4 Common-Pool Resource Theory pel Schlager ‘hn August 2000 ate inthe Naw York Timer Maptsine reported on ‘ve euined shes ofthe Northeast”? Th co, swords, and halibut Faber mo longer ae economically viable. Only the lobster fishery ce- nis productive, bat to it beinning to show signs of overharvesting. hers are sing large boats, spending more te at sa, sting more Inter taps and harvesting increasingly smaller lobsters. Most lobsters ested ae just of legal minimum size, meaning tat at most they have fad one yea in which to spawn and repcodvce Inthe article aber rman stites, “T have no incentive co conserve the ery, Becase any fa "ese is jst going tobe picked bythe next guy."* Many would aot find the description ofthe New England lobster fsh- ey surprising, Afer al, ¢ mirors the dynamic desribed by Gaveete Hadi nhs article “The Tragedy ofthe Connmons.™ The New England fuer, just ike Hardin's herder, are locked ina deadly competition for resources, a competition from which chey do ot scem tobe able to ex trate themselves. As the Bsheeman quoted here aoted, he faces fw i ‘eaves inthis harvest. Another wil harvest whatever he conserves and the fh stock wil sil Be dstcoyed, The fishers colectively ca init their harvesting and preserve cei series, thus helping themselves in the proces, yet that posilty appears remote because of the over: svtelming temptations hat each ser fees to freeride off ofthe others «lf, The fishers seem doomed, shore of forceful intervention by an extecal authoring, ‘What may surpive many i the description ofa diferent lobster fishery ‘nthe same newspapeartle. On the southern coast of Australi, fish es make a generous living front the sea by iting cir catches and146 dla Schlager conserving the fh stocks Through a combination of community orm, cle, and eaforcement plus government epulation, Australian fishers have exricatd themacoes for a cragedy ofthe commons. The Jobitermen imi themselves to sity taps each substantially fewer than the 800 raps commonly used by New England lobstermen). Associated vith each ap ie a license thatthe Ansalan government allocated mong working Bsbers inthe 19605 The licenses are uly transferable, land, in fact, if individual wanes o enter the fishery, be must purchase licenses from woking fishers willing to part with heirs No longer do the lobutermen race to harvest as many lobsters as posible, They eypiclly ‘work eight hour days up to 187 days pee year (again, ubstall ewer ‘than the 240 days pe year thie American counerpts work)” Further ‘more the lbster stock remaine healthy with large, older lobsters sil regolaly harvested. As one fisherman is quoted a saying, *Why hart the fisher... Fs my retirement Sand... Wf Lape and pillage the ery ‘owt inten years my liceases wont be worth anything."* “The Australian hers reno ike Hardin's herders, They have avoided 2 tagedy of the commons. Why have Australian, but aot Neve England, fishes igure way out of thee tragedy? Hardin's model cannot account for such success; it pret failure. Uni recent, fone tured tothe very best scholasly wor, one would Sind only explanations and pred tions of failure. This chapter argues, however, tha ths aude is begin- ning to change. Over the past fiteen years, scholars and practtioers have concluded that the tragedy ofthe commons is no longer the only ‘adel available ro account for human use of common pool resources Furthermore, aot only ace appropiators able to exciate themselves fom wagedies, but theocetially grounded and empirically tested expla nations ofthe condivons under which they are likly todo so have been sealzed. As suc, scholarship addressing common pool resource diem ‘mas, done largely (but not exclave) in dhe developing wee, now of fees. compas to peactoners and scholars for anscipating both fae and succes in overcoming these dilemmas? Having developed more complete explanations of cooperation and of resource ust’ ably to coordinate and govern thee behavior, however, is il afar ery fom parting such insights into pracce. The purpose. of this chaper is thos theefold: (1) t review how and why local | CommonPool Resource Theory 147 governance of common-pool resources as become a increasingly ine portant approach ro environmental management; (2) to review what we aow shou the conditions under which sich governance i more likely to he adopted and to be scesful when adopted and (3) tases he future suaegic choices, challenges, and opporintieslacal