Linguistic Society of America

Review
Author(s): Sarah Grey Thomason
Review by: Sarah Grey Thomason
Source: Language, Vol. 56, No. 2 (Jun., 1980), pp. 418-424
Published by: Linguistic Society of America
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LANGUAGE, VOLUME 56, NUMBER 2 (1980)

REFERENCES

CLARK, MARY. 1978. A dynamic treatment of tone, with special attention to the tonal

system of Igbo. Amherst: University of Massachusetts dissertation. [Distributed

by Indiana University Linguistics Club.]

DINNSEN, DANIEL. 1978 Phonological rules and phonetic explanation. Bloomington:

Indiana University Linguistics Club.

GOLDSMITH, JOHN. 1976. Autosegmental phonology. MIT dissertation. [Published,

New York: Garland Press, 1979.]

. 1979. The aims of autosegmental phonology. Current approaches to phono-

logical theory, ed. by Daniel Dinnsen, 202-22. Bloomington: Indiana University

Press.

HARAGUCHI, SHOSUKE. 1977. The tone pattern of Japanese: An autosegmental theory

of tonology. Tokyo: Kaitakusha.

HYMAN, LARRY. 1974. The great Igbo tone shift. 3rd Annual Conference on African

Linguistics, ed. by Erhard Voeltz, 111-26. Bloomington: Indiana University.

LADD, D. ROBERT. 1978. Stylized intonation. Lg. 54.517-40.

[Received 19 June 1979.]

Analogy. By RAIMO ANTTILA. (Trends in linguistics: State-of-the-art reports, 10.)

The Hague: Mouton, 1977. Pp. vii, 152.

Reviewed by SARAH GREY THOMASON, University of Pittsburgh*

This is a polemic book. Its first three sentences set the tone for the survey: 'The

past fifteen years have witnessed a most curious linguistic bubble. This is/was the

"Chomskyan Revolution" or "generative adventure" ... The whole episode has

no scientific merit' (1). This anti-generative emphasis will not surprise linguists

familiar with much of Anttila's recent work, which includes titles like 'Was there

a generative historical linguistics?' (1975). But it will disappoint historical linguists

who hoped that A would draw on his great erudition and return to constructive

and substantive matters, such as those he addressed in his excellent Proto-Indo-

European Schwebeablaut (1969b) and in his flawed but generally solid text-book

(1972).

It is not that all of A's arguments against generative historical linguistics are

wrong; some of them would find (in fact, have found) quite general acceptance

among historical linguists. But not all of them can be right, since they are in-

consistent with one another. In his eagerness to use whatever stone comes to hand,

A has taken contradictory positions, has made careless errors in interpreting (and

even in quoting) other authors, and has failed to take the time to weigh his words

and arrange his thoughts. (One expository flaw of the book is looseness of organi-

zation; the arguments on any given point are scattered through the text-lying, it

seems, where they first fell.) What remains is a tantalizing glimpse of the book that

could have been. A touches on several lines of research-in particular the work of

Henning Andersen and of Uhlan Slagle-that strike him as most promising for the

* I wish to thank Richmond Thomason and Robert Brandom, both of the Philosophy

Department of the University of Pittsburgh, for discussing with me at length the philosophical

issues raised in this review. Without their help I would have been unable to comment so fully

on these points; but of course any remaining errors of interpretation are my own.

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REVIEWS

future development of a linguistics in which analogy will play its proper prominent

role. But instead of developing his discussion of these into a clear over-all picture,

he uses them mainly as anti-generative ammunition-e.g., when he remarks that

'Andersen's work ... transcends the bland rewrite rules of the generativists' (81).

Because two other recent books on analogy contain extensive surveys of earlier

periods of research on the subject (Best 1973, Esper 1973), A intends his book as a

'state of the art report on analogy in general' between 1963 and 1973 (p. 3). The

book consists of a preface (subtitled 'Apologia pro analogia sua', 1-6) and five

chapters: I, 'Analogy and linguistics' (7-24); II, 'Analogy in synchrony' (25-64);

III, 'Analogical change' (65-86); IV 'Analogy in generative grammar and its

wake' (87-110); and V, 'Drift' (111-27). It also has a rather sparse index and, as

another unfortunate sign of haste, two 'References' sections-the first completed

for the book's first draft in 1974, and the second added as an 'Appendix to refer-

ences' in the final version.

