Koreas nuclear program is a danger to the entire world,
and a more direct approach, which includes China, is needed to counter this
threat. Despite the pro-nuke agenda of a vocal minority, led by Mr. Chong
Mong-joon, a South Korean businessman and erstwhile political operative,
South Korean nukes are neither in South Koreas, nor in the United
States strategic interests. South Korea risks undoing years of
economic progress, destabilizing the region, and sparking a nuclear
arms race in North East Asia, if not around the world. The United
States cannot endorse a South Korea withdrawal from the NPT, and must
oppose any such unilateral effort by Seoul. South Koreas greatest advantage
over North Korea is its extensive integration in the global economy as one of
the worlds top trading power. For its sake, Seoul must resist letting the
nuclear genie out of the bottle and deal with North Korea in innovative ways.
Anything else would play right into Kim Jong-Uns hands.

Korean Peninsula conventional war

North Koreans significant conventional threat
Smith, NDU senior research fellow, 2015
(Shane, Implications of US Extended Deterrence and Assurance in East Asia,
November, 38north.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/11/NKNF-Smith-Extended-DeterrenceAssurance.pdf; DDI- NB)
In 1965, Glenn Snyder argued that the catastrophic consequences of nuclear war
provided for a certain level of strategic stability between nuclear adversaries. No leader would want to

stability at
the high end of conflict could create overall instability by making lower levels
of conflict relatively safe and thereby erode extended deterrence . In the North
Korea context, some experts fear that its leaders might see a survivable secondstrike capability as
a shield from behind which it can launch conventional provocations and war. In short, a
escalate conflict to the nuclear threshold for fear of crossing it. Paradoxically, however,

survivable second-strike might give North Koreas leaders confidence that they can manage the risks of
escalation because nuclear weapons would deter a full retaliatory response from the United States and

North Korean leaders might calculate that they can

launch a conventional offensive at some favorable time, if only to
achieve limited objectives, before using the threat of nuclear attack
to sue for peace on their terms. Some analysts may be unconcerned about North Koreas
South Korea. As a result,

conventional military capabilities and therefore indifferent to this threat. It is true that allied forces far

but Pyongyangs conventional threat cannot be easily

dismissed. It is widely believed that North Koreas military strategy and operational concepts are based
on conducting quick and decisive assaults that can present a fait accompli before the United
outmatch those in North Korea,

States can get reinforcements to the peninsula. Once US reinforcements arrive, the more assured is North
Koreas defeat. This strategy is evident in reports about North Koreas military posture. For instance, the

that 70 percent of its forces are

forward deployed to allow rapid invasion of the South in as little as 48 to 72
hours without further deployments or supplying. Those forces include approximately
International Institute for Strategic Studies estimates

650,000 troops, 8,000 artillery, 2,000 tanks and formidable special operations forces numbering around
100,000.28 Of course, North Korea does not need to unify the peninsula to inflict a significant blow against

It could pursue much more limited aims, such as taking

territory across the demilitarized zone or islands along the Northern
Limit Line that it claims are in dispute. As North Koreas confidence
grows in its strategic deterrenti.e., the ability to target major
population centers in South Korea, Japan and the United Statesit
might even think that it could use nuclear weapons in a limited
fashion. For instance, it might think that it could use nuclear weapons for psychological effects during
the alliance.

a conflict by firing a demonstration shot; for area denial effects by targeting access points to North Korea
or military ports in the South, such as the Port of Busan, where the US might otherwise disembark forces;
or for operational effects by targeting military bases away from civilian population centers, such as air

Even the limited use of nuclear weapons, however, would

be extraordinarily risky, if only because such use would most certainly
increase the stakes of the conflict for the United States, South Korea and
much of the world. But it may be a risk that North Korea is willing to run
during a conflict in which survival of the regime is at stake ; more so, if it has
bases at Kunsan and Osan.

confidence in a survivable secondstrike strategic deterrent.

Impact helper North Korea

North Korea poses threat to stability
Smith, NDU senior research fellow, 2015
(Shane, Implications of US Extended Deterrence and Assurance in East Asia,
November, 38north.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/11/NKNF-Smith-Extended-DeterrenceAssurance.pdf; DDI- NB)
A worsening domestic situation, of course, can lead to risky external behavior. Scholars have argued that

states will sometimes engage in provocative behavior and even full-scale war
as a diversionary tactic to deflect attention from domestic woes or to
galvanize opposition to domestic challengers . This should be a familiar theme to
most North Korean analysts since domestic motivations have long been considered a primary
driver for North Koreas external provocations. For instance, some analysts speculate
that securing the militarys backing for the transition of leadership to Kim Jong Un from his father, Kim Jong
Il, was a primary motivation for the sinking of the Cheonan and shelling of Yeonpyeong island in 2010 .

Nuclear weapons could provide the North with added confidence that
it can launch such diversionary provocations with relative impunity
in the future. The answers to these questions do not bode well for the stabilizing
prospects of a nuclear-armed North Korea. However, it would be wrong to assume that
increased confidence in its nuclear weapons will fundamentally alter North Koreas behavior. First, its
leaders are not irrational or suicidal. We should not expect nuclear weapons to suddenly trigger a reckless
drive toward unification or a nuclear attack from out of the blue, for instance. Second, North Korea has a
long history of limited but violent provocations, ostensibly to either weaken, delegitimize and humiliate

Nuclear weapons might

make such conduct more frequent or intense with real implications
for extended deterrence and assurance, but the difference in North
Koreas behavior may be one of degree rather than a fundamental change .
South Korea and the United States or to shore up domestic support.

Terrorism
China uses counter-terrorism cooperation with the US to
exacerbate oppressive policiesETIM
Drennan 15
(Justine Drennan, fellow at Foreign Policy, 2-10-2015, "Is China Making Its
Own Terrorism Problem Worse?," Foreign Policy,
http://foreignpolicy.com/2015/02/09/is-china-making-its-own-terrorismproblem-worse-uighurs-islamic-state/ (DDI AGH)
Meanwhile, its unclear if the group Beijing singles out as the greatest threat, the East Turkestan Islamic Movement, comprises a distinct, self-

The Chinese government first

mentioned ETIM in a vaguely sourced document in 2001, shortly after then-U.S. President George W.
Bush announced his global war on terror. In it, China called the
group a major component of the terrorist network headed by
Osama bin Laden. United States seemed to agree that ETIM posed a
real threat, listing the group as a Specially Designated Global
Terrorist group in 2002 and detaining 22 Uighurs captured in
Afghanistan and Pakistan at Guantnamo Bay. Some were held for more than a decade,
though the United States later acknowledged that it didnt have
adequate evidence against them. Just over a year ago it sent the last three to Slovakia one of a handful
of small countries that agreed to host them. But George Washington Universitys Roberts
concluded in a 2012 paper titled Imaginary Terrorism? that Washington also may have inflated
the Uighur threat. The Uighur detainees at Guantnamo who said theyd received jihadi training described a training camp
identified terrorist entity or a looser grouping of individuals.

in Afghanistan that amounted to a small, run-down shack. The highlight, in Robertss words: A one-time opportunity to fire a few bullets with

detainees expressed anger about Chinese rule, they all

denied belonging to ETIM, and many said theyd never heard of the
group. Roberts has argued that the United States may have backed Chinas claims
about ETIM in order to cement Chinas support for the occupation of
Afghanistan and, later, Iraq. Nevertheless, various international terrorism analysts continued to perpetuate the
allegations about ETIM in work that cited government statements as their primary sources. According to Georgetowns Millward, China
uses this echo chamber of supposed evidence about ETIM to keep alive the idea of an
international Uighur threat, conflating ETIM with the newer,
propaganda-producing Turkistan Islamic Party. A U.S. State
Department official told Foreign Policy that the United States
designated ETIM a terrorist group after careful study, having
concluded that its members were responsible for terrorism in China
and were planning attacks on U.S. interests abroad, but declined to
specify the sources of this information. The official added that the government still maintains this
the only Kalashnikov rifle that was available at the camp. Although

listing. Officials at Washingtons Chinese Embassy and Chinas State Council didnt return repeated calls and emails seeking comment.

What worries Human Rights Watchs Bequelin, as several countries including the United
States move to scale up counterterrorism cooperation with China,
isnt so much that other countries believe Chinas inflated claims.
Its more that the need to cooperate on security and other goals may
mean de facto acceptance of, or even practical assistance for,
Chinas repressive policies.

Chinas false claims of ETIM terrorism are a self-fulfilling

prophecyfear and marginalization
Drennan 15
(Justine Drennan, fellow at Foreign Policy, 2-10-2015, "Is China Making Its
Own Terrorism Problem Worse?," Foreign Policy,
http://foreignpolicy.com/2015/02/09/is-china-making-its-own-terrorismproblem-worse-uighurs-islamic-state/ (DDI AGH)
an SUV crashed through a crowd at Beijings Tiananmen Square in late 2013, killing
two bystanders and injuring 40, it didnt take Chinese officials long to name culprits. The attackers, they said, had been
members of Chinas Uighur Muslim minority, with links to many
international extremist terrorist groups. Police said they found a flag bearing jihadi emblems in the crashed
vehicle and blamed the East Turkestan Islamic Movement, or ETIM, a group
named after the independent state China says some Uighurs want to
establish in the far-western region of Xinjiang. After the attack, Foreign
Ministry spokeswoman Hua Chunying called ETIM Chinas most
direct and realistic security threat. Beijing has long characterized
cases of Uighur violence as organized acts of terrorism and accused
individual attackers of having ties to international jihadi groups . Back in
2001, China released a document claiming that Eastern Turkistan
terrorists had received training from Osama bin Laden and the
Taliban and then fought in combats in Afghanistan, Chechnya and
Uzbekistan, or returned to Xinjiang for terrorist and violent
activities. Since then, China has frequently blamed ETIM for
violence in Xinjiang and elsewhere. But scholars, human rights groups,
and Uighur advocates argue that China is systematically
exaggerating the threat Uighurs pose to justify its repressive
policies in Xinjiang. The regions onetime-majority Uighur population of roughly 10 million, which is ethnically Turkic, has been marginalized
for decades by ethnic Han Chinese migrants that Beijing has encouraged to move there in the hope that theyd help integrate the restive region into China. The
repression has been getting worse. Since the regions bloody ethnic clashes in 2009, the
government has increased regulations on Muslim practices,
restricting veils and beards and strictly enforcing rules that prohibit
many from fasting during Ramadan or visiting mosques. Heightened
security operations have led in some cases to imprisonment,
executions, and suspected torture. Government materials about how to spot extremists (hint: they tend to look like
Uighurs) elide religiosity with terrorism. Now, with the rise of the Islamic State, China has again
ramped up its claims about Uighurs waging international jihad.
Chinese government-run Global Times asserted in December that about 300 Chinese extremists were fighting
alongside ISIS in Iraq and Syria, and in January that another 300 had traveled to Malaysia en route to joining the group. The reports suggested that
many were terrorists from the East Turkestan Islamic Movement. On
When

Thursday, Global Times said ISIS had executed one of these Uighur recruits in September and two in December when they tried to flee its control, attributing the
information to an anonymous Kurdish official.

Many experts

dismiss Global Timess numbers. I assume there are Uighurs joining ISIS, but I also

assume the numbers are quite small in comparison to other groups throughout the world, said Sean Roberts, a George Washington University professor who studies the
minority group. Were probably talking about 20 to 30 people max. Nicholas Bequelin, a Hong-Kong-based senior researcher with Human Rights Watch,

called

Chinese medias figure of 300 implausibly high. Its likely that the rise of the Islamic State has
given a few disenfranchised young Uighurs a cause to fight and potentially die for. Still, experts say any increase in
Uighur extremism is largely due to the fact that the very policies

China says are meant to combat terrorism have actually made the
threat worse. Chinese reports about hundreds of Uighurs fighting with the Islamic State are likely intended
to make the Uighurs look as if theyre a threat, an Islamist terrorist
organization, said Dru Gladney, an anthropologist who studies ethnic identities in China. Several international media outlets havere peated the
numbers from Chinese media. But Chinas inflated claims are ultimately
counterproductive, Gladney said. They create more fear and
marginalization, which exacerbates the problem. China isnt wholly inventing the threat.
Propaganda material from a group China links to ETIM that calls itself the Turkistan Islamic Party (TIP) suggests there are at least 30 to 40 Uighur jihadis in Syria and Iraq,
according to Washington Institute for Near East Policy fellow Aaron Zelin, who runs the website Jihadology.net. TIP has an increasingly active online presence that includes
footage of young children firing guns in mountain valleys. In recent years, it has also claimed responsibility for attacks like the Tiananmen Square SUV incident via videos
in which its purported leader, Abdullah Mansour, has called for more attacks. But many researchers doubt TIPs claims, as its accounts of attacks often contradict facts on
the ground that dont seem to indicate the sophistication of internationally organized terrorist operations. The general consensus, according to Georgetown professor
James Millward, is that radicalized Uighur expats, who mostly seem to be based in Pakistan rather than Iraq and Syria, havent provided any operational support for recent
violence in China, but rather just propaganda. And any who are fighting with Middle Eastern jihadi groups dont seem to be rising very high in their ranks, said Raffaello

China, however, has been quick to label

moderate Uighurs who speak out as radicals. Last year a Xinjiang
court sentenced Uighur professor Ilham Tohti to life in prison on
charges of separatism, for running a website that discussed
Uighur experiences in the region. The United States condemned Tohtis sentence, with Secretary of State John Kerry
Pantucci, an analyst at Londons Royal United Services Institute.

warning that silencing moderate voices can only make tensions worse. Indeed, acts of apparent Uighur terrorism within China have risen sharply over the past couple
years. An attack last March by eight knife-wielding men and women at a train station in Yunnan provinces city of Kunming left 29 dead and at least 130 wounded. In April,
people armed with knives and explosives killed three and injured 79 at the railway station in Xinjiangs capital, Urumqi. The next month, attackers crashed two cars into
shoppers at an Urumqi market and set off explosives, killing 31 and injuring more than 90. The Munich-based World Uyghur Congress, the leading advocacy organization
for the minority (which uses an alternate spelling of the groups name), condemns violence but says China uses the threat of terrorism to stifle peaceful dissent as well.
Alim Seytoff, the Washington spokesman for the group, told Foreign Policy by email that he didnt know whether any Uighurs had joined ISIS, but if they had, they by no
means represent the vast majority of peace-loving Uyghur people, just as those who joined ISIS from the U.S., the U.K., Australia and Europe by no means represent the

China is
conflating the Uyghur peoples legitimate demands for human
rights, religious freedom, and democracy with international Islamic
terrorism, he said. Gladney, the anthropologist, said any Uighurs with ties to ISIS were more likely driven by resentment of China than by aims of global
freedom-loving peoples of America, Great Britain, Australia and Europe. In order to deflect criticism of its Xinjiang policies,

jihad. They may want militant training to fight China and even to establish a Uighur state, he said, but theyre less interested in creating a global caliphate. Analysts also
note that those who do desire a global caliphate seem to have little more than a passing interest in Uighurs relatively parochial aspirations, despite some token gestures,
such as Abu Bakr al-Baghdadis reference to Chinese violations of Muslim rights last July, and exaggerated claims about such abuses made last fall by an al Qaeda-run
magazine.

Counterplan
Note that some of the alt cause cards could also be used as cp solvency for
relations adv.

