Republic v Grijaldo

FACTS:
Jose Grijaldo obtained five loans from the branch office of the Bank of Taiwan, Ltd. in Bacolod City,
in the total sum of P1,281.97 with interest at the rate of 6% per annum, compounded quarterly. These
loans are evidenced by five promissory notes executed by the appellant in favor of the Bank of Taiwan,
Ltd.
To secure the payment of the loans the appellant executed a chattel mortgage on the standing crops
on his land, Lot No. 1494 known as Hacienda Campugas in Hinigiran, Negros Occidental.
The assets in the Philippines of the Bank of Taiwan, Ltd. were vested in the Government of the United
States. Pursuant to the Philippine Property Act of 1946 of the United States, these assets, including the
loans in question, were subsequently transferred to the Republic of the Philippines by the Government of
the United States under Transfer Agreement dated July 20, 1954. These assets were among the
properties that were placed under the administration of the Board of Liquidators created under Executive
Order No. 372.
Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Chairman of the Board of Liquidators, made a written
extrajudicial demand upon the appellant for the payment of the account in question. The record
shows that the appellant had actually received the written demand for payment, but he failed to pay.
The appellant Jose Grijaldo died. Upon motion by the Solicitor General this Court, in a resolution of May
13, 1963, required Manuel Lagtapon, Jacinto Lagtapon, Ruben Lagtapon and Anita L. Aguilar, who are
the legal heirs of Jose Grijaldo to appear and be substituted as appellants in accordance with Section 17
of Rule 3 of the Rules of Court.
ISSUE 1: Privy of contract?
The appellant maintains that the appellee has no privity of contract with the appellant. It is claimed that
the transaction between the Taiwan Bank, Ltd. and the appellant, so that the appellee, Republic of the
Philippines, could not legally bring action against the appellant for the enforcement of the obligation
involved in said transaction. This contention has no merit. It is true that the Bank of Taiwan, Ltd. was the
original creditor and the transaction between the appellant and the Bank of Taiwan was a private contract
of loan. However, pursuant to the Trading with the Enemy Act, as amended, and Executive Order No.
9095 of the United States; and under Vesting Order No. P-4, dated January 21, 1946, the properties of
the Bank of Taiwan, Ltd., an entity which was declared to be under the jurisdiction of the enemy country
(Japan), were vested in the United States Government and the Republic of the Philippines, the assets of
the Bank of Taiwan, Ltd. were transferred to and vested in the Republic of the Philippines. The
successive transfer of the rights over the loans in question from the Bank of Taiwan, Ltd. to the
United States Government, and from the United States Government to the government of the
Republic of the Philippines, made the Republic of the Philippines the successor of the rights, title
and interest in said loans, thereby creating a privity of contract between the appellee and the
appellant.
ISSUE 2: Loss of crops extinguish obligation?
The appellant likewise maintains, in support of his contention that the appellee has no cause of action,
that because the loans were secured by a chattel mortgage on the standing crops on a land owned
by him and these crops were lost or destroyed through enemy action his obligation to pay the
loans was thereby extinguished. This argument is untenable. The terms of the promissory notes and
the chattel mortgage that the appellant executed in favor of the Bank of Taiwan, Ltd. do not support the
claim of appellant. The obligation of the appellant under the five promissory notes was not to
deliver a determinate thing namely, the crops to be harvested from his land, or the value of the
crops that would be harvested from his land. Rather, his obligation was to pay a generic thing

the amount of money representing the total sum of the five loans, with interest. The transaction
between the appellant and the Bank of Taiwan, Ltd. was a series of five contracts of simple loan of
sums of money. "By a contract of (simple) loan, one of the parties delivers to another ... money or
other consumable thing upon the condition that the same amount of the same kind and quality
shall be paid." (Article 1933, Civil Code) The obligation of the appellant under the five promissory notes
evidencing the loans in questions is to pay the value thereof; that is, to deliver a sum of money a clear
case of an obligation to deliver, a generic thing. Article 1263 of the Civil Code provides:
In an obligation to deliver a generic thing, the loss or destruction of anything of the same
kind does not extinguish the obligation.
