The Unsacrificeable

Author(s): Jean-Luc Nancy and Richard Livingston

Source: Yale French Studies, No. 79, Literature and the Ethical Question (1991), pp. 20-38
Published by: Yale University Press
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JEAN-LUC NANCY

The Unsacrificeable*

Contemporaryreflectionon sacrificecannotnot be hauntedbythethought

ofBataille.Ofthisthoughtitself,I will be speakinglateron; forthemoment,
I will merelyremarkupon threedistinctivetraitsthatgiveit an exemplary
character:
1) Bataille's thoughtcertainlydoes not ariseby chance orby individual
whim. It links up emphaticallywith a whole context-sociological, ethnological,and anthropologicalon the one hand,philosophical,theological,
and psychoanalyticon theother-that determinedit in thefirsthalfofthis
century.(Among many otherpossible confirmationsone could refer,for
instance,to the workofGeorgesGusdorf,L'Experiencehumaine du sacrifice,publishedin 1948 afterhavingbeen "undertakenin captivity."1
While
fromBataille's (whom Gusdorf
Gusdorf'sperspectiveis entirelydifferent
neverthelessknew personallyand cites in his text),the networkof references,theimportanceattributedto theobject,and itsreachingfortheidea of
a necessary"overcoming"of sacrificetestifyto a largecommunityofconcern at the time,above and beyondthe symptomaticvalue of the two authors(Gusdorf,267).
2) Bataille'sthoughtis well-knownto be not onlymarkedbya particular
interestin sacrifice,but obsessed and fascinatedbysacrifice."The allureof
sacrifice"is said to respondto nothingless than the following:"what we
await,fromour childhoodon, is thisupsettingofthe orderwe are suffocat*Thanksto Allan Stoekl.[Translator's
note]
1. GeorgeGusdorf,
L'Experiencehumainedu sacrifice
(Paris:PUF,1948),viii.Henceforthcitedin thetext.
and theEthicalQuestion,ed. ClaireNouvet,? 1991byYale
YFS 79, Literature
University.
20

JEAN-LUC

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21

ingin ... thenegationofthislimitofdeath,fascinatingas light."2Equally

well knownis thatBataille soughtnot onlyto thinksacrifice,but to think
accordingto sacrifice.He willed sacrificeitself,in theact; at least,he never
ceased presentinghis thoughtto himselfas a necessarysacrificeofthought.
3) No less well known,however,is theslow displacement,thelongdrifting,thatled Batailleto denouncethetheatreofsacrificeand consequentlyto
renounceits successfulaccomplishment.
Withoutlimitingmyselfto Bataille alone, the questions thatI want to
pose hereproceedfromwhat his experienceofthoughtexemplifiesforus.
Whatis therein thefascinationofsacrifice?Wheredoes it come from?What
does it engage,what does it engage in? What, in fact,is our relationto
sacrificemade of?Isn't all oftheWest,in some sense,determinedbyit?And
consequently,doesn't this relationkeep us rivetedto the closure of the
West?Isn't it time,finally,to take action: boththe end ofreal sacrificeand
the closure ofits fantasm?
I
Whatis thenatureoftheWest'sinitialrelationto sacrifice?More precisely:
accordingto what relation to the rest of humanity'ssacrifices(or to the
representationof those sacrifices)does the Westelaborate,so to speak, its
own "sacrifice"?
Socrates and Christ signifythat this relationis decisive and foundational. In each case a relationat once distancedand repetitiveis involved.
Bothofthesefigures-the double figureofontotheology-deviatedecidedfromsacrifice;in doingso, theyproposea metaly,and quite deliberately,
of sacrifice.What is involved,therefore,
or
a
morphosis
transfiguration
is
above all a mimesis: the ancient sacrificeis reproduced-up to a certain
point-in its formor its scheme; but it is reproducedso as to reveal an
entirelynew content,a truthhithertohiddenor misunderstood,ifnot perverted.By this factalone, the old sacrificeis representedas having constitutedno more than a preliminaryimitation,a crudeimage ofwhat has
since come to effecta transfigured
sacrifice.On the otherhand, the new
sacrificedoes not resultfromits rusticprecursorsby way of simple transmission or naturalgeneration:to inaugurateitselfit requirespreciselythe
gestureof this "mimeticrupture."
The mimeticruptureoftheWest'ssacrifice(ofWestern-style
sacrifice,if
you will) proposes a new sacrifice,distinguishedby a certainnumberof
characteristics.This does not mean thatthese characteristics
were always
2. GeorgesBataille,Oeuvrescompletes(Paris:Gallimard,1988),vol. 11,484. Henceforthcitedin thetext.

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purelyand simplyabsent fromthe older sacrifices-insofar,that is, as it

mightstillbe possible to retracethetruthofthese "older"sacrifices(thisis,
in one sense, the whole problem,and we will returnto it).But fourcharacteristicsare clearlyrequiredand presentedbytheontotheologyofsacrifice.
Socratesand Christare both condemned,both of
1) It is self-sacrifice.
them by an iniquitous condemnationwhich,as such, neitherthe victims
nor the executionersrepresentas a sacrifice.But the carrying-out
of this
condemnationis, in turn,representedas a desired sacrifice,willed and
soughtafterbytheentirebeing,bythelifeand thethoughtormessageofthe
victims. It is, in the fullestsense of the words,and in both senses of the
genitive,the sacrificeof the subject.
The Phaedo proposesnothingbut an appropriative
reversalofthe situation by the subject Socrates: he is in prison,he is goingto die, and so he
designatesall of earthlylifeas a prison,fromwhich it is fittingto liberate
oneselfthroughdeath.Philosophythusappears,not onlyas theknowledge
ofthisliberation,but as its actual enactment:"Andthosewho havepurified
themselvessufficiently
by philosophylive thereafteraltogetherwithout
bodies etc."3And so, shortlyafterhavingpronouncedthesewords,thephilosopherhimselfwill not hesitateto drinkand drainthe cup ofhemlock,
prayingto the gods thathis "removalfromthisworldto the othermay be
prosperous"(Phaedo, 117c).
As forChrist,the Pauline doctrineofkenosis is well known,thegesture
bywhich Christ"beingin the formofGod . .. humbledhimself"4becomingman evenunto death.God, lordoverthe deathofhis creatures,inflicts
thisdeathon himself;his own lifeand his ownlove,distributedthroughout
creation,are thus returnedto himselfand to his own glory.
Forboth Socratesand Christ,the eventofsacrificeproperlyspeaking(if
comes onlyto puncwe can stillput it in theseterms),theputting-to-death,
tuate and to unfoldthe processand the truthofa lifethatis itselfwhollya
sacrifice.Forthe West,the issue no longerinvolvesa lifethatwould understand sacrifice;nor even, accordingto a good Christianphrase,a "life of
sacrifice"alone. What is involvedis a life that would be in and of itself,
wholly a sacrifice.
2) This sacrificeis unique, and it is accomplishedforall. Or,still more
and consecrated.Let us cite Saint
precisely,in it all are assembled,offered,
Paul: "And everyprieststandethdailyministeringand offering
oftentimes
the same sacrifices,which can nevertake awaysins. But thisman, afterhe
he hath perhad offeredone sacrificeforsins forever . .. by one offering
fectedforeverthem that are sanctified."5And Saint Augustinewill say:
3. Plato,Phaedo,114c.Henceforth
citedin thetext.
4. Philippians2:6-8.
5. Hebrews10:11-14.