In the mid 1960's, according to A, generativists 'launched an attack against

analogy' (16). He is referring primarily to Kiparsky's well-known suggestion

(1968:176) that '[grammar] simplification is a generalized and re-interpreted

version of the traditional concept of analogy'. (A mentions several other generative

sources in this context, but Kiparsky's was the major theoretical proposal.) I have

never understood why A finds this position anti-analogic, since Kiparsky is simply

one of many linguists who treat analogic processes explicitly, but without using

analogy itself as a theoretical primitive-a practice which A himself acknowledges

and approves when he remarks that 'an analogist need not mention analogy at all

and still be a perfect representative of it' (32). A is thinking of people like Sapir and

Pike; but the comment applies equally well to Andersen, whose abduction is an

analogic concept. I would class Kiparsky in this group. If some of Kiparsky's

followers took his proposal as a denial of the existence of analogy, that is unfortu-

nate, but they have long since been answered. A's belief that there has been a

'dearth in the recent investigations about analogy' (66) is not borne out by his own

bibliographies. These contain at least seventy-six works on analogy written within

his ten-year period; and several important works he has omitted also come to

mind-in particular Kurylowicz 1964 (especially 37-52), Silverstein 1974, and the

literature on lexical diffusion (which is at least implicitly analogic), e.g. Wang 1969

and Chen & Hsieh 1971.

A's attempt to revive a live horse is unnecessary, and also somewhat overdone.

If he is correct in his repeated claim that '"everything" in language is analogical'

(12), then he is also correct-trivially-when he says that analogy explains every(1

thing in language. But then it is equally correct to say that analogy explains

nothing; and we must re-invent traditional analogy, under other names, if we are to

provide explanations for specific linguistic changes or types of changes. Moreover,

if A believes that 'all change mechanisms have an analogical ingredient' (20; cf.

12, 23, 69), then he should not object in principle to 'the generative pooling up of

sound change and analogy' (92), though he would presumably still object to the

specific outcome of that 'pooling up'.

One of A's major concerns is the integration of linguistic and selected philo-

sophical theories. He is ambitious in his efforts to pull together relevant bits of

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LANGUAGE, VOLUME 56, NUMBER 2 (1980)

philosophical thinking in developing a linguistic theory, and the endeavor is

praiseworthy. His success is limited, however, partly because he pays insufficient

attention to the contexts of the philosophical ideas he extracts. Of course linguists

and philosophers need not agree on the usefulness, or on the implications, of a

given philosophical theory for linguistics. Nevertheless, as in any interdisciplinary

study, it is surely crucial for the investigator to be fully aware of the position which

these philosophical theories occupy in the traditions to which they belong. A

apparently is not.

For instance, A considers Peirce's theory of signs to be of vital linguistic significance. Of

Peirce's three sign types-indexes, icons, and symbols-A pays most attention to icons. Now

an icon, for Peirce (and for A), must have a natural (physical) resemblance to its referent,

whereas a symbol is 'based on a learned conventional relation' (8). There is a rich philosophical

tradition which, since Peirce's time, has been devoted to breaking down the distinction between

icons and symbols-on the grounds that no evidence exists to support the claim that, without

training, people will be able to connect an icon with its referent.1 Philosophical thinking in this

tradition holds that icons are merely symbols whose conventions are transparent. A, and others

interested in semiotics, are free to reject the influential criticisms of this distinction; but

ignoring them is contrary to the standards of scholarship which apply to use of material from

neighboring disciplines. More ominously, A wants to incorporate both Peirce's and Wittgen-

stein's views into his linguistics (47), in spite of the fact that the only work of Wittgenstein's

that he cites (1953) contains an extended argument against the possibility of icons, even mental

ones.

In some cases, A neglects not only the general philosophical background, but other views of

the same philosopher as well. He embraces both Wittgenstein's theory of family resemblances

and his picture theory of meaning, even though the first is an integral part of a later approach

in which Wittgenstein utterly rejected his earlier picture theory. It is even hard to tell whether

or not A approves of Wittgenstein's philosophy. In his preface, commenting that 'linguistics is

not the only field where a step backwards has been decreed progress' (1), he gives an approving

nod to Maher's citation (1975) of Gellner's denunciation (1968) of what A variously calls

'Oxford language philosophy' (1) and 'Wittgensteinians' (5). The first problem here is his

confusion about just which philosophers Gellner is criticizing: does he mean J. L. Austin

and other ordinary language philosophers-who, though originally strongly influenced by

Wittgenstein, are certainly not ' Wittgensteinians' ? Or Wittgenstein, Anscombe, Malcolm, and

other Wittgensteinians? More puzzling is A's approval of this attack on people whom he, at

least, views as Wittgensteinians, coupled with his simultaneous approval of (and frequent

references to) Wittgenstein's family resemblances.

