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1, 2012, pp 116
There is a general consensus that the leaders G20 brought together in 2008
played a major part in co-ordinating policy responses to the global nancial
crisis that avoided catastrophe, but beyond this views of its signicance dier
widely. The G20 leaders themselves quickly declared it to be the premier
forum for our international economic cooperation1a substantial turnaround for an informal organisation whose membership was cobbled
together on the back of an envelope in April 1999 by Paul Martin (then
Canadian nance minister) and Larry Summers (then US deputy treasury
secretary).2 But, over a decade from its origin as a gathering of nance
ministers and Central Bank governors expanded beyond the G8 in the wake
of the Asia crisis, many still nd its informal and unrepresentative character, lack of justiable membership criteria and failure to advance on its
initial response to the crisis problematic.3 Nor is it yet clear how far if at all
the new G20 challenges the hegemony of the advanced economies. In a
perceptive article written just before its conversion into a leaders meeting,
Beeson and Bell contrasted models of US-led group hegemony and
Paul Cammack is in the Department of Asian and International Studies, City University of Hong Kong, Tat
Chee Avenue, Kowloon, Hong Kong SAR. Email: paul.cammack@cityu.edu.hk.
ISSN 0143-6597 print/ISSN 1360-2241 online/12/01000116
2012 Southseries Inc., www.thirdworldquarterly.com
http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/01436597.2012.628110
PAUL CAMMACK
PAUL CAMMACK
In spring 2008, even before the worst of the crisis struck, the IMF was
already forecasting recession in the US, and identifying the emerging
economies as the source of global salvation:
All eyes now turn to the worlds leading emerging economies. They have come
of economic age in the past half-decadediversifying their exports, strengthening their domestic economies, and improving their policy frameworks. It is
conceivable that their strong momentum, together with some timely policy
adjustments, can sustain both their domestic demand and the global economy.9
In the event overall growth in world output of 2.9 per cent in 2008 was the
combined result of 0.2 per cent growth in the advanced economies (with zero
growth in the US), and 6.1 per cent in the emerging and developing economies;
in 2009 world output fell by only 0.5 per cent because a fall of 3.4 per cent in
the advanced economies was oset by continuing growth of 2.7 per cent in the
emerging and developing economies, led by developing Asia (7.2 per cent). The
restoration of growth from 2010 set a pattern of two-speed recovery in which
the advanced economies were predicted in April 2011 to grow at 2.5 per cent per
annum, compared with 6.5 per cent for the emerging and developing economies.
Six months later the September 2011 World Economic Outlook: Slowing Growth,
Rising Risks projected global growth at four per cent for 2011 and 2012, with
growth in the advanced economies falling below two per cent (1.6 per cent and
1.9 per cent per annum, respectively), and all the risks on the downside.10
As all that seemed solid about the new world economic order and its
indispensable leading state melted into air in 200708, a dramatic shift took
place, marked by the collapse of advanced state policy coherence, and the
new authority of the emerging states. Eichengreen and Baldwin captured the
moment precisely on the eve of the November 2008 Washington meeting of
the G20 leaders:
There is no agreement on what to do about the global economic downturn.
Economically and nancially there is a clear sense of things spiralling out of
control again. Turning from the crisis to the reform agenda, there is no
consensus about how to prevent a recurrence. Everyone agrees on the need
to strengthen supervision and regulation, but there is no agreement on how to
go about this. Everyone recognises the threat posed by large cross border
institutions and banks that are too big to save, but there are few practical ideas
for solving these problems.11
Within and around the G20 events had moved fast in the intervening months.
