PROCLUS

Ten Problems Concerning Providence

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PROCLUS
Ten Problems Concerning
Providence
Translated by
Jan Opsomer and
Carlos Steel

LON DON N E W DE L H I N E W YOR K SY DN EY

Bloomsbury Academic
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First published in 2012
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Acknowledgements
The present translations have been made possible by generous
and imaginative funding from the following sources: the National
Endowment for the Humanities, Division of Research
Programs, an independent federal agency of the USA; the
Leverhulme Trust; the British Academy; the Jowett Copyright
Trustees; the Royal Society (UK); Centro Internazionale A. Beltrame
di Storia dello Spazio e del Tempo (Padua); Mario
Mignucci; Liverpool University; the Leventis Foundation; the
Arts and Humanities Research Council; Gresham College; the
Esme Fairbairn Charitable Trust; the Henry Brown Trust; Mr
and Mrs N. Egon; the Netherlands Organisation for Scientic
Research (NWO/GW); the Ashdown Trust; Dr Victoria Solomonides,
the Cultural Attach of the Greek Embassy in London.
The editor wishes to thank Michael Grifn for preparing the
volume for press, and Deborah Blake at Bristol Classical Press,
who has been the publisher responsible for every volume since
the rst.

Typeset by Ray Davies

Printed and bound in Great Britain

Contents
Conventions and Abbreviations
Preface
Introduction

vi
vii
1

Translation

69

Notes
Select Bibliography
Appendix 1: The place of the tria opuscula within
Proclus work
Appendix 2: Addenda and corrigenda to the translation of
De malorum substantia
Index of Passages
Index of Names
Subject Index

121
149
157
167
171
173
175

Conventions and Abbreviations

[}] Square brackets enclose words or phrases that have been added
to the translation for purposes of clarity.
<}> Angle brackets enclose conjectures to the Greek and Latin text,
i.e. additions to the transmitted text deriving from parallel sources
and editorial conjecture, and transposition of words and phrases.
Accompanying notes provide further details. The reader is moreover
advised to consult the forthcoming reconstruction of the Greek, with
philological notes, by Benedikt Strobel.
(}) Round brackets, besides being used for ordinary parentheses,
contain transliterated Greek words.
The chapter and line number references for the tria opuscula (Dub.,
Prov., Mal.) are to Boeses edition. The page and line number references for the Commentary on the Parmenides are to Steels OCT
edition.
The page, column and line numbers for Plutarch, De sera numinis
vindicta, correspond to the Teubner edition (Paton-Pohlenz-Sieveking 1927).
BS = Benedikt Strobel
Dub. = Decem quaestiones circa providentiam, Ten Problems Concerning Providence
ET = Elementatio theologica, Elements of Theology
Mal. = De malorum subsistentia, On the Existence of Evils
Prov. = De providentia et fato et eo quod in nobis ad Theodorum
mechanicum, On Providence
SVF = Stoicorum Veterum Fragmenta (ed. Arnim)
TP = Theologia platonica, Platonic Theology
For all other ancient works standard abbreviations are used.

Preface
No subjects of discussion are perhaps more interesting or more
important than those of which the present volume consists. For what
can more demand our most serious attention, or what can be more
essential to the well-being of our immortal part, than a scientific
elucidation and defence of the mysterious ways of Providence, and a
development of the nature of Evil? This is what Proclus does in the
following Treatises, with his usual acuteness and eloquence, by
arguments which are no less admirable for their perspicuity, than
invincible from their strength. We could not come up with a better
introduction for our translation of Proclus treatises Ten Problems
Concerning Providence than these words taken from the preface of
Thomas Taylors translation, though we may have more doubts than
our predecessor about the scientific character of Proclus arguments.
With the present volume the translation of the tria opuscula for the
Ancient Commentators on Aristotle series, edited by Richard Sorabji,
has come to completion. We are grateful to have our translation
published in this prestigious series, which brings the works produced
in the schools of Alexandria and Athens at the end of antiquity to a
contemporary audience.
Since we began work on the first volume, Richard has inspired,
encouraged and helped us in many ways. Translating the three
treatises was not an easy task: Proclus tria opuscula have been
transmitted through the Latin translation of William Moerbeke, in
which Proclus usual acuteness and eloquence has become unrecognisable. We were, therefore, fortunate that as a starting point for our
translation of this last volume we could use the Greek retroversion
by Benedikt Strobel (University of Trier). We had the good fortune of
a close collaboration with him and are greatly indebted to his superb
philological achievement. We are also very much in debt to Michael
Griffin who carefully read and edited the last version of our translation, was always prepared to accept last-minute corrections, and
shepherded this volume to the final publication.
As Proclus says in his introduction, his arguments are not original
as the questions he is dealing with in this treatise have been discussed a thousand times. Even less original are his translators, who
only want to introduce an ancient text, which for centuries was

viii

Preface

almost lost and accessible only with difficulty, to a new philosophical

public. Our ambition is not just scholarly erudition, as we hope, with
Proclus, that our readers will turn back upon themselves and, as it
were, discuss with themselves the questions raised and not just take
in arguments from outside.
Jan Opsomer and Carlos Steel

Introduction
Worries about providence arise only in a specific philosophical or
religious context. The main assumption is obviously the belief that
there is providence at all. Epicureans, for instance, rejected this idea
and were therefore free of the accompanying puzzles and fears.
Actually, to be free of these additional worries was one of the main
reasons for denying the existence of providence, so they argued. If one
believes, however, that there is a divine principle that knows and
cares about the world, that has the power to intervene somehow,
wants do to so, and hence actually and effectively intervenes; if one
further believes that the objects of its care include contingent smallscale events and things, including human lives, and that its care
consists to a large extent in rewarding and punishing on the basis of
merit: then a number of problems arise.
Since the providence exercised by the divinity was, by definition,
seen as good, the issue arises what to think about things that are not
so good, or even downright evil, and their relation to providence. Do
they fall outside the scope of providence, maybe even outside of the
power of the god(s)? Does the exercise of providence come with
responsibility, and is god accordingly responsible for evil? In addition, divine care for animal, and especially human, souls was cast in
terms of reward and punishment. This presupposes a divinity that
knows about action, is able to evaluate it and to confer rewards and
punishments accordingly. Since the ancient Platonists were committed to these claims they tried, throughout history, to find
philosophical answers to these problems.
An obvious problem, for instance, would be that good people do not
seem to be rewarded or bad people punished consistently. In fact,
there seems to be a great deal of counter-evidence to the idea of just
rewards and punishment consisting in providences distributing good
and bad fortune in accordance with merit and demerit. Additional
problems originated with certain peculiarities of the Neoplatonic1
philosophical system. The Neoplatonists did not just accept one
divinity, but a great number of divine entities, and more than one of
them were held to be engaged in providential activity. It was important to the Platonists to determine which providential agents
exercised what kind of agency in what part of the world (for instance

Introduction

in the realm of the celestial spheres, or in that of animal souls). Is it

permitted to say, for instance, that those demons whose task it is to
act as it were as avenging angels (in fact, angels were held to
constitute a different category of beings) are themselves evil, as
popular tradition had it?
Another set of problems had to do with the mode of cognition and
activity of the primary divinities, among whom the highest source of
providence was to be sought. For the highest metaphysical principle
and the entities in its vicinity in some way think and act in a timeless
manner. Everything which is present to them, including things that
have a temporal and even contingent existence, is held to be present
to them in a manner that transcends time and contingency. This
peculiarity would seem to bereave them of the ability to intervene
and even think and know. And if one grants knowledge to an eternal
being, the unchangeability of its knowledge is a problem if it is to
extend to things whose outcome has not been determined beforehand, i.e. contingent things.
These issues lead to a host of problems, which were thoroughly
discussed in the philosophical schools from Plato on to Boethius at
the end of antiquity. We shall not attempt to provide a survey of the
history of the problem.2 Suffice it to say that of the Hellenistic schools
the Stoics were known as the champions of an all-pervasive providence, and the Epicureans as the deniers of providence. The
Platonists of the imperial age tried to steer a middle course between
these positions (cf. p. 10).3 Platonic discussions of providence start
from the text of Plato, although Plato was not the first philosopher to
have affirmed his belief in providence.4 In the tenth book of the Laws
Plato offers a lengthy argument for divine providence based on the
idea of divine justice.5 God is claimed to care for the whole and does
so by subordinating the parts to the whole. Not even the smallest
things are neglected. God installs a perfect beneficial order in the
world and assigns to each soul its proper place in the order of things.
In the Timaeus we are taught how the world is created by its
demiurge as the best possible copy of the intelligible model, a single
visible living being, complete (teleios) in every way (30D2-3). The
later Platonic construction of Platos doctrine on providence is much
indebted to the Stoic view, which had been for centuries the dominant
paradigm for discussing the various problems concerning providence.
Platonists adopted Stoic arguments and reinterpreted them in a
Platonic fashion so as to combat the views of Epicureans but also of
Aristotelians (for the Aristotelian position on providence, see p. 5).
This Stoic influence is very evident in Plotinus discussion, in particular in his treatise On Providence (3.2-3 [47-8]), which became an
important point of reference for the later debates in the school.
Plotinus emphasised the souls capacity for self-determination,
which constitutes an indispensable premise in his theodicy.

Introduction

Proclus Ten Problems Concerning Providence (Peri tn deka pros

tn pronoian apormatn) stand in this tradition. The treatise has
been handed down together with two other works dealing with
related issues. Together these three works are known as the tria
opuscula.6 The ten essays on providence do not claim any originality. As Proclus writes in his introduction, he is well aware that
these problems have been discussed a thousand times in the
tradition, and in particular in the Platonic school. The first five
problems discuss fundamental philosophical presuppositions of
the belief in providence. Problems 1 and 2 examine how providence
knows the contingent and particular things and investigate
whether real contingency can be reconciled with divine foreknowledge. Both problems are often discussed by Platonists in their
polemics with Stoics and Peripatetics. Problem 3 focuses on the role
of the principles of limit and infinity in divine providence: this pair of
principles is of central importance to the later Neoplatonist system(s). In problem 4 Proclus examines how the inferior orders of
being participate in diverse ways in divine providence. Problem 5
raises the most difficult question: how can the experience of evil be
reconciled with the belief in providence. Proclus has devoted a separate treatise to this, arguably insoluble, problem: the third of the tria
opuscula, i.e. On the Existence of Evils. The next four essays (6-9) all
address various moral implications of the doctrine of providence,
above all the just distribution of rewards and punishment in accordance with merit. Problem 6 raises the traditional question of the
apparent inequality in the distribution of good and evil by providence. Proclus is indebted to Plotinus treatise on providence (Enn.
3.2-3 [47-8]) and probably also to Iamblichus lost treatises on the
subject. More original seems to be the investigation, in problem 7, of
the same kind of inequality in the lives of animals. We could not find
a direct source for this discussion. In his treatment of the eighth and
ninth problems the postponement of judgment, and inherited guilt,
respectively Proclus makes extensive use of a text by Plutarch of
Chaeronea that deals with the same issues, namely the dialogue On
the Delays of Gods Punishment, or, as it is often translated, On the
Delays of Divine Vengeance (De sera numinis vindicta). Proclus borrows ideas, arguments, examples and expressions from this author
without naming him. Yet when he refers to his remote predecessor
in other works it is usually to criticise him. We shall discuss the
relation between Plutarch and Proclus in a separate section of this
introduction.
With the last essay (10), finally, we return to the agency of providence. This time Proclus focuses on the role of demons, an issue often
examined by Platonists, as it was an important element of popular
religious belief and magical practices. Proclus had discussed the role

Introduction

of these intermediaries between gods and humans already in the

context of the third problem (15-16). We have already pointed out
that Proclus was well aware of his dependence on the tradition, not
only in raising the problems but also in his search for a solution. Yet
he gives the impression of wanting to examine these problems independently and partly for his own benefit and not just to take the
arguments from authorities. In this sense, the treatise would appear
to be primarily a philosophical exercise written for himself, helping
him to solve the many problems with which he is himself struggling:
Let us interrogate ourselves and raise problems in the secrecy of our
soul and thus attempt to exercise ourselves in solving these. Therefore, it does not make much difference whether what he proposes has
already been said by previous thinkers or not. For as long as what
we say corresponds to our own view, we may seem to say and write
these views as our own (Dub. 1,17-21). With these words Proclus
seems almost to apologise for repeating, even quoting literally without acknowledging what others, like Plutarch, have said before. His
heavy borrowing from Plutarch in essays 8 and 9, however, should
not make us jump to the conclusion that there is nothing original at
all in the Ten Problems. As we see it, Proclus is most on his own
where he examines the fundamental theological and metaphysical
presuppositions of the doctrine of providence. This is evident, above
all, in his insistence on the role of the gods in the providential order
and in his understanding of the gods as henads operating in the mode
of unity. The fundamental supposition behind his argumentation in
this treatise is excellently formulated in proposition 120 of the Elements of Theology:
Every god embraces in his being the function of exercising
providence towards the universe; and providence resides primarily in the gods. [}] For indeed, where should an activity
prior to intelligence be found, if not in the principles above
being? And providence, as its name (pronoia) shows, is an
activity prior to intelligence. In virtue, then, of their being gods
and their being goodness, they exercise providence towards all
things, filling all with a goodness which is prior to intelligence.7
Analysis of the argument, with comments
Preface
1 Providence exists and its activity extends to the most inferior
things, as is confirmed by the arguments of Plato and the
testimony of the Chaldean Oracles. Following their authority
Proclus intends to refute the erroneous views that prevent
people from believing in providence. Even though the problems

Introduction

surrounding providence have already received a great deal of

attention, it is worthwhile dealing with these problems once
more. It is indeed important to discuss the problems with
oneself and not just to take views from outside.
First problem: according to what mode of knowledge does
providence know the different classes of things?
Proclus opening move is not innocent. By claiming that providence
extends to corruptible things he aligns himself with Plato, according
to whom the supervisor of the universe arranged everything with an
eye to its preservation and excellence; [}] the parts, down to the
smallest details of their active and passive functions, have each been
put under the control of ruling powers that have perfected the
minutest constituents of the universe (Laws 10,903B, tr. T.J. Saunders). Chrysippus famously claimed that some things get neglected,
just as in large households some husks get lost and a certain quantity
of wheat also, though affairs as a whole are well managed.8 Yet the
Stoics were also convinced that there is providence over nations,
cities, and even individual human beings, as Ciceros Stoic spokesperson affirms.9 Providence attends individual persons, but one
should not blame it for the loss of a commodity or the damage done
by a hail storm: the gods exercise care in great matters, but neglect
small ones.10 The Aristotelians appear to have argued against the Stoics
that providence is concerned with species, not with individuals.11
In his treatise On Providence 3.2 [47] Plotinus clearly formulated
the Platonic position on the matter: For even if someone who is
intending to make something must look to the whole, yet all the same
it is right for him to set the parts where they ought to be [}] and
providence ought to reach everything, and its task ought to be just
this, to leave nothing neglected (6,18-23, tr. A.H. Armstrong; cf. also
7,34-5). This is in essence also Proclus view: providence must extend
to all things down to the most particular (TP I 15,70,23-5). This kind
of providential care implies, however, that providence must also have
knowledge about all contingent facts and individual things. In fact,
there can be no providence without a just distribution of good and evil
according to the principle of merit (to kat axian).12
Therefore, providence ought to know all things. But how can god
know all things, the universal and the individual, the eternal and the
corruptible, the necessary and the contingent? The Aristotelians
argued that the divine mind only knows the universal forms, and,
therefore, they restricted providence to the preservation of the species.13 Platonists too were tempted to defend such a view, since they
identified the objects of divine thought with the paradigmatic Forms.
Some raised the question whether there are ideas of accidents and
individual things. If there are no such Forms, it seemed that it was

Introduction

impossible for God to know the individual things and to distribute

good and evil according to merit. Proclus belongs to the Platonic
mainstream rejecting Forms of individuals (see in Parm. 824,9825,9). On the level of the intellect and its thought there are only
universal forms. The intellect qua intellect can never grasp the
individual thing, and certainly not the particular corporeal thing.
What then about providence? Platonists would seem to be compelled
to limit divine knowledge to universal forms and to accept the Aristotelian conclusion that providence does not extend to the individual
things. Proclus finds a solution for this problem by attributing to the
gods a mode of knowledge beyond intellect. If all forms of knowledge
correspond to the nature of the knowing subjects, there must also
exist a form of knowledge that is characteristic of divine being. As the
gods exist in virtue of being one (for they are henads) they will also
know in virtue of being one.
To prepare this conclusion Proclus first distinguishes six types of
knowledge under three general modes: (1) knowledge of particular
things pertains to cognitive functions related to bodily organs: (1a)
sense perception and (1b) imagination; (2) discursive (or rational)
knowledge of universals: (2a) opinion and (2b) science, the first of
objects in motion, the other of fixed and unchangeable objects; (3a)
intellective or (3b) intuitive knowledge of the Forms, pertaining
either to particular intellects or to the absolute universal intellect;
the universal intellect knows all Forms at once in all aspects, while
the particular knows all forms under a particular aspect.
Proclus then argues that the cognition proper to providence transcends all the ordinary types of cognition, including the intellective.
Hence he adds a fourth cognitive mode: (4) that of providential,
unitary knowledge. The mode of existence (hupostasis) of the gods is
characterised by their being one. As they exist beyond being and
beyond intellect, their act of knowing is also before-thinking (pronoein). Just as a form of knowledge corresponds to each of the three
other levels of being (irrational life, reason, intellect), there must also
exist a form of knowledge proportionate to divine being. This must be
a form of knowing according to the One, as their being also is
characterised by unity. It is by virtue of the One that providence
knows everything. This means that it knows everything by the fact
that it is beyond the difference of wholes and parts, natural and
unnatural, form and formless.
Proclus explains what this unitary knowledge could be through an
analogy. As there must be one cognitive criterion to discriminate
between different sensible objects, such as white and sweet, sc. the
so-called common sense (see Arist. DA 3.2, 426b19), and one again on
a higher level to discriminate between intelligible Forms (sc. the
intellect), there must be one cognitive principle beyond the intellect
that can discriminate between universal Forms (which fall under the

Introduction

intellect) and participating particular entities (which fall under sense

perception). To discriminate universals and particulars is only possible for a principle that can grasp them under a common aspect,
namely the oneness which they all have in common. Indeed, all
things on all levels, from the intelligible Forms until matter, only
exist insofar as they partake in unity. Only a principle that is itself
characterised by unity is capable of knowing all things, from the
universal Forms to the individuals. Such a principle knowing all
things insofar as they are one can only be the divine One, which
transcends all levels of being.
2 Providence extends from eternal things down to corruptible
things, encompasses wholes and parts, and must know each of
them in order to determine their worth. What is its mode of
knowledge for the different classes of things?
3 We should distinguish different types of cognition: (1) that of
the irrational cognitive faculties, i.e. sensation and imagination
(aisthsis, phantasia), having as its objects particular things
subject to change; (2) the cognition of the rational soul, i.e.
opinion and scientific knowledge (doxa, epistm), cognising
unchanging universals; (3) intellective cognition, of which there
are two kinds, (3a) that of the universal intellect thinking all
things at once in an absolute manner, and (3b) that of particular
intellects, thinking all things under a specific aspect, namely
each according to its own specificity.
4 Ontologically prior to them is (4) providential knowledge.
Providence knows and exists by virtue of the One. Therefore it
is better than intellect, in conformity with what our common
conceptions teach us, namely that the divine is better than
intellect. By its being one providence imparts goodness to all
things, as the One and the Good are identical, so that oneness
and goodness are identical. Providence transcends the distinctions between whole and parts, between natural and unnatural,
between forms and the formless. For in order for it to discern
between those opposites (in its function as kritrion), it must not
itself belong to one member of any pair of opposites. Hence it
must be prior to the Forms. For the only thing which all the
things over which providence rules have in common is oneness.
Everything that one can conceive of is indeed one. So it is in
virtue of oneness that providence knows them, in accordance
with the principle that like is known by the like.
5 Analogous to the ontological superiority of providence, providential knowledge is superior to intellective knowledge.

Introduction
Providence knows by the One and imparts unity to all things.
The One of providence is unlike the individual one which is
ranked the lowest but also unlike the universal one, as the
universal one is some one and possesses the differences of the
things it contains, whereas the One of providence is truly
indivisible. The One of providence produces and preserves all
things, transcends every form of essential being, and knows all
things in the same manner. It does not only know universals,
but every single individual. In the same way we say that the
entire circle exists in the centre according to the mode of the
centre; or that every number exists in the monad in a monadic
mode. Thus everything is contained in the One. If the centre of
a circle were to have knowledge, it would know the entire circle
as being contained in it. Likewise the One of providence knows
everything, universals and particulars, in the same way as it
produces them. Yet although this knowledge is all-encompassing, it is also indivisible, i.e. unitary above all distinctions.

The cognition of providence is unitary in a way that transcends all

distinctions. The one of providence should not be understood as the
individual one, this particular thing, which is the most inferior of all
beings and only exists in so far as it takes part in the universal. The
one of providence is also beyond the universal one (katholou), because is not a one in the sense of a whole (holon). The universal
whole is somehow divisible in its composing parts, as also the intellect is one and multiple. Providence however knows all things without being multiplied or divided or changed together with them.
Knowledge and production are strictly parallel: providence knows
everything it produces, namely all things. The only feature all of its
products have in common is their unity. One can also say that what
they have in common is goodness, as unity and goodness coincide,
just like the One and the Good, as the first principle, are identical.
Later on it will become clear that strictly speaking (see e.g. 16, 66)
it is not the first principle itself that is the primary agent of providence (except in a super-eminent way, as being the cause of
providence), but rather the gods or henads that express different
aspects of the One. The main point made here is that providence
knows in accordance with the One, viz. it knows the oneness and
hence the goodness of things and will also protect this oneness/goodness. One might expect that, given the absolute simplicity of the One,
providence could only have a general, undifferentiated knowledge.
Yet Proclus insists that providence knows and protects each
thing, including particulars. This paradoxical claim constitutes one
of the core problems of the Platonic doctrine of providence. The
second and third problems are devoted to this issue.
Proclus solution of the question how God can have knowledge of

Introduction

individual and contingent things was very attractive to the Christian

Philoponus. In his polemical writing against Proclus De aeternitate
mundi he quotes with approval the conclusion of this first problem.
As he says, on this point he was in full agreement with Proclus.14
Second problem: how can providence know contingent
things?
This discussion is a follow-up to the argument of the first problem.
Contingent things (contingent events) pose a special problem, as
their very nature seems to be incompatible with the determinate
knowledge that should be that of providence. (Proclus talk of contingent [things] does not discriminate between substance-like things
and events, which is typical of the ancient discussion.) However, if
one grants determinate knowledge of contingent things, their contingency appears to be threatened: for would they not need to be
determined that is, not contingent if they are to be known in a
determined way? The solution adopted by Proclus consists in claiming that the determination of providential knowledge does not stem
from the objects known, but rather from the knower.
6 Contingence seems incompatible with providence. Therefore
some abolish contingence, whereas others get rid of providence.
Both groups have the correct intuition that a provident agent
must know the objects under its sway and that it must know
those in a non-ambivalent, i.e. in a determinate way. The reality
of both providence and contingence is here taken as given and
will not receive further discussion.
7 Hence the problem to be solved is: how is providential
knowledge of contingent things possible?15 Knowledge is intermediate between the knower and the known. Does knowledge,
then, take on the character of the knower, of the known or of
neither? It is defined with respect to the knower, that is: it takes
on its basic character from the knower. The objects known, too,
contribute to the character of knowledge, but only so far as to
distinguish cognitions the one from the other. They do so qua
final causes of knowledge.
Since the nature of knowledge is determined essentially by
the character of the knower, the knowledge of unchanging
knowers will be immutable, the knowledge of rational knowers
will be rational, that of intellectual knowers intellectual, and
so on.
Since providence is not at a distance from the One, its knowledge is unitary. Its knowledge, even of contingent things is
moreover necessary (i.e. it knows contingent things as happen-

10

Introduction
ing with necessity). Indeed, the knowledge of providence takes
on the character of providence and is therefore incorporeal,
timeless, unitary, unchanging, determinate, necessary.
8 Hence providence knows contingent things not the way they
are, but the way providence itself is, i.e. in a mode superior to
the contingent. It does not know them while they are happening, but outside of time, at the level of the (non-contingent)
causes of contingent things. It knows contingent things as
things that are in themselves undetermined, yet are nonetheless determined qua existing in providence (i.e. causally) and
qua being the objects of providences knowledge (i.e. epistemically). So providences knowledge of contingent things combines
determinacy with indeterminacy. By its knowledge of causes, it
anticipates the coming about of the indeterminate, i.e. it knows
that something indeterminate will take place. To the extent,
however, that it also causes the indeterminate to exist and does
so in a determinate manner, it knows the contingent in a
determinate manner.
Providences knowledge is compared to the reason-principle
in a seed:16 the latter is itself not divided but at the same time
the cause of the division that will ensue when the seed develops
into a plant. The immaterial logos contained in the seed is, on
the one hand, the cause of the ensuing division, hence should
somehow possess what will be manifest in the full-grown plant.
On the other, it is not yet the plant, hence it cannot possess the
same characteristics in the very manner of the full-grown plant.
The logos is itself present in a substrate, the seed. It cannot
itself be divided, but bestows to the seed the possibility of
division. Likewise providence contains in a determinate way
the indeterminate things that will follow, both causally and
epistemically. It knows them as following in the future.

Many thinkers prior to Proclus have considered the compatibility of

all-encompassing providential knowledge with contingency to be
highly problematic.17 As Proclus says at the beginning of this Problem, there are two easy ways out: drop either the claim that there is
true contingency, or the premise that providence knows beforehand
what contingent events will take place in the future. According to the
Platonist way of framing the history of the problem, the first position
corresponds to that adopted by the Stoics, while the second is attributed to the Peripatetics, who restricted providence to the celestial
spheres, where there is only necessity.18 The positions taken are
analogous to those regarding the dilemma between providence and
evil.19 In both cases Platonists regard themselves as occupying a
middle position.20

Introduction

11

Elsewhere too Proclus accepts, on the authority of Plato, the idea

that god knows future contingents in a determinate way. For god
knows everything in a determinate way, both the things that according to their own nature are indeterminate and those that are
determinate:
But Plato and whoever is his friend assert both that god knows
future events in a determinate manner and that they happen
according to their own nature, some in a determinate manner,
others in an indeterminate manner. (Prov. 63,5-8, tr. C. Steel)
This claim follows a more general principle expressed also in the
Elements of Theology:
Every god has an undivided knowledge of things divided and a
timeless knowledge of things temporal; he knows the contingent
without contingency, the mutable immutably, and in general all
things in a higher mode than belongs to their station. (ET 124,
tr. E.R. Dodds)21
It is not clear, however, where Plato would have made the claim
about determinate knowledge of indeterminate events he certainly
did not formulate it the way the later Platonists did. Probably one
should think of a combination of Tim. 30B6-C1 and 44C6-7, where
divine providence is mentioned in relation to both the structure of the
world as a whole, and individual souls and bodies. It is passages such
as these that allowed Proclus to make the claim, in the first sentence
of our text, that Plato in the Timaeus literally22 says that the works
of creation, even down to the most inferior things, have been accomplished with accuracy, because of the providence of God (Dub. 1,3-5).
According to the testimony of Ammonius it was Iamblichus who
first claimed that knowledge does not necessarily have the same
status as the object known, but may derive its character from the
knower.23 The thesis that providence knows indeterminate24 and
contingent things in a determinate and non-contingent manner remains obscure.25 Insofar it amounts to the claim, apparently made
here by Proclus, that it knows that something contingent will take
place, it is relatively innocent.26 In this case providence will know, for
instance, that either A will happen or will not happen (A or not-A),
but not whether it will be A or B. In that case A or not-A is necessary,
while A remains contingent. Proclus, however, wants to make a
stronger claim. The idea that providence is outside of time should
make it possible for it to know the outcome of all things, including the
contingent ones (this obviously constitutes a threat to our ability to
make free choices,27 as god will also know what I am going to
choose).28 So things that for us lay in the future and of which it is not

12

Introduction

clear whether they will come about, are already known by providence. Yet the future has not become fixed by being known by
providence, so Proclus claims in On Providence:
Therefore, it is not true that, if the gods know the future, its
outcome is by necessity fixed, but one should attribute to the
future an undetermined outcome from what is determined, and
to the gods a determinate foreknowledge of what is undetermined. (Prov. 65,1-3, tr. C. Steel)
It is questionable whether this view can be made coherent. Complete
knowledge of things in time by a knower outside of time amounts to
knowledge of those things as already having taken place, and seems
to presuppose their already having happened. Yet eternity is also
conceived as in some sense prior to time, so that the knowledge would
seem to precede the outcome of contingent events. This combination
of priority with posteriority would seem to be impossible. Yet we
cannot but introduce the categories prior and posterior if we are to
explain the extent of such knowledge.
If the knowledge of providence is complete, determinate, timeless
and infallible, it is impossible for anything in the world to happen, or
for us to act, in such a way that it would make that which providence
would seem to know to turn out false. The relation between contingency and time in this case would seem to be this: if A is contingent,
the only way to know whether it takes place is to observe it at the
time of its happening (or not-happening at the time it could have
happened) or to have a recollection of such an observation. The
determinateness is connected to the fact that A cannot be undone.
This is true for events that lie in the past or that happen right now
(if one understands happening now in such a way as to exclude the
possibility of their being prevented in their outcome, so that if X
happens now, even it stops in the next second, it will still be the case
that it has happened).29 So the determinacy stems from the irrevocability of the past and of, in a sense, the present.30 Contingent events
do not become non-contingent after their occurrence: they are still
that which could have been otherwise,31 but they have been determined. Accordingly, a future contingent proposition is
indeterminately true or false, but after the event a proposition describing the same event is determinately, i.e. definitely, true or
false.32 The only way for contingent events to be determinate would
seem to consist in the fact that they are no longer future events. Hence
the timelessness of the knower would seem to solve the problem by
the fact that the contingent events do not lie in the future with respect
to the knower. Since these events are not in the future for providence,
they are definite.33 The exclusion of the future tense might seem to
lead directly to the irrevocability that is usually regarded as a

Introduction

13

property of the past. However, such an impression would be deceptive. For contingent events to be determined for a timeless observer,
one could argue, what is needed is not their being not in the future,
but rather their being in the past or in the present (yet the timeless
observer does not observe in time at all). But the believer in providence would also want to say that events that are in the future for us
are already known by providence. It is not clear how one could make
sense of that claim.
Boethius denies that gods infallible and all-encompassing knowledge can be correctly described as fore-knowledge (praescientia) or
fore-seeing (praevidentia),34 as that would entail determinism. Proclus in our text is less careful in that he speaks of providence knowing
contingents as being indeterminate and lying in the future.35
Boethius clever remark that nothing is made necessary by being
seen36 does not solve the problem either of how god can know determinately that A, if A is supposed to be contingent. For knowing
determinately that A turns out to be possible only if A is either
necessary or irrevocable. And in order for it to be the latter it would
need to lie in the past or in the present (according to the sense
outlined above), not just not in the future. So, in spite of whatever
the Platonists claim, a contingent event cannot be known in a determinate way without making it itself determinate. For A to be known
in a determinate way, however, the determinateness has to come
from somewhere: from its nature, in which case A is not contingent,
or from its having happened, in which case it is in the past with
respect to the knower. For the determinate character of a piece of
knowledge just cannot come from the knower. It is a claim the
Platonists make, but a claim that cannot be substantiated in a
rational way. The concept of determinate knowledge implies at least
that ones information about the object or event known is correct and
complete (and does not leave out whether the object is real or unreal
or whether the event takes place or not). If a contingent event does
not lay in the past or the present relative to a cognitive act, it is
always possible that it does not take place, for otherwise it would not
be contingent (this claim has to be modified, as we shall shortly see,
in the case of contingent events that become determined some time
before their occurrence, but this modification does not affect the core
of the objection). In that case the belief that A turns out to be false,
and can therefore not constitute knowledge, and a fortiori no determinate knowledge.
A more promising claim may be the one according to which everything can be said to be in the present for god as that is a way of
speaking that appears to be allowed.37 Yet this now would not be a
temporal instant, but a timeless now. This entails that it has the
same relation to all moments in time one would almost say: it is
simultaneous with all instants, if simultaneity were not itself a

14

Introduction

temporal relation. Yet this attempted solution too is fraught with

problems. Being present to any instant indeed implies being posterior to the instants (or time spans) preceding it and being anterior to
the instants (or time spans) following it.
Proclus further clarifies his position in the discussion of the third
problem when he explains how even contingent things participate in
determinate necessity (see 14, 9-23). In Proclus view the determination in which a contingent event participates does not merely
consist in the fact that providence knows in an atemporal way that
at some time (t1) it is either A or not-A. In such an interpretation the
determination or necessity would be attached only to the whole
contradiction (it is determined that either A or not-A), but not to
each of its parts distributively (it is determined that A or that A).38
This is, however, nothing special, as even human knowledge can have
such a determinate knowledge of a contingent event. In fact, Proclus
makes in 14 a stronger claim about providential knowledge. In case
a contingent event A takes place, this has become necessary some
time (t2) before A actually takes place (and analogously for the other
case, when not-A). Between t1 (when it is still indeterminate that A
or A) and the actual occurrence of A at t3 there has been at t2 a
metaptsis (a tipping of the scale) of the contingent into the necessary. To give the Aristotelian example, at t1 it is still equally possible
that there will be a sea battle or not. At t2 circumstances are such
that the irreversible decision is taken to engage in battle. At t3 the
battle occurs. In Proclus view divine providence knows in an atemporal manner that the contingent event (which before t2 is either A
or that A) has fallen into necessity at t2, before the sea battle
actually occurred. If we take away temporality this means knowing,
in all eternity, an indeterminate event in a determinate manner. In
human temporal knowledge, however, it is only after the transition
occurring at t2 that we may know that the contingent thing has
become determinate.39
One may also give an example that does not appeal to human
decisions: in the Platonic non-deterministic universe tomorrows rain is
contingent. Yet the day after tomorrow it will have rained or it wont
have. Some time before it actually rains (analogously of course for the
case in which it remains dry), the atmospheric conditions will have
changed in such a way as to make the rain inevitable. This can happen
either sooner or later, depending on the degree of contingency.40
This idea is paralleled in Ammonius commentary on Aristotles
On Interpretation: some time before the event, the contingent has
become unpreventable, as the conditions leading up to it and bringing
it about have become determined. In that way it is possible even for
us to have determinate knowledge of future contingents. This fact
should help to make the divine determinate knowledge of all contingents more understandable for us:

Introduction

15

And the same thing is contingent in its own nature, but in the
gods knowledge it is no longer indefinite, but rather definite. It
is clearly possible for the contingent sometimes to be known in
a definite manner even by our own knowledge, namely when it
is no longer contingent properly-speaking, but necessarily follows from the causes leading the way to (prohgsamena) its
own generation: it is possible, for example, for a sphere which
rests on a horizontal surface, while the surface keeps the same
position, to be moved by something or not, but when the surface
is tilted it is impossible for it not to be moved. Hence we also see
that physicians sometimes lack the confidence to pronounce
anything about whether their patients will recover or perish,
thinking both are possible, while they sometimes indubitably
pronounce about one or the other of these as certainly going to
happen to the patient. (Amm. in Int. 137,1-11, tr. D. Blank)
The last remark about the predictions made by doctors corresponds
to Proclus statement about conjectural predictions. The general idea
is that a contingent event becomes determined once all the conditions
for its realisation are given:41 before the plane is tilted, it is undetermined whether the sphere will move; but once it is tilted, the sphere
will roll inevitably. This is an ingenious solution, because it makes
possible determinate knowledge of a contingent event without reducing it to necessity. For even if the event has become determined some
time (t2) before its outcome, it cannot have been determined all the
time, as otherwise it would not be a contingent event. Hence, for
every contingent event there can be found a time (t1) at which it was
not determined at all. Divine providence purportedly knows in an
atemporal way that A is an indeterminate contingent event (at t1) and
that A is determined at t2. The idea would now be that the distinction
between t1 and t2 does not make any difference to an atemporal
knower in the sense that such a knower has the same non-temporal
relation to both points in time (god has a B-series perspective: to him
t1 and t2 are neither in the past or the future nor is the one more
remote than the other), so that one can say that divine knowledge
knows the indeterminate in a determinate manner, as it has both the
t1- and the t2-perspective on the event and can thus in its cognitive
act combine determination (from t2) with indetermination (from t1).
(The complication of introducing t2 may seem to be unnecessary, for
god can also get the determination from t3, yet the point is that a
contingent fact can be known determinedly at some point before its
actual happening.)
However, the objection raised above about the essential difference
between future events and past or present events remains valid.
Even if god can know the future in an atemporal way, one cannot
understand how this knowledge can be determinate unless god

16

Introduction

knows the future outcome as following by necessity. The price to

safeguard gods determinate knowledge of future contingent events,
is to understand them ultimately as following from a series of antecedents causes known by god. As Proclus observes in the argument
summarised above, divine providence anticipates the coming about
of the indeterminate, because it knows it in a causal manner. To the
extent that it also causes the indeterminate to exist and does so in a
determinate manner, it also knows the contingent in a determinate
manner. Given such an overall knowledge in virtue of causative
power, one wonders what is left of the contingent character of events
and in particular free human choices. Contingency thus appears to
be incompatible with divine foreknowledge, despite all claims to the
contrary. This poses a serious problem for someone who, like Proclus,
is committed to the premise that free will requires contingency.42 The
Platonic account in this case offers not more than a semblance of a
solution. The answer to this conundrum that consists in saying that
we humans cannot fully understand the divine mode of knowledge
(the answer given in Prov. 65,9-12, TP 1,98,3-6 and 14-16) is not very
satisfactory.43 In such a case it would be better to drop one of the
assumptions out of which the absurdity arose in the first place.
Third problem: is providence the cause of determinate and
indeterminate things in the same way?
Having explained how providence knows in a determinate way not
only what is determinate and necessary, but also what is indeterminate and contingent, Proclus raises the question how providence can
produce so different classes of beings. If providence were to produce
both indeterminate and determinate things in the same manner, one
could not explain how providence knows and produces the indeterminate as indeterminate and the determinate as determinate. A possible solution would be to say that providence knows and produces the
indeterminate with its infinite power and the determinate with the
One or Limit in it. In divine providence one can indeed distinguish
between peras and apeiron. For Proclus accepts that in the divine
henads too there is a sort of distinction between both aspects. Every
order of gods is derived from the two initial principles, Limit and
Infinity; but some manifest predominantly the causality of Limit,
others that of Infinity (ET 159, tr. E.R. Dodds). One might be
tempted to appeal to this distinction to explain how providence
produces the two different classes of beings. Such a solution was
probably defended in the Athenian school, which attributed a primordial role to the dyad of peras and apeiron among the fundamental
metaphysical principles.44 Proclus, however, does not adopt this solution, as it runs the risk of jeopardising the fundamental henadic
unity of divine providence. In his view, providence as a whole, in both

Introduction

17

its aspects of infinity and unity, produces determinate and indeterminate things alike, though with varying dominance of one or the
other aspect. All beings receive both unity and infinity from providence, but in higher beings unity dominates; therefore they are
determinate. In lower beings infinity is stronger, which is why they
are indeterminate (contingent). Indeterminate beings too, however,
share in determination. For all contingent beings become determined
before their occurrence, either a shorter or a longer time before. This
means that at some point the conditions leading up to a contingent
event will be such that the event has become inevitable, hence
determined (see above, pp. 14-15). To explain this subtle solution
Proclus is forced to engage in a long metaphysical digression on the
respective role of peras and apeiron in the constitution of beings.
9 Does providence cause determinate and indeterminate
things in the same way? The question is raised by the following
dilemma: if it does so in the same way, it is unclear how the
things caused by it can exhibit a different character, some being
determinate, others indeterminate; but if providence causes
them according to different aspects, the unity of providence is
jeopardised.
Proclus first explains a seeming contradiction, namely that providence has both the highest form of unity (10) and infinite power
(11).
10 Providence is established in the One. We know from our
common conceptions that every form of providence amounts to
a bestowal of goodness. The bestowal of goodness is identical
with the bestowal of unity, as the Good (as a principle) is also
the One. The One of providence has a character that is different
from that of material unity, from individual unity, and even
from universal unity. Unlike material unity, it is fertile and
eminently productive. Unlike individual unity, the One of providence contains all, is present to all, and preserves all things.
Unlike universal unity, which is called one-many because it
contains all things inferior to it [and caused by it] and anticipates the differences in them, the One of providence in no way
anticipates the differences in the things of which it is the
productive and perfective cause. Its power completely transcends its products. The latter cannot, either individually or
collectively, encompass the power of the providential One.
11 The One of providence therefore surpasses every union and
yet its power is more infinite than any other power, be it finite
or infinite. It is indeed possible that one infinite power is more

18

Introduction
infinite than another, as intelligible infinity is not quantitative,45 but an infinity of power. What is infinite is so for the
things inferior to it, but neither for the things superior to it, for
those are the ones that impose a limit on it, nor for itself, for if
it were not possible for it to limit itself it could not preserve
itself.46 The infinite power of providence is productive of all
objects under its sway; it bestows both infinity and unity to
these things in accordance with their own rank. Unity, too,
means different things at different [ontological] levels. Both
limit and unlimitedness proceed from the One and appear at
each level in a different manner.47

This section contains the striking claim that some infinities are more
infinite than others, followed by the rider that this can only be true
in the case of non-quantitative infinities boundless powers, that is.
An elucidation of that notion is, however, lacking.
12 Providence is thus characterised by unity and infinity. Its
products share in these two features, but some are more characterised by unity, others more by infinity. The beings that are
closer to the One display a stronger presence of limit, the ones
that are more distant a stronger presence of the unlimited, i.e.
of infinity. This corresponds to the distinction between determinate (or necessary), and indeterminate (or contingent) beings,
the determinate being superior to the indeterminate.
Providence can produce determinate as well as indeterminate beings,
because it has itself both unity (the source of determination or limit)
and infinity (for lower beings the source of indetermination).
All forms of determination and infinity stem from the unity and
infinity of providence, with unity (i.e. limit, determination)
always dominating. The relations between things down here
are analogous to the relations between their causes.
13 Comparison [of providences twofold power: productive and
cognitive] with intellects twofold production and cognition of
intellect and souls twofold production and cognition. Intellect
produces logoi of incorporeal and corporeal things, but in both
cases the logoi are incorporeal, i.e. correspond to the mode of
being of intellect; it also knows both of its products in an
intellective manner. Soul analogously produces logoi of animate
and inanimate things (scientific and technical logoi, respectively), but does so, in both cases, in a manner appropriate to its
own, vital, way of being.
The principle can be generalised: everything which produces

Introduction

19

and knows and uses different causes internal to it (in each of the
previous examples: the two types of logoi), produces and knows
them according to the superior type of cause. From the point of
view of the effects, however, one class of effects is produced according to the higher, the other according to the inferior causes.
Applied to providence: through the One (internal to it), it
produces determinate beings, through infinity (internal to it), it
produces indeterminate beings. It knows both classes according
to the higher of these causes, in a determinate way, that is. Of
the products, however, some are determinate, others indeterminate (i.e. necessary and contingent, respectively). Yet both
classes of products also participate in the other cause: determinate beings in infinity because of this they are everlasting ;
indeterminate beings in unity because of that they end up
being determined (once a determined event has come to pass, its
outcome is fixed).
14 All beings, corporeal and incorporeal, are constituted as a
mixture of limit and unlimitedness. These three elements
limit, unlimited, mixture stem from above, i.e. they are produced by providence. Hence providence also knows both limit
and the unlimited. All things contain both elements, but one of
them always dominates. If unity, i.e. limit, dominates, the
resulting being is determinate, i.e. necessary; if the unlimited
dominates, it is indeterminate, i.e. contingent. Yet even down
here things are never fully deprived of unity. Hence contingent
things somehow receive determination. For some things this
happens a long time, for others a short time before their occurrence, depending on how strong the principle of determination
is in their case. This means that future contingents at some time
become fixed: [when they happen they have become fixed, but]
the outcome has been determined already some time before the
occurrence. This determination stems from another source, superior to the contingent thing itself. This is shown by
conjectural divinations, which become more true the more the
event approaches.
In our comments on the second problem we discuss how even contingent things come to participate of determination.
With this conclusion Proclus has found an acceptable solution for the
third problem and he could have moved on to the next one. Somewhat
surprisingly he continues the discussion with the examination of a
subsidiary question that has only a loose connection with problem 3,
namely the question of the providence exercised by demons compared
to that of the gods.