governance oss fr environmental management Inthe process, the chapter demon ‘secates what contribution common-poolrsoarce theory can ake C0 the bulng of 2 resuls-basd sense of common purpose in environmental governance. Common-Pool Resources, Noncooperaive Behavior and the Tragedy ‘ofthe Commons (ver the course of amos ifeen years, erwen 1954 and 1968, scholars such insacins perform, snd how do they perform relative to ovemment.ceatered instewtions?150 Eda Seager “The Tragedy ofthe Commons Revised In 1985, the US. National Research Council convened 4 disingished panel of scholars ojestigate and eport on sel goveening instctiona arrangements devised by appropiators ro coordinate and limit thee use ‘of common-poo! resources. That panel was the genesis ofan inter ‘ions association of scholars and practioner a newsleer seve research nstietes and numerous esearch programs. Ou ofthat bad of research as come a variety of findings tha offer a more postive view ‘ofthe chances of building common purpose in environments governance ‘when common: poo! resources are involve. ‘One of the major research programs emerging from the Nationa Research Council panel, and the one that isthe primary focus of i chap te isthat of linot Ostrom,* Ostrom argues havin attempting to esl common-pool resource dilemmas, appropriatos must worktheough hee closely related issues—suppy, commitment, and monitoring. * Common pool resource dilemmas emerge because indviduasin interdependent st tntons donot coordinate ther actions, which eds co ourcomesin which all appropiatrs are made worse of, Better outcomes might be achieve ifindvidvals devised and adopted ses of rules that cooediated tei ws ‘ofthe common-poo reoure. However, those rules are public gods (nce provided, the rules benefit all appropriators, whether or ao all _npcopeators contnibuted othe ctestion. Consents when spel tng instil arzangemens that may resolve common pool resource ‘hlemmns,appeopeators are coaftonted with cllective action problem obtsining voluntary contributions of ime and esources aeededco ident, and negotiate ast of ules aceptable ro most of them Even f appropriacorssucesflly supply ase of tues, they must fo Jow those arrangements most ofthe tie to make chem credible 208 ffctive. In many instances, hoes, they wil face tempratons tod obey the rules, As Ostrom aks, “How does one appeopiatr creibi comnitbinself or herself to follow a eotation syrem when everyone ‘knows thatthe tempration to break that commitment will be exteme strong in are time perods?*= ‘Monitoring 1o ensure that most appropiators ae following he rule ‘most ofthe time supports commitment following the rules. Eee Commun Pol Resins They 151 ‘sorting discourages rule breaking and assures ul followers chat they eno being taken vantage of by rule breaker. Yer monitoring sitsll 1 patie good—it acrues to al appropiatre heneit, regardless of wether they all coneibuted 19 monitoring. But without monitoring, aamiumens co following the rules are not credible, and without cred be commitments to the eles no cules will be devised and adopted? “Ts the process of devising, implementing, and uring insittonal rcangements that cesoie common pol resource dilemmas i feaught week icky (Ortrom’s emerging theory of common-pool resources and related ce sexch promams pesent «convincing argument that appeopeators are ‘apable of resolving coramen-pool resource dilemmas” Also, the ine: tutional arrangements that appeopsatorsparicipatein devising, evising, ‘implementing, and enforciag outperform insiutonalareangements that overmen: oii devise, revise, implement, and enforce. Thy the ‘theory of common pool resources represents a significant and promising approach for she governance of natural resources and the zesaation of cttcalenveonmensal problems. What ie more, the empirical research sreested by these related research programs affords both prastiionrs tnd theorists 2 cobustcoatingeney theory suitable for guiding pence ‘snd baildng theory. Amongther things, the programs offer insights into the conditions under which seligovernance regimes are more or less likely to aie and under which longzeem cooperation within these ‘egies is more or les likly to occu ‘The Emergence of Cooperative Behavior ‘Whereas Ostrom’ inal wrk focused on explaining the conditions that support longterm coopeation aad coordination among appropriators, ter moce recent work has focused on identifying the conditions under ‘hich appropriators ae likly ro cooperate ta devise governing arrange ‘ets. The atibuts of ommon-pool resources that ae supportive of ‘he emergence of conpertion ae: 1. Feasible improvement. Resousce conditions ate not at such a point of \eciogaion tht i is wales 0 organize, nor ace they so undersized ‘ta file advantage eesults fom oxganisings, oe1st dole Schlager 2. Indicnors. Reliable and valid indicators of the condition of the resource system frequently ate available aa eelaiely low cont, 5. Predictably, The Rw of resoure amiss relatively predictable; 4. Spatial extent. The resource system is sfcietly small, given the transportation and commonicstion technology ine, hat anpropiaors can develop accurate knowledge of external boundaries and itera Appropriatorasributes that support the emergence of cooperation inlades 1. Salience. Appropritors are dependent on the resootce system for» _majoe portion of thse lvsinood or ober important actives 2. Common understanding. Appropriators have a shared image of how the resource system operates... and how thee actions affect each othe + and the erource yen; 3. Low discount rate, Apptoprators use a sufficiently low discount at jn ration to future benefits tobe achieved from the resources 4. Trust aed reciprocity. Appeopiators tust one another 0 keep roms and relate to one anther with reciprocity S. Autonomy. Appropsitors te ableto determine aces and harvesting rules withou exernal autores coumtecmanding thes 6. Prior organizational experience ad local ladersbip. Appropitars have leaned at fast minimal skill of organization and leadership through parcipasing in eter local associations or chrough studing ways that neighboring groups have organized. CChatacteristis of common pool resources and characteristics of appa tratos interact to affect the likebhood of ppropristors engaging ‘he challenging and sol process of supplying les For instance, take ee second appropristor condition common understanding ofthe resource and how ther actions affect. How quickly an easly do appeopriarcs ariveatsuch a copelusion?Arsvingat common understanding of ther Source and ofthe fects of thsi actions om i will be moc OF les ificalt todo depending onthe uber and types of reliable indicators ofthe re source condition available ro them esurce characteristic to} the pe etaily ofthe resource (eesource characteris thee), and he spt [Common Fool Resource Tivory 152 ‘extent of the resource (source charctrine four In celaively simple sexing, aperopriators ar ike tases thei stuntion more quickly ad accurately In more complex settings, such sin the West Basin cas in Calfoenia, described moee ely Intern the cape it may take years for appropriates to uncestand the problemsthe face. In West Eas, signs of ‘rouble began eo emer in 1912, butt was not unl the early 1940s that some appropritor began alerting others and rganizing for ralechanges. Even if apropritorchacctedntic two it me, appropristor ill st ices after they received a cerifiate, however. They id noe gain great ‘control over the resources they depend on fr ther iveiboods, As 00 Common Pool Recs Theory 167 resarcher concludes the legisation crating the certificates only assumed cagamunity capacity and therefore failed to provide recoutces 0 create ie? **Capaciy’ means nothing if there is no means or discetion with which eo exercise it” “Thus, as Agrawal and Gibson conclude, one key t9 implementing the ‘sighs of common-pool resource theory is fr policymakers to avoid ‘makin heroic o romanticized assumptions about communities and their capacities. Most importa they should not aesume that cermmuniis are small spatial units whose members are economically, polly, and socially homogeneous, and who share norms and belie that encourage ‘esoure conservation.” Developing and implementing policy based on those asumpsions is sue o lead to file and disillusionment. Agrawal and Gibsoa argue that implementation should be based instead on a ‘careful underseaiing ofthe multiple actors and thee diverse ingeress in sing common-pool resources, the processes by which they interact with one athe andthe scitonal arrangemens het src tee Cualysing Common Purpose? ‘The challenges of contingencies aside scholars and poiemakers have dis- covered the poenial of loalevel etors for governing and conserving "toral resources, What cemsins,howeve determining howto ualesh ‘hs poten appropriately fo Building reaultsbased sense of common