Its November 2007 communique had already noted that downside risks to
the near-term outlook have increased as a consequence of recent nancial
markets disturbances, but had been pleased to note . . . the resilience of
emerging market and other developing countries during the recent
turbulence.12 Even so, as the crisis continued into 2008, Beeson and Bell
reected the prevailing view that there seems to be little current prospect of
converting [the G20] into a more robust Leaders group, or L-20.13 On 11
October, however, after the Lehman Brothers collapse, incumbent chair
Guido Mantega, Finance Minister of Brazil, gave a press conference in
4
Washington following meetings of the IMF and the G20 ministers, in which
he extolled (in Portuguese) the soundness of the Brazilian banks, took
pleasure in describing the Brazilian regulation system as more advanced than
the American or European regulation systems, noted the slowing of growth
towards zero in the US and Europe, and called for the expansion of the G7 to
bring in excluded G20 leaders. He went on to say that:
The emerging countries will grow faster, and . . . it will be up to the emerging
countries to carry out countercyclical policies to maintain a certain level of
world economic growth, to somehow neutralize the drop in economic growth in
the advanced countries.14
It was not agreed even at this point that the G20 leaders would meet but,
after a visit to Washington from the French president Nicolas Sarkozy and
the EU president Jose Manuel Barroso, White House press secretary Dana
Perino conded on 22 October that Bush had spent two days on the
telephone talking to various leaders, and that the President thinks its very
important to include developing nations, because they have emerging
markets, theyre important on a variety of levels to the global economy,
and their input is important.15 The Leaders Summit on Financial Markets
and the World Economy was then convened as a one-o event, with a
permanent shift to a Leaders G20, formalised only in the following year.
G20 nance ministers and bank governors met as scheduled in Sao Paulo
on 89 November, and welcomed the decision to call the 15 November
meeting, blaming the nancial crisis squarely on excessive risk taking and
faulty risk management practices in nancial markets, inconsistent macroeconomic policies, which gave rise to domestic and external imbalances, as
well as deciencies in nancial regulation and supervision in some advanced
countries.16 It came as no surprise, therefore, when the Declaration
published at the end of the Washington meeting a few days later lambasted
market participants who sought higher yields without an adequate
appreciation of the risks and failed to exercise proper due diligence. The
Declaration also highlighted weak underwriting standards, unsound risk
management practices, and increasingly complex and opaque nancial
products, and concluded: Policy-makers, regulators and supervisors, in
some advanced countries, did not adequately appreciate and address the risks
building up in nancial markets, keep pace with nancial innovation, or take
into account the systemic ramications of domestic regulatory actions.17 Not
only had the G20 moved to centre-stage, but a narrative marking the shift of
authority to the emerging economies had gained ascendancy within it.
The capacity of the emerging economies to seize the initiative did not come
from nowhere. For a number of years they had been developing positions
and alliances that challenged the hegemony of the advanced economies, as
Chin has recently shown for Brazil, China, India, Indonesia, South Africa
and South Korea.18 Brazilian assertiveness reected a long-standing
aspiration to articulate the interests of developing states and the South,
intensied and given practical expression under President Luis Inacio da
Silva.19 And the willingness of Brazil and the Asian emerging economies to
5
PAUL CAMMACK
This reected the will of its founders. The G20 was intentionally created
within the IFI framework but outside its direct control. G7 nance ninisters
had agreed at Cologne in 1999 to create a group that could facilitate
dialogue among systemically important countries within the framework of
the Bretton Woods institutional system; but the option of joint chairing by the
chairs of the IMF Committee (IMFC) and the Development Committee (or by
the G7 chair) was rejected in favour of a separate, rotating G20 chair with the
chairs of the IMFC and the Development Committee and the heads of the IMF
and World Bank as ex ocio members.23 Martin would later comment:
The simple fact is that todays global concerns require a level of international
co-ordination that is fundamentally dierent from any earlier period of history.