The chattel mortgage on the crops growing on appellant's land simply stood as a security for the
fulfillment of appellant's obligation covered by the five promissory notes, and the loss of the
crops did not extinguish his obligation to pay, because the account could still be paid from other
sources aside from the mortgaged crops.
ISSUE 3: Prescribed?
Firstly, it should be considered that the complaint in the present case was brought by the Republic of the
Philippines not as a nominal party but in the exercise of its sovereign functions, to protect the interests of
the State over a public property. Under paragraph 4 of Article 1108 of the Civil Code prescription, both
acquisitive and extinctive, does not run against the State.
Secondly, the running of the period of prescription of the action to collect the loan from the appellant was
interrupted by the moratorium laws
If the prescriptive period was not interrupted by the moratorium laws, the action would have prescribed
already; but, as We have stated, the prescriptive period was suspended by the moratorium laws for a
period of 8 years and 6 months. If we deduct the period of suspension (8 years and 6 months) from the
period that elapsed from the time the cause of action arose to the time when the complaint was filed (16
years, 6 months and 16 days) there remains a period of 8 years and 16 days. In other words, the
prescriptive period ran for only 8 years and 16 days. There still remained a period of one year, 11 months
and 14 days of the prescriptive period when the complaint was filed.

Martinez v Ramos
FACTS:
On May 2, 1900, Antonino Ramos signed an obligation to the following effect in favor of Pedro
Martinez:1awphil.net
I hereby declare to be a fact that by order of my father, Julian Ramos, I have received from
Pedro Martinez one thousand nine hundred pesos ($1,900) as a loan without interest,
which I will return within three years, and I sign. Manila, May 2, 1900. (Sgd.) Antonino
Ramos.
Antonino Ramos was appointed judicial administrator of the estate of his deceased father, Julian Ramos,
and against him as such, and personally, in that special proceeding, Pedro Martinez filed suit for the
fulfillment of that obligation, for Antonino Ramos alleged that by order of his father he had contracted it,
and that subsequently he had transferred to some of his coheirs the business started with the money. But
the committee of appraisal of the estate, in its report rendered on February 9, 1912, decided that this
was not a debt against the estate, but against the heirs who had acknowledged it when presented
to them.
Antonino Ramos appealed from this judgment and alleges here as the sole assignment of error the fact
that the trial court regarded the obligation in question as a personal one of the appellant's, attempting to
base it on acts that occurred apparently, subsequent to the loan, whereby the borrower transferred to his
parents the business in which had been invested the money received as an accommodation or loan from
the lender, and on the fact that all or some of his coheirs had acknowledged such sum as a debt of the
testamentary administration of said parents of Antonino Ramos and coheirs.
ISSUE: Is the debt a personal one?
HELD:
One who receives as a loan money or other fungible thing, acquires ownership thereof and
is bound to return to his creditor an equal amount of the same kind and quality. (Civil Code,
art. 1753.)
In the instrument of obligation Antonino Ramos says:
I have received from Pedro Martinez one thousand nine hundred pesos as a loan without
interest, which I will return within three years, and I sign.
The contract consists in that Antonino, and nobody else, will return to Pedro Martinez in the time
stipulated the 1,900 pesos; and the allegations set up are of no avail against the wording of the contents
of the instrument.1awphil.net
Obligation arising from contracts have legal force between the contracting parties and must be
fullfilled in accordance with their stipulations. (Civil Code, art. 1091.)
Contracts that may have been made subsequent to the one under consideration, either between Antonio
Ramos and his parents or between himself and his coheirs, wherein the lender Pedro Martinez has not
intervened, cannot be alleged against the plaintiff Pedro Martinez, on the principle that the force of the
law of contrast cannot be extended to parties who do not intervene therein.