A also gives a distorted picture of the other philosophical notion that is vital to his linguistics,

Peirce's theory of abduction. As A's account suggests (14, 21), Peirce originally believed that

his three modes of inference were on a par, forming a trichotomy of deduction/induction/

abduction; but he later repudiated this position (on good grounds) and formulated a system in

which deductive and inductive relations between propositions merely contribute to inference,

namely abduction. A shows no awareness of Peirce's later position.

In sum, then, linguists should beware of this uncritical eclecticism. Some of the philosophical

ideas which A mentions may indeed be of great linguistic interest, but his criterion for selecting

1 Most of the literature on this issue does not make use of Peirce's terms' icon' and 'symbol';

Goodman (1968:231) is an exception, though he addresses the question elsewhere in his book,

without actually mentioning icons. Perhaps the most elaborate philosophical argument against

Peirce's notion of icons is in the early part of Wittgenstein 1953 (see, e.g., p. 54); the notion is

also incompatible with the hermeneuticians' theory of signs (cf. Gadamer 1975). McCord (Ms)

discusses the difficulty of distinguishing icons from symbols in an anthropological context. For

a consideration of the issue in psycholinguistics (and a limited endorsement of icons), see Fodor

1975, especially his discussion of imagery (174-94).

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them does not.ensure that the ideas can be integrated into a single theory. In fact, further

consideration of the philosophical background suggests that many of them cannot be.

On the subject of causation in language change, A returns to his own ground;

but here again his presentation is so uneven that it's hard to say exactly where he

stands on substantive issues. It is clear, however, that he is determined to deny any

validity to generative linguistics, and that he links it with attempts to provide

causal explanations.

On this subject, I think A agrees in principle with Coseriu 1974: he quotes this work at

length several times, with approval, and repeats (94) the basic point, derived from Coseriu, that

'we are dealing with history where the momentum is human intentional activity. In this domain

prediction as required by generative grammarians is completely beside the point'. Again (111),

'[Coseriu] argues that no causal concepts are acceptable ... Causality leads badly astray.' A

apparently feels that a philosophical position he calls 'positivism' is at fault in this causal-

generative approach to language change; but it is hard to be sure, because his scattershot

mentions of positivism and causality are not brought together in any single discussion. My

assumption of the connection is based primarily on his comment (126) that Sapir's notion of

causality, which A likes, 'is not that of the positivists ... We have to do with human intentional

rule-governed activity in which Hempelian causality plays a very minor role.' Here A is

attributing more substance to the general theory of positivism than a philosopher would be

willing to accept. In philosophy, perhaps the only point on which all positivists would agree is

that a theory should have some empirical content which renders it testable. In particular, though

positivists do believe that 'the task of philosophy is to find the general principles common to all

the sciences and to use these principles as guides to human conduct' (Abbagnano 1967:414), it

is not true that all positivists want(ed) to assimilate the social and human sciences to natural

science. Many people who have written about science have favored this assimilation; but this

is not a monopoly of positivism, and it is a tendency that has become gradually weaker as

positivist thought has developed in this century. Judging by his references to Hempel here, and

to neo-positivists eelsewhere, A is probably confusing positivism in general with logical positiv-

ism, which does emphasize scientific prediction. But even if he is actually talking about

logical positivism in the passage quoted above, A's notion of 'Hempelian causality' must be

confined to Hempel's early views: in his later work (1962), Hempel included probabilistic

explanation, which should be compatible with the predictive approaches that A approves of

(e.g. Mafczak's).