ROC CP
Ending support for ROC key to US China relations and
coop on other issues
Glaser, 2015 (Charles L., Professor in the Elliott School of International
Affairs and the Department of Political Science at George Washington
University., International Security, Spring 2015, google scholar UT, pg 40-90)
China considers
U.S. support of Taiwan a key source of strategic distrust. A recent
study by two leading authorities on U.S.-China relations concludes
that Beijing views U.S. arms sales to Taiwan as confirming
American arrogance and determination to interfere in Chinas
domestic affairs and to prevent peaceful unification from occurring,
thereby harming a clearly-articulated Chinese core interest. In a similar
vein, their report argues that continuing to provide Taiwan with advanced
weapons . . . is viewed as pernicious in Chinese eyes and has added
to suspicion that Washington will disregard Chinese interests and
sentiments as long as Chinas power position is secondary to
Americas.68 Nathan and Scobell conclude that most Chinese see strategic motives at the root of American
behavior. They believe that keeping the Taiwan problem going helps the
U.S. tie China down.69 Similarly, a prominent Chinese analyst
argues: The position the U.S. takes on the Taiwan issue
determines the essence of American strategy toward China, and thus
determines the quality and status of U.S.-China relations.70 Xu Hui, a
States does not take a position on what the final outcome of the Taiwan issue should be,

professor at Chinas National Defense University, holds that U.S. policies toward Taiwan have been and are the
fundamental cause of some anti-American sentiment among the Chinese public. . . . I assure you that a posture change
of the U.S. policy on Taiwan will remove the major obstacle for our military-tomilitary relations and also strengthen Sino-

In short, ending
the U.S. commitment to Taiwan has the potential to dramatically
improve U.S.-China relations, which in turn could increase the
possibility of cooperation on other issues and reduce the
probability of competition and conflict. Second, ending the U.S. commitment to defend
American cooperation by winning the hearts and minds of 1.3 billion Chinese people.71

Taiwan could greatly moderate the intensifying military competition between the United States and China, which is
adding to strains in their relationship.72 Most directly, the United States is developing its AirSea Battle concept to
counter Chinas A2/AD capabilities, which are intended primarily to undermine the U.S. ability to come to Taiwans aid.73
The impact of the U.S. commitment to Taiwan on Chinas military requirements and capabilities, however, arguably
reaches much further. China worries that in a conflict over Taiwan the United States will interrupt its SLOCs. This
vulnerability would leave China open to U.S. coercion during severe crises and conventional wars.74 The United States
dominates the SLOCs from the Persian Gulf to the Strait of Malacca and still enjoys signicant military advantages in the
South China and East China Seas. The requirement for both China and the United States to control these SLOCs during
a crisis or war creates a security dilemma, which adds to strains in the U.S.-China relationship. There is no militarytechnical solution to this security dilemma, however, because two countries cannot control the same space.75 A
decision by the United States to end its commitment to Taiwan could moderate this security dilemma in two important
ways. By eliminating the scenario that is most likely to bring the United States and China into a large war,
accommodation should significantly reduce the importance that China places on controlling its SLOCs. Although China
would likely still find U.S. control undesirable, the military threat the United States posed to Chinas security would be
greatly reduced. In addition, as explained above, U.S. accommodation could signal that U.S. goals in the region are
limited, which should contribute to improving the U.S.-China relationship by increasing Chinas assessment that U.S.
motives are benign, which would in turn further reduce the severity of the security dilemma.76

Uniqueness/Brink Relations
[both ways]

US China Relations Good now

US China Relations good now [military

exercises]
Relations are goods- military cooperation
Russel 14

Daniel R. Russel, Assistant Secretary, Bureau of East Asian and Pacific

Affairs 6-25-2014, "The Future of U.S.-China Relations," Testimony
Before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, (DDI AGH)
we are committed to building a
sustained and substantive military-to-military relationship that
focuses on identifying concrete, practical areas of cooperation and
reducing risk. This includes not only deepening the use of
institutionalized dialogue mechanisms, including senior defense
participation at the SSD and S&ED, but also inviting the Chinese to
join regional cooperative exercises and expanding talks with the
Chinese military about operational safety in the region . For the first
time this year, China will participate in RIMPAC June 26-August 1 in Hawaii.
We also aim to continue high-level exchanges between our
militaries. Recent exchanges have included visits to China by
Secretary Hagel in April and General Odierno in February, and a visit
to the United States by Chief of the General Staff General Fang
Fenghui in May. At the same time, we will continue to carefully monitor Chinas military developments and
On the military side of the U.S.-China relationship,

encourage China to exhibit greater transparency with respect to its military spending and modernization. This will help
countries better understand the motivations of the Peoples Liberation Army. We continue to encourage China to use its
military capabilities in a manner conducive to the maintenance of peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific region.

US China relations good [climate change]

Relations are resilient the u.s have shared interests that
they cooperate about
Russel 14

Daniel R. Russel, Assistant Secretary, Bureau of East Asian and Pacific

Affairs 6-25-2014, "The Future of U.S.-China Relations," Testimony
Before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, (DDI AGH)
As the largest energy consumers, greenhouse gas emitters, and
renewable energy producers, the United States and China share
common interests, challenges and responsibilities. These are issues that relate
directly to our economic and national security. Cooperation on climate change, energy,
and environmental protection is more critical than ever and is an important area of focus
in the U.S.-China bilateral relationship.
Through broad dialogues such as the Ten-Year Framework for Energy
and Environment Cooperation and the S&ED, over the last year we have
been able to produce new and expanded commitments to
cooperation on climate change, energy, and the environment. During
Secretary Kerrys February trip to Beijing, he announced implementation plans for each
of the five initiatives under the Climate Change Working Group as
well as a new enhanced policy dialogue on domestic and
international policies to address climate change that will be held on
the margins of the upcoming S&ED.

US China Relations Tension Now

US China Relations tension now [South China

Sea]
South china sea hurts relations and the new ruling makes
it worse
Apps 2016
Peter Apps, Reuters global affairs columnist, writing on international affairs,
globalization, conflict and other issues. He is founder and executive director
of the Project for Study of the 21st Century think tank, Before that, he spent 12
years as a reporter for Reuters covering defense, political risk and emerging markets;
PS21,7-14-2016, "Commentary: Can Washington prevent war in Southeast
Asia?," Reuters, (DDI AGH)
relations between China, its regional neighbors
and Washington are currently also seriously deteriorating. Outright conflict
The problem, of course, is that

on that front probably remains less likely than a more limited war involving North Korea, although it would
also be cataclysmic. As perhaps the worlds preeminent trading and exporting nation, Beijing has little
appetite for international isolation on the scale of North Korea. But it also has very real ambitions, growing
military capability and a government that has placed the quest for ever-growing geopolitical power at the

decision by the International

Court of Arbitration in the Hague over Chinas maritime boundaries
may be something of a turning point, and not in a good way . China
largely boycotted the process, which it said had little legitimacy. The
problem for Beijing, however, is that most of the countries do take it seriously
and the court roundly rejected Beijings assertions to rights to most
of the South China Sea. Chinese regular and auxiliary maritime and other forces
have already taken up a relatively assertive position on some of the
disputed islands and shoals, and there seems little prospect of them
are withdrawing anytime soon. The court judgment, however, may
ramp up the confidence of nations like the Philippines to take a
much more aggressive approach themselves, with potentially
seriously destabilizing consequences. Its not necessarily all bad news.
While the tribunal did conclude that Beijing had trampled on the territorial
rights of the Philippines, it also suggested that some disputed areas such as
Scarborough Shoal could be shared, for example when it came to fishing
rights. That might offer a path to cooperation or it could just make
confrontation more likely. Last year, a poll of leading national security experts put the risk of a
heart of its domestic legitimacy. In that sense, this weeks

conventional or nuclear war between the United States and China as marginally lower than the risk of a

the risk of states

like the Philippines, Japan and Vietnam -- many U.S. Treaty allies -finding themselves in a fight may well be higher. If peace is based
around consensus, the direction of travel in Asia this year seems to
be entirely the wrong way.
similar clash between NATO and Russia. That probably remains the case but

Tensions now- china refuses to budge on the south china

see and non traditional human rights
Johnson 15,

Christopher K. Johnson, Senior Advisor and Freeman Chair in

China Studies Center for Strategic and International Studies
(CSIS), Statement before the Senate Foreign Relations
Subcommittee on East Asia, the Pacific, and International
Cybersecurity Policy THE CHANGING LANDSCAPE OF U.S.-CHINA
RELATIONS: WHAT NEXT? , Center for Strategic and International
Studies (CSIS), September 29, 2015 DDI -AG
Moreover, aside from the agreement on cybersecurity,

there was very little

progress on the several security issues currently complicating U.S.China ties. For example, President Xi showed almost no willingness to
address U.S. concerns on maritime security, especially as it pertains
to brewing tensions in the South China Sea. In fact, the absence of any
reference to maritime security in the fact sheet released by the White House
represents a glaring omission and suggests the two sides are
fundamentally at loggerheads, with the United States calling for
Chinese restraint with their island building and the militarization of
reclaimed islands and the Chinese reiterating their sovereignty
claims. Similarly, while there was agreement to continue bilateral human rights talks, the
Chinese made no concessions on what might be called non-traditional
human rights concerns, such as the worries over the provisions of
Chinas draft law promising majorand potentially worrisomechanges to
the way the Chinese government manages non-governmental
organizations operating there

US China relations at crossroads [could go

either way/now a key time]
US-China relations, although strengthened by the SinoAmerican summit, remain tense
Shambaugh 15 (David, professor of political science and
international affairs at the George Washington University in
Washington DC, Improved atmosphere in US-China relations, but
constraints from domestic actors remain, Rising Power Initiative ,
January 27 http://www.risingpowersinitiative.org/improved-atmosphere-inus-china-relations-but-constraints-from-domestic-actors-remain/, DDI-NB)
The Sino-American summit between
presidents Barack Obama and Hu Jintao succeeded in stabilizing the
worlds most important relationship. After more than a year of fluctuating and deteriorating
The world is safer this week than last week.

ties, causing unsettling ripple effects throughout the Asia-Pacific region and globally, US-China relations were in dire need

Any
observer of Sino-American relations should be both cautiously
optimistic but skeptical. Establishing equilibrium in ties between the US
and China has been hard enough over the years sustaining it has been even
harder. If theres been one overriding characteristic in the relationship over the past 30 years, it has been
fluctuation and disequilibrium. As a result, this summit could not
have come at a more propitious time. The period since President Obamas state visit to China
of stabilization. Now the key question is how long can the new stability achieved at the summit last?

in November 2009 until this past week has been perhaps the worst period in two decades of relations since the

Both sides took advantage of the opportunity to

reset the tone of the relationship. Now the hope is that a new tone
can result in tangible cooperation. There was, in this observers view, an implicit wager by the
Obama administration going into the summit: The American side would accord President
Hu full respect and dignity befitting the leader of the worlds second
largest economy which would, in turn, hopefully produce a less
truculent and more compliant Chinese position on a wide range of
issues in which Washington sought Beijings cooperation. This was the simple,
Tiananmen incident of 1989.

but smart, strategy. Tactically, the administration sought to shape the summit atmosphere by rolling out four cabinet
secretaries Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, Secretary of Treasury Timothy Geithner
and Secretary of Commerce Gary Locke in the week leading up to Hus arrival to each give tough high-profile speeches

These highprofile speeches by leading cabinet secretaries set the tone going
into the summit and allowed the US side to articulate its China policy
and concerns about Beijings behavior. This was good both for
Beijing to hear as well as for building domestic political support
behind the administrations China policy. The administration coupled the toughness in its
outlining American expectations from China across virtually every area of the relationship.

pre-summit speeches with the warm, respectful welcome for Hu at the summit. The administration understood well that
what Hu and his entourage wanted most from the summit, by significant measure, was largely the symbolism of protocol.
This is true for one important reason: The Chinese Communist Partys (CCP) political legitimacy rests in part on restoring
Chinas international dignity as a major global power. Ever since 1949, when the Communists came to power, this has
been the consistent narrative that the CCP has told its people. Thus, with all the protocol trappings of a high-level state
visit a welcome at Andrews Air Force base by Vice-President Joseph Biden with a phalanx of armored Cadillac limousines,
staying at Blair House, a White House South Lawn honor guard reception and 21-gun salute, black-tie state dinner and

Hu was accorded the

symbolic respect from the worlds leading power, which Chinese
champagne toasts, Oval Office fireside chats, high-profile public speeches

believe is due their country, and all-important mianzi, literally face

but translated more as respect. As a result, Xinhua News Agency and other Chinese media
beamed an unrelenting series of photo images of Hu playing the role of international statesman back to domestic
constituencies in China. The Peoples Daily, the flagship newspaper of the CCP, delayed publication of its January 19

The Obama administrations

wager is, first, that providing President Hu and his party with full
symbolic respect will play into the CCPs domestic legitimacy and
sense of security, hopefully undercutting those constituencies in
China that perceive the United States is trying to subvert the CCPs
political power, restrain the nations rise, and contain Chinas
growing presence in East Asia and globally. Second, by according Hu respect and a civil
tone on display in Obamas own welcoming speech, banquet toasts, and comments at the joint press conference the
administration hopes that it might produce a more trustful and
cooperative China in addressing the long list of American concerns
inside China, throughout East Asia, and globally. The detailed 41-point joint
edition by an unprecedented six hours to carry images of the summit.

statement released by the two sides at the conclusion of the summit was a good step in the right direction, setting out
common positions and perspectives on a range of issues. But so too did the joint statement issued at Obamas November
2009 summit in Beijing only for it to become a stillborn document that immediately foundered on a series of irritants and

Time will tell whether the 2011 statement has more

staying power than the last one, as both countries have powerful
bureaucratic constituencies that remain distrustful of each other
with huge budgets aimed at countering the other. Differing political
values and systems will continue to be a barrier; volatile nationalism
in China remains a wildcard; economic protectionism embodied in
low renminbi and competition is not going to disappear; mutual
strategic interests in Asia only partially converge and Chinas
military modernization will continue to alter the regional balance of
power; respective worldviews differ and global interests are
increasingly competitive. These realities are not changed by the successful Obama-Hu summit. While
some skepticism about the future of US-China relations is thus
warranted for these reasons, nonetheless the summit did produce new and much-needed
actions by both sides.

stability and improved levels of trust. What it did not produce, though, are new mechanisms of institutionalized

The relationship remains driven by

episodic delegation exchanges and short visits , while whats needed is a new model
interaction to follow-through on the lengthy joint statement.

of institutionalized working groups that forge tangible cooperation across bilateral, functional, regional and global issues
365 days per year. Looking to the future, cooperative moves by both sides will likely take place in a parallel rather than
joint fashion. Whether the issue is North Korea or Iran, commercial or currency differences, release of imprisoned
dissidents or increasing press freedoms, Beijings ability to appear to be overtly cooperating with a US agenda will be

The Chinese
military, internal security and intelligence services, protected
domestic industries, and the Communist Party propaganda
apparatus all have vested institutional interests in countering
American influence and, to some extent, benefit from an
antagonistic relationship with the United States. For its part, the US military,
severely constrained by domestic nationalistic pressures and bureaucratic constituencies.

intelligence services, protectionist and xenophobic elements in Congress, the human rights community, and other
domestic actors similarly have a stake in an adversarial relationship with China. While these domestic actors will no doubt

for the moment both sides seem pleased with the

outcome of the summit. Whether they can now convert the improved
atmosphere into practical gains remains to be seen.
play their constraining roles,

US China relations conflict possible

US-China relations tense over several issues multiple
opportunities to spark conflict
Farley 14 (Robert Farley, 6-9-2014, Robert Farley, Assistant
Professor, started at the Patterson School in 2005 as a post-doc
scholar. He received his Ph.D. from the University of Washington
Department of Political Science in 2004. His dissertation,
"Transnational Determinants of Military Doctrine," investigated the
role that transnational networks of military officers play in the
diffusion of military doctrine. In addition to a forthcoming book on
the organization of American airpower, he is working on projects
involving anti-submarine warfare, naval doctrine, and the
relationship between military procurement and national
prestige."Asia's Greatest Fear: A U.S.-China War," National Interest,
http://nationalinterest.org/feature/asia-flames-us-china-war-10621)
The greatest reason to fret over a future conflict between
Washington and Beijing is the sheer amount of pressure points
between them: The East China Sea, Taiwan, The South China Sea,
North Korea, cyberattacks and/or cyber espionage that could go very
wrong, a space-based military competition, increasing economic
competition and so on. With none of these seem ripe for solving anytime
soon, as Farley notes the window for war between the United States
and China will, in all likelihood, last for a long time.

