G.R. No.

170192, February 10, 2016

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. MARISSA BAYKER, AccusedAppellant.
Brief: An illegal recruiter can be liable for the crimes of illegal recruitment committed in
large scale andestafa without risk of being put in double jeopardy, provided that the accused
has been so charged under separate informations.
Issue: Whether or not the CA properly convicted Bayker.
Ruling: Illegal recruitment is committed by a person who: (a) undertakes any recruitment
activity defined under Article 13(b) or any prohibited practice enumerated under Article 34
and Article 38 of the Labor Code; and (b) does not have a license or authority to lawfully
engage in the recruitment and placement of workers. It is committed in large scale when it
is committed against three or more persons individually or as a group.1
The CA properly affirmed the conviction of the accused-appellant by the RTC for illegal
recruitment committed in large scale because she had committed acts of recruitment
against at least three persons (namely: Canizares, Dahab, and Miparanum) despite her not
having been duly licensed or authorized by the Philippine Overseas Employment
Administration (POEA) for that purpose.
The accused-appellant's insistence on her very limited participation in the recruitment of the
complainants did not advance or help her cause any because the State established her
having personally promised foreign employment either as hotel porters or seafarers to the
complainants despite her having no license or authority to recruit from the POEA. The
records made it clear enough that her participation was anything but limited, for she herself
had accompanied them to their respective medical examinations at their own expense. In
addition, she herself brought them to GNB Marketing and introduced them to her coaccused. The CA pointedly observed.

The evidence established that without any license or authority to do so,

appellant promised private complainants overseas employment in regard to which
she required them to undergo medical examination and training and collected fees or
payments from them, while repeatedly assuring that they would be deployed abroad.
On appellant's contention that it was Nida Bermudez and Lorenz Langreo who
received money from the complainants, even assuming arguendo that appellant
never received any payment from the complainants, actual receipt of a fee is not an
essential element of the crime of Illegal Recruitment, but is only one of the modes
for the commission thereof. Besides, all the private complainants positively identified
appellant as the person who recruited them and exacted money from them.

1 Under Section 6 (m) (Definitions) of Republic Act No. 8042, illegal recruitment "when committed by a syndicate
or in large scale shall be considered as offense involving economic sabotage;" and illegal recruitment "is deemed
committed by a syndicate carried out by a group of three (3) or more persons conspiring or confederating with one
another. It is deemed committed in large scale if committed against three (3) or more persons
individually or as a group." See People v. Fernandez, G.R. No. 199211, June 4, 2014, 725 SCRA 152, 156-157.

Appellant's bare denials and self-serving assertions cannot prevail over the positive
testimonies of the complainants who had no ill motive to testify falsely against her.2
The accused-appellant's denial of her participation in the illegal recruitment activities of
Bermudez and Langreo did not gain traction from her charging her co-accused with the sole
responsibility for the illegal recruitment of the complainants. Based on the testimonial
narration of the complainants regarding their recruitment, she was unqualifiedly depicted as
having the primary and instrumental role in recruiting them for overseas placement from
the inception. Also, her claim of having been only casually associated with GNB Marketing
did not preclude her criminal liability for the crimes charged and proved. Even the mere
employee of a company or corporation engaged in illegal recruitment could be held liable,
along with the employer, as a principal in illegal recruitment once it was shown that he had
actively and consciously participated in illegal recruitment. This is because recruitment and
placement include any act of canvassing, enlisting, contracting, transporting, utilizing, hiring
or procuring workers, as well as referrals, contract services, promising or advertising for
employment, locally or abroad, whether for profit or not.

G.R. No. 199683, February 10, 2016

ARLENE
T.
SAMONTE,
VLADIMIR
P.
SAMONTE,
MA.
AUREA
ELEPANO, Petitioners, v. LA
SALLE GREENHILLS, INC., BRO.
BERNARD
OCA, Respondents.