Tan v Valdeheza
FACTS:
The decision a quo was rendered by the Court of First Instance of Misamis Occidental (Branch I) in an
action instituted by the plaintiff-appellee Lucia Tan against the defendants-appellants Arador Valdehueza
and Rediculo Valdehueza (docketed as civil case 2574) for (a) declaration of ownership and recovery of
possession of the parcel of land described in the first cause of action of the complaint, and (b)
consolidation of ownership of two portions of another parcel of (unregistered) land described in the
second cause of action of the complaint, purportedly sold to the plaintiff in two separate deeds of pacto de
retro.
That the parcel of land described in the first cause of action was the subject matter of the public
auction sale held on May 6, 1955 at the Capitol Building in Oroquieta, Misamis Occidental, wherein the
plaintiff was the highest bidder and as such a Certificate of Sale was executed by MR. VICENTE D. ROA
who was then the Ex-Officio Provincial Sheriff in favor of LUCIA TAN the herein plaintiff. Due to the failure
of defendant Arador Valdehueza to redeem the said land within the period of one year as being provided
by law, MR. VICENTE D. ROA who was then the Ex-Officio Provincial Sheriff executed an ABSOLUTE
DEED OF SALE in favor of the plaintiff LUCIA TAN.
That defendants ARADOR VALDEHUEZA and REDICULO VALDEHUEZA have executed two
documents of DEED OF PACTO DE RETRO SALE in favor of the plaintiff herein, LUCIA TAN of two
portions of a parcel of land which is described in the second cause of action with the total amount
of ONE THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED PESOS (P1,500.00), Philippine Currency,
That from the execution of the Deed of Sale with right to repurchase mentioned in the second cause of
action, defendants Arador Valdehueza and Rediculo Valdehueza remained in the possession of the land;
that land taxes to the said land were paid by the same said defendants.
Civil case 2002 referred to in stipulation of fact no. 4 was a complaint for injunction filed by Tan on
July 24, 1957 against the Valdehuezas, to enjoin them "from entering the above-described parcel
of land and gathering the nuts therein ...."
The Deed of Pacto de Retro referred to in stipulation of fact no. 5 as "Annex D" (dated August 5, 1955)
was not registered in the Registry of Deeds, while the Deed of Pacto de Retro referred to as "Annex E"
(dated March 15, 1955) was registered.
Ruling of the Trial Court
1. Declaring Lucia Tan the absolute owner of the property described in the first cause of action of the
amended complaint; and ordering the herein defendants not to encroach and molest her in the exercise of
her proprietary rights; and, from which property they must be dispossessed;
2. Ordering the defendants, Arador Valdehueza and Rediculo Valdehueza jointly and severally to pay
to the plaintiff, Lucia Tan, on Annex 'E' the amount of P1,200, with legal interest of 6% as of August
15, 1966, within 90 days to be deposited with the Office of the Court within 90 days from the date of
service of this decision, and that in default of such payment the property shall be sold in accordance with
the Rules of Court for the release of the mortgage debt, plus costs;
3. And as regards the land covered by deed of pacto de retro annex 'D', the herein defendants Arador
Valdehueza and Rediculo Valdehueza are hereby ordered to pay the plaintiff the amount of P300 with
legal interest of 6% from August 15, 1966, the said land serving as guaranty of the said amount of
payment;
ISSUE 1: Unregistered property still an equitable mortgage or loan?

The trial court treated the registered deed of pacto de retro as an equitable mortgage but considered the
unregistered deed of pacto de retro "as a mere case of simple loan, secured by the property thus
sold under pacto de retro," on the ground that no suit lies to foreclose an unregistered mortgage.
It would appear that the trial judge had not updated himself on law and jurisprudence; he cited, in support
of his ruling, article 1875 of the old Civil Code and decisions of this Court circa 1910 and 1912.
Under article 1875 of the Civil Code of 1889, registration was a necessary requisite for the validity of a
mortgage even as between the parties, but under article 2125 of the new Civil Code (in effect since
August 30,1950), this is no longer so.