uepos, This task, in tn, requires a fundamental choice involving how ‘Public managers and elected offcialsconcepvalize the means and ends of ‘vironmental govemance. For elf-egultory governance ractues to succeed, ofcias wll have to wosk with and encourage appropriation to over themselves and solve their own common-pool etource dilemmas [Nomerous scholars and analysts have noted, however, tht pablic an ‘ee, trsined as experts, come to view themselves as active problem solvers and 0 view citizens ar Best, a8 incapable of helping themselves ‘nd, at worst, a active and purpose! problem creators.” Furthermore, sures legltive mandates direct and constrain managers, They a0 ‘He capeted dually ro achieve multiple and often conflicting mandates in an administaively competent manner. In eo doing, they often lose “ahr ofthe goals thatthe and her programs were intended to achieve.”168 Edt Seger [As Mack Moore summarizes the dilemma, puble managers adopt the mindsets of bureaucrats and administrators and not of fciiators and desde che insights of commor-poo esource theory are tobe realized, ENR managers must reconceptuaize thee sense of cole and purpose, both in ‘heir own and in legislatos’ minds. As Robert Rech proposes more gen erally, ENR managers must lean to feiltte public education and Aeideration about public problems ina process of “ie discover¥™ Deliberation in these instanes, Focuses on mutsallsentifyingand dfn. ing problems with citizens, on considering akemative and coproduced solutions ro thee problems, anon discussing with citizens how slaions an be tealized. Meanwhile, liars must fllow Mooce’ gation ‘that they enable public managers to become “eaplorers who, with other, sek to dcover define, and produce public value." Undertaking this resentation i eal for commonpool resource management t9socceed. No longer mast pulie managers se source ppcopsiators as individuals who are tapped hopelessly in tragedies of the commons, but rather a individuals who are and must be ace problem solvers. As this chapter has daconed, ENR manages mat me sppcopeator participation a vital fortwo reasons. Fst they must a recite that appropistors posses ritalin and place kaowledge— bout resources, about their own social norms, about the rules and prseties thatthe follow. This knowledge, in tur, must be eaken into {scout in formalating ENR policies inorder ro make them workable, Second, managers and legislators must understand that monitoring and enforcing policies will be less problematic if appropriators embrace those polices. Rule—fllowings ely to behigh in that case and appeo- ators are likely to engage in sel monitoring ad enforcement “To these ends, common-pool resource theory requires both fei and varied approaches to iaclsvit. I points to numerous acces in ‘which governments can engage, suchas lowering the information end enforcement costs confronting nppropriatorsand providing appeopeatr ‘wth fir conic eesolution mechanisms In rare, while the activities hat overnments camengagein are many and varied, policymakers mations, fn appoopsaton? governing capacities rather than in command-asé ‘consol policy prescriptions. Indeed, the theory pons othe ental of Common Pool Resource Theory 168 allowing 20 sto devise he tions or atleast to pari pe actively Ta problem solving, with managers facilitating eather chan etsoing the pees. “The difclry of realizing chis fundamental peesteoiks in hinking cana be overestimated, Reorinting pubic managers, fr example, wll, ‘rewire ore han changing gradaateschools cutcula ital will require hanging the context in which public managers act. The cutentcontex of tuple and highly constraining mandates and procedares described by Denise Scheberte and others in their chaptee in tht volume fo= ses manager’ attention on contol, These proces will have 0 be redesigned o focus manages atention on faiitaton and problem soy inpin pareership with etizen. The conditions ander which lgislatres val be wiling to loosen their coatol over public managers by elaxing strit mandates i no dou, dependent on circumstances, But ty they _msstf the insights of common pool resource theory are to beeealized, Grated, commonpool resource theory does not predict that appeopiaor always wil e sucessful Intend, sucess or faire i con Jisoned onthe specifi cizcumstaneesia which appropriators and pie inskors find hemslves. Moreover, a noted, significant organisational ‘poi and analytical obstacles ext to