S.
S.

Brief: As each and all of the various and varied classes of employees in the gamut of the
labor force, from non-professionals to professionals, are afforded full protection of law and
security of tenure as enshrined in the Constitution, the entitlement is determined on the
basis of the nature of the work, qualifications of the employee, and other relevant
circumstances.
Issue: whether or not the Court of Appeals correctly ruled that the NLRC did not commit
grave abuse of discretion in ruling that petitioners were not regular employees who may
only be dismissed for just and authorized causes.
Ruling: Our inquiry and disposition will delve into the kind of employment relationship
between the parties, such employment relationship having been as much as admitted by
LSGI and then ruled upon categorically by the NLRC and the appellate court which both held
that petitioners were fixed-term employees and not independent contractors. Article 280 of
the Labor Code classifies employees into regular, project, seasonal, and casual:
Art. 280. Regular and casual employment. The provisions of written
agreement to the contrary notwithstanding and regardless of the oral agreement of
the parties, an employment shall be deemed to be regular where the employee has
been engaged to perform activities which are usually necessary or desirable in the
usual business or trade of the employer, except where the employment has been
fixed for a specific project or undertaking the completion or termination of which has
been determined at the time of the engagement of the employee or where the . work

2 Rollo, pp. 19-20

or service to be performed is seasonal in nature and the employment is for the

duration of the season.
An employment shall be deemed to be casual if it is not covered by the preceding
paragraph: Provided, That any employee who has rendered at least one year of
service, whether such service is continuous or broken, shall be considered a regular
employee with respect to the activity in which he is employed and his employment
shall continue while such activity exists.

The provision classifies regular employees into two kinds (1) those "engaged to perform
activities which are usually necessary or desirable in the usual business or trade of the
employer"; and (2) casual employees who have "rendered at least one year of service,
whether such service is continuous or broken."
The NLRC correctly identified the existence of an employer-employee relationship between
petitioners and LSGI and not a bilateral independent contractor relationship. On more than
one occasion, we recognised certain workers to be independent contractors: individuals with
unique skills and talents that set them apart from ordinary employees. We found them to be
independent contractors because of these unique skills and talents and the lack of control
over the means and methods in the performance of their work. In some instances, doctors
and other medical professional may fall into this independent contractor category,
legitimately providing medical professional services. However, as has been declared by theNLRC and the appellate court, petitioners herein are not independent contractors. Time and
again we have held that the power of control refers to the existence of the power and not
necessarily to the actual exercise thereof, nor is it essential for the employer to actually
supervise the performance of duties of the employee. 3 It is enough that the employer has
the right to wield that power.
G.R. No. 190534, February 10, 2016
C.F. SHARP CREW MANAGEMENT, INC., RONALD AUSTRIA, AND ABU DHABI
NATIONAL TANKER CO., Petitioners, v. LEGAL HEIRS OF THE LATE GODOFREDO
REPISO, REPRESENTED BY HIS WIFE LUZVIMINDA REPISO, Respondents.
Brief: Death is compensable depends on the terms and conditions of his Contract of
Employment. The employment of seafarers, including claims for death benefits, is governed
by the contracts they sign at the time of their engagement.
Issue: Whether or not Godofredo's death is compensable.
Ruling: It depends on the terms and conditions of his Contract of Employment. The
employment of seafarers, including claims for death benefits, is governed by the contracts
they sign at the time of their engagement. As long as the stipulations in said contracts are
not contrary to law, morals, public order, or public policy, they have the force of law
between the parties. Nonetheless, while the seafarer and his employer are governed by