20

Introduction

In 15-16 Proclus examines how demons know indeterminate

things and exercise providential care over them, and in what way
their providential knowledge is different from that of the gods. That
demons and other higher beings play an important role in providence
regarding the details of human life is not only confirmed by the
numerous magical practises in which demons are invoked but also
acknowledged by Platonists since the beginning of the Empire.48
Proclus will come back more extensively to the problem of demonic
providence in the tenth problem. The reason why he decided to
broach the subject already here is because it is closely linked with the
problem of the indeterminate. If the indeterminate were not known
and were not the object of providential care and thus connected with
the determinate, the unity of the universe would collapse. Platonists
may be tempted to insist on the essential role of demons in providence for this very reason. For one might think that without demonic
intervention the indeterminate would remain bereft of providence.
This is not Proclus view. Without denying the essential contribution
of the demons, he nevertheless attributes to them a mere subordinate
role as auxiliaries of the gods. The gods remain the primary providential agents. Providence over higher beings is exercised directly by
them. Divine providence over lower beings is mediated through
demons, as the recipients are of themselves not capable of receiving
the providential action of the gods directly.
15 In order for the universe to be one and governed in accordance with intellect, there must be a connection between
contingent things and the realm that is always determinate.
This is only possible if the beings superior to us have a knowledge of indeterminate things. Hence it should be examined how
it is possible for them to have such a knowledge.
Of the superior beings it is either (1) only demons that have
this knowledge (they are closest to the world), or (2) also the
gods, who then delegate the providential governance over different things to different demons. If it is only demons, either
(1a) they know the objects of their providential care and the
beings superior to themselves in turn, or (1b) they know both
classes of things simultaneously. In case (1a) demons would not
differ from our souls and they would themselves become subject to indetermination each time they turn toward contingent
reality. [Quod non.] In case (1b) there are two further possibilities: (1b1) they know indeterminate things either through
discursive reasoning, by possessing logoi and forms of indeterminate things; (1b2) or by a higher form of knowledge. In case
(1b1) they lack the impassivity of the higher orders and know
using memory and imagination. [Quod non.] In case (1b2) there
is no reason not to grant to the gods the same kind of knowledge.

Introduction

21

[The demons therefore know according to (1b1), but then it is

not the demons alone (1), but (2) the gods too that know contingent things.]
Determinate knowledge of contingent things exercised by }
(1) demons alone
(1a) knowledge of contingent things alternating with
knowledge of superior realities o no
(1b) knowledge of contingent things simultaneous with
knowledge of superior realities
(1b1) merely discursive knowledge of contingent
things o no
(1b2) higher form of knowledge of contingent things
o yes, but then not (1b1), but rather (2)
(2) demons and gods o yes
Hence [given that there is determinate knowledge of indeterminate things in superior beings], both demons and gods have
determinate knowledge of indeterminate things. For if we grant
it to demons, it would be absurd not to grant it to gods too.
Objection: possibly gods are capable of determinate knowledge
of indeterminate things, but do not want to have this knowledge. Reply: this is highly absurd, because gods will also want
to know the same things that they bring forth. Indeed all things
are products of gods: some directly from the demiurge, others
from the cosmic gods who act as delegates of the demiurge. Gods
will not neglect what they produce.
Proclus does not here make a distinction between providence (singular) and the gods (plural), here presented as the first providential
agents. The gods should be conceived as henads who each manifest a
specific aspect of the One, i.e. ways in which the One is participated.49
The term demons is here taken in the broad sense. In 25 and also in
62-6 Proclus distinguishes demons in the strict sense from angels
and heroes.50
16 Since the gods are willing to exercise providence over
indeterminate things and are capable of doing so, they will
exercise providence over indeterminate things and know them,
i.e. they know their merit. The providential care of gods is
transcendent, that of demons partitioned and specialised in
accordance with specific objects. The gods exercise direct providence over some beings, over others through the mediation of
demons, because some things are not capable of receiving the
providence of the gods directly. A sign of this is that some beings

22

Introduction
because of their inaptitude think that the only providence is
that exercised by demons; but when they regain their aptitude
they become aware of the providence of the gods from which
they benefited all the while. When this conversion takes place,
the indeterminate becomes determinate. From the divine perspective it was determinate all the while, but before the
conversion the indeterminate beings were indeterminate to
themselves. Yet their indeterminacy was not so great that they
lacked determination completely, as that would have meant
their destruction.

Proclus here appeals to the familiar principle that incomplete participation, or a failure to participate directly in the highest causes, is
always due to the weakness of the participants, never to the causes.51
The so-called indeterminate beings that are the object of the providential care exercised by demons are too weak to enjoy the unmediated providence of the gods. This can change due to a kind of
conversion. It is not fully clear in what the conversion consists
exactly. When Proclus says that these beings become determinate at
this point, he might mean that they undergo a real change (as in 15),
or merely, as the example of waking up in the sunlight suggests, that
they realise that they were determined all the while. These beings
were in fact determined all the time, but only from the perspective of
the gods. Their receiving determination could then consist in nothing
but their new awareness. But it could also mean that indeterminate
things change to being determinate, and that what they witness is a
real change.
How all things participate in providence, though in different ways
Proclus concludes the third problem with a comprehensive investigation of the role of providence in the world (17-20). All things from
the highest to the lowest level take part in the providential order,
though in different ways. This extensive conclusion discusses fundamental issues on providence beyond the strict scope of the third
problem (which was a rather technical question within the school). It
would have been more opportune if Proclus had put it at the very end
of this treatise.
17 All that is good stems from providence, just as all understanding stems from intellect and everything pertaining to life
from soul. Even non-universal beings, intermittent participants, corruptible, and indeterminate things receive what is
good for them from providence, either unmediatedly or mediatedly. The intermediaries [which play a mediating role in the
participation, for instance the demons mentioned in 16] make

Introduction

23

what they receive from above adapted to the ultimate participants, and they also make the latter fit for receiving the gifts
from above. The intermediaries themselves too enjoy what they
receive from above. They have in fact a greater participation, as
they are closer to the superior causes.
Proclus lists a number of characteristics of inferior things, without
specifying how these relate to one another. Every one of these lower
beings will be non-universal (partial). All corruptible things will be
intermittent participants, but it is less certain whether all intermittent participants are corruptible. The complete answer should involve various degrees of both intermittency and corruptibility. All
intermittent participants and all corruptible beings should be indeterminate, as the interruption of their participation and the moment
and mode of their corruption will not be fully determined.
18 All things are made good by providence, some directly,
others through intermediaries. There has to be an order and
coordination among the objects of providence, for otherwise the
universe would not be one. Order distinguishes things from one
another according to the way they are produced by the good;
coordination brings them back to the one good. [Order and
coordination thus correspond to procession and reversion.]
Hence the mode of providence must be different for different
things (on account of coordination). If there is providence over
primary beings, then also over secondary beings, because whatever is capable of producing the higher is also capable of
producing the lower. Providence produces superior, secondary,
and inferior things, for the gods are not lacking in power and in
their case will is always in line with power. Similarly, good
people wish to achieve that of which they are capable.
19 If there is providence over secondary beings, there is certainly providence over primary beings. Primary beings are
self-sufficient, [hence one might think they do not need providence,] but this self-sufficiency itself is a gift they receive from
providence. For higher beings either need something, in which
case they get all they need (plenitude) from providence; or they
do not need something, in which case they have received this
very state of not needing anything from providence.
20 All beings, even those that do not always exist, receive their
good from providence. Some stem directly from providence,
others through intermediaries. The reason is not that providence would not be capable of producing and perfecting the
latter, too. It is the latter participants that are not capable of

24

Introduction
receiving [primary] providence directly, but need intermediaries that are produced close to providence.
The good received from providence is different for different
things. Sometimes the difference is related to the essence of the
thing (corresponding to the ontological rank of each being, as
e.g. the good of souls is different from that of bodies), sometimes
to its activities: for souls, for instance, activities determine
merit, and merit determines what good they receive. Some souls
enjoy the good they get, others suffer it with aversion.
That providence is also concerned with particular things can
be understood if one considers that they too contribute to the
universe and that everything in the universe is connected
even if we are not always able to see this.

Fourth problem: participation

In the fourth quaestio Proclus examines how inferior beings participate in divine providence. More particularly he attempts to explain
why some beings participate in a deficient manner and with interruptions, others continuously, despite the fact that the gods themselves are eternally active in the same manner. The answer will be
that each participant not only receives something from causes superior to it, but also contributes something of its own. The different way
in which each participant receives the divine illumination explains
the variety in the modes of participation. The treatment of intermittent participants provides Proclus with the opportunity to discuss
once more the role of the so-called superior kinds as providential
agents. This role will be discussed further in the tenth question.
21 The problem of participation of the gods is related to the
problem raised in relation to Forms. Either the gods are always
active, but things down here do not always participate; but how
could they have an activity if nothing is receptive of it? Or the
gods are not always active. But that too is absurd, as the activity
of the gods is not just perpetual, but lies even before time.
As Proclus notices, this is a problem that also those who love to
speculate about the Forms are accustomed to investigate regarding
the Forms. The question of participation indeed belongs to the
traditional list of four problems in relation to the Platonic doctrine of
the Forms.52 Interestingly, Proclus also uses the principle that is at
the base of his argument in this question in his demonstration of the
eternity of the world. According to Philoponus, who wrote a refutation of Proclus lost treatise, the argument runs as follows. If the
divine paradigm of the world is eternal and exercises its paradigmatic function per se, there must always exist an image correspond-

Introduction

25

ing to this eternal model. Without a copy the paradigm qua paradigm
would cease to exist. For that reason the sensible world must exist as
a temporal but everlasting image of the eternal forms.53
Before answering the question Proclus explains in general terms
how he understands participation in the divine. Participation is not
the activity itself of providence, but what comes from this activity to
a particular type of being. It occupies an intermediary position between the participants and the participated: it proceeds from the
participated entities, but is established in the participants. All things
participate in providence according to their own capacities, and thus
contribute to the works of providence.
22 Participation is intermediate between participated and
participants. Like every intermediate, it has something in common with both extremes. This is comparable to the position of
knowledge between knower and known (cf. 7); knowing too is
a participatory relation. Providence is participated by all
classes of things, by each class in accordance with its own
power. Participation therefore reveals the character of providence itself but also the character proper to each class of
participants. Participation bears a single, unitary character
resulting from the characteristics of the participated (providence) and the participants (the objects of providential care).
This mixture of characteristics may be compared to the light of
the moon.
23 The activity of providence is unitary and unchanging. The
participants participate, that is, they are perfected, in accordance with their own nature: some for their existence, some for
their life, some for their thinking, some for all of these three.54
Some participate uninterruptedly and unvaryingly, others intermittently, because of their own weakness. The interruption
of the participation is thus due to the participants alone. The
activity of the participated remains unaffected. This can be
compared with the sun that always shines, while not all beings
are able to gaze at the sun all the time.
24 The interruption of participation due to the participant does
not diminish the activity of the participated. This can be compared to an unmoving face whose imprint is received by a
smooth mirror, but not by things with a rough, non-reflecting
surface. This feature can also be observed in oracles having
periods of inactivity. The gods nonetheless send out oracular
spirits without pause, i.e. they constantly illuminate angels,
demons and heroes, but not all regions are able to benefit from
their oracular activity without interruption. Similarly with

26

Introduction
statues that through the power of sacred rites become animated
and filled with a divine spirit for a while. The cessation of this
divine animation is due to the weakness of the material recipient, not to the gods, for the inspiration that comes from them is
unchanging. It is like with lunar eclipses, which should not be
blamed on the sun.

Proclus here takes up another topic that was discussed by Plutarch

of Chaeroneia. While his take on the issue is essentially the same as
Plutarchs considered view (not to be confused with the views expressed by some interlocutors of De defectu oraculorum), Proclus
regards the oracular spirits (pneumata) as straightforwardly immaterial.55 The animation of statues is another aspect of traditional
religion adopted by the Platonists.56 The sacred rites according to
Proclus create an aptitude in the material for receiving the divine
spirits.
25 Between providence, which is unchanging and uniform, and
the participants, of which there is a great variety and which are
(in many cases) impermanent, there must be common bonds,
intermediaries more limited in number. Of these intermediaries between providence (i.e. the gods or henads: see 15) some
are closer to the gods, others more remote. Three classes can be
distinguished (from high to low): angels, demons, heroes. The
illumination which they provide to the participants sometimes
comes from them, sometimes passes through them. Some participants can indeed hardly reach the intermediaries, whereas
others reach through them to the higher causes (the gods). In
the latter case, the intermediaries serve as substrate for the
good that comes from the gods. Analogously, some pupils merely
study geometry for its own sake, whereas others are able to use
geometry as a means to reach the level of intellect and practice
dialectics.57 The first merely ascend to geometry, and are perfected by it, the others ascend to a higher level and receive a
higher perfection, having passed through geometry. By receiving the illumination that stems from the intermediaries the
participants, however, receive in some sense the illumination
from the gods themselves, as the intermediaries receive their
own power from the gods.
Whereas Proclus previously mentioned only demons as intermediaries, he now lists three classes: angels, demons sensu stricto, and
heroes. In the earlier discussion (15) the term demons as used in
the broader sense, which encompasses all three superior classes.58
Proclus distinguishes between two levels of participation, corresponding to the power of different participants (and expressed in

Introduction

27

terms of ascent, i.e. reversion): participation of the good proper to the

intermediaries and participation of the good proper to the gods but
transmitted through the intermediaries. A further qualification,
added afterwards, blurs this distinction: the participation of the good
of the intermediaries is in some sense a participation of the good of
the gods, because the intermediaries are what they are, and are
capable of bestowing the goodness they have to inferior beings,
because of their own participation of the gods. The difference between
the two kinds of participation would then merely be that in the one
case one participates of the intermediaries in accordance with their
essence (corresponding to their own rank), even if what one participates in is only there in virtue of the gods; in the other case one
participates in the gifts of the gods through the intermediaries. In both
cases the participation is in the good that ultimately stems from the
gods, but as it is present in the essence of the intermediaries; yet in the
one case this higher provenance would be hidden, in the other not (the
intermediaries would be either opaque or transparent, so to speak).
Fifth problem: why does evil exist?
This problem receives a fuller and much more nuanced treatment in
the third of the opuscula, On the Existence of Evils.59 The relation
between providence and evil is addressed explicitly in the last part of
that work (58-61).
26 Evil seems incompatible with providence (if providence is
taken to be all-pervasive [and powerful]). Therefore some abolish the idea of providence that extends to all things, whereas
others get rid of evil (by considering it to be just a lesser good).
The aporia is set up in a way that is very similar to that regarding
contingency (cf. 6). Also in On the Existence of Evils the treatment of
the relation between providence and evil begins with the same aporia:
If there is evil, how will it not stand in the way of that which is
providential towards the good? On the other hand, if providence
fills the universe, how can there be evil in beings? Some thinkers indeed yield to one of the two lines of reasoning: either they
admit that not everything comes from providence, and [acknowledge there is evil, or they] deny the existence of evil, and
maintain that everything comes from providence and the good.
And this indeed is a problem that fascinates the soul. But
perhaps one may find a perspective from which both points of
view do not conflict. (Mal. 58,2-7, tr. Opsomer-Steel)
27 (1) By denying the existence of evil we would indeed avoid

28

Introduction
the problem. (2) If, however, we accept that evil exists, we have
to explain its origin. Evil either (2a) stems from providence or
(2b) from another cause. If (2b1) that other case stems itself
from providence, evil will stem from providence ultimately; if
(2b2) that other cause does not itself stem from providence, our
theory is dualistic: there will be a principle of good and a
principle of evil things. This second principle will inevitably
constitute a threat to providences tranquillity.
We accept the existence of evil and try to find an explanation
of its mode of existence that constitutes no threat to providence.
Evil exists in bodies, but not in all bodies, and in souls, but
not in universal souls. Evil in bodies is contrary to nature [the
ruling principle of body], evil in souls is contrary to reason [the
ruling principle of soul]. Let us start with evil in bodies, examining in what kinds of bodies it occurs and how contrariety to
nature is reconcilable with providence.
(1) evil does not exist o no
(2) evil exists o yes
(2a) evil stems (directly) from providence
(2b) evil stems from another cause
(2b1) this other cause stems from providence o evil
stems from providence ultimately
(2b2) this other cause does not stem from providence o
no, as this amounts to dualism

Proclus does not tell us yet which options he will go for, though he
excludes some resolutely. He affirms the existence of evil, hence
rejects (1). In Mal. the thesis of the existence of evil is deemed worthy
of a lengthy argument (2-10); in our text, however, it is posited
without further argument. Proclus rejects (2b2) the possibility of an
independent principle of evil, citing what we may consider a theological reason: the first principle should be free from worry (in other texts
he adds metaphysical reasons for rejecting dualism). So we seem to
be left with the possibilities (2a) and (2b1). In both cases evil will
stem from providence, either directly (2a) or indirectly (2b1). Proclus
will certainly not want to say that providence directly causes evil. So
the only option would seem to be (2b1). Yet Proclus would not want
to accept this in the way it is formulated here. For he wants at all
costs to avoid making providence responsible for evil, as we will see.
Proclus will therefore argue that evil has a special mode of existence
(parhupostasis) and is not the result of per se causation.
In order to address the issue, Proclus starts by distinguishing
different types of evils by looking at the beings in which they exist.
Without arguing for it he posits that evil is found only in some types
of body and some types of soul (in Mal. he develops a long argument

Introduction

29

that leads to that conclusion, i.e. in 11-39, which he just skips here).
He also posits that evil in bodies consists in contrariety to nature,
that in souls in contrariety to reason; for nature and reason are the
ruling principles of body and soul, respectively (cf. Mal. 39; 55). The
corruptible bodies that are liable to evil are ordinary, material and
particular bodies. Bodies that are not corruptible are the four elements, seen as totalities, and the (relatively) immaterial bodies, such
as heavenly bodies and ethereal bodies.60 The souls susceptible to evil
are the human souls (including the so-called irrational souls), not the
divine souls and the universal souls.61
28 Contrariety to nature can only occur in corruptible bodies,
as everlasting bodies cannot be contrary to nature. Corruptible
bodies need to exist for the sake of the plenitude of the world
(with reference to Tim. 41C1-4). Moreover, primary beings
should not be the last.62 The completeness and perfection of the
universe are intended by providence, hence the existence of
corruptible bodies, and of the evil in them, is in accordance with
providence. The good is thus the final cause of the evil in bodies.
By their very existence they contribute to the whole. [Moreover], by their corruptibility they allow the generation of other
things; in this way what is against nature (corruption) exists for
the sake of what is according to nature (generation).
Proclus does not strictly distinguish what are in fact two different
ways in which corruptible bodies contribute to the whole: (1) they
make the world complete; (2) their corruption makes room for the
generation of other things.
29 The evil that exists for the sake of the good is not unmixedly
evil. It is evil only for the thing corrupted, but good for that
which will be generated and for the universe as a whole. Corruption is according to the nature of the corrupting agent, but
appears to be contrary to nature for the patient. Yet on closer
inspection the corruption is according to the nature of the patient.
It belongs to the concept of contrariety that one of the contraries is
corruptive, the other corruptible. And since all generation depends
on contrariety, corruptibility contributes to generation. And since
generation is in accordance with providence, corruption is an
instrument of providence. It comes to be as a side-effect of teleological processes, i.e. it has a parhupostasis.
Proclus discusses generation and corruption in Mal. 5, as part of the
dialectical argument in favour of the existence of evils. In the last
part of the treatise he argues that corruption of bodies contributes to
the good of the whole (Mal. 60-1).63

30

Introduction

At the end of Dub. 29 Proclus introduces the notion of parhupostasis, translated below as parasitical existence (as a matter of fact, he
only uses the verbal form in 29). The concept of parhupostasis is
crucial to Proclus theory of evils. It is more fully explained in On the
Existence of Evils.64 The concept does not, as is often thought, refer
to a diminished form of existence or to a kind of counter-force, but is
connected rather to a causal analysis according to which that which
is not the result of a per se causation, but accidentally arises as the
side-effect of a per se causal process, is called parhupostasis:
We must next consider what the mode of evil is and how it comes
into existence from the above-mentioned causes and noncauses. Here we have to bring in the aforementioned
parhupostasis [i.e. parasitic existence]. For there is no other
way of existing for that which neither is produced, in any way
whatever, from a principal cause, nor has a relation to a definite
goal and a final cause, nor has received in its own right an entry
into being, since anything whatever that exists properly must
come from a cause in accordance with nature indeed, without
a cause it is impossible for anything to come about and must
relate the order of its coming about to some goal. (Mal. 50,1-7,
tr. Opsomer-Steel)
30 The evil in souls, i.e. contrariety to reason, is in accordance
with providence. Contrariety to reason comes about as a result
of the meeting of the rational soul with the so-called irrational
soul.65 Whenever the mortal, i.e. the irrational, prevails, vice
[i.e. contrariety to reason] arises in the rational soul. These
lower appetites emotions are nevertheless natural for the
irrational soul itself. But they are contrary to the essence of
soul, which aspires to rationality. Evil originates in the mixture
of these two elements. Yet it does not have a principal existence,
but rather a parasitical existence (parhupostasis). In a sense
contrariety to reason is not evil, namely for the irrational soul
that causes this state in the rational soul. This is clear from the
fact that where the irrational is not coupled with a rational soul,
for instance in brutes, irrationality is in no way evil.66
Whereas irrationality is in a sense contrary to the essence of
the rational soul, it is, inversely, not contrary to the nature of
an irrational soul to be controlled by reason. This asymmetry is
characteristic for opposites of unequal value: it is according to
nature for the worse to be dominated by the better. For every
being has its own good and a good that stems from what is better
than itself.
The origin of contrariety to reason in souls is similar to that of

Introduction

31

contrariety to nature in bodies: the agent acts according to nature,

but for the patient (the corrupted body, the vicious soul) what happens is contrary to nature, in a sense. Yet in another sense it is not
evil. Proclus elaborates the idea that the influence of the irrational
soul on the rational soul is in accordance with the nature of the
irrational soul. Since it only intends what is in accordance with its
own being, the negative effects in the rational soul are a mere
side-product. In other words, they are not as such intended by the
irrational soul. The term parhupostasis is therefore used appropriately (see above, 29).
It should be noticed that the theory of On the Existence of Evils is
much more sophisticated in this respect. Whereas in our text the
irrationality affecting the rational soul seems to be blamed entirely
upon the obtrusive presence of the irrational soul (which is nonetheless needed as a buffer between the rational soul and the body), the
other treatise, in which the problem of evil is discussed much more
extensively, emphasises the responsibility of the rational soul that
makes the wrong choices.
31 If one admits that the descent of the soul into the realm of
becoming and the existence67 of the irrational soul into the body
are in themselves in accordance with providence i.e. good ,
then contrariety to reason too must somehow be traced back to
some good. The descent of the soul is good, for it happens for the
sake of the existence of rational mortal animals occupying the
place between immortal animals and mortal irrational animals
(in addition, there are also immortal irrational animals). The
irrational soul is needed as an intermediary between the soul
and the body: otherwise our divine soul would be in direct
contact with the body. That is, however, impossible for two
reasons: the body is unable to receive the incorporeal soul
immediately; and the soul would be hindered in its rationality
by the body, and by the affections and desires pertaining to
body. For in order to protect and take proper care of the body, it
would need to be itself in possession of desires and be affected
by them. The soul would also need the lower cognitive faculties,
as only sense-perception can grasp particulars, e.g. threats to
the body coming from particular things. Hence the soul needs
the irrational soul. Thus, both the descent of the soul and the
generation of the so-called irrational soul are intended by providence. [And since this inevitably entails contrariety to reason,
as the irrational soul is contrary to reason, which is the governing principle of the divine soul,] contrariety to reason too
follows from the decree of providence, i.e. is intended by it. Just
like in the case of bodies the counternatural exists for the sake

32

Introduction
of the natural, in the case of souls contrariety to reason exists
for the sake of reason.

In this fifth problem Proclus has not said much on the mode of being
and the causation of evil. He merely points out that the evils of
corruptible bodies and human souls (including irrational souls) the
only evils there are contribute to the goodness of the universe and
(some of) its parts, and are therefore also good. That is why they were
intended thus by providence. Hence there is no incompatibility between providence and evil. A question that has not been addressed
explicitly either, is that of the possible responsibility of providence
for evil. Yet the account Proclus gives is not unrelated to theodicy, in
that it shows the admixture of goodness in the really existing evils.
Sixth problem: how to reconcile the activity of providence
with the inequalities in human lives
From the sixth up to the ninth problem Proclus addresses questions
regarding the justice of rewards and punishments. A just distribution
ought to follow the principle of merit, i.e. geometric equality, as Plato
and Aristotle had taught.68 Yet fortunes do not always seem to be
distributed according to this principle. In On Providence 53 Proclus
discusses the same problem, saying that it is often used in arguments
against providence: why do good people suffer misfortune? And why do
bad people achieve what they desire?69 Goods, at least external goods,
seem to be distributed, not according to the correct geometric proportion, but in inverted proportion.
32 If providence heeds the principle of merit, why is there such
inequality among humans? Some morally bad people are successful, some morally good people suffer. This poses a problem
for our concept of providence: not only are people of unequal
merit awarded equal fortunes, but also there sometimes is an
inverse distribution of unequal fortunes, so that the meritorious
are worse off, those without merit better off. Yet providence
ought to distribute fortunes proportionally to merit, i.e. according to the geometrical mean.
33 It is perfectly normal that providence gives to the virtuous
the means to increase their virtue, and to the vicious that for
which they care, for instance, external goods. The vicious are
focused on apparent goods like money and power and do not
care about real goods (like contemplation, temperance, the
possession of a good soul). Inversely, the virtuous do not care
about apparent goods. Both groups believe that providence is
the provider of what they regard as goods. Hence providence

Introduction

33

distributes according to merit: each group gets the kind of goods

it deserves: apparent goods in the case of the morally bad, real
goods in the case of the virtuous. Yet there is an important
qualification to be made: whereas the real goods are lasting and
self-sufficient, the apparent goods are insecure and do not lead
to contentment.
In his initial answer Proclus argues that the external goods for which
the morally bad people are held to be fortunate do not really further
their well-being, whereas virtue contains its own reward.70 Moreover
the external goods for which the bad people are sometimes envied are
easily lost and only lead to more desires, that cannot be satisfied.
34 The shortage of apparent goods even incites good people to
greater virtue; and to others it shows the greatness of virtue.
For it shows virtue in its purity, without the addition of apparent goods. We indeed admire virtue more when it meets with
misfortune.
35 Providence moreover has pedagogical reasons for the way it
distributes apparent and real goods. If it were the other way
around, and good people got apparent goods whereas bad people
would lack them, then people would want to be virtuous for the
wrong reasons, i.e. because of the prestige attached to it. As it
is, however, virtue is shown without any foreign adornments
and is all the more admirable when it is coupled with bad luck.
Consequently, immoral behaviour will be detested even when
people see it accompanied by good luck. Providence thus stimulates the pursuance of virtue and the avoidance of wickedness.
Virtue is seen to be its own reward, whereas viciousness makes
even good fortune shameful.
36 The immortal soul needs to use an irrational soul and a
body. The latter two hinder the immortal soul in its striving for
true beauty so it is good that they are kept in check, for instance
by disease, poverty, lack of power (in the relation with other
humans). That is the reason why some honest people even seek
to live in unhealthy conditions (e.g. Plato) and poverty (e.g.
Crates).
In 35-6 Proclus highlights the pedagogical value of the aforementioned distribution: by not giving apparent goods to the virtuous, the
true value of virtue shines more brightly, since virtue is shown in its
purity. In the next section (37) he for the first time introduces the
notion of punishment.

34

Introduction
37 Providence gives to the good exactly what they themselves
want. The apparent goods given to the wicked are actually
punishments. The apparent goods with which the bad are supplied are effectively instruments for vice and thus exposes their
depravity. This is not even bad for them. For as long as it is not
exposed the bad condition cannot be healed. As for the virtuous,
they should exercise themselves. By carefully varying the goods
with which providence supplies them, it incites them to become
active in different domains and manners. The virtuous may
thus recognise the varying circumstances in which they find
themselves as opportunities given by providence.71

By giving external goods to the wicked, providence supplies them

with instruments for vice. This is a punishment for them, but since
punishment has to be understood as primarily corrective, it is in fact
good for them (in some cases punishment also seems to retain a
retributive dimension).72 The virtuous too benefit from the adverse
circumstances in which they find themselves. These are blessings in
disguise, and should be regarded as exercises73 for them; the changes
of circumstances due to what is usually called bad luck in fact offer
opportunities for becoming active in new ways.
38 Providence does not give all the goods to a single person, but
distributes them, just as Plato did not give all the goods to a
single class in the state: for the whole city, not just a single
class, needs to prosper. Therefore all the souls that descend
should also experience some of the evil down here. Thus they
will appreciate the good all the more. Therefore providence
gives apparent evils to the virtuous and apparent goods to the
wicked; thus the latter get to know, if not the real good, at least
an image of it, and by getting punished [afterwards] they are
directed away from this place.
The virtuous too have to experience evil, but they should not (and
cannot) experience real evil, so they get confronted with apparent
evils: adverse external circumstances. The vicious already experience evil, yet they should also experience some good. Yet they too are
unable to experience the true opposite of their own nature, which is
why they get to experience an apparent good, i.e. an image of the good
in the form of external goods. This has the further advantage that
this is for them an instrument for evil, which first makes them worse,
but also brings the corrective punishment nearer. The idea that good
people cannot be harmed by anything goes back to Socrates provocative claim that he cannot be harmed by the Athenians, as the only
thing that could harm his soul is his soul itself, by becoming unjust.74
Virtue, he claims, is sufficient for happiness.75 This undoubtedly

Introduction

35

inspired the Stoics to make the claim that the good cannot be harmed,
as virtue coincides with happiness.76 The external goods according to
them are indifferent (they are morally indifferent, but are nonetheless preferred).77
39 Three agents determine our situation: our own actions; the
actions of others; providence. We are ourselves responsible for
the trouble we bring upon ourselves, not providence (Proclus
adds an allusion78 to Resp. 10, 617E4). It is not the aim of
providence to abolish our self-determination [for instance once
the consequences start to be negative], but rather to preserve it
[hence providence is not to be blamed even if we choose harmful
things].
The same principle holds for actions by other beings that
affect us: providence allows that parts of the universe act on one
another. In the course of these interactions, some things [i.e.
lifeless things] act by nature, others [i.e. rational beings79] by
choice. These interactions are a constitutive part of the unity of
the universe. These actions [only those of agents capable of
choice, presumably] will all be judged by means of the moral
distinction between good and bad. For the victims [of a harmful
action] what happens to them is deserved, but the agent [of a
morally bad action] will not escape [divine] justice. Between
natural agents it is not a matter of mere coincidence what agent
affects what patient. Similarly in the case of rational agents: it
is not a matter of coincidence. Rather providence has organised
these interactions in such a way that they are beneficial for the
patient. But the perpetrator of a morally bad action will nonetheless be punished, even though (s)he was the instrument of
the universe. For it is the [bad] inclination that makes the agent
deserving of punishment.
As for the things we undergo by the sole action of the universe
[i.e. in accordance with providence]: we must accept that they
correspond to our merit. Our merit may be determined by the
present, the past or the future. When providence leads us away
from human occupation [by taking external goods like money,
power or prestige from us], we are encouraged to concentrate on
virtue.
The argument insists on the freedom of human action, understood in
a libertarian fashion (this agrees with Proclus previous rejection of
the claim that foreknowledge implies determinism: this would be
fatal to his libertarian outlook). Souls are self-movers, capable of
self-determination. This means that they can initiate a course of
action without being determined in such a way that only that course
of action was open to them. There is, then, a real choice among

36

Introduction

alternative possibilities. Together with other (silent) assumptions,80

this leads to the consequence that we bring about certain situations
for ourselves and others. These situations may not always be beneficial or pleasant. The idea that providence has created our capacity
for self-determination, and is thus responsible for its existence, does
not entail that it is also responsible for what happens on account of
this capacity. The nature of self-determination is indeed conceived to
be such that it interrupts the chain of responsibility. With self-determining agents responsibility originates in such a way that it does not
carry over to the ontological causes of self-determination. This is of
course a classic idea in theodicy. In antiquity, there was indeed a
strong link between libertarianism (even if it was not yet called this)
and theodicy, which may well explain in part the prevalence of
libertarian positions regarding moral responsibility (the important
exception being of course Stoicism). Implicit in the present argument
is the further idea that our freedom of choice is more important than
any harm we can do by using this freedom. Thus, if providence
chooses what is best, and decides to preserve our freedom of choice,
then this freedom is better than all the goods that may be lost as a
result of our actions.
Adverse circumstances may also be caused by other free agents.
Proclus speaks in this section about both natural and rational agents,
but the activities of natural agents are merely used for comparison.
This is clear by the fact that he applies moral categories and argues
that these actions will be judged. Proclus commits himself to the view
that in the case of harm inflicted by A on B, B (always) deserves this,
and A will not escape punishment for what (s)he does. A acts as an
instrument of providence, but will nevertheless incur punishment for
what (s)he did. This is a rather striking remark that, if taken
seriously and literally (i.e. by making the always explicit, since
Proclus does not suggest this is only true for certain cases), amounts
to the remarkable claim that all adverse circumstances due to other
human agents are deserved. This claim is less harsh if one takes into
account that here too punishment should be understood to be corrective, and not retributive. And in those cases in which misfortune is
not truly a punishment (e.g. the loss of external goods for the sage),
the claim amounts to the idea that likewise the benefits outweigh the
suffering. Yet the problem remains of how providence can at the
same time preserve the freedom of the agents and make sure that
their actions affect only those who deserve to be punished. A radical
solution to this problem would consist in saying that everyone deserves to be punished, but it is questionable whether Proclus would
be willing to endorse such an unhellenic view. When he turns to the
agents, Proclus again makes no restrictions or qualifications: they
will be punished for what they did. Proclus thus disregards the case
of an official who carries out legal and legitimate punishment.

Introduction

37

Clearly he is thinking merely of people who out of badness inflict

harm on others.
The third possible cause of adverse conditions is providence itself,
i.e. the order of the universe. If adverse circumstances are neither
due to ourselves, nor to others, we must accept that they were
destined for us by the order of things, i.e. by providence, and that they
correspond to our merit (see our introduction to the seventh problem
for the relation between fate and providence). This merit may be
defined by past deeds (Proclus is probably talking about past deeds
in our current life; he will discuss previous incarnations later on), by
our present behaviour or even by our future behaviour. The question
is of course how providence can know what we will do in the future
given the fact that we are free agents. Proclus does not explain this,
but he would probably argue along the lines of the views he expounded in the second problem.
The argument in this section, then, is not without problems and
leaves out crucial steps and premises. This may have to do with the
fact that Proclus is here following Plotinus 3.2 [47] 13. From this text
the phrase unjustly for the offender, but justly for the victim81 is
drawn, and also the idea that providence monitors future behaviour
and determines merit by it. When Plotinus refers to past deeds, he is
clearly also thinking of reincarnation, as is clear from the examples
of the man who murdered his mother and will be reborn as a woman
in order that he (actually she) can then in turn be murdered by
his/her son, or of the man who has raped a woman and will become a
woman in order to be raped (l. 14-15). Although Proclus does not
clearly say that in the present chapter he is talking about punishment within a single life span, it is probably that what he intends,
since he comes to speak of reincarnation in 41, but more extensively
in 60.
Proclus essentially asks his readers to believe that everything is
for the good even when people suffer for reasons we cannot explain:
we may not understand the designs of providence, but we should just
trust it to act for our good and to organise all things, including the
rational agents it uses as instruments, for our ultimate benefit. This
will be the style of argument for many of the sections to come.
40 A further problem consists in a distribution not based on
geometric, but on arithmetic equality, namely when the same
(bad) fortune befalls a group of people with unequal merit, for
instance when whole cities perish and the good and the bad
suffer alike. The first thing to say concerning this problem is
that these people suffer the same fate insofar they have something in common, not insofar they are different. Insofar they are
different they will bear the same fate in a different way, either
in a shameful or in a worthy manner; after their death they will

38

Introduction
accordingly be received either in the abode of the bad or in that
of the good. Second, the parts have to follow the whole and the
less important parts share the fate of the more important beings
with which they are linked (i.e. the cosmic cycles). Since what
happens to the latter corresponds to providential design, so do
the sufferings of less important parts. 41 Thirdly, the commonality of souls may be hidden, so that we regard as unequal what
is actually quite equal. So do souls that are attached to the same
god have a greater commonality. Sometimes they have things
in common if their actions in previous lives are included. If one
takes this hidden commonality in account, equal things tend to
happen to souls of equal merit.