JEAN-LUC

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"The whole city of the redeemed,all the assemblyof saints,is offeredto

He himGod, in one unique and universalsacrificebythe supremepontiff.
himselfforus in his passion in theformofthe slave,so that
selfhas offered
we may become the bodyofsuch an augusthead.6
The uniqueness of the sacrificeis thus displaced or made dialectical,
froma uniqueness that is exemplaryand counts as such (whereSocrates
ranksfirstand foremost;and we could add: in general,isn't thesacrificethe
most exemplaryofexamples?)to a uniqueness ofthelifeand the substance
in which or to which all singularityis sacrificed.At theend ofthisprocess,
thereis, ofcourse,Hegel: "thesubstanceoftheState[is]thepowerbywhich
theparticularindependenceofindividualsand theirabsorptionin theexternal existenceofpossession and in naturallifeis convictedofits own nothingness,and the powerwhich mediates the conservationof the universal
substancethroughthesacrifice-operatingthroughtheinternaldisposition
it implies-of thisnaturaland particularbeing."7
3) This sacrificeis inseparablefromits being the unveiledtruthof all
sacrifices,orofsacrificein general.Itis thusnotonlyunique; itsuniqueness
lies in its elevationinto the principalor the essence ofsacrificeitself.
It is remarkablethatthe Phaedo should be framedby two referencesto
what I have termedthe "older" sacrifice.At the beginning,we learn that,
followingthejudgment,Socrates'deathhad to be postponedbecause executions were forbiddenduringthe annual voyage to Delos that celebrated
Theseus's victoryover the Minotaur: the end, that is, of the sacrificeto
which the Minotaur had compelled the Athenians (58b). At the end, by
contrast,as is well known, Socrates,at the point of death, alreadyhalfparalyzedby thepoison,utterstheselast words: "Crito,we oughtto offera
cock to Asclepius. See to it and don't forget"(118). Interpretation
here is
doomed-by the text itself-to a significantambiguity:eitherSocrates,
his body,is thankingthegod
recoveringthehealthofthe soul bysacrificing
ofhealing;or else he is leavingbehindhim,withdistanceand perhapswith
irony,a sacrificeitselfvainin theeyesofone who,at thatverymoment,is in
himselfaccomplishinga philosophical purification.But eitherway,the
truthofsacrificeis broughtto lightin its mimesis: the "old" sacrificeis an
6. SaintAugustine,CityofGod, citedin E. Mersch,Le Corpsmystiquedu Christ
(Decl6e, 1951),vol. 2, 114.
7. Hegel,Encyclopedie, trans.B. Bourgeois(Paris:Vrin,1988),vol. 3, 325 (? 546).
thispassageas follows:"Country
A. V. Miller,in Hegel'sPhilosophyofMind,translates
ofindiindependence
thenappearas thepowerbywhichtheparticular
and fatherland
in theexternalexistenceofpossessionandin naturallifeis
vidualsand theirabsorption
ofthegeneral
themaintenance
convictedofitsownnullity-as thepowerwhichprocures
substanceby the patrioticsacrificeon the partof the individualsof thisnaturaland
it" (276).
particularexistence-so makingnugatorythe nugatorinessthat confronts
fromMillermodified]
[Translation

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exteriorfigure-vain in itself-of thattruthin which the subjectsacrifices

itself,in spirit,to spirit[esprit].And in thisspirit,it is to thetruthitselfthat
thetruesacrificeis offered;
it is in truthand as truththatit is accomplished.
In themiddleofthedialogue,consecratedto thetruthoftheimmortality
of
thesoul, Socrateswill have declared:"As foryou,ifyouwill takemyadvice,
you will thinkverylittleofSocrates,and much moreofthe truth"(91 b-c).
In thewake ofSaintPaul,Augustine,and theentiretradition,Pascal will
write: "Circumcisionoftheheart,truefast,truesacrifice,truetemple:the
prophetshave indicatedthatall of this is spiritual.Not the fleshthatperishes, but the one thatdoes not perish."8
4) So the truthof the sacrificesublates,along with "the fleshthatperishes,"the sacrificialmomentofsacrificeitself.And thatis thereasonwhy
the finalcharacteristicofWesternsacrificeis to be itselfthe transcendence
of sacrifice,its infiniteand dialectical transcendence.Westernsacrificeis
in beinguniversal,and in revealing
alreadyinfinitein being self-sacrifice,
the spiritualtruthof all sacrifice.But it is-and must be-infinite also
insofaras itreabsorbsthefinitemomentofsacrificeitselfand thusinsofaras
it must,logically,sacrificeitselfas sacrificein orderto accede to its truth.
This is themeaningofthe Catholic Eucharistwhich,consumedthrough
the finitudeof sensible tokens,passes into the interiorworshipof the reformedspirit.And this is its speculativetruth:
ofthefinitecan also onlycome aboutin finitefashion.
The negativity
Herewe havecometo whatis generallycalledsacrifice.
The immediate
ofan immediatefinitude,
contentofsacrifice
is thesurrender
inthesense
ofmytestifying
thatthisfinitude
oughtnottobe myownpossessionand
thatI do notwantto keepit formyself.... Becausethedepthsofmind
and heartare not yetpresent,negativity
cannothererevealitselfin an
innerprocess... thesubject... is onlyto surrender
an immediatepossessionand a naturalexistence.In thissensesacrificeis no longerto be
andwhatis therecalledsacrifice
foundin a spiritualreligion,
can onlybe
sense.9
so in a figurative
II

Mimesis, then:spiritualsacrificewill be sacrificeonlyin a figurative

sense.
Truly,it is "the reconciliationofabsolute essence with itself."l1Mimesis,
but repetition:the reconciliationof essence neverthelessrequirespassage
8. BlaisePascal,Pensees{Paris:Gallimard,1954),569; Brunschvig,
683.
trans.Gibelin(Paris:Vrin,1971),vol. 1,223-24;
9. Hegel,Philosophiede la religion,
Lectureson thePhilosophy
ofReligion,ed.PeterHodgson(Berkeley:
University
ofCalifornia Press,1984),384 n.

