Pag-Asa Steel Works, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, 486 SCRA 475, G.R. No.

166647
March 31, 2006
Evidence; Customs; Like any other fact, habits, customs, usage or patterns of
conduct must be proved.However, just like any other fact, habits, customs, usage
or patterns of conduct must be proved. Thus was the ruling of the Court in Boston
Bank of the Philippines v. Manalo, et al., 482 SCRA 108 (2006): Habit, custom, usage
or pattern of conduct must be proved like any other facts. Courts must contend with
the caveat that, before they admit evidence of usage, of habit or pattern of conduct,
the offering party must establish the degree of specificity and frequency of uniform
response that ensures more than a mere tendency to act in a given manner but
rather, conduct that is semi-automatic in nature. The offering party must allege and
prove specific, repetitive conduct that might constitute evidence of habit. The
examples offered in evidence to prove habit, or pattern of evidence must be
numerous enough to base on inference of systematic conduct. Mere similarity of
contracts does not present the kind of sufficiently similar circumstances to outweigh
the danger of prejudice and confusion.
Conde vs. Court of Appeals, 119 SCRA 245, No. L-40242 December 15,
1982
Same; Same; Same; Same; Parol evidence rule; Oral testimony cannot prevail over
a written agreement of the document of repurchase; Purpose of parol evidence rule.
There is nothing in the document of repurchase to show that Paciente Cordero had
signed the same merely to indicate that he had no objection to petitioners right of
repurchase. Besides, he would have had no personality to object. To uphold his oral
testimony on that point, would be a departure from the parol evidence rule and
would defeat the purpose for which the doctrine is intended. x x x The purpose of
the rule is to give stability to written agreements, and to remove the temptation
and possibility of perjury, which would be afforded if parol evidence was admissible
Ortaez vs. Court of Appeals, 266 SCRA 561, G.R. No. 107372 January 23, 1997
Evidence; Parol Evidence; Contracts; Under the general rule in Section 9 of Rule 130
of the Rules of Court, when the terms of an agreement were reduced to writing, it is
deemed to contain all the terms agreed upon and no evidence of such terms can be
admitted other than the contents thereof.The parol evidence herein introduced is
inadmissible. First, private respondents oral testimony on the alleged conditions,
coming from a party who has an interest in the outcome of the case, depending
exclusively on human memory, is not as reliable as written or documentary
evidence. Spoken words could be notoriously unreliable unlike a written contract
which speaks of a uniform language. Thus, under the general rule in Section 9 of
Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, when the terms of an agreement were reduced to
writing, as in this case, it is deemed to contain all the terms agreed upon and no
evidence of such terms can be admitted other than the contents thereof.

Considering that the written deeds of sale were the only repository of the truth,
whatever is not found in said instruments must have been waived and abandoned
by the parties. Examining the deeds of sale, we cannot even make an inference that
the sale was subject to any condition. As a contract, it is the law between the
parties.

Ortaez vs. Court of Appeals, 266 SCRA 561, G.R. No. 107372 January 23, 1997

Same; Same; The parol evidence herein sought to be introduced would vary,
contradict or defeat the operation of a valid instrument.The parol evidence herein
sought to be introduced would vary, contradict or defeat the operation of a valid
instrument, hence, contrary to the rule that: The parol evidence rule forbids any
addition to x x x the terms of a written instrument by testimony purporting to show
that, at or before the signing of the document, other or different terms were orally
agreed upon by the parties.
Same; Same; Parol evidence is admissible to explain the meaning of a contract but
cannot incorporate additional contemporaneous conditions which are not mentioned
at all in the writing unless there has been fraud or mistake.Although parol
evidence is admissible to explain the meaning of a contract, it cannot serve the
purpose of incorporating into the contract additional contemporaneous conditions
which are not mentioned at all in the writing unless there has been fraud or
mistake. No such fraud or mistake exists in this case.
Same; Same; Private respondents did not expressly plead that the deeds of sale
were incomplete or that it did not reflect the intention of the buyer and the seller.
We are not persuaded by private respondents contention that they put in issue by
the pleadings the failure of the written agreement to express the true intent of the
parties. Record shows that private respondents did not expressly plead that the
deeds of sale were incomplete or that it did not reflect the intention of the buyer
(petitioner) and the seller (private respondents). Such issue must be squarely
presented. Private respondents merely alleged that the sale was subject to four (4)
conditions which they tried to prove during trial by parol evidence. Obviously, this
cannot be done, because they did not plead any of the exceptions mentioned in the
parol evidence rule. Their case is covered by the general rule that the contents of
the writing are the only repository of the terms of the agreement.
Inciong, Jr. vs. Court of Appeals, 257 SCRA 578, G.R. No. 96405 June 26,
1996

Contracts; Evidence; Parol Evidence Rule; Negotiable Instruments; Promissory

Notes; The parol evidence rule does not specify that the written agreement be a
public document.Nor is there merit in petitioners assertion that since the
promissory note is not a public deed with the formalities prescribed by law but x x
x a mere commercial paper which does not bear the signature of x x x attesting
witnesses, parol evidence may overcome the contents of the promissory note.
The first paragraph of the parol evidence rule states: When the terms of an
agreement have been reduced to writing, it is considered as containing all the terms
agreed upon and there can be, between the parties and their successors in interest,
no evidence of such terms other than the contents of the written agreement.
Clearly, the rule does not specify that the written agreement be a public document.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; For the parol evidence rule to apply, a written
contract need not be in any particular form, or be signed by both partiesas a
general rule, bills, notes and other instruments of a similar nature are not subject to
be varied or contradicted by parol or extrinsic evidence.What is required is that
the agreement be in writing as the rule is in fact founded on long experience that
written evidence is so much more certain and accurate than that which rests in
fleeting memory only, that it would be unsafe, when parties have expressed the
terms of their contract in writing, to admit weaker evidence to control and vary the
stronger and to show that the parties intended a different contract from that
expressed in the writing signed by them. Thus, for the parol evidence rule to apply,
a written contract need not be in any particular form, or be signed by both parties.
As a general rule, bills, notes and other instruments of a similar nature are not
subject to be varied or contradicted by parol or extrinsic evidence.
Same; Same; Same; Fraud; Fraud must be established by clear and convincing
evidence, mere preponderance of evidence not even being adequateand a partys
attempt to prove fraud must fail where it was evidenced only by his own
uncorroborated and self-serving testimony.By alleging fraud in his answer,
petitioner was actually in the right direction towards proving that he and his comakers agreed to a loan of P5,000.00 only considering that, where a parol
contemporaneous agreement was the inducing and moving cause of the written
contract, it may be shown by parol evidence. However, fraud must be established
by clear and convincing evidence, mere preponderance of evidence, not even being
adequate. Petitioners attempt to prove fraud must, therefore, fail as it was
evidenced only by his own uncorroborated and, expectedly, self-serving.
Cruz vs. Court of Appeals, 192 SCRA 209, G.R. No. 79962 December 10,
1990
Evidence; Parol Evidence; Sec. 7, Rule 130 is predicated on the existence of a
document embodying the terms of an agreement. Exh. D does not contain such an
agreement, hence the rule will not apply, and parol evidence may be introduced to
explain the real agreement between the parties.The reason for the rule is the