If the instrument is not recorded, the mortgage is nonetheless binding between the
parties. (Article 2125, 2nd sentence).
The Valdehuezas having remained in possession of the land and the realty taxes having been paid
by them, the
contracts which purported to be pacto de retro transactions are presumed to be equitable
mortgages, whether registered or not, there being no third parties involved.
ISSUE 2: Should there be legal interest?
The imposition of legal interest on the amounts subject of the equitable mortgages, P1,200 and
P300, respectively, is without legal basis, for, "No interest shall be due unless it has been
expressly stipulated in writing." (Article 1956, new Civil Code) Furthermore, the plaintiff did not pray
for such interest; her thesis was a consolidation of ownership, which was properly rejected, the
contracts being equitable mortgages.
ISSUE 3: Double prejudice?
The Valdehuezas claim that their answer to the complaint of the plaintiff affirmed that they remained in
possession of the land and gave the proceeds of the harvest to the plaintiff; it is thus argued that they
would suffer double prejudice if they are to pay legal interest on the amounts stated in the pacto de retro
contracts, as the lower court has directed, and that therefore the court should have ordered evidence to
be adduced on the harvest.
The record does not support this claim. Nowhere in the original and the amended complaints is an
allegation of delivery to the plaintiff of the harvest from the land involved in the second cause of
action. Hence, the defendants' answer had none to affirm.

Jardenil v Solas
*Note: Wala talagang facts. They just answer the question. Its a one page decision. You can basically
understand the facts from the decision. This is basically the whole case pero dinelete ko lang isang
paragraph HAHA.
ISSUE:
This is an action for foreclosure of mortgage. The only question raised in this appeal is: Is defendantappellee bound to pay the stipulated interest only up to the date of maturity as fixed in the
promissory note, or up to the date payment is effected? This question is, in our opinion controlled by
the express stipulation of the parties.
HELD:
*There was a mortgage deed in Spanish then court concluded the ff:
Defendant-appellee has, therefore, clearly agreed to pay interest only up to the date of maturity, or
until March 31, 1934. As the contract is silent as to whether after that date, in the event of nonpayment, the debtor would continue to pay interest, we cannot in law, indulge in any presumption
as to such interest; otherwise, we would be imposing upon the debtor an obligation that the
parties have not chosen to agree upon. Article 1755 of the Civil Code provides that "interest shall
be due only when it has been expressly stipulated."
A writing must be interpreted according to the legal meaning of its language and only when the
wording of the written instrument appears to be contrary to the evident intention of the parties
that such intention must prevail. (Article 1281, Civil Code.) There is nothing in the mortgage deed to
show that the terms employed by the parties thereto are at war with their evident intent. On the contrary
the act of the mortgage of granting to the mortgagor on the same date of execution of the deed of
mortgage, an extension of one year from the date of maturity within which to make payment,
without making any mention of any interest which the mortgagor should pay during the additional
period, indicates that the true intention of the parties was that no interest should be paid during
the period of grace. What reason the parties may have therefor, we need not here seek to explore.
Neither has either of the parties shown that, by mutual mistake, the deed of mortgage fails to
express their agreement, for if such mistake existed, plaintiff would have undoubtedly adduced
evidence to establish it and asked that the deed be reformed accordingly, under the parcel-evidence
rule.
We hold therefore, that as the contract is clear and unmistakable and the terms employed therein have
not been shown to belie or otherwise fail to express the true intention of the parties and that the deed has
not been assailed on the ground of mutual mistake which would require its reformation, same should be
given its full force and effect. When a party sues on a written contract and no attempt is made to show
any vice therein, he cannot be allowed to lay any claim more than what its clear stipulations accord. His
omission, to which the law attaches a definite warning as an in the instant case, cannot by the courts be
arbitrarily supplied by what their own notions of justice or equity may dictate.