War between US and China is possible deeper analysis of

situation key
Kazianis 16 (Harry J. Kazianis, 3-4-2016, "Hell Cometh to Earth: Is a U.S.China War Really Possible?," National Interest,
http://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/hell-cometh-earth-us-china-warreally-possible-15404)
Is a war between the United States and the Peoples Republic of
China really possible? On the surface, the idea seems quite silly.
Washington and Beijing sport two-way trade equal to over a half a
trillion dollars. China holds trillions more in U.S. debt. America
educates scores of Chinese students in our public and private
universitiesover 300,000 young and scholarly minds. Chinese
immigrants have become a rich part of American culture. How could
such a conflict really occur considering such interwoven connections
that span in some instances centuries? My snap reaction: whoever said
war was always the most logical of choices? Indeed, despite countless
areas of mutual interest, relations between Beijing and Washington
are clearly on the decline. Some of this is easily explainedboth sides
during the Cold War feared the Soviet Union more than each other
and worked together to contain Moscow. Losing a common enemy

was certainly going to create a challenge. However, with what can only
be described as a ring of tensions running from the East China Sea all
the way to the very ends of the South China Sea, from allegations of
cyber espionage on both sides to comments from high-level military
officials that seem more menacing by the day, it seems a clash of
some sorts is increasingly possible.

US China relations conflict not inevitable

Conflict not inevitable multiple areas for cooperation or
conflict
Glaser, Senior Adviser for Asia, Freeman Chair in China Studies,
Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2014 (Bonnie S. "USCHINA RELATIONS Managing Differences Remains an Urgent Challenge."
Southeast Asian Affairs (2014): 76-82. DDI TM)
Conflict
between the US and China is not inevitable. In agreeing to establish a new
type of major power relationship, Presidents Obama and Xi Jinping have
prioritized the need to manage differences and avoid confrontation and
conflict. Both leaders are focused on reinvigorating their economies and addressing other pressing domestic
challenges, and hope to avoid bilateral strains where possible.Nevertheless, it remains possible that
the US and China will be unable to sustain an amicable relationship. In this regard,
there are three broad categories that deserve discussion: (1) tensions could increase over political
and economic issues; (2) a military conflict could occur either as a result of
escalation of an inadvertent incident or deliberate action; and (3) a Cold Warlike strategic competition could emerge over time as a consequence of
increasing mistrust and diverging interests.
US-China relations are a complicated mix of positive and negative elements, competition and cooperation.

Now key time for improved understanding in relationship

to ensure cooperative rather than conflictual relationship
Freeman III, Senior Fellow with the Brookings Institution and a
Senior Advisor to the Center for Strategic and International Studies,
2015 (Charles, U.S.-CHINA RELATIONS: CHALLENGES FOR THE 114TH
CONGRESS, The National Bureau of Asian Research, March 2015,
http://www.nbr.org/DOWNLOADS/PDFS/OUTREACH/NBR_BRIEFINGSERIES_PRIO
RITIESFORTHE114THCONGRESS_030315.PDF#page=18, DDI TM)
For decades, policymakers have struggled to define the U.S. relationship with
China. Are we partners? Strategic partners? Strategic competitors? Is it,
to quote Chinese president Xi Jinping, a new kind of big power relationship?
Or, as President George W. Bush noted toward the end of his administration,
is the relationship best described simply as complex? The consensus
among most U.S. China watchers in 2015 is that the United States and China
are competitors. There is far less consensus, however, on what exactly the two countries are competing for.
China is not a geostrategic rival like the former Soviet Union. Nor is China
absolutely hostile to U.S. policy in the Asia-Pacific. Indeed, far from sowing
open competition, U.S. engagement with China since the 1970s has sought to
bring China into the ambit of U.S.-led global institutions and encourage
Chinese support for a U.S. vision of global governance. That policy has yielded remarkable
dividends: China has gone from being an isolated, poor country that was openly hostile to the United States and its vision

To many policymakers in
Washington, U.S. engagement has perhaps been too successful. Few
of the global order to become one of the primary stakeholders in that order.

would have imagined that the economic backwater that was China in the 1970s might become the worlds biggest
economy less than 50 years later.

The miracle of Chinas success thus has spawned

an active effort in Washington to hedge against the possibility that

China uses its newfound clout to undermine and destabilize the U.S.led regional and global order in ways that lead to direct conflict. Such
hedging has yielded a two-headed policy approach that seeks to draw China diplomatically and economically closer while
preparing for a disastrous military contingency. Viewed through this bifurcated policy prism, Beijings actions can

For all that the

U.S. policy community thinks it knows about the role China desires for itself
on the global stage, it really is not sure. Why is China expanding its blue
water navy, if not to challenge U.S. primacy on the high seas? Why did Beijing
unveil an air defense identification zone in the East China Sea, if not to deny
the ability of the United States and its allies to access and control Chinas
periphery? Why would Beijing engage in a charm offensive in other Asian
capitals, if not to compete with Washington for their hearts, minds, and
economic interests? Why would Beijing seek to create development
institutions like an Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank that are separate
and distinct from those established under the Bretton Woods architecture, if
not to challenge the normative global leadership of the United States? Beijing
simultaneously confound and confirm U.S. assumptions and suspicions of Chinese intentions.

sees similar ambiguity in U.S. intentions. True, constructive engagement with the United States has been a key enabler of

But U.S. activities on Chinas peripherythe maintenance of

northeast Asian alliances, military assistance to Taiwan, the strengthening of
relationships with previously unfriendly countries in southeast Asia, and the
warming of relations with that other Asian giant to the south, Indiasmack to
many in Chinese policy circles of a Cold Warstyle containment policy. Moreover,
Chinas rise.

the Obama administrations rebalance to Asia, although articulated in terms that are at best neutral to Chinas
emergence, is frequently couched in the language of managing Chinas rise, which is not, on its face, reassuring to Beijing

The lack of clear understanding and trust between the two

countries has hastened a drift toward a self-fulfilling prophecy of strategic
rivalry, even as the economic and geopolitical stakes in U.S.-China
cooperation become more deeply rooted and fundamental. The relationship is
no longer as asymmetric as it was when the basic framework of U.S. policy
toward China was formed, and the corresponding levers the United States
could pull to channel Beijings behavior are no longer as available or
effective. Yet the need to solve problems in the relationship has never been
more important, even as the United States faces a domestic political divide
and grim fiscal realities affecting its ability to manage multiple global crises
and China stands at an economic (and possibly political) crossroads in its own
domestic development.
about U.S. intentions.

US economy linked with Chinas China will move away

from conflict
Nosselt 15
(Nele Nosselt, Chinas Foreign Strategy After the 18th Party Congress:
Business as Usual? Journal of Chinese Political Science March 2015, Volume
20, Issue 1, pp 1733 Ebsco DDI TM)
As the focus of the reforms rests on (sustainable) economic growth and ascribes a
central role to the market and the private sector, it is more than self-evident
that the restructuring of the economy at home will somehow impact

on Chinas global business activities. Due to Chinas growing economic powerit is

now the worlds second largest economy (expected to surpass the US in the very
next years) and already has become the number one creditor of the USand its going
globalstrategy the linkages and interdependencies between the national and the international dimension

In order to secure its

national core interestseconomic growth and socio-political stability
China needs a stable regional and global environment. In this vein,
the actions undertaken by Chinas new leaders could be expected to
focus on power consolidation at home and conflict resolution abroad.
of Chinas policy formulation and implementation have increased.

Conflict inevitable China rise

collapse of relations and war with china is inevitable due
to power shift- empirics prove
Graham 2015
Graham Allison, an American political scientist and professor at the John F. Kennedy School
of Government at Harvard. xx-xx-xxxx, "The Thucydides Trap: Are the U.S. and
China Headed for War?," Atlantic, (DDI AGH)
whether China and the
United States can escape Thucydidess Trap. The Greek historians metaphor
reminds us of the attendant dangers when a rising power rivals a ruling
poweras Athens challenged Sparta in ancient Greece, or as
Germany did Britain a century ago. Most such contests have ended badly, often for both
The defining question about global order for this generation is

nations, a team of mine at the Harvard Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs has concluded
after analyzing the historical record.

In 12 of 16 cases over the past 500 years,

the result was war. When the parties avoided war, it required huge,
painful adjustments in attitudes and actions on the part not just of
the challenger but also the challenged. Based on the current trajectory, war
between the United States and China in the decades ahead is not
just possible, but much more likely than recognized at the moment .
Indeed, judging by the historical record, war is more likely than not. Moreover, current
underestimations and misapprehensions of the hazards inherent in the U.S.-China relationship contribute
greatly to those hazards. A risk associated with Thucydidess Trap is that business as usualnot just an
unexpected, extraordinary eventcan trigger large-scale conflict. When a rising power is threatening to
displace a ruling power, standard crises that would otherwise be contained, like the assassination of an
archduke in 1914, can initiate a cascade of reactions that, in turn, produce outcomes none of the parties
would otherwise have chosen. War, however, is not inevitable. Four of the 16 cases in our review did not
end in bloodshed. Those successes, as well as the failures, offer pertinent lessons for todays world
leaders. Escaping the Trap requires tremendous effort. As Xi Jinping himself said during a visit to Seattle on
Tuesday, There is no such thing as the so-called Thucydides Trap in the world. But should major countries
time and again make the mistakes of strategic miscalculation, they might create such traps for
themselves. More than 2,400 years ago, the Athenian historian Thucydides offered a powerful insight:

It was the rise of Athens, and the fear that this inspired in Sparta,
that made war inevitable. Others identified an array of contributing causes of the
Peloponnesian War. But Thucydides went to the heart of the matter,
focusing on the inexorable, structural stress caused by a rapid shift
in the balance of power between two rivals. Note that Thucydides identified two
key drivers of this dynamic: the rising powers growing entitlement, sense of its importance, and demand
for greater say and sway, on the one hand, and the fear, insecurity, and determination to defend the
status quo this engenders in the established power, on the other. In the case about which he wrote in the
fifth century B.C., Athens had emerged over a half century as a steeple of civilization, yielding advances in
philosophy, history, drama, architecture, democracy, and naval prowess. This shocked Sparta, which for a
century had been the leading land power on the Peloponnese peninsula. As Thucydides saw it, Athenss
position was understandable. As its clout grew, so too did its self-confidence, its consciousness of past
injustices, its sensitivity to instances of disrespect, and its insistence that previous arrangements be
revised to reflect new realities of power. It was also natural, Thucydides explained, that Sparta interpreted
the Athenian posture as unreasonable, ungrateful, and threatening to the system it had establishedand

War between the U.S. and China is more

likely than recognized at the moment. Indeed, judging by the
historical record, war is more likely than not. Thucydides chronicled objective
within which Athens had flourished.

changes in relative power, but he also focused on perceptions of change among the leaders of Athens and
Spartaand how this led each to strengthen alliances with other states in the hopes of counterbalancing

the other. But entanglement runs both ways. (It was for this reason that George Washington famously
cautioned America to beware of entangling alliances.) When conflict broke out between the second-tier
city-states of Corinth and Corcyra (now Corfu), Sparta felt it necessary to come to Corinths defense, which
left Athens little choice but to back its ally. The Peloponnesian War followed. When it ended 30 years later,
Sparta was the nominal victor. But both states lay in ruin, leaving Greece vulnerable to the Persians. Eight
years before the outbreak of world war in Europe, Britains King Edward VII asked his prime minister why
the British government was becoming so unfriendly to his nephew Kaiser Wilhelm IIs Germany, rather than
keeping its eye on America, which he saw as the greater challenge. The prime minister instructed the
Foreign Offices chief Germany watcher, Eyre Crowe, to write a memo answering the kings question.
Crowe delivered his memorandum on New Years Day, 1907. The document is a gem in the annals of
diplomacy. The logic of Crowes analysis echoed Thucydidess insight. And his central question, as
paraphrased by Henry Kissinger in On China, was the following: Did increasing hostility between Britain
and Germany stem more from German capabilities or German conduct? Crowe put it a bit differently: Did
Germanys pursuit of political hegemony and maritime ascendancy pose an existential threat to the
independence of her neighbours and ultimately the existence of England? The British Grand Fleet on its
way to meet the Imperial German Navys fleet for the Battle of Jutland in 1916 (AP) Crowes answer was
unambiguous: Capability was key. As Germanys economy surpassed Britains, Germany would not only
develop the strongest army on the continent. It would soon also build as powerful a navy as she can
afford. In other words, Kissinger writes, once Germany achieved naval supremacy this in itself
regardless of German intentionswould be an objective threat to Britain, and incompatible with the
existence of the British Empire. Three years after reading that memo, Edward VII died. Attendees at his
funeral included two chief mournersEdwards successor, George V, and Germanys Kaiser Wilhelm
along with Theodore Roosevelt representing the United States. At one point, Roosevelt (an avid student of
naval power and leading champion of the buildup of the U.S. Navy) asked Wilhelm whether he would
consider a moratorium in the German-British naval arms race. The kaiser replied that Germany was
unalterably committed to having a powerful navy. But as he went on to explain, war between Germany and
Britain was simply unthinkable, because I was brought up in England, very largely; I feel myself partly an
Englishman. Next to Germany I care more for England than for any other country. And then with

unimaginable conflict seems, however

catastrophic the potential consequences for all actors, however deep
the cultural empathy among leaders, even blood relatives, and
however economically interdependent states may benone of these
factors is sufficient to prevent war, in 1914 or today. In fact, in 12 of 16
cases over the last 500 years in which there was a rapid shift in the
relative power of a rising nation that threatened to displace a ruling
state, the result was war. As the table below suggests, the struggle for mastery in Europe
emphasis: I ADORE ENGLAND! However

and Asia over the past half millennium offers a succession of variations on a common storyline.

Relations resilient [wont

collapse]

Resilient laundry list

US China interests ensure resilient relations even if have
healthy competition
Russel 14

Daniel R. Russel, Assistant Secretary, Bureau of East Asian and Pacific

Affairs 6-25-2014, "The Future of U.S.-China Relations," Testimony
Before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, (DDI AGH)
This year marks the 35th anniversary of the establishment of
official diplomatic relations between the United States and China. We have
made remarkable progress since the era of back-channel messaging and
secret trips. The scope of todays U.S.-China relationship was unimaginable when President Nixon made his historic
visit in 1972 to China.Yet there is still enormous potential for progress in the U.S.China relationship. Progress that will yield benefits to the citizens of both
countries, our neighbors, and the world. To realize this progress and these
benefits, we seek to ensure that the relationship is not defined by strategic
rivalry, but by fair and healthy competition, by practical cooperation on priority issues, and by
constructive management of our differences and disagreements. Where interests overlap, we will
seek to expand cooperation with China. These areas include economic
prosperity, a denuclearized Korean Peninsula, peaceful resolution of the
Iranian nuclear issue, and a reduction in the emission of greenhouse gases.
Overall Bilateral Relations

Where they diverge and we have significant and well-known areas of disagreement we will work to ensure that our

Mr. Chairman, there are those who argue that cold

war-like rivalry is inevitable and that the United States and China are
condemned to a zero-sum struggle for supremacy, if not conflict. I reject such
mechanistic thinking. As anyone who has served in government can tell you, this deterministic analysis
differences are constructively managed.

overlooks the role of leaders who have the ability to set policy and to shape relationships. It gives short shrift to the fact
that our two economies are becoming increasingly intertwined, which increases each sides stake in the success of the
other.

It undervalues the fact that leaders in Washington and Beijing are fully
cognizant of the risk of unintended strategic rivalry between an emerging
power and an established power and have agreed to take deliberate actions
to prevent such an outcome. And it ignores the reality of the past 35 years
that, in spite of our differences, U.S.-China relations have steadily grown
deeper and stronger and in doing so, we have built a very resilient
relationship. We view Chinas economic growth as complementary to the
regions prosperity, and Chinas expanded role in the region can be
complementary to the sustained U.S. strategic engagement in the AsiaPacific. We and our partners in the region want Chinas rise to contribute to
the stability and continued development of the region. As President Obama and Secretary
Kerry have made very clear, we do not seek to contain China; to the contrary, we welcome the emergence of a stable,

We believe all countries, and particularly emerging

powers like China, should recognize the self-benefit of upholding basic rules
and norms on which the international system is built; these are rules and
norms which China has participated in formulating and shaping, and they are
rules and norms that it continues to benefit from. In this context, we are
encouraging China to exercise restraint in dealing with its neighbors and
peaceful, and prosperous China.

show respect for universal values and international law both at home and
abroad.