presumption that when the parties have reduced their agreement to writing they
have made such writing the only repository and memorial of the truth, and
whatever is not found in the writing must be understood to have been waived or
abandoned. The rule, however, is not applicable in the case at bar. Section 7, Rule
130 is predicated on the existence of a document embodying the terms of an
agreement, but Exhibit D does not contain such an agreement. It is only a receipt
attesting to the fact that on May 4,1982, the petitioner received from the private
respondent the amount of P35,000. It is not and could have not been intended by
the parties to be the sole memorial of their agreement. As a matter of fact, Exhibit
D does not even mention the transaction that gave rise to its issuance. At most,
Exhibit D can only be considered a casual memorandum of a transaction between
the parties and an acknowledgment of the receipt of money executed by the
petitioner for the private respondent's satisfaction. A writing of this nature, as
Wigmore observed, is not covered by the parol evidence rule. A receipti.e. a
written acknowledgment, handed by one party to the other, of the manual custody
of money or other personaltywill in general fall without the line of the rule; i.e. it is
not intended to be an exclusive memorial, and the facts may be shown irrespective
of the terms of the receipt. This is because usually a receipt is merely a written
admission of a transaction independently existing, and, like other admissions, is not
conclusive.
Same; Same; Same; A deed is not conclusive evidence of everything it may contain.
While Exhibit I is dated May 14, 1982, it does not make any categorical
declaration that the amount of P28,000.00 stated therein was received by the
petitioner on that same date. That date may not therefore be considered conclusive
as to when the amount of P28,000.00 was actually received. A deed is not
conclusive evidence of everything it may contain. For instance, it is not the only
evidence of the date of its execution, nor its omission of a consideration conclusive
evidence that none passed, nor is its acknowledgment of a particular consideration
an objection to other proof of other and consistent considerations; and, by analogy,
the acknowledgment in a deed is not conclusive of the fact.
Same; Same; Same; Failure to object to the introduction of evidence varying the
terms of a written agreement, is deemed a waiver of the benefit of the parol
evidence rule.For failure of the private respondent to object to the evidence
introduced by the petitioner, he is deemed to have waived the benefit of the parol
evidence rule. Thus, in Abrenica v. Gonda, this Court held: x x x it has been
repeatedly laid down as a rule of evidence that a protest or objection against the
admission of any evidence must be made at the proper time, and that if not so
made it will be understood to have been waived. The proper time to make a protest
or objection is when, from the question ad dressed to the witness, or from the
answer thereto, or from the presentation of proof, the inadmissibility of evidence is,
or may be inferred.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Courts cannot disregard evidence which would ordinarily
be incompetent under the rules but has been rendered admissible by the failure of a
party to object thereto.It is also settled that the court cannot disregard evidence
which would ordinarily be incompetent under the rules but has been rendered
admissible by the failure of a party to object thereto. Thus: x x x The acceptance of
an incompetent witness to testify in a civil suit, as well as the allowance of improper
questions that may be put to him while on the stand is a matter resting in the
discretion of the litigant. He may assert his right by timely objection or he may
waive it, expressly or by silence. In any case the option rests with him. Once
admitted, the testimony is in the case for what it is worth and the judge has no
power to disregard it for the sole reason that it could have been excluded, if it had
been objected to, nor to strike it out on its own motion.

Lechugas vs. Court of Appeals, 143 SCRA 335, Nos. L-39972 & L-40300
August 6, 1986
Evidence; Contracts; Parol evidence rule cannot be invoked where at least one party
to the suit is not a party or privy to the written instrument in question.As
explained by a leading commentator on our Rules of Court, the parol evidence rule
does not apply, and may not properly be invoked by either party to the litigation
against the other, where at least one of the parties to the suit is not party or a privy
of a party to the written instrument in question and does not base a claim on the
instrument or assert a right originating in the instrument or the relation established
thereby. (Francisco on Evidence, Vol. VII, part I of the Rules of Court, p. 155 citing 32
C.J.S. 79.)
Same; Same; Same.The petitioners reliance on the parol evidence rule is
misplaced. The rule is not applicable where the controversy is between one of the
parties to the document and third persons. The deed of sale was executed by
Leoncia Lasangue in favor of Victoria Lechugas. The dispute over what was actually
sold is between petitioner and the private respondents. In the case at bar, through
the testimony of Leoncia Lasangue, it was shown that what she really intended to
sell and to be the subject of Exhibit A was Lot No. 5522 but not being able to read
and write and fully relying on the good faith of her first cousin, the petitioner, she
just placed her thumbmark on a piece of paper which petitioner told her was the
document evidencing the sale of land. The deed of sale described the disputed lot
instead.
Same; Same; Appeal; The respondents never changed their theory on appealthat
what appears on the Deed of Sale was not the land the vendor intended to sell to
petitioner.Respondents, from the very start, had questioned and denied Leoncia
Lasangues capacity to sell the disputed lot to petitioner. It was their contention that
the lot was sold by Leoncias father Emeterio Lasangue to their father, Hugo Loza

wayback in 1941 while the alleged sale by Leoncia to the petitioner took place only
in 1950. In essence, therefore, the respondents were already attacking the validity
of Exhibit A. Moreover, although the prior sale of the lot to their father may have
been emphasized in their defenses in the civil cases filed against them by the
petitioner in the lower court, nevertheless in their affirmative defense, the
respondents already raised doubt on the true intention of Leoncia Lasangue in
signing Exhibit A when they alleged that x x x Leoncia Lasangue, publicly, and in
writing repudiated said allegation and pretension of the plaintiff, to the effect that
the parcel of land now in litigation in the present case WAS NOT INCLUDED in the
sale she executed in favor of the plaintiff x x x.

Ramirez vs. Orientalist Co. and Fernandez., 38 Phil. 634, [No. 11897 September 24,
1918
CONTRACTS; SURETY; PAROL EVIDENCE TO SHOW CHARACTER IN WHIGH PARTY IS
BOUND.The written contract which was the subject of this action contained the
corporate name signed at the lower right-hand corner of the contract, in the manner
usual with a party signing in the character of principal obligor. The name of another
individual was signed somewhat below and to the left of the corporate signature,
after the customary manner of those who sign in a subsidiary capacity; but no
words were written to indicate clearly whether this individual signed as a principal
obligor or as surety. Held: That parol evidence was admissible to show that the
intention was that he should be bound as surety and not jointly with the other party.

TESTIMONIAL EVIDENCE
People vs. Duranan, 349 SCRA 180, G.R. Nos. 134074-75 January 16, 2001
Criminal Law; Rape; Mental Retardates; Witnesses; The mother of an offended party
in a case of rape, though not a psychiatrist, if she knows the physical and mental
condition of the party, how she was born, what she is suffering from, and what her
attainments are, is competent to testify on the matter; It is competent for the
ordinary witness to give his opinion as to the sanity or mental condition of a person,
provided the witness has had sufficient opportunity to observe the speech, manner,
habits, and conduct of the person in question.Discussing this provision of the
Rules on Evidence, Sen. Vicente J. Francisco writes in his treatise: The mother of an
offended party in a case of rape, though not a psychiatrist, if she knows the physical
and mental condition of the party, how she was born, what she is suffering from,
and what her attainments are, is competent to testify on the matter. . . . . It is
competent for the ordinary witness to give his opinion as to the sanity or mental
condition of a person, provided the witness has had sufficient opportunity to
observe the speech, manner, habits, and conduct of the person in question.

Generally, it is required that the witness details the factors and reasons upon which
he bases his opinion before he can testify as to what it is. As the Supreme Court of
Vermont said: A non-expert witness may give his opinion as to the sanity or
insanity of another, when based upon conversations or dealings which he has had
with such person, or upon his appearance, or upon any fact bearing upon his mental
condition, with the witness own knowledge and observation, he having first
testified to such conversations, dealings, appearance or other observed facts, as the
basis for his opinion.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Although the complainant may be a retardate, she is
nevertheless competent to testify if she is able to tell the court what the accused
had done to her and to answer the questions of both the prosecutor and the
defense counsel.On the alternative, accused-appellant argues that indeed,
complainant could not be a competent witness if she is a retardate. Under Rule 130,
20, any person who can perceive and make known his/her perception is qualified
to be a witness. In this case, although complainant is a retardate, she was
nevertheless able to tell the court what accused-appellant had done to her and to
answer the questions of both the prosecutor and the defense counsel. This is clear
from her testimony.
Same; Same; Same; Same; The competency of complainant to testify should be
raised by the defense at the outsetit cannot be raised for the first time on appeal.
At all events, any objection to the competency of complainant to testify should
have been raised by the defense at the outset. It cannot be raised for the first time
in this appeal. It has been held: A party may waive his objections to the competency
of a witness and permit him to testify . . . . [I]f, after such incompetency appears,
there is failure to make timely objection, by a party having knowledge of the
incompetency, the objection will be deemed waived, whether it is on the ground of
want of mental capacity or for some other reason. If the objection could have been
taken during the trial, a new trial will be refused and the objection will not be
available on writ of error.
Same; Same; The presence or absence of injuries is not essential in proving rape.
Accused-appellant contends that the absence of injury sustained by complainant
negates the presence of any force and intimidation. This contention is likewise
without merit. The presence or absence of injuries is not essential in proving rape.
What is essential is proof that sexual intercourse with a woman was accomplished
without her consent. In this case, the absence of consent is shown by the fact that
complainant is a mental retardate vulnerable to intimidation by accused-appellant.
People vs. Espanola, 271 SCRA 689, G.R. No. 119308 April 18, 1997
Same; Witnesses; Mental Retardates; A mental retardate is not, per se, disqualified
from being a witness.Appellants also assail the testimony of Gonzales on the
ground of his alleged mental incapacity. Section 20 of Rule 130 provides that

