Laguna Lake Development Authority vs.

Court of Appeals

FACTS: Laguna Lake Development Authority (LLDA) was created through

Republic Act No. 4850 to promote, and accelerate the development and balanced
growth of the Laguna Lake area and the surrounding provinces, cities and towns
hereinafter referred to as the region, within the context of the national and regional
plans and policies for social and economic development and to carry out the
development of the Laguna Lake region with due regard and adequate provisions for
environmental management and control, preservation of the quality of human life and
ecological systems, and the prevention of undue ecological disturbances,
deterioration and pollution. President Marcos through Presidential Decree no. 813
amended certain sections of said act by means of adding seven new paragraphs to
Section 4. In paragraph k of said amendment, it states that the Authority shall have
the exclusive power to issue new permit for the use of the lake waters for any
projects or activities in or affecting the said lake including navigation,
construction, and operation of fishpens, fish enclosures, fish corrals and the
like, and to impose necessary safeguards for lake quality control and
management and to collect necessary fees for said activities and projects. This
specific provision of the Act was further question by the Local Government
Units which are part of the Laguna de Bay Region. Their basis for this was Section
149 of the Local Government Code which states that Municipalities shall have the
exclusive authority to grant fishery privileges in the municipal waters and impose
rental fees or charges therefor in accordance with the provisions of this Section.
ISSUE: Who has the exclusive authority to issue permits for the use of the lake
waters for any project or activity in Laguna de Bay?
HELD: The Local Government Code of 1991 does not necessarily repeal the charter of the Laguna
Lake Development Authority. By way of statutory construction, a general law cannot prevail over a
special law. R.A. 7160 does not contain any expressed provision which categorically expressly
repeal the charter of LLDA. The repeal of laws should be made clear and expressed. It is basic in
statutory construction that the enactment of a later legislation which is a general law cannot be
construed to have repealed a special law. It is a well-settled rule in this jurisdiction that "a special
statute, provided for a particular case or class of cases, is not repealed by a subsequent statute,
general in its terms, provisions and application, unless the intent to repeal or alter is manifest,
although the terms of the general law are broad enough to include the cases embraced in the
special law. Where there is a conflict between a general law and a special statute, the special statute
should prevail since it evinces the legislative intent more clearly than the general statute. Implied
repeals are not favored and as much as possible, effect must be given to all enactments of the
legislature. A special law cannot be repealed, amended or altered by a subsequent general law by
mere implication. Therefore, LLDA has the exclusive jurisdiction to issue permits for the enjoyment of
fishery privileges in Laguna de Bay to the exclusion of municipalities situated therein and the
authority to exercise such powers as are by its charter vested on it.