And while successful international global institutions are essential if the world
is to work, national governments are the masters of those institutionsnot the
other way around. Thus, the system of global governance must build on
national governments as the ultimate source of authority.24
IFIs
The rst G20 communique committed itself to informal dialogue within the
Bretton Woods institutional system, rearmed the importance of progress by
the World Trade Organization (WTO) to multilateral liberalisation of trade in
goods and services, endorsed the need for sound national economic and
nancial policies, and undertook to complete Reports on Observance of
Standards and Codes . . . and Financial Sector Assessments, within the
context of continuing eorts by the IMF and the World Bank to improve
these mechanisms.26 At that time its stance was clearly consistent with a process of drawing emerging states into a framework devised and supported by
the G7. Successive communiques continued to endorse IFI policies, invariably
emphasising that the needs of the emerging economies and the poorest
countries should be given full consideration, and pressing for progress on
stalled initiatives such as the Doha Round, along with the strengthening and
extension of IMF surveillance. Against that background, the rst signs of crisis
in 2007 were met with emphatic endorsement of the continued promotion of
global liberalism and universal competitiveness:
We rearmed our commitment to maintain open trade and investment regimes
and to resist protectionist pressures. We committed to working with our trade
authorities to reach a rapid and successful conclusion to Doha, to promote open
and rules-based trade and investment regimes, improve productivity, create jobs,
alleviate poverty and spur competition. We noted the critical importance of
trade liberalisation and Aid for Trade for global poverty reduction.27
A year later the G20s critique of excessive risk-taking and lax regulation in
the advanced economies cited above was coupled with calls for all countries
to resist protectionism, and demands for a prompt and ambitious conclusion
of the Doha Development Round of trade negotiations, and the granting of
7
PAUL CAMMACK
This reects precisely the role that I have previously ascribed to the IFIs in
promoting the politics of global competitiveness through a partnership with
states in which the IFIs have the task of reconciling national and global
patterns of development, or promoting national reforms that contribute
simultaneously to national and global competitiveness.30
By November 2010, as a consequence of the initiative of the host
government, South Korea, the Framework had taken the form of the Seoul
Summit Document, comprised of the Seoul Action Plan, the Seoul Development
Consensus for Shared Growth, and the Multi-Year Action Plan on Development. The Seoul Action Plan, to be pursued with expert guidance from the
OECD, IMF, World Bank, ILO and other international organisations, seeks to
secure co-ordination between countries in the areas of monetary and exchange
rate policies, trade and development policies (with a renewed commitment to
free trade and investment); scal policies (with advanced economies enjoined
to formulate and implement clear, credible, ambitious and growth-friendly
medium term scal consolidation plans), nancial reforms, and, most
signicantly, structural reforms (see Table 1).
8
TABLE 1. The structural reforms advocated in the 2010 G10 Seoul Action Plan
Structural Reforms: We will implement a range of structural reforms to boost and sustain global demand,
foster job creation, contribute to global rebalancing, and increase our growth potential, and where needed
undertake:
. Product market reforms to simplify regulation and reduce regulatory barriers in order to promote
competition and enhance productivity in key sectors.
. Labor market and human resource development reforms, including better targeted benets schemes to
increase participation; education and training to increase employment in quality jobs, boost productivity
and thereby enhance potential growth.
. Tax reform to enhance productivity by removing distortions and improving the incentives to work,
invest and innovate.
. Green growth and innovation oriented policy measures to nd new sources of growth and promote
sustainable development.
. Reforms to reduce the reliance on external demand and focus more on domestic sources of growth in
surplus countries while promoting higher national savings and enhancing export competitiveness in
decit countries.
. Reforms to strengthen social safety nets such as public health care and pension plans, corporate
governance and nancial market development to help reduce precautionary savings in emerging surplus
countries.
. Investment in infrastructure to address bottlenecks and enhance growth potential.
Source: G20, Seoul Summit Document, G20 Seoul Summit Declaration, 2010, para 10.
The ngerprints of the IMF, the OECD, the World Bank and the UNDP are all
over this set of structural reforms, which replicates perfectly the consensus put
together through the 1990s and promoted throughout the early years of the
present century. At the same time, as noted by Kalinowski, the development
model put forward, with its emphasis on capacity building in low-income
countries for foreign investment- and private sector-led growth, corresponds
exactly to the interests of Korea itself, as its largest companies look for
investment opportunities abroad.31
Supporting the policy framework set out in the Action Plan (and more
discursively in the Seoul Consensus) were the second and third elements of
the new global liberal developmental regime: the greatly enhanced power
of the IMF (again), and the vehicle through which it would lead the process of
policy co-ordination, the country-led, consultative Mutual Assessment
Process. The G20 had been calling since 2005 for the strengthening of the
IMFs powers and representativeness, in accordance with the logic expressed
at the 2010 Toronto summit: Modernizing the IMFs governance is a core
element of our eort to improve the IMFs credibility, legitimacy, and
eectiveness.32 As with so many other initiatives primarily of concern to the
emerging economies, progress was glacially slow until the crisis struck.