complicate success, Neverthe [es developing more complet explanations of cooperation and resource ‘erably to cooedinate and govern their behavior n pei of bule- ing resuls-ased sense of common purpose ia significant coatrbution to environmental governance inthe rventy fist century. Given the relax tne infancy of de theory and is testing hiss po soa accomplishment. Whether policymakers choose to take advantage ofthese insights in order thelp build common purpose when common-poot resources ik emains an unanswered et important question asthe twenty frst ‘eaury unfolds. What is nr in question, however, i the ned for imniyto find ways to addees collaboratively the rks t0 common poo resources tha ae so vial 10 livehoods wockdwide. Nori it debatable thar developing the common undetanding, srs, and. exiprocity ‘sata for collaboration to occur often the produ of regula iter ‘enol interactions and participation indecision making process Its ‘othe opcof reconnecting citizens and stakeholders with environmental lmerance that this volume tens nest170 Edel Schloger Notes 4. J Tlerney, “A Tl of Two Fishes,” New York Times Magan, August 27, 2000, pp 3843 2 Tid, 9. 3. Ba p38 4. Garret Hawn, “The Tegedy of tbe Commons” Scie 162 (968 5. Trey, “ATi of To Feri,” pt a 7 8 hd 9, For an exe review ofthe emerging evidence fom nonsnvironneta ‘eas concering cooperation and the condions under which isoees™ ‘Brita problems ar arene elec se Mark Van Vay Mat Saye, ‘Tom RI and Ader Bel, ed, Cooperation x Mader Sac: Promeig the Welfare of Comptes, Orgameations, a Ses (Londons Reale. 2000) 10 H, Soo Gordon, “The Economic Thor of Compea Pope Reouce “The Fahey,” Jowral of PoiicalEconamy 821989) 124-42; Antony eo, "he Fahy Te Objetine of Sole Owner.” aural of Pliel Econom) 5 11995F 116-124, 1, “By gavin the sept impc of an individu ppropraon on eke fesuny the sppopetes cee 4 epve extemal The presece of ie ‘enya to oerinvenment fests tothe apeprstion pro {Onto Re Gade and J Walle ele, Games ed Camo Pal ‘Resources [aa Arb: nett of Michigan Pes 194, 12, According Daa and Holy Taker wast feo ait the prio ‘epims (D. Dave and C. Heke Espermental Econo [Peon = ‘natn User Pts, 193] Soe A W Take, “A Two Pee Diy” ‘nonin pepe Sonord Unset, 180) 13. Mancur Ole, The Loi of Collective Action: Public ode andthe The. ‘ny of Groupe (Camas, Maun: Haeacd Unies Pres, 1963) ee Rese Hardin, Collect Act (slumore, Ma Joos Hopkins Uniersiy Pres, 1982) fra care expbston and examina of te condsoas under Wie cooperation can emerge under O08 then: 14. Obon, The Lope of Cllctve Aton, p 2 ais he ceil 1S. Ae le asthe 1980s, the Canadian mister of eres ply aumping Ads shee othe ape of he comtons[D. R- Marhew® {Gontroling Common Preprtys Regulating Canadas Fast Coast Bb ‘ote: iver of Toronto Pres, 1930. ili, 16, Mire Landy, Mace Robes, and Stephen Thoms, The Esianmental Protection gon New Yorks Oxford Univer Pes, 194) 17, Consolidated Statts ad Regltons, Deparment of Faber an Oseane ‘Ae Cama 1978 paws justice ple 158268 Ml 16. Nasional Reseech Counc Pocedings ofthe Conference on Comma Property Resource Management (Washington, D.C: National Academy Pes. "Sl, MCay and J Acheson, The Dustin of the Comore: Te Cale ud Belo of Commumal Resse Tacs: Unversity of Actona Pres, 587, tees, ody Conon Property Resourcer esky and Comment. [ed Sustainable Devtpmen (Londo Belaaen, 19895 Mars, Commo Pal Resupce and Calecave Acton Bibbogtapiny vo. 1 (loomingo Inna Univers, Workshop ia Plat Theory and Pol) Anas, 1989) 19, Sach model ate no incorrect they simply have been asd ingore) — pled to many stations and cremstances whose essential acs thy Eto ‘Str (Einar Osteo, Goering the Commons The Eaton of nations {orColectve Acton (Cambridge: Cambie Unversity Press 199] 20. The InecttinalAnwciation for the Study of Common Pope, ‘erin lc 21. The Gonmon Property Resource Dig, able thee fu ig winds supp 22. For instance, the Cee forthe Study of lations, Popalaion, and Envioaene Chnge, eres dlp! 23. Ostrom, Governing the Commons Elinor Oxtom, “lavioms Rational ‘hce:-An Asevenent of che Instatonal Aas and Beveapme Rare ‘skin Pal Sat y Toons of the Pony Pocers 24-74 (olay, aly: Wtssvew, 199) linor Ostom, “The Danger of Sl. Evicet Ths.” PS Polina! Sacne and Pais 33) (200 38-46, 2. Oar, Governing the Common 25 tid, pt, a 26 id 9.4, 27, Oxo, Garde nd Wilke Rules, Games, and Common Foo Resouces: F Bakes Sucre Esology Trisoma Ectopic! Koouladpe and Rea Managment (hip, Pa Toylor and Francs 1993); B. NeCsy, "Ener ‘ce of Intutons for the Commons Canes, Sto, a Eves” Elsec Ostrom, Thomas Diz, Nites Doak, Pal . Ser, Susan Sonic, and Ere U. Weber ede, Te Dram of the Commons, S602 Waehington, DC: atonal Academy Fe 200. 