Azarcon vs. Sandiganbayan

Facts: Petitioner Alfredo Azarcon owned and operated an earth-moving business,

hauling dirt and ore. His services were contracted by PICOP. Occasionally, he engaged
the services of sub-contractors like Jaime Ancla whose trucks were left at the formers
premises.
On May 25, 1983, a Warrant of Distraint of Personal Property was issued by BIR
commanding one of its Regional Directors to distraint the goods, chattels or effects and
other personal property of Jaime Ancla, a sub-contractor of accused Azarcon and a
delinquent taxpayer. A Warrant of Garnishment was issued to and subsequently signed
by accused Azarcon ordering him to transfer, surrender, transmit and/or remit to BIR the
property in his possession owned by Ancla. Azarcon then volunteered himself to act as
custodian of the truck owned by Ancla.
After some time, Azarcon wrote a letter to the Reg. Dir of BIR stating that while he had
made representations to retain possession of the property of Ancla, he thereby
relinquishes whatever responsibility he had over the said property since Ancla
surreptitiously withdrew his equipment from him. In his reply, the BIR Reg. Dir. said that
Azarcons failure to comply with the provisions of the warrant did not relieve him from
his responsibility.
Along with his co-accused, Azarcon was charged before the Sandiganbayan with the
crime of malversation of public funds or property. On March 8, 1994, the
Sandiganbayan rendered a Decision sentencing the accused to suffer the penalty of
imprisonment ranging from 10 yrs and 1 day of prision mayor in its maximum period to
17 yrs, 4 mos and 1 day of reclusion temporal. Petitioner filed a motion for new trial
which was subsequently denied by Sandiganbayan. Hence, this petition.
Issue: Whether or not Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over a private individual
designated by BIR as a custodian of distrained property.
Held: SC held that the Sandiganbayans decision was null and void for lack of
jurisdiction.
Sec. 4 of PD 1606 provides for the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. It was specified
therein that the only instances when the Sandiganbayan will have jurisdiction over a
private individual is when the complaint charges the private individual either as a coprincipal, accomplice or accessory of a public officer or employee who has been
charged with a crime within its jurisdiction.
The Information does no charge petitioner Azarcon of becoming a co-principal,
accomplice or accessory to a public officer committing an offense under the
Sandiganbayans jurisdiction. Thus, unless the petitioner be proven a public officer,
Sandiganbayan will have no jurisdiction over the crime charged.
Art. 203 of the RPC determines who public officers are. Granting that the petitioner, in
signing the receipt for the truck constructively distrained by the BIR, commenced to take

part in an activity constituting public functions, he obviously may not be deemed

authorized by popular election. Neither was he appointed by direct provision of law nor
by competent authority. While BIR had authority to require Azarcon to sign a receipt for
the distrained truck, the National Internal Revenue Code did not grant it power to
appoint Azarcon a public officer. The BIRs power authorizing a private individual to act
as a depositary cannot be stretched to include the power to appoint him as a public
officer. Thus, Azarcon is not a public officer.
SECRETARY OF JUSTICE v. LANTION
October 26, 2012 Leave a Comment
FACTS:
Secretary Of Justice Franklin Drilon, representing the Government of the Republic of
the Philippines, signed in Manila the extradition Treaty Between the Government of the
Philippines and the Government of the U.S.A. The Philippine Senate ratified the said
Treaty.
On June 18, 1999, the Department of Justice received from the Department of Foreign
Affairs U.S Note Verbale No. 0522 containing a request for the extradition of private
respondent Mark Jiminez to the United States.
On the same day petitioner designate and authorizing a panel of attorneys to take
charge of and to handle the case. Pending evaluation of the aforestated extradition
documents, Mark Jiminez through counsel, wrote a letter to Justice Secretary
requesting copies of the official extradition request from the U.S Government and that
he be given ample time to comment on the request after he shall have received copies
of the requested papers but the petitioner denied the request for the consistency of
Article 7 of the RP-US Extradition Treaty stated in Article 7 that the Philippine
Government must present the interests of the United States in any proceedings arising
out of a request for extradition.

ISSUE: Whether or not to uphold a citizens basic due process rights or the
governments ironclad duties under a treaty.

RULING: Petition dismissed.

The human rights of person, whether citizen or alien , and the rights of the accused
guaranteed in our Constitution should take precedence over treaty rights claimed by a
contracting state. The duties of the government to the individual deserve preferential
consideration when they collide with its treaty obligations to the government of another
state. This is so although we recognize treaties as a source of binding obligations under
generally accepted principles of international law incorporated in our Constitution as
part of the law of the land.
The doctrine of incorporation is applied whenever municipal tribunals are confronted
with situation in which there appears to be a conflict between a rule of international law
and the provision of the constitution or statute of the local state.
Petitioner (Secretary of Justice) is ordered to furnish Mark Jimenez copies of the
extradition request and its supporting papers, and to grant him (Mark Jimenez) a
reasonable period within which to file his comment with supporting evidence.
Under the Doctrine of Incorporation, rules of international law form part of the law of the
land and no further legislative action is needed to make such rules applicable in the
domestic sphere.
The doctrine of incorporation is applied whenever municipal tribunals are confronted
with situations in which there appears to be a conflict between a rule of international law
and the provisions of the constitution or statute of the local state.
Efforts should first be exerted to harmonize them, so as to give effect to both since it is
to be presumed that municipal law was enacted with proper regard for the generally
accepted principles of international law in observance of the incorporation clause in the
above cited constitutional provision.