except as provided in the next succeeding section, all persons who can perceive,
and perceiving, can make known their perception to others, may be witnesses.
Section 21, inter alia, disqualifies as witnesses, those whose mental condition, at
the time of their production for examination, is such that they are incapable of
intelligently making known their perception to others. A mental retardate is not
therefore, per se, disqualified from being a witness. As long as his senses can
perceive facts and if he can convey his perceptions in court, he can be a witness. In
the case at bar, we find that Gonzales had a tendency to be repetitious and at times
had to be asked leading questions, but he was not unintelligible to be beyond
understanding. He was clear and unyielding in identifying the appellants as the
perpetrators of the crime. On the whole, his account of the crime was coherent
enough to shed light on the guilt or innocence of the accused.
Same; Same; Same; Modern rules on evidence have downgraded mental incapacity
as a ground to disqualify a witness.To be sure, modern rules on evidence have
downgraded mental incapacity as a ground to disqualify a witness. As observed by
McCormick, the remedy of excluding such a witness who may be the only person
available who knows the facts, seems inept and primitive. Our rules follow the
modern trend of evidence.
Same; Same; Affidavits; It is well-settled rule that affidavits should not be
considered as the final and full repository of truth.Nor can the alleged
inconsistencies between the sworn statement of Gonza-les and his testimony in
court affect his credibility. Gonzales testimony jibes on material points. His
inconsistencies on minor details of the crime are not earmarks of falsehoods. On the
contrary, they show that his testimony is honest and unrehearsed. Moreover, it is a
well-settled rule that affidavits should not be considered as the final and full
repository of truth. Affidavits are usually taken ex-parte. They are oftentimes
incomplete and inaccurate. Ordinarily in a question-andanswer form, they are
usually and routinely prepared in police precincts by police investigators. Not
infrequently, the investigator propounds questions merely to elicit a general picture
of the subject matter under investigation.
Same; Same; Same; Testimonies given during trials are more exact and elaborate
for their accuracy is tested by the process of cross-examination where the truth is
distilled from half-truths and the total lies.Indeed, there is no rule of evidence that
would stop an affiant from elaborating his prior sworn statement at the trial itself.
Testimonies given during trials are more exact and elaborate for their accuracy is
tested by the process of cross-examination where the truth is distilled from half
truths and the total lies.
People vs. Pedrosa, 169 SCRA 545, G.R. No. 56457 January 27, 1989
Criminal Law; Rape; Remedial Law; Evidence; Circumstantial Evidence; To determine
the sufficiency of circumstantial evidence all the facts and circumstances are to be

taken as a whole; and such facts if so considered, may be sufficient for conviction,
although one or more facts taken separately would not be sufficient for this
purpose.The Court does not, however, rule out the overpowering force of
circumstantial evidence to establish the guilt of accused. Sec. 5 of Rule 133, Rules
of Court, provides that Circumstantial evidence is sufficient for conviction if: (a)
There is more than one circumstance; (b) The facts from which the inferences are
derived are proven; and (c) The combination of all the circumstances is such as to
produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt. In determining the sufficiency of
circumstantial evidence to support a conviction, each case is to be determined on
its own peculiar circumstances. All the facts and circumstances are to be considered
together as a whole. When so considered, they may be sufficient to support a
conviction, although one or more of the facts taken separately would not be
sufficient for this purpose.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Res Gestae; The reply of accused when asked by the
policeman if he was Dioscoro Pedrosa, such reply being I did not know what I was
doing, is an unusual utterance, an admission of guilt, and is part of the res gestae.
(1)The reply of the accused, when he was asked by Patrolman Rogelio Montejo
whether he was Dioscoro Pedrosa, which reply was made not very long after he had
failed to secure poison, such a reply being: I did not know what I was doing. This
utterance is an unusual utterance. It was not the proper answer to a simple
question. It was made spontaneously and instinctively, with the knowledge that his
fear and apprehension had been transformed into realityhe was already being
made to answer and to account for the death of Maria Belen. This utterance is an
admission of guilt. It is part of res gestae.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Witnesses; The testimony of children who are of sound
mind are likely to be more correct and truthful than that of older persons, and the
same should be given full faith and credence when it has been established that they
fully understood the nature and character of an oath.The star witnesses for the
prosecution in this case are children of tender years. And from the mouths of
children we get the truth. An intelligent boy is undoubtedly the best observer to be
found. The world begins to take him by storm with its thousand matters of interest;
what the school and his daily life furnish cannot satisfy his overflowing and
generous heart. He lays hold of everything new, striking, stranger all his senses are
on the stretch to assimilate it as far as possible. x x x Besides, he has already got
some principles; lying is distasteful to him, because he thinks it mean; he is no
stranger to the sentiment of self-respect, and he never loses an opportunity of being
right in what he affirms. Thus he is, as a rule, but little influenced by the
suggestions of others, and he describes objects and occurrences as he has really
seen them. We say again that an intelligent boy is as a rule the best witness in the
world. Truly, children of sound mind are likely to be more observant of incidents
which take place within their view than older persons, so their testimony is likely to
be more correct and truthful than that of older persons, and where once established

that they have fully understood the nature and character of an oath, as in this case
before us, their testimony should be given full faith and credence.
MARITAL DISQUALIFICATION
THE UNITED STATES vs. CONCEPCION, 31 Phil. 182, No. 10396 July 29, 1915
WITNESSES; COMPETENCY; HUSBAND OR WIFE.A husband cannot be examined for
or against his wife, without her consent; nor a wife for or against her husband,
without his consent; nor can either, during the marriage, or afterwards, be, without
the consent of the other, examined as to any communication made by one to the
other during the marriage; but this exception does not apply to a civil action or
proceeding by one against the other, or to a criminal action or proceeding for a
crime committed by one against the other. (Par. 3, sec. 383, Act No. 190; sec. 58,
General Orders No. 58.) At the common law the rule was that the husband and wife
could not testify for or against the other, in any criminal proceedings, except in the
prosecution of one for criminal injury to the other. The rule is based-upon
considerations of public policy, growing out of the marital relation. To allow one to
testify for or against the other would be to subject him or her to great temptation to
commit perjury and to endanger the harmony and confidence of the marital
relation.
3.ID.; ID.; ID.; DECLARATION MADE IN ANOTHER CASE.R declared in a criminal
action against himself. Later, in a criminal action against C, said declaration was
presented as proof and accepted, over the objection of C. No proof was offered to
show that R was not still alive. Said declarations are not only not admissible by
virtue of the provisions of section 383 of Act No. 190 and section 58 of General
Orders No. 58, but also by virtue of the provisions of paragraph 2 of section 5 of the
Act of Congress of July 1, 1902. C, the defendant, was not given an opportunity "to
meet the witness face to face." The acceptance of the testimony of her husband, E,
given in another case, was in absolute violation of her rights, and in direct
contravention of the law.