The fate of many people of unequal merit being hit by the same
afflictions was first explained by denying that there is a problem:
they suffer insofar they have something in common and for the good
people the suffering is not real (here one could bring in the arguments
from 33-7). The second reply amounted to saying that sometimes
collateral damage is inevitable. The third reply, like the first, denies
the reality of the problem, this time by pointing at hidden similarities
between people who suffer the same fate. These commonalities are
explained by the idea that they are souls of the same type, as being
followers of the same god (an unalterable difference between soul
types), or by actions in previous lives.
42 Against those who criticise the inequality of goods bestowed
on different people by providence, it has already been said that
the morally good receive true goods, the morally bad only apparent goods (33). Yet there is more: providence gives the best
among the apparent goods to the virtuous: a good reputation,
that is. The wicked are mocked as soon as they are dead by those
who praised them while alive, while the good enjoy enduring
prestige. This distribution, too, is in accordance with the principle of merit. The good moreover enjoy a tranquil equanimity,
by which they resemble the gods, the bad are always worried,
which is fitting for someone who is a slave of her or his passions.
The distribution of this too corresponds to merit.
Proclus returns to the beginning of the argument, where he distinguished between true and apparent goods in order to save the idea of
a just distribution based on geometric equality. He now adds the idea
that the best of the apparent goods, prestige, is awarded to the
virtuous as well. Finally the virtuous also enjoy tranquillity and
equanimity whereas the wicked are plagued by worries, as is fitting
to their respective characters.

Introduction

39

Seventh problem: irrational mortal animals

Proclus discusses the question whether there is individualised providence over brutes, starting alternately from one of two contradictory
hypotheses: either there is a vestige of self-determination in them or
not. In other words, animals are either capable of acting freely, or
they are fully determined by natural impulses. The idea that providential care could extend to individual non-human animals (animals
considered inferior to humans, that is), is quite revolutionary. It
entails that the principle of merit applies to animals, with the further
implication that treatment of animals, but also animal behaviour,82
is subject to rules of justice.83
In order to clarify the problem Proclus sketches a three-level
hierarchy in relation to the unitary rule of providence and fate.84 The
superior beings are ruled in a perfect manner by providence. The
intermediate level, to which human beings belong, are ruled by
providence and fate alike (as we have both reason and necessity).
The lowest level, that of irrational animals, provided they are merely
natural, and plants, is ruled primarily by fate, but also to an extent
by providence.
The distinction between fate and providence is not explained here.
From On Providence we learn that providence is the divine cause of
goods, whereas fate is the cause of some connection and sequence
between events (Prov. 7). Providence is superior to fate in such a way
that everything that is ruled by fate is also ruled by providence, but
not the other way around (Prov. 13). This is in fact a traditional
doctrine. It is one of the leading ideas in the treatise On Fate falsely
attributed to Plutarch,85 and it is picked up by Plotinus,86 Iamblichus,87 and many others. Concerning the question how the relation
between providence and fate works in practice, Proclus general idea
is that providence is the divine force that confers goodness onto the
universe. It includes fate, which is understood as the connection
between things (in line with the original Stoic concept of fate as the
causal network connecting antecedents and consequents). Providence is more akin to intellect and rationality, fate to body (nature),
in accordance with the doctrine expressed in the Timaeus that the
world is a mixture of reason and necessity, whereby reason rules over
necessity (Tim. 48A1-2 quoted in Prov. 13,13-15).88 The fated connection between events is intended by providence and used by it to bring
about goodness. Providence does not only extend over the world as a
whole and over unchanging beings (stars), but also over individual
souls, for which there is special, individualised providence. Since,
however, the activity of the gods is unchanging, the providence
exercised over the latter is mediated by demons in the broad sense
(divine beings living in the world: angels, demons sensu stricto,
heroes).

40

Introduction

Proclus replies to the objection of the seemingly unjust treatment

of irrational mortal animals by providence are essentially identical
to those given in the case of humans, under the hypothesis that
irrational animals have some form of self-determination like we do.
43 What explains the inequality and equality among animals,
given the fact that providence extends to them as well? There
are in fact three issues: inequality (some are healthy, others
sick, some have a pleasant life, others a wretched life);89 equality (they are sometimes victims of common catastrophes);90 they
eat each other.91 A preliminary distinction needs to be made:
either brutes have some form of self-determination, or there are
only natural causes acting in them.
44 If they have some form of self-determination, they have the
possibility of behaving better or worse (either truly or apparently better/worse) for that is what self-determination
amounts to their fortune, their eating each other and their
common catastrophes fall within the domain of [individual]
providence, just as is the case with humans. Providence, then,
treats and arranges their passions in a just way, makes them
correspond to the cosmic cycles or with the similarity of their
lives, just as it does with humans.92 The fact that they eat each
other is their own responsibility, as the capacity for self-determination was given to them by providence, just as with human
souls.93 The norm of justice is the same for brutes and humans,
but animals can only eat one another, or by extension, do
physical harm to one another, whereas humans can also harm
one another by aiming at each others money and possessions.
As in the case with humans, providence makes use of free agents
as its instruments. Here too the principle unjustly for the offender,
justly for the victim applies. The suffering is therefore deserved.
If animals have self-determination they can indeed become
morally better or worse. Therefore providence applies therapeutic measures to them and also enacts retribution.
When they have similar fortunes, as with human souls this
can be understood by a similarity of essence, by the fact that
they follow the same demons94 or belong to the same cosmic
cycle, by the fact that they have the same merit or demerit.95 All
the inequalities and equalities can be explained in a plausible
way. The demons allotted to them treat them in different ways
[in accordance with their individual merit and demerit]. These
different fortunes follow a single decree of providence; they are
part of a cosmic providential network in which everything is
woven together causally. Thus providence coordinates everything into a unity.

Introduction
45 If brutes have only a mortal form of life [i.e. if they have no
self-determination whatsoever], there is a common [i.e. not an
individual] providence over them, just as in the case of plants
(plants have no imagination, animals have sensation and
imagination).
There is only one logos for all the things in the world, but
some parts are more important than others (just like some body
parts are more important than others). All parts benefit from
providence (pronoia) and fate (heimarmen). The leading parts,
however, benefit more from providence, the inferior parts [i.e.
plants and irrational animals provided there is no vestige of
self-determination in them] more from fate. 46 Evidence for
this view consists in the fact that the leading parts follow an
orderly path; the intermediate parts, i.e. those having the capacity of choice, are governed by providence and fate equally.
We are indeed aware of the influence of both providence and fate
in our lives. We even mistakenly attribute to fate things that are
up to us. We experience providence in oracles, in epiphanies of
gods and demons, in dream therapy.96 We experience fate when
we are in distress and when we are aware of the influence of the
stars. The influence of either fate or providence can be so
striking that we misguidedly think only one of the two is active
over us. Our intellect is more akin to providence, the necessity
in us [i.e. the natural and mortal] is more akin to fate. We will
perceive either of two forces depending on whether we live more
in accordance with necessity or with intellect. 47 The inferior
beings [irrational animals, plants] have nothing transcendent,
and although they share in fate and providence, live almost
completely in accordance with fate. For they are close to body
and fate is the power ruling body. Every providential action is
interwoven with fate. Hence they receive their origin, life, and
death, but also their well-being (the ultimate trace of providence) through fate. Their destiny is fully dependent on that of
other things. In their case the principle of merit only reaches
this far: to be dependent on other things and hence to be
co-affected with them, that is their merit.
48 The further question, why some thing has a certain rank in
the universe and not another, makes no sense.97 The explanation for their situation is their rank in the universe; why they
are at that specific rank is no longer subject to explanation. But
if something which has a different, transcendent origin comes
to be in the universe, [this has the capacity to behave either in
accordance or not in accordance with its rank, and hence] the
principle of merit applies. But those beings for which this is not
the case automatically conform to their rank. Merit in that case

41

42

Introduction
is reduced to occupying the position assigned to the thing in
question. Contrary to the things superior to it, there is for them
no special merit in behaving in accordance with their rank.

Eighth problem: why does providence sometimes postpone its

punishments (and rewards)?
The eighth and ninth problem are inspired by Plutarch of
Chaeroneas dialogue De sera numinis vindicta, On the Delays of
Gods Punishment. We compare the two texts on pp. 50-9. Proclus
(and Plutarchs) argument suffers from the fact that different functions of punishment are not clearly distinguished. Although Proclus
argues that the punishment imposed by providence serves corrective
purposes (i.e. heals the soul), he also attributes to it the function of
preventing further crimes, both in a specific and a general sense (it
prevents the same person from committing the same type of crime,
and it deters others from committing this and other types of crime),
but also implicitly allows for purely retributive aspects, even the
notion of revenge, to play a role. The conflation of these different
dimensions sometimes leads to unclarities in the argument, as we
will see. The aspect of retribution is the more popular one and can be
justifiably used when describing the reactions of ordinary people to
delayed punishments or punishments conferred on relatives of
wrongdoers. Proclus does indeed refer to the retributive role of
punishment to this effect. Yet he also occasionally argues that providence itself wants retaliation. A full-blown theory of punishment,
obviously, was not yet available to Proclus.
49 Divine punishment inflicted on wrongdoers sometimes follows only long after the facts. This seems to cause problems:
offenders benefit less from a late punishment; when they are
finally punished they have forgotten their crimes, as a result of
which they get indignant. Providence does not seem to get the
desired results: good people, who once were offenders, do not
understand why they now suffer and get indignant; bad people
blame their misfortune on chance, for they see both themselves
and good people suffering alike. Hence bad people think one
does not benefit from being good, rather on the contrary: the
vicious seem to prosper more. All of this would not happen if the
punishment were simultaneous with the crime.
Having set out the problem in 49, Proclus proceeds to offer a series
of replies: (i) swiftness of punishment does not always deter either;
(ii) knowledge of the kairos belongs to tekhn; (iii) not to be punished
yet in itself amounts to a form of punishment; (iv) the delay teaches
us to be patient and equanimous; (v) gods decisions take into account

Introduction

43

the specificity of the cases; (vi) great natures should not be prevented
from achieving great things; (vii) there will be punishments after
death, which criminals fear already now.
These arguments, which are drawn from Plutarchs text, are organised in a rather haphazard way. Replies (ii) and (v) amount to the
same argument; (vi) could also be treated as a specific case under the
same heading. Moreover, several conceptions of punishment are at
play: (i) considers punishment in its deterring function, i.e. as preventive (in a sense this is also the case in (iv)); in (ii) and (v) punishment is
viewed under its corrective aspect; in (vii) punishment is seen as
primarily retributive; in (iii) the retributive aspect is mixed up in a
rather confused way with the corrective; in (vi) the delay is explained
with reference to pragmatic reasons; in (iv) the reasons are didactic.
50 (i) A punishment that directly follows upon the crime does
not always eliminate depravity either, as the empirical evidence
shows. Sometimes the depravity is simply too strong: it goes for
immediate gratification and deliberately ignores the consequences. Why then blame punishment for not punishing
immediately?
51 (ii) True craftsmanship (tekhn) sometimes requires waiting, as the comparison with physicians shows. For the
pathologies of the soul, too, it is sometimes opportune to wait
until they have developed fully. This is in the interest of the
patient. To choose the right moment (kairos) is part of craftsmanship (supported by a quotation from Leg. IV 709B, on gods
heeding the right moment). Providence therefore awaits the
right moment to punish, as its punishment is primarily corrective. This deserves our admiration, rather than our criticism.
52 (iii) Real evil consists in the perversion of the soul, the
disease of the soul being much more terrible than that of the
body. To be just to the soul is to purge it from its disease. This
is what punishment by providence amounts to. Not to be delivered from this disease would be a real punishment for the soul.
Hence the offenders who are not immediately punished do not
escape punishment: by the very fact of the postponement their
punishment is worse.
53 Not to be punished immediately amounts to an intensification of punishment. Whoever understands this would want to
be punished sooner in order to be healed, just like one wants
ones bodily wounds healed, if necessary by painful treatments.
The wrongdoers who are not punished immediately suffer this
delay because they are not yet worthy of being punished. In fact

44

Introduction
they are punished all the while. Their conscience plagues them
so that they in fact undergo a double punishment. Socrates
therefore encouraged people to turn themselves in.

The argument is only on the surface contradictory: the lack of punishment constitutes a punishment; being punished is not really being
punished. Proclus rhetorically plays on the ambiguity of the term
punishment between its retributive and corrective (and preventive)
aspects, we might say. The penalties paid by souls for their wrongdoings are punishments in that they heal the soul. They seem to be
punishments in the retributive sense, but they are not. Not to be
paying the penalty (i.e. not being subjected to corrective and preventive punishment) would amount to being subject to revenge (retributive punishment) by the gods. The argument is not inconsistent, but
still bizarre: for the postponement is here justified by the fact that
this increases the punishment in the sense of retribution. Yet Proclus main argument is based on a theory of corrective and preventive
punishment. Here, however, the retributive view is used as it were
to soothe those who want to see revenge. The double punishment that
Proclus mentions at the end of 53 consists, then, of the suffering
inflicted upon the offender by way of revenge, on the one hand, and
the likewise painful treatment of his disease, on the other. The latter
takes place later, the former follows directly upon the deed and lasts
until the latter sets in. As a matter of fact, however, the retributive
punishment as described by Proclus consists itself of two different
aspects though Proclus does not make the distinction and speaks
as if it were one and the same thing: the mere fact of the postponement, which intensifies the disease and the debt to be paid, on the
one hand; the bites of conscience, on the other (here cited for their
retributive function, yet they would have a corrective dimension too,
of course). The confusion in the argument98 is thus due to the intrusion of popular notions of punishment. Plutarch, by whose argument
Proclus is clearly influenced, explicitly refers to the common peoples
understanding of punishment. Proclus calls the two forms of punishment internal and external.99
54 (iv) Imitation of god, i.e. assimilation to the divine is the
greatest good for a human being (supported by a combination of
passages from the Timaeus). By postponing the punishment
providence shows us that it is good to remain equanimous and
impassive. By giving it time, providence persuades the soul to
repent. The punishment that will eventually follow has a double
function: corrective, by healing the wrongdoers, and didactic
(preventive), by showing the others the value of not rushing and
of not being led by strong emotions. Anecdotal examples of
restraint: Plato, Archytas, Theano.

Introduction

45

The argument in 54 amounts to the claim that divine equanimity

and patience are qualities that we should imitate. Proclus announces
his next argument (in 55) by saying that different arguments are
needed when matters are obscure to us.
55 (v) God recognises the disposition from which vice will arise
and decides the time, the form and the intensity of punishment
for each individual case, based on what each soul deserves and
what is best for it. In some souls wrongdoing stems from a firm
disposition, in others not. Prompt punishment may prevent the
evil from becoming habitual. In the case of other souls it is wise
to wait until the perversion has reached its peak. Some souls err
because of an error of judgment, without there being an underlying bad condition, others because the irrational is in such a
bad shape that it perverts the judgments of the soul [and will
continue to do so]. In the first case an immediate punishment is
beneficial, in the second not, because the soul is incapable of
accepting the admonishment. The time of punishment may also
depend on cosmic cycles, determined by fate. Providence indeed
acts with and through fate. 56 In these cases the principle of
merit is respected. There may be many reasons for the postponement, which are not always clear to us. Instead of blaming
providence, we should look for its reasons.
(vi) In human life enormous wrongdoings are sometimes
mixed with big accomplishments. So-called great natures are
great in both extremes. In their case providence often postpones
punishment so as not to preclude the accomplishments of which
these natures are capable. There are plenty of examples of
people having the capacity to do great good and bad things:
Themistocles, Dionysius, Periander.
57 (vii) What for us is a long time span (subjectively) is just a
moment for providence100 and not just for providence, but also
for the souls that are outside of generation [i.e. the time between
reincarnations is much longer than that of a human life]. Hence
the time of eschatological retribution is much longer than our
earthly life; likewise the abodes in Hades are much bigger than
the earth.101 Hence it is not a problem if the punishment does
not follow shortly after the facts nor takes place here. Contrary
to punishments in this life, punishments after death are unmixed with pleasure. The fear of eschatological punishments
tortures offenders already during their life a foretaste of what
awaits them. Known examples are Apollodorus the tyrant of
Cassandreia, and Ptolemy Ceraunus.
Despite the variety of argumentative strategies the guiding princi-

46

Introduction

ples of Proclus replies are relatively clear: in the long run every soul
gets its due. The time spans we need to look at, however, may be
considerably longer than a single human life. The subject of divine
justice is therefore not the human being as having one earthly
identity, but rather the soul as it passes through several cycles of
reincarnation. This becomes clear in the next problem.
Ninth problem: inherited guilt and punishment by proxy
The problem of punishment for the sins of the forefathers is discussed
in Plutarchs dialogue De sera numinis vindicta, a text that without
any doubt has inspired Proclus account (cf. pp. 50-9). Proclus mentions the question of inherited guilt also in his Commentary on the
Cratylus 93, p. 46,12-23, and gives three explanations, complementary to one another: (1) the souls of ancestors and offspring belong to
the same suntaxis (they are grouped together); (2) via the body,
through the badness of the seed, the descendents inherit the depravity of the forefathers; (3) the descendents profit from the wealth
inherited from their relatives and acquired by the latter in an unjust
manner. Proclus also points out that Socrates in the Phaedrus claims
that this pollution by the sins of the forefathers can be treated by
telestic means. Hermias, in his commentary of the passage (Phaedr.
244D), discusses the problem of inherited guilt in terms that are
strongly reminiscent of Proclus account in in Crat. and Dub. 58-9.102
Proclus must have been familiar with Hermias discussion (in
Phaedr. 96,8-97,14) or its source. Hermias mentions the wealth
acquired by unjust means and inherited by the progeny (in Phaedr.
96,9-11), the similarity of the souls (in Phaedr. 96,11-15; cf. Dub.
59,46-9; 61,2-4), which makes a soul be incarnated into the family of
a criminal (in Phaedr. 96,13-15; cf. Dub. 60,13-14: Proclus cites
Oedipus as an example),103 the role of seeds that pass on badness104
(in Phaedr. 96,17; cf. Plut. De ser. num. vind. 563A4-6, quoted by
Procl., Dub. 61,11-13), the strong unity of the family and the continuity
that may not always be visible to us (in Phaedr. 96,16-23; Dub. 59,1-33),
the role of the family demons who await the right moment to intervene
and to punish without being constrained by the boundaries between
generations (in Phaedr. 96,24-8) and of course the possibility of expiation through rites (in Phaedr. 96,28-97,14). Some of these ideas also
figure prominently in Plutarchs text, especially the idea of the family
constituting a physical unity. Hermias even appears to allude to the
Growing Argument (in Phaedr. 96,19-21), to which Plutarch explicitly
refers (and which is also mentioned by Proclus), which may be an
indication that Hermias, too, knew Plutarchs work.
58 Punishment of progeny for crimes committed by the fathers
and forefathers seems unjust: either the wrongdoers them-

Introduction

47

selves have already been punished then there is a double

punishment, for which the only motive seems to be revenge; or
they have not been punished, but then the innocent are punished whereas the guilty go free. Punishment of progeny
appears to be real (cf. mysteries, absolutory rites and popular
belief). How can it be reconciled with the principle of merit
honoured by providence)?
The problem is set up in a way very similar to Plutarchs account (see
below). The reference to rites that absolve the descendents from
inherited guilt refers to Phaedrus 244D, a passage quoted in this
context by Proclus and Hermias (see above).
59 (i) Every city and every family is an organic living being,
having a unity that is greater than that of individuals; they have
a much longer life and are more divine than individuals. One
person presides over the city as over one single whole, and
likewise for the family. Every member of the family and every
citizen of the city is linked with the whole of which they are a
part. Providence, being one, and fate, being one, rule over each
city as over one single whole and over each family as over a
single whole. Hence it is normal that individuals are rewarded
and punished for deeds of other members of either family or city.
Indeed, we also benefit from what others did for our city or
family. That others are punished does not mean, however, that
the original offenders escape justice.105 Since all the parts are
connected, punishment may be inflicted not only on close, but
also on remote relatives. It is not the case either that the
intensity of punishment depends on proximity. For sometimes
the more remote parts resemble one another more than proximate parts. Compare medical practice: often certain organs are
healed through manipulation of parts in a completely different
region of the body. Providence looks at which parts are coaffected, even if this co-affection is hidden from us.106
This argument is based on Plutarchs treatment of the issue. See
below. Notice that Proclus denies that the original offenders ever
escape their due penalty.
60 (ii) If the doctrine of reincarnation is true it is possible that
when someone is punished for the crimes of his or her forefathers, it is actually the very same soul that perpetrated the
crime, in another life, and is punished now, and likewise for
rewards. Apollonius of Tyana is an example. There is, then,
nothing strange about a soul being punished for crimes it committed while in another body. Souls moreover do not end up in

48

Introduction
a specific family or town by coincidence. Hence, even if it is not
the same souls that are punished, the soul that gets punished
is a soul that has ended up in a specific family or town for a
special reason [i.e. because it belongs in that family or town
because of a certain affinity]. And if they are the same, there is
all the more reason for it to be punished. The lives of cities
and families can be compared with theatre plays, with fate as
the poet of the play; the souls are like the actors, each of them
playing several roles. In order to understand the workings of
providence, we should not look at the surface identity of the
characters played, but at the deeper-lying identity of the
actors.107

This argument has no parallel in Plutarch. The hypothesis that it is

actually numerically the same soul that undergoes the punishment
may very well stem from Proclus himself. The idea that souls end up
in the family of a criminal because of bad disposition is already in
Hermias, in Phaedr. 96,13-14.
61 A punishment across generations is not strange if the soul
is the same, but remains difficult to accept if it is different,
unless one understands that there may be a hidden similarity
between the life of the wrongdoer and that of the person punished. Providence notices the similarity, i.e. it sees the innate
defects and prevents the later-born from erring by punishing
them before they have the opportunity to do so. Providence can
thus anticipate: it knows that certain conditions spring up
again after several generations.
One could ask why providence did not do the same thing, i.e. intervene in a timely way, when the forefathers were about to go wrong.
Surely it must have had its reasons, one would think. Proclus cannot
seriously mean that providence only knows vice about to erupt
because it has observed similar characters before. If it is possible to
anticipate in the one case, it should also be possible for it to do so in
the other.
Tenth problem: providence of angels, heroes, demons, souls
Proclus ends his work with an overview of the different types of
providential agents, from the universal providence of the gods over
the higher kinds down even to our souls that are occasionally
providential.
62 What kind of providence is exercised by angels, heroes,
demons [the three superior kinds], and the souls governing the

Introduction

49

world? It could not have the same unitary character as the

providence of the gods.
63 Each god has his being defined by, and proceeds from, the
One-Good, which transcends being. The henads, which are the
different forms the One takes, are produced by the One. The
first type of henads (the gods) is self-complete, the second
consists in derivative unities existing in other things. The series
of the One is indeed structured according to the triad in the
cause, according to its substantial rank; in the participants.
Intellects and souls are one through participation. Likewise,
the one and absolute intellect produces first a series of selfcomplete intellects, each having its own character (e.g. some are
solar intellects, other lunar intellects); below that are entities,
i.e. souls, that participate in intellect. The latter have selfmotion qua souls and are intellective qua participating in intellect. Likewise there is a double psychic procession: the first soul
produces first self-complete souls, i.e. substantial souls separate from bodies; next come the beings that are ensouled
through participation. The latter one may call entelechy or
better ensouled bonds [i.e. the shadows of souls, or irrational
souls].

The doctrines of the triad of procession and the related theory of the
double series proceeding from the cause are explained in the Elements of Theology. The precise references are given in our notes to
the translation.
64 The primary hypostases thus all bring forth a double series,
one of self-complete entities, and one of participatory entities.
Angels, demons, heroes, and also our souls in that hierarchical
order belong to the second series with respect to unity (Oneness being the principle of providence). They are not henads, but
still henadic. This means that they have within them a trace of
divinity, something that surpasses intellect, and which is the
principle of their providential activity.
65 Whereas gods exercise a universal providence by what they
are essentially i.e. henads , angels, demons, and heroes

50

Introduction
exercise providence through the one that is in them. Through
that by which they imitate the gods and are united with them
their henadic character they are also providential. Assisted by
the gods, they exercise providence over all things. The primary
agents of providence are the gods, as goodness coincides with
unity. [Angels, heroes, and demons are the secondary agents of
providence, as participating in oneness/goodness.] After them
come the souls, that, like the superior kinds, exercise providence together with the gods, by participating in oneness, i.e.
goodness. Their providence does not consist in making calculations about the future, but comes to be when they are firmly
rooted in the One of the soul, which is why their providence, too,
is transcendent and unitary. This state of divine inspiration is
temporary for the souls, but permanent to the superior kinds.
Hence the providence of the superior kinds is constant and not
dependent upon deliberation. Their providence is due to their
henadic nature. Yet they are not just henadic, but also have
something other besides the One, i.e. their special character
which constitutes their substantial being and is related to the
specific god whom each of them follows. 66 Therefore everything that can be said of providence belongs to the superior
kinds in a secondary manner. The very first principle (the
One/Good) transcends providence, except if one is willing to call
this providential too for its being the ultimate final cause. The
primary agents of providence, properly speaking, however, are
the gods/henads.

The doctrine expounded here is fairly straightforward: strictly speaking the One transcends providence. The gods or self-complete henads
are the primary agents of providence. Angels, heroes, demons, but
also souls are derivatively henadic and secondary agents of providence. Their providential activity is transcendent, universal, unitary
and not dependent on dianoetic thought insofar as they are established in the One. For the superior kinds this is always the case; souls
reach this state only intermittently.
Plutarchs On the Delays of Gods Punishment (De sera
numinis vindicta)
In the eighth and ninth problem Proclus makes ample use of a text
by Plutarch of Chaeronea, whom he does not mention. Only a vague
allusion at the end of the preface may be taken as a sign of his
awareness of the proximity of his argument to Plutarchs and even as
a kind of apology for having copied his text almost shamelessly
(which is at least how contemporary scholars would view the matter).
Proclus borrows arguments, expressions, analogies, historical exam-

Introduction

51

ples and anecdotes from his predecessor. Plutarchs De sera numinis

vindicta108 is a dialogue, set in Delphi, between several interlocutors.
The dialogue starts in the middle of an ongoing conversation, just at
the moment when a character by the name of Epicurus makes an
unexpected exit it is no coincidence, of course, that his famous
namesake was regarded as the denier of providence; obviously, the
radicalness of the latters rejection of providence makes him, in the
eyes of the Platonist Plutarch, unfit for a conversation dealing with
a special problem related to providence. The remaining speakers are
firm believers in providence: Plutarch, his brother Timon, his son in
law Patrocleas and Olympichus. The work ends with a myth about
the journey to the underworld by a man called Thespesius, who prior
to his vision went by the name Aridaeus (who is probably meant to
be the same person as Ardiaeus/Aridaeus mentioned in the myth of
Er, Resp. 10, 615C5; E6). There he witnesses the punishments of the
wrongdoers, including those whose crimes caused suffering for their
descendents. One of the issues raised by Epicurus,109 as an objection
to the belief in providence, is the fact that providence would seem to
postpone its punishments unreasonably long (548C-D).110 If one believes that misfortunes are in fact punishments by the gods, the latter
would seem to handle the punishments in a rather inefficient and
even unreasonable manner. Often the alleged punishment comes so
late that it completely misses any effect it could have had, had it come
more timely. Moreover, the gods would seem to punish and reward
the wrong ones. Hence it would be better, so Epicurus appears to
have argued, to drop the idea that misfortune and good fortune are
due to the gods.
The interlocutors obviously do not want to take that path, but
instead try to find a reasonable explanation for the lateness of the
punishments and rewards. The postponement of divine punishment
was held to be a problem long before Plutarch. Plutarch cites
Euripides, among other, as someone who already complained about
it.111 In the course of the ensuing conversation different aspects of the
problem are developed and different solutions of the difficulties are
proposed. We try to arrange them in a somewhat more systematic
way (deviating from the divisions made by Plutarchs characters
themselves, as they often conflate several points that ought to be
distinguished more clearly). The general framework of the discussion
is the same as that in Proclus: providence knows and cares for the
universe and everything in it, including human beings. Its activity is
beneficial, even if this means that it sometimes has to punish. This
is only possible because its bestowal of goods fundamentally respects
the principle of merit.112 Only then can the providential activity be
called just. Piety obviously compels us to regard the divinity as
invariably and supremely just.

52

Introduction

First problem: the postponement of punishment

The frequent postponement of providential punishment has several
negative consequences.
i. Punishment (as deterrent) fails to prevent further crimes
perpetrated
a. by the same offenders (548D),
b. by others (549A-B).
ii. The procrastination makes the victims desperate and fails to
give them comfort (548E) (punishment is here probably
conceived as retribution, the victims being those to whom
retribution is owed, whereby the punishment gives them
comfort).
a. Victims may either not live to see the offenders
punished (548F-549A),
b. or they may fail to see the connection between the
offence and the afflictions of the offender (see below).
iii. The general belief in providence is lessened (549B-C). This in
fact explains the first point: because people see no reason to
belief in the justice enacted by providence, they carelessly
proceed on the path of vice; the offenders fail to see their
afflictions as punishments for crimes they committed much
earlier (549C-D).
iv. The bad disposition of the perpetrators goes untreated as
long as the punishment is deferred (this refers to the
corrective dimension of punishment).
v. When the punishment finally follows, it can no longer have
the healing, i.e. corrective, function, because of the
aforementioned failure on behalf of the criminals to
understand that their misfortune is meant as a punishment
(549C).
Second problem: the punishment of descendents
Timon raises what is in fact another problem, yet one that is closely
related to the first: the punishment may sometimes come so late that
not the perpetrators, but their offspring, even their remote descendents, seem to be punished.
vi. If punishment visits other people, i.e. apparently innocent
descendents, can this be just? The punishment is unfair to
the descendents.
a. If the offenders have already received the punishment
owed by them, one crime would be punished twice,
which is unjust (556E6-9).

Introduction

53

b. If the offenders have not been punished, it would be

unfair for god to make up for his original indolence by
punishing innocents (556E9-11).
This is an especially damaging objection, for if the
punishment is not fair, the one who imposes the
punishment,113 i.e. god, would be unjust horribile
dictu (556E).
vii. It is unfair that the offenders escape their punishment,
understood in a retributive sense (passim).
viii. The punishment is ineffective.
a. The offenders can no longer be healed by the
punishment. This kind of punishment can hardly fulfil
a corrective function. Plutarch invokes a comparison
made by Bion: the deferred punishment would be even
more ridiculous than if a physician were to treat a
descendent for the disease of an ancestor (561C).114
b. The future punishment of descendents does not prevent
further crimes committed by the offenders (as they do
not know yet that their descendents will be punished).
c. The future punishment of descendents does not prevent
further crimes committed by contemporaries of the
offenders (as they do not know someone will have to
pay the penalty for the injustice committed).
The two problems are indeed sufficiently distinct for Proclus to deal
with them in two separate questions (the eighth and ninth problem,
respectively). The quotation from Bion shows that divine punishment
of descendents was an ancient popular belief, that was already felt to
be problematic even in ancient times.115 The ancient stories of cursed
families come to mind and especially their literary treatment by the
great tragedians. The treatment of this problem in Greek tragedy116
is examined in a recent monograph by N.J. Sewell-Rutter, who
argues that archaic authors tend to justify the punishment of descendents by arguing that the latter share certain pertinent character traits with the offenders.117 This argument is also used by
Plutarch and Proclus. The problem of inherited guilt was also discussed by other philosophers, for instance Philo of Alexandria (who
generally appears to be strongly influenced by Stoic accounts of
providence).118 It is not unrelated to the Christian doctrine of original
sin, which was of utmost importance for their speculations on divine
providence. Yet that tradition had no bearing on our text.
Replies to the first problem
Whereas some of the replies are directed at specific objections, others
defend the postponement of punishment in a more general way, for

54

Introduction

instance by saying that the benefits from the postponement outweigh

the disadvantages (1, 3, 4, 5, 6) or that in some cases there is in fact
no delay (7, in some sense,119 8).
1. God is our paradigm; he wants to set a good example, that is: it is
indeed better not to rush and to avoid anger and violence in
punishment, as that is damaging for the person punishing (examples of humans refraining from punishment for this very reason:
Plato, Archytas). There is of course no danger involved for god
himself, but only for us. So the postponement serves didactic
reasons (550C-551C). Gods teaching in this respect does not so
much target the offenders, but rather people in general.
2. Divine punishment is primarily corrective, not retributive, as is
often the case when humans punish. In curable cases, the offender
is allowed time to repent and/or better the disposition from which
the offence sprang. That this is the intention can be seen from the
contrast with incurable offenders who get punished immediately
(551C-E). God can do so, because he knows that goodness is innate,
so that there is in most cases hope for a spontaneous improvement.
Moreover, he can oversee the evolution of the patient (550D-552B),
and he is also certain that the offenders cannot escape from their
punishment (551E; cf. 554E-F). This argument targets in particular objection iv.
3. The delay is acceptable because of the benefits which the offender
is expected to produce in the meantime. In this case a small evil,
the postponement, is compensated by a greater good (552D-E).
4. So-called great natures (megalai phuseis, 552B12) are capable of
great deeds, both for the better and for the worse. By punishing
such characters too soon god would prevent them from producing
their great benefits (552A-553C).120 This is a special case of 3.
5. God uses wrongdoers as instruments for his own purposes, for
instance to punish others (552F-553A). This punishment is here
conceived as cathartic, i.e. corrective (553A5).
6. God knows the right moment (kairos). This is a point that is very
general but also central to Plutarchs defence of providence (549F550C; 551D; 553D; passim), and has obvious links to the other
points made (which explain in what way the timing is appropriate). Knowledge of the kairos belongs to the tekhn of providence;
god is indeed the perfect craftsman (aristoteknas, a term used by
Pindar, 550A6-7); to the craft also belong knowledge of the right
manner and degree of punishment (see also 562E6-9). This argument addresses the objections iv and v, but also the problem in
general.
7. Vice contains its own punishment; in this way punishment (understood in a retributive sense) is always simultaneous with the crime
(553F-554B; 556D6-9). This is true in several ways:

Introduction

55

a. Vice springs from a bad disposition; having a bad disposition

constitutes a punishment (554B; also 555F-556D).
b. The bad disposition often leads to further crimes, which makes
the guilt and the future punishment worse (554D).
c. There are secondary effects (554B; 554F5-555D4; 555F-556D):
anxiety, pangs of remorse.
The offenders awaiting their punishment are compared to
actors playing villains in the theatre: only a young and inexperienced audience is fooled into believing that the villains will get
away with it. Adult viewers know that the wrongdoers are
already being punished while they are still parading around
(554B-C, the ensuing damage to ones reputation may be considered a further secondary effect). Further comparisons are that
with fish on a hook (554E9) or with the convict who has already
drunk the poison but does not yet notice its effects (554E2-4).
This again refers to the ineluctability of the punishment.
The postponement is thus a prolongation of the punishment
(554C9-D1).
d. Even the fact that crime does not always bear fruits would be a
source of worry for the criminal (555D-F).
The argument in 7 targets the objections i, ii, and iii. It does
not require the assumption that the soul is immortal, as Plutarch
emphasises. It is even stronger when there is nothing after death:
for then a quick punishment, assumed that the punishment consists in the loss of ones life, would be wrong, as it would amount
to a quick deliverance from fears and other unpleasant consequences (555C11-D4).
8. A long time for us is a short time for god (554D2-7). This point is
made in the course of the argument for 7.b, but can also be
considered on its own; it then somewhat softens the notion of a long
delay. The point is related to the idea that the criminal cannot run
away from his punishment: it is ineluctable (554E-F).
Replies to the second problem
Some of the replies address the problem of the punishment of descendents directly, either by denying its prevalence (9 a reply
Plutarch admits to have made only in order to gain time), by
explaining why it is good after all that descendents are punished for
crimes they did not commit (12, 14), or by denying they are punished
for crimes they did not commit (11, which is in fact the final reply
given by Plutarch: see below). Some replies specifically target the
felt injustice of the phenomenon with respect to the descendents
(objection vi; replies 10, 12) or the original offenders (objection vii,
replies 13, 15), others its alleged ineffectiveness (objection viii, a;
replies 12, 15; b: reply 15; c: reply 14).

56

Introduction

9. Many stories about punishment of descendents are unreliable

(557E-558A). This is above all an ad hominem argument against
Timon, who in 556F-557E had listed a series of alleged examples.
10. Everyone who approves the rewarding of descendents for the
virtue of their ancestors should also accept their punishment for
their crimes (in part an ad hominem argument; 558A-D). People
are indeed also proud if they belong to venerable families. They
believe the virtue of their ancestors reflects on them.
11. Moral badness is contagious and can pass over from one generation to the next (558D-F). The consequence is obvious: the
descendents are not actually punished for the crimes of their
ancestors, but for their own badness. This is explained later on
(591C10-562A12): Punishment of descendents is sometimes not a
punishment for the crimes of the ancestors, but a punishment for
their own sake, namely when god diagnoses a slumbering illness
that, when not treated, will lead to wrongdoing. Hence punishment is pre-emptive, i.e. not retributive but preventive. God can
indeed distinguish between cases that look deceptively equal, but
are not; he can detect the badness that we may manage to hide
from our fellow human beings (562A13-D9: Plutarch conflates the
cases of a bad disposition of which those who have it are not aware,
and that of a similar disposition of which others are unaware).
When one is born without the shortcomings of ones forefathers,
one will not be punished for their wrongdoings (562E9-563B5).
With the last remark Plutarch as a matter of fact ends the
dialogical part of the work. It is followed by the myth of
Thespesius. The remark, however, fits ill with those arguments
starting from the assumption that the punishment for crimes
committed by ancestors is a real phenomenon (especially 10, 12,
14, 15). Indeed, the present remark seems to make the general
claim that perceived postponed punishment does not correspond
to the fact of the matter: the descendents are actually punished for
their own sakes, namely in virtue of a bad disposition unknown to
themselves and/or to others (punishment is here taken in its
preventive and corrective dimension). It should be stressed that
these other arguments in the course of the conversation precede
the remark at 562E9-563B5 (we have put this remark here because it takes up the argument of point 11, which we present in its
proper position). The relevance of the position at the end of the
conversation could be that the remark is meant to overrule the
previous arguments, making them superfluous.
12. A city is an individual with a strong identity, like a living thing,
all parts of which are linked by sympathy (559A1-7). The Growing
Argument devised by Epicharmus121 in order to question the
persistence of individuals is sophistic and even less applicable to
cities than to individual human beings (559A-C). Hence the pun-

Introduction

57

ishment of fellow citizens for crimes perpetrated by other citizens

is justified (558C; 559E6-7). The same holds for families and their
members, as the identity of a family is even stronger than that of
a city (559C10-D6).
The sympathy by which the members of a city or family are
connected can be compared to the way a living organism forms a
unity: physicians too heal one part by making incisions and cauterising elsewhere (559E7-F5). In the same manner should we
understand the punishment of one part to heal another. The
correction is passed on from soul to soul, just like when a teacher
or a general punishes one person to admonish all the others
(560A1-10).
After making this point the argument is interrupted by Olympichus
who ask about death: should we accept that the soul survives death,
either for a short time or even completely, and does this have any
repercussions for the main argument (560B5-8)? Plutarch replies
that the immortality of the soul is crucial, as god would not waste efforts
on an ephemeral being (560B8-C7; 560F3-6). This allows Plutarch to
complement his argument with an eschatological aspect.122
13. It is not so that in the aforementioned cases the offenders do not
undergo punishment, for they are punished after death (560F6A6). Plutarch here seems to have in mind primarily the
retributive dimension, but maybe also the corrective.
14. Punishment of descendents is a deterrent for their contemporaries contrary to the eschatological punishment of the souls of the
deceased, which is invisible to others (561A6-8).
15. Punishment of descendents is at the same time a punishment, in
a preventive and corrective sense, of the offenders, as it is very
painful for them to witness the afflictions of their descendents (it
is assumed that they not only watch the world but also that they
understand who bears the blame): next time around they will
refrain from doing wrong (561A9-B7; C1-10).
In order to make the last point more plausible Plutarch ends the
dialogue with a myth in which eschatological punishments are described in rich detail (563B-568A). Prior to that, in the course of his
treatment of the second problem, he has already given explicit arguments in favour of the immortality of the soul (assumed for points 13
and 15), as we have seen. The survival of the soul after death also
sheds a new light on 3, 4, 6 and 8 (all replies to the first problem). The
delay may obviously amount to a punishment after death, in which
case the contemporaries of the offenders, including in some cases the
victims (if they still live, obviously) might think there is no punishment at all.