Thereafter it has been swift, at least in terms of generating new resources and
implementing prior commitments to greater representation of systemically
important economies, for all that it still falls short of anything approaching
equity.33 The Seoul Action Plan commits to completion of the six per cent
shift in quota shares to the dynamic emerging market and developing
countries and to under-represented companies and to the doubling of quotas
by 2012. It adds a commitment to a comprehensive review of the quota
9
PAUL CAMMACK
The World Bank was addressing the costs and benets of Chinese and
Indian growth and its implications for Africa in particular before the crisis,
and its 2009 World Development Report, Reshaping Economic Geography,
reected a marked shift of focus towards Asia in general and China in
particular.37 A year later the OECDs 2010 study of Shifting Wealth
documented the rise of the rest, welcomed the fact that the new
conguration of global economic and political power means that the auent
countries can no longer set the agenda alone, and explicitly advocated
increased trade, aid and investment between emerging economies and poor
countries, SouthSouth FDI and SouthSouth peer learning. Both development strategies and the way in which the OECD and non-OECD countries
interact, it declared, will need to change in a very fundamental way.38
In a wider ocial literature that is expanding rapidly, two themes stand
out, each geared towards the dissemination throughout emerging and lowincome countries of sustainable processes of domestic accumulation. First,
regional integration should be pursued by means of reduced taris and other
barriers to regional trade and investment; second, SouthSouth integration
should be pursued with vigour, along with a diversication of economic
activity away from markets in North America and Western Europe.
Regional integration has been most actively pursued at the heart of Asia,
with the creation of the ASEAN Economic Community and ASEAN free trade
treaties with AustraliaNew Zealand, China, Japan and Korea.39 More broadly
the Asian Development Bank promoted a seamless Asia in 2009 with the
argument that, to mitigate the medium-term consequences of the ongoing crisis,
Asia will need to put greater emphasis on increasing regional demand. This will
have strong implications for regional infrastructure, which will need to be
geared more towards supporting Asian production networks and regional
supply chains for intra-regional trade to meet the rising regional demand.40
A similar logic infuses the Inter-American Development Banks 2011
Sector Strategy to Support Competitive Global and Regional Integration, as
the title suggests. And as regards Africa, the World Bank, African
Development Bank and international donors are collaborating on a new
strategy that sees regional integration as a critical aspect of the competitiveness agenda. In the World Banks New Africa Strategy (March 2011):
Pillar 1 focuses on competitiveness and employment, covering all traded goods
and service sectors (for example, light manufacturing, agribusiness, mining,
information and communication technology, and tourism) as well as key domestic
sectors that support competitiveness (for example, agriculture, transportation,
utilities, education and skills development, construction, and retail). A priority
will be to focus reforms and public investments on areas of highest growth
potential, a healthy and skilled workforce, womens empowerment, and regional
integration programs. Strategically targeted interventions will be complemented
by deeper and broader interventions targeted at each of the three main investment
climate constraints: infrastructure, business environment, and skills.41
PAUL CAMMACK
that multiple poles of growth have emerged and for your region this means
new markets and new investors, and an opportunity to hedge shocks
through a diversication in markets. She went on to advocate delinking from
the West:
Consider this. The United States contributed 27 percent of the worlds GDP
growth in the 80s and a whopping 36 percent in the 90s; but only 21 percent in
the 2000s. By contrast, the share of China and India increased from 5, to 12,
and now to 32 percent! And closer to home, the share of Brazil increased from
1, to 2, and now 3 percent. Against this shifting economic geography,
Caribbean countries exports are still going primarily to the US and Europe,
with 54 percent to the US and 19 percent to the EU, but less than 1 percent to
China and India combined, and merely 3 percent to neighboring Argentina,
Brazil, and Mexico combined. These numbers represent a huge opportunity.46
PAUL CAMMACK
thereby noting and welcoming the proposed focus on jobs and productivity
announced for the World Development Report 2012.48 Speaking in the
BBC Global Debate held at IMF headquarters on 23 September 2011, IMF
Managing Director Christine Lagarde pointed to the implications for the
advanced economies: structural changes were taking place, with economic
power shifting to emerging market and developing countries; the challenge
was to accommodate the restructuring of the world economy in a way
that will allow advanced countries to cope with the current slowdown.49 For
anyone who believed that the current crisis might bring about the eclipse of
the Bretton Woods institutions, and with it the remorseless drive towards
capitalism on a global scale, the message is dierent: if another world is
possible, it is not (yet, at least) the world that some imagined.
Notes
1 Leaders Statement: The Pittsburgh Summit, 25 September 2009, p 3, para 19; and The G20 Toronto
Summit Declaration June 2627, 2010, p 1, para 1. All ocial G20 statements are taken from http://
www.g20.org/pub_communiques.aspx.