JEAN-LUC

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25

throughabsolute negativityand death. "Sacrifice"means appropriationof

the Selfin its own negativity.And ifthe sacrificialgesturehas been abandoned to a finiteworld,it is onlyso thatthe infinitesacrificialstructureof
this appropriationof the Subjectmay emergemore clearly.The appropriaofthefinite,ofthe infinitetruthofthe
tion,by means ofthe transgression
In a sense thereis no longer
finite,mightbe termed"trans-appropriation."
sacrifice:there is a process. In anothersense, this process only matters
throughits negativemoment,in which thefinitemustbe annihilated;and
ofthelaw,thelaw ofselfthismomentremainsnonethelessa transgression
in
occurs
even
presence.This transgression
suffering, in horror.ForHegel,
forinstance,it is the somber,bloody,yet ineluctableface ofhistoryitself.
Such is theresultofthemimeticrupture:sacrificeis sublatedin itsfinite
Yet a fascinatedgaze remains fixedon the
functionsand its exteriority.
momentofsacrificialcrueltyas such. "Flesh thatdoes not perish"remains
fleshcut out ofan adorablebody,and the secretofthishorrorcontinuesto
cast an obscurelightfromthe centerofthe sublation,fromtheheartofthe
it is this secret that makes this
dialectic. Truly,Hegel notwithstanding,
heartbeat. Or else, even more seriously,it is the dialectical gestureitself
invented
thatinstitutedthissecret.Westernspiritualization/dialectization
the secret of the infiniteefficacityof transgressionand its cruelty.After
Hegel and Nietzsche comes an eye fixedon this secret,with a clear conscience,necessaryand unbearable:forinstance,the eye ofBataille.
Butwhat,exactly,does thiseyesee? It sees its own sacrifice.It sees thatit
cannotsee excepton the conditionofan unbearable,intolerablevision-a
vision of sacrificialcruelty.Or else, it sees thatit sees nothing.
If it is always, indeed, a question of the old sacrificeat the heart of
modem sacrifice,it must be acknowledgedthat the mimeticrupturehas
made us lose theoldertruthofsacrifice.Justas thespecialistsofourownday
tell us that "sacrifice"is an artificialnotion, so the spiritualizingconsciousness ofsacrificemaynothave alwayshad a clearawarenessofits own
assumptionofthe,afterall, heterogeneousfunctionsofsacrifice.Itwouldbe
usefulto followthecomplicated-and doubtlesspoorlyunified-destinyof
theremissionofsins, thepreservationofgrace,and the acquisitionofglory
(tomentiononlythethreefunctionsofsacrificethatSaintThomas Aquinas
acknowledged)throughthe theologicalliterature;the threemodes ofsacriworksofjusticeand worship-no doubtfollow
fice-martyrdom,austerity,
a parallelcourse.11In reality,onlyone thingis clear:theinteriorisation,
the
spiritualization,and the dialecticizationof sacrifice.
10. Hegel,Phenomenologie
de 1'esprit,
trans.JeanHippolyte(Paris:Aubier,1951)vol.
is to Christ.
2, 280: thereference
11. ThomasAquinas,SummaTheologicaIla qu.,22,2C; IIaIIae,qu. 85 3 ad.2.

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But this clarityis itselfobscure.Indeed,what appears,in the lightof

spiritualization,as the "old" sacrificeis a pure economyofbarterbetween
man and the divine powers.Everythingis reduced to the formulaof the
this
brahmanicritual(orat least, to the onlywaywe have ofunderstanding
formula):"Here is the butter?Whereare the gifts?"(Cited in Gusdorf;45).
Condemnation of this sacrificial"economism" runs throughPlato and
Christianity,
Hegel and Bataille. Spiritualizationhas no doubtleftus, from
the outset,incapable ofgraspingthepropersignificanceofthe old sacrifice
in its own context.When someone says to his gods: "Here is the butter.
Whereare thegifts?"it maybe thatwe do not knowwhathe is saying,since
we knownothingofthecommunityin whichhe liveswithhis gods.Similarly,to answerthe otherchargethatis leveledat the old sacrifice-that it is
nothingbut a simulacrum,as long as it has not attainedthe level of selfsacrifice-we do not know what mimesis is in this context.At most we
in guessingthatit maybe methexis,participation:
could followLevy-Bruhl
but we do not know what such "participation"means, if not, forus, a
confusionofidentity.(Similarly,Freuddid not knowwhat "identification"
meant; and likewise,we could ask whetherGirardknows what the contagionofmimeticviolencemeans.Eitherway,we do notknowwhat "beingin-common"means,ifnot the "being-one"ofsacrifice-withits cruelty.
12)
thedialecDenunciationsofeconomismand simulationrunthroughout
tical understandingof sacrifice,up to and includingBataille. Indeed-and
hereBataille's contributioncannotbe contested-a fascinationwith sacri12. Cf.,Les Carnetsde LucienLevy-Bruhl(Paris:PUF,1949).In general,therelations
herebut
whichI cannotundertake
requirean examination
betweenmimesisandsacrifice
oftheotherthrough
thealternation
Ifmimesisis theappropriation
willpursueelsewhere.
(Cf.,
nothomologousto thatofsacrifice?
is its structure
oftheproper,
orthesuppression
analysisofDiin PhilippeLacoue-Labarthe's
forexample,"beingno one-or everyone,"
derot'sParadox,in L'Imitationdes Modernes(Paris:Galilee,1986),35. As fortherelation
Derrida,"La PharmaciedePlaton"inLa
andmimesis,cf.,as wellJacques
betweensacrifice
on
befounded
Dissemination (Paris:Seuil,1972),forexample,152-53).So shouldsacrifice
anmimesis,understoodnow in Girardianterms,at the priceof a ratherproblematic
inMimesis:desarticulations
has discussedtheseproblems
(Lacoue-Labarthe
thropology?
(Paris:Flammarion,1975),as has Y. J.Harderin his "Le Sacrificedu Christ,"S6minaire
1989).Or shouldmimesisnotratherbe
GRTST,Strasbourg,
philosophie/psychanalyse,
methexis,thatis,on thebasisofthegeneralquestionof
thoughton thebasisofsacrificial
(cf.,e.g.,BatailleOC 7 369-71)?Thiswouldrequirethinkcontagionandcommunication
of the Westernsacrificialmodel as "communion"and the
ing both the construction
whichI will getto at theendof
ofthismodelin thethoughtoffinitude,
deconstruction
Shouldn'twe ask
this piece, a thought,thatis, of a non-communalcommunication.
insistson denouncing
thesimulacrum
whenWestern
thought
whether,
finally,
ourselves,
the new sacrificeas the "true"mimesis(or
of the "old" sacrifice,and on presenting
ora refusal,totouchonmethexis:
sublation)oftheother,itdoesnotbetrayan incapacity,
an "incomon a dangerofcontagionand,paradoxically,
thatis, perhaps,simultaneously
to whichontotheology
orofparticipation,
objectson princimunion"ofcommunication
bya Subject)?
ple (initsprincipleofappropriation