58

Introduction

On several occasions Plutarch reminds his interlocutors to be

cautious and not to make bold assertions concerning the reasons god
may have for his way of proceeding. We can merely make plausible
conjectures regarding his motives (549E5-550A3; 551C11; 552E2;
553F3-4; 558D5-9; 558F4-5; 561B7). If we forget the limits of our
understanding we are led to entertain impious and blasphemous
thoughts: we are upset at providence, yet we should only blame our
own ignorance (562D10-E9).
Proclus borrows several of these arguments. The table123 shows
how much he is indebted to Plutarch (for specific expressions, historical examples, and quotations,124 see our notes ad loc.).
Like Plutarch, Proclus repeatedly points to the limitations of human
understanding (e.g. 56,1-9; 55,1-3): our ignorance of gods reasons
should not make us conceive a grudge of providence.127 Unlike Proclus,
Plutarch emphasises the Academic background of this caution. In
other words, the influence of the Hellenistic epistemological debates is
made more explicit. Plutarch is convinced that the caution advocated by
the (New) Academics agrees with Platos own approach.
F. Frazier128 draws the attention to the difference in style of the
two treatments, related in part to the different literary genre. In
Plutarch the arguments are presented in the course of a conversation, one argument leading in a natural manner to the next. In the
dialogue the punishment of descendents is discussed as part of the
same general issue of postponed punishment, actually as its most
extreme and most problematic case, whereas Proclus separates the
two problems and treats them as the eighth and ninth problem
respectively. So even if Plutarch introduces the eschatological dimension only in his discussion of the problem of inherited punishment,
the fact that this is part of the same general discussion means that
the arguments offered here have repercussions for the postponement
problem as well, as is clear from the end of the dialogical part, where
the two aspects are drawn closer together.
Obviously, specifically Neoplatonic conceptions underlying Proclus arguments are absent from Plutarch. So even in cases where
Proclus picks up a Plutarchan train of thought the underlying idea
may be different. One may think of the doctrine, exposed in the
preceding Problems, of a literally absolute and eternal knowledge of
providence, a (paradoxical) fore-sight from an a-temporal perspective. Such an idea is absent from Plutarch, who has a much less
metaphysical theology and a less stringent notion of eternity. In
another sense too Proclus takes a more transcendent and hence less
worldly perspective than Plutarch does. For he appears to focus less
on the punishment of a particular crime and more on the general
destiny of a soul (he also calls the argument that is based on the
health of the soul [8.iii, 52,1-2] the most important), i.e. its general
condition across generations.129 His idea that a soul may be punished

Introduction

59

in one of its earthly lives for crimes committed in a different earthly

life (9.ii) exemplifies the general tendency of his argument.
Finally, it is remarkable that punishments in the underworld,
though Plato and Plutarch are wont to depict them in vivid detail,
hardly play a role in Proclus discussion. Most of his arguments focus
on what souls suffer and enjoy during their earthly lives.

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Introduction
Note on the translation

As the basis for our translation we use a reconstruction of the lost

Greek text made by Benedikt Strobel (Universitt Trier).130 For this
reconstruction Moerbekes Latin translation is the main source, as it
is the only document that has transmitted the complete text of the
treatise. Fortunately long sections are preserved in the compilation
of Isaak Sebastocrator, though with often substantial rewriting;
some texts are to be found in a Byzantine florilegium; some are
quoted by Philoponus and Psellus; and for some phrases there are
parallels in Plutarch. Strobel does not just offer a Greek retroversion
of the Latin translation, thus reconstructing the Greek model used
by Moerbeke, but, by making use of the indirect traditions and
introducing a number of conjectural corrections he made a critical
edition of the three treatises that aims to be as close as possible to
the original version of Proclus. The edition of Strobel is accompanied
by an extensive philological commentary justifying the retroversion
and all corrections introduced in the text. On difficult passages we
had intensive email discussions and we also benefited from a workshop organised at the university of Wrzburg (12-13.10.2009) and an
informal meeting in Leuven. As Strobels edition is due to appear in
the series Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca et Byzantina (De
Gruyter) it would not make much sense for us to summarise all his
findings and arguments in a philological appendix to our translation.
For a philological justification the reader is referred to Strobels
forthcoming edition. In our footnotes we refer to Strobel whenever he
introduces corrections in the text deviating from Moerbekes translation, insofar these were not already proposed by H. Boese. In principle we translate the text as reconstructed by Strobel, pointing out in
the notes the few cases in which we deviate from Strobel. We should
however gratefully acknowledge that we owe much more to his
philological acumen than could be mentioned in the notes. If we had
not had at our disposition the full Greek retroversion, we would have
had many more difficulties in understanding and translating correctly Proclus often convoluted arguments, as is demonstrated e
contrario in Appendix 1 where we propose a number of corrections to
our translation of De malorum subsistentia that were made possible
by comparing our translation with Strobels reconstruction of the
Greek text (which was not yet available when we published that
volume).
About two hundred years ago the English Platonist Thomas Taylor published the first English translation of this treatise in an
appendix to his translation of Proclus Platonic Theology (1816). For
his translation he used Moerbekes Latin version, which he knew in
the first edition of Fabricius (1717). At the end of his career, in 1833,
he published, as a separate volume, a new version of his translation,

Introduction

61

adapting it to the new edition of Victor Cousin (1820). Taylors

translation is an impressive achievement, if one considers that he
had to work with Moerbekes often obscure Latin and could not make
use of the resources available to contemporary scholars. This was
compensated, however, by his extraordinary knowledge of Proclus
philosophy and his great admiration for the Platonic Diadochos.
Taylor had noticed that Proclus depends on Plutarch in essays 8 and
9. In these essays and in essay 7, Taylor did not always have the
courage, apparently, to produce a full translation of the text. He
skipped long sections and complained in a footnote that Moerbekes
version of the remaining part was, unfortunately, so barbarous, that
I found it impossible to translate it.131 Certainly, much can be criticised and improved in Taylors translation of Proclus arguments.
Also his archaic style unnecessarily bestows a flavour of arcane
wisdom. Yet, not being native speakers of English, we were often
pleased to find inspiration in his translation when we were searching
for expressions rendering Proclus style, in particular for the first
part of our translation.
Notes
1. A note on terminology: Proclus and Platonists roughly contemporary
with him did not of course regard themselves as Neo-Platonists, which is why
nowadays some scholars prefer to refer to them just as Platonists. Yet we do
not abjure the conventional terminology. It has the advantage that it makes
clear that the philosophy of these late Platonists was in significant ways
different from that of Plato and from that of earlier followers of Plato.
2. See Babut 1974, Dragona-Monachou 1994 and Steel 2007, 5-11 for the
history of the problem in the imperial period.
3. For Plotinus, see Sharples 1994.
4. cf. Dragona-Monachou 1994, 4419, who mentions, among others, Diogenes of Apollonia and Socrates. Favorinus, quoted by Diogenes Laertius,
asserted that Plato was the first philosopher who attributed providence to
the gods (DL 3.24). The idea of the moralised supernatural, to use an
expression by E.R. Dodds (1951, 35), is probably older than the belief in
divine providence.
5. Leg. 10, 899D7-903D19. Similar ideas are central to the Epinomis: cf.
980C10-D3.
6. De providentia et fato et eo quod in nobis ad Theodorum mechanicum
(Prov.) = On Providence (Steel 2007); and De malorum subsistentia (Mal.) = On
the Existence of Evils (Opsomer and Steel 2003). A comparison of the arguments
in Prov. with discussion of similar problems in the three opuscula and in the
other works seems to suggest that the treatise Ten Problems Concerning Providence is an earlier work and the first in the series (see Appendix 1).
7. Proclus, ET 120, p. 104,31-2; 106,5-9, tr. Dodds (modified).
8. Plutarch, Stoic. rep. 1051C (= SVF II 1178; tr. H. Cherniss). Epictetus
could be believed (Dragona-Monachou 1994, 4445) to disagree: Diss. 1.16.914. There is, however, no strong inconsistency: Epictetus here praises the
fine organisation of the world, even in its details.
9. Cic. ND 2.164-7.

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10. Cic. ND 2.167 (magna di curant, parva neglegunt); see also ND 3.86.
11. The view of Alexander of Aphrodisias is in fact much more sophisticated, see Sharples 1983, 25-6; 1990, 91-3; Rashed 2007, 294-304.
12. See Dub. 32,2-3; in Parm. 1017,16-17; in Remp. 2,102,4-7.
13. See Sorabji 2004, II, 3a and 4a (pp. 69-89).
14. See Philop. Aet. mund. 37,19-39,1; 569,22-588,18.
15. Similarly in in Parm. 779,1-3: we accept that gods know contingent
things and exercise providence over them; it remains to be examined how
this is possible.
16. An image often used by Plotinus: see our translation, n. 44. See also
Philop. in DA 13,25-35.
17. See, e.g., Alex. Aphr. Fat. 200,12-201,32.
18. See Prov. 63 and Steel 2007, 24-5. On this Platonic dialectical reading
of the history of the problem, see Opsomer 1997, 343-7; Opsomer and Steel
1999, 232-3.
19. cf. Opsomer and Steel 1999, 229-35.
20. One may usefully compare in Parm. 842,20-2; 921,11-13.
21. See also in Tim. 1,352,5-8; Prov. 64,1-8; TP 1,98,5-9.
22. In fact literally merely refers to the words dia tn tou theou genesthai
pronoian (30B8-C1).
23. Amm. in Int. 135,14-19; on this principle, see also Procl. in Tim.
1,352,11-16. Iamblichus account was apparently based on the same idea as
that which we find in our text, namely that knowledge is intermediate
between knower and known (in Int. 135,16; cf. Dub. 7,2-4). Ammonius goes
on to develop an account of divine knowledge that is strikingly similar to that
of Proclus and that contains very similar expressions: god knows contingent
things in a manner superior to their nature (136,11-12); he knows divided
things in an undivided way, plurality in a unitary way, temporal things in
an eternal way (136,15-16).
24. The use of the term indeterminate in the context of future contingents may be usefully compared with Ammonius (and Boethius) analysis
according to which future contingent propositions divide the true and the
false in an indefinite way. Cf. Mignucci 1998, 55, 58, 67-9.
25. On the problem of henadic knowledge of individuals and accidents, see
also Lloyd 1990, 159-63.
26. According to Boeth. in Int. II, 226,9-13 god knows the contingent as
contingent, which means that he knows that A is contingent. Proclus and
Ammonius would agree. Boethius adds the claim that god will also know
what will happen, because he understands our motives and reasons (better
than we do). Boethius fundamentally espouses the central idea of the theory
propounded by Proclus and Ammonius, according to which providence knows
contingents in a determinate way: cf. Boeth. in Int. I, 108,4-5; 123,20-2;
124,6-7; II 190,7; Amm. in Int. 137,1.
27. Our free choices presuppose contingency, as Proclus explains in in
Remp. 2,275,8-19: our choices are not (fully) determined, i.e. they do not
belong to the necessary (anankaion) but to the contingent (endekhomenon),
yet what follows from our choices follows with necessity (in other words, this
is a hypothetical necessity: if you choose p, then q follows with necessity).
This also applies to our choice of a life type, that precedes each single life, as
Proclus explains. Later on he adds that this choice of a bios, though to some
extent (ta polla) determined by our previous lives (Resp. 10, 620A2-3), is
always free. Proclus explains that Plato by adding the expression ta polla
makes the proposition a contingent one: cf. in Remp. 305,2-12.

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63

28. cf. Sharples 1983, 165.

29. We are in other words talking about events that are complete in every
instance of their occurrence; the case of processes that can only be said to
have happened after their accomplishment, but can in a sense said to be
happening during their occurrence can be fitted in easily: in that case the
now of the observation should be the posterior limit of their occurrence.
30. Only in a deterministic framework, such as that of Diodorus, does
unalterability attach to future events. Cf. Cic. Fat. 17-18.
31. In accordance with the definitions of contingency and necessity: cf.
Amm. in Int. 143,11-13; 151,26-7. See also 145,11-12; 14-15 (tr. D. Blank):
For just because time has brought it into being, we should not think it has
happened by a necessary pre-establishment (prokatabol). [}] If this is so, it
is clear that it was also possible for it not to occur.
32. cf. Mignucci 1998, 60-1, 64.
33. cf. Amm. in Int. 136,1-3 and 15-20, with Sorabji 1983, 262.
34. Cons. 5,6 (l. 66-72 Tester). Cf. Sorabji 1983, 254; Marenbon 2010.
35. Dub. 8,38.
36. Cons. 5,6 (l. 72-5 Tester). See also Amm. in Int. 136,26-9.
37. cf. Amm. in Int. 136,19-21, citing the locus classicus, Tim. 37E6-38A2.
38. See, e.g., Amm. in Int. 141,31-4; 154,28-34.
39. We have benefited from discussions with Benedikt Strobel regarding
this argument (workshop Wrzburg 12.10.2009).
40. The latter difference would not seem to coincide with the traditional
one between in most cases and in the fewest cases (hs epi to polu / hs epi
to elatton); cf. Amm. in Int. 142,1-3; 151,30-1. For the time of determination
is likely to be independent of statistic probability.
41. cf. Mignucci 1998, 60 and our nn. 77-8 to the translation.
42. cf. Steel 2007, 25.
43. cf. Sorabji 1983, 255-7; also 259-62. To say that the One simply
transcends the distinctions between contingent and necessary (Prov. 64,812, cf. Schneider 2010, 110-11) does not solve anything either.
44. See Luna 2000.
45. There are no greater and smaller quantitative infinities. On Proclus
concept of quantitative infinity, there is nothing greater than quantitative
infinity. Cf. Dodds 1963, 248.
46. This corresponds to ET 93.
47. cf. in Parm. 1120,26-30; 1121,17-1124,28; ET 89-92; TP 3,8,24-10,14;
Van Riel 2000, 404-6.
48. cf. Soury 1942; Brenk 1986.
49. cf. ET 113-65, esp. 113, 116, 120, 122, 134.
50. See also n. 136 to our translation.
51. cf. ET 143; TP 1.18, p. 83,24-84,15; Mal. 7,25-7; 41,25-7. See also the
fourth problem.
52. See n. 117 to our translation.
53. See Philoponus, De aet. mundi, 24,1-16, 103,21-5, and 549,7-550,24 (cf.
Lang and Macro 2001, 41).
54. Proclus recalls the triad being-life-intellect, that structures all of
reality (below the One).
55. See nn. 131-2 to our translation.
56. See n. 135 to our translation.
57. The reference is to Plat. Resp. 6, 510B4-511D5.
58. cf. nn. 138-9 to our translation.
59. For a discussion, see our introduction and notes in Opsomer-Steel

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Introduction

2003, and the more recent publications Schfer 2002 (not cited in our
translation), OMeara 2005, Phillips 2006, Narbonne 2007, Phillips 2007,
Opsomer 2007, Kavvadas 2009.
60. cf. Mal. 27-8, with our nn. 193, 199 (Opsomer-Steel 2003, 118).
61. cf. Mal. 20-6.
62. cf. Mal. 7.18-19: For all good things would be the lowest [in the
hierarchy] of beings, and the eternal beings would exist at the level of
matter, with our n. 40 (Opsomer-Steel 2003, 108).
63. See also in Tim. 1,376,28-377,7.
64. cf. Mal. 50, Opsomer-Steel 2003, 23-8.
65. Properly speaking the irrational soul is not a soul, but merely a
shadow of a soul.
66. Irrational animals will be discussed in the seventh problem (43-8).
See also Mal. 18,22-3 (tr. Opsomer-Steel): In the case of lions and leopards
one would not consider rage to be something evil, but one would do so in the
case of human beings, for whom reason is the best. In this text, Proclus adds
the qualification that for brutes too there can be evil, namely when they act
contrary to their nature. Cf. Mal. 25,20-7: And as for virtue, it does not exist
in the same way in all beings; in one case it is by possessing the virtue of a
horse that one has the good corresponding to ones nature, in another case
by possessing the virtue of a lion, or that of another animal. And all species
reside in the good, though some more, some less. But if an animal becomes
a fox instead of a lion, slackening its virile and haughty nature, or if it
becomes cowardly instead of bellicose, or if another assumes any other type
of life, abandoning the virtue that is naturally fitting to it, they give evidence
that in these <beings> too there is evil.
67. The irrational soul does not properly speaking descend. It is rather
created for the sake of the animation of the body. For more details, see the
notes to our translation and Opsomer 2006.
68. Proclus considers this to be an essentially Platonic doctrine, pace
Dragona-Monachou 1994, 4488, n. 211. See our n. 185 to the translation.
69. cf. Cic. ND 3,66-95 (esp. 79) (Cottas argument against providence);
Philo Alex., Prov. 2,8-11 Hadas-Lebel (the suffering of the virtuous; replies:
2.16-33); 2,3-6 (the prospering of the bad; replies 2,12-14); Sen. Prov. 1,1;
3,1-14; Plot. 3.2 [47] 6,1-6; Iambl. Ep. ad Maced. (Stob. Anth. II, 175,17176,10 W.-H.). Proclus (Prov. 53,13-14) mentions Plotinus, Iamblichus and
Theodorus of Asine (= Test. 39 Deuse) as philosophers who have struggled
with this problem. Cf. Steel 2007, 22 and 88, n. 248.
70. cf. Iambl. Ep. ad Maced., fr. 6 (Stob., Anth. II, 175,22-3 W.-H., tr.
Dillon-Poleichtner): There is, then, no fruit of virtue other than virtue itself.
Iamblichus goes on to say that the good person is superior to all accidents of
fortune. See also ib., fr. 7 (Stob., Anth. II, 176,12-21 W.-H.).
71. cf. Iambl. Ep. ad Maced., fr. 6 (Stob., Anth. II, 176,4-5 W.-H.).
72. e.g. 44,26-7, in the case of irrational animals; 52-3 (with our comments); 57 (eschatological retribution).
73. cf. Orig. Contra Cels. 4,75; 4,78 = SVF II 1173; Sen. Prov. 1,5-6; 2,3-7.
74. cf. Plat. Ap. 30C6-D5.
75. cf. Plat. Gorg. 470E; 471E; 507C; Crito 48B. Cf. Irwin 1995, 58-60.
76. cf. DL 7.89; Plut. Comm. not. 1062B; Epict. Diss. 1,17,21-8; Ench. 1.
77. Long-Sedley 1987, section 58.
78. Platonists often use a kind of poetic licence when citing Plato: the
context in the Republic is of course different, while eschatological. Yet the
idea is the same: the one who chooses is responsible, not god. The require-

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65

ment that god be never made responsible for evil is expressed repeatedly by
Plato: see also Resp. 2, 380B6-C3; Tim. 42E3-4. For a reconstruction of the
freedom attributed to the soul in choosing its type of life and in making
choices within its earthly life, see Schneider 2010, 278-83.
79. Of course not everything done by rational beings results from choice.
The position of the brutes is intermediate between lifeless things and rational animals.
80. These would be assumptions about the effectiveness of our actions,
including their ability to create badness in a providential universe.
81. At Dub. 39,14-15 Proclus cites this phrase from Plotinus in a loose
way, but when he applies the same argument to brutes at 44,18, he quotes
Plotinus literally; see our notes ad loc.
82. cf. n. 66.
83. For this debate, see Sorabji 1993, 166-169, citing Maimonides, who
claims that the rule of providence does not extend to individual non-rational
animals, but merely to their species. See also Sorabjis ch. 14 on Christian
teachings regarding the treatment of animals.
84. A similar appeal to the unity of the cosmos in Iambl. Ep. ad Maced.,
fr. 1 (Stob. Anth. II, 80,11-81,6 W.-H.).
85. De fat. 572F-573B; see also Calc. in Tim. 143. For the early Stoics, see
Dragona-Monachou 1994, 4432-3.
86. Plot. 3.3 [48] 5,15-16.
87. Iambl. Ep. ad Maced., fr. 4 (Stob. Anth. II, 173,26-174,8 W.-H., tr.
Dillon-Poleichtner).
88. cf. Steel 2007, 77 n. 59: The identification of intellect with providence and necessity with fate goes back to Middle Platonism, see
Numenius quoted by Calcidius, in Tim. 269 and 296.
89. For similar examples in the human world, cf. 32.
90. The same happens with humans: cf. 40.
91. Human beings too inflict harm on each other: cf. 39.
92. cf. 40.
93. cf. 39.
94. In the case of human souls Proclus makes gods the leaders of their
chains, in that of animals demons fulfil that role. Cf. 41,4.
95. This broadly corresponds to the account of human fates in 39-41.
96. See also Cic. ND 2,162-4; Marc. Aur. Med. 1,17,20; 9,27,3.
97. Just as it makes no sense to question the principle of procession itself:
cf. Opsomer-Steel 2003, 21.
98. See also our n. 360 to the translation.
99. See our n. 330 to the translation.
100. In fact there can be no comparison, i.e. no proportion between any
time span and eternity.
101. cf. Steel 2012.
102. For a more extensive discussion of these parallel texts, see Van den
Berg forthcoming (cf. n. 108).
103. Our previous lives determine the choices made by the soul which lead
to the next reincarnation. Cf. Plato Resp. 10, 617E3-5.
104. Plato Tim. 87B4-6 claims that in those cases the parents are responsible, as R. Van den Berg (cf. n. 108) points out.
105. This possibility, mentioned when Proclus outlined the problem in
58, is not a real one: wrongdoers do not escape justice, but that may not
always be visible to us (as was clear from the discussion of the eighth
problem).

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Introduction

106. For the idea of inherited badness, of soul and body, see in Crat. 93,
p. 46,18-20.
107. This is of course exactly what one should not do when watching a play
(or a movie): in suspending disbelief, the audience is supposed to forget the
actor and watch the character (which is however less obvious the stronger
the personality cult is).
108. De Lacy-Einarson 1959, 170-9 and Baldassarri 1994 are reliable
introductions to the text. For a more extensive, recent study with new
bibliography, see Frazier 2010. In a forthcoming text that she kindly made
available to us, Justice et Providence. Du dialogue de Plutarque aux questions de Proclus, Frazier moreover examines, in an exemplary way, the
relation with Proclus Ten Problems. We have also benefited from the kindness of R.M. van den Berg, who provided us with a copy of his forthcoming
article on the ninth problem and its relation to Plutarch, Proclus and
Plutarch on inherited guilt and postponed punishment.
109. Henceforth we use quotation marks to distinguish the characters
Epicurus and Plutarch from the historical figures. The character Epicurus
is of course not supposed to be the well-known founder of the Epicurean
school, whereas Plutarch does stand for a historical figure, viz. the author.
110. The same criticism is voiced by the Academic Cotta in Cic. ND 3,90,
where it is meant as a criticism of the Stoic theory of providence.
111. cf. Eurip. Or. 420 (548D) and fr. 979 Nauck (549B, D).
112. Expressis verbis appealed to by Plutarch at 558C3 and 560B3.
113. cf., e.g., Dub. 53,2, referring to the justice of he who punishes.
114. The same example, without mention of Bion, is given by Philo Alex.,
Prov. 2,7 Hadas-Lebel.
115. cf. Dodds 1951, 33-4.
116. Plutarch cites Euripides (fr. 980 Nauck) as someone who criticises
the gods for this (556E3-6). Plato too mentions the punishment of descendents for the crimes of ancestors (Resp. 2, 366A6-7).
117. cf. Sewell-Rutter 2007, 10-11, 23, 33-34, 48.
118. cf. Philo Alex., Prov. 2,7 Hadas-Lebel.
119. Compare our remark on the same argument as used by Proclus,
p. 44.
120. cf. Philo Alex., Prov. 2,31-2 Hadas-Lebel, on the benefits tyrants may
provide, as intended by providence.
121. Epicharmus was the first to have advanced this famous argument
(DK 23 B2). Plutarch quotes it several times: De tranq. 473D-E; De comm.
not. 1083A, Theseus 23,1. He connects it with Heraclitus theory of flux
(559C6-9)
122. Proclus makes a similar move when he introduces reincarnation in
60.
123. Proclus arguments are indicated by the roman numbers used in our
analysis of the text (pp. 42-8, preceded by 8 and 9, standing for the eighth
and ninth of the Dubitationes, respectively; it should be noted that in the
case of Proclus the numbering follows the sequence of the text; we have not,
as we did for Plutarch, regrouped the arguments. We add a short description
for the arguments added by Proclus.
124. Proclus also uses some analogies that can be found in Plutarch, but
also in other texts. This is the case for the frequent medical analogies. An
analogy that is somewhat more special is that of a dramatic play. Proclus
uses this analogy in a markedly different way though: he compares the
reincarnations of a single soul to the different roles played by the same actor,

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67

whereas Plutarch highlights the contrast between the knowledge had by the
spectators (they anticipate the inevitable punishment of the characters) with
the ignorance the characters have regarding what awaits them.
125. Hermias, in Phaedr. 96,28-97,8 provides a parallel in that he in a
similar way connects the severity of the disease, i.e. the question to what
extent a crime does or does not spring from an inveterate disposition, with
the possibility of postponement of the treatment. Only, in Hermias account
the treatment consists in expiatory rites, whereas in Dub. 59 it is the
punishment that does the job.
126. See also n. 420 to our translation.
127. This answer is traditional. See, e.g., Philo Alex., Prov. 2,30 HadasLebel.
128. See n. 108 above.
129. Both F. Frazier and R. Van den Berg (cf. n. 108) make this point.
130. Another attempt at retroversion, though not of the whole opusculum,
was made by Schneider 2010, 319-30: 6-8, 13-15, 31 (partim), 39 (partim),
46 (partim), 47, 60 (partim), 63 (partim).
131. Taylor 1833, 61.

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PROCLUS
Ten Problems Concerning
Providence
Translation

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Ten Problems Concerning Providence

Preface
1. The great Plato, in the tenth book of the Laws, forced us, so to
speak, with adamantine arguments1 to admit that providence exists,2 and he did so in many other places, as in the Timaeus where he
shows that the works of creation, even down to the most inferior
things, have been accomplished with accuracy, because of the providence of God,3 as he literally says. Having faith in what Plato
demonstrated, as the Oracles, too, testify to Platos demonstrations
in the clearest way4 for that very transmission of the Oracles to the
worthy disciples of the gods is, I believe, the most evident demonstration of providence we should strike all around whatever illusion
(phantasma) prevents the thought of many people from admitting
that all things are in accordance with providence, and, having refuted
the faults in what is said, bring it back to the truth.5 Not that these
problems did not receive due concern from our predecessors. [Our]
soul, however, longs to speak and hear6 about these problems, even
though they have been raised and articulated a thousand times, and
wants to turn back upon itself7 and, as it were, discuss with itself,8
and not just take in arguments about these issues from outside. Let
us, then, interrogate ourselves, if that is all right, and raise problems
in the secrecy of our soul and thus attempt to exercise ourselves in
solving these problems. Whether we discuss what has been said by
previous thinkers or not, it makes no difference. For as long as we say
what corresponds to our own view, we may seem to say and write
these views as our own.9 After all we have the common Hermes as
our leader, the same who is said to place in every soul the untaught
preconceptions of the common notions.10

10

15

20

First problem
2. Before all other problems let us examine [the following issue].11
Given that providence extends to all things, to wholes, to parts, even
as far as the most individual things, to the celestial and to what is
under the heaven, to the eternal and the corruptible, and that it
ought to know the merit of all things it provides for (or else in case it
would ignore their merit, it would not be possible to steer all things
in accordance with justice)12 how does providence know everything,
the whole and the parts, the corruptible and the eternal, and what is
the mode of its knowledge? And if we are capable to get a grasp on

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Translation

this, we will subsequently raise some other problem and then again
another [and so on].

10

15

10

15

3. After having proposed first this problem to ourselves and having

awakened the common Hermes13 we should say that [there are
different types of] knowledge.14 (1) The first type one may think of as
being connatural with the irrational part [of the soul]: it is called
perception or imagination; both these definitely belong to particular
things and do not exist outside bodies, which shows that they are
cognitions of particular things. (2) Another type is essentially inherent in rational life and is called a kind of opinion and scientific
knowledge. They are different from the irrational cognitions by the
fact that they know the universals, whereas the former, as was said,
only apprehend15 particular objects; they differ from one another
because the first, namely opinion, is cognition of things in change, the
latter, science obviously, is cognition of what is always stable and
unchangeable. (3) Prior to them is the so-called intellective cognition,
of which one kind is knowledge of all things at once and absolutely,
another of all things under one aspect. In these respects the knowledge of the all-encompassing intellect and the knowledge of the
particular intellects are different.16 All these intellects think all
things and thus transcend rational cognitions, yet the [universal
intellect] is all things and thinks all as a whole, whereas the [particular intellects] are both [i.e. being all things and thinking all things]
in a particular way, because as each intellect is, it also <thinks> what
it thinks and as it thinks it <is> also what it is.17
4. Beyond all these [forms of knowledge], however, is the knowledge
of providence. It exists above intellect, having established itself18 in
an activity prior to thinking by virtue of the One alone, according to
which every god is said both to exist and to exercise providence over
all things.19 By this One, according to which it also exists, [providence] knows all things. Indeed, all other cognitions are necessarily
connatural with [different modes of] being,20 for instance, imagination and sense perception, which belong to irrational life, must
themselves be assumed to be irrational, and the cognitions prior to
these to be rational, as they pertain to rational souls, and the
cognitions of the intellects to be intellective. If that is the case, it
would be absurd not to define the cognition possessed by the gods, in
so far as they are gods, in accordance with their unitary being. For
our common conceptions conceive of the divinity as something better
than intellect and make us admit that each being also knows in the
manner in which it exists.21 If it is, then, according to its [being] one
that providence is that which it is said to be and imparts what is good
to all things and if this [good] is the same as the One,22 it is in virtue
of the way it exists as providence for all, that it also knows the things

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73

for which it provides. It is therefore by [being] one that [providence]

is capable of knowing all things, i.e., by the fact that it does not
pertain to wholes more than to parts, not more to what is according
to nature than to what is contrary to nature, not more to forms than
to what is formless. Just as of all perceptible things there must be
some indivisible criterion and likewise of the Forms prior to the
perceptible things there must be some other criterion which discerns
them23 for if one part were to discern one object, another part
another, it would be similar, as someone24 says, to me perceiving this
thing and you another thus there must be something prior to the
Forms, having a unitary knowledge of both universals and individuals. For how could it otherwise order some things as participants,
others as participated?25 In fact, these things have nothing in common but [being] one. Prior, therefore, to what knows the Forms, there
is that which knows all things insofar as they are one. It is evident
that this [principle] knows in accordance with the One, such that like
is known by the like,26 I mean, what comes from a cause by its cause.
For everywhere, and in all these things, is the One. But not all being
whatsoever is universal, for the universal and the particular are
different things; nor is everything form, for there is something which
is not form; nor is everything according to nature, for there is also the
unnatural. But whatever one can conceive of is one, as the One is over
all things. If something does not participate in the One, it would not
exist at all and it would not be able to participate in providence.27 If
therefore nothing escapes the One, if something is to know everything, it will know it in a unitary way obviously. For [it will know]
either by what is one or by what is not one. This [latter mode of]
knowledge, however, is inferior and alien to the One. By virtue of the
One, therefore, providence knows whatever is in some way one. If
then something knows everything, it will know all things in accordance with the One. For that is what is common to all things, to those
that are and to those that are not.28
5. Since providence, as we have said, is characterised by [its being]
the One and the good, and since the good exists prior to intellect (for
the intellect longs for the good, as do all beings; but the good does not
long for the intellect), providential knowledge, too, must be superior
to intellective knowledge. And in this manner providence should
know all things, namely by its own One, according to which it also
makes all things good: those that think as well as those that do not
think, living as well as not living things, beings as well as non-beings.
To all things it imparts unity, as a trace of its own One. For the One
of [providence] is not like the individual one, for this is the last of
beings and is inferior to the universal and is what it is through
participating in the universal, whereas [the One of providence] is
even superior to the universal.29 For [the universal] is something one

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but not the One itself, for it is many things and not only one, since it
also possesses the differences of the things it contains.30 But the One,
which characterises the being of providence, is not even something
like a whole. For the latter is divisible, whereas the former, which is
truly one, is also truly indivisible.31
In summary,32 we say that this One [sc. of providence] brings forth
all things, preserves them all, has an existence more true than all
being and more clear than all knowledge, not being divided by the
objects known nor moving around them. The latter [features] are
peculiarities of psychic and intellective knowledge. For also every
intellect is one-many33 both in its being and in its thinking. And every
soul, being motion, also thinks with motion. But [providence], which
remains in the One both immutable and indivisible, also knows all
things in the same manner. And it not only knows humankind and
the sun and everything whatsoever of that kind, but also every single
one of particular things. For nothing escapes that One in any way,
whether in its being or in its being known. And it is said, and rightly
said, that the entire circle exists in the centre in the mode of the
centre, since the centre is the cause, the circle the thing caused. And
for the same reason every number exists in a monadic way in the
monad. In the One of providence, however, all things exist in a
superior way, since it is also one in a degree superior to that of the
centre or monad. Suppose, then, that the centre had knowledge of the
circle, it would have a central knowledge, as it likewise had a central
existence, and it would not divide itself in the parts of the circle.34 In
a similar way, the unitary knowledge of providence is in the same
indivisibility the knowledge of all divided things and of every single
one of both the most individual and the most universal things. And
just as it gave existence35 to everything <according to the One, so it
knows everything>36 according to the One. And neither is its knowledge divided by the objects known nor are the objects known
commingled because of the one unification of knowledge. This knowledge, while being one, comprehends the whole infinity of the objects
known, but it is united above all unification that is in them. Let this
be the answer to the first of our problems concerning providence.
Second problem

6. Let us put forward, if you like, a second problem and examine in

what sense37 one may say that providence knows contingent events,
since the ancients too have amply shown the depth of this problem.38
Because of this problem, some philosophers who admitted the existence of providence banished the nature of the contingent from reality,
whereas others, who could not contradict the evident existence of
contingent events, denied that providence extends as far down.39
Both of them are right in assuming that (1), if providence has to

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exercise its activity, it must know the objects of its providence and
that (2), if it should know them, it must not, because of the ambivalent nature of the contingent, know them in an ambivalent way. The
demonstration of these points I mean both that providence extends
to all things and that the contingent is not a mere name but a truly
existing nature does not pertain to the present argument. For it is
[from this double assumption] that providence exists and that all
things exist which are said to be,40 that we have undertaken to solve
the many serious problems concerning these issues.
7. With these problems set before us and granting beforehand the
existence of providence, let us say that knowledge and I mean all
knowledge is always intermediate between some cognitive
[power] and an object known that from which, and that toward
which, respectively and connects both; hence it must be in one of
two conditions: either to change together with the knowing subject
and to be such as the subject, or to be homogeneous with the
objects known. Or41 it is neither of the two, and knowledge corresponds not more to the one than to the other. But if knowledge had
its being in the object known, it would need to be defined with
reference to the object exclusively. If, however, it existed in both,
or without both, it should not belong to any one of the extremes
more than to the other. But since knowledge is in the subject, yet
longing for the object known, it is evident that, being the perfection
of the one and desiring the other,42 it is defined correctly with
reference to the nature of the knowing subject, having only as
much of the object known as to distinguish it completely from other
cognitions. For knowledge must have something of the object, too,
as this is its end.
This having been demonstrated I mean that knowledge exists in
the knowing subject and is characterised from the latters existence
in accordance with its mode of being it is already clear that the
cognitions of [knowers] that are in all respects immutable are of the
same kind [i.e. immutable], and that cognitions of mutable [knowers]
are of the opposite character; and that things whose essence is not
rational have a non-rational knowledge and beings whose essence is
reason and intellect also have knowledge that is a kind of reason and
intellect; and that beings whose existence is superior also have a
superior knowledge. Therefore, if providence existed somehow at
some distance from the One, its knowledge too would necessarily as
it were escape from the One. If, however, it is nothing else but One,
obviously it would also remain in the One, when knowing, and, while
remaining, it would know everything in accordance with its own
character. And just as it knows in a unitary manner, even if the
objects known are multiple, so it would know its objects with necessity, even if they are contingent. And, in general, it will know all

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things in accordance with its own existence, not in accordance with

the existence of the objects known. Therefore it makes no difference
to providence whether its object is divided, or generated in time, or
corporeal, or instable. No, its knowledge of these objects is characterised by one limiting principle, which is incorporeal, timeless,
undivided, detached from all contraries, since, as was shown, knowledge is defined in accordance with the peculiarity of the knowing
subject, and this subject is unitary, immutable and established according to one limit.
8. If then someone inquires into how providence knows what is
contingent, we shall say to the person inquiring into this that providence does not know the contingent things the way they are for that
was what troubled us but [knows them] the way providence is, that
is, in a manner superior to the existence of contingent things. For we
claim that providence does not know them by looking at them so that
it would be affected along with these unstable things; but rather that,
existing outside of them and prior to all time, it possesses knowledge
of the things that change in time. For to know each thing from its
cause is also more venerable than to know it from itself, and to know
something in a superior manner is more venerable than to know it at
its own level. Knowing, then, the indeterminate in a determinate
manner, [providence] knows both that it is indeterminate and that it
has been determined within itself.43 For neither does it know merely
that [the contingent] has been determined within itself for that
would not amount to knowing it nor does it merely know that it is
indeterminate for that would not amount to knowing it according
to providences own mode of being. Therefore its knowledge has both,
the determinate on account of the knower and the fact that [this piece
of knowledge] is of something indeterminate on account of the nature
of the object. Providence knows by possessing as a whole a determinate knowledge of the indeterminate, whereby the indeterminate
will come to be, but is not actually present, and the knowledge
anticipates the cause of the indeterminate. For [providence] knows
that something indeterminate will take place. Seeing the cause of
this [indeterminate thing], it also knows it. And in the manner it
makes the indeterminate exist, in the same manner it also knows it.
It makes the indeterminate exist not in an indeterminate, but in a
determinate manner. By consequence, providence also knows the
indeterminate in a determinate manner, just as it knows incorporeally and without distension that which is distended and made corporeal, which comes after it.
One may compare the reason-principle inside the seed:44 in every
single part of the seed it is one and whole and it contains the cause
of the further division of what proceeds from it. Suppose it [also]
knew itself as the cause of the division for what comes after it and as

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being itself indivisible. Then it might say the following: I possess in

an indivisible manner what is divided, without being separate from
either [the indivisible] or [the divisible], but containing the inferior
in the superior this in order to avoid that the division is either
uncaused or already anticipated45 in the cause; it exists there causally, but formally [only] in those which have received it.46 And
suppose it investigated the cause within itself of that division, it
would find that it itself, despite being indivisible, is nonetheless lying
in another substrate.47 The fact that it is itself in another and not in
itself grants the [recipients] the opportunity of being divided and
being present in other things and [makes it possible] that each part
is not everywhere. After this manner, we say, providence too, being
the cause of all things it knows, also knows the things of which it is
the cause, both the determinate and the indeterminate, in a determinate way. And it knows as a future event the coming to be of that
which is indeterminate and knows the cause of how it will provide to
indeterminate things a determinate48 entry into being. And nothing
impossible happens on account of this, since the indeterminateness
exists in things posterior to [providence], even if it is preconceived by
its knowledge, as is fitting for causes. This much is clear by now.