Resilient economic interdependence

US China relations resilient economic interdependence
ensures cooperation and alliance
The Diplomat, 2014 (China and the US: Destined to Cooperate?
Geography, economics, and energy will all push America and China closer
together, 6/24 http://thediplomat.com/2014/06/china-and-the-us-destined-tocooperate/ accessed on 7/14/2016; DDI - AH)
The 21st century will be defined by the relationship between the
American superpower and rising China. A new Cold War would threaten the world order
while a mutually beneficial association could bring all prosperity. The latter scenario is more likely. The
geography, economies, and energy resources of the U.S and China
align their core interests. First, geography. The U.S. is located on the most resource and capitalrich continent, North America. The American Midwest consists of valuable arable land and is bisected by the worlds
largest navigable rivers, allowing the export of food and products at bargain prices. Nearby nations have either historically
been on friendly terms (Canada) or lack the ability to present a threat (Central America and the Caribbean) without an
external sponsor. This benign environment has allowed America to focus on projecting power and dominating global
merchant marine traffic. Since China lies across an ocean dominated by the American Navy, neither directly threatens the
other. China, meanwhile, is a populous and vast land power with a long coastline. Yet Chinas focus has historically
turned inward, with only sporadic efforts to build a naval presence. Chinas heartland is exposed to Russia from the north,
Japan to the east, various fractious states to the west, and the rising powers of Thailand, India, and Vietnam to the south.
In other words, China is surrounded, and its biggest threats are from other land-based powers, particularly Russia and

China therefore cannot afford to antagonize America, since it

would require American support or tacit neutrality in any conflict
with Russia or India. Geography ensures that China does not see American naval dominance on its shores
as a comparable threat. A Chinese move against American interests would
open it to aggression from its neighbors while simultaneously
cutting off a needed ally. No Chinese government is foolish enough
to risk multiple high-intensity wars. The geography of China and the U.S. dictate their core
India.

interests as mutually non-threatening states, and make cooperation more likely since both have an interest in opposing

the American and Chinese economies are destined to

become more interdependent, and integrated economies usually
lead to geostrategic alliances. The U.S. follows a laissez-faire
economic model, entailing a boom-and-bust cycle that is harsher
than in more planned systems. When the free market dictates economic apportionment, at the
Russia. Secondly,

height of the cycle resources are often applied to unwise projects. During recessions, companies either downsize or go out
of business, resulting in short spurts of high unemployment. America tolerates these fluctuations because she long ago
decided to trade economic stability for higher long term growth. This has succeeded over the past century. This growth,
combined with other advantages, ensures the U.S. will endure as a superpower. America utilizes its advantages to
maintain a global maritime trade order in the form of organizations like the World Bank, International Monetary Fund,
and World Trade Organization, resulting in economic growth for the world and a successful consumption-based economy
at home.

Contrastingly, Chinas economy is a sort of state capitalism

distinct from the European state champion model. The economy is
based around exporting finished manufactured goods to America,
further integrating both economies. Chinas two-decade-plus surge
in economic growth will soon end, yet given the lack of progress in
transitioning to a more consumption-based economy, China has not achieved
what its large population considers an equitable distribution of resources and benefits. Such imbalances foster domestic
tensions. The growth constraints facing Chinas economy will only create additional problems with fewer new resources at
Beijings disposal. The Chinese slowdown has already led to political infighting, and this is likely to continue in the future.
Addressing this problem while transitioning to a consumption-based economy may reduce the ability of the ruling

Economically, America is
strong in areas like food production, education, technology, and
Communist Party to project power abroad while retaining it at home.

precision industrial manufacturing. China, by contrast, is strong in

areas like heavy industry, light manufacturing, and cheap labor. This
presents a recipe for complementary economic interdependence .
Finally, both countries will move closer geopolitically due to their complementary energy interests. Most of Chinas foreign
policy centers on attempts to acquire new energy resources, particularly oil. Over the following decades, China will seek to
become more self-sufficient by expanding its hydropower capacity and coal plants. America shares this goal, and with the
shale revolution will likely end up exporting energy to China, including oil and liquid natural gas. This gives America a
geopolitical lever over China by increasing economic interdependence. The American situation on energy resources,
particularly oil and natural gas, outclasses Chinas. Oil is non-renewable, and OPEC nations will likely be unable to meet
Chinas growing demand. However, America now controls the worlds largest untapped oil reserve, the Green River
Formation. This formation alone contains up to 3 trillion barrels of untapped oil-shale, roughly half of which may be
recoverable. This single geologic formation could contain more oil than the rest of the worlds proven reserves combined.
As Chinese demand rises, Beijing will likely become the top importer of this oil. No other oil source can supply Chinas
needs as efficiently. Eastern European and Russian oil shale reserves are smaller and less politically and economically
extractable than Americas emerging sources. If America invests a comparatively small portion of its new energy-based
wealth into a larger Navy to secure a Pacific trade route to China, the economic integration of the two nations will be
virtually irreversible. Already foreign investments are pouring into the new Middle East of America and Canada, despite
strong opposition from the current administration. American control over future markets for natural gas is almost as
certain as for oil. The U.S. produces natural gas abundantly and is building the facilities to export it to foreign markets,
including China. China imports roughly 56 percent of its oil and this number grows each year. Beijing plans to increase
reserves by acquiring new offshore resources and secure reserves abroad. Since between 60-70 percent of its imported
oil originates in Africa or the Middle East, the only way to inexpensively transport it is by sea. This makes China vulnerable
to economic warfare from India, which can sever much of its supply at will. This is a strategic concern and makes war with
India more likely. China doesnt have many other domestic energy options with the exception of coal, which carries high
health and environmental risks. Renewable energy is too expensive, hydraulic power creates instability in rural areas, and
social biases prohibit nuclear power. For technical reasons, Chinas untapped oil shale reserves, though large, would be
prohibitively expensive to process. They are estimated to be economically recoverable at $345 a barrel, more than triple
the price of American oil shale. An American boom in natural gas cannot fully bail out China; nonetheless it will certainly
be part of the solution. Domestic political pressures, environmental concerns and rising demand for portable fuels mean
the crux of Chinese foreign policy for the foreseeable future will be aimed at acquiring new oil supplies and protecting
existing supply lines across the Indian Ocean. The South China Sea is critical to Chinas goals because most imported oil
from Africa must cross it and the sea contains its own marginal reserves close to China. Inadequate naval forces
guarantee China will continue to depend upon the American Navy to protect its oil trade. The dispute surrounding the
Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands does not change that. In any case, heightened regional competition for energy assets will diminish
as American reserves come online over the next five to ten years. In the energy sector, America will ultimately transition

This will further

connect their economies and build strong economic ties. Both China
and America hope for a mutually beneficial arrangement to meet
their security and development goals. Geographic, economic, and
energy considerations ensure these two nations will become more
interdependent throughout this century.
to an energy and fuel exporter and China will ultimately import American resources.

China and the US shared interested in multilateral

economic institutions means good relations
Johnson 15,
Christopher K. Johnson, Senior Advisor and Freeman Chair in
China Studies Center for Strategic and International Studies
(CSIS), Statement before the Senate Foreign Relations
Subcommittee on East Asia, the Pacific, and International
Cybersecurity Policy THE CHANGING LANDSCAPE OF U.S.-CHINA
RELATIONS: WHAT NEXT? , Center for Strategic and International
Studies (CSIS), September 29, 2015 DDI -AG
President Xis visit also witnessed some progress in the bilateral
economic relationship. One key commitment was both sides
acknowledgement that they have a shared interest in promoting a
stable global economy supported by the multilateral economic

institutions founded at the end of World War II that have benefited the people of both nations. This
recognition is a helpful step toward addressing some of the concerns
that China seeks either to undermine those institutions or to short
circuit their effectiveness through the development of parallel
institutions such as the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB).
As with the cybersecurity agreement, however, it remains to be seen whether Chinas actions will match its words.
Commitments from the U.S. side to implement the 2010 IMF quota and governance reforms as soon as possible and to

the IMFs SDR

basket of reserve currencies presumably will serve as positive
inducements to China to remain committed to working within these
established global financial structures.
endorse, with the appropriate caveats, the inclusion of the Chinese currency, the renminbi, in

Resilient regional security concerns

No evidence for US China war and conflict likely authors
misread US interests in region
Summers 16 (Tim, Chatham House, International Affairs, 92:3; DDI-NB)
As the editor, David Denoon, notes at the start of China, the United States,
and the future of central Asia, there is a vast literature on USChina
relations. This book adds to it, but by focusing on an aspect less discussed
in the field, that of central Asia. Plenty has been written on China and central
Asia (see e.g. my review of Marlene Laruelle and Sebastien Peyrouse, The
Chinese question in central Asia, Routledge, 2012; reviewed in International
Affairs 89: 4), and the US and Russia are oft-cited factors in this literature, but
setting out to tackle the USChina dynamic directly is useful. Another
strength of the book is that it brings into the picture other states on the
periphery of central Asia which get less attention than the US, China and
Russia, namely India, Pakistan, Iran and Turkey. It also provides a useful
overview of Japanese and Korean economic interests in the region (Edward
Lincoln, chapter nine). Excellent early chapters by Nazgul Jenish and
Marlene Laruelle review, respectively, the economic and foreign
policy dynamics among the central Asian states. The result is a
comprehensive coverage of a series of state perspectives. These are
generally good chapters, and will be useful reference material on issues such
as European approaches to central Asia (Sebastien Peyrouse, chapter eight),
regional organiza-tions and the state of integration in central Asia (Richard
Pomfret, chapter twelve), or the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (Pan
Guang, chapter 13). The only chapter which does not quite fulfil the books
focus on central Asia is the one on Turkey, which is more of a broad overview
of Turkish foreign policy ( Joshua Walker, chapter eleven).However, the books
format somehow reduces the scope for analytical engagement between these
various perspectives. Indeed, the book at times feels like a series of
background papers written from different national perspectives, useful for
policy-makers or for those looking for a background reference, but lacking indepth analysis or explanatory power. There are also too many
unproblematized statements along the lines of Russia is ... or the US
wants ..., as if policy positions are clear or uncontested. And nontraditional security challengesfrom extremism to narcoticsand
differing concepts of security, mentioned by many of the authors,
could have been explored systematically somewhere in the volume.
This was an up-to-date volume when it went to press. Since then, the
Chinese proposal to build a silk road economic belt across Eurasia
(as well as a maritime silk roadthe belt and road initiative or one
belt, one road) has dominated much analysis of the region. The silk
road economic belt is mentioned briefly three times, twice by Chinese
authors as it happens (Kuchins and Sharan, p. 114; Xing Guangcheng, p. 159;
and Pan Guang, p. 356), but it is interesting to note that none of the writers
predicted the weight which has since been given to what has been described

as Chinese President Xi Jinpings signature foreign policy initiative. Most

notable, perhaps, is what the book saysor doesnt sayabout the role of
the US in central Asia. Although this should be at the centre of the books
analysis, many chapters either deal with it in passing or end up
demonstrating the rather one-dimensional nature of US interests in
the region, focused on the aftermath of its intervention in Afghanistan.
Several authors raise the question of the prognosis for the region after US
drawdown from Afghanistan, but there is not much in the way of answers or
even pointers to be found in the volume beyond uncertainty ahead. What
Denoon does conclude, though, is that there is little scope for conflict
between a fatigued US and a rising China in central Asia; if
anything, it is Russia, not China, which is a strategic competitor to
the US in the region.

Resilient no interest in conflict/No impact no

escalation of conflicts
US China relations peaceful defensive realism relieves
pressures in the international system
Glaser, 2015 (Charles L., Professor in the Elliott School of International
Affairs and the Department of Political
Science at George Washington University, International Security, Spring 2015,
google scholar UT, pg 40-90 DDI TM)
U.S. beliefs about Chinas motives and vice versa further favor
Chinas peaceful rise. If the United States believes that China is
likely driven by concern for its own security, then the United States
may be willing to pursue cooperative policies that communicate its
own benign motives. In contrast, if the United States believes that China is a greedy state that values
changing the status quo for nonsecurity reasons, then the United States should pursue more competitive policies, which

The fact that U.S.- China relations are much

better than U.S.-Soviet relations were during the Cold War bodes
well for Chinas rise. The strains that have grown in the U.S.-China relationship over the past decade,
will strain U.S.-China relations.

however, reduce the prospects for avoiding a negative political spiral and increase the probability of war. In short,

international conditions should enable both the United States and

China to be highly secure; they greatly moderate the security
dilemma, which reduces the competitive pressures generated by
the international system. Although Northeast Asia is not fully primed for peace,7 defensive
realism is relatively optimistic about the prospects for Chinas
peaceful rise. In contrast, other well-established strands of structural realist theory provide a far more
pessimistic assessment of the future of U.S-China relations.8 Standard structural realism, focusing only on power, argues
that Chinas military buildup is designed to overwhelm U.S. military advantages in Northeast Asia. The overall result will
be intense Sino-American competition that resembles the Cold War; nuclear weapons will keep the peace, but competition
and insecurity will be the defining features of the relationship.9 Offensive realism envisions a still more competitive
outcome. China, acting in accordance with the theorys call for states to maximize their power, will attempt to become
the hegemonic power in Northeast Asia.10 Achieving regional hegemony will require China to build military forces
capable of defeating its neighbors and pushing the United States out of the region. Threatened by Chinese pursuit of
regional hegemony, the United States will compete intensely to maintain its position in Northeast Asia, leaving both

Grounding my analysis in
defensive realism and its more general rational variant therefore
has significant implications for U.S. policy. Because defensive
realism finds that the pressures generated by international structure
will allow China to rise peacefully, regional issues that could derail
this promising trajectory become more important.
states less secure and major power war a not unlikely outcome.11

China will not confront the U.S- 3 reasons

Nguyen 2016
Hang Thuy Thi Nguyen,( School of Global, Urban and Social Studies, The
Royal Melbourne Institute of Technology (RMIT University)),Robert G.
Sutter.The United States and Asia: Regional Dynamics and Twenty First
Century Relations., European journal of American studies Reviews 2016-1, 19
May 2016. DDI -AG

Sutter goes on to explore U.S. relations with the important nations and subregions in Asia. The very first nation that he

the first
twenty-five years of the post-Cold War period saw Chinas tougher
approach to secure its interests in the Asia-Pacific which has been
manifested in Chinese assertiveness and expansion over maritime
territorial and other disputes involving the United States Asian
allies. Apart from illustrating the economic, political and strategic drivers of the United States undertaking leadership
responsibility in the Asia-Pacific, Sutter points out three set of strong restrains on Chinas
tough measures in foreign affairs related to the United States:
Domestic preoccupations, strong interdependence, and Chinas
insecure position in the Asia-Pacific. This means that China is
strongly constrained in the region, and not in a position to seriously
confront and challenge the United States.
touches on in his examination of the United States and Asia is necessarily China. According to Sutter,

Chinese assertiveness does not confront American

leadership in the region
Nguyen 2016
Hang Thuy Thi Nguyen,( School of Global, Urban and Social Studies, The
Royal Melbourne Institute of Technology (RMIT University)),Robert G.
Sutter.The United States and Asia: Regional Dynamics and Twenty First
Century Relations., European journal of American studies Reviews 2016-1, 19
May 2016. DDI -AG
Looking ahead, Sutter stresses that a serious

problem for effective US policy and

relations in the Asia-Pacific involves American sustainabili ty and
will (297). It is in American interest to develop closer relations with
this ever more important part of the world. Chinese assertiveness in
the region is a problem for the United States but does not (at least not yet) fundamentally
challenge and confront continued American leadership in this region.
Sutter points out that: Beijings obnoxious and coercive behaviour
has the effect of opening even wider the doors of opportunity for
American advancement in relations with most regional governments
(315) and suggests that U.S. policy makers should pursue the wide range of
U.S. interests in the region within the framework of the Obama administrations rebalance policy and
ideally they should quietly demonstrate U.S willingness and ability to
pursue those interests to avoid serious confrontations with China.

