Академический Документы
Профессиональный Документы
Культура Документы
Requisites
1- LAWFUL SUBJECT: The interests of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a
particular class, require the exercise of the police power
2- LAWFUL MEANS: The means employed are reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of
the purpose and not unduly oppressive upon individuals
MMDA v. Bel-Air Village Association, Inc., 328 SCRA 836, March 27, 2000, 1st Div. [Puno]
Police power is an inherent attribute of sovereignty. It has been defined as the power
vested by the Constitution in the legislature to make, ordain, and establish all manner of
wholesome and reasonable laws, statutes and ordinances, either with penalties or without,
not repugnant to the Constitution, as they shall judge to be for the good and welfare of the
commonwealth, and for the subjects of the same.
It bears stressing that police power is lodged primarily in the National Legislature. It
cannot be exercised by any group or body of individuals not possessing legislative
power. The National Legislature, however, may delegate this power to the President and
administrative boards as well as the lawmaking bodies of municipal corporations or local
government units. Once delegated, the agents can exercise only such legislative powers as
are conferred on them by the national lawmaking body.
Acebedo Optical Company, Inc. v. CA, 329 SCRA 314, March 31, 2000, En Banc [Purisima]
The scope of police power has been held to be so comprehensive as to encompass almost all matters affecting
the health, safety, peace, order, morals, comfort and convenience of the community. Police power is essentially
regulatory in nature and the power to issue licenses or grant business permits, if exercised for a regulatory and not
revenue-raising purpose, is within the ambit of this power.
Philtread Workers Union [PTWU] v. Confesor, 269 SCRA 393, March 12, 1997
Article 263(g) of the Labor Code (vesting upon the Secretary of Labor the discretion to
determine what industries are indispensable to the national interest and thereafter, assume
jurisdiction over disputes in said industries) does not interfere with the workers right to
strike but merely regulates it, when in the exercise of such right, national interests will be
affected. The rights granted by the Constitution are not absolute. They are still subject to
control and limitation to ensure that they are not exercised arbitrarily. The interests of both
the employers and the employees are intended to be protected and not one of them is given
undue preference.
The Labor Code vests upon the Secretary of Labor the discretion to determine what
industries are indispensable to national interest. Thus, upon the determination of the
Secretary of Labor that such industry is indispensable to the national interest, it will assume
jurisdiction over the labor dispute of said industry. The assumption of jurisdiction is in the
nature of police power measure. This is done for the promotion of the common good
considering that a prolonged strike or lockout can be inimical to the national economy.
Heirs of Alberto Suguitan v. City of Mandaluyong, 328 SCRA 137, March 14, 2000,
3rd Div. [Gonzaga-Reyes]
The exercise of the right of eminent domain, whether directly by the State, or by its authorized agents, is
necessarily in derogation of private rights, and the rule in that case is that the authority must be strictly construed. No
species of property is held by individuals with greater tenacity, and none is guarded by the Constitution and the laws
more sedulously, than the right to the freehold of inhabitants. When the legislature interferes with that right, and, for
greater public purposes, appropriates the land of ah individual without his consent, the plain meaning of the law
should not be enlarged by doubt[ful] interpretation.
Municipality of Paranaque v.
1998 [Panganiban]
V.M.
Realty
Corp., 292
SCRA
678, July
20,
The power of eminent domain is lodged in the legislative branch of government, which
may delegate the exercise thereof to LGUs, other public entities and public utilities. An LGU
may therefore exercise the power to expropriate private property only when authorized by
Congress and subject to the latter's control and restraints imposed "through the law
conferring the power or in other legislations." In this case, Section 19 of RA 7160, which
delegates to LGUs the power of eminent domain, also lays down the parameters for its
exercise.
Thus, the following essential requisites must concur before an LGU can exercise the
power of eminent domain:
1. An ordinance is enacted by the local legislative council authorizing the local chief
executive, in behalf of the LGU, to exercise the power of eminent domain or pursue
expropriation proceedings over a particular private property.