Lezama vs. Rodriguez, 23 SCRA 1166, No. L-25643 June 27, 1968
evidence; Husband and wife; Rule that a husband cannot be examined for or
against his wife; Scope of its application; Reason for the rule; Case at bar.A
husband cannot be examined for or against his wife without her consent; nor a wife
for or against her husband without his consent, except in a civil case by one against
the other, or in a criminal case for a crime committed by one against the other (Sec.
20 [b], Rule 130, Rules of Court). This provision and rule deals with two different
matters which rest on different grounds of policy: the disqualification f husband and
wife to testify in each others behalf, as well as their privilege not to testify against
each other. The fundamental theory of the common law is said to be that

relationship of the spouses, not their pecuniary interest, is the basis of the
disqualification. Indeed section 20 of Rule 130 is entitled Disqualification by reason
of x x x relationship.
On the other hand, while a welter of emotional reasons has been offered (see U.S. v.
Concepcion, 31 Phil. 182; and People v. Francisco, 78 Phil. 694) for the privilege, the
true explanation which is after all the simplest (Wigmore, sec. 2227 at 212) and
which constitutes the real and sole strength of the opposition to abolishing the
privilege, is the natural repugnance in every fair-minded person to compelling a
wife or husband to be the means of the others condemnation and to subjecting the
culprit to the humiliation of being condemned by the words of his intimate life
partner (Id., sec. 2228, at 217).
In the case at bar where the wife is a co-defendant in a suit charging fraud against
the spouses, can the wife be compelled to testify as an adverse party witness
concerning her participation in the alleged fraud without violating section 20(b) of
Rule 130? Even in those jurisdictions which allow one spouse to be subjected to
examination by the adverse party as a hostile witness when both spouses are
parties to the action, either the interests of the spouses are separate or separable,
or the spouse offerred as a witness is merely a formal or nominal party (97 C.J.S.
477). Section 6 of Rule 132 (Rule on Direct Examination of unwilling or hostile
witnesses) is a mere concession, for the sake of discovery, from the rule which
precludes the husband or the wife from becoming the means of the others
condemnation. The said rule of discovery should therefore not be expanded in
meaning or scope as to allow examination of ones spouse in a situation where this
natural repugnance obtains.
People vs. Castaeda, Jr., 88 SCRA 562, No. L-46306 February 27, 1979
Criminal Procedure; Wife may testify against husband for crime of falsification of a
deed of sale of conjugal house and lot where wife was made to appear as having
given far consent to the sale.With more reason must the exception apply to the
instant case where the victim of the crime and the person who stands to be directly
prejudiced by the falsification is not a third person but the wife herself. And it is
undeniable that the criminal act complained of had the effect of directly and vitally
impairing the conjugal relation. This is apparent not only in the act of the wife in
personally lodging her complaint with the office of the Provincial Fiscal, but also in
her insistent efforts in connection with the instant petition, which seeks to set aside
the order disqualifying her from testifying against her husband. Taken collectively,
the actuations of the witness-wife underscore the fact that the martial and domestic
relations between her and the accused-husband have become so strained that there
is no more harmony to be preserved nor peace and tranguility which may be
disturbed. In such a case, as We have occasion to point out in previous decisions,
identity of interests disappears and the consequent danger of perjury based on
that identity is nonexistent. Likewise, in such a situation, the security and

confidences of private life which the law aims at protecting will be nothing but
ideals which, through their absence, merely leave a void in the unhappy home.
Thus, there is no reason to apply the marital disqualification rule.
Guerrero vs. St. Clares Realty Co., Ltd., 124 SCRA 553, No. L-58164 September 2,
1983
Evidence; Witnesses; The dead-mans rule does not apply to a witness who is not
a party or assignor of a party or person in whose behalf a case is being prosecuted.
Upon the facts and under the law, this Court is fully persuaded that the
affirmative rulings of both the trial court and the Court of Appeals were made in
error. The plain truth is that Laura Cervantes and Jose Cervantes are not parties in
the present case, and neither are they assignors of the parties nor persons in
whose behalf a case is prosecuted. They are mere witnesses by whose testimonies
the plaintiffs aimed to establish that it was not Cristina Guerrero, but Andres
Guerrero, who owned the disputed land at the time of its alleged sale to Manuel
Guerrero; that Cristina Guerrero did not really sell but merely mortgaged the
property to Manuel Guerrero.
Same; Same; The dead mans rule does not apply where the case is not a claim or
demand against the estate of a deceased person, but a case where defendant is
being sued for allegedly claiming ownership of plaintiffs lot without basis.
Moreover, the present case is not a claim or demand against the estate of the
deceased Manuel Guerrero. The defendants Guerreros are not the executors or
administrators or representatives of such deceased. They are being sued as
claimants of ownership in their individual capacities of the disputed lot. The lot is
not a part of the estate of Manuel Guerrero. Hence, the inapplicability of the dead
mans rule.
Same; Same; It is error to require a formal offer of testimonial evidence as a
condition for its admission in evidence.The next question that requires attention is
whether or not the exclusion of plaintiffs evidence and their preclusion from
presenting further proof was correctly sustained by the respondent Court of
appeals. Prior to the issuance of the courts order of June 14, 1974, by which the
plaintiffs were deemed to have waived their right to further present or formally
offer their evidence, the following had testified as witnesses of the plaintiffs,
namely: Alfredo Zamora, Roman Mataverde, Moises Javillonar, Dominador Ramirez,
Bonifacio Sumulong, Frisco Cervantes, Laura Cervantes and Jose Cervantes. It was
error to hold that the testimonial evidence should have been formally offered, or
that without such offer, such evidence was waived. The offer of testimonial
evidence is effected by calling the witness to the stand and letting him testify
before the court upon appropriate questions.
Goi vs. Court of Appeals, 144 SCRA 222, No. L-27434 September 23, 1986

Evidence; The privilege to invoke the Dead Mans Statute is waived by the
defendant where (a) he cross-examines the plaintiff; and (b) he files a counterclaim
against the plaintiff.Such protection, however, was effectively waived when
counsel for petitioners crossexamined private respondent Vicente. A waiver occurs
when plaintiffs deposition is taken by the representative of the estate or when
counsel for the representative cross-examined the plaintiff as to matters occurring
during deceaseds lifetime. It must further be observed that petitioners presented
a counterclaim against private respondent Vicente. When Vicente thus took the
witness stand, it was in a dual capacity as plaintiff in the action for recovery of
property and as defendant in the counterclaim for accounting and surrender of
fields nos. 4 and 13. Evidently, as defendant in the counterclaim, he was not
disqualified from testifying as to matters of fact occurring before the death of
Praxedes Villanueva, said action not having been brought against, but by the estate
or representatives of the estate/deceased person.
Same; The Survivorship Disqualification Rule cannot be invoke where defendant
testifies as to communications made or contracts entered into with the agent of the
decedent while latter was alive.Likewise, under a great majority of statutes, the
adverse party is competent to testify to transactions or communications with the
deceased or incompetent person which were made with an agent of such person in
cases in which the agent is still alive and competent to testify. But the testimony of
the adverse party must be confined to those transactions or communications which
were had with the agent. The contract/promise to sell under consideration was
signed by petitioner Goi as attorney-in-fact (apoderado) of Praxedes Villanueva. He
was privy to the circumstances surrounding the execution of such contract and
therefore could either confirm or deny any allegations made by private respondent
Vicente with respect to said contract. The inequality or injustice sought to be
avoided by Section 20(a) of Rule 130, where one of the parties no longer has the
opportunity to either confirm or rebut the testimony of the other because death has
permanently sealed the formers lips, does not actually exist in the case at bar, for
the reason that petitioner Goi could and did not negate the binding effect of the
contract/promise to sell. Thus, while admitting the existence of the said
contract/promise to sell, petitioner Goi testified that the same was subsequently
novated into a verbal contract of lease over fields nos. 4 and 13 of the Hacienda
Dulce Nombre de Maria.