JEAN-LUC

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fice does not preventone fromremarkingon a generalized"economism"

and "mimeticism"in its dialectic.Sacrificeas self-sacrifice,
universalsacrifice,truth,and sublationofsacrifice,is itselftheinstitutionofthe absolute
economyofabsolute subjectivity,
which can onlymimic (in the pejorative
sense) a passage throughnegativity,
fromwhich,symmetrically,
it cannot
but reappropriateor trans-appropriate
itselfinfinitely.
Everything
finallyoccursas ifthe spiritualization/dialectization
ofsacrificecould not operatewithouta formidabledisavowalofitself.It disavows
itselfbeneaththefigureofan "old" sacrifice,whichit pretendsto knowand
whichin realityitfabricatesforits ownpurposes.Andit approvesofitselfin
the formof an infiniteprocess ofnegativity,
which it coverswith the "sacred"name of"sacrifice."This double operationbringsto thecenter,simultaneouslyand in a painfulambiguity,the infiniteefficacity
of dialectical
negativityand the bloodyheartof sacrifice.
To cast doubt upon this disavowal-this manipulation,rather-is to
and to be forcedto ask whetherdialecticalnegaquestionthissimultaneity,
tivityexpungesblood or whether,on the contrary,
blood must ineluctably
continueto spurt.In his desireto put an end to dialecticalprocessas comedy,Bataille wantedblood to spurt.He wantedto weighin the balance the
horriblylaceratedbody and the look-distraught or ecstatic?-of a young
Chinese beingtortured,a famousphotograph.But in so doing,Bataille was
reallyworkingout the deep logic ofthe sublationofsacrifice,whichwould
rescue it fromits repetitiveand mimetic character:because sublation is
ultimatelyincapable ofknowingwhat is trulyinvolvedin repetitionand
mimesis,and so in sacrifice.In return,this same logic,which claims to be
bothrupturewith and mimeticrepetitionofsacrifice,wants,bythis same
movement,to be boththesublationand thetruthofsacrifice.So we have to
thinkthatthevictimoftorturesublatesintoecstasythehorrorthatrenders
him distraught.But how to thinkso in truth,ifthe eye thatsees-and not
theone thatis herelookedat-does notknowwhatitis seeing,orevenifitis
seeing? How to think it, without the subject of this gaze having already
appropriated,in himself,the dialectic of the distraughtand the ecstatic?
How to think it, that is, without having fascinationconstituteitselfas
masteryand dialectical knowledgeof sacrifice?
Bataillewoundup declaring:"As fornostalgiaforthesacred,it is timeto
admit that it necessarilycomes to nothing,thatit misleads: what today's
worldlacks is theproposingoftemptations.Or theproposingofsuchhateful
ones thattheymatteronlyon the conditionthattheydeceivethosewhom
theytempt,"(Bataille,OC 11: 55). Undoubtedly,ambiguitydoes not disappearentirelyfromthesephrases;theirsyntaxis constructedso as to sustain
it. On the one hand,today'sworld"lacks" trulysacred"temptations,"ones
thatare givenimmediatelyand withoutrecourseto nostalgia;on the other

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hand, the world "lacks"-in the sense, now,ofbeinglacking-because its

temptationsare illusory.So sacrifice-or somethingabout sacrifice-still
cannot help be lacking.
III
Even there,Bataille must have thought-only up to a certainpoint-to
palliate this lack throughliterature,or art in general.(At the same time,
Heidegger,speaking of art and the putting-to-work
[mise-en-oeuvre]of
truth,named "theessentialsacrificeas one ofthemodes ofthisputting-toworkthatis concentratedin art;elsewherein thesame text,he had already
thoughtitnecessaryto count "giftsand sacrifice"at theheartoftheexistent
which is open to the clearingofbeing.13I cannotcommentfurther
on this
referencehere.)
One link betweensacrificeand art,especiallyliterature,incontestably
runs through,or doubles, the Westernprocess of the spiritualizationof
sacrifice.Book V of Saint Augustine's Confessions,forexample,begins:
"Accept the sacrificeof my confessions,presentedby the hand of my
tongue,which you have formedand exhortedto confessyourname"-and
thatwill springfrom"confession"in our
thusopens thewayforeverything
literatures.But is there,finally,a veritablelimitbetween"confession"and
literatureand art?Or at least,isn't one dominantrepresentation
ofartthat
ofthe transgressive
expositionofa subject,who therebyappropriateshimThe Kantiansublimeis producedin a
selfand lets himselfbe appropriated?
"sacrifice"ofthe imagination,which "plungesintotheabyssofitselfand is
The whole programofpoetryis
thusplungedinto a movingsatisfaction."14
givenin Novalis's note to Heinrich von Ofterdingen:"Dissolution of the
poet in his song-he will be sacrificedamongsavagepeoples."15and,moving quickly,we returnto Bataille,who writes: "poetry. .. is . . . sacrifice
where the words are victims.... We cannot ... dispense with the
efficaciousrelationsthatwordsintroducebetweenmen and things.But we
wrestthemdeliriouslyfromthese relations"(Bataille,OC 5: 156).
More precisely,artcomes to supplement,to relayor to sublate,the impasse ofsacrifice.This impasse is linkedto thefollowing:"Ifthe subjectis
is still equivocal. And ifit is destroyed,the
not trulydestroyed,everything
equivocal is resolved,but in the void where everythingis obliterated"
(Bataille,OC 12: 485). So the choice is betweenthe simulacrumand noth13. Heidegger,"L'Originede 1'oeuvred'art,"in Cheminsqui ne menentnullepart,
(Paris:NRF, 1962),48 and40.
des
14. Kant,Critiquede la facult6de juger,"Remarquegeneralesur1'exposition
and ? 26.
jugementsesthetiquesrefl1chissants,"
trans.R. Rovni(Paris:10/18.1967),269.
15. Novalis,HeinrichvonOfterdingen,