In a situation, however, where the conflict is irreconcilable and a choice has to be made
between a rule of international law and a municipal law, jurisprudence dictates that
municipal law should be upheld by the municipal courts, for the reason that such courts
are organs of municipal law and are accordingly bound by it in all circumstances.
The fact that international law has been made part of the law of the land does not
pertain to or imply the primacy of international law over national or municipal law in the
municipal sphere. The doctrine of incorporation, as applied in most countries, decrees
that rules of international law are given equal standing with, but are not superior to,
national legislative enactments. Accordingly, the principle lex posterior derogate priori
takes effect a treaty may repeal a statute and a statute may repeal a treaty. In states
where the Constitution is the highest law of the land, such as the Republic of the
Philippines, both statutes and treaties may be invalidated if they are in conflict with the
constitution
MAKATI STOCK EXCHANGE INC VS SECGR NO. L-23004 JUNE 30,
1965BENGZON, CJ

This case s a review of the resolutions of the SEC which would deny the Makati Stock
Exchange Incpermission to operate a stock exchange unless it agreed not to list for
trading on its board, securitiesalready listed in Manila Stock Exchange.

MSEI contends that SEC has no power to impose such and that is illegal, discriminatory
and unjust.

Sec 17 of Commonwealth Act 83 provides nor shall a security already listed in any
securitie
s exchange e
listed anew in any other securities exchange

Manila Stock Exchange has been operating alone for the past 25 years and presumably
all available orworthwhile securities for trading in the market are already listed there.
SEC only wants MSEI to deal onlywith other securities. (store can only sell goods not
sold in other stores)

SECs order would make it impossible for MSEI to operate so it resulted in a prohibition.

SEC argued that it acted in the public interest because the operation of two or more
exchanges affectspublic interest.

AUTHORITY OF SEC

Administrative officer has only such powers as are expressly granted to him bystatute
and
those necessarily implied in the exercise thereof
.
o
Approved by the department head

before the war

o
Not in conflict with the provisions of the Securities Act-The approval of the department
by itself adds no weight in a judicial litigation and thetest is not whether the Act forbids
the commission from imposing a prohibition butwhether it empowers the commission to
prohibit.

The power to regulate does not imply the authority to prohibit

ISSUES:
o
Whether the establishment of another exchange in the environs of manila would be
inimical tothe public interest.
o
Whether double or multiple listings of securities s
hould be prohibited for the protection of investors


A.) Encourage monopolies as oppose to promoting a healthy competition. The price in a
one on one salewould be higher due to fixed rates plus brokerage fee.

B.) Protection of investors

is it necessary to protect them as opposed to protecting the public fromfraudulent

representations or false promises.

It is beneficial for public interest to have more than one stock exchange. AND the SEC
has no legalauthority to stifle free enterprise and individual liberty. The legislature has
specified the conditions underwhich a stock exchange may legally obtain a permit and it
is not for the commission to impose on others.If the existence of 2 or more competing
exchanges jeopardizes public interest it should be the Congressthat should act with the
recommendation of the SEC but the operation of exchanges should not be soregulated
as practically to create a monopoly by preventing the establishment of other stock
exchanges
and thereby contravening
o
MSEIs constitut
ional right to equality before the law
o
Granted civil liberty to pursue any lawful employment or trade
o
Investors right to choose where to buy or sell and his privilege to select the brokers in
his
employment.

MSEIs articles of incorporation was

approved therefore granting a license to operate not minding the
condition given by the commission because such didnt affect them at that time. Upon
learning of the
prohibition they immediately contested. Accordingly, the license of the petition to
operate a stockexchange is approved without such condition