Razon vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 207 SCRA 234, G.R. No. 74306,
G.R. No. 74315 March 16, 1992

Evidence; Dead mans statute.In the instant case, the testimony excluded by
the appellate court is that of the defendant (petitioner herein) to the effect that the
late Juan Chuidian, (the father of private respondent Vicente Chuidian, the
administrator of the estate of Juan Chuidian) and the defendant agreed in the
lifetime of Juan Chuidian that the 1,500 shares of stock in E. Razon, Inc. are actually
owned by the defendant unless the deceased Juan Chuidian opted to pay the same
which never happened. The case was filed by the administrator of the estate of the
late Juan Chuidian to recover shares of stock in E. Razon, Inc. allegedly owned by
the late Juan T. Chuidian. It is clear, therefore, that the testimony of the petitioner is
not within the prohibition of the rule. The case was not filed against the
administrator of the estate, nor was it filed upon claims against the estate.
Furthermore, the records show that the private respondent never objected to the
testimony of the petitioner as regards the true nature of his transaction with the
late elder Chuidian. The petitioners testimony was subject to cross-examination by
the private respon-dents counsel. Hence, granting that the petitioners testimony is
within the prohibition of Section 20(a), Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, the private
respondent is deemed to have waived the rule.

COMMUNICATION PRIVILEGE
Krohn vs. Court of Appeals, 233 SCRA 146, G.R. No. 108854 June 14, 1994
Evidence; Privileged Communication; Physician-Patient Relationship; Requisites in
order that the privilege may be successfully invoked.Requisites in order that the
privilege may be successfully invoked: (a) the privilege is claimed in a civil case; (b)
the person against whom the privilege is claimed is one duly authorized to practice
medicine, surgery or obstetrics; (c) such person acquired the information while he
was attending to the patient in his professional capacity; (d) the information was
necessary to enable him to act in that capacity; and, (e) the information was
confidential and, if disclosed, would blacken the reputation (formerly character) of
the patient.
Same; Same; Same; The person against whom the privilege is claimed is not one
duly authorized to practice medicine, surgery or obstetrics. He is the patients
husband who wishes to testify on a document executed by medical practitioners.
His testimony cannot have the force and effect of the testimony of the physician
who examined the patient and executed the report.In the instant case, the person
against whom the privilege is claimed is not one duly authorized to practice
medicine, surgery or obstetrics. He is simply the patients husband who wishes to
testify on a document executed by medical practitioners. Plainly and clearly, this
does not fall within the claimed prohibition Neither can his testimony be considered
a circumvention of the prohibition because his testimony cannot have the force and

effect of the testimony of the physician who examined the patient and executed the
report.
Same; Same; Same; In failing to object to the testimony on the ground that it was
hearsay, counsel waived his right to make such objection and, consequently, the
evidence offered may be admitted.Counsel for petitioner indulged heavily in
objecting to the testimony of private respondent on the ground that it was
privileged. In his Manifestation before the trial court dated 10 May 1991, he invoked
the rule on privileged communications but never questioned the testimony as
hearsay. It was a fatal mistake. For, in failing to object to the testimony on the
ground that it was hearsay, counsel waived his right to make such objection and,
consequently, the evidence offered may be admitted.
Regala vs. Sandiganbayan, First Division, 262 SCRA 122, G.R. No. 105938,
G.R. No. 108113 September 20, 1996
Attorneys; Lawyer-Client Relationship; Petitioners are being prosecuted solely on the
basis of activities and services performed in the course of their duties as lawyers.
It would seem that petitioners are merely standing in for their clients as defendants
in the complaint. Petitioners are being prosecuted solely on the basis of activities
and services performed in the course of their duties as lawyers. Quite obviously,
petitioners inclusion as co-defendants in the complaint is merely being used as
leverage to compel them to name their clients and consequently to enable the
PCGG to nail these clients. Such being the case, respondent PCGG has no valid
cause of action as against petitioners and should exclude them from the Third
Amended Complaint.
Same; Same; An attorney is more than a mere agent or servant because he
possesses special powers of trust and confidence reposed on him by his client.In
modern day perception of the lawyer-client relationship, an attorney is more than a
mere agent or servant, because he possesses special powers of trust and
confidence reposed on him by his client. A lawyer is also as independent as the
judge of the court, thus his powers are entirely different from and superior to those
of an ordinary agent. Moreover, an attorney also occupies what may be considered
as a quasi-judicial office since he is in fact an officer of the Court and exercises his
judgment in the choice of courses of action to be taken favorable to his client.
Same; Same; In the creation of lawyer-client relationship there are rules, ethical
conduct and duties that breathe life into it.Thus, in the creation of lawyer-client
relationship, there are rules, ethical conduct and duties that breathe life into it,
among those, the fiduciary duty to his client which is of a very delicate, exacting
and confidential character, requiring a very high degree of fidelity and good faith,
that is required by reason of necessity and public interest based on the hypothesis
that abstinence from seeking legal advice in a good cause is an evil which is fatal to
the administration of justice.

Neri vs. Senate Committee on Accountability of Public Officers and Investigations,

549 SCRA 77, G.R. No. 180643 March 25, 2008
The claim of executive privilege is highly recognized in cases where the subject of
inquiry relates to a power textually committed by the Constitution to the President
such as the area of military and foreign relations.
Nixon, In Re Sealed Case and Judicial Watch, somehow provide the elements of
presidential communications privilege, to wit: 1) The protected communication must
relate to a quintessential and non-delegable presidential power. 2) The
communication must be authored or solicited and received by a close advisor of
the President or the President himself. The judicial test is that an advisor must be in
operational proximity with the President. 3) The presidential communications
privilege remains a qualified privilege that may be overcome by a showing of
adequate need, such that the information sought likely contains important
evidence and by the unavailability of the information elsewhere by an appropriate
investigating authority.
Banco Filipino vs. Monetary Board, 142 SCRA 523, No. L-70054 July 8, 1986
Evidence; Motions; Statutes declaring certain official records confidential must be
liberally construed and an exception thereto is deemed implied when the records
are needed in a court of justice.The motion for the production of the subject
documents was filed by petitioner pursuant to Section 1, Rule 27, of the Rules of
Court. It has been held that a party is ordinarily entitled to the production of books,
documents and papers which are material and relevant to the establishment of his
cause of action or defense (General Electric Co. vs. Superior Court in and for
Alameda County, 45 C. 2d 879, cited in Martin, Rules of Court, 3rd edition, Vol. 2, p.
104). The test to be applied by the trial judge in determining the relevancy of
documents and the sufficiency of their description is one of reasonableness and
practicability (Line Corp. of the Philippines vs. Moran, 59 Phil. 176, 180). On the
ground of public policy, the rules providing for production and inspection of books
and papers do not authorize the production or inspection of privileged matter, that
is, books, papers which because of their confidential and privileged character could
not be received in evidence (27) CJS 224). In passing on a motion for discovery of
documents, the courts should be liberal in determining whether or not documents
are relevant to the subject matter of action (Hercules Powder Co. vs. Haas Co., U.S.
Dist. Ct. Oct. 26, 1944, 9 Fed. Rules Service, 659, cited in Moran, Comments on the

Rules of Court, 1979 Ed. Vol. 2, p. 102). Likewise, any statute declaring in general
terms that official records are confidential should be liberally construed, to have an
implied exception for disclosure when needed in a court of justice (Wigmore on
Evidence, Vol. VIII, p. 801, citing the case of Marbury vs. Madison, 1 Cr. 137, 14.