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ofthe "old" sacrifice

ingness;thatis also to say,betweentherepresentation
and the postulation of self-sacrifice."But"-Bataille continues-"out of
thisdoubleimpassearisesa sense ofthemomentofart,which,puttingus on
the trackofutterextinction-leaving us suspendedtherefora time-proposes to man a ravishingwithoutrepose." "Ravishingwithoutrepose" is
still a dialectical formula.There is ravishinginasmuchas artpreservesus
"suspended" on the edge of extinction,which is one way of recognizinga
new formof the simulacrumhere. But it is "withoutrepose,"because it
bringsalong the intenseagitationofan emotionthataccedes to extinction.
This emotiondoes not properlybelongto art:it can onlyexistin access to
the bloody heart of extinction.Fartheron, Bataille writes: "the infinite
festivityofworksofartis thereto tell us thata triumph. . . is promisedto
anyone who leaps into the irresolutionof the instant.This is why one
cannot be too interestedby the manifoldintoxicationthat traversesthe
world'sopacitywithlightningbolts ofapparentcruelty,whereseductionis
linked to massacre,to torture,to horror."Artitselfthus displacesthe gaze
It is limited
once again: "apparent"crueltyis a singularlyambiguouseffect.
to the simulacral,and at the same timeit mattersonlythroughthe cruelty,
thehorrorthatit bringsout,and which (so to speak)means something-in
any case, onlyhas force-if it is not simulated.Bataille's articleis entitled:
"Art,exercisein cruelty":it involves,whateverthedetours,acceding-even
exerciseofan effective
ifonlya little-to the effective
cruelty,at least in its
if
it
still
Art
thus
matters
sends
us
back
to the sacrificeit
emotion.
only
cannot
sacrifice
sacrifice
still
to sacrifice.
supplants.It
exceptby
sacrificing
Bataille sees the difficulty-andpromptlyturnsaway: "This is not an
apology forhorriblefacts [he is speaking of the factsof sacrificeevoked
earlierin the text].This is not a call fortheirreturn."Yet he cannot help
shiftingonce again,to slip intohis refusal(I will notsay,at thispoint,thatit
is a disavowal)a certainrestriction:"But . . . these moments . . . have, in
the momentofravishing,all the truthofthe emotionin themselves."And
furtheron: "the movement[of art]places him without difficulty
at the
the paintingofthe horrorrevealsthe
heightof the worstand, reciprocally,
openingtowardsthe entiretyofthepossible."In thisreciprocity-hownot
to see this?-something of the mimesis is annulled; or rather,mimesis
reveals (and Bataille speaks of revelation)effectivemethexis: art lets us
with horror.
commune,by means of a transgressionthatis still effective,
That is to say,with the enjoymentof an instantaneousappropriationof
death.
By settingaside the horror-troublesomeand reputedlyineffective-of
blood spilled,and byproposinga horrorravishingbut "at the heightofthe
worst,"one shows that,on the one hand, one no longerhas access to real
sacrifice,butalso, on theotherhand,thatthoughtcontinuesto be measured

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Yet it is still,
bythelogic and thedesireofan infinite"trans-appropriation."
forBataille (and perhaps-even doubtless-obscurely,forthe whole Western tradition)only a question of access without access to a moment of
But sacrificialthoughtdoes not leave offreappropriating,
disappropriation.
thisaccess. Eventhechasmofhorror,
its "openingto the
trans-appropriating
as soon as it is placedunderthesign
entiretyofthepossible,"is appropriated
of sacrifice.Which it is, because the sign of sacrificeis the sign of the
repetitiveand mimeticpossibilityofaccess to thatobscureplace thatboth
repetitionand mimesis are supposedto come from.But what ifthatplace
were nothingat all, and if,consequently,therewerenothingthatcould be
sacrificedto reachit?
death that
To put it anotherway,one mightsay: it is by appropriating
And for
sacrificeescapes the truthof the moment of dis-appropriation.
in
final
what
is
the
at
stake
in
sacrificeis not
reckoning,
Bataille himself,
death: "The awakeningofsensibility,the passage fromthe sphereofintelligible-and usable-objects to an excessiveintensity,this is the destruction of the object as such. Of course, it is not what is ordinarilycalled
In the eyes of a butchera
death . . . it is, in one sense, quite the contrary.
horseis alreadydead (meat,an object)"(Bataille,OC 4: 103).Bythisreckoningthesubstitutionofartforsacrificeis morereadilygrasped.Butit should
be at thepriceofa truesuppressionofsacrifice.Anditis in thissame passage
that Bataille insertsone of his strongest-make no mistake-condemnations of sacrifice:"it is not what is ordinarilycalled death (and sacrifice,
afterall, is definitelya shockerfunpave de l'ours]).To the extentthatart
maintains the sacrificialmoment,by its emotion "at the height of the
worst,"the "shocker"is notmissingeither.Or rather,sacrificeshouldnotbe
involvedin any way,and the horrorof death-on a real altar or a painted
one-gives access only to itselfand not to any "suprememoment."One
moretime: if "sovereigntyis NOTHING," (Bataille,OC 8: 300) as Bataille
wore himselfout thinking,is therenothing-that is, some thing-that
could be sacrificedforit?
IV
Beforeputtingthis questionto the testmoreprecisely,we have to take one
morestepwithBataille.Wehave to followhim in his reflectionon theNazi
camps.I will followthemovementofhis mostdevelopedtexton thesubject
(aboutwhich he wroteverylittle):"Reflectionson theExecutionerand the
Victim,"about David Rousset'sbook, Les Joursde notremort.16
16. Bataille,OC 11, 262ff.Forlack of space I will omit discussionof the article
withon theJewsandthecamps(Ibid,266 ff).The conclusionswouldconverge:
"Sartre,"