China has no interest in pursuing global power projection

with its navy
Xin 12 (Qiang, Professor and Deputy Director of the Center for American
Studies @ Fudan University, Cooperation Opportunity or Confrontation
Catalyst? The implication of Chinas naval development for ChinaUS
relations, Journal of Contemporary China, pg. 606-607)
Within the overarching national defensive strategy, the PLAN underwent a strategic transition from inshore/coastal

The strategic goal of the PLAN since its

birth, as summed up by Admirals Liu Huaqing and Shi Yunsheng, two ex-commanders of the PLAN, has been
defense in the 1950s to offshore defense in the 1980s.

keeping the enemy within limits and resisting any invasion .12 Even though in the past
few decades the PLAN has achieved major developments in its capabilities, the PLANs primary focus
remains on missions for near-sea operations: to resist seaborne aggression,
protect national sovereignty, and safeguard maritime rights and interests .13 In
line with the defensive strategy, General Liang Guanglie, Chinese Defense Minister, clearly stated that the goals of
ongoing navy modernization will be limited to a strong coastal defense and certain measures for blue water combat.14
Driven by its aim to boost the ability to fight in regional sea wars under the circumstance of information technology as

the PLAN will not pursue sea control,

let alone command of the sea as pursued by the US navy, as some Western
strategists have warned.15 Some Chinese strategists have even stressed
openly that, although the PLAN has improved its capabilities from coastal
defense to offshore defense, it would not build a navy for global power
projection and engagement like the US navy. 16
declared by Navy Commander Admiral Wu Shengli in April 2009,

china policies focus on peaceful ascent no conflict

Nosselt 15
(Nele Nosselt, Chinas Foreign Strategy After the 18th Party Congress:
Business as Usual? Journal of Chinese Political Science March 2015, Volume
20, Issue 1, pp 1733 Ebsco DDI TM)
What has become obvious from the first few statements made on
foreign affairs by the countrys new leaders is a reconfirmation of
Chinas core interestsnational sover-eignty, territorial integrity,
domestic developmentand the staking of the claim to having a
greater say, on the basis of Chinas own worldview and principles,
ininternational politics. The global financial crisis has opened a
window of opportunity for China to accelerate its rise to new global
power status; it will be one of the new leadership generations tasks to define how China will deal with its
increased capacities and to determine what role the country will play in the international arena over the course of the next

business interests and stable economic

growth remain at the top of the partys agenda. Given the Chinese party-states
prioritization of stability and continuity, a major reshuffling of its foreign strategy
priorities is rather unlikely to occur. If at all, these changes have already been prepared by
decade. In any case, as this article evidences,

past generations of political leaders. The two new catchphrases that have come to the fore in the foreign policy of the Xi-

Chinas revised
rhetoric positioning in international affairs. The countrys new leaders hope to play a major role
in the joint reconstruction of a post-crisis world order, one that is no
longer based on the principles of a unipolar system but that reflects the interests
of the worlds new rising powers. This, however, does not represent a major deviation
from Chinas general foreign policy principles, but stands in line with
Chinasoldstrategy of a peaceful re-ascent.
Li-administrationtheChinese dreamand thenew type of great power relationsillustrate

Resilient strategic incentives

There may have been past confrontations, but China has
embraced coop with US now
Xin 12 (Qiang, Professor and Deputy Director of the Center for American
Studies @ Fudan University, Cooperation Opportunity or Confrontation
Catalyst? The implication of Chinas naval development for ChinaUS
relations, Journal of Contemporary China, Google Scholar UT DDI TM)
Undoubtedly, Chinas naval building effort, intended to protect its sovereignty interests, could trigger a conflict between

Mainland China has consistently expressed its anger and taken

countermeasures to US arms sales to Taiwan and the offshore spying of US
vessels and aircrafts. The unexpected escalation of the ChinaJapan Diaoyu Island disputes in 2009, and the
the US and China.

implicit declaration of the South China Sea as Chinas core national interest in 2010, ignited a new wave of suspicion

However, given the fact that

China needs a peaceful and stable environment for economic growth, that
China has accomplished peaceful resolution of almost all border disputes with
its contiguous neighbors without taking advantage of its economic and
military muscle, that China has refrained from using force for decades to deal
with island disputes in the East and South China Sea, and that China has
established comprehensive and profound relations with all of the relevant
countries, it is unlikely that China will turn from diplomatic and political
negotiations to coercion or military attack. Moreover, the challenges to
Chinas development interests will provide new dynamics and opportunities
for cooperation between the US navy and a PLAN with stronger and better
force-projection capabilities.
towards Chinas naval ambitions from the US and its regional partners.

leaders setting policy that intertwines US and China

creates resilient relations
Russel 14

Daniel R. Russel, Assistant Secretary, Bureau of East Asian and Pacific

Affairs 6-25-2014, "The Future of U.S.-China Relations," Testimony
Before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, (DDI AGH)
there are those who argue that cold war-like rivalry is
inevitable and that the United States and China are condemned to a
zero-sum struggle for supremacy, if not conflict. I reject such
mechanistic thinking. As anyone who has served in government can tell you, this
deterministic analysis overlooks the role of leaders who have the
ability to set policy and to shape relationships. It gives short shrift
to the fact that our two economies are becoming increasingly
intertwined, which increases each sides stake in the success of the other. It undervalues
the fact that leaders in Washington and Beijing are fully cognizant of
the risk of unintended strategic rivalry between an emerging power and an
established power and have agreed to take deliberate actions to prevent such an outcome. And it
ignores the reality of the past 35 years that, in spite of our
Mr. Chairman,

differences, U.S.-China relations have steadily grown deeper and

stronger and in doing so, we have built a very resilient relationship .

US China Conflict Inevitable/AT

they say Relations Resilient
[conflict inevitable top level alt
causes]

Economic competition = conflict

Economic interdependence does not deter conflict - US
China war likely because of power transition
Yuan, 2016 (JingDong, University of Sydney Associate Professor at the
Centre for International Security Studies (CISS), Averting USChina conflict in
the AsiaPacific, 6/20/2016, google scholar 7/13/2016; DDI AH)
How the United
States and China manage their relationship in the coming years will
affect whether peace, stability and prosperity will continue, or
whether their rivalry will lead to tension, conflict or even military
clashes between the two Great Powers. Despite their growing
economic interdependence and a multitude of official dialogues
between Beijing and Washington, bilateral ties have become
strained in recent years due to major differences over a range of
issues. According to power transition theory, a USChina
confrontation might seem inevitable. It is in this structural contexta period of power
The rise of China is transforming the geopolitical landscape of the AsiaPacific region.

transitionthat the question whether history will repeat itself becomes a serious concern for policy-makers and analysts

Comparing China to Wilhelmine Germany, against the backdrop of

the centenary of the First World War, is a growing cottage industry
and fills the pages of academic journals and think-tank reports. The next
alike.

Great War? addresses this important and contentious question: will Chinas rise challenge US predomi-nance and replicate
prewar European Great Power rivalry? This edited volume was produced under the auspices of the Belfer Center at
Harvard University and the contributors make a concerted effort to examine some of the factors leading to the first Great
War, from balance of power politics and alliances to regime types and domestic coalitions. Several themes emerge from
the book, some of them deeply worrying, while others will reassure readers that sanity will prevail more than a century
after the Great War.

As a number of authors show, alliance commitments; the

glorification of military prowess and war; the perceived advantage
and indeed the cult of offensive; greed and territorial conquest;
and the so-called little things on the eve of the First World War
helped propel European powers into conflict, the sheer destruction
and horror of which, with hind-sight, should have deterred leaders.
Furthermore, war ensued despite significant economic interdependence between major European powers such as Germany and
Britain.

Territorial disputes = conflict

Territorial disputes in the East and South China Seas
spillover and hurt US-China ties
Krishnan, 2016
(S. Krishnan, "The South China Sea: Assessing U.S. Policy and Options For the
Future", The Diplomatic Insight, Vol. 9 No. 1, LexisNexis, January 31, 2016,
DDI TM)
American policies have contributed mightily to enabling Asia to
become an engine of both global and American growth for the last 35 years. The
American security presence and associated actions have reduced the chances of large-scale conflict over this period,

Unfortunately, maritime territorial disputes in

the East China sea and the south China sea increasingly threaten
these critical U.s. interests. This regional situation is unfolding in the
larger context of the rise of China and its growing activism regarding
regional and global issues and institutions, including more
vigorously asserting its interests in the western Pacific. While expansion of
facilitating Asia's economic emergence.

China's interests and influence is normal and natural, it is inevitably unsettling to many Americans and Asians, particularly
when it involves employment of military and quasi-military assets. China's greater global activism also makes more salient
the reality that almost all of the core challenges of this era"such as terrorism, nuclear proliferation, cyber security,
opposition to trade and investment liberalization, climate change, and epidemics"are more manageable when the United
states and China can cooperate or act along parallel lines and far less tractable when the two countries see their interests

The growing U.s.-China distrust over both countries'

respective positions in the maritime territorial conflicts in the East
China Sea and the South China Sea risks creating an impact on
overall U.S.-China relations that can have consequences far beyond
the specific merits of the disputes themselves. Wrongly, Beijing is
convinced that the flare-up of disputes in the East China Sea and the
South China Sea reflects an underlying U.s. strategy to encourage
others, especially Japan, Vietnam, and the Philippines, to push the
envelope in the hopes the Chinese responses will lead those
countries" and ASEAN "to become more united and dependent on the
United states. At the same time, China's increasingly bullying
approach to its maritime territorial claims has increased the growing
ranks and influence of analysts who argue that China's "peaceful
rise" is a mirage and that intense competition, if not outright
conflict, between the United States and China will define the future .
as at cross purposes.

US-China relations will continue to spiral- inability to

resolve maritime security issues increases tensions and
prevents stabilization of relations
Gang, 2015
(An Gang interviewing Robert S. Ross, a professor of political science at
Boston College and an associate with the John King Fairbank Center for
Chinese Studies, Harvard University, Uncharted Waters, Beijing Review, July
30, 2015, DDI TM)

An Gang: After the conclusion of the seventh S&ED, do you still believe that the China-U.S. relations are undergoing a

The results of the S&ED reflect the

ongoing trend in U.S.-China relations. While there was considerable
progress toward cooperation on bilateral non-security issues and on
global cooperation, the United States maintained its firm resistance
to Chinese activities in the South China Sea. The ability of the United States and China
critical moment or downward spiral? Robert S. Ross:

to cooperate despite deteriorating security relations underscores the fundamental difference between U.S.-Soviet Cold

But security relations remain the

most important aspect of great power relations, and the
development of adversarial relations in East Asia is very worrisome .
War relations and contemporary U.S.-China relations.

As to the maritime security issue in China-U.S. relations, how do you evaluate its future development? Is it becoming a

The maritime security issue is the most

important issue in U.S.-China relations. It involves U.S. and Chinese
defense spending, weapons acquisition, alliance relations and the
risk of crisis dynamics. U.S.-China relations in the South China Sea
will be difficult to stabilize, and it will be even more difficult to
reverse the current trend and strengthen cooperative relations.
core issue of risk between our two countries?

Improved security relations will require an extended period of U.S. and Chinese restraint that will contribute to mutual
confidence in each other's strategic intentions.

Specific Alt Causes Erode

Relations/

Specific relations advantage links

ROC hurt relations arms sales

ROC biggest challenge in US-China relations arms sales
Freeman III, 2015 (Charles, Senior Fellow with the Brookings Institution and
a Senior Advisor to the Center for Strategic and International Studies, U.S.CHINA RELATIONS: CHALLENGES FOR THE 114TH CONGRESS, The National
Bureau of Asian Research, March 2015,
http://www.nbr.org/DOWNLOADS/PDFS/OUTREACH/NBR_BRIEFINGSERIES_PRIO
RITIESFORTHE114THCONGRESS_030315.PDF#page=18, DDI TM)
Taiwan The Occupy Central protests and their aftermath also have had an impact on attitudes in Taiwan regarding its long-

Beijing has long articulated a cross-strait policy that calls

for reunification of Taiwan with the Chinese mainland based on a version of
Hong Kongs one country, two systems model that would grant relative
political autonomy for Taiwan. The election restrictions handed down by Beijing for Hong Kong did little
for Beijings cause with the people of Taiwan. In spring 2016, Taiwan will hold presidential
elections that will largely be a referendum on the policies of President Ma
Ying-jeou, which have built closer economic ties between China and Taiwan.
If, as many analysts predict, the opposition Democratic Peoples Progressive
Party candidate is successful in defeating the candidate of the ruling
Kuomintang Party, that could signal a rechilling of relations between Beijing
and Taipei, and tensions in the region could spike. Taiwan has always
been the biggest challenge to U.S.-China relations. The United States is
obligated by the Taiwan Relations Act to provide Taiwan with the opportunity
to acquire arms to defend itself in the event of an attack from the mainland. If
the relationship between Beijing and Taiwan sours badly, U.S. arms sales to Taiwan will be closely
scrutinized for the degree to which they embolden those who advocate de
jure independence from Chinese rule. Congress will invariably be drawn into the debate on arms
term relationship with Beijing.

sales. It will be important for policymakers to understand and weigh in on what package of arms will contribute to stability
across the Taiwan Strait. There is an element of symbolism to exactly what weapons Taipei requests (and what it actually
purchases if those requests are approved). Getting the package right will take considerable technical and diplomatic skill.

Whatever the outcome of the Taiwan election in 2016, Congress should be at

the forefront of international efforts to support the continued impressive
evolution of democracy on this island of predominantly Chinese-origin
citizens. In particular, the long history of inter-parliamentary relations between Congress and the Legislative Yuan in
Taipei merits rekindling. More frequent exchanges between members of Congress and
their counterparts in Taiwan would be an important demonstration of the U.S.
commitment to democracy in a Chinese context.

China dislikes arms sales sanction discussion proves

Glaser, 2014 (Bonnie S. Senior Adviser for Asia, Freeman Chair in China
Studies, Center for Strategic and International Studies, "US-CHINA RELATIONS
Managing Differences Remains an Urgent Challenge." Southeast Asian Affairs
(2014): 76-82. ProQuest.
http://search.proquest.com/docview/1650876560/A406786705834EF3PQ/1?
accountid=36295, DDI TM)
US Arms Sales to TaiwanThe

US is likely to continue to sell weapons to Taiwan, and if it

sells an advanced weapons system - e.g. submarines or new fighter jets - Beijing could

conclude that it has to punish the US by imposing sanctions on American

companies, suspending military exchanges, and possibly taking punitive
political actions such as recalling China's ambassador to the United States .
Although in the past China's reactions to US arms sales to Taiwan have been
limited to curtailing military interactions, domestic pressure combined with
leadership and elite agreement that the time has come to impose costs on
the US for challenging China's sovereignty could result in a tougher response.