United States vs. Ching Po, 23 Phil., 578, No. 7707 December 6, 1912

Evidence; Admissibility of Declarations by Defendant Upon a Former Trial.The rule

seems to be well settled that the declarations made by a defendant, or a third party
by his authority, if relevant, are admissible against one charged with a crime. If the
defendant has made statements constituting an admission of the facts charged in
the complaint, or relevant thereto, they are admissible against him. A man's acts,
conduct and declarations, wherever made, provided they are voluntary, are
admissible against him, for the reason that it is fair to presume that they correspond
with the truth, and it is his fault if they do not. If a man's extrajudicial admissions
are admissible against him, there seems to be no reason why his admissions made
in open court, under oath, should not be accepted against him.
Ysmael & Co. vs. Hashim and Gorayeb, 50 Phil. 132, No. 26247 March
18, 1927
ID.; EVIDENCE; BOOK ACCOUNTS; INQUIRIES AS TO SOURCES OF ENTRIES.In an
action upon a book account, the defendant debtor should be given the opportunity,
if he so desires, to inquire into the source of the entries found in the plaintiff's books
of account in relation to the indebtedness.
3.ID.; ID.; INTRODUCTION OF TESTIMONY GIVEN IN AN EARLIER CASE; LAYING
FOUNDATION FOR SUCH INTRODUCTION ; ADMISSIONS AGAINST INTEREST.The
defendant offered in evidence testimony given in an earlier case by members of the
plaintiff firm, Held: That if such testimony contained admissions against interest by
the parties to the action or their agents, it would have been admissible without the
laying of' a foundation and without the witnesses having testified in the case at bar;
but the purpose of the offer of the testimony was evidently to impeach the
testimony of the same witnesses in the present case and, if so, a foundation should
have been laid by calling the attention of the witnesses to the former statements so
as to give them opportunity to explain before the statements were offered in
evidence.

ADMISSION VS CONFESSION
People vs. Lorenzo, 240 SCRA 624, G.R. No. 110107 January 26, 1995
Evidence; Witnesses; When the issue is the witnesses credibility, appellate courts
will generally not disturb the findings of the trial court.The pith of the assigned
errors and the focus of the appellants arguments is the issue of the witnesses
credibility. It is a wellentrenched rule that when such is the issue, appellate courts
will generally not disturb the findings of the trial court considering that the latter is
in a better position to decide the question, having heard the witnesses themselves
and observed their deportment and manner of testifying during the trial, unless
certain facts of value have been plainly overlooked which, if considered, might
affect the result of the case. The trial court has the singular opportunity to observe
and consider certain potent aids in understanding and weighing the testimony of
witnesses, such as the emphasis, gesture, and inflection of the voice of the
witnesses while they are on the witness stand. As these are not incorporated into
the record, the appellate court cannot avail of them and must therefore rely on the
good judgment of the trial court. The appellant has not convinced us that the trial
court plainly overlooked proved facts or circumstances which, if considered, may
affect the result of this case. We thus accept its assessment of the evidence as
correct and consider it binding, there being no showing that it was reached
arbitrarily. Our own evaluation thereof yields no cause for the application of the
exception to the settled rule.
Same; Same; Motive; Absence of evidence as to an improper motive strongly tends
to sustain the conclusion that none existed and that the testimony is worthy of full
faith and credit.lf there was any bias, it should have been, logically, in favor of the
appellant because of esprit de corps. Eclipse did not allow that sentiment to
compromise his official and public duty as a peace officer. It is settled that the
absence of evidence as to an improper motive strongly tends to sustain the
conclusion that none existed and that the testimony is worthy of full faith and
credit, for, indeed, if an accused had nothing to do with the crime, it would be
against the natural order of events and of human nature and against the
presumption of good faith for a prosecution witness to falsely testify against the
accused.
Same; Same; Extrajudicial Confessions; Under Sec. 3, Rule 133 of the Rules of Court,
what must be corroborated is the extrajudicial confession and not the testimony of
the person to whom the confession is made, and the corroborative evidence
required is that of the corpus delicti.Nor is there merit to the claim that Isabelo
Libans testimony must corroborate Eclipses testimony or the confession of the
appellant since without such corroboration Eclipses testimony would have no
probative value. This theory could only be a product of a misunderstanding of
Section 3, Rule 133 of the Rules of Court which provides: SEC. 3. Extrajudicial
confession, not sufficient ground for conviction.An extrajudicial confession made

by an accused, shall not be sufficient ground for conviction, unless corroborated by

evidence of corpus delicti. Note that what must be corroborated is the extrajudicial
confession and not the testimony of the person to whom the confession is made,
and the corroborative evidence required is not the testimony of another person who
heard the confession but the evidence of corpus delicti.
Same; Same; In determining the value and credibility of evidence, witnesses are to
be weighed, not numbered.Except when expressly required by law, the testimony
of a single person, if credible and positive and if it satisfies the court as to the guilt
of the accused beyond reasonable doubt, is sufficient to convict. In determining the
value and credibility of evidence, witnesses are to be weighed, not numbered.
Same; Same; Words and Phrases; Corpus Delicti, Explained.As to the
corroborative evidence of corpus delicti, the appellant herself does not question its
presence because she knows that it has been overwhelmingly established in this
case. Corpus delicti is the body (material substance) upon which a crime has been
committed, e.g., the corpse of a murdered man or the charred remains of a house
burned down. In a derivative sense, it means the substantial fact that a crime was
committed. It is made up of two elements: (a) that a certain result has been proved,
for example a man has died or a building has been burned, and (b) that some
person is criminally responsible for the act. Same; Same; Parricide; Admissions
and Confessions, Distinguished.We do not, however, agree with the trial courts
characterization of the appellants declaration that she killed her husband as an
extrajudicial confession. It is only an admission. It is clear from Sections 26 and 33,
Rule 130 of the Rules of Court that there is a distinction between an admission and
a confession. These sections read as follows: SEC. 26. Admission of a party.The
act, declaration or omission of a party as to a relevant fact may be given in
evidence against him. * * * SEC. 33. Confession.The declaration of an accused
acknowledging his guilt of the offense charged, or of any offense necessarily
included therein, may be given in evidence against him. In a confession, there is an
acknowledgment of guilt. Admission is usually applied in criminal cases to
statements of fact by the accused which do not directly involve an acknowledgment
of guilt of the accused or of the criminal intent to commit the offense with which he
is charged.
Same; Same; Same; An admissible confession or admission which has been duly
proved shifts to the accused the burden of evidence to disprove, by strong
evidence, that he made the admission, or admitting it, that he is not guilty of the
crime.Nevertheless, whether it was a confession or an admission, it was
admissible against the appellant and, having been duly proved, together with the
other facts and circumstances, the burden of the evidence was shifted to the
appellant to disprove, by strong evidence, that she made the admission or,
admitting it, to prove that she was not guilty of killing her husband. As earlier
shown, the trial court characterized her story as palpably a put-up scenario .... [A]
story which runs against the grain of ordinary reality, controverts logic and assails

common sense. The five reasons enumerated by it to support this conclusion are
founded on or are inferred from facts duly established by the prosecution or are
otherwise solidly based on common experience, logic, and common sense.
CMS Logging, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, 211 SCRA 374, G.R. No. 41420 July
10, 1992
Same; Same; An admission or declaration to be competent must have been
expressed in definite, certain and unequivocal language.As correctly stated by the
appellate court: It is a rule that a statement is not competent as an admission
where it does not, under a reasonable construction, appear to admit or acknowledge
the fact which is sought to be proved by it. An admission or declaration to be
competent must have been expressed in definite, certain and unequivocal
language.