2. Oxrom, “The Dang af Self viene Truth,” p40. 25. Bid 4. 30. ta 3, Onrom; Governing the Common, 9.90.172 Bde Schlager 52 Fla Shiau, “Mode Speiestion and Poly Als The Governance (oF Coutal Faker" PD. ny Indians Unser, 1990; Ella Scag, Fabs lsttonal Respodss to Comman ool Resource Dera” ie Ostom, R. Gade ap J. Wake, es, Rules, Games, ad Common Poa) Resour 247-265 [Ana Arbor: Unvray of Michigan Pes, 194) 33. The Saber aaa fries only oa over space ad ato neh ‘esing, Acuttly aeastringovthvestig is cl a no ach reson, Th ay ofthe ce suc ind in he analyte. Se loge, “Fen tutional Responie,” p26, fora moc extensive dco, 4 ht 55. £1 Chi, Trtorl Use igh arn cherie Deion and Cin Aion, FAO Fhe Techical Pps 127 (Ram Food 208 Agel Oreaeation ofthe United Nations, 1982), 536. KO. Maria, “The Lain fbn Says Space Dio ed Resource Alcan inthe Newfoundland Fishing Commun of Feevse” master ‘ho Memorial University of Newfoundland, 1973. 57. eek, "Local Level Manigaant 20d the Common Problem: A Can Daratve Stay of Turkish Causal Faeries” Mane Poy 10 uly 1986} Bsa, 38, McCay, “Community Bae ad Cooperative Feri: Solitons to sre Prolems” if. Burger . Ostomy Novena, Paianshy ad 1 Goldin, ede, Protecig the Canmrns (Wsshngon, D.C Ian 2000), Iss 2, Shige, “Mow Spin and Poy Anais Eel Schlge an hor Onrom, "Propet Rights Regines and Cosh Fsheses! Ax Epi ‘ales i Andenon and RT Simons, ee, The Political Economy f Chet and Guar: Infrmal Sens fo he Commons Pablem, 13-2 HHankany 8: Rowman na fel 1993), 40. . S Tang, “Tnstisons and Colesve Acton i ligation Systems,” ‘PUD. dis, Indiana Unersty, 198% YS. Tan, Istasions and Cole Aton SejGoverance in Ingen (Si Franco 1S, 1982). 8. Te, “Ipsraions and Peformance i rigation Sper in Otto, Gass a ale ede, aes, Games, and Common Pool Reon, 225246; W. Fam, Gonning rigtion Star Nepal Itt, nascar ord Colle tive Action (Son Franses CS, 1998) 41. Tang, “esteutions and Collie Action"; Tang, “sitions and Perfomance ligation ems” 42, Tang “eats and Cole Aton” Tang, feta and Cole ‘ion ang, “nstaons and Pesormanc i igton Sema” 4. "The eel of minenane of ny iignton sem sted Ue tho well {sumer contains oconation and maistesnce ar cted anced ‘aed arcs te extent whch ron dimmer ave Been mitigated Commo Pool Resour Theory 178 “Te adecuyof wae supply depends onthe les wed to alba water athe [Dot suincnane: Bch wr slacaton and spate mainane depend on ‘nw wl ead the eles governing each ate and De xen © Which Matos fon hose ale {4 Tang “lztons and Peformance in ngation Sater" 15. The typeof water allocation re ound among poor pefrmiog stems ‘Tosa fied timer rl Theiegtor walled otk wate for ed pe Todt une tet teas Alton Seen sot aks are tlie 5) 0 ‘fie and afore (peeamably Sato wl protec hi tine soso ek thr wer they ep sheaf in fo tne a lames acer sroune of em ota cerain amount of watee che ‘lsame lots ate not cattlycoowiated with water aay af wate, lib npr,» red ele wl vei vale 146. Tag ection ond Collectice Action... Lam aan extensive ta “150 Nepalese gation stensinGonening Irigaion Stems Nepal set to W-F Lam, M Ley apd F- Ostomy “Ar isto! Ana Apponc Frags fom he NUS a gation Perfomance in). Somers © Surat [Pradhan A. Sulla and: Ouro de Pom farmer Fs o Data Bel (nd Back A Syibesis of Panaptor Infomation Sst fo Irgation and ‘iter Reson p. 59-93 (Colm, Ss Lanka: emma ign Mw ‘een Insure ad Rampur, Nepal Istate of Aggie and Anal ‘Senet, 1894) Like Tang inion and Cole Acton “lsat std orem gation Some am fond that farmer manage gon sys pero scan beer thn do goverment mpage ein 9 {one Ingato in toner maneed ayes exhibe sonfcaty higher lees of ececaril activites a attenpeing co cordnate uration acti, in ‘toe ad understanding of he gation aye, ad marl rt (Goce [ington Sst Nepal, p. 26-13), lets a frmeeeanaged systems {loie more tard and complsets of re oe govern aceies Ia “oe, gos i atrsmaraped syste ae scaly moe kl oe ‘Beate and sancned le rl tions than ar iegstos in gover Imaaged shits Rule flowing behave signet bighee In ee ‘tanger Lam, Governing gation Stems Nepal 131 47, Among the farmarowaed stems examined by Tang (Isao and Pevoemanc in eigaon Sates". 24 #1 percent dd ot se ay uses 48 Tid 9.2, 49, W. 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