Plaintiff is, therefore, entitled only to the stipulated interest of 12 per cent on the loan of P2, 400
from November 8, 1932 to March 31, 1934. And it being a fact that extra judicial demands have
been made which we may assume to have been so made on the expiration of the year of grace, he
shall be entitled to legal interest upon the principal and the accrued interest from April 1, 1935,
until full payment.

Soncuya v. Azarraga
FACTS:
The plaintiff has four causes of action. Under the first cause he seeks to recover from the defendants
the sum of P118,635.68 as damages, which he alleges to have been caused by the defendants in
fraudulently depriving him of the possession of four parcels of land with a total area of 296
hectares, 58 ares and 92 centares, which they, with knowledge that said real properties belonged to him
exclusively, registered in their names in the registry of property and mortgaged in favor of "Hijos de I. de
la Rama" to pay a certain obligation which they had contracted with the Panay Municipal Cadastre. Under
the second cause, plaintiff seeks to recover P6,080 as the supposed value of the heads of cattle
belonging to him, which the tenants of the defendants had slaughtered. Under the third cause, he seeks
payment of the sum of P5,575 as the supposed value of 1,115 coconut trees which he had planted on the
four parcels of land in question. Under the fourth and last cause of action, plaintiff prays that the
defendants surnamed Azarraga, with the exception of Joaquin Azarraga, be ordered to make up to 123
hectares, 13 ares and 99 centares the land which the latter had sold to him, because plaintiff did not take
possession of the land, except a portion thereof, having an area of 72 hectares, 83 ares and 5 centares.
In other words, the defendants should deliver to the plaintiff an additional 50 hectares , 30 ares and 94
centares inasmuch as the participation of said Joaquin Azarraga in the estate left to him and his brothers,
his co- defendants herein, by their common grandfather, Juan Azarraga y Galvez, which Joaquin
Azarraga sold to plaintiff, had that area according to the deed of partition, executed by all of them, and the
plan of said estate which was subsequently drawn up.
By reason of the proceedings had in case No. 11489 of the Court of First Instance of Manila, entitled
"Testate Estate of the Deceased Juan Azarraga y Galvez", the defendants surnamed Azarraga
became indebted to Attorney Leodegario Azarraga, who represented them in said case, for attorney's
fees, which on October 21, 1919 the court, which took cognizance of the case, fixed at P3,000 (Exhibit B).
The defendants Azarraga had previously agreed among themselves to pay Attorney Leodegario Azarraga
attorney's fees in the manner set out in Exhibit A.
The parties also agree that the parcels of land located in Bay-ang, New Washington, Capiz, P. I.,
which are enumerated in the inventory of this partition as Nos. 81, 82 and 83, are specially mortgaged
and subject to the payment of the fees of said attorney of the testate estate, which fees shall be
fixed by the court, and said attorney may hold said lands under no obligation to pay any rent until
his fees shall have been fully paid: Provided, however, that if, at the end of the period of five years
from the date of the approval of this project of partition, said parties shall not have been able to
pay in full the fees of said attorney, then said parcels of land, Nos. 81, 82 and 83, located in Bayang, shall be definitely adjudicated to said attorney, Mr. Leodegario Azarraga, as his property, in
payment of his fees, and all sums which he may have received from time to time from the interested
parties in these testate proceedings, within the said period, shall be returned to said parties: Provided,
further, that in case said interested parties in the testate proceedings shall be able to pay in full the
fees of the attorney for the estate before the expiration of said period of five years, then said
parcels of land situated in Bay-ang shall continue in the possession of said attorney for an
additional period of three years from the date of the last payment in the event that said attorney
may have kept livestock in said lands.
About nine months after the court approved Exhibit A, or to be exact, on June 9, 1920, which was long
before the expiration of the period of five years within which the defendants Azarraga were bound to pay
Attorney Leodegario Azarraga his fees, which had been fixed at P3,000, said attorney decided to sell
and did sell to the plaintiff his credit against the defendants for the sum of P2,500 with all the
rights inherent therein in accordance with the agreements and stipulations appearing in said
document (Exhibit C). One of said agreement was that Attorney Leodegario Azarraga would take
possession of the said parcels of land and, occupy the same, if he so desired, without paying any rent or
annuity, until fees shall have been fully paid.