2 The episode, which took place on 27 April 1999 in Summers oce in the US Treasury, is recounted J
Ibbitson & T Perkins, How Canada made the G20 happen, Globe and Mail (Toronto), 19 June 2010,
at
http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/world/g8-g20/news/how-canada-made-the-g20-happen/
article1609690/, accessed 3 June 2011.
3 See, for example, A Payne, How many Gs are there in global governance after the crisis? The
perspectives of the marginal majority of the worlds states, International Aairs, 86(3), 2010, pp
729740; J Vestergaard, The G20 and beyond: towards eective global economic governance, DIIS
Report, 4, 2011, Copenhagen: Danish Institute for International Studies; AF Cooper, The G20 as an
improvised crisis committee and/or a contested steering committee for the world, International
Aairs, 86(3), 2010, pp 741757; and S Soederberg, The politics of representation and nancial
fetishism: the case of the G20 summits, Third World Quarterly, 31(4), 2010, pp 523540.
4 M Beeson & S Bell, The G-20 and international economic governance: hegemony, collectivism, or
both?, Global Governance, 15(1), 2009, pp 6869. Contrast BK Gills, Going South: capitalist crisis,
systemic crisis, civilisational crisis, Third World Quarterly, 31(2), 2010, who concludes that, despite
shared hegemony (p 170), the USA and the West, together as an ensemble, remain globally
hegemonic (p 181).
5 P Martin, Time for the G20 to take the mantle from the G8, in J Kirton & M Koch (eds), G20
Growth, Innovation, Inclusion: The G20 at Ten, London: Newsdesk Communications/G20 Research
Group, November 2008, p 22.
6 The phrase quoted is from LH Summers, Reections on managing global integration, Journal of
Economic Perspectives, 13(2), 1999, p 4. For an equally pompous exercise in hubristic pontication, see
his International nancial crises: causes, prevention, and cures, American Economic Review, 90(2),
2000, in which we learn what it means to have an ecient nancial system and the best ways to design
one (p 2). Footnote 1 on the same page marks this as a moment at which Summers was most condent
of the benets that liquid markets provide.
7 The image of Hu Jintao, the president of China, and Manmohan Singh, the prime minister of India
leaders of the two most populous countries on earth, quite possibly destined to be the largest
economies on earth within our lifetimeswaiting outside while we held our G8 meetings, coming in for
lunch, and then being ushered from the room so that we could resume our discussions among
ourselves, is one that stayed with me. P Martin, Hell or High Water: My Life in and out of Politics,
p 358, quoted in GS Smith, G7 to G8 to G20: Evolution in Global Governance, CIGI G20 Papers, No 6,
May 2011, p 5.
8 Brazil, China, India, Mexico and Korea were invited to deliberate upon promoting and protecting
innovation; enhancing freedom of investment by means of an open investment climate including
strengthening the principles of corporate social responsibility; dening joint responsibilities for
development focusing specically on Africa; and joint access to know-how to improve energy eciency
and technology cooperation with the aim of contributing to reducing CO2 emissions. Ibid, p 5, note 7.
9 IMF, World Economic Outlook April 2008, Washington, DC: IMF, 2008, p xii. See also R Wade, The
First-World debt crisis of 20072010 in global perspective, Challenge, 51(4), 2008, pp 2425.
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22
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24
25
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27
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31
32
33
34
IMF, World Economic Outlook April 2011, Washington, DC: IMF, 2011, p 181, Table A1; and IMF,
World Economic Outlook September 2011, Washington, DC: IMF, 2011, p 2, Table 1.1.
B Eichengreen & R Baldwin, Introduction, in Eichengreen & Baldwin (eds), What G20 Leaders Must
Do to Stabilise our Economy and Fix the Financial System, London: Centre for Economic Policy
Research, 2008, p 1.
G20, CommuniqueKleinmond, Cape Town, South Africa, 1718 November 2007, p 1, para 2.
Beeson & Bell, The G-20 and international economic governance, p 77. They did presciently suggest,
however, that a major systemic crisis would allow the G20 to take up issues central to perceived US
interests ( p 81).
IMF, Transcript of a Press Brieng by Guido Mantega, Finance Minister of Brazil and Chairman of the
G-20, Washington, DC, 11 October 2008, at http://www.imf.org/external/np/tr/2008/tr081011.htm,
webcast at http://www.imf.org/external/mmedia/view.aspx?vid79160994001, accessed 13 June 2011.