People vs. Molleda, 86 SCRA 667, No. L-34248 November 21, 1978
same; Same; Extrajudicial Confessions; When extrajudicial confessions of accused
were voluntarily given, they are admissible in evidence against them; No need for
prosecution to present all persons who witnessed the investigation of a crime to
testify on the voluntary character of the confessions of the accused in the absence
of evidence that said confessions were extracted thru third degree.Appellants
Nicolas and Baluyots claim that the trial court should have rejected their extrajudicial confessions, to wit, Exhibit H and Exhibit Ion the ground that these
were not voluntarily given but were obtained by force, violence and coercion, is
bereft of any evidentiary support apart from their own testimonies to this effect. The
records also show that they never complained to anyone that they were maltreated
or tortured in the course of their investigations. Upon the other hand, the trial
courts finding that the statementsincluding that of appellant Molleda (Exh. G)
were voluntarily executed, is premised on the facts that the accused were
investigated in the open and before several witnesses; that they were therafter
brought in the presence of the Inquest Fiscal before whom they signed and affirmed
to the truth of their statements; and that the same contain details which could have
been given only by the accused themselves. The trial court, thereforeas
maintained by the Solicitor General in his reply briefscorrectly concluded that the
same were voluntarily given and consequently are admissible in evidence. Since no
evidence was adduced by the appellants to support their claim that the confessions
were extracted thru third degree, i.e., force and intimidation, apart from their selfserving assertions, there was clearly no need on the part of the prosecution to
present all the persons who witnessed the investigation to testify on the voluntary
character of the confessions.
National Development Co. vs. Workmens Compensation Commission, 19
SCRA 861, No. L-21724 April 27, 1967

Evidence; Self-serving evidence; Workmens compensation; Claimant may testify in

workmens compensation case.The right of a claimant to be present at the
hearing of his claim for workmens compensation includes the right to testify in his
own behalf. While a partys interest may to some extent affect his credibility, his
interest alone is not a ground for disregarding his testimony. Self-serving evidence is
evidence made by a party out of court at one time; it does not include a partys
testimony as a witness in court. It is excluded on the same ground as any hearsay
evidence, that is the lack of opportunity for cross-examination by the adverse party,
and on the consideration that its admission would open the door to fraud and
fabrication of evidence. On the other hand, a partys testimony in court is sworn and
affords the other party -the opportunity for cross-examination.
Same; Hearsay evidence in workmens compensation cases.The Workmens
Compensation Law allows the admission of certain kinds of hearsay evidence (Sec.
49).
Same; Presumption as to aggravation of illness.There is a presumption that the
claimants illness was aggravated by the nature of his employment and that the
doctors affidavit, that he treated the claimant for tuberculosis, is correct. This
presumption is intended to reverse the burden of proof and make it the duty of the
employer to establish, by substantial evidence, that the illness was not in fact
aggravated by the nature of the job,
ADMISSION BY CONDUCT
People vs. Sope and Cruz, 75 Phil. 810, No. L-16 January 31, 1946
CRIMINAL LAW; ROBBERY; EVIDENCE; SUFFICIENCY OF TESTIMONY OF SINGLE
WITNESS.The testimony of the offended party is quite reasonable, and the trial
judge who had the opportunity to observe her demeanor while on the stand gave it
full weight and credit as against those of the appellants. Moreover, it has been
repeatedly held by this court that the testimony of a single witness which satisfies
the court in a given case is sufficient to convict.
2.ID. ; ID. ; ID. ; OFFER TO SETTLE BY ONE CONSPIRATOR.The repeated offer of one
conspirator constitutes a strong indication and an implied admission of guilt of said
conspirator and of the two accused and appellants.

People vs. Ocampo, 226 SCRA 1, G.R. No. 80262 September 1, 1993
Same; Same; Flight; There can be no dispute to the legal proposi-tion that flight
from the scene of the felony is one of the indicia of a guilty conscience.Accusedappellant also argues next that if he was indeed responsible for what happened to

Evelyn, he should not have immediately returned to the situs of the crime, much
less opened the door to the house after passing through the window from where he
escaped, for such actuations are incongruous with human nature. There can be no
dispute to the legal proposition that flight from the scene of the felony is one of the
indicia of a guilty conscience. However, it is equally true that in exceptional cases,
culprits have become bolder by returning to their prey to ensure that the victim was
successfully eliminated under the pretext of feigning innocence. The fact that this
form of reverse psychology does not happen as often as flight does not mean that it
can never take place.
Same; Same; Alibi; For the defense of alibi to be tenable, the accused must prove
that it was physically impossible for him to be at the scene of the crime at the time
of its commission.The defense of alibi interposed by accused-appellant is
unavailing in the face of Mary Janes positive identification of accused-appellant as
the author of the rape-killing of Evelyn (People vs. Mercado, 38 SCRA 168 [1971];
People vs. Cardesan, 56 SCRA 631 [1974]). For the defense of alibi to be tenable,
the accused must prove that it was physically impossible for him to be at the scene
of the crime at the time of its commission.

ADMISSION BY DECLARATION
Sison vs. Ambalada., 30 Phil. 118, No. 9943 March 18, 1915
MARRIAGE; PRESUMPTION OF MARRIAGE.Whatever may have been the proof
required by the legislation prior to the Civil Code, and that required by it, which
requirements were not put into force, it is a fact that in Act No. 190, by which the
courts must be governed, there exists the presumption of law that a man and
woman who are living together as husband and wife have entered into a legal
contract of marriage. (Code Civ. Proc., sec. 334, No. 28.)
2.ID.; ID.; LACK or RECORD.The mere absence of the record of the marriage in the
books of the church in which the marriage took place does not destroy that
presumption, when the husband himself acknowledges, and so testifies at the trial,
that he and the woman to whom he was united from 1870 to July 30, 1886, lived
continuously as husband and wife, and were regarded as such by their own parents
and by public opinion, it being publicly known -in the town in which they lived that
said woman was his lawful wife, sharing in all his titles; and when they had during
this existence as husband and wife eight legitimate children, who were regarded by
everybody as their children.
3.ID.; ID.; EVIDENCE.The legal presumption is further corroborated by competent
parol evidence, which in the present case is unanimous and supports the claim with
reference to the performance of the marriage and to other points regarding the fact,
not the least of which are acts of the husband himself, who in various documents

stated that he was married during the time he lived with the woman and an element
of proof exists in writing in various public and official instruments.
4.HUSBAND AND WlFE; DEATH; LlQUIDATION OF PARTNERSHIP.When the marriage
has been dissolved by the death of one of the spouses, all the property of the
marriage being considered as partnership property until it is proven that it belongs
exclusively to the husband or to the wife, the conjugal partnership ceases and
should be liquidated. (Civil Code, arts. 1407, 1417 et seq.)

People vs. Yatco. etc., et al., 97 Phil. 940, No. L-9181 November 28, 1955

EVIDENCE; ADMISSIBILITY OF EVIDENCE; EXTRA-JUDICIAL CONFESSION; ADMISSIBLE

AS EVIDENCE OF DECLARANT'S GUILT.Under the rule of multiple admissibility of
evidence, even if an accused's confession may not be competent as against his coaccused, being hearsay as to the latter, or to prove conspiracy between them
without the conspiracy being established by other evidence, the confession is
nevertheless, admissible as evidence of the declarant's own guilt (U. S. vs. Vega, 43
Phil.,. 41; People vs. Bande, 50 Phil., 37; People vs. Buan, 64 Phil., 2,96)', and should
be admitted as such.
2.lD.; ID.; ACT OR DECLARATION OF CONSPIRATOR; SECTION 12, RULE 123, Is NOT
APPLICABLE TO CONFESSIONS MADE AFTER CONSPIRACY HAS ENDED.Section 12
of Rule 123, providing that "The act or declaration of a conspirator relating to the
conspiracy and during its existence may be given in evidence against the coconspirator after the conspiracy is shown by evidence other than such act or
declaration," refers to statements made by one conspirator during the pendency of
the unlawful enterprise ("during its existence") and in furtherance of its. object, and
not to a confession made long after the conspiracy had; been brought to an end (U.
S. vs. Empeinado, 9 Phil., 613; U. S. vs. Raymundo, 14 Phil., 416; People vs. Badilla,
48 Phil,, 718; People vs. Napkil, 52 Phil., 985).
3.ID.; ID.; OBJECTIONS, WAIVER OF; COURT HAS No POWER TO DIS-REGARD
EVIDENCE "MOTU PROPRIO."The exclusion of the profered confessions was not
made on the basis of the objection interposed by defense counsel, but upon an
altogether different ground, which the Court issued motu proprio. By so doing, the
Court overlooked that the right to object is a mere privilege which the parties may
waive; and if the ground for objection is known and not seasonably made, the
objection is deemed waived and the Court has no power, on its own motion, to
disregard the evidence (Marella vs. Reyes, 12 Phil., 1).
4.ID ; ID. ; RULE ON ADMISSIBILITY OF EVIDENCE.The practice of excluding
evidence on doubtful objections to its materiality or technical objections to the form