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Third problem
9. A third problem following upon this deserves to be examined, since
it too requires much attention.49 If providence is cause of both determinate and indeterminate beings, is it [the cause] of both in the same
respect or according to different aspects? For if it is in the same
respect, how could it discriminate in its knowledge that some things
proceeding from it will be determinate, others indeterminate? But if
it is according to different aspects, how can unity still persist in the
being [of providence], if there are different aspects in it?
10. Let us then, in this case too, beseech the divinity50 to join us in
coming to grips with the argument51 and bring to their end the labour
pains we suffer in our souls52 regarding this subject, and let us say to
ourselves that according to our argument providence is established
in the One. For, as our common conceptions tell us,53 whatever
exercises providence communicates either a real or an apparent good,
but always a good, to the subjects of its care. And providence is
nothing other than doing well to the things that are said to belong to
it. But we claim, and have said so before, that to bestow goodness is
in all cases identical with the bestowing of unity, because the One is
good and the good is One and this has been said a thousand times.54
We say, then, that providence is characterised by the One or,
which is the same thing, by the good but the One of providence, as
we have already shown before,55 is not so in the manner of the

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material one. For the latter is inefficacious and infertile, as there is

nothing after matter, whereas that One is fertile and most efficacious, as all things come after providence. Nor is it like the individual
one, for this has reached ultimate division and is one in such a way
as to be none of the other things, whereas [the One of providence is
one] as containing all things and as present to all things of which it
is the cause and as the principle of preservation for all things. Nor is
it [one] and that is a most paradoxical statement in the manner
of what some call the universal one.56 For this one, while containing
the things which fall under it and imparting essence to each of them,
nonetheless anticipates the differences of the things that it contains,
and is essentially one many,57 whereas the One [of providence] is
exempt from all things of which it is the productive and perfective
[cause] and is free from any variety. Providence, therefore, being
none of these, but established above every specific essence, and
nevertheless producing all things according to its unitary union,
possesses a power that cannot be circumscribed and is incomprehensible58 for all things. Hence, neither can one of the things which exist
from it, nor all of them distributively, nor all of them collectively,
unfold the power that pre-exists in it, or receive it in themselves and
embrace it in their bosom and adopt it, whereas the powers of all
other things, that are as it were absorbed by it, love to participate in
it somehow, insofar as it is in the nature of each.
11. The One of providence is thus more one than any union, incorporeal and corporeal, and its infinity of power more infinite than any
power, infinite or finite.59 There is nothing surprising about [the idea
that], among infinite powers, one is more infinite than another. For
no one would assume that, up there, there is a quantitative infinity
(in which the infinite does indeed not have anything more infinite
[than itself]).60 Nevertheless, everything that is infinite in power61
will be infinite with respect to beings that are inferior to it, but will
be finite to the beings that are prior to it, being limited by them. For
otherwise, if it were not comprehended, it could not be governed by
the superior beings nor held together by them, being indeed ungovernable. If, then, it is held together, though it is infinite, it is dominated, and if it is dominated, it is also comprehended, <and if
comprehended>,62 it is not infinite to them. But neither is it infinite
to itself. For that which is infinite to itself cannot be comprehended
by itself; therefore it would not be capable to hold itself together and
preserve itself. But every being is capable of preserving itself according to its power. It remains, then, that each of the infinite beings is
infinite only to the things posterior to it.
Let us, then, conceive of the infinite power of providence as a
power comprehending all powers that the subjects of its providential
care possess, and as bringing forth and dominating them all accord-

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ing to its one union, each of them in their own infinity, just as it
imparts to all things a union commensurate to the essence of each.
For even unity is not the same in all cases. It is, for instance, not the
same in incorporeal beings as in bodies, nor is it the same in everlasting bodies as in corruptible bodies, since the union of everlasting
bodies is greater. Or how could the former remain indissoluble,
whereas the unity of the other perishes? Further, the incorporeal is
more proximate to the One, whereas body, on account of its infinite
partitioning, falls short of the One by a great deal. Nor should one
consider it to be a problem if there is something more one than
another, seeing, as we do, that everything in the universe through
declining always becomes other with regard to what is prior to it,
until it reaches the extremity of its own series.63
12. Providence, then, is both unitary and of infinite power. Yet
though all things which are produced by it and fall under its care
share in both [features], some of them rather exist according to the
One, those namely for which determination is in their nature, others
according to the infinite, those for which the indeterminate is in their
nature. For through their indeterminacy the things here below are
imitations of the infinity there, and through their determinacy [they
are imitations] of the One.64 Therefore, the first classes in this
universe are what they are according to one unchangeable limit,
whereas the beings that succeed these tend to indeterminacy as they
have a second rank.65
As all infinity exists according to the infinity of providence and
everything determinate according to the unity [of providence] and as
the infinity there is dominated by the One and belongs to the One,
here too indeterminate beings are by nature subservient to determinate beings,66 and the determinate beings order the manifold changes
of things that are moved in an indeterminate manner. And just as
their primordial causes are ordered the one to the other, so their
effects too have received a relation analogous to their causes and thus
make the world complete, whereby the inferior beings depend upon
the superior.
13. The argument will become clearer to those who accept the following assumptions. The intellect too produces effects of two sorts67 the
body and the incorporeal, I mean yet it knows and produces each of
them in an incorporeal manner in accordance with its own nature.
The reason-principle (logos) of the incorporeal in the [intellect] is
itself incorporeal and cause of incorporeal things, whereas the reason-principle of body, though being incorporeal, is cause of bodies.
The former principle makes also its product similar to itself, the
latter produces things more foreign to incorporeal form because of a
declension with respect to the former. As a matter of fact, the soul

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likewise generates [two sorts of] reason-principles: those in other

souls, which are alive and in motion, and those which fall into matter,
the former being scientific reason-principles, the other technical
ones. And yet the soul produces all of these reason-principles in a
vital manner; but some proceed through life into life, others through
life into the lifeless.68 And, to summarise, everything that generates
and knows what it generates by different causes,69 generates and
knows its effects according to the superior. Of the things, however,
which are produced from this cause, some are produced according to
that [superior cause], some according to the inferior. Therefore, it
may be right to say that providence, too, possesses, through the One,
the cause of determinate beings, and, through infinity, the cause of
indeterminate beings; that it knows and brings forth both sorts of
things in a determinate manner and according to both principles in
the same manner,70 just as the intellect [knows and brings forth]
according to the reason-principle of an incorporeal or according to the
reason-principle of a body in an incorporeal manner, but that of
things [thus] produced [by providence] it is right to say that some are
determinate on account of the One, others indeterminate on account
of infinity. Yet neither the necessary beings are without a share in
infinity nor the contingent without limit. For the latter too end up at
any rate in the bound of necessity and the former, being everlasting
on account of their necessary nature, participate in infinite power; or
from where else do they derive their everlasting character and the
[property] of never being in another state?71 In some cases, the One
prevails and, on account of this, makes that which is produced in
accordance with it necessary, stringing together, as it were, the
infinite with limit. In other cases, however, the infinite predominates
and, by trying to escape from what swiftly approaches it and attempts to catch it, it makes the One fade away.72 Providence, however, knows both, be it according to the superior, as we have already
said, and it anticipates in its knowledge the peculiarity of both kinds
[of beings] with respect to generation: the one, if one may say so, as
limit-producing, the other as infinity-producing.73
14. Every limit, therefore, stems from there and every infinity,
whether in corporeal natures or in bodies, stems from there; and the
product of both likewise stems from there.74 And for that reason the
knowledge of both simple and composite things is there, just as also
the coming to be of both simple and composite things originates
there. Because, as said, the One and the infinite power of the One are
there, both the limits and, separately, everything that is somehow
infinite proceed from there. But because one of them infinite power
also belongs to the other to the One down here too the products
from both form couples75 and make the [resulting] whole one. What
is produced is either necessary, when the One is firmly established

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[in it], or contingent, when infinity outruns it. Since, however, it was
not right that even down here the infinite be bereft of the One, the
contingent too ends in the nature of the necessary, as we have said.
This [contingent thing] either is to a greater extent dominated by the
One, and having been switched76 into something necessary is made
determinate a long time before its occurrence, or, on account of a
weaker participation in the One, it underwent the same change as
the former [i.e. it switched to something necessary] though only a
short time before, and having been made determinate it came to a
standstill from the slippery nature77 and became alike the former
and imitated the infinite power which belongs to the One, not to
itself.78 For every power belongs to some other thing, which possesses
it, but not to itself.
Everything that is somehow indeterminate has its indeterminacy
and so-called contingency in the fact that it does not yet exist, but it
ends into that which by necessity either exist or does not exist, and
this either a long or a short time before [its occurrence]. And this is
what the conjectural divinations show, for they are more true when
made a shorter time than a longer time before the future events, as
if the indeterminate had already fallen [into necessity].79
15. That the beings superior to us80 must have knowledge of the
indeterminate too, if this too is to partake of order and not be, as it
were, an episode81 unconnected to the universe let this be granted,
since it has been demonstrated elsewhere.82 We were investigating
merely how [they have such knowledge]: this too should be made
clear. For the universe will not be one nor its governance in accordance with intellect, if there were not also some connection of this
[indeterminate being] with things that are determined and have the
same order. This knowledge [of the indeterminate] must be attributed either (1) to demons alone for they, being proximate to the
things down here, would seem both to know and to govern them (2)
or also, prior to them, to the gods, who, while apportioning providence
to the demons, to different demons for different things, remain
themselves master over all these things.
Now, if we leave the knowledge and providence of indeterminate
events to the demons alone, we must say either that they know the
objects of their providence and the realities prior to themselves in
turn, just like we do, or else that they know both simultaneously.
And if they know them in turn, in what way indeed will they differ
from our souls? For [our souls] are not capable of exercising providence while belonging to themselves and looking at the higher
realities.83 How could we, then, avoid to admit that [the demons], by
extending themselves towards what is external, will also follow the
events, and will themselves be in an indeterminate state [when
occupying themselves] with the indeterminate. If, however, [they

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know the higher and the lower] at the same time, it is again necessary either to attribute to them knowledge based on reasoning84
about the things they govern and to entrust them with reason-principles as well as exemplary forms of indeterminate [things] (for
knowledge of these is discursive reasoning); or else, if we affirm that
this knowledge is established prior to reasoning and in a manner
proper to those who are divinely active, we must refer it a fortiori to
the gods, from whom also the demons possess divination and the
capacity to have determinate foreknowledge even of the indeterminate.85 For if they grasp what is not determinate in an indeterminate
manner, we will deprive86 them of the impassivity which is appropriate to the immutable classes. For everything [that knows] in such a
way,87 needs both imagination and sense perception, so that, by
remembering what is not present, it may link the conjecture of the
future events to the present and the past. If, however, [they grasp the
indeterminate] in a determinate manner, why should we grant this
to the demons and not to the gods too, much more so [I mean the
capacity] to know indeterminate things in a determinate manner,
just like they also know temporal things in a non-temporal manner,
and to have providence over what is indeterminate according to their
mode of knowledge? For if [the gods] are unable to know indeterminate things in a determinate way, it is absurd to grant this knowledge
to the demons and to remove it from the gods as if they lacked the
power for such knowledge. And suppose [one would say] that the gods
do not want [to have providence over indeterminate things]:88 that
would be even more absurd than [to say that] they are not capable [of
doing so], since although they are their creators (hupostatai), they
would not want to exercise providence over the things they
brought to existence. Are not all mortal things and all particular
things and everything the world comprehends89 creatures of the
gods? Some of the things created stem from the one father, others
from the cosmic gods; yet the latter too made [everything] in
accordance with the fathers commandment, and he produced
these things too, yet through them.90 But it was not right and it is
not right that the gods, who produce things either directly or
through intermediates, would, while being gods, not take care of
the things they produce.
16. If, then, the [gods] both want to exercise providence over indeterminate things in a determinate way and are capable of it, it is
absolutely evident that they both exercise providence and, in their
exercise of providence, know the merit of the objects of their providence. And gods exercise their own providence in a transcendent
manner and extend it to all beings, whereas the demons partition the
supervision they receive from them,91 some having bound to themselves the herd-keeping92 of these kinds of beings, others of other

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kinds, down to the ultimate division as Plato says,93 so that some are
guardians of human beings, others of lions, others of other animals
or plants, and, still more partially, some of eyes, some of the heart,
some of the liver.94 And indeed, all is full of gods.95 Over some of these
beings the gods too exercise providence directly, over others through
the mediation of demons, as was said. Not because they would be
incapable of being present to all, but because the lowest beings are
too weak to participate in the primary beings out of themselves. The
inaptitude96 of the participants to enjoy [the care] of the gods is
evidenced by the fact that sometimes they are [merely] aware of the
providence coming from the demons,97 whereas the recovery of their
aptitude is shown by the fact that they have the gods immediately
present and know then that they are known by them and receive the
providence coming down upon them, of which they partook and in
which they shared without noticing. Just like someone sleeping in the
light of the sun may because of his sleep not be aware of being
illuminated, but on waking up would see himself bathe in light. Such
a person might then think that the light is present, and is present to
him for the first time, although it was he who was not present to the
light, because of his ignorance. At that point, then, the indeterminate
too is determined. Only after its conversion to the divinity, with
whom the indeterminate [always] was in a determinate manner, and
after having partaken from there in limit, does it realise,98 thanks to
its participation, that although it was indeterminate for itself before
its conversion, it did not appear to the divinity such as it was in itself,
but such as is appropriate to the divinity. It existed in fact in a
determinate way, but it was known [to itself] as something that had
fallen from [the divine limit] on account of its own indeterminacy, yet
not as having fallen so deep as to escape limit completely for in that
case it would without noticing have slipped99 into the yawning gulf of
non-being100 but rather in such a way that it neither has no share
at all in limit nor is fully established in it. Having been established
[in limit] after its conversion it came to understand that knowledge
of its own indeterminacy and limit, which brings order into indeterminacy, pre-existed up there.
17. Indeed, if we admit that the good comes to all things from
nowhere else but providence, just as intellection comes from intellect
and life and vital motion from soul for what is somehow living lives
because of soul, and whatever is thinking thinks because of intellect
it is obvious that also what participates of the good possesses its
good on account of the providential cause, even if it belongs to
particular beings and to intermittent participants. For one must lead
each thing to its own source, from which existence comes to the whole
series. If, then, something of the things in the world is made good, it
is made good thanks to providence. And [this is true] not only of every

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single eternal, but also of every single corruptible being; and not only
of every single determinate, but also of every single indeterminate
being, whether each receives its proper good immediately from providence or through intermediates, which have first been made good
from it. For the intermediaries among beings are not intermediaries
by taking away from the causes prior to them of their action upon
what comes after them,101 but by making the gifts that come from
what is prior commensurable to the things that come after them. The
intermediaries, which themselves participate in these gifts in a fused
manner (sumphus), introduce [to the higher beings],102 as it were,
the beings posterior to them, which are weak because of their declension,103 and render the latter apt for participation, corroborating
them with their own precursory illuminations.
The beings, then, which are more proximate to providence enjoy it
much more and are adorned to a greater degree by its vicinity, just
as what is closer to the sun, to soul or to intellect would be more
illuminated than more remote things, more vital, or more perfect
with regard to intellection. This is what we too should admit, and it
also agrees with our common notions.104 For one uses the very term
close on account of the affinity of an essence with those things to
which it is indeed close, and the term remote because of a distance
in being in all respects whatsoever. By consequence, the beings that
are more kindred to the beings that are capable of giving them what
they actually give, are capable of a greater participation in them.
Therefore, they also enjoy a greater participation.
18. As providence hastens to do nothing else but to make all things
good, beings that participate more in it, are made good and adorned
to a greater extent. But also things that are not close to it must be
attached to it, albeit through intermediaries that are precisely close
to it. The result is that some things will enjoy providence immediately, whereas others will need other beings as bonds connecting
them to it. For if there were no coordination of all things into unity,
the world would not be one either. But if all things participated in the
same way in the adorning [cause], there would be no order of things
adorned. There must, then, be both order and coordination: order
distinguishes all things and produces some things prior to others,
other things posterior to others, whereas coordination converts
divided things to the one good. If that is the case, it is necessary
that there should be providence over all things, but not the same
providence over all things. Providence indeed exists on account of
coordination, but is not the same on account of order. For if
providence is over the first beings, there must also be providence
over the secondary and over others following upon them. As Plato
says and true reason has it,105 every power that sets greater things
in motion is all the more capable of moving smaller things; being

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in control of the stronger, it will control the weaker all the more.
Since in case of the gods106 will converges with power,107 it is necessary that there is also providence over smaller things.108 For it is not
the case that the gods are capable, but do not want to do what they
are capable of. Similarly the good persons among us are believed to
want [to achieve] whatever they are capable of, and there is no room
in them for a power without will nor for a will without power, since
the latter would render the appetite vain, whereas the former would
render the power unaccomplished.
19. If, however, there is providence over secondary beings, it is even
more necessary that it be also over primary beings. For it does not
pertain to providence to take care of the inferior things and to
order them while leaving the superior things destitute of itself. For
even if the superior beings do not need anything, this itself, i.e. the
absence of need for anything, is something they have from providence, we could say, and gives to them, primary beings indeed,
self-sufficiency.109
If we assert that providence is the cause of all good things which
our common notions shout out, so we have said before110 we are
forced to admit that self-sufficiency, too, stems from there for the
beings possessing it and exists on account of it. For either these
beings are in need: in that case they receive plenitude from providence and do so prior to all others on account of their proximity in
being [to providence]; or else they are not in need: in that case they
are always fulfilled and have self-sufficiency on account of the
cause that produces them as self-sufficient beings, prior to those
beings that are constantly in need, yet always receive a restored
plenitude.111
20. All beings, then, as I have said, are full of providence112 in
accordance with their order, including those that come to be and do
not always exist. Some stem immediately from it and exist always,
whereas others have their generation through the mediation of beings that always exist not because providence would need others,
posterior to itself but existing prior to them, for the production and
perfection of these beings, but because the latter, in consequence of
being several stages below it, need beings produced in the vicinity of
providence in order to participate of providence. However, although
providence is present everywhere and in all beings, the good is not
the same in all things, which should not surprise us. For this too is
the work of the most excellent providence, that there is for all things
a participation of the good, yet a participation measured by the merit
of the beings receiving it; and that it lets each thing take what it is
able to take, whether essence causes the difference, as in souls and
bodies for the good of each of them is not the same, because their

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being is not the same either or whether it is merely its activity that
establishes [the recipient] in this or that merit, as we say that souls
having different activities receive different fates from up there. All
souls, indeed, receive [the gifts of providence], but some enjoy what
they acquire, others suffer them with hardship, namely those that
could never revert to providence without feeling hardship.113
Having determined this question in this way we may take our
leave from it. That true providence must also be concerned with
particular things can be grasped by considering the fact that all these
things that are happening contribute something to the universe and
that of all the things happening in the universe nothing is episodic,114
even if we are not capable of detecting the causes in every case. Also,
even for blockheads it is clear in some cases that what happens comes
from providence. And it would be ridiculous that in some cases it
were thus, in other cases not, as all things are similar. Enough about
this.
Fourth problem

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21. Let us catch our breath,115 as it were, after this argument, and
examine a fourth [problem], taking another starting point. How do
we say participations of the gods come about?116 This is a problem
that also those who love to speculate about the Forms are accustomed
to investigate regarding the Forms.117 For either the gods are
always active, but the things here do not always participate of
them; now how would that not be absurd? for to what will their
activity extend, if there is no participant? Or we do not credit [the
gods] with the continual exercise of the activity they have. That is
even more absurd, if one may call absurd what is impossible.118
For whatever belongs to the gods belongs to them always and prior
to all time, not119 only prior to this particular time, but also prior
to the entire infinite time. For time is, even in its infinity,120
posterior to the gods.121
22. In order that these [questions] too may be adequately investigated, at least for the present account, it must be said122 first that all
participation, whether it is by eternal or corruptible things, always
holds an intermediary position between the participants and the
participated. And as all intermediaries are supposed to have something in common with the extremes,123 it is necessary that also this
[intermediary] should be related in some way to the participant and
in another way to what is participated. For if it were related to only
one of the two, it would not connect both extremes to one another.
Situated in the middle in said manner, it exists in the participants,
as it proceeds from the participated entities, but establishes itself
firmly in the things that receive the latters activity, just like know-

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ledge, as we said before, exists in the knowing subjects and not in the
objects known.124 Indeed, the knowing subjects are related as participants to the objects known. For every knower wants to participate of
the known. This is the structure of participation, and all things
participate primarily of providence animate, inanimate, rational,
irrational, eternal and corruptible beings according to the power
proper to each of them (for they are all instruments of providence,
some serving it125 from near, some from afar). Therefore it is necessary that participation not only reveals providence as the cause from
which it proceeds, but also anticipates the aptitude of the participant;
this aptitude exists rationally in rational beings, intellectively in
intellective beings, in the way of imagination or perception in beings
that live according to imagination or perception, in the way of substance and mere being in those that have received being without life.
As all these are organs of providence and used by it, it is necessary
that every single one contributes to its own work, thus serving the
power using it, without obliterating in its activity either providences
proper mode of existence or its own nature, but displaying a single
[character] resulting from both. So they say that the sun transmits
light to the moon, which then comes from the moon unto us.126 Yet
this light is not like solar light, warm and dry, nor like lunar light,
murky and caliginous, but as a mixture of the power of the participated and the participant it changes with respect to its colour and the
activity it had. This can be observed in many other [phenomena].
23. Although providence is situated above all beings in accordance
with its divine union and exercises one activity befitting to the One,
everything that accedes to it participates in the manner it is naturally capable of. One thing shares in providence, and is perfected in
the manner of which it is naturally capable, just in order to exist,
another does so in order to live, still another in order to know, another
in order to [obtain] all [of these three]. Some things participate
always on account of their own power and have an uninterrupted
participation on account of both the infinite activity of their giver and
their own permanent and firm relation to it; others participate only
at times because their nature is unstable, and from their own weakness bestow this sometimes to their participation. Hence, they have
their well-being from providence, but the impermanence of their
well-being from the receiver. For the latter is indeed what withdraws
itself, whereas providence has the power to give always and always
gives to those beings that possess the power of always receiving from
it what it gives.127 Therefore, the participant does not attach the
sometimes to providence, but just removes from itself the always.
In the same way the sun always shines, but that which is not able
always to look at it and looks [only] at times does not attach the
sometimes to the light of the sun. Rather, by turning away from the

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light, it removed permanent vision from itself. Thus, even if the sun
has no effect upon this [being] because of the latters infirmity for
participation, its activity does affect those that are capable of receiving its illumination. Participation, however, is not present in this
being whenever it turns away, for we do not call participation the
activity itself of providence, but only what comes from this activity to
this [particular] thing.
24. If something, then, participates [only] at times, whereas providence is always active, this thing diminishes merely its own participation, without depriving the activity [of providence] from its
permanency, for the activity of god always remains the same. Similarly in the case of a face which is motionless: one thing which is
suitable and turned toward it is adorned, as when a mirror, which is
smooth and brilliant, placed opposite to the face would receive some
imprint from it, whereas another thing, either because of weakness
because it is too far away or also because it is turned away from it,
blurs what it receives from there for being irregular and dark. It
comes to be of such a nature because of its enjoyment of matter.128 A
case in point are the oracles:129 sometimes they participate of the
oracular gods,130 sometimes they leave off, becoming impotent and,
as it were, without spirit131 for a certain time. The cause of this
irregularity should be traced to the oracles themselves, since [the
gods] use without interruption spirits and constantly act upon that
which is capable of participation.132 For the true oracles, contrary to
the apparent ones,133 are those accomplished by angels, demons, and
heroes, who themselves are illuminated by the gods and by the
ever-present allotted regions of the universe (moirai).134 Yet certain
waters and chasms in the earth, because of their instable nature,
cannot always participate of them. [A further example are] the
powers of sacred rites, which sometimes enter statues and make
them alive and filled with divine inspiration, but leave off in certain
periods. One should, I think, attribute the deficiency of these, too, to
the recipients and not to any change of the activity of the gods
inspiring the statues.135 For we would not dare to blame the sun for
the eclipse136 of the moon either, but explain it by the fact that the
[moon] falls into the conical shadow of the earth.137 In general, one
should not attribute to providence, either, the impermanence in the
case of those things that sometimes enjoy providence. One should on
the contrary accept that the explanation is to be found in those beings
in which the participation takes place, and not in that [being] from
which these things as well as those that always participate get their
participation.
25. As providence is present to all things according to its unitary and
at the same time infinite activity, and as the beings that participate

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of it, now in this manner, then in that manner, manifest an incomprehensible variety, there must exist, so I believe, some bonds that
keep both [extremes] together, conjoining the One of providence with
the multitude of these [participants], the permanency of the former
with the instability of the latter. Among those intermediaries138 some
are more proximate to providence, namely some angels; some are
more proximate to [the multitude of participants], namely the socalled heroes; and some complete the mediating connection of the
extremes with the primarily participated, on the one hand, and the
ultimate participant, on the other, namely the demons who are
properly thus called.139 Through these intermediaries the junction
between instable beings and the unvarying permanence of providence, between multiplied beings and that which is both one and
infinite is accomplished. And sometimes the illuminations to the
beings posterior to them come from these [intermediaries], sometimes through these. For it makes a great difference whether something is illuminated140 by the superior classes141 or through the
superior classes this also produces a change of the illuminations.
For some, because of the inferiority of their aptitude, scarcely participate of the beings that are posited proximately above them, whereas
others, on account of their excellence, tend upwards to the participation of sublime beings. In the last case the illumination from the
proximate serves as matter for the gift coming from above.142 Take
the case of one person who is only capable of participating in geometry, and that of another who is able to participate in both geometry
and a more sublime doctrine.143 Though the latter, too, could not be
led upwards without geometry, having being accustomed to the
incorporeal through it,144 the former loves to practice what geometry
teaches, but is insufficiently strong to direct the eye of his soul145
toward what the intellect sees. It is, then, evident that for the first
person the perfection comes from geometry and that his ascent is as
far as to this, whereas for the latter the perfection passes through
geometry toward beings prior to it. If this is also the case in the
classes superior to us, it is one thing to be illuminated through the
classes posterior to the gods, another thing to be illuminated from
these classes.146 In the latter case the cause of illumination goes back
to the attendants of the gods, but in the former it goes back to the
presiding gods themselves;147 except that, although the illuminations, or rather some illuminations, come from them [i.e. from the
intermediate classes] in another sense these illuminations, too, come
from providence. Hence they receive their own power to illuminate
other beings. For they, too, have the providential activity from there,
as they imitate, in accordance with their order, the beneficent activity of [providence]. For, as we have often called to mind, it is necessary that some participate immediately of the first, some through
intermediaries; [and this mediation may happen in two ways]: either

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the intermediaries are seen as producing what they have from there
[i.e. the gods];148 or as leading, through what they have, the subsequent beings towards those [divine beings] from which they [themselves] derive their powers.
Let these be my answers to this question, able to lead those who are
well disposed by nature to the perfect contemplation of providence.
Fifth problem

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26. After this, if you please, let us examine another, fifth, problem.
For this too agitates the imaginations of many: if there is providence,
why does evil have a place among beings at all?149 This problem
persuaded many (1) either to accept evil because of its evidence and
dispute the existence of an all-pervasive providence (2) or to admit
that providence orders all things and get rid of evil by saying that all
things are only good (though some people want to call evil the good
things that are the most remote from the primary). For there is not
some evil that is not a lesser good.150
27. If (1), then, we too will agree with these people, there is no longer
a need to examine the problems that we set out to investigate. For
there will be no evil, the very thing that creates trouble for providence, as we said. If (2), however, we say that there is something that
is in some way evil, we must establish from where it comes at all. For
(2a) either it comes from providence, which is absurd, since from
providence comes everything that is good; or (2b) it comes from
another cause. (2b1) [But] if it comes from151 what comes from
providence, the argument runs the risk of tracing the cause [of evil]
back to providence again. For that which stems from something that
stems from providence, stems itself from providence. (2b2) And if it
comes from something which has no share of providence at all, we
will end up with two principles, one of good, and another of evil
things; then it will be impossible to keep providence free from
trouble, as it will have something contrary to it.152
Admitting, therefore, that evil exists, let us look in what manner
it exists, without disturbing the kingdom of providence.153 And because evil is twofold, one type existing in bodies contrary to nature,
another in souls contrary to reason, and neither exists in all bodies
nor in the universal souls,154 let us first consider how, in agreement
with providence, what is contrary to nature can exist and in what
kinds of body.
28. What is contrary to nature is only found in corruptible bodies:
that is obvious, since what cannot be in a state contrary to nature is
everlasting,155 if indeed to be contrary to nature is a path to nonbeing. But everything that perishes has a place among beings for the

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very reason given by Timaeus,156 that the universe should not be

incomplete and that primary beings should not be the last of all: for
everlasting beings come first and are cognate to the [demiurgic]
cause. If, then, evil exists in order that the corruptible exist, and the
latter exists in order that there be not only that which is perpetual,
and this again in order that the universe be complete and perfect,157
and this again because of the providence for the world, then it has
been shown in the clearest possible way that evil exists because of
providence, so that providence may be perfect in producing a perfect
world. Therefore, for this evil too158 the good is the end, since it is
because of the good that this [evil] too is incorporated in beings so as
to contribute to the whole. For all corruption is because of the
generation of another thing, and all that is against nature exists in
order that something in accordance with nature may come about, and
not the other way around.
29. Hence, that which exists for the sake of the good is not evil in all
respects nor is it unmixed with the good, but it is evil for a certain
thing, namely for that which is corrupted, and good for another thing,
namely for that which comes to be because of the corruption of the
former. Hence, [this evil] is also good for the universe. Indeed, it is
good for the universe by being the cause of corruption [for one thing]
and the cause of generation for another. For there must be generation
as well as corruption, and the universe needs both of them in order
for it to be the All,159 as it is so often called. Although that which
corrupts does so according to nature, that which is affected is affected
contrary to nature. But perhaps even the latter is affected according
to nature.160 For as it is one of a pair of contraries, it is according to
nature to be affected by its contrary. Thus, it has become already
clear to us that, because of the excellent providence within the
universe, the contrary to nature received an entry into being, and
that it is not simply contrary to nature, but rather in accordance with
nature than contrary to nature. As a matter of fact, it is in accordance
with nature for that which is corruptible to be corrupted and for that
which is capable of corrupting to corrupt. And if there are contraries,
there must be one that is corruptible and another that is corruptive; and if there is to be generation, there must also be contraries;
for generation comes from contraries. If, then, generation is according to providence and that which is prior to [generation] is
according to providence, also that which is contrary161 to nature
and comes to exist along with162 the generation of one thing from
another,163 is an instrument used by the cause of the processes of
generation to accomplish what is according to nature. Now let this
discussion, which does not require a long argument, find its conclusion here.

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30. Passing on to the consideration of what is contrary to reason and

is evil in souls let us consider how this too exists in accordance with
providence.
Well, in this case too, the meeting of contraries of some sort I
mean of the immortal soul and the mortal creates room for that
which is contrary to reason. For whenever that which is mortal
prevails over that which is divine in us, vice arises in us. For
instance, when anger or desire prevails, for themselves the affections
by which they are affected are natural, that is, [it is natural] for anger
to be in anger, for desire to be desiring (for the very affection that is
natural for each of them is that by which it is indeed affected). But
for the divine part [to be affected in that way] is contrary to nature,
because the divine part is essentially foreign to mortal passions, even
if these are natural for the beings that have been allotted an irrational nature.164 Since, however, the divine part in us is reason, this
[evil] received as name contrary to reason, instead of being called
contrary to nature.165 Likewise when reason wins, the good is established in the souls and the name for this good is according to reason
instead of according to nature. Both parts, however, are because of
their desire for what is natural [to them] eager to act accordingly: the
one to live in a passionate way, the other to live without passions; the
one rationally, the other irrationally. In the mixture of both, however,
and in their relation with one another, evil acquires existence, yet not
a principal existence, not even here, but what is rightly called a
parasitical existence (parhupostasis).166 It is to everyone clear, then,
that what is called contrary to reason (and not contrary to the
irrational)167 is not only evil, but is also [in a sense] not evil. Indeed,
it is evil for that being for which it is contrary to reason [i.e. the
rational part]; but is not evil for that for which it is according to
nature [i.e. the irrational part]. That is clear. For where there is no
reason, for instance in irrational animals, nothing of these things168
is evil. Moreover, the fact that it is according to nature for a passion
to be passionate does not make it contrary to nature for it to be ruled
by reason. For the latter state is even more in accordance with nature
than what belongs to it from its proper nature. For when of two
opposites one is better, the other worse, the latter is subject to its own
passion when acting according to its natural ability, but is transformed to what is superior to its nature, when it becomes subservient
to the better. For reason too, when acting as reason, frustrates that
which in us is better than reason.169 Yet in so doing it merely
activates the kind of activity that naturally belongs to it. If, however,
the [better part] prevails, reason will obtain to a greater degree what
is good for it. For every being has both a good at its own level, and a
greater good that comes from what is better than itself, as the
intellect has the capacity to act divinely, and the soul to act intellectively, and the body to have self-motion. This then is also true of the

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irrational: when it remains as such, is angry and desires, it is moved

according to nature and the more so as each of them [anger and
desire] remains itself (for everything, indeed natural existence also
increases natural activity). But when the irrational converses with
the divine [i.e. rational] part in us and gets in its way in order to
exercise its own activities, although it has the ability to participate
in the greater good which comes from the [divine part], it remains
deprived of this good as long as it wants to be moved with its own
motions, and this offers the evil that is called against reason an
entry into partial souls.
31. If what we say is true, people who believe that these facts are not
in accordance with providence must either blame the divine soul for
its descent into the realm of generation or the mortal soul for its
existence in body.170 But if these people grant that both171 happen in
accordance with providence, they must absolutely refer also the
origin of what is contrary to reason to a good worthy of providence
which pervades the world. Clearly it is good that the divine soul
descends to the last part of the universe, in order that also in this
way172 the All is complete173 and is not only full of rational immortal
animals and, besides those, of irrational mortal animals, but also of
living beings intermediate between these, beings that are both rational and mortal. Let it be added that it also contains irrational
immortal beings: for such a tribe174 too exists in this universe.175
Without these the world would be truly incomplete. It is moreover
clear to all that, given that the divine soul proceeds to generation, the
mortal soul had to be present to the bodies prior to the divine and that
the divine soul should not itself inhabit these fleshy, bony and, in
short, earthy organs.176 For how could a body destitute of life and
mixed out of many elements participate directly in an incorporeal
and immortal soul? And if it had really entered the material masses
would it not have blinded its own reason, being itself affected by all
the affections of the mortal soul? For perceiving the bodily affections
it would itself be subject to the affections of sense perception, and
holding the imprints of these affections, it would be subject to the
affections of imagination, and desiring things needed for the body it
would itself be subject to the affections of desire; and wanting to ward
off177 whatever is harmful to the mortal animal, it would be subject
to the affections of anger. For if it were not active about all these
things, or rather if it were not affected by them, it would soon have a
serious destructive effect on the body, and its descent would have
been in vain, as the [bodies] receiving it would not have benefited
from it but would suffer destruction. For it is not possible to know the
things which may corrupt [the body] from outside without sense-perception that knows the particulars. Nor can it yearn for drinks and
food without desire, nor manage the mortal without memory of what

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can harm or benefit it. In so far as it was better for the soul not to
undergo itself the affections, but to let something other undergo
them, even if the soul is occasionally troubled by this other thing,178
and this only sometimes, not always, to that extent it was a greater
good for the soul to endure the irrational [soul] than to turn itself into
something irrational by undergoing the passions of the irrational
[soul]. If, therefore, it was necessary that the immortal soul should
descend to this place and that the mortal soul too should come to
exist179 for the sake of it, and that both facts are according to providence, contrariety to reason should180 also be referred to the same
decree of providence. And just as in the case of the bodies what is
contrary to nature is for the sake of what is according to nature, thus
too in the case of the souls what is contrary to reason is for the sake
of what is according to reason. For the activity contrary to reason
exists so that reason in us may act according to reason. But enough
of this problem. For we have said enough for the present occasion.
Sixth problem
32. Next, let us discuss a sixth issue: if there is providence and if,
given the existence of providence, there must also be that which is
meritorious, how can there be such inequality of human lives in the
world?182 Some have tyrannical power, although they are vicious;
others are enslaved, although they are virtuous. Some are faring well
as regards their bodily condition, in what fortune bestows on them,
and all such similar things. Others, on the contrary, though [living]
better forms of life are besieged by adverse circumstances. Regarding
all these cases the theory of providence seems to be hard pressed for
an explanation.
Not only are equal fortunes here distributed over people of unequal merit, which in itself is already unreasonable,183 but there is
also an inverse distribution of unequal fortunes such that the worse
fortunes go to the better people, the better to the worse.184 And yet it
is not the arithmetic mean which seems to be appropriate to such
[distributions], but rather the geometric185 mean, which he [Plato] for
this reason deigned worthy of the appellation Zeus verdict.186
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33. The first thing to be said is this. Since providence, as we have

said, gives to all what is fitting and provides the ends that agree with
the characters, it is not at all surprising that it gives to the virtuous
that which will increase their virtue and to the non-virtuous that
about which they seriously care in their neglect of virtue. Such people
when doing bodily exercise get health, when excited about money and
power get money and power, things which the virtuous hold in
contempt. Just as those who are exclusively focused on apparent
goods are not demotivated by the fact that they are not temperate,

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that they are not spectators of true being, that their souls are not
undamaged, in the same way the virtuous are not displeased by the
fact that they are not rich and have no power, for they do not exert
themselves over it, being practitioners of virtue alone, which they
already possess. For neither do peasants get irritated by not obtaining what sailors do, nor are the latter displeased for not partaking in
the harvest, but both these [professions] stick to their own goals and
when they obtain them believe that they enjoy them thanks to
providence.
Let us therefore not say that the giving by providence is without
concern for geometry, but rather that it is most harmonious:187 it
grants good things to all, but to each individually those to which they
apply themselves and of which they show themselves worthy, be they
apparent or real goods. And this too is clear: how the person that
pursues virtue always attains what he desires and lives in accordance with virtue, but the person who seeks external things does not
always obtain that which is connected with his appetite. In this case,
too, providence provides what is fitting to character: giving to the one
something lasting and self-sufficient, to the others what is insecure
and full of indigence.
34. This is what needed to be said first. Next, however, we have to
say that, for honest people, the shortage of apparent goods even
contributes to virtue. For it whets the soul of some people so as to
despise them, exercises them in adverse conditions, gets them used
to treating the body with contempt, turns them away from the
excitement about apparent goods. To other people it conveys more
forcefully the true greatness of virtue. For it strips [virtue] from the
things that most people believe to be good, displaying it in itself to
those who are capable of seeing true beauty188 as something venerable and surpassing those things that stun189 the masses. For we do
not admire the skill of the helmsman when the sea is calm and there
is no wind, but only if there are storms and a rough sea. Likewise we
do not admire virtue when our human affairs prosper, but we do
admire the virtue that remains undisturbed under the blows of [bad]
fortune.
35. Thirdly, if we say that providence has a pedagogical function even
for those people who do not live in accordance with <virtue>190 by
distributing goods in a such a way [as described above], our conjecture might not be far from the truth. For if it were always giving
wealth, bodily beauty and power to the virtuous, and all kinds of
disgrace, dishonour, poverty and more such things to the wicked,
then virtue, for being all-inclusive, would truly appear to have prestige and wickedness would have all that is to be shunned.191 In
reality, however, providence reveals virtue [as it is] by itself alone,

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but wickedness in the company of its specific additional advantages.