When the plaintiff became the creditor of the defendants Azarraga by virtue of the sale and cession which
Attorney Azarraga had made in his favor of the rights which said attorney had under Exhibit A, he
allowed the defendants an extension of a few years over the five years with in which they would
have to pay him his credit, or up to February 16, 1926, but with the express condition that they
would pay him interest at the rate of 12 per cent per annum, from August 30, 1924.This term was
later extended to April 26, 1926 on the request of the defendants, but also with the condition that
they would pay the plaintiff the same interest of 12 per cent. The plaintiff granted another
extension to expire on October 31, 1928, but subject to the condition that instead of seven
thousand and odd pesos, which undoubtedly referred to the interest of 12 per cent per annum
charged the defendants, they should pay him P12,000
Aside from the above transactions between the plaintiff and the defendants Azarraga, one of the latter,
Joaquin Azarraga, executed in favor of the former, the deed known as Exhibit E of the record and
dated October 14, 1922, by which he sold to the plaintiff, for the sum of P4,000, his portion of the
inheritance in the testate estate of the late Juan Azarraga y Galvez, consisting of an undivided tract of
land containing an estimated area of 63 hectares and located in Bay-ang Chico, New Washington, Capiz.
It is further stated therein that the period of redemption would be five years to be counted from
February 16, 1921, which was later extended to April 26, 1926. In granting him this extension, the
plaintiff imposed on Joaquin Azarraga the condition that he should pay him interest at the rate of
12 per cent from the expiration of the first term A second extension was further granted, but under
the condition that he should, together with his brothers, pay the plaintiff instead of seven
thousand and odd pesos, representing the interest referred to in the preceding paragraph, in
which the P3,000 mentioned in Exhibit A were included, P12,000.
By virtue of the transfer made to him by Joaquin Azarraga and also of the terms conditions enumerated in
said Exhibit A, the plaintiff took possession of practically the whole land of the defendants Azarraga,
located in Bay-ang, placing therein livestock from the month of August, 1920 and in the same year built
sheepfolds therein, besides erecting some wire fences. When the plaintiff took possession of part of the
land in question in August, 1920 and another part thereof in February, 1922, after the execution in his
favor of the deed of transfer, which is a clarification of Exhibit E, he found fruit-bearing and young coconut
trees, the latter being more numerous. In 1925, 1926 and 1927, Joaquin Azarraga, either by himself or his
laborers, planted therein hundreds of coconut trees of which but a few hundreds, as we the case with the
old ones, remained on account of the long droughts or other causes.
ISSUES and HELD:
I. Was the contract entered into by-the Azarraga brothers, the defendants herein, with Attorney
Leodegario Azarraga from whom the plaintiff derived his right, a sale with pacto de retro, or an
assignment in payment of a debt, or was it an antichresis partaking of the nature of what was anciently
known as pacto comisorio, or a mortgage, or was it merely a loan with real estate security?