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Not once does this textpronouncethe word "sacrifice."Nor do other,

parallel textsofBataille's. Nevertheless,it lays out the elementsofa sacrificiallogic.Firstofall, thecamps giveexposureto whatis at stakebywayof
sacrifice:"in a worldofsuffering,
stench,and degradation,each one had the
leisure to measurethe abyssand the absence oflimitsofthe abyssand this
obsessiveand fascinatingtruth."Butto knowthese "depthsofhorror,""the
price has to be paid." This price-if I understandBataille-is double: it
consists,first,in thegivenconditionsfora "senseless experience"-that is,
the veryexistenceofthe camp-and then,ofa will thatdoes not refuseto
facethishorroras a human possibility.This will must be the victim's(and
Bataillefindsit in the "exaltation"and the "humor"he findsin Rousset).To
refuseit would be "a negationofhumanityscarcelyless degradingthanthat
An appeal is made, ifnot to self-sacrifice,
thento the posiofthe torturer."
tion, afterall, of a subject. To be sure, Bataille specifies: "the horroris
havingno limitbut
evidentlynot thetruth:it is onlyan infinitepossibility,
death."Access to the "fascinating"truth,however,requiresthat,"by some
means" "abjectionand pain revealthemselvesin fullto man." These means
werefoundin the camps. In particular,theymade it clearthat"thedepthof
horroris in theresolutionofthosewho demandit."It is theresolutionofthe
executionerswhich would "ruinthe redoubtthatis thefoundingreasonof
civilizedorder"(ElsewhereBataillewrotethattheJewsat Auschwitz"incarnated reason.").Civilized reason,however,is preciselyno morethana "redoubt,"fragileand limited.What is pittedagainstit, namely "the rage to
notevenfroma
torture,"
does not comefromanyplace otherthanhumanity,
special partofhumanity("partiesorraceswhich,we imagine,have nothing
human about them").This possibilityis "ours."Knowingthispossibilityas
such makes reasoncapable ofits own "putting-into
questionwithoutreservations,"which assures no definitivevictorybut the highesthuman possibilitythat is "the awakening.""Only,what would awakeningbe if it illuminatedonlya worldofabstractpossibilities?ifit did not awakenfirstof
all to thepossibilityofAuschwitz,to thepossibilityofstenchand irrepara" Thereis a necessity,therefore,
in therealizationofthispossibility.
ble fury?
For Bataille, this necessity evidentlystems fromthe existenceof the

BatailletendstoconsidertheJewsas victimsofa sacrificial

immolaoutsayingso directly,
tion of "reason."Anothertext:7:376-79. On the character-sacrificial
or not?of the
it (Seminaire 11 [Paris:Seuil,19771,247);Lacoue-Labarthe,
camps,cf.,Lacan,whoaffirms
who deniesit butdiscussesan objection(La Fictiondu politique[Paris:Bourgeois,1987]
80-81); Derrida,who seems to suggesttheaffirmative
(cf.,Schibboleth[Paris:Galike,
n. 20, "Apresle sujet qui
19861,82-83, and "II fautbien manger"in Confrontations,
vient,"113,in themidstofa development
on sacrifice
as oralityandon philosophies
that
"do notsacrificesacrifice."

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camps and fromthe will to face,withoutfacilemoralism,what theyrevealed.It is notposed as a necessitya priori.Not foran instantwould I want
to suggestthe slightestidea of complicity,evenunconscious,on Bataille's
part.I believe only that the followingshould be considered:the logic followed hereis quite exactlythe somberreverseofa clearlogic ofsacrifice(at
least if it is possible to isolate such a "clarity").This logic declares: only
extremehorrorkeeps reason awake. The logic of sacrificewould say: the
only awakening is an awakeningto horror,where the moment of truth
transpires.The two utterancesare farfrombeingconfounded.But the second can always harborthe truthof the first.IfBataille does not draw this
conclusion,and ifthe camps remainoutsideofsacrificeforhim,is it not,in
fact,because the horrorof sacrificeis silentlytopplingdown here? Even
thoughBataille cannotbringhimselfto say so, thuspreservingperhaps,in
spite ofall, a possibilitythat,at the end ofthe text,indicates"poetry"as a
formof "awakening"(butnow we knowwhat returnofsacrifice"poetry"is
dedicatedto).
Sacrificewould topple here,in silence, into a contrarythat is also its
accomplishment:a revelationof horrorwith no access, no appropriation,
onlywith the revelationitself,infinite,or rather,indefinite.
ofthe camps is thusno doubtpossible,even
A sacrificialinterpretation
the
but
on
paradoxicalconditionofreversingitselfinto its
necessary, only
contrary(fromHolocaust to Shoah): thissacrificeleads nowhere,it givesno
since
access. Still,in one sense,it could be said to be a modelofself-sacrifice,
the reason that is the victim of the camps is likewise on the side of the
executioner,as theanalysisofthe stateand technicalmechanismsofexterminationhas constantlyunderlined.Bataillesaid,elsewhere:"theunleashing of passions that seethed at Buchenwaldand at Auschwitzwas an unleashinggovernedbyreason."17It would not be at all surprisingifa certain
ifself-sacrifice-whoseequivalence
rationalityculminatedin self-sacrifice,
we
can
now
understand-renders
theaccountofa
sacrifice
to all ofWestern
certainprocessofReason.It appropriatesto itselftheabyssofitsownsubjectitude(to speak like Heidegger).
Butat thesame time-and withoutcontradiction-thecampsrepresent
the absence of sacrifice,because theyput into play an unheard-oftension
betweensacrificeitselfand the absence ofsacrifice.It is not irrelevantthat
the descriptionof the privilegesof the Aryanrace in Mein Kampfculminates in the possession of the absolute meaningof sacrifice:"The Aryan
17. Bataille,OC 7: Notethata similardiscussionhastakenplaceonthesubjectofthe
regicide:cf.,MyriamRevaultd'Allones,D'une
oftherevolutionary
sacrificialcharacter
Iwant
differences.
considerable
mort 1'autre (Paris:Seuil,1989),59.Thereare,obviously,
haslongsincebegunto
sacrifice
sacrifice,
onlyto suggestthat,underthereignofWestern
discomposeitself.