And virtue is admired all the more when coupled with bad luck,
whereas wickedness is to be shunned all the more even when coupled
with good luck. Providence thus stimulates, in persons with a good
nature, the desire for virtue and the avoidance of wickedness. For
they see that wickedness by itself puts any good fortune to shame and
that virtue makes every circumstance into a true ornament; that
virtue uses its own ornament, whereas wickedness does not even
leave the ornaments it borrows undamaged, but taints those <too>192
with ugliness. Or is not wealth made reprehensible by injustice, health
by intemperance, power by smallness of mind? And does not greatness
of mind193 adorn poverty, does not courage grace ill health and pride
powerlessness? When we say that these distributions of things are
lessons given by providence, we will not be far off from the truth.
36. Furthermore we should say that, evidently a human being is soul
that has been shown conclusively but a soul that uses body and a
mortal form of life.194 These latter often contravene the erotic occupation of the immortal soul with the truly beautiful195 and they require
things that are able to keep them in check. Such as, for instance,
sickness, lest a vigorous body drags about the intellect in us; or
poverty, lest the intemperate form of life gets the opportunity to stuff
itself by means of possessions; or lack of power, lest the love of
honour196 [stuffs itself with honour]. For that reason even many
honest people prefer to inhabit pestilential regions over healthy ones,
thus chastising the festering body and choosing to carry around an
ailing instrument rather than one that because of its strength despises its user. Others have thrown away the wealth they had,
wanting to have their souls free from the passions that spring up
through wealth. And many [examples] will come to mind for the
students of these things: Plato, who settled in a pestilential location
in order to deliver his body from excess;197 Crates, who threw away
his money shouting the famous words Crates sets Crates free from
money198 and a good deal of similar stories.
37. Now, if providence bestows on the virtuous those goods which
they themselves, even without it, destine for themselves out of love
for virtue, how could one blame it for giving [these] to the virtuous?
How then should one not rather call punishments the gifts of such
things to the wicked?199 Indeed, by providing the instruments of vice
they expose these peoples depravity, of which they may not have
been aware, and increase200 the verdict for what these people do when
they make bad use of these instruments. Providence does not make
even these people worse when it supplies them with these instruments. For many dispositions remain incurable as long as they
remain inactive. They too would need some kind of treatment.201

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Moreover, virtue too, which is not one nor indivisible at that

but has many forms, is stirred up by providence, so we have to
assume, toward ever different realisations of its reason-principles,202
in order that the person who has virtue acts in accordance with every
aspect of his virtue and proves himself, to the organisers of the virtue
competitions, to be a genuine athlete of virtue.203
Therefore providence often forces men of action to rest, thereby
turning their intellect toward itself. And those who look only to the
inside it moves to action, thus teaching them what their specific kind
of virtue was and to what extent it is variegated.204 To these purposes
therefore it both gives the instruments and takes away again some
of those she has given. By introducing variations into their lives
providence spurs the disposition of the virtuous toward all activity,
which is the exercise of governance of this world together with the
gods.205 For the same reason does it expel the one or the other from
his fatherland and takes him away from parents and friends, in order
that this person gets around and finds himself in all kinds of situation
while always remaining the same, and comes to consider206 the earth
as not so great.207 It keeps another person in his familiar surroundings as a servant for the gods of his fathers, and a familiar208 helper
in the service of the providential care for his relatives.
Therefore any moral person, and not just an engineer, might say
By the power given to me I move any state of affairs209 for virtue
is truly a power, not to be found wanting in the face of external
circumstances, and also These were given to my by providence
as exercises for the reason-principles in me. One has to make use
of them in a noble way and not let oneself be bent by any odd
circumstance,210 for it is not given to everyone either to bear
extreme good luck with temperance or to suffer extreme bad luck
with magnanimity.211
38. Let us put it in another way. The work of providence does not
confine the bestowal of all kinds of goods to a single individual.
Likewise Plato when founding the ideal state was not of the opinion
that he should equip one single class with all goods, but rather
thought he should assign different goods to different people. For that
was the task of someone making the state <as a whole>212 prospering
and not just one part.213 [Therefore,] since the souls descended into
the realm of becoming, they should experience also some of the evils
down here. Nudged by those [evils] they will be made to long for the
transition from here to that place which is free from evils.214 For those
who are virtuous out of themselves, providence has devised the gift
of apparent evils to this very purpose. But the wicked had to partake
of the good, and indeed they partake in some image of it. And the just
punishments direct them, too, towards the flight from this place.

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39. Furthermore, of all the things we possess some we have through

our souls capacity for self-determination,215 others because we suffer
from other people, still others through the sole agency of the universe.216 For the things then of which we ourselves are master by
acting on our own, we have only ourselves to blame. For the responsibility, as he [Plato] says,217 is with the person who chooses,218
whether it is illness or poverty someone owes to himself. Providence
is not to be blamed.219 For we do not say that providence, which has
brought about the capacity of free choice, rules in the universe for the
sake of the abolishment of this freedom, but as preserving its coming
about.220 As for the things done to us by others,221 though we may
unjustly suffer, [we should consider that] the law of the universe
allows parts to act on each other according to their own inclinations.
All things converging to constitute a unity are of this kind, some
acting and suffering by nature, others by choice. A just verdict,
however, will befall all, those who act in a good and those who act in
a bad way. And for the victim the suffering is deserved, but the agent
does not escape from the law.222 And as with natural agents one does
not say that a random agent acts on a random patient nor that a
random patient undergoes the action of a random agent.223 Similarly
with agents acting on choice it does not seem to be the case that a
random patient undergoes the action of a random agent, but rather
that a specific agent has been put in place in the universe for the
benefit of this patient. Neither, however, is the person who acted
exempted from getting his adjudication,224 although he was the
instrument of the universe. For the [specific] quality of his inclination brings the agent to justice. Indeed, the agent was not like
it were an inanimate instrument, but one that has put itself in line
with its user.225
As for the things we undergo solely by [the agency of] the universe,
whether they be rather good or rather bad things, they find their
explanation, so we must believe, in our own merit. And that merit
must either be referred to our present life for instance in the case
where we need some kind of rein; many indeed are made better
because of their difficult situation or to our previous life for they
were not honest people from the outset and there is a need for
purification of their ways of living before they were virtuous or to
our future life.226 [In the last case,] providence leads us away from
human [occupations], in order that, having virtue alone as a perfection, we give first rank in ourselves to the love of virtue, being
persuaded that only virtue is something good.
40. Furthermore, in the same way one could inquire why equal things
come from providence to unequal people on the arithmetic understanding of equality (for that is the remaining [problem])227 for
instance, when whole cities perish, there being a common destruction

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of both the good and the bad in the [city], that is, a similar situation,
apparently, affecting people of dissimilar character.
To someone asking this question one could reply, I think, first that
these people do not suffer similar things insofar they happen to be
dissimilar, but insofar they are similar. For instance, by having
chosen the same city, by having embarked on the same ship, by
joining the same military expedition, or by some other circumstance
of this kind, and so, for having done the same thing they suffer
something in common.
But insofar some are better and others worse, they experience the
common calamity differently: the ones indeed bemoan, the others
calmly bear their ruin and after their departure some are received by
the abode destined for the good, others by the abode for the bad.
Secondly, in the case of such coordinated fates of people that are
saved together or perish together there is some kind of order in the
universe linking both, a kind of common revolution of fate that from
different beginnings results in the same end, a running together of
courses that either save everyone or let everyone perish. The parts
have to follow the whole, this part perpetrating or suffering something together with that, and another again with yet another. For
comparison take an individual whose heart is in a <bad>228 shape.
Sometimes some single [bodily] part is co-affected, whereas sometimes more parts are co-affected. Likewise in this universe the less
important parts suffer some of their own sufferings and others
they suffer in common with the more important parts.229 That the
latter do not suffer anything of those things suffered by the former
is no wonder. Hence, if the motions of the ones [the important
things] are in accordance with providence, then so too are the
effects that necessarily follow from these. If no argument commands us to believe that the effects that result from these motions
are in accordance with providence, it will not be possible either to
maintain that those motions themselves are in accordance with
providence.
41. We should add to what we have said in reply to those who criticise
the equality in unequal cases that they have overlooked that for
many reasons the equality of souls takes on different forms in different contexts.230 Indeed, insofar as souls belong to the same god,231 for
instance sun and moon, some, more than others, assimilate themselves to one another, and insofar as they have done things in
common232 in previous [life] cycles, it is no wonder that now too they
suffer the same, repaying with common sufferings their due in return
for the actions they perpetrated together. And233 the greater the
commonality amongst each other, the stronger the similarity tends
to be of the things happening to them.

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42. And to those who criticise the inequality of what people receive
from providence in relation to their character, [the following shall be
said]. Besides the fact that the morally superior have the upper hand
with respect to true goods, whereas the morally inferior fare better
with respect to apparent goods, which was [said to constitute] an
example of distribution according to merit, providence moreover
procures the most important of the apparent goods pre-eminently for
the virtuous even if they do not make any special effort for them. Or
should we not put a good reputation before pleasure, wealth and
bodily health? Only the virtuous enjoy a good reputation, just as the
wicked are all ill-reputed and deprived of respect, even if a thousand
flatterers swirl around them. For as soon as they are dead they are
mocked by those who extolled them while alive. As for the virtuous,
they are admired to a larger extent [after they die], even by those who
despised them while alive. If then the most important even of external goods falls to the lot of the morally superior, how would we not
maintain that providence in these cases too aims at merit, bestowing
on some what lasts the life down here like cattle they long to be
fattened and to but with their horns234 while to others it gives
something they can take with them into the life hereafter. For the
former live according to their mortal soul part, the latter according
to the immortal one. Hence to those who relish the mortal part among
the things inside them also the more mortal ones among the external
things are fitting, but to those who advance the immortal, things that
are immortal to a higher degree are appropriate. In both cases the
principle of merit is preserved by the similarity of what is given to
the life of those upon whom it is bestowed. Consider that the person
having virtue is also blessed with good humour,235 which is a feature
of the gods as well, whereas the whole life of the depraved person is
spent in worries and trouble, when he takes enjoyment in the pleasures of animals and lives the savage, bitter life of venomous creatures. And there is not rest from these evils,236 for they are
insatiable.237 [If all that is so,] how then could it not be clear to
everyone that providence shows the one as being made equal to the
superior beings,238 whereas it ranks with beings inferior to human
nature239 the one who tries to satisfy his passions by means of what
is given to him [by providence]?
Seventh problem

43. Well then, leaving the investigation of this topic, let us move on
to the related problems that are customarily raised concerning irrational animals, and direct our attention to this seventh problem.240
Since providence extends to these as well,241 wherein consists the
inequality among them? For instance of those having an agreeable
life and those that do not; of those that are weighed down by diseases

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and those that are in good shape; and of those that differ from each
other in other such ways? And wherein consists the equality in their
case, dissimilar as they are? For in their case too, just as with
humans, do we see that catastrophes occur in which they perish
together. Here too we have to examine the reason for what happens,
in the conviction that providence extends down to the lowest
things.242 And indeed, concerning the fact that they eat each other we
have to look for what reason this happens.243 For these are the three
issues that pose a problem regarding providence in relation to them:
the inequality in what happens to them; the common perishings
inflicted on them too; their eating each other.
Let us say something about these issues already now, by first
making the following distinction: either there is in them too some
vestige of self-moving life and something separate from the body, or
there is no such thing and the kind of soul inhabiting them is in its
entirety quenched together with the body for it would be something
like the qualities or like the innate heat. Those distinctions having
been made, we will not lack arguments to demonstrate the governance of providence in their case too.
44. If in them244 too there is, as we said, some vestige of self-moving
life,245 and this has from246 itself the power to do both something
worse or something better that is precisely what we call self-motion
either in accordance with belief or in reality, then we may attribute
to providence their prospering, their eating each other, their perishing in common, as in the case of humans. Providence indeed treats
each of the passions proper to them, orders them and tempers them
justly, bringing them together either in accordance with the similarity of their lives, or with the cosmic cycles247 or with both (for this was
the case for human souls too,248 more truly so). Providence leaves
their eating each other up to them, just as it is also in our power to
attack one another.249 The norm of justice is the same in both cases,
except that, in the manner of wild animals, the revenge exacted by
them on one another ends in the feasting on one another, since they
have no money and possessions to trigger greediness.250 That is
indeed absent.251 The only possibility left for evil to cleanse itself is
the attack from bodies on bodies. And this is a very important work
of providence, also in their case to use the shameful as an instrument
as it were for the cleansing of the similar adopting the principle
Unjustly for the perpetrator, justly for the victim.252 This in itself
shows that the user is another;253 that therefore the experience of
suffering is a just one; and that this and everything similar [i.e. the
just and unjust] also has its place among these [animals]. For to
them too, because of the vestige of self-motion, the principle applies
that [it is possible] out of themselves to be in a better or worse
condition. They can by all means become less just or more just,254

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more moderate or more licentious, tamer and wilder. What comes to

them from providence will reasonably be different things. For it takes
away the bitterness of some by [making them experience] patience,
or provides to others the benefits of a more temperate life, or demands from others, who have behaved unjustly255 to one another, the
retribution that consists in their being made to suffer the one from
the other.
One could expand on many more similar things because of the
similarity of their lives which metes out also to them situations
similar to those of humans. For it is possible to trace back the
coordinations [of their fates] and their perishing or being saved
together to either the community in essence or to the fact that the
demons that guide them like leaders of a herd256 are the same or to
the sameness of the cosmic cycle that is concordant with itself or to
the repayment of the same debt because of the sameness of their
actions. Each of these possibilities will receive a plausible explanation, for instance that those who have led a similarly cruel life will
meet the same fate and likewise those who have become unjust. Their
parallel course <must>257 be fated258 because their descent into [the
realm of] becoming is concordant259 (the hypothesis260 is indeed that
they possess some self-moving part separate from the body). The
demons allotted to them261 take pleasure, some in deaths of this kind,
others in <births>,262 some in these, others in others.263 Or as far as
their essence is concerned, some are akin to each other, others
unrelated, and hence some find themselves subject to similar experiences, others to experiences opposite to those. Or all these
[explanations] converge according to a single decree of providence,
according to which also fated events are woven together with what is
in our power and the antecedents are connected with the consequences; and there happens to be a single fabric in which all things are
woven together, even those that seem to be detached. For whence comes
that coordination and [their being] one, if not from the one, which we
have said to define providence most of all and which also renders that
which becomes good, since the good coincides with the one?
45. But suppose that every form of live in irrational animals is
mortal, somehow264 residing in a mortal body, [being] just like body
and having nothing of its own, but everything from that in which it
resides: then indeed the principle of providence in them will be by all
means similar and shared,265 as also in the case of plants, in which
there resides only a nature without any imaginations266 and which
have nothing that is separable from their root. What then is the
principle of providence in the case of these [plants] and the [animals] that have sensation and imagination, if at all, being capable
only of experiencing or having experienced what comes from sense
perception?267

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Maybe [look at it in the following way:] for all things in this world
there is only one reason-principle, consisting of all these; and of its
parts, some are more important, analogously to the heart and the
leading parts in ourselves, others less important than the former,
without however being cast down to the lowest rank, comparable to
the lungs and the organs that cooperate with those [leading] parts;
and still other parts are at a rank most remote from the principles, similar
to our nails and those parts in us that possess just the faintest echo of
life.268 Considering this, we may say that the whole world, in all its parts,
needs to have the benefit of both, providence and fate; I mean, just like our
body, as a whole and in all of its parts, has the benefit of nature and of
rational soul exercising providence over each; yet those parts that have a
leading role profit more from providence, the lowest parts more from fate,
and those in the middle no more from the one than from the other.
46. The first and leading parts of the universe indeed show very clear
marks of the gifts of providence. They always follow their path in
perfect order, thereby imitating intellect and being all good and
beneficent toward the other parts. They are creative and life-giving
and are in full control of perfect virtue.269 The intermediate parts
those are the ones that use choice and have received a life that frolics
from one extreme to the other do not appear to be governed any less
by the one than by the other [i.e. providence and fate].270 For people
have experience of providence as something evident insofar that they
say that they are aware of its influence and that Nemesis corrective
activity with respect to light talk is familiar to all.271 People are also
aware of fate, in such a way that, because of the manifest character
of many events that have their origin in fate, they attribute many
things that are in their [own] power to it. Indeed, gifts from both of
them are theirs and strike their attention. They experience the one
[providence] in the oracles, in the epiphanies of gods or demons, in
dream therapy and all such occasions.272 They experience the other
[fate] when they get into all kinds of distress and are aware of the
activity of the stars reaching down as far as to us.273 As a consequence, there are many different beliefs among the different people
[of the earth]: some asseverate throughout that fate is in charge of
everything, others are convinced that providence, above all, presides
over human affairs. For the manifest presence of each of the two [i.e.
providence and fate] in our lives induces the imperfect conception
that either the one or the other <is> the only one.274 Because of its
activity it strikes us, but because of our imperfect grasp of what
strikes us it seems to be the only one. Struck by both is the person
who possesses something akin to the striking force: the intellect in us
is akin to providence, whereas the necessity in us is akin to fate. We
live either in accordance with intellect being present in us in all ways
or in accordance with the necessity in us.

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47. The third rank of inhabitants of the world are those that have
nothing transcendent. Yet even though these too partake of both
[providence and fate] they live almost exclusively in accordance with
fate, as they receive their shape from there and are in their entirety
and in all respects governed by it. For fate is [the power] governing
body and everything that, either in substance or with respect to its
activities, has its seat in the body.275 Everything then, which is
available from providence for beings living in this way is woven
together with the works of fate and is as it were fated, being coaffected with them.276
Therefore, since fate has provided the principle of their coming
into being and shapes277 their being as such, their well-being too
follows in accordance with this principle,278 which is precisely the
ultimate trace of providence with respect to them. By consequence, if
their original constitution has a share of this kind in the universe,
their life and death will for them be of this kind too, corresponding to
their original constitution. If, however, one of them has some other
kind of origin, it will also receive some other kind of features from the
things descending toward it from up there. Hence, whether they
destroy one another or suffer their misfortune by other agents,
whether they undergo this misfortune together or separately;
whether they experience it with pleasure or pain: all these [eventualities] are consequences of earlier motions. Therefore the less
important parts are necessarily always followers and have nothing
of their own, but always experience the same, like a shadow279 that
is transformed in various shapes in accordance with the motions of
the body whose shadow it is.
And <such is the correspondence to merit in their case>,280 namely
that something of such and such a shape must have such and such a
life. For also in the case of self-movers we say that the quality of each
defines their merit, but that quality is for them something that comes
from themselves, whereas for non-self-movers it comes from others.
48. One should not ask the further question, why some specific thing
has come to be in this particular rank of the universe, and that thing
in another.281 Or why this one is in pleasure, the other in pain because
of the principle of its constitution, which provides for the creature
constituted in accordance with this principle either a natural state or
one contrary to nature. For to ask this question is to ask for a
principle of a principle.282 The only principle for such things is the
order of the universe. One should not look for a principle prior to it
in the case of things that have nothing prior [to itself], for there is
nothing [prior] at all.283 But this principle284 is always productive of
something, now this, now that, and will indeed fabricate the things
that come to be in accordance with its own mode of production alone.
If, however, something from elsewhere and having a prior existence

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comes into this order of things, it is necessary to ask in the case of

this creature about its merit and about its being in agreement with
its rank and about what connects it with its rank otherwise285 the
one would be connected in vain with the other. Everything that does
not enter into a rank, however, but originates in it, is in unison with
its order, even if there is nothing which brings them together. And
therein consists the principle of merit for that thing, namely to be
bound up with the order from which it has taken its origin. For the
fact of having originated it receives no merit. For everything that is
in accordance with merit is attributed to something pre-existing, but
this thing did not exist at all before its coming into being in such a
way as to make it possible for us to ask about the merit of its coming
into being. Therefore, to summarise our position, for those who exist
prior to their order [in the universe] their order is in accordance with
merit; for those who originate from a certain order [their order] is not
in accordance with merit, but is the principle of what is [for them] in
accordance with merit. For what is in accordance with merit is
posterior and not first. This is confirmed by the common notions,
which say that this one suffers according to merit and another not
according to merit, namely when they see nothing prior because of
which what happens afterwards is deserved. That is what we had to
say about this issue.

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Eighth problem
49. Next, let us discuss an eighth issue,286 that is often talked about,
troubles many people and makes them contest providence,287 namely
the fact that the punishments that providence metes out to wrongdoers do not immediately follow upon the wrong-doings, but only
after some time, even a very long one. What is the rationale for this
to happen? Surely offenders would benefit more if they were immediately punished than if the punishment is deferred for such a long
time that they do not even know for what they are punished. What is
more, they even conceive a grudge against providence because they
feel the punishments but have forgotten what they did wrong for
instance people who in other lives pay the penalty for previous lives,
or even in this life for crimes committed a long time ago. Now, since
providence acts for the good and since those who are sanctioned at
the time of their crimes get more of the good,288 why do we not see this
happening? In some cases the exact opposite happens: good people
have no explanation for their sufferings, since they have forgotten the
deeds for which the present punishments befall to them: good people,
that is! Bad people, however, attribute theirs to circumstances,289
although it is they that incur them [i.e. their punishments]. And
because they see them happen no more to themselves than to people
who are said to be good, they do not think these events speak against

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their own badness. They rather call the exercise of goodness vain, but
not that of vice. For if, from above, the same things flow to both
[goodness and vice], in the appearances vice happens to obtain the
bigger share of things. If, however, the punishment of the offence
were simultaneous with the deed, neither would the bad person
blame fortune when he is punished nor would the good bear a grudge.
For someone who suffers while being good would not blame his own
life. For no debt, as someone says, when it becomes overdue so
augments effrontery as the debt of merited punishment,290 when
badness prospers,291 that is.
50. Now, a retribution that is directly connected with the wrongdoings and whose cause is clearly understood by the wrongdoers does
not necessarily eliminate depravity or hinder the actions springing
from it. That is somehow clear to everyone when we consider people
who get every day punished for what they have done, yet do the same
things for which they were punished, stringing together without
gaps, so to speak, deeds with punishments and punishments with
deeds. They commit crimes of sacrilege, plundering, robbery, licentiousness and undergo the due sanction for it which is in some cases
a legal sanction [carried out] by men, in other cases a sanction
[carried out by] demons and show no greater restraint for knowing
what they get beaten for. For the innate root of wickedness292 brings
forth the same activities without being turned around by the punishments that follow them, just like thorn-producing land will bring
forth more of the same even if you cut the burgeoning thorns293 a
thousand times.294 Hence, if even retribution immediately following
the wrongdoings does not contribute anything, so to speak, or very
little, to deter295 bad people from doing wrong, why do we blame
providence for its delay because of this? <Now> why would we say a
retribution accompanying the wrongdoings is of little use? Even
when retribution is foretold most clearly and is universally acknowledged badness does not cower with respect to the satisfaction of its
own inclinations. No, it puts the immediate obtainment of what it
desires before the blow296 that lies before our eyes, separating the
deed from the expected punishment by the already and not yet.
51. Moreover, that it is not a sign of craftsmanship to join the
corrections immediately to the wrongdoings is shown by the judgments made by physicians who truly master their art. These observe
not only the pathologies but also the right moments during which
each of them is wont to be treated,297 and wait for those, even if they
seem to be long away, and do not attack298 diseases when they are
still, as they say, unripe, explaining that proper timing is the vital
point of the treatment.299 Such opportune moments, I think,300 are
also heeded by providence,301 not only for pathologies of the body but

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also for pathologies of the soul different opportune moments for

different pathologies; thus providence preserves an ensouled302 therapy.303 Making the interest of the patient its goal, it must wait for the
opportune time for the retribution, whether it is necessary to grant
some good or to purge away the opposite.304 For also he himself305 says
that, with the gods, fortune and timing govern the totality of human
affairs. If it is the right moment that always puts every activity to
work, including the one that corrects transgressions of the natural or
rational (the natural pertaining to bodies, the rational to all human
affairs, so to speak),306 it is obviously necessary to suppose that, prior
to these things, the providence ruling over this universe knows
whether it is necessary to delay or to heal the badness immediately,
and that it is not concerned with what would please us little people,
but rather with how it could be beneficial by bringing the therapy to
the wicked at the right moment. Obviously, the healing of souls,
called chastisement,307 is of all the medical arts the one that is the
most characterised by true craftsmanship.308 For the patient is soul,
a divine thing, so to speak, and its badness is more diverse than that
of the body.309 So, for a greater therapy providence will need a greater
craftsmanship. A greater craft does not consist in pleasing others by
the speed of its execution but in helping those in need of healing,
whether faster or slower, assisted by the right timing.310 If then it is
inappropriate for uncultured people to criticise the cultured, and
more generally, for the craftless to criticise craftspeople,311 no one
ought to criticise providence in ignorance of the fact that it knows
that which in every treatment of bodies and souls is the most important, the right moment.312 Nor shall one urge justice to cast its vote
because one is being goaded on by sheer viciousness. One should
rather listen to providence as it says: For you the time to suffer is
now, and for the perpetrators the suitable time to suffer will come.313
If one thinks about this carefully, one will pity them for their persisting viciousness.314 And while realising that one is oneself already
getting what awaits them one will be, I think, an admirer of providence and sing its praise.
52. Also look, if you please, at another argument, the most veridical
of all, by considering315 wherein a righteous punishment would consist, and what the evil is for which some people will be rightly
punished. Well, that [evil] would be a mutilation and perversion of
the soul and because of that it is called, and it is, its real evil, when
the soul is sick from the worst disease, not a disease of the liver nor
of the heart mortal and corruptible things, whose natural state
consists in the fact that its components are in an unnatural state316
but a disease of the life that is in essence divine but is struck by
disaster because of its falling down to an alien place, because it knows
neither itself nor that place and embraces the place that is alien to

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it.317 We shall state that the righteous punishment consists in the

deliverance from that wound, bringing a purgation of real evil and a
disease that is really terrible.318 For a disease of the body is not
terrible for the soul, as it draws the soul back from its inclination
toward the body. Its own disease, however, is [terrible for the soul],
as it ties it to the body and completely drags it down toward [the
realm of] becoming. By saying, then, that punishment is the treatment of this disease, we do not mean that the fact that the diseased
are being subjected to a penalty is truly a punishment, but on the
contrary, that not being subjected to a penalty would be.319 For those
who pay the penalty benefit, whereas those who do not, carry around
their own, unhealed wound.320 If then the wicked are immediately
penalised we shall say that they pay their debt,321 and if they are not
immediately penalised, we shall say that then they pay an even
greater debt, as they have a more chronic disease322 and will therefore
be in need of a bigger punishment; instead of receiving treatment
they have their own vice remaining untreated.323 For even for the
body the cutting and cauterising alone is not the evil, but rather the
fact of ailing and being in need of cutting and cauterising.324
53. Therefore, not yet to be punished by those who exact a righteous
punishment is not a slackening of providence, but rather an intensification. Truly this is the greatest punishment, to remain in evil
without being punished.325 And if someone could see himself in this
state, this person would really lament himself as someone who has
not merited to undergo a punishment that is actually a cure, but is
being overlooked in the universe, being tainted not in some part of
his body, but in the most divine part of his soul. It is as if someone
suffering from an extreme bodily disease were overlooked by Asclepius the Saviour,326 and were to utter a thousand laments for being
overlooked. And why speak of someone who fails to find Asclepius
and to be delivered from the evils he has? What about a human
person who possesses [medical] craftsmanship?327 What person suffering from a wound of the leg would not wish to find someone who
cures the wound by making incisions and cauterising?328 Who would
not resort to lamentation, even more than the previous person, if he
were to incur a disease of the eyes, for that is what everyone always
talks about: to be deprived of the light that is present in each of us?329
What kind of wailing will then be emitted by the one who is tainted
in his soul and is maimed in his highly valued mind itself, if he
somehow becomes aware of the state he is in? Will he not by all means
desire treatment and consider himself to be worthy of lament for not
finding those who are capable of delivering him from his evil, with or
without pain? In a nutshell: not to be punished immediately is an
unsurpassable punishment. As a consequence, they too get a punishment, [but] in a different way, as they have not become worthy of

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receiving the other punishment330 because of the excess of badness.

And it is not after a long time but during a long time331 that they pay
the penalty, one kind [of punishment] being internal, the other
external. For conscience,332 being the cause of unbearable fears, and
the evil that is inveterate induce a true retribution,333 so that, in my
view, it eludes them that they undergo a double punishment compared to the punishment exacted from those who are caught redhanded. Socrates strongly encouraged the wrongdoers to turn
themselves in to the judges, in order that they be freed from wickedness by paying the penalty.334 For he was convinced that the unpunished335 is punished more severely than the punished and tries to
convince us that it is a greater evil to have an evil than to be delivered
from it with pain.
54. Let us approach the same discussion also in the following way,
fighting for providence, or rather for ourselves [showing that we are]
well-governed. What indeed could be greater for a human being than
the imitation of god? Does not Plato state this when he says that the
god kindled the light in the second orbit from the earth336 and that
he has given us light-carrying eyes,337 so that through them we may
see the ordered motions in the heavens338 and conceive the notion of
number and thus assimilate the disturbed orbits in ourselves339 to
those, which are undisturbed?340 Well, if this is the greatest good for
the souls, the assimilation to the divine,341 does not providence provide this greatest good to those looking at it? For it takes away our
boisterous urge342 toward the punishment of wrong-doers and admonishes our raging spirit to move smoothly and to imitate it somehow
as far as possible343 by postponing and withholding the punishments.
It persuades the soul344 to give itself time to consider repentance. As
a consequence, this mode of correction, too, which educates the souls,
is not unworthy of the justice that promotes the well-being of all: the
wrong-doers by the punishment that eventually follows, the others
by educating them already [beforehand]. Or, when we look at this, I
mean the reining in of the bucking passions and the restraining of
their vehement motions, are we not wont to be reminded of some of
the ancients? Plato, brandishing345 a stick over a servant then stood
for a long time holding <it>346 in the air. Asked for the reason he said
he was chastening his own anger that had been rushing forward.347
Or Archytas, on his farm, furious <as he saw that his slaves> had in
a serious way failed to carry out his orders about farming348 and
needed to be punished, said: You are lucky that I am furious <at
you>349.350 Or Theano, who spoke the following words to her female
servant: If I were not furious, I would beat you!351 Through all these
examples, that are like admonishments, we are strongly warned
against entrusting two [agents] with punishments, spirit352 and reason. Having kept our spirit in check through holding it back we leave

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the judging to reason.353 If, then, we are educated by the admonishments from such men,354 it is so much more likely that when we see
the deity withholding his punishments and waiting for the right time
we might eliminate this unreasonable and unsteady inner drive
towards punishing and practise magnanimity,355 which the deity too
put first.356 By punishing he helps only those who are punished, but
by withholding [the punishment] he educates more people and makes
them less passionate.357 For magnanimity is the teacher of impassivity.358 So consider this mode [of punishment] favouring the postponement of the punishments that stem from providence, as we have
described it, as settled, a mode that is educational for those who are
capable of perceiving it.359
55. Let us also examine the following argument for it is necessary
in the case of things unknown to us to take into account several
explanations for what happens, different explanations of different
things happening360 let us then examine this argument, that holds
that the god recognises the dispositions of the soul from which they
get to commit their wrongdoings361 and determines moreover in each
case what is deserved in all punishments according to quantity,
quality and time362 for neither the same punishment nor an equal
punishment nor a punishment at the same time is fitting to all souls.
Starting from there I think we might find another solution of the
problem. For [the argument] holds that this too, i.e. the fact that
some souls are purified more swiftly, others more slowly and that
there is a different starting point of the purification for different
souls, most of all aims at what the souls deserve.363 What indeed if in
some among the souls that erred the error does not stem from a life
that has some passion habitually whereas in others it stems so to
speak from an inveterate passion in them?364 Is it not clear then that
for some [souls] the penalty for a certain behaviour needs to follow
[promptly], making them averse from suchlike behaviour? For thus
it will be avoided that through overlooking their behaviour they
repeat it again and again and let it settle into a habit.365 And [is it not
equally clear] that other souls [have to] await the lapse of time,366
during which the habit becomes saturated by the activities related to
it so that there will be room for punishment, the retribution being
imposed after the inflammation has reached its climax? What then if
some souls erred because the cognitive part of the soul had no [sound]
judgment,367 their life remaining healthy, whereas others have their
life tainted <as well>368 in addition to the maiming of their judgment?369 Is it not clear in these cases too that the punishment which
is imposed immediately on some souls draws the attention to the
mistake, whereas for others who have received a postponement it will
in due time procure a greater and more effective benefit for the
reasons specified? For in the latter there is for the time being nothing

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capable of receiving the treatment because of their manifold mutilation, as we have said. And what if there were some predestined
times370 for evil habits, i.e. cycles that bring either a swifter or a
slower dissolution of these, just as in the case of bodily diseases? Is
this not clear as well, that for this reason too some get a prompter
punishment, others only after a longer span of time because of the
ordering of the universe? For the decrees of providence descend from
providence through the order of the universe down to the souls
dwelling in the [realm of] becoming and are interwoven with the laws
of destiny.371
56. So numerous, then, are the modes of punishment and there are
even more, unknown to us but seen in advance by providence, according to which it is fitting that some souls are punished simultaneously
with their wrongdoings and others not simultaneously. The principle
of merit is present in the latter too, for not every soul deserves to be
delivered more swiftly from the penalty for the crimes it has committed. Therefore one should not blame providence for the delay but look
for the causes372 due to which providence might impose an overdue
punishment to some souls and exact an inexorable penalty from
others for wrongdoings that are still fresh.
And lest we build our entire argument by inveighing against those
who are punished with delay we should also consider the following
point. Human life is mixed: often it commits great wrongdoings, but
has some greatness, namely toward the accomplishment of great
things in accordance with its nature for both belong to great
natures, as he373 himself says.374 And because of this, providence, as
might be expected, contrives to bring about a delay of the punishment
of its wrongdoings, in order that they are not reduced to smallness
through punishments but use the greatness of their nature to accomplish great feats and by their success in achieving them acquire an
aptitude, which they lacked, for purification with regard to great
wrongdoings.375 For both groups follows what ought to: for the ones,
the addition of goods, for the others so to speak the incisions and
cauterisations applied by physicians. So, if the Egyptians used to
have a law specifying that a pregnant woman sentenced to death was
not to be put to death until after the delivery,376 why wonder if
providence disregards a person who deserves to die but is capable of
giving birth to deeds that are not insignificant,377 but rather some
that are extraordinary because he makes use of the greatness of his
nature, and if it saves this person for the sake of those deeds instead
of inflicting death upon him because of his wrongdoings and so
preventing the achievements of his actions? And for these matters too
you will find a long list of reported cases that lend credibility to this
argument.378 For instance, if Themistocles379 had instantly paid the
penalty for the things he did as a young man, who would have

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delivered the city from the Persian evils? Who would have been the
interpreter of the Pythia?380 If Dionysius [had received his deserved
punishment] in the early days of his tyrannical rule, who would have
freed Sicily, expected to be laid waste, from the Carthaginians?381 If
Periander had been punished not after some long time span, who
would have rescued Apollonia, the peninsula of Leucas and Anactorium from their enemies?382 Would it then be strange that providence
for these very reasons in some cases awaits the successes of great
natures and imposes on those a late punishment for their mistakes?
[By acting thus] it does not [make the mistake], by the speediness of
the punishment, [of] prevent[ing] them who have done great things
for the bad, to do great things for the good, as if it were angry with
them and not eager to turn them back toward itself383 and set them
upright after they were fallen.
57. And for sure, there is even a further reason for admiring the
judgment of providence, more particularly if one considers the length
of that time span not for us, who have a dim sight and the
dimensions of the place of becoming: each of them is small.384 The
time that separates us from old age is for providence and not only
for it, but also for the souls outside the realm of becoming only so
long as an indivisible moment for us.385 And this place in which we
live carrying around our bodies is absolutely tiny for the retribution
of our great wrongdoings. But the prisons of pay-back386 and the
places in Hades are vast and unmapped, and the size of the retributions for all who in whatever way end up there is unsurpassable.387
So if both the span of a human life is nothing to the eye of providence388 and this place [is nothing] for punishment, it is normal that
both are disdained for this reason and that the delay in time happens
with regard to the transferral of the [souls] who require great retributions from the smaller to the greater penitentiaries389 and that the
relocation is from a place that combines retributions with enjoyments
to a region that is there for retribution alone, so that even in this brief
time span they experience discomfort having their punishment looming large over them,390 stabbing them unseen and stirring the images391 of their wrongdoings present in them, in their dreams and
while they are awake, making them their own accusers. Having
within themselves the tribunal for what they did they live in fear.
And what they experienced earlier in themselves they see coming [to
them] afterwards from outside, bereft in the places where they are
from anything that could somehow cheer them up. For everyone who
has acted unjustly is immediately subjected to justice, swallowing
the sweetness of injustice as some kind of bait.392 The rest of the time
he is getting throttled little by little, when he rehearses in his mind
the punishment to which the punishments in this life are mere
preludes.393 For because of the immensity of the retribution he can

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not grasp it at once. The psychic fears with which they struggle are
designed as fore-runners for the greatest sufferings. They say that
Apollodorus the tyrant saw in a dream how he was skinned and
boiled by some Scythians394 and how his own heart was whispering
from the cauldron: I am the cause of your torments.395 And they say
that the friends of Ptolemy who was surnamed Lightning dreamt
that he was called to justice by Seleucus, before a tribunal composed
of vultures and wolves. This kind of [fears] befalls the vicious beforehand as preludes to the punishments that hang over them and are
imposed additionally on their own wrongdoings. So we have made our
way through this rough sea, so to speak.396

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Ninth problem
58. After this let us examine a ninth problem,397 looking at a further
anomaly showing up in what comes to be from providence, when
those who do wrong are others [than those who are punished], for
instance fathers and forefathers,398 and the punishment is said to go
to their progeny, in which case399 they say: If those [back then] had
paid the penalty for their wrongdoings, it would be superfluous and
ridiculous for providence to impose further retributions on those who
come after them. It would be just as if it wanted nothing more than
glut itself with vengeance on human beings. If, however, it has let off
those who have done wrong from their sentence and transfers it to
people who have done no wrong, it does not avoid the perpetration of
injustice, as it turns a blind eye to the offender and inflicts the
punishment [owed by] the offender on a person that has committed
no offence.400 Now, some people are said to pay the penalty for the
wrongdoings of their forefathers;401 the mysteries and initiations
confirm this and people strongly believe that there are some gods of
absolution402 who provide purification from those [wrongdoings].
Given the existence of providence and the fact that providence403
adheres to the principle of merit: what satisfactory explanation can
there be for this to happen along those principles?404
59. Such405 being the problems regarding this topic, let us first say
that every city406 and every family407 constitutes one single living
being, more so than every single person, being to a larger degree
immortal and sacred. Indeed, one single mayor presides over the city
as over one single being, one relative over the family as one whole.
And there is a single [life] cycle in common for the city and [one] for
the family, <always>408 making the life and the customs of each of
them converge, different ones for different cities and families as
their lives are simultaneous as it were and their different body
sizes, different resources, postures and motions409 as if one single
nature were pervading the whole city and every single family in it,

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making both that city and that family one. If, then, also providence
is one and fate, with respect to these things,410 is one, if their life is of
the same form and their nature from the same root, how could one
refuse to call the city and the family one living being,411 and from now
on to talk412 specifically413 about each of them as one, since, when
compared to any one of us, [each of them] is a living being that is
longer-lived, more divine and more like the universe in that it
encompasses414 the other, smaller living beings and is akin to the
everlasting? So if, as has been shown, every city and every family is
a single living being, why wonder if the [deeds] of the forefathers are
paid out to the progeny and if the life of the cities, being one, spread
out from above [over the citizens] like a canvas,415 encompasses the
compensation, in other times, for actions, be they good416 or bad,
committed in other times? For providence shows not only that every
one of us bears the fruit417 of the things that he did in another time
[of his life] and receives the penalty for them, but also that [this is
the case for] the city as a unity and the family as a unity and as a
living being, at that whereby the first to act are not disregarded
either418 (for it is not allowed that something is overlooked, given that
providence exists) and the later-born because of the co-affection419 to
the first as to their founding fathers and by the fact that together
with them they complete, as it were, one single living being, inherit
from them the share that they deserve. For their origin is from them
and they share a life and nature in common with them, so that it is
obvious that because of them they receive honour and punishment.
Since all are parts of one and the same being and all are connected
to one another, it is no wonder, I think, that not [only] the close
relatives but those further away incur a fate similar to those [that
came] before. For not all parts are in the same way similar to all
others, but some are more similar, others less. Nor is the explanation
the same: one ties them together more closely, another more loosely.
And this gradual difference does not depend on proximity. For instance, nothing prevents the more remote parts to resemble [the
first] more than those that are closer. This phenomenon can also be
observed in medical practice. For instance, when the hips are injured
the [doctors] cauterise, not the surrounding [flesh], but the thumb,
and when the liver is inflamed they scratch the epigastric region, and
if cattle get soft hooves they rub with ointment, not the parts next to
the hooves, but the horns.420 For their concern421 is to act on the parts
that need healing, not through the parts close by but through the
parts that are co-affected.422 Now, those who originally committed an
offence have by all means paid the penalty for their wrong-doings,
but also, among the persons that came after them, those423 that have
a co-affection with them. For something, unnoticed,424 passed to
them. And they do not suffer unjustly, but because they resemble425
these [persons] more than they resemble those closer by, because of