2. The power of eminent domain is exercised for public use, purpose or welfare, or for the
benefit of the poor and the landless.
3. There is payment of just compensation, as required under Section 9, Article III of the
Constitution, and other pertinent laws.
4. A valid and definite offer has been previously made to the owner of the property sought
to be expropriated, but said offer was not accepted.
In the case at bar, the local chief executive sought to exercise the power of eminent
domain pursuant to a resolution of the municipal council. Thus, there was no compliance
with the first requisite that the mayor be authorized through an ordinance.
A municipal ordinance is different from a resolution. An ordinance is a law, but a
resolution is merely a declaration of the sentiment or opinion of a lawmaking body on a
specific matter. An ordinance possesses a general and permanent character, but a
resolution is temporary in nature. Additionally, the two are enacted differently a third
reading is necessary for an ordinance, but not for a resolution, unless decided otherwise by a
majority of all the Sanggunian members.
-
1234-
The extent of the taking or deprivation is not insubstantial; this is not a case of a de
minimis temporary limitation or restraint upon the use of private property. The monetary
value of the compulsory "donation," measured by the advertising rates ordinarily charged by
newspaper publishers whether in cities or in non-urban areas, may be very substantial
indeed. The taking of private property for public use is, of course, authorized by the
Constitution, but not without payment of "just compensation" (Article III, Section 9). And
apparently the necessity of paying compensation for "Comelec space" is precisely what is
sought to be avoided by respondent Commission, whether Section 2 of Resolution No. 2772
is read as petitioner PPI reads it, as an assertion of authority to require newspaper publishers
to "donate" free print space for Comelec purposes, or as an exhortation, or perhaps an
appeal, to publishers to donate free print space, as Section 1 of Resolution No. 2772-A
attempts to suggest. The threshold requisites for a lawful taking of private property for
public use need to be examined here: one is the necessity for the taking; another is the legal
authority to effect the taking. The element of necessity for the taking has not been shown by
respondent Comelecxxx
Similarly, it has not been suggested, let alone demonstrated, that Comelec has been
granted the power of eminent domain either by the Constitution or by the legislative
authority. A reasonable relationship between that power and the enforcement and
administration of election laws by Comelec must be shown; it is not casually to be
assumed. . . . Section 2 does not constitute a valid exercise of the power of eminent domain.
TELEBAP, Inc. v. COMELEC, 289 SCRA 337, April 21, 1998 [Mendoza]
In truth, radio and television broadcasting companies, which are given franchises, do not
own the airwaves and frequencies through which they transmit broadcast signals and
images. They are merely given the temporary privilege of using them. Since a franchise is
a mere privilege, the exercise of the privilege may reasonably be burdened with the
performance by the grantee of some form of public service.
Consequently, a license permits broadcasting, but the licensee has no constitutional
right to be the one who holds the license or to monopolize a radio frequency to the exclusion
of his fellow citizens. There is nothing in the First Amendment which prevents the
government from requiring a licensee to share his frequency with others and to conduct
himself as a proxy or fiduciary with obligations to present those views and voices which are
representative of his community and which would otherwise, by necessity, be barred from
the airwaves. As radio and television broadcast stations do not own the airwaves, no
private property is taken by the requirement that they provide airtime to the Comelec.
-
If
Concept of vicarious benefit: Abandons the traditional concept. The purpose is public
as long as the society in general is indirectly benefited, i.e. conversion of a slum area into a
model housing community. There is a vicarious advantage to the society.
Filstream International Incorporated v. CA, 284 SCRA 716, Jan. 23, 1998 [Francisco]
The City of Manila, acting through its legislative branch, has the express power to
acquire private lands in the city and subdivide these lands into home lots for sale to bona
fide tenants or occupants thereof, and to laborers and low-salaried employees of the city.
That only a few could actually benefit from the expropriation of the property does not
diminish its public character. It is simply not possible to provide all at once land and shelter
for all who need them.
Through the years, the public use requirement in eminent domain has evolved into a
flexible concept, influenced by changing conditions. Public use now includes the broader
notion of indirect public benefit or advantage, including in particular, urban land reform and
housing.