US-Taiwanese relations threaten stability of US-Sino

relations
Volkhonsky 11 (Boris, Head of the Asia Sector of the Asia and Middle East
Center, Russian Institute of Strategic Studies, Taiwan to ruin US-China
relations sales, The Voice of Russia, 9/14/11 accessed 7/14/16 at
http://sputniknews.com/voiceofrussia/2011/09/16/56271568.html; DDI- NB)
Obama has finally made a
decision on the long-pending issue of arms sales to Taiwan. According to
an unnamed official, the administration has approved the arms package worth $4.2 billion.
The package is likely to include upgrading F-16 A/B fighter aircraft,
but not the supply of 66 advanced F-16 C/D model aircraft requested
by Taiwan. The formal announcement of the volume and content of the arms package is expected
On Thursday, The Washington Times reported that President

shortly. Thus, the Presidents decision appears to be a dubious one on the one hand, it reflects the
administrations

determination to continue military cooperation with

Taiwan, while on the other hand, it is very cautious and meant not to
irritate China too much. In fact, the dubious nature of Obamas decision reflects even a much
greater number of contradictions both internationally and domestically. The issue of arms
sales to Taiwan has long been a stumbling block in U.S. China
relations. In 2008, China even cut off its exchanges with the Pentagon
after the U.S. announced an arms package. Lately, the administration has been
willing to show that it favors a thaw in bilateral relations, and President Obama has been showing his

direct military
confrontation between the two powers is out of question, since it
would be suicidal for both. But the dominant strategy in the postWorld War II period has been that of proxy wars rather than direct
confrontation. And in this context Taiwan plays an important role in the U.S. strategy in Asia
unwillingness to approve the new package for several months. Definitely, a

Pacific. But with the growing military might of mainland China, the disparity between it and the tiny island
which China considers part of its territory, is becoming more and more obvious. At present, Taiwan has
only 388 fighter aircraft compared to 1,680 of China. China, in its turn, would be an obvious loser in the

it possesses a tool that may be

even more ruinous than weaponry that is, the $3 trillion U.S. debts
it holds. Withdrawing even a small portion of it would be disastrous for the already debt-stricken U.S.
economy with unpredictable consequences for the rest of the world. Also, the issue of arms
sales to Taiwan has become an important one for the U.S. domestic
politics, and has especially aggravated in view of the approaching elections. There, the contradictions
case of a direct military confrontation with the U.S., but

lie along two axes one, between the administration and the Congress, another one, within the
administration between the Pentagon and the State Department. The Pentagon and the military insist that
increased arms sales to Taiwan would mean more jobs for Americans, and this view is ardently supported
by the majority of congressmen and senators. The State Department prefers not to spoil the relationship
with China, and earlier this week it became known that for the first time ever no State Department
representative would address the annual U.S. Taiwan industry conference on defense and security ties.

Apparently, the State Departments stance has a stronger influence on President Obama. The whole story
may also have an impact on Taiwanese presidential elections scheduled for January 2012. The present
Taiwanese president Ma Ying-jeou, elected in 2008, has based his policy towards mainland China on the
principles of bringing the two sides closer through commercial ties, and by doing this; he managed to bring
tensions between the two countries to their lowest level since 1949. His main opponent, Tsai Ing-wen has
adopted a more hawkish approach towards mainland China, and according to the Financial Times
newspaper, American officials have already expressed distinct doubts about whether she (Ms. Tsai) is both

The policy of wibblewobble in relations with China demonstrated by Barack Obama

throughout all two and a half years of his presidency is hardly
favorable for the hawkish Taiwanese presidential candidate. And even if she ultimately wins the
willing and able to continue the stability in cross-strait relations.

elections, it would make her task to stick to the policies much more complicated

SCS tensions hurt relations

SCS tensions rising now Rorschach test for US China
relations
Gady, 2016
(Franz-Stefan Gady, "China-US Strategic and Economic Dialogue: Time to
Move Beyond the South China Sea?", The Diplomat, June 08, 2016,
http://thediplomat.com/2016/06/china-us-strategic-and-economic-dialoguetime-to-move-beyond-the-south-china-sea/, DDI TM)
The South China Sea tensions have become the Rorschach Test for
China-U.S. relations: They appear to reveal the innate character and
intentions of both countries not just for the South China Sea, but
also their respective larger policy agendas for the region at least thats what
some analysts think. Based on remarks by officials from both China and the United States, territorial
disputes in the South China Sea were set to overshadow the eighth
round of the annually-held China-U.S. Strategic and Economic
Dialogue (S&ED) that took place from June 5th through June 7th in Beijing. At the dialogue, China intends to
pressure Washington over maritime issues () the United States increasing military presence in the South China Sea is
among Chinas major concerns, the state-run China Daily reported. China hopes the United States would honor its
commitment of not taking sides and fix its stand according to what is right or wrong, not according to allies, Chinese Vice
Foreign Minister Zheng Zeguang said last week ahead of the dialogue. Similarly, during the meeting the United States is
expected to show concerns with Chinese behavior in the South China Sea, and is likely to take issue with China on the
alleged militarization of the South China Sea, Daniel Russel, the U.S. State Departments Assistant Secretary for East
Asian and Pacific Affairs said during a press briefing on May 31st. U.S. Secretary of Defense Ashton Carter recently used a
harsher tone when he said that Chinese actions are contrary to international law and that China may soon find itself

Tensions in the South China Sea between the

two countries have indeed been on the rise of late. This May, two Chinese
fighter jets flew dangerously close to a U.S. EP-3 Aries signals
reconnaissance aircraft, an encounter the United States called a
dangerous intercept. This came days after the United States Navy
conducted its third freedom of navigation operation (FONOP) in the
South China Sea since China started building artificial land features
in the disputed Spratly Islands. The FONOP consisted of the guided-missile destroyer USS William
behind a Great Wall of self-isolation.

P. Lawrence sailing within 12 nautical miles of Fiery Cross Reef, on which China is constructing a 3,000 meter airstrip for

For the United States and its allies, China in the South
China Sea has been behaving contrary to customary international
law and the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). Indeed, China has engaged in
a continuous effort to create legal ambiguity over its territorial
claims in the South China Sea paired with so-called gray zone coercionthe use of China Coast Guard (CCG) and
military aircraft.

maritime militia vessels to establish facts on the ground in the surrounding water while avoiding open military conflict and
U.S. intervention.

SCS disputes undermine relations threat perception

Wyne 2015 (Ali, an associate of the Harvard Kennedy School of
Governments Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs and a junior
fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, where he
researched democratization and governance in China, Carnegie Endowment
for International Peace, June 3, 2015,
http://www.carnegiecouncil.org/publications/ethics_online/0106, DDI TM)

At the end of March 2015, the commander of the U.S. Pacific Fleet told an audience in Canberra that "China is creating a

He warned that the course it pursues in

addressing its maritime disputes "will be a key indicator of whether the [AsiaPacific] region is heading towards confrontation or cooperation." In an April 9
press conference, meanwhile, Chinese Foreign Ministry Spokeswoman Hua
Chunyin concededfor the first time, according to veteran China watcher
Bonnie Glaserthat at least some of China's land reclamation on Mischief
Reef serves military purposes. A week later, the French government released
satellite imagery showing that China is building a roughly 10,000-foot-long
runway on Fiery Cross Reef. China claims the United States is feigning concern
over China's maritime activities to isolate the mainland: observes a recent
Xinhua editorial, "deeper U.S. involvement in the South China Sea issue and
itsefforts to drive wedges between China and some Southeast Asian nations
are aimed at strengthening its military presence in the Asia-Pacific region."
Given these developments, it is natural to fear that a miscalculation at sea
could spiral into an armed confrontation between the United States and
China; some observers, such as the University of Pennsylvania's Avery Goldstein, have even ventured that such a clash
could involve nuclear weapons. To their credit, the two countries are taking steps to
preempt destabilizing contingencies. In November 2014, for example, the
U.S. Department of Defense and the Chinese Ministry of National Defense
signed a memorandum of understanding on "rules of behavior for safety of
air and maritime encounters" and another on "notification of major military
activities."
great wall of sand" in the South China Sea.

Chinas SCS aggression hurts US-China relations and

damages US global leadership
Advincula Jr. 2014 (Julian V., University of the Philippines Manila, Metro
Manila, Philippines, Chinas Leadership Transition and the Future of US-China
Relations: Insights from the Spratly Islands Case, 27 December 2014,
http://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11366-014-9327-x) DDI - JT
Chinas actions in the SCS, especially after Xi became Chinas top
leader, have clear ramifications for US-China relations. The recent
expansion of Chinas 9 dotted line/dash map into a 10 dotted
line/dash map is a solid proof that China is seriously claiming
almost all of SCS and aggressively asserting its territorial and
maritime interests. This move syncs with the NPCs guidelines that China
will not yield to outside pressure and will avoid sacrificing its core interests
[53]. Motivated in part by the negative historical experience of the Century of
National Humiliation, China refuses to tolerate what it perceives to be
bullying, intimidation and subjugation by other foreign powers [57].
Chinas contemporary emphasis on national sovereignty, security and core
interests, as pursued by the new Chinese leadership under Xi Jinping, is the
main reason why the PRC is insistent on using its 9/10 dotted
line/dash map and persistent in claiming all the disputed islands in
the SCS, particularly the Islands. Chinas dominance of the Islands (if
achieved) and/or the SCS may build up Chinas aggregate power, which ties

to a states population, economic resources, industrial capability, military

strength, and technical prowess, among other factors [58]. Thus, Chinas
stance has the potential to increase Chinas power relative to the
US. At a minimum, Chinese dominance of the SCS, which would
affect freedom of navigation in the area, would threaten the status
of the US as a regional and global superpower [59]. This makes it clear
why the China-Philippines dispute and the stance of Chinas new
leaders to the dispute are important for the future of US-China
relations.

Military buildup
Military competition increase tension in relationship
Glaser, 2014 (Bonnie S. Senior Adviser for Asia, Freeman Chair in China
Studies, Center for Strategic and International Studies, "US-CHINA RELATIONS
Managing Differences Remains an Urgent Challenge." Southeast Asian Affairs
(2014): 76-82. ProQuest.
http://search.proquest.com/docview/1650876560/A406786705834EF3PQ/1?
accountid=36295, DDI TM)
In the military realm, there are other factors that are already driving the US
and China towards greater strategic competition. China is developing
capabilities that are aimed at denying the US Navy easy access in a crisis to
its near seas - the Yellow Sea, the East China Sea, and the South China Sea which occupy significant portions of the Western Pacific. From China's
perspective this is a defensive strategy that is referred to in Chinese
writings as aimed at "counter-intervention". The US views the
development of these capabilities, which it terms "anti-access/area
denial", as threatening its ability to protect its interests in the AsiaPacific, including defending its allies. To ensure that it can maintain
freedom of access and manoeuvre in the waters around China, the US is
applying operational concepts such as Air-Sea Battle. Although this competition is already
underway, the two countries are so far able to effectively isolate the military competition from the broader political and

Even US-China military exchanges and joint exercises have

increased despite their growing competition for sea control in the waters
around China. However, if this competition becomes more intense, US-China
cooperation in the Asia-Pacific may become impossible. And if China were to
employ its anti-accs s/area-denial weapons to warn or intimidate the US, the
US would likely respond, and tensions could escalate rapidly.
economic relationship.

Spying
U.S. close-in surveillance in the Chinese EEZ results in
the negative political relationship between China and US
Empirics prove.
Glaser, 2014 (Bonnie S. Senior Adviser for Asia, Freeman Chair in China
Studies, Center for Strategic and International Studies, "US-CHINA RELATIONS
Managing Differences Remains an Urgent Challenge." Southeast Asian Affairs
(2014): 76-82. ProQuest.
http://search.proquest.com/docview/1650876560/A406786705834EF3PQ/1?
accountid=36295, DDI TM)
China strongly objects to US close-in surveillance
activity near its 12 nm territorial waters and air space. China could begin to
more aggressively push back against US surveillance. There are precedents for a more
aggressive push back: in 2001, a Chinese pilot aggressively intercepted a US EP-3
surveillance plane, which resulted in his death and the forced landing of the
US plane on Hainan Island where twenty-four crew members were held for
eleven days. The crisis was defused, although it had a long lasting negative impact on relations between the two
militaries. In 2009, Chinese vessels harassed US surveillance ships on several
occasions and came very close to causing a collision. China's newly
established Air Defense Identification Zone further heightens the possibility of
an accident. Past incidents suggest that the US and China would prevent escalation and quickly move to contain
Incident in China's Exclusive Economic Zone

negative fallout. However, domestic publics would become engaged immediately, making it more difficult to defuse the

China's leadership would not want to be seen as backing down under US

pressure. The potential exists that an accident could negatively affect the
broader political relationship for a prolonged period.
crisis.

Trade disputes (general) hurt relations

US-Chinese relations weakened by economic and trade
policy disputes
Morrison 15 (Wayne M., Specialist in Asian Trade and Finance, China-U.S.
Trade Issues, Congressional Research Service, 12/15/15 accessed 7/14/15 at
https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL33536.pdf; DDI- NB)
Chinas economic reforms and rapid economic growth, along with the effects of globalization, have caused

economies of the United States and China to become increasingly

integrated. Although growing U.S.-China economic ties are considered by most analysts to be
mutually beneficial overall, tensions have risen over a number of Chinese
economic and trade policies that many U.S. critics charge are
protectionist, economically distortive, and damaging to U.S.
economic interests. According to the USTR, most U.S. trade disputes with
China stem from the consequences of its incomplete transition to a
free market economy. Major areas of concern for U.S. stakeholders include Chinas:
Extensive network of industrial policies that seek to promote and
protect domestic sectors and firms, especially SOEs, deemed by the government to be
critical to the countrys future economic growth; Targeting of foreign firms with anticompetitive investigations in order to limit foreign market share of various industries in
China; Failure to provide adequate protection of U.S. intellectual
property rights (IPR) and (alleged) government-directed cybersecurity attacks against U.S. firms;
the

Mixed record on implementing its obligations in the World Trade Organization (WTO) and its failure to date
to join the WTOs Government Procurement Agreement (GPA); and Intervention in currency markets to limit
the appreciation of the renminbi (RMB) against the dollar (and other major currencies) in order to make
Chinas exports more globally competitive.

Lifting Vietnam arms ban hurts relations

Chinese angry with US over the lifting of the Vietnam
arms embargo
The Times of India 16 (Chinese media slams US lifting of Vietnam
arms embargo, Times of India, 5/24/16 accessed 7/14/16 at
http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/world/us/Chinese-media-slams-US-liftingof-Vietnam-arms-embargo/articleshow/52412398.cms; DDI-NB)
Chinese state media on Tuesday slammed the lifting of a decades-old
U.S. arms embargo against Vietnam, saying the move was aimed at
Beijing and calling Barack Obamas assurances to the contrary a
very poor lie. Obama announced the end of the 41-year-old ban on weapons
sales to the United States former foe in Hanoi on Monday, as Washington and Beijing jockey for
influence in Asia and tensions mount in the strategically important South
China Sea. Beijing is taking an increasingly assertive stance in the area, building up artificial islands
with facilities that have military use, while Washington has responded with freedom of navigation sail-bys

Beijing claims almost the whole of the sea, while several of

its neighbors, including Vietnam, have conflicting claims. The arms sales
and fly-pasts.

decision was not based on China, Obama said, but part of normalizing ties with the ex-enemy.

Chinas Global Times newspaper, which is close to the ruling

Communist party, retorted Tuesday that the comment was a very
poor lie and exacerbated the strategic antagonism between
Washington and Beijing. Washingtons ultimate goal was to cement
U.S. dominance in the area, it said, and it was taking advantage of
Vietnam to stir up more troubles in the South China Sea. Similarly the
Trans-Pacific Partnership trade agreement, which includes Vietnam
but not China, was one of three nets that the U.S. is knitting
around China ideology, security, economy and trade, it said. The lifting
of the embargo will have come as a surprise to the paper, which on Monday confidently declared that such
a move obviously cannot be achieved. The stance was echoed on the front page of the China Daily,
which is published by the government and whose front-page headline said the U.S. was charting a

clear course aimed at containing China. In an editorial, the paper said that the
move risked turning the region into a tinderbox of conflicts. The former bitter foes have
turned into friends and are seeking to boost their commercial,
military and political relations, it said, adding the move showed there are no eternal
allies or perpetual enemies, only eternal and perpetual interests.

North Korea hurts relations

Tension over North Korea policy spills over to other US
China relations issues
Glaser, 2014 (Bonnie S. Senior Adviser for Asia, Freeman Chair in China
Studies, Center for Strategic and International Studies, "US-CHINA RELATIONS
Managing Differences Remains an Urgent Challenge." Southeast Asian Affairs
(2014): 76-82. ProQuest.
http://search.proquest.com/docview/1650876560/A406786705834EF3PQ/1?
accountid=36295, DDI TM)
Denuclearization remains a shared goal, but the US and China have
never agreed on how to achieve it. At times the two nations have appeared to be in lock-step, for
Korea

example in the aftermath of North Korea's third nuclear test when both joined the other members of the UN Security

In the future, cooperation on

North Korea could go badly and sour US-China ties, but not end up in a USChina military confrontation. North Korean military provocations against South
Korea or proliferation of nuclear material could prompt the US to seek to
overthrow the regime in Pyongyang. Beijing would be unlikely to go along
with such a strategy and might view US actions in pursuit of regime change
as more dangerous than North Korea's behaviour. Such a sharp divergence
between Washington and Beijing could undermine the ability of the two
countries to cooperate on other issues, especially in the Asia-Pacific
region. In the near term, it is possible that the US and China may differ over the nature and extent of sanctions to
Council in passing a resolution that tightened sanctions on North Korea.

impose on North Korea. The US increasingly supports imposing Iran-like sanctions on North Korea that would seek to
cripple the economy and force Pyongyang to abandon its nuclear programme. Beijing adamantly opposes such a strategy,
in part because it could cause instability that could spill over China's borders, but also because it believes that economic
prosperity and enhanced security will be needed before Pyongyang will give up its nuclear weapons. The efficacy of
economic sanctions without China's cooperation would be limited, but could have some effect if other nations were to go
along with the US. Differences over sanctions on North Korea would likely increase US-China bilateral tensions, but might
not derail the overall relationship.