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a life that is similar and co-affected, they receive similar [punishments] from providence.426
60. One may also make the following point. Those who accept the
reincarnations427 of souls and their migrations to different lives
would like to say that the souls [living] in other, second lives, as they
come to be, are actually those of people that have lived before, and
either enjoy rewards for the things they accomplished in their previous lives or receive the appropriate retribution in the form of
punishment. And this is also clearly confirmed by history. For it is
said that the great Apollonius received in the life [up] there the
honours of the gods and a divine life, because he saved in a former
life a virgin woman who would live428 on a second time with the extra
life time she obtained.429 Why then would it still be paradoxical that
souls who have migrated to different bodies are punished for wrongdoings committed in other bodies? For souls do not haphazardly
consort with this or that family and do not by sheer coincidence live
in this or that city.430 By consequence, even if they do not happen to
be the same [souls],431 when they are allocated to this particular
family on the basis of desert, they bear as their lot, deservedly, the
punishment owed by that family. But if they are the same, it is a
fortiori by all means necessary that they are submitted to justice.
They have as it were put on masks as in the theatre and tragic boots
and robes and seem to be others to those who are unable to see them
naked.432 For indeed in our lives the whole cycle of the family is
analogous to a play, fate corresponding to the poet of this play, the
souls to those who partake in the play, now these souls then others.
However, the same souls occupy the fated scene several times, just
like in the theatre the same actors appear several times speaking
now the part of Tiresias,433 then that of Oedipus.434 Providence offers
rewards to the souls and conveys honour, or dishonour, to some souls
because of other souls on account of the similarity of their life, but
also to some souls because of themselves in other lives435 on account
of their identity, an identity that escapes those who gaze at the
exchange of the fated theatrical performance.436
Now that is something no one will find absurd, namely that, being
the same, souls are honoured and dishonoured because of themselves, even if they appear as others on account of their living
different lives.
61. But that others are punished because of others seems to be
strange. However, that too has some reasonable explanation,
namely, as we have said, the similarity of their lives festering437
underneath.438 This is cut away by providence, as some malignant
plant root,439 which for it is easy to spot ahead of time.440 For scorpions
too are born with their stings and vipers with their poison. And when

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we are attacked by them we recognise what the poison is and what

the sting.441 But in the whole of things there is something that
recognises this even before the attack. In the same way, then, does
providence detect the innate psychic defects, as akin to those who
already erred, and confer a punishment upon them, as they have a
similar nature, even if they did not do what these other souls did.442
For it removes their badness in advance,443 as some hidden epileptic
condition preceding the seizure.444 Just like the warts, birthmarks
and moles of the fathers that have disappeared in their children445
reappear in the grandchildren,446 so the particularities of character
shoot up again in the nth generation. These may be unknown to the
others, but one must grant that the One, which knows everything,
both knows them and makes them disappear pre-emptively. They
show the similarity [with their forefathers] by the fact that they have
the impression that the penalty they pay is the consequence of what
they [themselves] have done wrong. Let this then be clear on the
basis of these arguments, as I am also aware that I have elaborated
them in other works.447
Tenth problem

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62. I will now bring the treatment of the difficulties to a close with
this tenth448 and so to speak crowning difficulty.449 If, as has been
established, providence, by this much-praised One, knows all things
and leads them back to the good, how can also angels be said to
exercise providence, and demons, and, if you wish, heroes and, in
addition to these, souls governing the world450 together with the
gods? Indeed, it is necessary that we determine also in their case the
type of providence according to its essence, not claiming any longer that
they too exercise providence in accordance with the One, which in fact
we hold451 to be characteristic of the mode of existence of the gods,452 lest
a demon, an angel, a soul and a hero be the same as a god.453
63. Indeed, every god, as I have already stated before, has his being
as a god on account of the One, which we hold to be prior to intellect
and which exists as identical with the good and proceeds from the
good.454 For the henads, i.e. the forms of good,455 are of two kinds.
They have been produced by that first good, which is the cause of both
of them and is one in a different manner. One type of henads is
complete in itself,456 the other type of henads is sown as seeds into
the things that participate of them.457 For the one and the good are
threefold: either in a causal mode, as in the case of the first; for that
is the good and the One itself458 as cause of all that is good and of all
the henads; or according to its existence, as in the case of every single
god, who is one and good; or through participation,459 as in the case
of the one and good in substances through this each substance is

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unified and has the form460 of good. Every god, then, if indeed it is a
henad, is a henad complete in itself,461 not being of another, but of
itself;462 but every intellect and every soul,463 that participates in
some one (for it is some one, of which a soul participates and of which
an intellect participates), has the form of one.464 In this way, indeed,
is the one and absolute intellect the cause of all intellects, but of the
intellects that stem from it some are complete in themselves, each
single one being in a particular way all the things that the absolute
intellect is in a comprehensive way, one having its particularity
according to this, another according to a different form one tending
to the moon, the other to the sun, yet another to some other of the
forms that are comprised in the absolute [intellect].465 Other [intellects] are irradiations466 from those [intellects] to souls that have
been intellectualised.467 Because of these irradiations those souls too,
being intellective through participation, have the form of intellect
and are called thus and are directed upwards toward the intellect.
Insofar as they are souls, they possess the self-motion common to all
souls, but insofar as they partake of intellect they also belong468 to
beings that have the intellective character, as has been said, through
participation. If then we take a look at the soul, both the first soul
and the souls that stem from it, they too will turn out to have a double
appearance, the ones substantial souls separate from bodies, the
others being irradiations in bodies from those that are souls in
substance. For the ensouled is ensouled through participation, when
some soul comes to be in it. Someone may call this entelechy,469 if
this someone likes to call thus the ensouled bonds.470
64. Corresponding to all the hypostases that rank as principles (I
mean soul, intellect, and the good)471 there is a number [of entities
proceeding] from it, but this number is twofold, on the one hand that
of the hypostatical entities as complete in themselves, on the other
that of their irradiations into what comes next.472 Hence, although
angels and demons, which are prior to us, and heroes and in addition
our own souls are not gods nor henads, they still participate in some
henads and have a henadic form: firstly those who are attached to the
gods themselves, secondly those who through the mediation of the
first connect to the gods, in the third rank, as they say, those who are
inferior to the second, and ultimately we.473 Indeed, even in us lies a
hidden trace of the One, something that is more divine than the
intellect in us.474 When the soul has reached this and has settled itself
in it, it is divinely possessed and lives a divine life, to the extent this
is allowed to it.
65. The gods exercise providence <over the whole universe>475
through the whole of themselves. For they are what they are, as we
said, by being476 all henads.477 But angels and demons and heroes

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exercise providence insofar they too have some seed of the One, not
insofar they are alive or intelligising. For the latter two [activities]
show them either as merely bestowing motion on non-self-movers or
as merely cognising beings (for it is proper to soul to move and proper
to intellect to think, [activities] that are available to all souls and to
all intellects), whereas to exercise providence belongs to the one that
is in them. For that according to which they imitate the gods is also
that according to which they exercise providence, together with
them, over all things.478 Indeed, that which primarily exercises providence is god, which is why it is also the primarily good. After them
[i.e. after angels, demons, heroes] come souls. When they are established in the good, in virtue of the One [in them], they are active in a
divinely possessed manner and with the gods and the kinds that are
superior to us they exercise providence in a transcendent manner,
just like479 these too [i.e. the superior kinds] did. And their providence
consists not in conjectural calculations about the future, as in the
case of our political affairs;480 but by positioning481 themselves firmly
in the One of the soul and therefore being illuminated all around by
the unitary light of the gods they see the things in time non-temporally, divided things undividedly, things in location non-locally; and
they do not belong to themselves, but to those who illuminate [them].
This condition befalls souls now and then, but to the angels and the
other kinds prior to them it is permanently present. That is why
these are always exercising providence, in a manner that is better
than if they were active through deliberation, since they do not follow
in the steps of what happens, but see all things by virtue of the one
that is causally present in the gods, whether they intelligise or
reason,482 without any diminution of providential activity. They differ
from souls by their constant providential activity, as we have said,
and from the gods whose attendants they are by not exercising
providence with their whole being, but with what is the most divine
in them, through which they are united483 with the gods. For whereas
each of the gods is a henad, each of these [angels, demons, heroes] is
like a henad.484 Each then having something other besides the One,
imitates through the One the god that precedes it and on whom it
depends, but by something else it lives in accordance with another
activity. And whereas the existence485 of each is by virtue of the One,
the [substantial] being486 in them, of which it is the existence,487 is in
virtue of the not-one.
66. If that is understood, all the other things said of providence may
be adapted to the [angels, demons and heroes] in a secondary degree,
except for the fact that of the henads some will be present in them
with a more universal, others with a more particular power, as was
the case with the divine henads. But what is the very first among all
things will be better than providence, just as it is better than all

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119

power.488 If someone would venture to say that this very first, too,
exercises providence, then only as that which is for all things desirable and the final cause of everything and the cause of providence.
For the providence of the gods and of all beings posterior to the gods
is on account of the good,489 as reality itself shows, and also Plato, who
established this securely, just as we said at the beginning of this text.

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Notes
1. With iron and adamantine arguments (Gorg. 509A1-2). Proclus refers to this
Platonic passage in a similar way in in Remp. 1,167,15-17: the Athenian stranger
established so to speak with adamantine arguments the providence of the gods,
which extends to all things. See also Prov. 46,8-9.
2. Book 10 of the Laws is entirely devoted to the demonstration of the existence
of the gods and their providence (for a summary of the argument see Proclus, TP
1,15). The Athenian stranger expresses the compelling character of the argument
in the same terms. Cf. 903A10: he [sc. who denies providence] was forced by our
arguments to admit that he was wrong.
3. Tim. 30B8-C1.
4. Reading enargestata for energestata (efficacissime g) [Kroll 1894, 50, n. 1; BS].
Proclus often insists that the Chaldean Oracles confirm by their sacred authority
the doctrine of Plato (or vice versa: Plato by his arguments confirms their authority): see in Parm. 991,1-2; having faith in Plato and the Oracles; in Tim. 2,50,31-2:
the Oracles testify to the teachings of Plato and in Tim. 1,408,24: Plato testifies
to the Oracles.
5. To strike all around and detect the flaws in what is said is the advice given
by Socrates to Theaetetus in Theaet. 179D3-4 (see also Phil. 55C6-9). The phantasms may be the illusionary concepts of the soul that are not worth to be given
birth: see 150C1-3: the most important thing about my art [midwifery] is the
ability to apply all possible tests to the offspring, to determine whether the young
mind is being delivered of a phantom (eidlon); that is, an error, or a fertile truth.
6. An allusion to Symp. 173B8 [BS] on the pleasure of telling and hearing about
what happened at the banquet of Agathon. Here the telling and listening occurs
within the soul.
7. Expression taken from Tim. 37A7 [BS].
8. On thinking as an internal dialogue of the soul, see Theaet. 189E6-190A6.
9. It almost looks as if Proclus apologises in advance for using large sections of
Plutarchs work on the tardiness of divine punishment later on. See Introduction,
pp. 50-9.
10. On Hermes as our common leader see also below, Dub. 3; in Remp. 2,62,17
and 2,221,11; in Alc. 105,1-2: Reason is common to all and also the expression of
reason, and therefore Hermes is common. See Aristotle, Rhet. 2, 1401a21-2 (as an
example of a fallacy!): to say that Hermes is the most sociable (koinnikos) of the
gods: for he alone is called Hermes Common. Aristotle refers to the practice of
invoking Hermes Common when someone found a valuable thing and wanted to
keep it for himself (cf. Kennedy 1991, 206). See also Theophrastus, Char. 30,9. The
expression later became idiomatic for the sharing of reason (mentioned in the next
phrase by Aristotle; logos is the best thing). See Simplicius, in Epict. 132,40-1.
According to Proclus all rational souls share, without being taught, the same
common notions (koinai ennoiai). On the concept of common notions (of Stoic
origin) see Steel 2007, nn. 28, 30, 34.
11. On the first problem, see Introduction, pp. 5-9.

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Notes to pages 71-73

12. Following Strobels conjecture (kata dikn for kat axian [secundum dignitatem g]). Proclus often uses the expression kata dikn, which is taken from
Euripides Tr. 887-8: see TP 1,59,19; 77,8; 87,17 (with the notes of SaffreyWesterink 1968 ad loc.); in Remp. 1,94,18. For the reference to Euripides, see
Plutarch, De Iside 381B5 and Quaest. Plat. 1007C; and Plotinus, 4.4 [28] 45,28.
13. See n. 10 above.
14. Proclus classifies here under three types six modes of knowledge: sense
perception, imagination, opinion, science, the intuition of the particular intellect,
the intuition of the universal intellect. In the next chapter he distinguished the
knowledge of divine providence as transcending these three modes. In Prov. 27-31
Proclus distinguishes five types of knowledge: opinion, discursive reasoning (in
mathematics), dialectic, intuitive knowledge and divine knowledge beyond the
intellect. See also Introduction, p. 6.
15. qualificatorum perceptionem habere: reconstructing the original Greek
phrase as poioumenn tn antilpsin [BS].
16. See ET 170 (with the comments of Dodds 1963, 288): Every intellect has
simultaneous intellection of all things; but while the unparticipated intellect
knows all absolutely, each subsequent intellect knows all in one aspect.
17. et est unusquisque et quecumque intelligi, et ut intelligit et quod est: reconstructing the original Greek as kai <hs> estin hekastos kai <noei> hosa noei kai
hs noei kai <estin> ho estin [BS]. See ET 174: Every intellect constitutes what
comes after it, and its making consists in thinking and its thinking in making.
18. Reading se ipsum for se ipsam (4,4).
19. Proclus understands providence pro-noia as an activity prior, i.e.
superior, to (pro-) thinking (noein): cf. ET 120, p. 106,7: providence, as its name
shows, is an activity prior to intellect; cf. also 134, p. 118,25-6. This etymology
features already in Plotinus: see 5.3 [49] 10,43-4.
20. Reading hupostasesin einai for hupostasesi meinai (ypostasibus permanere g)
[BS].
21. The superiority of gods to intellect is since Plotinus a common idea in
Neoplatonism, but the principle is already formulated by Aristotle: see EE
1248a28-9: what is superior to knowledge and intellect but god? That the subject
always knows according to its mode of existence, is a general principle first clearly
formulated by Iamblichus: see Amm. in De Int. 135,12-19.
22. On the identification of the Good and the One, see n. 27 below.
23. On the criterion, see the interesting digression of Proclus, in Tim. 1,254,19255,26.
24. This someone is Aristotle, who makes this comparison in DA 3.2, 426b19.
In this chapter he addresses the inter-sensory binding problem by introducing a
common sensory faculty: a single faculty of perception is required to apprehend the
difference between two objects of perception, such as white and sweet (426b14-19).
Proclus applies this principle to higher levels of cognition. See also in Parm.
957,27-958,1: there is also one single life-principle by virtue of which we say I
desire and I am angry and I make such and such a choice; [}] and prior to both
faculties is the unitary principle of the soul.
25. Participants are the individual things, participated the universals.
26. That like is known by the like, is a principle often invoked by Proclus: see
TP 1,15,17-18 (with Saffrey-Westerink 1968, 15 n. 3, 135-6); in Remp. 1,177,21;
255,23-4; 2,326,24; in Alc. 247,12; in Tim. 1,246; in Parm. 924,27-8; 975,27;
1091,4-5; Prov. 31 (with n. 146). The principle goes back to Empedocles (31 B 109):
cf. Aristotle, DA 1.2, 405b15.

Notes to pages 73-77

123

27. The identity of the One with the Good is since Plotinus a firmly established
central tenet of Neoplatonic philosophy: see ET 13 with Dodds 1963, 199-200.
28. Things that are not: such is matter or what exists contrary to nature as a
parhupostasis.
29. On the individual one and the universal one, see also below, Dub. 10,14-22.
30. On the individual differences included in the universal, see in Parm.
981,12-17.
31. cf. Soph. 245A8-9.
32. This summary is quoted appraisingly by Philoponus, De aeternitate mundi,
37,20-39,1. See Share 2005, 39-40.
33. cf. TP 1,47,10-11; Plot. 5.1 [10] 8,25-6.
34. For the metaphor of the circle for explaining unitary knowledge, see also in
Tim. 2,243,14; in Remp. 2,46,21; ps.-Philop. in DA, 542,29.
35. Reading substituit (hupestsen) for subsistit [Cousin, Boese].
36. Addition from the quotation in Philoponus.
37. <ps> added from Isaak [BS].
38. On this problem see Introduction, pp. 9-16.
39. This is how Proclus construes the opposition between Peripatetics and
Stoics. See Introduction, p. 10.
40. Dub. 6,13-14: tamquam omnium que dicuntur esse entia. We follow the interpretation of BS: Moerbeke should have translated tamquam } entibus. Proclus
assumes that all things that usually count as in some way being (necessary, eternal,
corruptible, contingent things; substances, accidents, etc.) fall under providence.
41. This or, then, does not introduce a third possibility on a par with the two
previous ones, but an alternative to the earlier disjunction.
42. i.e. knowledge is the perfection of the knower and desires the known.
43. Within itself (parauti); i.e. within providence; in its own presence, on
the level of its thinking.
44. The example of the reason-principle in a seed (a favourite image of the
Stoics) is often used by Plotinus, see 3.2 [47] 2,18-23 ; 3.7 [45] 11,23ff. See also
Proclus, in Parm. 754,10-14.
45. prothen: literally runs ahead in the cause. This verb is already used in a
metaphorical sense by Plato: cf. Crat. 412A3.
46. On the distinction between three different modes of existing: pre-existing in
its cause (kataitian); existing formally in accordance with its proper being
(kathhuparxin); existing by participation (kata methexin) in its effect; see ET 65
(with the commentary of Dodds).
47. The reason-principle or logos is lying in the seed.
48. Reading hrismenn for hrismen.
49. On this problem see Introduction, pp. 16-24.
50. On the necessity of invoking the gods when one examines a difficult
question, see Proclus TP 1,7,17-8,4 (and Saffrey-Westerink 1968, 7 n. 4, 131). The
inspiring example is Plato, Tim. 27C1-D1.
51. Understanding illuminare as an erroneous translation of sunephapsasthai
(cf. Isaak). For a similar phrase see in Tim. 3,175,15-17 [BS].
52. For the metaphor of the labours of the soul, see Plato, Resp. 6, 490B7 and
Theaet. 151A7. This metaphor is often used by Plotinus and Proclus.
53. On common notions, see n. 10 above.
54. See also above, Dub. 4,3-14. The identity of the One with the Good is a
central thesis of Neoplatonic philosophy since Plotinus. Proclus often sets out the
reasons for this identification, see ET 13 and TP 2,40-3.

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Notes to pages 77-80

55. On the difference between the One of providence, the universal one and the
individual one, see above, Dub. 5,8-38.
56. The universal one is the genus in which the differences of the species falling
under it are subsumed and anticipated, or also the species with respect to the
individuals falling under it. See also above, Dub. 5.
57. One many: this formula adopted from the second hypothesis of the Parmenides distinguishes the unity of the Intellect from the absolute One. See Proclus
TP 1,47,10-11; Plot. 5.1 [10] 8,25-6.
58. Incomprehensible here does not mean unfathomable, impossible to understand but rather impossible to encompass or grasp.
59. This sentence is rhetorical, but involves no contradiction if one understands
that greater than any power just means greater than any other power. Just as
the One (to hen) of providence transcends any union or unification (hensis), so the
infinity of power (to apeirodunamon) is greater even than any other infinite power.
to apeirodunamon denotes the infinite principle of all dunamis, which resides in
providence. Cf. Van Riel 2000, 399-406.
60. On the difference between quantitative infinity and infinite power see ET
86: All true being is infinite neither in number nor in size, but only in power. Cf.
Simplicius, in Phys. 452,16-17; Philoponus, in Meteor. 17,14-15; in Phys. 429,18-19;
ps.-David, in Isag. 94,17-30.
61. We follow Strobel in deleting kai kata tn dunamin apeiron (et secundum
virtutum infinitum) in 11,7 and adding <kata tn dunamin> before apeiron (infinitum) in 11,6.
62. kai ei perieilptai added by BS.
63. On the role of declension (huphesis) in the vertical series of properties, see
ET 125, pp. 110,33-112,13. In our text Proclus emphasises that despite the
declension identity is preserved, through intermediaries. See also in Parm. 880,258; TP 3,97,20-1: Every form heads some series. Starting from above it descends to
the last [members of the series].
64. See Aristotle, Metaph. A 6, 988a7 (explaining Platos doctrine of the one and
the dyad as principles): these things [the male and the female] are imitations of
these principles.
65. The first classes in the universe are the celestial bodies.
66. Proclus applies the Aristotelian vocabulary of natural slaves and masters (Pol. 1.5, 1255a1-2) to explain the relation of the inferior to the superior
beings.
67. In ET 64 Proclus demonstrates that every monadic principle gives rise to
two series: to a series of self-complete beings and to a series of irradiations which
exist in other things than themselves. Thus from the intellect come forth other
intellects and intellective irradiations in the souls participating of the intellect.
See n. 457 below. Here the point is somehow different: the intellect produces not
only intellective beings but also, since it is demiurge, bodies.
68. The two kinds correspond, respectively, to the transmission of knowledge
from one mind to an other and to the realisation of logoi in artefacts.
69. i.e. it brings forth its products according to different causal principles
existing in it. The soul, for instance, possesses principles of incorporeal and of
corporeal effects.
70. We follow OSV and read etiam ambo, which corresponds to kai amphotera.
71. On perpetuity as a property that the celestial bodies receive from superior
causes see n. 111 below.
72. It is limit which goes after the indeterminate and tries to catch it. The

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125

metaphor of the escape from a pursuer already occurs in Plotinus 5.3 [49] 17,21-2:
the soul runs after all truths and yet flees away from the truths.
73. A search in the TLG-E produces only six occurrences of the term apeiropoion
(limit-producing), five in Proclus and one in Damascius; the term peratopoion
(infinity-producing) is apparently a hapax legomenon.
74. On the derivation of all forms of limit and unlimitedness from transcendent
causes (peras and apeiron), see Proclus, in Parm. 1119,5-1123,14; Van Riel 2000.
75. sunduasthenta. The verb means to couple, to copulate; but here it is used
in the metaphorical sense for the pairing of limit and infinity. For a parallel usage
see Themistius, in Phys. 39,8-10: form and matter mate to produce a composite
nature, for instance, a plant or an animal.
76. The term metapiptein (denoting a sudden radical change) can be used in a
technical sense for the transition of something that at first is purely possible to
actuality. See Alex., in An. Pr. 193,14-17 and Proclus, in Parm. 696,22-3 (metapiptein eis to althes) in a discussion of Stoic logic.
77. The verb olisthanein to slip away is used in a metaphorical sense for
matter: see also Plot. 3.6 [26] 14,24 (tr. Armstrong): what it might have grasped,
slips away from it as from an alien nature; 6.9 [9] 3,6. Cf. n. 99.
78. In this somewhat obscure passage Proclus expresses the following idea:
contingent, i.e. indeterminate, things too receive a share in necessity and determination. This happens because the events leading up to their coming about take a
definite form at some point. To some contingent things this happens shortly before
they come about, to others a long time before they occur. The former have a greater
affinity with the One.
79. Proclus seems to hold the view that contingent events become necessary as
soon as the causal conditions for their coming to existence have been fully determined. He even adds the idea that the closer an event comes to its outcome, the
more determinate it already becomes, i.e. the less it can take an alternative course.
This contradicts the scholastic definition of the contingent as that which could also
have been otherwise. The fact that it later happened to be this way rather than the
other should not make any difference to its contingent nature: it could have been
otherwise, even though now it has taken a definite course. Compare the view
intimated by Arist. Int. 9, 18b14-15, and the standard doctrine as given by
Ammonius, in Int. 145,9-19 (contradicting the view that a prediction that will turn
out to be correct deprives the contingent event of its contingency; it is false to say
that something [contingent] will necessarily happen, even if it later effectively so
happens); Proclus, on the contrary, seems to say that the correct prediction has
more necessity the nearer the outcome. The ancient understanding of contingency,
however, is closer to accepting that the facticity of what happens affects the status
of the contingent. Cf. Sorabji 2004, III, 10(a-c). See also Ammonius in Int. 137,1-11
and our Introduction, pp. 14-15.
80. en tois kreittosin hmn. This should here not be taken in the strict sense as
referring only to the so-called superior classes, heroes, demons and angels. The
expression here has the general meaning of beings superior to humans including
the gods. In what follows, Proclus will examine whether only demons have this
knowledge or also the gods.
81. Aristotle was the first to use this metaphor for the world: there should be
nothing episodic in the world as in a bad tragedy (Metaph. N 3, 1090b19; Poet.
1451b33-5). Proclus refers to this passage at in Tim. 1,262,16. See also Dub. 20,3;
Prov. 34,11; in Remp. 1,38,26-9; in Tim. 3,303,22 and Opsomer-Steel 2003, 127 n.
353; Steel 2007, 83 n. 156.

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Notes to pages 81-83

82. cf. Appendix 1.

83. It is the privilege of divine providence to take care of the inferior things
without ever losing its transcendence, see ET 122: All that is divine both
exercises providence towards secondary existents and transcends the beings for
which it provides: its providence involves no remission of its pure and unitary
transcendence, neither does its separate unity annul its providence (tr. Dodds)
and TP 1,74,17-77,4. Cf. Steel 1996. Not to be alienated from ones own nature (to
belong to oneself) is closely linked with the preservation of the bond with the
transcendent causes of ones nature, as every being preserves its own nature by
remaining attached to its cause. Hence the threefold alternative to know the
lower, oneself and the higher boils down to a twofold one: to know the lower and
to know oneself/the higher (cf. n. 383). As a consequence, what Proclus says about
the human souls is in fact perfectly parallel to what was said about the demons.
84. logismos, calculation. Logismos is denied of divine providence not only
because it is discursive, but also because it remains conjectural and ambivalent:
cf. below, Dub. 65,13 and 25; TP 1,75,1.
85. cf. Procl. in Alc. 87,2-88,11, in particular 87,3-14 (tr. ONeill, modified): [}]
why the demon permitted Socrates to converse with him; at any rate the demon
was not unaware that he would be corrupted and as time went by would break out
into wantonness and would be a traitor to his country. But some say in reply that
the undetermined tendency of our personal initiative is not clear even to the
demon; for being unstable and liable to change both for the worse and for the
better, it is difficult for the spirits themselves to ascertain. To me this view is
insufferable, but nevertheless it is advanced by some. For is it not absurd to define
the differences of knowledge by the nature of the objects known, and not on the
contrary to distinguish them by the distinctions of knowledge?
86. Reading parairsometha for paraitsometha (excusabimus g) [BS].
87. tali omni: ti toiouti panti. This may be a corruption for ti toiauta gnonti.
88. Proclus follows Platos argument in Leg. 10, 901E-903A, where Socrates
maintains against the atheists that the gods both want to take care of the world
and are capable of it: 902E8: boulomenon tepimeleisthai kai dunamenon. See also
TP 1,72,16-74,16, where Proclus first argues that the gods are capable of providence and, then, that they want to exercise it.
89. A quotation from Tim. 39E4-5.
90. The demiurge (the one father) directly creates the world as a whole, the
immortal soul and also the eternal celestial beings within the world. He orders the
younger gods to create the mortal beings in the world (see Tim. 41A-D). About the
commandment of the demiurge, see Proclus, in Tim. 3,239,13-14, and Opsomer
2000; 2003.
91. See in Tim. 1,39,30-40,4; in Alc. 68,22-69,9.
92. agelaiokomik: the expression stems from Plato, Pol. 275E5-76E11 where
the visitor from Elea attempts to define statesmanship by looking at the art of
herd-keeping. Taking care of the animals is the task of the shepherd. The Eleatic
visitor explains that the paradigm of herd-keeping is not appropriate for human
statesmanship, but is more suitably used to describe the divine care in the age of
Kronos (which is exactly why the Neoplatonists could rehabilitate the metaphor
and use it for divine providential care). Proclus uses the term for the particularised
providential care of the gods, thus explaining ethnic differences, for instance. See
in Tim. 1,99,18 and 3,279,13. The same idea is also to be found in Leg. 4, 713D1-E3;
see also Crit. 109B2-D2.
93. A quotation from Leg. 10, 903B9 (see Introduction, p. 5).

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127

94. On the relation between demons and particular parts of the body, and the
explanation of diseases and cures, see Proclus, in Parm. 826,15-18. On demons and
animals and plants, see Proclus, in Alc. 69,3-14. Proclus gives an example of a
particular plant related to demons at in Remp. 2,183,1-2.
95. This is a famous dictum attributed to Thales, quoted by Plato in the
discussion on providence, Leg. 10, 899B9 (cf. DK 11 A 22). See also Proclus, in Tim.
3,36,25 and ET 145, p. 128,20.
96. On the aptitude, epitdeiots, of the participants or their lack of it, see n. 142.
97. They are aware of the providence of the demons, not however of the presence
of the gods.
98. Following Feldbusch we read ephistsin with Isaak, where Moerbeke has
existit.
99. exolisthsan. See our n. 77.
100. non entis abyssum, corresponding to tou m ontos akhaneian. BS rightly
keeps akhaneian for abyssum. See in Tim. 1,209,31-2; in Parm. 1072,5 and
7,504,12. Cf. also Syrianus, in Metaph. 60,5; Damascius, in Parm. (4,115,14
Westerink).
101. i.e. upon the things that come after the intermediaries.
102. We take prosagousi in the sense of introducing as someone is introduced
to a king or another superior authority. As the inferior beings are incapable to
present themselves to the gods, they need intermediaries introducing them.
103. i.e. their lower rank in the scale of being. See n. 63 above.
104. On the common notions, see n. 10 above.
105. See Plato Leg. 10, 902E7-903A3: We must not suppose that God, who is
supremely wise and willing and able to superintend the world, looks to major
matters but [}] neglects the minor, which we established were in fact easier to
look after. The same principle is applied in TP 1,72,25-74,16. On the concordance
of Plato with the truth, see TP 1,94,3; 6,36,21; in Remp. 1,118,4; in Tim. 3,186,6-7.
106. ekei, literally there.
107. On the relation between will and power in providence, see in Tim. 1,371,9373,21 (commentary on Tim. 30A1: God wanted all things to be good); in Alc.
125,4-126,3; TP 1,73,17-74,16.
108. The argument runs as follows: providence has the power to control lesser
things. And it will, since it wants to do whatever is in its power.
109. See ET 10: All that is self-sufficient is inferior to the unqualified Good
(with Dodds 1963, 196-7). As Proclus argues, the self-sufficient has fulfilled itself
with goodness; therefore that from which it has fulfilled itself must be beyond
self-sufficiency.
110. See above, Dub. 10,4-7.
111. The world and the celestial bodies are not eternal by themselves, but
always receive from the divine demiurge a restored immortality (Pol. 270A4).
Proclus often uses this Platonic expression to indicate an immortality that is
acquired. See in Tim. 1,260,14-15; 278,21; 281,2; Opsomer 2003, 32-3.
112. We follow the conjecture of BS: mesta (meta Isaak; cum Moerbeke) ts
pronoias. Cf. above, Dub. 16,9-10: everything is full of gods.
113. Proclus is committed to the view that some souls can only return to
providence and the good life after having being punished for their sins.
114. cf. above, Dub. 15,2-3.
115. Proclus uses a Platonic metaphor (Soph. 231C8) [BS].
116. See Introduction, pp. 24-7.
117. The problem of participation of the Forms is raised in Parm. 130E4-135E3.

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Notes to pages 86-88

The question of participation is the third in Proclus list of traditional problems

related to Forms: see in Parm. 784,12-18 and 838,6-19; dHoine 2004.
118. Arist. Phys. 185a30.
119. Reading ou tou for outoun (neque igitur g) [BS].
120. kai <kata> [BS].
121. On the distinction between a particular time and infinite time see ET 55:
Whatever exists in time either exists always or has obtained its existence in some
part of time. The celestial bodies, for instance, exist always in an infinite time,
particular living beings only during a limited span of time. The gods are eternal,
whereas the world as a whole and the celestial bodies exist in an infinite time with
perpetuity. See also in Tim. 1,278,3-6; 281,15-17; 282,5-6.
122. Reading legesth for epagesth (inducatur g) [BS].
123. On this fundamental principle see ET 148, p. 130,8-9: the mean term,
reaching out towards both the extremes, links the whole together with itself as
mediator. See also in Tim. 2,207,6-10.
124. This is discussed in Proclus treatment of the second problem.
125. Reading hupretoumena for ekpuroumena (Isaak, Moerbeke, MS Vm in
mg.).
126. The body of the moon has itself only a murky light; only when illuminated
by the sun does it become bright and shining. See Cleomedes, De motu 32,9-15 and
194,3-11. Olympiodorus (with reference to Anaxagoras and Democritus) explains
that planets have their own dim light in addition to the light they receive from the
sun, as is clear in the example of the moon. The latters own light is like coal, as
can be observed during eclipses. See Ol. in Meteor. 67,32-5; Philoponus, in An. Post.
422,18-23.
127. These are everlasting beings such as the celestial bodies.
128. On Proclus use of the metaphor of the mirror, see Steel 2008.
129. khrstria here refers not to the content of the oracle but to the sanctuary
or the medium (the priestess). The question why some of the ancient oracles have
ceased to function is discussed in Plutarchs celebrated treatise On the Obsolescence of Oracles (De defectu oraculorum). For an interpretation of this dialogue see
Babut 1992.
130. The oracular gods are the gods who reveal themselves in a particular
oracle, as Apollo was alleged to do in Delphi.
131. For Proclus the spirits are divine forces and share in the permanency of
the gods who use them without interruption, even if the places are for some time
not adapted. See also in Remp. 2,108,27-30: with the divine symbols the whole
space on earth is full of all kinds of goods which the gods procure to human beings,
and without them everything is without spirit and deprived of the illuminations of
the gods.
132. The role of vapours or spirits (pneumata) in the functioning of oracles had
already been discussed in Plutarchs dialogue on the obsolescence of oracles (De
def. or. 434B-C). The materialistic explanation based on pneumata (inspired by
Aristotle, Meteor. 1.3) is proposed by one of the interlocutors in order to account for
the decline of the oracles. The same opinion is to be held regarding the spirits that
inspire prophesy (mantikn pneumatn); the power that they possess is not everlasting and ageless, but is subject to changes. For excessive rains most likely
extinguish them, and they probably are dispersed by thunderbolts, and especially
when the earth is shaken beneath by an earthquake. This view is discredited by
other interlocutors, as such an explanation would make the power of the gods
inferior to material conditions. In Plutarchs dialogue the term pneuma indeed

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129

stands for a plain material substance, a kind of vapour. Proclus accepts that some
physical phenomena may render oracular sites for some time unsuitable. This
could create the impression that the gods are no longer giving oracles. Yet Proclus,
too, denies that the pneumata used by the gods would themselves be affected by
these physical causes.
133. Reading pro apparentibus (anti tn phainomenn) for preapparentibus
[BS].
134. The places in the world are not just geographical divisions; they have been
allotted by the demiurge to different types of divinities, who make these parts
suitable for the exercise of their powers, be they mantic, medical or purifying. Cf.
Procl. in Parm. 805,15-17: the gods who exercise authority over the allotments in
the cosmos and draw up to themselves many portions of the divine allotments in
the All; TP 1,24,3-5: the demiurge of all things in the cosmos has placed in every
portion (moira) of the universe similitudes of the unknowable existence of the
gods. Some places, for instance cracks in the earth or certain sources, are suitable
for mantic revelations. Cf. in Tim. 3,140,25-6: the chthonic Apollo imparts to many
places of the earth mantic waters and mouths foretelling the future; see also
1,162,25 on mantic waters.
135. On the making of divine statues: see Proclus, in Eucl. 138,10-22; in Tim.
1,51,25-7; 1,144,16-17; 3,6,8-12 and 3,155,18-22; in Parm. 847,15-23.
136. The leaving off (ekleipein) of the oracles and the ritual powers is compared
to the occultation of the moon. In the Greek the same verb, ekleipein, is used in all
these cases.
137. On this explanation of the eclipse of moon, see Theon, Comm. in Ptol.
962,15-963,11.
138. On the role of the three intermediate classes (angels, heroes and demons),
in divine providence, see Dub. 15-16; 44,32; 46,14; 62-5. On the superior classes,
see also n. 473.
139. On demons in the proper sense and demons in the larger sense (even the
gods and the immortal soul can be called demons), see in Tim. 3,153,22-159,7.
140. Reading illustrari for illustrare [BS].
141. <apo> tn kreittonn [BS]. The superior classes or kinds: another name for
angels, demons, and heroes. Cf. n. 473.
142. Proclus adopts the hylomorphic model to explain the relation between the
illumination by the proximate cause and the illumination by the superior cause.
The first gift prepares the participant to receive the superior gift.
143. The more sublime discipline is dialectics. Cf. Plato, Resp. 6, 510B4-511D5.
144. See Plotinus 1.3 [20] 2,6: a text also quoted by Proclus, in Eucl. 49,9-12; see
also David, Prolegomena 59,17-19.
145. Resp. 7, 533D2.
146. ab ipsis [diis]: diis deleted by D. Isaac.
147. The distinction between the presiding gods and the attendant divine classes
stems from the myth of the Phaedrus, 252C-253C. Cf. nn. 231 and 450 below.
148. This is a rather free translation of a difficult and corrupted passage: per
media aut tanquam a facientibus ea que inde habent: through intermediaries
either as from producing what they receive from there. The preposition a (which
has no equivalent in Isaaks compilation) may stand for para or apo but could also
be a vestige of a corrupted word or prefix. If we delete it with Isaak, we may
construe facientibus (which should then have been rendered as facientia) in
apposition to media. Proclus distinguishes here between two ways of participation
through intermediaries (which he had distinguished earlier as from or through):

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Notes to pages 90-92

either the intermediaries are seen by the participants as being themselves the
producers of what they mediate or they are seen as mediating and leading back to
the divine causes.
149. On this problem see Introduction, pp. 27-32.
150. In defence of providence one may even consider evil as nothing else than
a falling short [}] and a lesser good (Cf. Plotinus 2.9 [33] 13,27-9; but see also 1.8
[51] 5,6-8). This leads to a denial of the reality of evil. Proclus criticises this view
in Mal. 4,32-4 and 6,19-25. See Steel 1998.
151. Reading ei men <ek> tn.
152. To be free from trouble is a characteristic of the blessed state of the gods
and also a component of human happiness (cf. Proclus, in Parm. 787,13-17). The
exercise of providence risks causing the gods a lot of trouble: therefore the Epicureans rejected divine providence (see Cic. ND 1,22; 1,52; Plut. Stoic. rep. 1043B).
According to the Platonists the gods exercise their providence in a transcendent
way without there being any nuisance for them. See also Proclus, in Parm.
1017,1-2; Steel 1996.
153. See Prov. 14,1-2: You should consider that there are two realms, the intelligible and the sensible, each with its own kingdom, that of providence [}] that of fate.
154. There are two kinds of evil, in souls (evil contrary to reason) and in
bodies (evil contrary to nature): see Mal. 39; 55; only particular souls are subject
to evil, not the divine and universal souls: see Mal. 23-4; likewise, only particular
material bodies can undergo evil, not the universal bodies: see Mal. 29.
155. See Proclus, ET 105. We do not follow the transposition proposed by BS.
156. See Tim. 41C1-4 (tr. D. Zeyl): as long as the mortal beings have not come
to be, the universe will be incomplete, for it will still lack within it all the kinds of
living it must have if it is to be sufficiently complete.
157. We used complete and perfect to translate teleios, as the subsequent
argument depends on both meanings of the term.
158. i.e. the counter-natural in bodies.
159. cf. Tim. 41C3-4. The All is the literal translation of to pan, a term that we
elsewhere translate as universe (in the sense of cosmos).
160. cf. Mal. 48,4-5; 59,4.
161. contrary translates para, literally besides.
162. i.e. parhupostan.
163. As there can be no process of generation without the destruction of another
thing, the state of being para phusin exists together with and along the process of
generation as an unavoidable by-product of a natural process. The state of being
contrary to nature is parasitical upon what is according to nature. For the notion
of parhupostasis, see Mal. 50 and Opsomer-Steel 2003, 24-8. In l. 21 we read with
BS pros tn instead of pros t (cum hoc quod est).
164. The phrasing is somewhat convoluted, but the meaning is clear: for beings
that have a rational and an irrational part, it is natural to be affected by passions.
That is not, however, in accordance with the nature of the rational, divine, part
itself. Yet for the irrational part it is again natural. In l. 10 we understand, with
BS, et in hiis que sortiuntur as kan hi lakhousi.
165. cf. Mal. 55, with our n. 381 (p. 129), ad loc.
166. Reading with D. Isaac tou kakou [par]hupostasin } eikots <parhupostasin> lambanontos. On the notion of parhupostasis, which we render as parasitical
existence, see n. 163.
167. As one can say of vicious behaviour that it is against reason one could just
as well say of rational behaviour that it is against the irrational part. The latter