3 Corporal Sr. v. National Labor Relations Commission, 395 Phil. 980 (2000)

their mutual agreement, the POEA Rules and Regulations require that the POEA-SEC be
integrated in every seafarer's contract.4
As a rule, stipulations in an employment contract not contrary to statutes, public policy,
public order or morals have the force of law between the contracting parties. In
controversies between a laborer and his master, doubts reasonably arising from the
evidence or in the interpretation of agreements and writing should be resolved in the
former's favor. The policy is to extend the doctrine to a greater number of employees who
can avail of the benefits under the law, in consonance with the avowed policy of the State,
under Article XIII, Section 3 of the 1987 Constitution, to give maximum aid and protection
to labor. Consistent with this policy, the POEA-SEC was designed primarily for the protection
and benefit of Filipino seafarers in the pursuit of their employment on board ocean-going
vessels. As such., it is a standing principle that its provisions are to be construed and
applied fairly, reasonably, and liberally in their favor.5
For a seafarer's death to be compensable under the 1996 POEA-SEC, the Court explicitly
ruled inInter-Orient Maritime, Inc. v. Candava6 that:
The prevailing rule under the 1996 POEA-SEC was that the illness leading to
the eventual death of seafarer need not be shown to be work-related in order to
be compensable, but must be proven to have been contracted during the term of
the contract. Neither is it required that there be proof that the working conditions
increased the risk of contracting the disease or illness. An injury or accident is said to
arise "in the course of employment" when it takes place within the period of
employment, at a place where the employee reasonably may be, and while he is
fulfilling his duties or is engaged in doing something incidental thereto. (Emphases
supplied, citations omitted.)
Based on the foregoing, herein respondents are entitled to the benefits they are claiming as
it can be logically and reasonably concluded from the particular circumstances in the case at
bar that Godofredo contracted the illness which eventually caused his death during the term
of his contract or in the course of his employment.
G.R. No. 214230, February 10,2016
SECURITY BANK SAVINGS CORPORATION (formerly PREMIERE DEVELOPMENT
/HERMINIO FAMATIGAN, JR.,Petitioner V. CHARLES M. SINGSON, Respondent.
Brief: Separation pay is warranted when the cause for termination is not attributable to the
employee's fault, as well as in cases of illegal dismissal where reinstatement is no longer
feasible.
Issue: Whether or not the CA erred in upholding the award of separation pay as financial
assistance to respondent despite having been validly dismissed.

4 Inter-Orient Maritime, Inc. v. Candava, G.R. No. 201251, June 26, 2013, 700 SCRA 174, 182.
5 Racelis v. United Philippine Lines, Inc., G.R. No. 198408, November 12, 2014
6 Supra note 4 at 186

Ruling: the Court finds the CA to have erred in awarding separation pay. To reiterate, the
grant of separation pay to a dismissed employee is primarily determined by the cause of the
dismissal. In the case at bar, respondent's established act of repeatedly allowing Branch
Manager Pinero to bring the checkbooks and bank forms outside of the bank's premises in
violation of the company's rules and regulations had already been declared by the LA to be
gross and habitual neglect of duty under Article 282 of the Labor Code, which finding was
not contested on appeal by respondent. It was petitioners who interposed an appeal solely
with respect to the award of separation pay as financial assistance. As they aptly pointed
out, the infractions, while not clearly indicative of any wrongful intent, is, nonetheless,
serious in nature when one considers the employee's functions, rendering it inequitable to
award separation pay based on social justice. As the records show, respondent was the
custodian of accountable bank forms in his assigned branch and as such, was mandated to
strictly comply with the monitoring procedure and disposition thereof as a security measure
to avoid the attendant high risk to the bank. Indeed, it is true that the failure to observe the
processes and risk preventive measures and worse, to take action and address its violation,
may subject the bank to regulatory sanction. It bears stressing that the banking industry is
imbued with public interest. Banks are required to possess not only ordinary diligence in the
conduct of its business but extraordinary diligence in the care of its accounts and the
interests of its stakeholders. The banking business is highly sensitive with a fiduciary duty
towards its client and the public in general, such that central measures must be strictly
observed.7 It is undisputed that respondent failed to perform his duties diligently, and
therefore, not only violated established company policy but also put the bank's credibility
and business at risk. The excuse that his Branch Manager, Pinero, merely prompted him
towards such ineptitude is of no moment. He readily admitted that he violated established
company policy against bringing out checkbooks and bank forms, 8 which means that he was
well aware of the fact that the same was prohibited. Nevertheless, he still chose to,
regardless of his superior's influence, disobey the same not only once, but on numerous
occasions. All throughout, there is no showing that he questioned the acts of Branch
Manager Pinero; neither did he take it upon himself to report said irregularities to a higher
authority. Hence, under these circumstances, the award of separation pay based on social
justice would be improper.

7 See rollo, pp. 26-27

8 Id. at 47.