Chinese airforce incident

China airforce incident both proves low relations and
undermines effective resolution of other issues
Kazianis, senior communications manager for foreign policy and legal
studies at the Heritage Foundation, 2016
(Harry J. Kazianis, senior fellow for defense policy at the Center for the
National Interest and fellow for national security at The Potomac Foundation,
former executive editor of The National Interest and former editor-in-chief of
The Diplomat, Tensions Rising With China After Near Collision, The Daily
Signal, http://dailysignal.com/2016/05/19/tensions-rising-with-china-afternear-collision/, DDI TM)
To say the bilateral relationship between the United States and the
Peoples Republic of China is complex might just be the ultimate of
understatements. Consider the facts: Beijing and Washington enjoy rich historic and cultural ties that date
back generations. Over 300,000 Chinese students today attend American universities, only adding to the richness and
cultural diversity of these important institutions. And most important of all, the U.S.-China bilateral trade relationship is

Bearing in mind how much both sides gain from a

productive and strong partnership, many in Washingtonand certainly many
around the worldhoped that strong ties would serve as a springboard
towards Beijings peaceful rise. Indeed, Chinas economy is now the second
largest by measure of gross domestic product (ranked number one if you consider purchasing power parity) and has
only fueled hopes of Beijing becoming what is popularly termed a
responsible stakeholderthat China, with a stake in the stability of the international
system thanks to strong global economic ties, would follow widely accepted international
relations norms and practices. Cooperation on areas of shared and mutual interest would be
worth over $591 Billion and rising.

emphasized with a clear hope any areas of competitionwith a clear understanding that there would be competition in

Sadly, such hopes have

not transcended into reality. Unfortunately for the United States and its allies in Asia, it
seems Beijing has decided to undertake a very different direction in
its foreign policy and security goals over the last several yearsone
that very well undermines the very peace and security Asia has
known for decades, the very bedrock of the regions awe inspiring economic transformation. In what can
only be described as an arch of instability stretching North from the
Japanese-administered Senkaku Islands all the way to the very
southern edges of the South China Sea and now moving west to
what is commonly referred to the Second Island Chain, Beijing has
decided that an aggressive policy of slowly but surely weakening the
status quo serves its interests. And Chinese actions clearly demonstrate the above approach. In just the last
multiple domainswould not derail or weaken what had been accomplished.

several years (and far from a comprehensive list), Beijing has sought to enforce lines drawn over vast expanses of the
South China Sea along with building islands in this hotly contested area, declared an Air-Defense Identification Zone in the
East China Sea without any prior warning along with booting regional allies like the Philippines out of disputed reefs far
closer to the Philippines than China. The goal, many would argue, is to dominate Asia, but more importantly, displace the
United States as the preeminent power in the region. In fact, it now seems America, along with its allies and partners, are
slowly moving towards a much more intense security competition with China in the months and years to come, the
consequences of which cannot be simply swept asideespecially considering Washington and Beijing both have nuclear

recent headlines only prove Beijings aggressive actions

throughout the region could spark a superpower clash that has not
been seen in decades. While close monitoring of a military aircraft or
weapons. Sadly,

naval vessel in international space is certainly a standard practice

this interaction was anything but normal. Chinese aviators came
within 50 feet of the U.S. plane, prompting the pilot to descend several thousand feet out of
safety considerations. Sound familiar? It should, as China has utilized this playbook before .
In 2014, a Chinese fighter jet came dangerously close to a P-8 U.S. surveillance plane and preformed a barrel roll over it.
According to reports, the Chinese J-11 fighter passed the P-8 Poseidon at 90 degrees, with its belly toward the U.S.

recent incidents like the ones described

above have not led to any injuries or deathsbut that has not
always been the case. Back in 2001, an American EP-3 aircraft collided with a Chinese J-8 fighter jet. The
aircraft to show off its weapons. Thankfully,

pilot of the J-8 was killed while the U.S. aircraft was forced to undertake an emergency landing in China on Hainan Island.
A tense standoff ensued. Thankfully the U.S. crew was released weeks later. When one considers carefully incidents like
the above combined with Beijings clear attempts to alter the status quo, it is vital that Washington respond accordingly to
not only reinforce Americas commitment to the region but demonstrate clear American leadership.

Chinese airforce incident raises tensions in US-Chinese

relationship and sparks possibility of conflict
Brook 16 (Tom Vanden, journalist for USA Today with undergraduate degree in
history and a master's degree in journalism at the University of Wisconsin
Madison, Chinese fighters buzz Navy patrol plane, Navy Times, 5/18/16
accessed 7/14/16 at
http://www.navytimes.com/story/military/2016/05/18/chinese-jets-interceptus-navy-spy-plane/84562724/; DDI-NB)
Chinese warplanes, in a dangerous maneuver, intercepted a U.S.
Navy patrol plane flying a routine mission over the South China Sea
on Tuesday, according to the Pentagon. The incident is the latest in a series of
unwelcome encounters between the Chinese military and U.S.
military aircraft and ships in the region where China has increasingly asserted claims of
sovereignty. It has filled in slivers of land in the sea to build landing strips and has challenged
American naval vessels in international water. Initial reports characterized the
incident as unsafe, according to a Pentagon statement. It occurred in international air space during a
routine patrol. Tuesdays encounter ran counter to the trend over the last year in which Chinese pilots had
been flying in a safe and professional manner, according to the Pentagon. Air Force Gen. Herbert Hawk

Chinese intercepts seem geared toward

pushing U.S. warplanes farther from their shores. Buzzing U.S. patrol
planes is dangerous, and in 2001 resulted in a mid-air collision with
a Chinese fighter. The Navy P-3 patrol plane was severely damaged
and forced to land on the Chinese island of Hainan . One Chinese fighter pilot
died when his plane crashed. The crew of 24 naval aviators was held by the Chinese for 11 days. A
similar incident is likely to happen if the Chinese continue to
intercept American planes aggressively, Carlisle said. If they continue to become
more and more aggressive, the potential (exists) for a miscalculation or a
safety incident, Carlisle said. Weve worked hard to prevent another P-3 and Hainan island
situation. Weve seen some of their aggressive maneuvers against our aircraft
that are operating in international airspace. Thats dangerous. And theres the
potential miscalculation or some kind of safety incident that could
potentially spiral into a very bad situation .
Carlisle said in a recent interview that the

AT Specific Alt Causes Erode

Relations/

Specific relations advantage links

AT they say ROC hurt relations

ROC insignificant to US China relations
Glaser, 2015 (Charles L., Professor in the Elliott School of International Affairs
and the Department of Political Science at George Washington University.,
International Security, Spring 2015, google scholar UT, pg 40-90)
Taiwan is no longer the key issue straining U.S.China relations. Consequently, focusing on Taiwan is misguided. As
discussed earlier, cross-strait relations have been improving for
many years. At the same time, Chinas disputes with its neighbors
in the South China and East China Seas have become more intense,
and increasingly define day-to-day tensions in the region. Possibly
most worrisome, Sino-Japanese relations have become increasingly
strained in the past few years, taking the spotlight off Taiwan. Two
rejoinders help to put this counterargument into perspective. As I have already argued, the dangers
generated by the U.S. commitment to Taiwan go well beyond the
immediate possibility of the United States fighting China to protect
Taiwan and, therefore, are not adequately captured by focusing
solely on the cross-strait relationship. The U.S. commitment to Taiwan is among the key
A second counterargument is that

factors fueling Chinese doubts about U.S. motives in the region and Chinese worries about a war over Taiwan make
control of the Northeast Asian SLOCs far more important. These worries contribute to military competition and strained
political relations, thereby increasing the probability of conflict over the longer term. Second, a grand bargain would deal
fully with this counterargument by requiring resolution of these other disputes.

AT they say SCS tensions hurt relations

U.S and China have shard interest in the south china sea
and can cooperate
Yung and Dong 2016
Christopher Yung, Donald Bren Chair of Non-Western Strategic Thought at the
U.S. Marine Corps University. Wang Dong, Associate Professor in the School of
International Studies and Deputy Executive Director of the Institute for ChinaU.S. People to People Exchange at Peking University7-6-2016, "The United
States and China Can Get Along in the South China Sea," War on the Rocks,
(DDI AGH)
China and the United States share interests in the principle of
freedom of navigation (FON). Although they disagree over what FON
entails, it offers both sides tangible benefits from maritime-related
economies, good order and stability at sea, and the use of the sea to
foster and protect national security interests. This is not to deny the
notable differences in their respective maritime priorities. For the United
States, the entire international trading and economic order is dependent on a
secure maritime domain. Additionally, the ocean serves as both an initial
barrier to threats to the homeland and as a highway for the United States to
project power abroad. Finally, because the Washington sees the prevention of
regional hegemons as vital to its own national security interests, the United
States is able to take action to balance that emerging threat or, if necessary,
defeat it through a secure maritime domain. Chinas interests in the maritime
domain center on safeguarding national unity and territorial integrity,
defending maritime rights and benefits, and protecting Chinas rapidly
expanding overseas interests which include trade to and from China and
access to needed natural resources. During wartime, China also wants to be
able to deny or deter other powers ability to pose either threats within its
strategic maritime zones or layers of Chinese defenses that are defined by
the first and second island chains. Chinese and U.S. perspectives diverge
when it comes to how the two countries define their respective national
interests, what they believe to be appropriate means of displaying good and
bad intentions, how the two sides view the sea, and how they interpret
international law and the protection of maritime sovereignty. China and the
United States have fundamentally different philosophies about the nature and
meaning of the sea. Historically for modern China, the sea is first and
foremost a means of access by enemies to threaten and humiliate the
country. In contrast, the United States views the sea as a potential barrier to
foreign threats and simultaneously a means for the United States to push out
and advance its own interests. This explains the tension over U.S. Navy
surveillance and reconnaissance operations (SRO). The United States regards
as its right the ability to fly surveillance aircraft or sail surveillance ships
within Chinas exclusive economic zone but outside Chinas territorial waters
and contiguous zone. China, however, sees U.S. SROs as an affront to

Chinese sovereignty, intrusive in nature, and potentially threatening to

Chinas security. Complicating this divergence of interests and perspectives is
the security dilemma involved when a hegemon is confronted by a rising
challenger the so-called Thucydides Trap. An additional complication is the
vexing fact that all the present hot spots or potential conflict scenarios
between the two countries reside in the maritime domain. There remains the
possibility that China and the United States could tangle with each other over
a crisis emerging from a Taiwan, a South China Sea, or an East China Sea
scenario. Nevertheless, there are enough overlapping interests in the
maritime domain to warrant serious thought about deepening and
strengthening cooperative programs already in existence. The
convergence of interests is substantial enough that new programs that can
foster habits of cooperation and reduce tensions deserve consideration.
During President Obamas visit to China in November 2014, the two
sides signed memoranda of understanding on encounters at sea. The
annex on air-to-air encounters was signed during President Xis
state visit to the United States in September 2015. Now both sides
should ensure that all parties adhere to the agreements. They could even
consider conducting joint or separate training sessions for sailors and pilots
from both sides. The United States and China should build on existing
cooperative activities between their respective coast guards, while sustaining
and, if possible, extending cooperation on anti-pollution measures, ocean
observation, marine scientific research, and prevention of marine hazards.
Moreover, the two powers could expand on the military-to-military
cooperation that has taken place within the maritime domain over
the past few years. In particular, the United States should consider inviting
China to exercises such as the Cooperation Afloat Readiness and Training
(CARAT) exercise that it conducts annually with Southeast Asian militaries.
China and the United States should also work to establish a working group at
ASEAN to discuss maritime security cooperation and dialogue. Cementing
these cooperation efforts would ensure that although Chinese and
American maritime interests may vary, the joint interest in
preserving stability remains paramount.

US and China strategic interests will desescalate conflict

in SQ
Advincula Jr. 2014 (Julian V., University of the Philippines Manila, Metro
Manila, Philippines, Chinas Leadership Transition and the Future of US-China
Relations: Insights from the Spratly Islands Case, 27 December 2014,
http://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11366-014-9327-x) DDI - JT
However, conflict is not impending or ordained even if Chinas new
leaders opt for a more aggressive stance towards the Islands and
the SCS. There are various reasons for this. For its part, the US presently
is preoccupied with wars and entanglements in the Middle East as
well as fiscal budgetary constraints and economic challenges on the
homefront. Washington has a strong interest in ensuring SCS conflicts

are contained so that the US can maintain its fruitful economic

partnership with China, focus on repairing its own economy, and re-assert
its global power, particularly in Asia, as a counter to a continuing rising China.
For its part, the PRC is still in the process of consolidating its domestic
economic gains and building up its military strength. Such
consolidation is essential to solidify its base in the APR and legitimating its
status as a regional and global superpower, notwithstanding its current
territorial dispute and maritime claim against Japan over Diaoyu/Senkaku
Island in the East China Sea [76]. Moreover, by decreasing political
tension and lowering the likelihood of military confrontation, Beijing
can focus on nation building and economic development. My
expectation is that there will be many years of stable and cordial USChina relations because both countries need each other to survive,
develop and prosper. Leadership transitions can surely push the Islands
dispute, China-Philippines relations, and US-China ties in a negative direction,
but the national interests of both China and the US suggest leaders
in both countries will employ constructive engagement strategies
towards the other despite their competing interests and marked
political differences.

China wont poke US understands US leadership position

Advincula Jr. 2014 (Julian V., University of the Philippines Manila, Metro
Manila, Philippines, Chinas Leadership Transition and the Future of US-China
Relations: Insights from the Spratly Islands Case, 27 December 2014,
http://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11366-014-9327-x) DDI - JT
Still, regardless of the stance of Chinas leaders, the intensity with
which China pursues its interests will be tempered by various factors
such as Chinas awareness of continuing US global leadership [60]. In
the past, such awareness has encouraged China to avoid provoking
the US too much. Although some of Chinas actions dispatching patrol
vessels, building structures, blocking portions of the SCS, shooting water
cannons, colliding with vessels, and extracting oil in disputed waterscan be
consideredaggressive, ithas avoided the directuse of military force since a
brief armed conflict with Vietnam in 1979 [54]. Beyond this, while China
originally championed bilateral negotiations that would, in effect, give it the
ability to divide and rule other claimants given its relatively greater
bargaining power, it recently has become more open to multilateral
talks with ASEAN member states. Urged by US President Obama and
US Secretary of State John Kerry at, respectively, the East Asian
Summit (EAS) in Cambodia in November 2012 and the ASEAN
Ministerial Meeting in Brunei in July 2013, China took steps to ease
tensions in the SCS. Indeed, it sponsored a meeting between foreign
ministers of China and the ASEAN in Beijing in late August 2013 to
consolidate their strategic partnership and resolve territorial
disputes [61]. An outcome of this meeting was an agreement between the

PRC and ASEAN to work on formalizing a legally binding Code of Conduct in

the SCS [58].