JEAN-LUC

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33

does notattainhis fullgrandeurbyhis spiritualpropertiesin themselves;he

attainsit by the measure ofhis readinessto put all ofhis capacitiesto the
serviceofthe community.The instinctofpreservationhas attainedin him
its noblestform,forhe voluntarilysubordinateshis own selfto the collectivityand,whenthehourdemandsit,he will go so faras to sacrificeit."18Or
again: "posterityforgetsmen who have onlyservedtheirown interests,and
celebratesheroeswho have renouncedtheirown happiness"(Mein Kampf,
329). So theAryanis essentiallythe one who sacrificeshimselfto the community,to therace; thatis, theone who giveshis blood forAryanBlood. He
is thusnot only"theone who sacrificeshimself,"he is, in essence,sacrifice,
the sacrifice.
As is onlyfair,whatfollowsimmediatelyis thedescriptionoftheracein
is dominant."Among the Jewish
which the instinctof self-preservation
people,thewill to sacrificedoes not go beyondthepureand simpleinstinct
of the preservationof the individual" (Mein Kampf,330). There is thus a
double reason thatthe Jewnot be and should not be sacrificed:on the one
hand,nothingofhim shouldbe appropriated;on thecontrary,
one shouldrid
oneselfofhis verminas a defensiveandhygenicmeasure.On theotherhand,
sacrificeis entirelypresent,investedand accomplishedin the Aryancommunityas such. "Wehavethemoralright,we havea dutytowardsourpeople
to annihilatethis people who would annihilateus . . . we can say thatwe
of dutiesforthe love of our people....
have carriedout the most difficult
You should knowwhat a hundred-or fivehundredor a thousand-corpses
laid nextto one anotherare. To have held out,and at the same time . . . to
have remainedhonestmen,thisis whathas hardenedus. It is a gloriouspage
of our historythat has neverbeen writtenand which will neverbe written."19Thus Himmlerin 1943 presentedto his Gruppenfiihrer
the sacrifice
and whichgoes so faras to sacrificethe
ofdutythatdefieshuman strength,
memorialofthisglorioussacrifice.Thus he declares,simultaneously,that
theside ofthevictimsis intolerableand thaton theside oftheexecutioners,
thereis the most silent,most interiorformofsacrifice.
Himmler does not use the word "sacrifice":it would, in effect,be too
honorifictowardthe victims,and he would claim,forthe executioners,too
much of the glorious narrative,which must be withheldfromthem. It
would be possible,it seems to me, to say thatat this point sacrificedisappearsin itself.It is the SS or theAryan,then,who withdraws,who absorbs
intohimselfall thepowerand thefruitofsacrifice,includingits secret:he is
alreadyhimself,in his own being,thesacrificialsecret.Beforehimhe leaves
18. AdolphHitler,MeinKampf183/184e,Munich,1936,326.Henceforth
citedinthe
text.
19. Himmler'sspeechof4 October1943,in Raul Hillberg,La Destructiondes Juifs
d'Europe,trans.M. F. de PalomeraandA. Charpentier
(Paris:Fayard,1985),870-71.

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only naked horror,a parodyof immolation and smoke mountingto the

heavens,a parodythatno longerevenhas therightto thename of "parody."
Whatdisappearsalongwithsacrificeis theverypossibilityofconsidering,
in
whateversense,the simulacrum.The Aryanexposesdevastation,nightand
fog: "nightand fog,"however,also formthe disastroussecretof his own
the regenerationofhis Blood. No longerWesternsacrifice,it
appropriation,
is the "westerning"ofsacrifice.A secondrupturetakesplace, and thistime
it is the ruptureof sacrificeitself.Or rather,its brutalinterruption:
in the
verysite ofimmolationitself,thereis no moreimmolation.
V
"....
immolation,murder. . . ": theycan no longerbe distinguished.Immolationitselfis put to death."Not divine,""illusory,"sacrificehas lost all
rightsand all its dignity.Transgressiontrans-appropriates
nothing. Or
rather,it appropriatesnothingbut this: the victimas corpse,the charnelhouse heap, and the other(forwhom the name of executioneris scarcely
fitting)as pure instrumentof the productionof the charnel-househeap.
Thus, thedecompositionofsacrificenotonlyavowsitselfas possiblethanks
to the technicalmeans, but it deliversitselfas an exemplaryfigure-hideously exemplary-of techniqueitself.20
This does not imply a condemnationof the said "technique."On the
thatis, so to speak,exemplarily
Forwhat is hideously exemplary,
contrary.
hideous,is that"technique"shouldbe presentedas theoperationofa sortof
sacrifice,as the last secretof sacrifice,even while it worksto decompose
sacrifice.The questionthatarisesis ratherthefollowing:shouldnottheage
oftechniquebe understoodas theage oftheendofsacrifice?That is to say,as
or in otherwords,as the age of
the age of the end of trans-appropriation;
anothermode ofappropriationentirely:no longerofsacrificialtrans-appropriation,but of what Heideggertriedto name with the wordEreignis.To
withoutbeingable to analyzeorto justifyit here,I
forcethisinterpretation,
would say: "technique" is Ereignis,that is, the eventappropriating
finite
existenceas such. In this sense, ratherthan appealingto an "essence" of
technique,it maybe morefittingto considertechniqueitself,in that,turning everypossible mode of appropriationback on itselfand its own "onedimensionality,"if you will, it exposes at one strokeboth the question of
finiteexistenceas such and the questionofits equallyfiniteappropriation.
The techniqueofthe camps is doubtlessone possibilityoftechnique,but it
is also its sacrificialpossibility.

thought,
20. On technique,techn6,art,and theworkin Nazism and/orHeidegger's
La Fictiondu politique,passim.
see Lacoue-Labarthe,

JEAN-LUC

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is the appropriationof the Subject who

Sacrificialtrans-appropriation
penetratesnegativity,that sustains itselfthere,that survivesits own destruction,and thatreturnsto itselfas sovereign.(Andthisnegativitycould
well play the same role,in a subtlefashion,when it is what Bataille calls
"negativitywithoutuse.") Fascinationforthesacrificeformulatesthedesire
of this transfiguration.
Perhapsit is also what Lacan meant by saying(a
proposofthecamps)that"sacrificesignifiesthat,in theobjectofourdesires,
we tryto discoverevidenceofthepresenceofthedesireofthatOtherwhomI
will herecall "theobscureGod."'21Let another'sdesire,obscure,consecrate
as his my own desire,and I am constitutedin absolute Self-possession,in
Whatis thusrequiredis sacrifice,theproductionof
unlimitedself-presence.
the object as reject,even if this object were its own subject,which here,
itself.
precisely,trans-appropriates
is nothing,ifthe "obscureGod" is onlytheobscurityof
Butifsovereignty
desireecstaticin thefaceofitself,ifexistencearrangesitselfonlytowardsits
own finitude,thenwe must thinkapartfromsacrifice.
On the one hand, what is at stake since the beginningof the Western
be acknowledged:strictlyspeaking
sublationofsacrificeshoulddefinitively
we know nothingdecisive about the old sacrifice.We need to admit that
what we consideras a mercenaryexchange("Here is the butter. . . ") sustainedand gave meaningto billionsofindividualand collectiveexistences,
and we do not know how to thinkabout what foundsthisgesture.(Wecan
thatthisbarterin itselfgoes beyondbarter.)On the
onlyguess,confusedly,
we know that,forus, it is absolutelyimpossibleto declare: "here
contrary,
arethelives,wherearetheothers?" (all theothers:ourotherlives,thelifeof
a greatOther,the otheroflifeand the otherlifein general).
Consequently,on theotherhand,it shouldbe definitively
acknowledged
that the Westerneconomy of sacrificehas come to a close, and that it is
closed by the decompositionofthe sacrificialapparatusitself,thatbloody
transgressionby which the "momentof the finite"would be transcended
and appropriatedinfinitely.
But finitudeis not a "moment" in a process or an economy.A finite
existencedoes nothave to let its meaningspringforththrougha destructive
explosion of its finitude.Not only does it not have to do so; in a sense it
cannot even do so: thoughtrigorously,
thoughtaccordingto its Ereignis,
"finitude"signifiesthatexistencecannotbe sacrificed.
It cannotbe sacrificedbecause, in itself,it is already,not sacrificed,but
offered
to theworld.Thereis a resemblance,andthetwocan be mistakenfor
one another;and yet,thereis nothingmoredissimilar.
21. Lacan,Seminaire11 (Paris:Seuil, 1973),247. HereLacan expressly
derivesthis
definition
fromtheexistenceofthecamps.