The first question offers no difficulty if account is taken of the established facts and the conduct of the
interested parties after the expiration of the term of five years fixed in Exhibit A. When the plaintiff
extended the period to February 16, 1926 within which the defendants Azarraga could pay him his
credit, but imposed on them the condition that they pay him 12 per cent annual interest from
August 30, 1924 on the principal of P3,000 (Exh. 5) and gave them another extension up to April
26, 1926, under the same conditions as regard interest (Exh. M), what perhaps could have been
considered as a antichresis or pacto comisorio not an assignment in payment of a debt, or a sale with
pacto de retro because there is nothing in Exhibit A to indicate that such was the intention of the
defendants Azarraga or, at least, that they bound themselves to deliver the land in question to the plaintiff
and that the latter should pay them the value thereof; and because there was what may be considered
the resolutory condition of five years was converted into a simple loan by the decisive
circumstance that plaintiff chose to collect thereafter, and the obligors agreed to pay him, 12 per
cent annual interest. It is only in contracts of loan, with or without guaranty, that interest may be
demanded (articles 1108, 1740, 1755, 1868, 1876, and 1881 of the Civil Code. As a matter of fact, the
contract embodied in Exhibit A was novated by Exhibits 5 and M, and the plaintiff wanted to have it

novated for the third time by means of Exhibit 2. It does not appear of record, however, that the
defendants Azarraga ever assented to the latter novation. Perhaps, their refusal to agree to the same was
due to the fact that the plaintiff wanted to raise their old obligation (P3,000 or P2,700 of all the Azarraga
brothers, plus P4,000 which Joaquin Azarraga alone owed, which two accounts both the plaintiff and the
defendants considered as amounting to P7,000, exclusive of the annual interest of 12 per cent) to the
round sum of P12,000. From all this it may easily be inferred that the obligation which the defendants had
imposed upon themselves by Exhibit A had ceased to exist and became a simple loan with security, if so
desired, of the lands in question, but without prejudice to third parties as neither Exhibit A nor the deed of
assignment Exhibit C, executed by Leodegario Azarraga in favor of the plaintiff, was inscribed in the
registry of deeds.
II. Was the contract executed by the defendant Joaquin Azarraga, on the one hand, and the plaintiff, on
the other, embodied in Exhibit E, a sale with pacto de retro or simply a loan with real estate security?
There is also no difficulty in disposing of the second question, considering the various novations which, as
has been said, had taken place and had been extended not only to the Azarraga brothers with respect to
their obligation of P3,000 or P2,700, but also to the defendant Joaquin Azarraga as regard his personal
debt of P4,000. We must not lose sight of the fact that the plaintiff never considered the contract
entered into by him with Joaquin Azarraga as, strictly speaking, a sale with pacto de retro. And if
he had ever considered it as such, it is, nevertheless, true that he novated it on February 16, 1926,
considering it from the time on as a simple loan, inasmuch as on that date he began to charge the
said defendant 12 per cent annual interest with the latter's assent and confirmity. This clearly
appears in Exhibit M which must be considered together with paragraphs 7 and 8 of Exhibit E, as the
plaintiff himself does in his brief (brief for the plaintiff as appellant, pages 4 and 5), because the term of
five years to which said Exhibit E refers and which should have expired on February 16, 1926 was
extended by the said plaintiff, by Exhibit M, up to April 26, 1926 under the aforementioned condition that
he should be paid 12 per cent annual interest.
Consequently, the contention of the defendants that the plaintiff did not and could never receive
the lands in question as an assignment in payment of a debt, and much less did he acquire them
by purchase with pacto de retro, is well taken. It must also be noted that at no time did the plaintiff
claim any rights of dominion over the lands since he did not even intimate to the defendants, either
directly or indirectly, that for their failure to pay him his credit within the time provided therefor, he become
the absolute owner thereof. Notwithstanding the fact that all the extensions he had given
defendants had expired, he did not, even only for tax declaration purposes, declare the lands as
his property. Having reached this conclusion, it is needless to state that the plaintiff has no right
to the various sums which he seeks in his complaint and to which he refers in the first and last
errors assigned by him. If, as has been shown, he never became the owner of the lands in question,
he can neither claim payment of the value of the same nor ask to be indemnified for the
deprivation of their possession. The plaintiff, moreover, has no reason to complain that his lien, if his
right over said lands could be termed as such, was not annotated in the certificate of title which the
defendants Azarraga had obtained, or that the latter did not ask that it be stated therein that the lands to
which it refers are charged with his credit against them; inasmuch as he was himself negligent in that he
did not ask the court, while the registration case relating to said lands was being heard, for the annotation
of what he considered necessary to protect his rights, and in not seeking the revision of modification of
the decree of registration within the period of one year provided for the purpose.