of the questions should be avoided. In a case of any intricacy it is impossible for a

judge of first instance, in the early stages of the development of the proof,, to know
with any certainty whether testimony is relevant or not;, and where there is no
indication of bad faith on the part of the attorney offering the evidence, the court
may as a rule safely accept the testimony upon the statement of the attorney that
the proof offered will be connected later." (Prats & Co. vs. Phoenix Insurance Co., 52
Phil., 807, 816-817.)
At any rate, in the final determination and consideration of the case, the trial Court
should be able to distinguish the admissible from the inadmissible, and reject what,
under the rules of evidence, should be excluded. There is greater reason to adhere
to such policy in criminal cases where questions arise as to admissibility of evidence
for the prosecution, for the unjustified exclusion of evidence may lead to the
erroneous acquittal of the accused or the dismissal of the charges, from which the
People can no longer appeal. People vs. Yatco. etc., et al., 97 Phil. 940, No. L-9181
November 28, 1955

ADMISSION BY SILENCE
People vs. Paragsa, 84 SCRA 105, No. L-44060 July 20, 1978
Same; Same; Estoppel; Requisites of the rule that silence of a person may be taken
as admission of the truth of the statements uttered in his presence.The rule
allowing silence of a person to be taken as an implied admission of the truth of the
statements uttered in his presence is applicable in criminal cases. But before the
silence of a party can be taken as an admission of what is said, it must appear: (1)
that he heard and understood the statement; (2) that he was at liberty to interpose
a denial; (3) that the statement was in respect to some matter affecting his rights or
in which he was then interested, and calling, naturally, for an answer; (4) that the
facts were within his knowledge; and (5) that the fact admitted or the inference to
be drawn from his silence would be material to the issue (IV Francisco, The Revised
Rules of Court in the Philippines, 1973 ed., p. 316).
These requisites of admission by silence all obtain in the present case. Hence, the
silence of Mirasol on the facts asserted by the accused and his witnesses may be
safely construed as an admission of the truth of such assertion. Same; Same; Facts
that victim of alleged rape was of tender age yet no lacerations were found in her
vagina and that she felt no pain during the time of intercourse may adversely affect
her claim that she was raped.Considering Mirasols tender age, if she had no
previous sexual experience, she must have been a virgin when she was allegedly
raped by the accused. Yet she did not state that she felt some pain as the accused
tried to insert his organ into her private part. Neither did she state that she was
bleeding during and after the alleged forced coition. Instead, she matter-of-factly
narrated that the accused made four push and pull movements after which the

latter ejaculatedindicating that he had an easy time doing it. If WE are to believe
her story, certainly the doctor who examined her could have noticed the lacerations
even after the lapse of three (3) days from the coition, if the intercourse on July 13,
1971 was in fact her first experience. WE believe the absence of lacerations in the
walls of Mirasols vagina, as testified to by Dr. Gandiongco, supra, eloquently
confirms the truth of the accuseds assertion that before the incident in question, he
and Mirasol had two prior copulations. People vs. Paragsa, 84 SCRA 105, No. L44060 July 20, 1978

DYING DECLARATION
People vs. Salison, Jr., 253 SCRA 758, G.R. No. 115690 February 20, 1996
Same; Same; Same; Dying Declaration; Assuming that declaration is not admissible
as a dying declaration, it is still admissible as part of the res gestae.Appellant
likewise argues that the declaration made by the victim before the purok leader can
not be considered as a dying declaration because it was not made by the deceased
under the consciousness of an impending death. As earlier narrated, at the time
the deceased made the declaration he was in great pain. He expressed a belief on
his imminent death and the hope that his declaration could be used as evidence
regarding the circumstances thereof. A person would not say so if he believes he
would recover and be able to testify against his assailants. At all events, assuming
that declaration is not admissible as a dying declaration, it is still admissible as part
of the res gestae, since it was made shortly after the startling incident and, under
the circumstances, the victim had no opportunity to contrive.
DELARATION AGAINST OWN INTEREST
Fuentes, Jr. vs. Court of Appeals, 253 SCRA 430, G.R. No. 111692 February 9, 1996
Evidence; Hearsay Rule; Exception; One of the exceptions to the hearsay rule is that
pertaining to declarations made against interest. Its admissibility is grounded on
necessity and trustworthiness.One of the recognized exceptions to the hearsay
rule is that pertaining to declarations made against interest. Sec. 38 of Rule 130 of
the Rules of Court provides that (t)he declaration made by a person deceased, or
unable to testify, against the interest of the declarant, if the fact asserted in the
declaration was at the time it was made so far contrary to declarants own interest,
that a reasonable man in his position would not have made the declaration unless
he believed it to be true, may be received in evidence against himself or his
successors in interest and against third persons. The admissibility in evidence of
such declaration is grounded on necessity and trustworthiness.
Same; Same; Declaration Against Interest; Requisites.There are three (3) essential
requisites for the admissibility of a declaration against interest: (a) the declarant

must not be available to testify; (b) the declaration must concern a fact cognizable
by the declarant; and (c) the circumstances must render it improbable that a motive
to falsify existed.
Same; Same; Same; The admission against penal interest cannot be accepted in the
instant case as the declarant is not unable to testify. No showing that declarant is
either dead, mentally incapacitated or physically incompetent was made which
Section 38 of the rules contemplates.But more importantly, the far weightier
reason why the admission against penal interest cannot be accepted in the instant
case is that the declarant is not unable to testify. There is no showing that Zoilo is
either dead, mentally incapacitated or physically incompetent which Sec. 38
obviously contemplates. His mere absence from the jurisdiction does not make him
ipso facto unavailable under this rule. For it is incumbent upon the defense to
produce each and every piece of evidence that can break the prosecution and
assure the acquittal of the accused. Other than the gratuitous statements of
accused-appellant and his uncle to the effect that Zoilo admitted having killed
Malaspina, the records show that the defense did not exert any serious effort to
produce Zoilo as a witness. Lest we be misunderstood, the Court is always for the
admission of evidence that would let an innocent declaration of guilt by the real
culprit. But this can be open to abuse, as when the extrajudicial statement is not
even authenticated thus increasing the probability of its fabrication; it is made to
persons who have every reason to lie and falsify; and it is not altogether clear that
the declarant himself is unable to testify.
People vs. Bernal, 274 SCRA 197, G.R. No. 113685 June 19, 1997
Same; Same; Same; Declaration Against Interest; Requisites before a statement
may be admissible.A statement may be admissible when it complies with the
following requisites, to wit: (1) that the declarant is dead or unable to testify; (2)
that it relates to a fact against the interest of the declarant; (3) that at the time he
made said declaration the declarant was aware that the same was contrary to his
aforesaid interest; and (4) that the declarant had no motive to falsify and believed
such declaration to be true.
Philippine Free Press, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, 473 SCRA 639, G.R. No. 132864
October 24, 2005
Same; Same; The Supreme Court is not unmindful of the exception to the hearsay
rule provided in Section 38, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, i.e., declaration against
interest.Like the Court of Appeals, we are not unmindful of the exception to the
hearsay rule provided in Section 38, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, which reads:
SEC. 38. Declaration against interest.The declaration made by a person deceased
or unable to testify, against the interest of the declarant, if the fact asserted in the
declaration was at the time it was made so far contrary to the declarants own
interest, that a reasonable man in his position would not have made the declaration

unless he believed it to be true, may be received in evidence against himself or his

successors-in-interest and against third persons.