Even without this added complication, however, A's position on the subject of causality is far

from consistent. His endorsement of Coseriu's anti-causal view is directly opposed to his

assertion that 'we must seek for causal explanations even for the most mystifying properties of

language' (126). Moreover, in reference to comments by Weinreich, Labov & Herzog 1968 on

generative historical linguistics, he observes (101) that only the 'proposal of fresh CONSTRAINTS

on change' and the 'proposal of new CAUSES of change' (Weinreich et al. 126) 'really advance

historical linguistics'. He then goes on to say that generativists have done little of either. If, as

his remark about Sapir and Hempelian causality implies, A is indeed thinking of two quite

different concepts of causality, his exposition is not clear enough for the reader to understand

what the difference between them is supposed to be.

As for the issue itself, A seems to conflate the question of predicting WHAT (and WHEN)

change will occur with the question of predicting WHAT FORM change will take IF it occurs.

Surely no serious historical linguist has ever laid claim to a predictive theory that encompasses

the first of these questions in any general sense-though recent work on typological change,

both in word-order patterns and (starting at a much earlier period) in the morphological cycle,

does involve limited claims in that direction. In particular, it simply isn't true that formal

'analysis entails formalistic taxonomic universals, with a deterministic causality factor for

predicting the future' (127). For instance, even granted that a given morphophonemic change

will simplify the grammar through analogic leveling, there will still be more than one possible

direction for the change to take. This is true even if one route is more probable than another. In

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LANGUAGE, VOLUME 56, NUMBER 2 (1980)

fact, the specifically generative theories to which A so strongly objects fall into the more modest

second category of prediction. They belong to the same eminently respectable line of research as

the Praguean work of Trubetzkoy, Jakobson, and Martinet. Where the Pragueans made

predictions based on imbalances in inventories, especially in phonological systems, Kiparsky

made predictions based on imbalances in phonological rule systems, e.g. with his prediction

that bleeding order will tend to be minimized in a changing system. Neither Kiparsky nor the

Pragueans claim that moit thevations for ALL linguistic changes are to be found in such struc-

tural relations, and it is unlikely that any of them would want to do so.

In view of these methodological similarities, it is difficult to see how A can reasonably attack

the general approach to the study of change exemplified in Kiparsky's work without also

attacking the Prague approach. Nor is it easy to see why he would want to attack either one, as

long as the limitations of such investigations are clearly recognized. (He might, and no doubt

would, still object to the validity of Kiparsky's RESULTS; but in this book he is attacking the

methodology more than the results.) Finally, both the Prague and the generative investigations

seem to me to be entirely compatible with, for example, the framework for change outlined in

Andersen 1973, in which structural imbalances would serve as one type of locus for abductive

innovations.

The value of the proportional formula is another issue on which A takes contradictory

positions. First, citing Householder 1971 with approval, he says (23) that 'the only candidate

for conscious or unconscious systematization is analogy ... expressed in proportions ... The

brain does not do the operations equivalent to these proportions in a generative grammar, but

recognizes the proportions more directly.' Later (70), he endorses the vindication of the

proportional formula by Leed 1970, and Jeffers' 1974 defense of it (72,93). Elsewhere, however,

he cites, again with approval, Esper's reference to Stern's 1931 warning against 'proportions on

paper' (91). I cannot tell where A stands on this issue, because the only common factor I can

find in the comments he makes is that they are all opposed to some generative position. The

most sensible statements I know of on the subject are Campbell's observation (1971:201) that

'the proportion ... was not intended so much literally, but rather as suggestive of processes in

language', and Esper's warning (193): 'proportional statements may serve very well as con-

jectures concerning the probable sources within the language of given analogical formations,

but they must not be taken as descriptions of actual processes in the brains of the speakers.'

A's reaction to formal approaches to the analysis of linguistic structure and/or change seems

to depend on whether or not he views a given formalism as generative. On the one hand, he

believes that it is 'impossible to tackle [the human mind] with a formalistic approach' (105); on

the other hand, he endorses Leed's requirement that a theory of analogy must include formal

operation(s) (70), and he frequently mentions his own formal 'diagrammatic method of

analysis' (23). He concludes that 'it must be significant that Pike and Anttila independently

arrived at such similar diagrams [of analogy] ... Some of the traditional notions in this sphere

must certainly be right, since they easily lead to the same formalization' (64). He does not,

however, provide cogent arguments to support his belief that formalism is good if it consists of

diagrams, but bad if it consists of rules.