AT they say Cyberattacks hurt relations

SQuo summits solve cyberattacks tensions cyber crimes
agreement proves
The US and China are actively improving cyber relations
and have pledged to not engage in cyber crimes
Ware 15 (Doug G. Ware, 12-1-2015, "U.S., Chinese leaders hope new
cooperation will cut cyber thefts, improve relations," UPI,
http://www.upi.com/Top_News/US/2015/12/01/US-Chinese-leaders-hope-newcooperation-will-cut-cyber-thefts-improve-relations/3501449024293/) DDI JT
WASHINGTON, Dec. 1 (UPI) -- Representatives of the United States and
China met in Washington, D.C., Tuesday for a summit on cyber
security that was arranged by the nations' leaders two months ago -a meeting both sides say they hope will remove bilateral obstacles
to greater diplomacy. The meeting involve discussions between members
of Chinese General Secretary Xi Jinping's administration and U.S. law
enforcement and intelligence officials -- including the Federal Bureau of
Investigation and Department of Justice -- who will address issues like
commercial cyber espionage. Jinping and President Barack Obama set
the stage for the meetings in September during the Chinese leader's
visit to the White House -- during which the pair pledged not to
conduct or condone commercial cyber thefts. They are the first official
meetings on cyber security between the two nations in nearly two years. The
meeting is partially driven by concerns among some American businesses
who claim commercial thefts by Chinese hackers is costing them billions each
year -- alleged intrusions that have gradually strained U.S.-Chinese relations.
U.S. officials said they met with the Chinese leaders to "candidly
discuss ways to enhance cooperation" on cyber security matters. The
two-day meeting is co-chaired by U.S. Attorney General Loretta Lynch,
Homeland Security chief Jeh Johnson and China's State Councilor and Minister
of Public Security Guo Shengkun. China's state-run Xinhua News Agency
cited "positive outcomes" from Tuesday's meeting with American
officials. "The two sides reached an agreement on the guidelines on
joint China-U.S. fight against cyber crimes and related matters, and
the establishment of a hot line," Xinhua reported. "They identified a
number of cases for future cooperation on enhancing cyber security,
reached further consensus on fighting cyber terrorism, and agreed
on some specific programs of strengthening capability building in
fighting cyber crimes." Leaders from both sides will meet again
Wednesday to conclude the meetings. Both sides also reportedly agreed to
hold another round of cyber security talks in Beijing next June.

AT they say Lifting Vietnam arms ban hurts

relations
Lifting the Vietnam arms ban doesnt anger China
Corsi 16 (Gareth Corsi, For Cnn, 5-23-2016, "Will lifting Vietnam arms ban
trouble Beijing?," CNN, http://www.cnn.com/2016/05/23/politics/vietnamarms-ban-south-china-sea/) DDI - JT
Orville Schell, Arthur Ross Director at the Asia Society Center for U.S.-China
Relations, said a lifting of the arms embargo on Hanoi would present
Chinese Premier Xi Jinping with a significant symbol of just how far
his aggressive policies in the South China Sea have alienated China's
neighbors. South China Sea: Is China upping the stakes? "If he was smart Xi
would go on a charm offensive and moderate China's posture," said Schell.
"However, that seems unlikely given his past unwillingness to seek
compromise on matters of sovereignty." When asked about President Obama
potentially lifting the ban on lethal weapons sales in the past, China has
downplayed the issue. On Monday, at a press briefing by China's Ministry
of Foreign Affairs, ministry spokeswoman Hua Chunying said that it
was appropriate for the ban to be lifted. "(The) arms sales ban was a
product of the Cold War and should no longer exist," she told
reporters. "We hope the lifting of all such bans will benefit regional
peace and development. And we are happy to see the United States
and Vietnam develop normal cooperative relations."

AT North Korea hurts relations

The US and China are cooperating on North Korea recent
sanctions prove
Sengupta 16 (Somini Sengupta, 2-25-2016, "U.S. and China Agree on
Proposal for Tougher North Korea Sanctions," New York Times,
http://www.nytimes.com/2016/02/26/world/asia/north-korea-sanctions.html)
DDI - JT
UNITED NATIONS The United States and China reached an
agreement to impose tougher sanctions against North Korea, in
what appeared to be a diplomatic shift by Beijing regarding its
intransigent ally. The proposed resolution is the product of intense
negotiations between the two nations over the last seven weeks,
since Pyongyang tested a nuclear weapon it claimed was a hydrogen bomb. It
was circulated to members of the United Nations Security Council on
Thursday, and diplomats said it could come up for a vote in the coming days.
Diplomats said the fact that Washington and Beijing had agreed on a
set of measures increased the international pressure on the North Koreans.
In the past, after previous nuclear tests condemned by the Security Council,
China agreed only to banning weapons transfers and limited sanctions
against those linked to the nuclear program. Whether the proposed new
sanctions will succeed in curtailing Pyongyangs nuclear ambitions remains to
be seen. Past efforts to halt its nuclear program have not been fully carried
out, nor have they prevented North Korea from pursuing a nuclear arsenal.
Whether China would follow through on tougher sanctions was also a key
question. United States officials declined, without explanation, to provide the
text of the resolution. The proposed measures, according to a United
States official, would ban the trade of conventional weapons, luxury
goods like jet skis and Rolex watches, and aviation fuel to North
Korea, which could effectively ground its national airline. It would
also place prohibitions on dozens of new companies and individuals
accused of trafficking in illicit nuclear material. In what may be the
toughest proposed measure, all North Korean cargo entering or
leaving a country must be inspected by that country. The mandatory
cargo inspection applies to anything going to and from the D.P.R.K.,
according to an American official who spoke on the condition of anonymity
because of the delicacy of the talks. If it is on your territory, in your ports or
in your airports, theres a requirement to inspect cargo to and from the
D.P.R.K., the official said, using the initials for the Democratic Peoples
Republic of Korea. In addition, 31 ships that have been known to traffic in
illegal nuclear goods are to be banned from docking in any port. It is
impossible to verify whether countries sending or receiving North Korean
goods will carry out the inspections. However, they will be legally binding if
the resolution is adopted.

AT Trump hurts relations

Chinese leaders prefer a Trump presidency hes more
open to compromise and would be less hard on China
Chin 16 (Josh Chin, 3-8-2016, "China Returns Donald Trumps Love-Hate,"
WSJ, http://blogs.wsj.com/chinarealtime/2016/03/08/china-returns-donaldtrumps-love-hate/) DDI - JT
Trump winning the U.S. presidency is to Chinas benefit, Yu Zhiguo, a
film industry public relations executive, wrote in one such comment. So from
this day on, Chinas government needs to keep this in mind. Dont say things
that might hurt Trump. Dont do things that might hurt Trump. Definitely dont
use this as an opportunity to mock or attack American democracy. Such
jokes are rooted in a certain reality, though Mr. Trumps lack of a track record
made it difficult to say whether hopes of future American decline were
misplaced, said Shi Yinhong, an expert on U.S.-China relations at Beijings
Renmin University. Chinese people arent afraid of a hardline U.S. president.
Theyre afraid of a smart U.S. president. But can you guarantee hell continue
to be an idiot once hes in office? Its hard to say, he said. Multiple
international relations experts speculated that Chinas leaders might
prefer to see Mr. Trump in the White House over Democratic frontrunner Hillary Clinton, who as Secretary of State helped lead a
refocusing of American power in Asia that Beijing found threatening.
The reason: as a businessman, Mr. Trump would likely be more open
to compromise. You know what he wants. Hes interest-driven so
its easier to negotiate with him, said Jin Canrong, another
international relations scholar at Renmin University.

China likes Trump wont have an effect

Wright, 2016 (Thomas, fellow and director of the Project on International
Order and Strategy and a fellow in the Center on the United States and
Europe, Five things we learned from Trumps foreign policy speech,
Brookings Institution, April 27, 2016, http://www.brookings.edu/blogs/orderfrom-chaos/posts/2016/04/27-reviewing-trump-foreign-policy-speech-wright
DDI TM)
Donald Trump gave his much-anticipated foreign policy speech at an event
hosted by the Center for the National Interest today. It was contradictory in
parts and repeated standard Republican criticisms of President Obama, but
there was a clear message that is consistent with what Trump has said
before. It was not the shift in substance that some predicted. There were
several notable takeaways, most of which confirmed what we already knew.
1.Trump will end U.S. alliances in Europe and Asia Trump was more
specific than usual about his beef with Americas allies . He said, We have spent
trillions of dollars over timeon planes, missiles, ships, equipmentbuilding
up our military to provide a strong defense for Europe and Asia. The countries
we are defending must pay for the cost of this defenseand, if not, the U.S.

must be prepared to let these countries defend themselves. Trump

is not asking them just to increase their defense budgets to 2 percent of GDP
(a long-standing U.S. claim), nor is he asking them to pay a greater share of overseas
bases. Trump is asking the allies to pay for a significant share of the
U.S. defense budget that enables the United States to be militarily
present in Europe and Asia. This would run into hundreds of billions of dollars per year.
Trumps demand is based on his stated belief that the United States
has no-self interest in being in Asia or Europe. Needless to say,
Americas allies cannot write a check to cover a significant share of the U.S.
defense budget, which means he will then have an excuse to pull out of the
alliances. 2.Trump has an isolationist mindset Trump believes that the
United States has defined its national interest too broadly . He said today, We will
no longer surrender this country, or its people, to the false song of globalism .
The nation-state remains the true foundation for happiness and harmony. I am skeptical of international
unions that tie us up and bring America down, and will never enter America
into any agreement that reduces our ability to control our own affairs.
Trump also described his foreign policy as America First , which was
the slogan of Charles Lindbergh and the isolationists of the 1930s.
Isolationists were never opposed to acting when America was directly
threatened but they were opposed to proactively shaping the world so it
provided a healthy environment in which the country to flourish and prosper.
Trump could not be clearer that he agrees with the isolationists on this and wants to revert back to an age where the

He opposes democracy
promotion, multilateralism, security guarantees, and, implicitly,
keeping the global commons open for use by all nations.
United States does much, much less in the world than it does now.

Internal links

Top level Approaches key to good

relations

Accommodation of China = good relations

Accommodative foreign policy not assumed mistrust key
to managing US China relations
Bader 15 (Jeffrey A. Bader, 10-2-2015, "Working on positive China-U.S.
relations," Brookings Institution,
http://www.brookings.edu/research/interviews/2015/10/02-working-onpositive-us-china-relations-bader)
"I think the more that kind of attitude becomes widespread, the
harder it's going to be to maintain a positive relationship between
the US and China," he told China Daily before Xi's visit. Bader believes that attitude is
based on a misunderstanding of China. In a June article: Changing China Policy: Are We in
Search of Enemies?, Bader argued that the US should not discard the approach taken
by eight presidents since Nixon in favor of an assumption of
inevitable hostility and a strategy of across-the-board rivalry that
may be compelling in international relations theory but which no
president has found persuasive. "I hope and expect that the ninth
president since Nixon, though faced with an evolving China, will not discard the
playbook used by the American statesmen who built and nurtured
the US-China relationship and built a generation of peace in Asia ," said
Bader, who from 2009 to 2011 was a special assistant to the president of the United States for national security affairs at
the National Security Council and is now a senior fellow at the John L. Thornton China Center of the Brookings Institution.

Mutual trust key to relations

Mutual trust key to overcoming perception that US trying
to block China rise
Zhu, 2015 (Zhiqun, Professor of Political science and International Relations
at Bucknell University, Raising US-China relations to new heights, China
Daily, September 23 2015, http://usa.chinadaily.com.cn/epaper/201509/23/content_21959393.htm DDI TM)
The American concern about China's rising power reflects Americans' lack of
confidence in their competition with China. The reality is that China remains
a developing country despite a large economy. According to Premier Li
Keqiang, 200 million Chinese still live in poverty. China faces tremendous
domestic challenges, including a widening income gap, an aging population,
rampant corruption and a deteriorating environment. The United States
remains far ahead of China, especially in technology and innovation. The two
economies and societies are complementary in many aspects. A recent study by the National Committee on US-China
Relations and the Rhodium Group reveals that from 2000 to 2014, Chinese firms spent nearly $46 billion on new

If
the US continues to welcome China's booming investment, it could receive
between $100 billion to $200 billion from China by 2020, which would add
between 200,000 and 400,000 full-time jobs in the US. China is the largest trading partner
of a growing number of countries, from Asia to Africa and from Latin America to the Middle East. A trade regime
without China's participation is unlikely to succeed. China-led new initiatives
such as the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) complement the work
of the World Bank and Asian Development Bank. "Pivot" and "new type of
great power relations" are attempts by the United States and China,
respectively, to handle the complicated relationship, but they are poorly
defined and largely misunderstood by the other side. Americans generally
believe that China has become more assertive in foreign policy and intends to
replace the US in global affairs. Many Chinese genuinely think the United
States is trying to block China's rise. Lack of trust has been identified as the
outstanding problem between the two countries. But how to build trust?
Going forward, the two countries must first readjust their mentality. For China,
the priority remains at home. Chinese leaders must resist the temptation to
flex muscles abroad. It is not time to abandon Deng Xiaoping's dictum of lying low and focusing on growth.
The United States, on the other hand, must be realistic and remove
ideological lenses to overcome the "China fear". It must also rein in its
smaller allies in Asia so as to avoid conflicts that will drag the US and China
into direct confrontation.China and the United States are joined at the hip. There is no bad blood between
establishments and acquisitions in the US. Chinese-affiliated companies directly employ more than 80,000 Americans.

them. They cannot afford to allow hardliners or protectionists to interfere with the generally cooperative relationship.

Mutual
accommodation and appreciation will enhance personal relations as
well as relations between nations.
Disagreement on certain issues and occasional quarrels are part of the normal life in a relationship.

One issue doesnt spillover

generic
Multiple points of friction in SQ no threat to overall
relationship
Glaser, 2014 (Bonnie S. Senior Adviser for Asia, Freeman Chair in China
Studies, Center for Strategic and International Studies, "US-CHINA RELATIONS
Managing Differences Remains an Urgent Challenge." Southeast Asian Affairs
(2014): 76-82. ProQuest.
http://search.proquest.com/docview/1650876560/A406786705834EF3PQ/1?
accountid=36295, DDI TM)
Friction over political and economic issues is commonplace in the US-China
relationship. In the past few years, Washington and Beijing have bickered over
the exchange rate of the renminbi; China's unwillingness to condemn North
Korea's sinking of the South Korean vessel the Cheonan or its shelling of
Yeonpyong Island; and Beijing's veto of United Nations Security Council
resolutions aimed at imposing sanctions on Syria, to name only a few issues .
In most cases, US-China differences over specific issues do not spill over into other areas and threaten to set back the

In the foreseeable future, the majority of issues on which

the US and China disagree are also not likely to threaten the overall
relationship. There are, however, a few potential matters that could send US-China ties into a tailspin.
entire bilateral relationship.

Cooperation =/= good relations

US-China relations dont prompt increased cooperation
Tiankai 2016
(Cui Tiankai, Ambassador of the Peoples Republic of China to the United States, May 8, 2016,
Brookings U.S.-China Leadership Forum, Making the Right Choices China-U.S. Relations at a
Critical Point, http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/Research/Files/Speeches/2015/05/China-USRelations-at-a-Critical-Point.pdf?la=en DDI TM)

It is a real pleasure to come to Sunnylands again. There is no better place in America

to host this forum. Three years ago next month, our leaders, President Xi and
President Obama, had their first presidential meeting here. It was the beginning of a
new model of presidential dialogue, one with less formality and fewer aides but
greater candor and a clearer focus on issues of strategic importance. Such top-level
communication has now become a prominent feature of our relationship, from
Sunnylands to Yingtai, from the Blair House to the recent Nuclear Security Summit. It
has enabled our leaders to build up a good mutual understanding not only of
priorities and policies, but also of each other as people. Thanks to the strong
guidance of our two presidents and the joint efforts of both sides, the China-U.S.
relationship in the last three years has withstood one test after another and has by
and large moved forward on a positive and stable track. Today, our bilateral
cooperation is more extensive and comprehensive than what is usually
reported in the media. The relationship is stronger and more resilient than
many people have realized. At the same time, this relationship now seems to be
more difficult to manage than ever before. While our cooperation is expanding
and deepening, our differences stand out more and more. While there is
growing evidence that our two countries are increasingly connected to each
other, there are also mounting worries that we might eventually clash. This
is, I believe, partly because of the inherent complexities of the relationship,
and partly because fundamental changes in the global political and
economic structure have made these complexities even more complicated
and have magnified their impact.