Estate of Salud Jimenez v. PEZA, 349 SCRA 240, Jan. 16, 2001, 2nd Div. [De Leon] (Public
Use Requirement; Payment of Just Compensation)
In the exercise of eminent domain, only as much land can be taken as is necessary for
the legitimate purpose of the condemnation. The term "necessary", in this connection, does
not mean absolutely indispensable but requires only a reasonable necessity of the taking for
the stated purpose, growth and future needs of the enterprise. The respondent cannot attain
a self-sustaining and viable ECOZONE if inevitable needs in the expansion in the surrounding
areas are hampered by the mere refusal of the private landowners to part with their
properties. The purpose of creating an ECOZONE and other facilities is better served if
respondent directly owns the areas subject of the expansion program.
The Legislature may directly determine the necessity for appropriating private property
for a particular improvement for public use, and it may select the exact location of the
improvement. In such a case, it is well-settled that the utility of the proposed improvement,
the existence of the public necessity for its construction, the expediency of constructing it,
the suitableness of the location selected, are all questions exclusively for the legislature to
determine, and the courts have no power to interfere or to substitute their own views for
those of the representatives of the people.
In the absence of some constitutional or statutory provision to the contrary, the
necessity and expediency of exercising the right of eminent domain are questions
essentially political and not judicial in their character.
The concept of just compensation embraces not only the correct determination of the
amount to be paid to the owners of the land, but also the payment of the land within a
reasonable time from its taking. Without prompt payment, compensation cannot be
considered "just" inasmuch as the property owner is made to suffer the consequences of
being immediately deprived of his land while being made to wait for a decade or more
before actually receiving the amount necessary to cope with his loss. 46 Payment of just
compensation should follow as a matter of right immediately after the order of expropriation
is issued. Any delay in payment must be counted from said order. However, the delay to
constitute a violation of due process must be unreasonable and inexcusable; it must be
deliberately done by a party in order to defeat the ends of justice.
-
imposition by the plaintiff upon the defendants that below said transmission lines, no plant
higher than 3 meters is allowed.(NPC v. Gutierrez, 193 SCRA 1)
Republic v. Salem Investment Corporation, G.R. No. 137569, June 23, 2000, 2nd Div.
[Mendoza]
The first is concerned with the determination of the authority of the plaintiff to exercise
the power of eminent domain and the propriety of its exercise in the context of the facts
involved in the suit. It ends with an order, if not dismissal of the action, "of condemnation
declaring that the plaintiff has a lawful right to take the property sought to be condemned,
for the public use or purpose declared in the complaint, upon the payment of just
compensation to be determined as of the date of the filing of the complaint"xxx.
The second phase of the eminent domain action is concerned with the determination by
the court of "the just compensation for the property sought to be taken." This is done by the
court with the assistance of not more than three (3) commissionersxxx
It is only upon the completion of these two stages that expropriation is said to have been
completed. Moreover, it is only upon payment of just compensation that title over the
property passes to the government. Therefore, until the action for expropriation has been
completed and terminated, ownership over the property being expropriated remains with
the registered owner. Consequently, the latter can exercise all rights pertaining to an owner,
including the right to dispose of his property, subject to the power of the State ultimately to
acquire it through expropriation.
-
SMI Development Corporation v. Republic, 323 SCRA 862, Jan. 28, 2000, 3rd Div.
[Panganiban]
Current effective law on delegated authority to exercise the power of eminent domain is
found in Section 12, Book III of the Revised Administrative Code, which provides:
SEC. 12. Power of Eminent Domain The President shall determine when it is necessary or
advantageous to exercise the power of eminent domain in behalf of the National
Government, and direct the Solicitor General, whenever he deems the action advisable, to
institute expropriation proceedings in the proper court.
The foregoing provision does not require prior unsuccessful negotiation as a condition
precedent for the exercise of eminent domain. In Iron and Steel Authority v. Court of
Appeals,the President chose to prescribe this condition as an additional requirement
instead. In the instant case, however, no such voluntary restriction was imposed.