The book contains few typographical errors, and only one-the omission of one or more

lines at the beginning of ?4.5 (p. 110)-could lead to confusion. Ho

However, errors in references are

numerous and annoying. Examples are several references to' Anttila 1969' without specification

of 1969a or 1969b (47, 67, 96); an otherwise unspecified reference to 'Harris' (44), which could

be to A. D. Harris 1974, J. W. Harris 1973, or M. B. Harris 1977; and references that don't

specify in which of the two 'References' sections they are to be found (110, 127, and elsewhere).

More serious errors occur in A's citations from other writers. I have not made an exhaustive

search, by any means; but in a check of the book by Esper, which A cites frequently, I found

A making no fewer than seven errors of fact or interpretation. For example, see A's p. 116:

Esper says of Ervin's work that it continues Thumb, not Marbe; and it is A, not Esper, who

provides the implied anti-generative criticism here. P. 46: Esper does not mention Wittgenstein

on his p. 11 or, indeed, anywhere else in his book. P. 52: Esper does not say that 'in psychology

association is spatial or temporal contiguity', but rather that the term 'ASSOCIATION usually

designates the connections which result from spatial and temporal contiguity' (Esper 47). P. 52:

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the quotation about association as 'an insult to man's intellectual capacities' does appear in

Esper (171), but the words are Kirk Smith's, not Esper's; and Smith is not referring to associa-

tion in general, but to 'simple associative rules'. A gives a second reference after the 'insult'

quotation, to Esper 136; but on that page Esper is discussing Deese's objection to contiguity as

the main principle of association, which is not an objection to association itself. P. 56: Esper's

fn. 62 on p. 202 has nothing to do with formal languages or closed systems. Finally, p. 52: A

simply cites Esper 33 for the idea that 'association is everywhere', when the notion (not quite

accurately paraphrased by A) actually appears in a lengthy quotation from Brugmann. I have

listed these errors in such detail because, if they are representative of the citations in this book, the

cautious reader will want to turn to the original source before accepting any attributions made

here.

Other errors are less serious. Some are grammatical or stylistic, many having a non-native-

speaker flavor; of these, the only one likely to mislead the reader is the statement (p. 4) that

Anttila 1969a 'did take issue with analogy'. There are repetitions of several points, e.g. on the

subject of Leed's eight reasons for analogy (71, 92).

A ends his book with a quotation from Klein 1975 about a zookeeper who predicts that, if a

bear has three cubs, and if they aren't all males or all females, then there will either be two

males and a female or two females and a male. According to A (127), Klein uses this quotation

to show that 'Vennemann's principle of natural serialization is false'; but showing that a

hypothesis is trivial is not the same as showing that it is false. There is, finally, a surprisingly

self-referential cast to the book: A feels (4) that he has not been listened to sufficiently because

he did not 'accept the fashionable dogma of the day'; and, perhaps in an effort to make up for

previous neglect, he includes ninety-eight references to his own work.

As a state-of-the-art report, A's book is flawed by misinterpretations, errors, and

lack of organization. It should nevertheless be valued for the important issues it

raises, for its admirably broad scope (linguistics, philosophy, psychology), and for

its rich bibliography, which will help the reader to explore analogy further. But the

most important lesson to be learned here, in my opinion, was best summed up by

Esper-who, like Anttila, was distressed by much of what he saw in transformational-

generative linguistics. Commenting on another scholar's attack on generativists,

Esper said (161): 'this [anti-Chomskyan] reaction ... shares with its provocation

the blame ... for the loss of that friendly interstimulation among scholars which is

so powerful a motivating force in the development of any science.'

REFERENCES

ABBAGNANO, NICOLA. 1967. Positivism. The encyclopedia of philosophy, 6.414-19.

New York: Macmillan.

ANDERSEN, HENNING. 1973. Abductive and deductive change. Lg. 49.765-93.

ANTTILA, RAIMO. 1969a. Uusimman aannehistorian suunnasta ja luonteesta. Turku.

. 1969b. Proto-Indo-European Schwebeablaut. (UCPL 58). Berkeley & Los

Angeles: University of California Press.

--. 1972. An introduction to historical and comparative linguistics. New York:

Macmillan.

--. 1975. Was there a generative historical linguistics? The Nordic languages and

modern linguistics, II, ed. by Karl-Hampus Dahlstedt, 70-92. Stockholm: Almqvist

& Wiksell.

BEST, KARL-HEINZ. 1973. Probleme der Analogieforschung. Munich: Hueber.