See Press Brieng by Press Secretary Dana Perino, 22 October 2008, at http://georgewbushwhitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2008/10/20081022-2.html, accessed 13 June 2011. See also PM
Kevin Rudds role in international crisis summit, The Australian, 25 October 2008, which reports a
lengthy conversation between Rudd and Bush on 10 October in which Rudd urged the calling together
of the G20 leaders, at http://www.theaustralian.com.au/news/pms-role-in-crisis-summit/storye6frg6no-1111117850306, accessed 3 July 2011. The claim that Bush asked Rudd Whats the G20?
was subsequently denied.
G20, Communique Sao Paulo, Brazil, 89 November 2008, p 1, para 3.
DeclarationWashington, US, 15 November 2008, p 1, para 3.
G Chin, The emerging countries and China in the G20: reshaping global economic governance, Studia
Diplomatica, LXIII(2), 2010, pp 105123.
See the trenchant (and far from diplomatically expressed) case for emerging power recognition put
forward by Brazilian diplomat Marcel Biato in MF Biato, Shaping global governance: a Brazilian
perspective, Artigos CEBRI, 3(1), 2008, which notes Brazilian outreach to Africa and India, and the
South in general, and derides the G5 and Heiligendamm processes. Note also the more recent
characterisation of Brazilian foreign policy in P da Motta Veiga & S Polonia Rios, A pol tica externa
brasileira sob Lula: o m do Consenso de Bras lia?, Artigos CEBRI, 5(3), 2010, p 13: it is important
to note that issues of global governance are essentially perceived in Brasilia through the lens of North
South opposition. From this perspective, the central policy issue, as regards global governance, is the
redistribution of power between developed and developing countries in international forums. Measures
to deal with global challenges should be compatible with this objective, which is to say that they should
not only increase the voice of developing countries, but also make the developed countries foot the bill
for the measures concerned.
See, for example, M Kawai, G-20 Financial Reforms and Emerging Asias Challenges, in K Dervis,
M Kawai & D Lombardi (eds), Asia and Policymaking for the Global Economy, Manila/Washington,
DC: Asian Development Bank Institute/Brookings, 2011, pp 105106, 11622.
See J Pisani-Ferry, International governance: is the G20 the right forum?, Bruegel Policy
Contribution, March 2009, pp 34.
Cooper, The G20 as an improvised crisis committee and/or a contested steering committee for the
world, p 744.
G20, The Group of TwentyA History, Study Group Report presented to Finance Ministers and
Central Bank Governors, Kleinmond, South Africa: November 2007, pp 1819, emphasis added.
Martin, Time for the G20 to take the mantle from the G8, p 25.
P Cammack, What the World Bank means by poverty reduction and why it matters, New Political
Economy, 9(2), 2004, pp 189211.
G20, Communique, 1999, p 1, paras 25.
G20, Communique, 2007, p 2, para 4.
G20, Communique, 2008, p 5, para 14.
G20, Leaders Statement, the Pittsburgh Summit, 25 September 2009, p 6, para 6, emphasis added.
P Cammack, Poverty reduction and universal competitiveness, Labour, Capital and Society, 42(12),
2009, p 45.
T Kalinowski, Can Korea be a bridge between developing and developed countries in the G20 and
beyond?, in T Fues & P Wol (eds), G20 and Global Development: How can the New Summit
Architecture promote Pro-poor Growth and Sustainability?, Bonn: Deutsches Institut fur Entwicklungspolitik, 2010, pp 8687.
G20, The G20 Toronto Summit Declaration, 2627 June 2010, p 25, para 14.
See P Cammack, All power to global capital!, Papers in the Politics of Global Competitiveness, No 10,
Institute for Global Studies, Manchester Metropolitan University, e-space Open Access Repository,
2009.
Seoul Action Plan, pp 45, para 16.
15
PAUL CAMMACK
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Notes on contributor
Paul Cammack is Professor of Global Political Economy, City University of
Hong Kong. He is author of Capitalism and Development in the Third World
(1997) and most recently of The shape of capitalism to come, Antipode,
41(S1), 2010 and Knowledge and power in the eld of IPE, in S Shields, I
Bru and H Macartney, eds, Critical International Political Economy:
Dialogue, Debate, Dissensus (2011). He is currently completing a monograph
on The politics of global competitiveness.
16
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