Republic v. Salem Investment Corporation, G.R. No. 137569, June 23, 2000, 2nd Div.
[Mendoza]
The recognized rule, indeed, is that title to the property expropriated shall pass from the owner to the
expropriator only upon full payment of the just compensation. Jurisprudence on this settled principle is consistent
both here and in other democratic jurisdictions.
POWER OF TAXATION
-
NOTES:
> If the purpose of taxation is regulatory in character, taxation is used to implement
the police power of the state.
> If the power of taxation is used to destroy things, businesses, or enterprises and
the purpose is to raise revenue, the court will come in because there will be violation of the
inherent and constitutional limitations and it will be declared invalid.
Taxes distinguished from Licenses
Acebedo Optical Company, Inc. v. CA, 329 SCRA 314, March 31, 2000, En Banc [Purisima]
The scope of police power has been held to be so comprehensive as to encompass
almost all matters affecting the health, safety, peace, order, morals, comfort and
convenience of the community. Police power is essentially regulatory in nature and the
power to issue licenses or grant business permits, if exercised for a regulatory and not
revenue-raising purpose, is within the ambit of this power.
The power to grant or issue licenses or business permits must always be exercised in
accordance with law, with utmost observance of the rights of all concerned to due process
and equal protection of the law.
Distinction must be made between the grant of a license or permit to do business and
the issuance of a license to engage in the practice of a particular profession. The first is
usually granted by the local authorities and the second is issued by the Board or
Commission tasked to regulate the particular profession. A business permit authorizes the
person, natural or otherwise, to engage in business or some form of commercial activity. A
professional license, on the other hand, is the grant of authority to a natural person to
engage in the practice or exercise of his or her profession.
The Life-Blood Doctrine
Taxes are the life-blood of the Government and their prompt and certain availability are
an imperious need. (CIR v. Pineda, 21 SCRA 105)
The existence of the government is a necessity; the main source of the government is
taxes. These are the life-blood of the government. The government will not be able to
survive and continue to perform its functions without taxes. (CIR v. Algue, Inc., 158 SCRA
8)
-
Philex Mining Corporation v. CIR, 294 SCRA 687, Aug. 28, 1998 [Romero]
Taxes cannot be subject to compensation for the simple reason that the government and
the taxpayer are not creditors and debtors of each other. There is a material distinction
between a tax and debt. Debts are due to the Government in its corporate capacity, while
taxes are due to the Government in its sovereign capacity. It must be noted that a
distinguishing feature of a tax is that it is compulsory rather than a matter of bargain.
Hence, a tax does not depend upon the consent of the taxpayer. If any taxpayer can defer
the payment of taxes by raising the defense that it still has a pending claim for refund or
credit, this would adversely affect the government revenue system. A taxpayer cannot
refuse to pay his taxes when they fall due simply because he has a claim against the
government or that the collection of a tax is contingent on the result of the lawsuit it filed
against the government.
-
Tax Exemptions
CIR v. S.C. Johnson and Son, Inc., 309 SCRA 87, June 25, 1999, 3rd Div. [Gonzaga-Reyes]
The RP-US Tax Treaty is just one of a number of bilateral treaties which
the Philippines has entered into for the avoidance of double taxation. The purpose of these
international agreements is to reconcile the national fiscal legislations of the contracting
parties in order to help the taxpayer avoid simultaneous taxation in two different
jurisdictions. More precisely, the tax conventions are drafted with a view towards the
elimination of international juridical double taxation.
International juridical double taxation is defined as the imposition of comparable
taxes in two or more states on the same taxpayer in respect of the same subject matter and
for identical periods.
The apparent rationale for doing away with double taxation is to encourage the free flow of
goods and services and the movement of capital, technology and persons between countries,
conditions deemed vital in creating robust and dynamic economies. Foreign investments will
only thrive in a fairly predictable and reasonable international investment climate and the
protection against double taxation is crucial in creating such a climate.
Posted by ValreD at 11:15 PM