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One could say: existenceis in essence sacrificed.To saythiswould be to

reproduce,in one ofits forms,the fundamentalutteranceofWesternsacrifice.And we would have to add thismajorform,whichnecessarilyfollows:
thatexistenceis, in its essence, sacrifice.
is no doubtto use a wordfromthe sacriTo say thatexistenceis offered
ficial vocabulary(and ifwe were in the Germanlanguage,it would be the
Butit is an attemptto markthat,ifwe have
same word:Opfer,Aufopferung).
to say thatexistenceis sacrificed,it is not in any case sacrificedby anyone,
noris it sacrificedto anything."Existenceis offered"
means thefinitudeof
existence.Finitudeis not negativitycut out of being and grantingaccess,
throughthis cutting,to the restoredintegrityof being or to sovereignty.
Finitudeutterswhat Bataille uttersin sayingthat sovereignty
is nothing.
to
the
formula
of
Finitudesimply corresponds
generative
the thoughtof
existence,whichis thethoughtofthefinitudeofbeing,orthethoughtofthe
meaning of being as the finitudeof meaning. This formulastates: "the
"essence" ofDasein lies in its existence.22Ifitsessence (inquotationmarks)
is in its existence,it is thattheexistenthas no essence.It cannotbe returned
ofan essence. But it is offered,
to the trans-appropriation
thatis to say,it is
presentedto the existencethatit is.
ofall essence,
The existenceexposesbeingin its essence disappropriated
and thusofall "being:" thebeingthatis not. Such negativity,
however,does
not come dialecticallyto say thatit shall be, thatit shall finallybe a transthisnegationaffirms
theinappropriate
as
appropriatedSelf.On thecontrary,
and in truthas theunique mode
its most appropriateformofappropriation,
ofall appropriation.
Also, thenegativemode ofthisutterance:"beingis not"
This is what is
does not implya negationbut an ontologicalaffirmation.
meant by Ereignis.
The existentarrives,takes place, and thisis nothingbut a being-thrown
it is offered.
But it is offered
intotheworld.In thisbeing-thrown,
byno one,
ifnothing-no being,no subject-preto no one. Nor is it self-sacrificed,
In truth,it is not even offeredor sacrificedto a
cedes its being-thrown.
Nothing,to a Nothingnessor an Otherin whose abyss it would come to
enjoyits own impossibilityof beingimpossibly.It is exactlyat this point
thatbothBataille and Heideggermust be relentlesslycorrected.Corrected,
that is: withdrawnfromthe slightesttendencytowardssacrifice.Forthis
tendencytowardssacrifice,or throughsacrifice,is always linked to a fascination with an ecstasyturnedtowardsan Other or towardsan absolute
thebetterto be restored.
Outside,intowhichthesubjectis diverted/spilled
22. Heidegger,
Beingand Time,Trans.JohnMacquarrie& EdwardRobinson(New
York:Harper,1962),? 9.

JEAN-LUC

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Westernsacrificeis hauntedby an Outside offinitude,as obscureand bottomless as this "outside" may be.
But thereis no "outside."The eventof existence,the "thereis," means
thatthereis nothingelse. Thereis no "obscureGod." Thereis no obscurity
thatwouldbe God. In thissense,and sincethereis no longeranycleardivine
epiphany,I mightsaythatwhattechniquepresentsus withcould simplybe:
claritywithoutGod. The clarity,
however,ofan openspacein whichan open
eye can no longerbe fascinated.Fascinationis alreadyproofthatsomething
has been accordedto obscurityand its bloodyheart.But thereis nothingto
accord,nothingbut "nothing.""Nothing"is not an abyssopen to the outside. "Nothing" affirmsfinitude,and this "nothing"at once returnsexistence to itselfand to nothingelse. It de-subjectivizesit, removingall positselfthroughanythingbut its own event,
sibilityof trans-appropriating
advent.Existence,in this sense,its propersense, is unsacrificeable.
Thus thereis room to givemeaningto theinfiniteabsence ofappropriable meaning. Once again, "technique"could well constitutesuch an horizon. That is once more to say,theremust be no retreat:the closure of an
immanence.But this immanencewould not have lost or be lackingtranscendence.In otherwords,itwould notbe sacrificein anysense oftheword.
Whatwe used to call "transcendence"would signifyratherthatappropriation is immanent,but that "immanence" is not some indistinctcoagulation: it is made only fromits horizon. The horizon holds existenceat a
distancefromitself,in thegaporthe "between"thatconstitutesit: between
birthand death, between one and the others.One does not enterthe between,which is also the space oftheplayofmimesis and ofmethexis.Not
because it would be an abyss,an altar,oran impenetrableheart,butbecause
it would be nothingotherthanthe limitoffinitude;and lest we confuseit
with,say,Hegelian "finiteness,"thislimitis a limitthatdoes notsoarabove
nothingness.Existencealone breaksawayfromevenitself.
Does this mean rejoicingin a mediocreand limitedlife?Surelysuch a
suspicioncould itselfcome onlyfroma mediocreand limitedlife.And it is
this same lifethatcould suddenlybe exalted,fascinated,by sacrifice.Neitherpain nor death are to be denied. Still less, ifpossible,are these to be
At issue, rather,is a pain
soughtafterin view ofsome trans-appropriation.
that no longersacrifices,and which one no longersacrifices.True pain,
doubtless,and perhaps even the truestof all. It does not effacejoy (nor
enjoyment),and yet,it is not the latter'sdialecticalor sublimatingthreshhold either.Thereis no threshhold,
no sublimeand bloodygesture,thatwill
cross it.
Afterall, Westernsacrificehas almostalwaysknown,and almostalways
been readyto say,that it sacrificedto nothing.That is why it has always

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tendedto say thattruesacrificewas no longersacrifice.Yet henceforth

it is
incumbentupon us to say-after Bataille,withhim and beyondhim-that
thereis no "true"sacrifice,thatveritableexistenceis unsacrificeable,and
thatfinallythe truthofexistenceis thatit cannotbe sacrificed.
Translatedby RichardLivingston