CAMPBELL, LYLE. 1971. Review of Historical linguistics and generative grammar,

by Robert D. King. Lg. 47.191-209.

CHEN, MATTHEW, and HSIN-I HSIEH. 1971. The time variable in phonological change.

Journal of Linguistics 7.1-13.

COSERIu, EUGENIO. 1974. Synchronie, Diachronie und Geschichte. Ubersetzt von Helga

Sohre. Munich: Fink.

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LANGUAGE, VOLUME 56, NUMBER 2 (1980)

ESPER, ERWIN A. 1973. Analogy and association in linguistics and psychology. Athens:

University of Georgia Press.

FODOR, JERRY A. 1975. The language of thought. New York: Crowell.

GADAMER, HANS-GEORG. 1975. Truth and method. New York: Seabury Press.

GELLNER, ERNST. 1968. Words and things. Harmondsworth: Penguin.

GOODMAN, NELSON. 1968. Languages of art: An approach to a theory of symbols.

Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill.

HARRIS, ADRIAN DAVID. 1974. The analogous conception of being: A study in dia-

lectical idealism. Ann Arbor: University Microfilms.

HARRIS, JAMES W. 1973. On the order of certain phonological rules in Spanish. A

Festschrift for Morris Halle, ed. by Stephen R. Anderson & Paul Kiparsky, 59-76.

New York: Holt.

HARRIS, MARTIN B. 1977. The inter-relationship between phonological and grammatical

change. Recent developments in historical phonology, ed. by Jacek Fisiak, 159-72.

The Hague: Mouton.

HEMPEL, CARL GUSTAV. 1962. Deductive-nomological vs. statistical explanation.

Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science 3.98-169.

HOUSEHOLDER, FRED W. 1971. Linguistic speculations. Cambridge: University Press.

JEFFERS, ROBERT J. 1974. On the notion 'explanation' in historical linguistics. Historical

linguistics, ed. by John M. Anderson & Charles Jones, 2.231-55. Amsterdam:

North-Holland.

KIPARSKY, PAUL. 1968. Linguistic universals and linguistic change. Universals in

linguistic theory, ed. by Emmon Bach & Robert T. Harms, 170-202. New York:

Holt.

KLEIN, WOLFGANG. 1975. Eine Theorie der Wortstellungsveranderung: Einige kritische

Bemerkungen zu Vennemanns Theorie der Sprachentwicklung. Linguistische

Berichte 37.46-57.

KURYLOWICZ, JERZY. 1964. The inflectional categories of Indo-European. Heidelberg:

Winter.

LEED, RICHARD. 1970. Distinctive features and analogy. Lingua 26.1-24.

MCCORD, EDWARD. MS. Philosophical groundwork for the comparison of cultures.

University of Pittsburgh dissertation.

MAHER, J. PETER. 1975. The TG paradigm: Against the MITniks. To appear.

SILVERSTEIN, MICHAEL. 1974. Dialectal developments in Chinookan tense-aspect

systems: An areal-historical analysis. (IJAL Memoir 29, pp. 45-99.) Baltimore.

STERN, GUSTAV. 1931. Meaning and change of meaning (Goteborgs H6gskolas

Arskrift, 38.) G6teborg. [Reprinted, Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1964.]

WANG, WILLIAM S-Y. 1969. Competing changes as a cause of residue. Lg. 45.9-25.

WEINREICH, URIEL; WILLIAM LABOV; and MARVIN I. HERZOG. 1968. Empirical founda-

tions for a theory of language change. Directions for historical linguistics, ed. by

Winfred P. Lehmann & Yakov Malkiel, 95-195. Austin: University of Texas Press.

WITTGENSTEIN, LUDWIG. 1953. Philosophical investigations. Translated by G. E. M.

Anscombe. Oxford: Blackwell.

[Received 27 April 1979.]

Crimean Gothic: Analysis and etymology of the corpus. By MACDONALD STEARNS JR.

(Studia linguistica et philologica, 6.) Saratoga, CA: Anma Libri, 1978. Pp. xii,

172.

Reviewed by RICHARD D. JANDA, UCLA

In the section concerning Crimean Gothic (CG) in the 1920 edition of his

Gotisches Elementarbuch, Wilhelm Streitberg wrote little more than a summary

statement that the vocabulary of CG showed 'unmistakable [EGmc.] traits',

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