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131

state, however, in which the inferior is subordinated to the superior, will never be
considered as evil.
168. What is meant is behaviour that would be regarded as bad in the case of
rational animals.
169. When reason remains on the level of discursive reasoning it frustrates the
intellect and its higher cognitive activities. We follow the correction of BS reading
tou in l. 31 for divinum (= theiou).
170. Reading with D. Isaac eam que in corpore subsistentiam instead of eum qui
in generationem. On the distinction between descending and coming to exist, see
nn. 176 and 179.
171. i.e., the descent of the divine soul and the existence of the irrational soul.
172. We propose to read in l. 8 hac (tauti) instead of hic (entautha).
173. See Tim. 41C1-4 and n. 156 above.
174. <phulon> added by Boese from marginal note in Vm.
175. Humans (rational and mortal) are between divine beings (rational and
immortal) and brutes (irrational and mortal): see Proclus, in Tim. 3,324,15-19.
Less evident is the insertion of another intermediate tribe of animals, which are
irrational yet immortal. Proclus has in mind the irrational demons which are
irrational and immortal. See in Tim. 3,157,27-158,26, a long digression on the
creation of these special animals.
176. Proclus distinguishes between the fleshy earthy body, composed of the four
elements, and the higher vehicles of the soul (the pneumatic vehicle and the
ethereal). The divine soul cannot be incarnated directly into the earthy bony body
and put in a canvas of bones. Elsewhere Proclus relates three vehicles to three
psychic levels: the ordinary, earthy, body is the vehicle of the vegetative soul; the
pneumatic body that of the irrational soul, the seat of the passions and the lower
cognitive faculties; the aetherial, luminous body that of the rational soul. Cf. Opsomer
2006. The term osteinos (bony) is used by Plato at Tim. 73E1; 7, 74A7 and E5.
177. Reading repellere (amunasthai) for refellere [BS].
178. Proclus is talking about the relation between the rational and the irrational soul.
179. Proclus distinguishes between the pre-existing rational soul which descends
and the irrational soul, which is not eternal but comes to exist for the sake of the
rational soul. This does not mean that a new irrational soul is generated each time a
rational soul descends, as it is reusable a number of times. Cf. Opsomer 2006.
180. Reading edei for eita (deinde g) [BS].
181. We assume that the original Greek had the subjunctive form thersmen
(as in Isaak), rather than the future indicative thersomen, rendered by Moerbeke
as considerabimus [BS].
182. On the sixth problem, see Introduction, pp. 32-8.
183. This fact offends against the idea of a just distribution, based on geometric
equality. Cf. n. 185.
184. This would seem to constitute a reversal of the just proportionality.
185. Geometric equality forms the basis of distributive justice (cf. Dodds 1963,
339): remuneration is supposed to be proportional to merit, punishment to demerit. Merit, of course resides in virtue. The meritocratic principle of distribution
is proper to aristocracy, whereas democracy strives for a numerically equal distribution (the latter equality is also proper to friendship). See Plato, Leg. 6,
757B1-C6. See also Arist. EN 5.3, 1131a29-b24; Pol. 6.2, 1317b3-20. That Proclus
is thinking of the passage from Laws 6 is obvious from the quotation of 757B7 (cf.
n. 186), but also from another passage where he refers to the Laws explicitly: in

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Notes to pages 94-97

Tim. 2,227,2-6. On the principle of distributive justice, see also in Alc. 325,13326,8.
186. A citation from Plato, Leg. 6, 757B7.
187. This is not a reference to the harmonic mean. The Greek does not contain
a reference to harmonia, but to mousik.
188. For this expression, see, e.g., in Remp. 1,108,22-5; 174,9; TP 4,31,10; in Alc.
27,5; 184,6. The locus classicus is Plato, Symp. 210E4-212A7.
189. Reconstructing the Greek as di hn hoi polloi eisin <en> thaumati.
190. Reading kataretn for kata pronoian (secundum providentiam g) [BS].
191. One may have expected Proclus to have offered the following explanation:
because it encompasses all that is bad.
192. <kai> [BS].
193. For greatness of mind (megalopsukhia) and pride (megalophrosun), see in
Parm. 854,15-25, where it is connected with the use of megaloprepes (highminded); Plato, Resp. 487A4 (for the same association, see ps.-Plat. Def.
412E9-10). In our text, too, this association of terms appears to play a role, as the
opposite of megaloprepeia is used earlier in the sentence: mikroprepeia psukhs
(smallness of mind). For Aristotle greatness of soul consists rather in being
worthy of great external goods. See EN 4.3.
194. For this definition of the human being as a soul using body, see in Alc.
45,17; 73,18; 296,25. This definition is based on Alc. I, 129E9-130A2. The expression mortal form of life (eidos zs thnton) is taken from the Timaeus (69C7-8;
also 41D1-2) and refers to the irrational soul which is not a soul sensu stricto, but
the souls shadow which it uses in order to converse with the body. See in Tim.
3,233,26-8; in Crat. 53, p. 22,6; in Remp. 2,90,19-20. Cf. our n. 470.
195. cf. Plat. Symp. 211B7-D1.
196. On philotimia, see Resp. 5, 475A9-B2, but especially 8, 545B4-550C2: love
of honour is the basis of a timocratic society, which evolves from the aristocratic
society. The dominating soul part is the spirited. A further degeneration takes
place when the love of money and possessions (philokhrmatia) becomes dominant.
Love of money forms the basis of an oligarchic society. On philokhrmatia and the
oligarchic state, see Resp. 8, 550C4-555B2. The oligarchic person gives in to certain
desires (epithumiai), but keeps others in check.
197. cf. Porph. De abst. 1,36, p. 112,24-6 Nauck; Aelian, Hist. var. 9,10. See
Riginos 1976, anecdotes 76 and 77, pp. 121-3.
198. The Cynic philosopher Crates of Thebes gave his money to a banker, who
had to promise that he would later give it to Crates children in case they would
turn out to be ordinary citizens, but would distribute it among the people in case
they become philosophers. When he renounced his riches he shouted the famous
words quoted by Proclus. See DL 6,88, and Crates fr. 4-12 Giannantoni (SSR). The
scene is famously depicted on the marble pavement of the cathedral of Siena and
is sometimes used on the cover of books on ancient philosophy.
199. Namely, external goods which they use as instruments for their wrong-doings.
200. Considering the Greek axiousas behind Moerbekes exigentes as a corruption of auxousas [BS].
201. Proclus discusses an application of this principle at in Remp. 1,105,12106,10: when the Homeric gods were debating whether to stop the Trojan war or
not, Hera and Athena were opposed; they wanted to precipitate the punishment
and give the inherent vice the opportunity to express itself, so that it could be
punished better afterwards.
202. Literally the projections of the reason-principles (probolas logn). The

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133

souls freely choose which among the logoi (one can understand them here as plans,
projects, blueprints) they possess they want to develop. This is called their choice
in the myth of Er. Cf. in Remp. 2,95,2-4; Resp. 10, 617E. See also in Alc. 8,19-20;
15,14-15; in Parm. 896,2; in Tim. 2,124,18; 3,279,13-17.
203. For this image, compare Plot. 3.2 [47] 5,3-4; Plut. De sera 561A2-3.
204. Understanding polueides instead of poluhodos, translated by Moerbeke as
multarum viarum [BS].
205. Our translation deviates from Moerbekes Latin translation, and follows
Isaak. Moerbeke wrongly connected meletn ousan with hexin, not with energeian.
He should have written quae instead of qui [BS]. The idea that the souls co-administer the world with the gods stems from the Phaedrus myth. See our n. 450.
206. Reading hupolabi for blepi (respiciat g) [BS].
207. See also below, Dub. 57,3-4.
208. Assuming with BS that Moerbekes cognoscens translates gnrizon and
that this is a corruption of gnrimon.
209. A loose reference to Archimedes, fr. 15: dos moi pou st kai kin tn gn,
Give me somewhere to stand and Ill move the earth = Pappus Syn. 8,1060,1-4
(who calls this a mechanical discovery mkhanopoios is the word translated by
us as engineer). Compare Prov. 25,18-19 (with Steel 2007, 81 n. 117) for a very
similar application of this Archimedean dictum in a moral context.
210. We have not been able to trace this citation. Possibly it is fictitious. Cf.
above, Dub. 34,3.
211. cf. Prov. 25,14-15.
212. <holn> [BS]. Plato indeed emphasises this point: Resp. 4, 420B5-8; 6,
519E1-520A4 (in Tim. 1,43,28-31).
213. The train of thoughts is elliptical. What is supposed to be understood could
be the following: it is not the case that one person gets all the good; hence this
person will also partake of bad things, or at least lack some good things; that is
natural, because all souls are destined to have negative experiences.
214. Probably an allusion (see also tn enteuthen phugn, line 13) to Plato
Theaet. 179A9.
215. i.e. to autexousion.
216. See n. 247 below.
217. Reading phsi instead of phasi (aiunt) [BS].
218. A citation from Resp. 10, 617E4: aitia helomenou. Cf. Opsomer-Steel 2003,
11 (T2).
219. Compare Resp. 10, 617E5: theos anaitios.
220. cf. in Alc. 143,7-17, again citing the myth of Er (Resp. 10, 617D), for the
idea that human self-determination is preserved by providence: Lachesis proposes
the types of life, the soul makes the choice, and the gods give to the souls what fits
the life they have chosen.
221. Boese signals a lacuna. Unless the peculiar syntax is due to an anacolouthon (see Bhme), one might supply: <the agent is to be blamed, but only as
instrument of the All. For> we would <not> suffer unjustly, but the law of the
universe } [BS].
222. cf. Plot. 3.2 [47] 13,8-9.
223. A citation of Arist. Phys. 1.5, 188a33.
224. Following Dornseiff, we read auto krises (cf. Isaak, Dub. 39,22 and
Phaedr. 249A6, krises etukhon) for autokinses (autokineseos g) [BS].
225. Compare Ar. Pol. 1253b27-30.
226. cf. Plot. 3.2 [47] 13,1-15.

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Notes to pages 99-101

227. See above, Dub. 32,11-12 and our n. 185.

228. <kaks>, added in the text of Isaak by Dornseiff.
229. This is a type of collateral damage incurred by the less important parts. It
only affects the less important parts.
230. This echoes a passage from Plato, Gorg. 508A5-7.
231. In the Timaeus Plato describes how souls are sown onto different heavenly
bodies (42D4-5). Proclus explains that each of these heavenly bodies commands a
herd of living beings, from superior kinds (cf. n. 473) down to human souls. Cf. in Tim.
3,131,18-132,5; 3,164,5-11. See also Phaedr. 247A; 248C3; and especially 252C-253C6.
The idea that different human souls follow different gods has been developed in later
Platonism to the theory of different chains or series (seirai) of beings.
232. Reading exeirgasmenas for operate et (exeirgasmenai kai) [BS].
233. Supplementing <kai> [BS].
234. cf. Resp. 9, 586A1-B6.
235. cf. in Parm. 667,10-13 (tr. Morrow-Dillon): For it is primarily the gods
whose life is free of care, and secondarily the divine classes of being and, when they
participate in that blessedness, temperate souls, who always manifest good humour, joy, and contentment with their fate. Plato, Leg. 7, 792D1-4.
236. Resp. 5, 473D5: there is no rest from evils (ouk estin kakn paula).
237. Gorg. 507E3; Leg. 4, 714A5.
238. Reading with BS exisoumenon for axioumenon (dignificatum g). An allusion to the assimilation to god (homoisis thei), the Platonic telos. Cf. Theaet.
176A8-B3. Cf. Opsomer-Steel 2003, 11; Van den Berg 2003.
239. cf. Prov. 25,25-6: since they are estranged from the gods, the universe uses
them as if they were irrational beings; in Tim. 3,277,18-20: when the souls are
dominated by the mortal kind of soul, they become slaves of fate: for the universe
uses them as irrational beings.
240. On the seventh problem, see Introduction, pp. 39-42.
241. cf. Plot. 3.2 [47] 6,20-2.
242. cf. Plot. 3.2 [47] 13,19-20.
243. cf. Plot. 3.2 [47] 15,3-4: the difficulties related to the fact that other
animals eat each other (tn alllophagian tn alln zn).
244. Reading with Isaak tauta and not toutn (horum g) [BS].
245. At in Alc. 225,16-17, Proclus says that the human soul even imparts to
body the last vestige of self-motion (autokinsias eskhaton indalma). Animal
soul-shadows would be one level up from mere bodies. The irrational principle of
life common to all animals is itself a shadow of soul (indalma ts psukhs): in Tim.
1,360,29-30. Proclus indeed thinks that all ensouled beings have a trace of self-motion: TP 5,66,6-9 (referring to Phaedr. 245E5-6, where Proclus probably read
autokinton, not aeikinton). The concept of self-motion amounts to the idea that
a soul is a true, i.e. independent and free origin of motion. In other words, it can
freely decide to initiate a motion.
246. <par> heautou [BS].
247. Cosmic cycles, determined by the motion of various heavenly bodies, were
held to concord with the lives of different types of (living) beings: see, e.g., in Tim.
1,116,10-21; 412,18-23; Prov. 12. See also Plot. 3.1 [3] 5,7-15 and even Aristotle,
Phys. 4.14, 223b28-9.
248. cf. Dub. 41,5 (also 39,3), for the cosmic cycles; and Dub. 40 for the
similarities of human lives.
249. The same parallel is drawn by Plotinus, 3.2 [47] 15,3-6.
250. i.e. pleonexia, a cardinal vice according to Plato.

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135

251. Strobel supplies ouden gar estin <en autois philokrmaton>: for there is no
love of money in them.
252. Plot. 3.2 [47] 13,8-9. See also Procl. in Remp. 1,105,21-2: This comes about
unjustly for the perpetrator, justly for the victim, says Plotinus. Whether the
perpetrator is guilty of evil in fact depends on his or her motive: cf. Mal. 59.
253. i.e. a third instance besides the perpetrator and the victim. This third party
is of course providence as expressed in the order of the universe.
254. Alc. I 113D2-3; see also Alc. I 109D4 [BS].
255. Reading adikn = <in>iustorum (Cousin, BS).
256. This refers to the notion of chains or series (seirai). See n. 231. On the role
of demons as herdsmen, see Plat. Leg. 4, 713D1-3; Polit. 271D6-7; Hes. Op. 121-6.
See also Procl. Schol. in Hes. 75, pp. 54-7 Marzillo.
257. Reading kai dei for kai d (et etiam g) [BS].
258. Reading heimarmenn, instead of heimarmens [BS].
259. According to Bhme 1975, 45 their souls followed a similar trajectory
through the heavens and therefore heard the same heavenly music, hence the
reference to concordant (sumphonous) descents.
260. This is the assumption made at the beginning of the chapter.
261. Reading daimonn; instead of ontn (entibus g) [BS].
262. Reading genesesi, instead of anesesi (remissionibus g) [BS].
263. Ultimately the souls are themselves responsible for the guardian demons,
and thus for the type of life, they choose for themselves. Cf. Resp. 10, 617E1-5.
264. pou instead of poi [BS].
265. If animals do not have a trace of rationality, there will be no individualised
providential rule over them.
266. i.e. mental representation; cf. TP 3,24,7-12.
267. Proclus here examines the hypothesis that irrational living beings have no
trace of self-determination. For those beings who lack this have only sensation
(aisthsis) and possibly a form of imagination (phantasia) not, however, constructive imagination or imagination onto which rational principles are projected from
above, i.e. from the rational soul, but at most an imagination that receives
information from the senses. In other words, Proclus is speaking about those
beings that have only receptivity (on the receptivity of the senses, see ps.-Simpl.
in DA 165,31-166,33). On the two forms of imagination and on the fact that plants
have only the receptivity of the senses and the lower form of phantasia, see in
Remp. 1,232,15-233,28. Cf. Lautner 2006, 128-30; Opsomer 2006, 142-4. In our text
Proclus makes the point that particular beings that are in no way separate from
the body are not the object of providential care (contrary to the whole of which they
are parts), yet fall in the domain of fate. Cf. Prov. 3,10-14: The second distinction
is that between two types of soul. The one is separable from the body and descends
into this mortal region from somewhere above, from the gods; the other is that
which resides in the bodies and is inseparable from its substrates. The latter
depends in its being upon fate, the former upon providence.
268. cf. Plot. 3.3 [48] 5.
269. Proclus here refers to the heavenly bodies.
270. Human beings, more precisely their rational souls, belong to this intermediary class of beings. See Prov. 20.
271. Leg. 4, 717C6-D3: the child should watch his tongue in addressing his
parents, for Nemesis (Retribution), the angel of justice (Diks angelos), oversees
these things and punishes ill-considered language. Proclus refers to this piece of
popular wisdom as evidence for the common belief in providence. Also at in Tim.

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Notes to pages 103-106

1,198,2-3 does he refer to Nemesis as the overseer of ill-considered talk (tn

kouphn logn episkopos).
272. Marinus Life of Proclus provides ample evidence for the importance
attached to this kind of lore. For dreams, see 6,10; 26,28-36; for apparitions:
19,12; 32 (and also in Tim. 3,164,14-15); for oracles: 32,11. References to the
oracles abound in Proclus writings. See Majercik 1989, 21-46; Lewy 2011. See also
Plut. De sera 566C6-7.
273. cf. Steel 2007, 75 n. 37.
274. hs monon <on> [BS].
275. The vegetative soul is essentially linked to the body (cf. in Tim. 1,393,4-5),
whereas the rational soul is essentially separate from the body, though it may have
activities linked to the body Cf. Opsomer 2006, 148-9.
276. The fate of these lower irrational forces (so-called souls or rather shadows
of souls) is indeed inextricably connected with bodies, that are works of fate alone.
277. Reading with Boese informante (morphouss) for in formam [BS].
278. See ET 38,9-10: The well-being of a thing is derived through as many
causes as its being, and conversely; in Remp. 1,206,25-207,4.
279. cf. TP 3,23,21-3: In general it is clear from many passages that Plato
regards as soul the rational soul, and the others as shadows of souls. For a more
extensive discussion, see Opsomer 2006, 136-40.
280. to kat <axian toiouton esti> (Boese from Isaak).
281. It would not be sensible to complain about ones own ontological rank, i.e.
about not being a god but merely human. This is connected to the idea that there need
to be different levels, which in itself does not constitute a form of evil: cf. Mal. 7.
282. cf. Phaedr. 245D2-3; Arist. Metaph. 12.10, 1075b24-7; Plot. 6.8 [39] 11,8-9.
283. Reading oud hols on.
284. i.e. the order of the universe.
285. Reading instead of m (non g) [BS].
286. On the eighth problem, see Introduction, pp. 42-6. The eighth problem, just
like the ninth, is closely inspired by Plutarch of Chaeroneas dialogue on those
punished late by the deity (usually cited with its Latin title De sera numinis vindicta).
Proclus borrows arguments, examples and some expressions from Plutarchs text.
287. For this characterisation of the problem, see Plut. De sera 548C-D; 549B9.
288. This is the kind of reasoning Proclus will contest further on. He will argue
that in many cases it is better for the wrong-doer to be punished later.
289. i.e. to coincidence. For this type of reasoning, see Plut. De sera 549C1; D5-7.
290. A literal citation of Plut. De sera 548D10-11 combined with a paraphrase
of 548E1-2.
291. The same verb, euroouss, used by Plutarch, De sera 548D10.
292. For the expression, see Procl. in Remp. 2,49,13; Dub. 61,3-4. On the
presence of evil in the soul, see Mal. 23-4; 45-6.
293. akanthas. Cf. Isaak, Dub. 50,13 [BS].
294. Plutarch mentions the thorny plant (akantha) at De sera 553C3, but in the
context of its having edible roots.
295. non abstinere (m apekhesthai); Moerbeke should not have translated the
redundant Greek negation [BS].
296. The expressions are inspired by Plut. De sera 554C9 (tn parautika plgn
ekphugein).
297. cf. Plut. De sera 549F2-550A3.
298. Reading conantium (egkheirountn) instead of cogentium, cf. Isaak, Dub.
50,20 [BS].

Notes to pages 106-108

137

299. psukhas therapein (Boese with Isaak); literally: the souls of the treatments. Cf. Corp. Hipp. Epist. 16,31: the right moments are the souls of the
therapies (psukhai de tn therapein hoi kairoi); Aphor. 1,1; Proclus cites the
saying and attributes it to Hippocrates, one of the Asclepiadeans, in in Alc.
120,12-14. More extensive references in Segonds 1985, 99 n. 5 (p. 193).
300. Reading puto (oimai) for puta [BS].
301. We keep tn pronoian, deleted by BS.
302. i.e. a therapy that takes into account the kairos, which constitutes the soul
(the vital point) of the treatment. See our n. 299.
303. cf. Plut. De sera 550A3-10.
304. For the idea, see Plut. De sera 550A-B; 551D.
305. i.e. Plato. The quote is from Leg. 4, 709B7-8. This text is also quoted in the
discussion on kairos in in Alc. 124,12-13, and in Prov. 34,19-22 (where the quotation is extended so as to include skill, tekhn). See Steel 2007, 83 nn. 157-60.
306. Nature is the ruling principle of bodies, reason that of the desires located
in the irrational soul. Cf. Dub. 30,11-12; Mal. 55, with our n. 381 (p. 129), ad loc.
307. i.e. dik. Plut. De sera 550A4-5: the medical treatment of the soul (h peri
psukhn iatreia), which goes by the name of chastisement (dik) and justice
(dikaiosun). This may be inspired by Plato, Gorg. 464B8: the part corresponding
to medicine is justice.
308. cf. Plut. De sera 550A5: the greatest of all arts (pasn tekhnn megist).
309. cf. Mal. 56.
310. Reading hotan i kairos instead of hn kairos (quorum tempus g) [BS].
311. The same idea in Plut. De sera 549E8-F4; 550A12-B2. The expression
atekhnous teknitn (= eos qui sine arte arteficum g) is a literal quotation from De
sera 549E8-F1.
312. A similar idea in Plut. De sera 550C10-14.
313. Compare Aesch. Choeph. 313: suffering [comes] for the perpetrator (drasanti pathein); fr. 665,3 Mette; Soph. fr. 209 Nauck = 229 Pearson (drasanti gar toi
kai pathein opheiletai): for the perpetrator owes some suffering (ton drnta gar ti
kai pathein ofeiletai).
314. See below, Dub. 53: to be guilty of a crime and not to be punished directly
makes things worse for the wrong-doer.
315. Reading intelligens (nosas) instead of intelligis [BS].
316. What is natural (kata phusin) for the whole is unnatural (para phusin) for
the parts, that have been pressed together (sumpepgen) against their natural
leanings. Cf. Isaac 1977, 117 n. 1 (p. 117), citing Dornseiff.
317. Proclus continues alluding to the theory of natural places. The alien place
(allotrios topos) is an expression often used to refer to unnatural places, that is, the
places different from the natural place of (elementary) bodies. See, e.g., Inst.
phys. 2,15,46; in Tim. 2,12,3; 3,115,4. For the lack of self-knowledge and the
concomitant love of the material world, see in Alc. 33,21-34; 53,12-17; 112,9-10;
Mal. 20,11-12.
318. Divine punishment is in essence, at least for the curable cases, corrective,
not retributive, as Plutarch also points out: De sera 551C6-D8; 561E5-F3. For Plato
himself on divine punishment, see Mackenzie 1981, 236-7.
319. cf. Plato Gorg. 478D4-7: Was not paying the due penalty getting rid of the
worst thing there is, depravity? It was. Indeed, justice (dik) makes people
self-controlled and more just (dikaioterous) and proves to be a treatment against
depravity; 479D5-6: Not paying the due penalty when one has done something
unjust is the first worst thing, the very worst of all things that are bad.

138

Notes to pages 108-109

320. cf. Mal. 59,11-16, and already Plato Gorg. 460B2, for the image of the
unhealed wound.
321. i.e. what they owe, their dik. In in Remp. 2,140,11-12 Proclus distinguishes justice (dik), which is beneficial, from timria, vengeance or retribution.
In Dub., however, timria is also used for beneficial, corrective forms of punishment.
322. See also Plut. De sera 552C1-3; 554C8-D1, for the idea that a delayed
punishment is worse for the wrong-doer. This is of course connected to the idea
that vice is its own punishment: 556D6-9.
323. Compare in Remp. 1,106,3-8.
324. Compare Plut. De sera 559E7-F2, where the context is however somewhat
different (healing one part of the body by inflicting a painful treatment on another), yet the underlying idea agrees with Proclus remark. See also Plato, Gorg.
460C6-8.
325. See also Plut. De sera 554A7-B4.
326. For Asclepius Sotr, see Saffrey 2001, 35 n. 6 (p. 162).
327. The comparison between human craftsmanship, in particular medicine,
and the craft of providence is one of the leading ideas of Plutarchs De sera. See,
e.g., 549E-F; 561C11-E4; 559E7-F2.
328. cf. n. 324 above.
329. Sight was deemed the most valuable of the senses, and the most akin to
mind: cf. Plato Resp. 6, 507E5-B5; Tim. 47A1-C4. The latter passage is quoted at
the beginning of the next chapter (Dub. 54,6-8).
330. i.e. the immediate punishment. Proclus argument, as was Plutarchs, is
rendered somewhat confusing by the various uses of the expressions denoting
punishment. What he means here is that those who have not received the punishment that is conferred by an active intervention (by providence, or by human
authorities) are in fact being punished in a different way, as they suffer in various
ways (by bearing the consequences of their viciousness; through anxieties etc.)
while they await that other punishment. The claim that not to be punished is the
greatest punishment may produce a nice rhetorical effect, but is rather unsuitable
for technical arguments. This tells something about the nature and purpose of
these texts. Plutarch explains the terminological confusion by his remark that
ordinary, unthinking people, take to be the punishment for a crime what is actually
only the end of the punishment (because the wrong-doer dies, in the most extreme
case): He compares this to someone who denies that a fish is caught if it has
swallowed the hook but is not yet set to broil or being cut in pieces by the cook, or
to children who see villains parade on stage and think that their affairs go well and
they are happy, till the moment when before their eyes they get stabbed: De sera
554B5-C4; E5-F1. Proclus later in the chapter will call one kind of punishment
internal, the other external (53,23).
331. Plut. De sera 554C9-10.
332. i.e. to suneidos (see also Plut. De sera 554F3). What is meant here is merely
the awareness of previous crimes (for which no amends have been made), not some
kind of mental faculty or centre of such awareness. For the early history of the
concept of conscience, see Reiner 1974, 574-81.
333. cf. Plut. De sera 554A7-B4; E5-9; 555A3-C11.
334. Socrates makes this point in the Gorgias, 480A6-D7. See esp. 460A8-B2
(the wrong-doer should go as soon as possible to the judge as to a doctor, in order
that the disease of injustice be not protracted so as to make the soul unhealable);
C3-5.

Notes to pages 109-110

139

335. There may be a word-play on akolastos, which literally means unpunished, but usually denotes licence and incontinence.
336. Plato, Tim. 39B4-5. The sun is the second heavenly body from the earth.
337. Plato, Tim. 45B3.
338. Plato, Tim. 47B6-7.
339. Plato, Tim. 47C3-4.
340. Plato, Tim. 47C3. Plutarch refers to the same Timaeus passage (47B-C) at
De sera 550D6-E5.
341. This is the traditional Platonic telos, for which the key passage is Theaet.
176A. See our n. 238. Interestingly Plutarch has inserted a remarkable passage on
assimilation to god in De sera 550C12-F4: god is said to set himself in the middle
as a paradigm and assimilation is given both a moral and a cosmological sense.
God, as a moral paradigm, teaches us to be slow and gentle by being himself slow
and gentle when it comes to meting out punishments.
342. Plut. De sera 550E8 (labron aphairn).
343. cf. Theaet. 176B1: assimilation to god insofar as possible (homoisis theoi
kata to dunaton).
344. This argument is inspired by Plut. De sera 550C12-F4: god sets an example
of mildness and unhurriedness. Thus the perpetrator is given time to repent
(551D1). Just like Plutarch, Proclus lets the argument on providence be followed
by human examples that show why it is wise not to punish while in anger, but
rather to wait. The first two examples are again taken from De sera, in the same
order (see nn. 347 and 350 below).
345. epanateinamenos: superextendit g [BS].
346. <autn> cf. Gnom. Par. 173. [BS].
347. Cf. Plut., De sera 550A10-B1. For this anecdote, see De Lacy-Einarson
1959, 198-9, n. a; Riginos 1976, 155-6, anecdote 113 (version B).
348. BS assumes a lacuna in the text.
349. <humin> [BS].
350. cf. Plut. De sera 550B2-6. For this anecdote, see De Lacy-Einarson 1959,
199, n. b.
351. The example of Theano (a famous Pythagorean, considered to be the wife
of Pythagoras and the daughter of Brontinus; some sources claim she was not
Pythagoras wife, but just his student, and not the daughter, but the wife of
Brontinus; cf. DL 8.42) is not in Plutarch, but may have been inspired by the
preceding mention of Archytas. We have been unable to trace another mention of
this anecdote. Cf. Riginos 1976, p. 156, n. 16. This is one of several apophthegmata
and anecdotes attributed to Theano.
352. i.e. thumos, translated as anger in the Plato anecdote.
353. cf. Plut. De sera 551A8-9.
354. Proclus apparently has already forgotten that one of the anecdotes concerns a woman, namely Theano. The reason may be that he is freely copying
Plutarch who also speaks of examples of men that we should remember (551B6).
In his series of examples Plutarch indeed only lists men.
355. Plut. De sera 551C2 (megalopatheian). Using a word play Proclus goes on
to make the point that megalopatheia teaches apatheia (54,35).
356. cf. Plut. De sera 551B6-C5.
357. cf. Plut. De sera 551C3-5.
358. i.e. megalopatheia is the teacher of apatheia.
359. Compare the exhortation at Plut. De sera 551B6-C5.
360. Proclus appears to be aware of the fact that the different explanations he

140

Notes to pages 110-112

found in Plutarch and reproduced by him are not always compatible (for instance
providence is said to wait in order to give the wrong-doer ample opportunity to do even
more wrong, so that the evil becomes more apparent, but is also said to wait until the
wrong-doer shows repentance; or also: not being punished is called the worst punishment, but it also offers opportunities for getting rid of the evil). That is why he points
out that the delay in punishment is due to different reasons in different cases.
361. In De sera 562B1-D9 Plutarch argues that god knows more than we do, as
he knows hidden motives and character dispositions. The present argument is not
so much inspired by this passage, though, as by 551C11-E9 (or even up to 552D3):
the deity detects the passions (ta path perhoran, 551C12) and can discern between
curable and incurable cases; it knows whether the crimes stem from an ingrained
habit and how stable the evil disposition is. The latter idea is indeed picked up by
Proclus (55,12-14).
362. These three aspects are also mentioned by Plutarch, De sera 550A9 (to pote
kai ps kai mekhri posou).
363. i.e. to kataxian. Cf. Plut. De sera 558C3; 560B2-3.
364. cf. Plut. De sera 551D7-E9.
365. Compare Plut. De sera 551D5-6.
366. ton khronon perimenein (Boese, Isaak, Dub. 55,17; Plut. De sera 551B10C1: perimenonta ton khronon): tempore expectare g.
367. cf. Plut. De sera 551E2-3: those whose proclivity for error springs from
ignorance of the beautiful rather than choice of the shameful.
368. <kai> (Boese).
369. Reconstructing the Greek meta tou prou ts gnses: cum orbali cognitione
g [BS].
370. Compare Arist. Meteor. 352a29 [BS].
371. Tim. 41E2-3: nomous tous heimarmenous.
372. At De sera 551D9-E9 Plutarch lists some possible causes for the difference
in treatment wrongdoers receive from providence.
373. i.e. Plato. Cf. n. 374.
374. The idea that great natures, i.e. people with great natural endowments,
can turn out either very well or very badly is explained in a famous passage from
Platos Republic. Whether they develop their abilities for the good or for bad
purposes is said to depend on nurture and education (6, 491D1-E5). Plutarch takes
up the idea in De sera 551E9-552D3. The idea of great natures is important
throughout Plutarchs oeuvre and underlies many of his character portraits in the
Lives. See Duff 1999. Both Plato and Plutarch use agricultural metaphors: strong
seeds and fertile soils.
375. This application of the idea of great natures to providence is taken over
from Plutarch, De sera 551E9-552D3; 553B7-C11.
376. The example is taken from De sera 552D4-7.
377. cf. Plut. De sera 552B12.
378. Plutarch indeed lists several examples: De sera 551E9-552B11; 552D4553C11.
379. cf. Plut. De sera 552B5-9.
380. Themistocles famously interpreted the prophecy of the Delphic oracle
according to which only a wall of wood could protect Athens as a reference to the
fleet, and subsequently beat the Persians at Salamis. Cf. Herodotus 7.140-3.
381. cf. Plut. De sera 552E3-5. Dionysius I (c. 430-367), the infamously cruel
tyrant of Syracuse, combated the military presence of the Carthaginians in Sicily
with varying success.

Notes to pages 112-113

141

382. cf. Plut. De sera 552E6-8. Periander of Corinth, whose reign began in 628
(the traditional date) and lasted for about forty years, was the classical example of
a tyrant (he murdered his own wife). He established colonies in Apollonia, Leucas
and Anactorium and thus secured Greek presence in these regions.
383. This is the Platonic idea of reversion: the soul should turn toward the
higher causes (whose trace it can find within itself; cf. n. 83 above). On reversion,
see ET 31; 35; Steel 2006.
384. cf. Dub. 37,24.
385. cf. Plut. De sera 554D, esp. D1-3 (tr. De Lacy-Einarson): When I speak of a
long period I mean it relatively to ourselves, as for the gods any length of human life
is but nothing. Any period of time is strictly speaking incommensurable with eternity.
386. i.e. ts tises desmtria, an expression taken from Plato, Gorg. 523B3
(tises te kai diks desmtrion, the prison of pay-back and retribution).
387. For the punishment in Hades, see in Remp. 1,117,22-122,20.
388. Proclus uses an expression from Plut. De sera D2-3, who says that for the
gods the length of a human life is nothing (to mden). Cf. n. 385.
389. Human prisons and the underworld, respectively.
390. cf. Plut. De sera 554D8-10 (tr. De Lacy-Einarson, modified): as people in
prison playing at dice or draughts with the rope hanging overhead.
391. Plutarch too mentions the role of imagination (De sera 560A9-10), more
particularly in the transmission of fearful images through stories from one soul
to another.
392. A quotation from Plut. De sera 554F1-2 (tr. De Lacy-Einarson, modified):
he has snapped up in an instant the sweetness of injustice, like a bait.
393. Plutarch devotes the final part of De sera to an eschatological myth
(563B7-568A12), but had introduced the eschatological perspective earlier on
(560F6-561B7). Plutarch moreover emphasises the idea that fear and anxiety in
themselves constitute a severe punishment (554F2-3; 555C1-556D9), yet understands this condition predominantly as fear of being found out and punished
during this life.
394. Reading skuthn instead of poion (BS, based on Plut. De sera 555B2).
395. Proclus has taken this and the next anecdote from Plut. De sera 555B1-6
and 555B8-C1, respectively. Apollodorus was the tyrant of Cassandreia from about
279 to 276 BCE, known for his cruelty. He had killed a young man called Callimeles and served the flesh to his fellow conspirers so that they would become fellows
in crime (see also De sera 556D2-3). Cf. Polyaenus Strat. 6,7,2; De Lacy-Einarson
1959, 221, n. d; 228-9, n. b. Ptolemy Ceraunus (Lightning) murdered Seleucus in
280 BC. Cf. De Lacy-Einarson 1959, 223, n. a, suggesting that the dream may have
been triggered by the proverb the hare runs for her meat.
396. An image from Plato Parm. 137A5-6.
397. On the ninth problem, see Introduction, pp. 46-8. For his treatment of this
problem too, Proclus continues to use Plutarch De sera as the main source.
Hermias of Alexandria raises the same issue in his Commentary on the Phaedrus:
in Phaedr. 96,8-9.
398. The idea that in Hades punishment will be exacted for crimes committed,
either from the perpetrators of the crimes or from their childrens children, is
mentioned by Plato at Resp. 2, 366A6-7. Apparently Euripides had already called
this a scandal (Plut. De sera 556E3-6; = Eur. fr. 980 Nauck).
399. kai instead of kan (quamvis g) [BS].
400. Plutarch starts his discussion of this problem with the same dilemma; it is
raised by the interlocutor Timon: De sera 556E6-11. Proclus borrows this argument

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Notes to pages 113-114

and goes on by confirming that there are good grounds for believing that punishment is sometimes inflicted on the progeny of the wrong-doer. Plutarch, or rather
the interlocutor Timon, offers a long series of examples that are supposed to show
the reality of divine punishment of offspring: De sera 556F1-557E6. The character
that bears Plutarchs own name subsequently casts doubt on these stories, but does
not dispute the reality of the phenomenon (557E9-558A2).
401. tn de instead of to de (quod autem g) [BS].
402. cf. Plato Resp. 2, 366A7, but especially Phaedr. 244D, cited in this context
by Proclus in Crat. 93, p. 46,12-23 and Hermias, in Phaedr. 96,8-97,14. See
Introduction, p. 47.
403. Reading providentie (ti pronoiai) instead of providentia [BS].
404. cf. Plut. De sera 557D4-5 (Timon speaking, tr. De Lacy-Einarson): where
is the logic or justice (to eulogon } kai dikaion) of this?
405. Reading toioutn, instead of toutn (hiis g) [BS].
406. This argument concerning the city is based on Plut. De sera 559A1-C9: a
city has a unity like that of a living being, with an identity that persists through
time; Epicharmus-style arguments (the sophistic Growing argument: 559A11-B2)
against persistence through time are even less sound in the case of a city than in
that of an individual person. Hence it is perfectly justifiable that divine wrath
crosses the boundaries between generations and even affects individuals that are
not related to the original wrong-doers: the fact that they are citizens of the same
city suffices.
407. The argument regarding the cross-generational unity of the family is
drawn from Plut. De sera 559C10-D6 (with a rhetorical reinforcement of the
argument up to 559E7): the unity of the family is even stronger than that of the
city, as there is a genetic connection of all family members to the first family father.
On the unity of the family, see also Herm. in Phaedr. 96,16-18; 22.
408. Reading kai aei instead of kaitoi (equidem g) [BS].
409. i.e. kinmata. cf. Plut. De sera 559B7. Postures, motions, glances etc. are
often considered as mirrors of the soul (not the expression used in the sources),
i.e. as tell-tale signs of passions, especially in early Christian texts. See, e.g., Ioann.
Chrysost. in ep. i ad Tim. 541,43-5; Bas. De virg. 708,12-13.
410. Reading hec (tauta) for hoc [BS].
411. Here Proclus goes beyond Plutarch De sera 559A2, who merely compares
the city to a living being, and does not go so far as to say it is a living being.
412. Proclus here literally cites the expression d poieisthai tous logous from
Tim. 27B5-6.
413. Reading diapheronts for diapherontn (differentium g) [BS].
414. to perilpt<ik>on: comprehensibilitatem g [BS].
415. Understanding skn for funem (finem Latin MSS). Cf. Plot. 1.4 [46]
1,18-19; Procl. TP 5,73,22-3. [BS].
416. Plutarch argues indeed that we do not complain when we share in the
honour of a city or family: if we accept this we have no reason to refuse to accept
the common guilt or disgrace (De sera 558A5-D2). See also Herm. in Phaedr. 96,18.
417. This image also in Plut. De sera 549B3; 553C7.
418. In other words, the fact that the progeny will be punished does not mean
that the original wrong-doer escapes from punishment (whether in this life but
maybe unknown to his contemporaries or in the afterlife).
419. i.e. the sumpatheia. Cf. Plut. De sera 559A4; Herm. in Phaedr. 96,11.
Cosmic sympathy was a key concept in Stoic moral cosmology and is crucial to their
doctrine of fate (SVF II 532 = Philo, Migr. Abr. 180; Posid. fr. 106 Edelstein-Kidd

Notes to pages 114-115

143

= Cic. Div. 2,34). The idea was picked up by Platonists. Cf. Plot. 3.1 [3] 5,7-15; Procl.
in Alc. 69,9-15.
420. These examples are taken from Plut. De sera 559E8-F2 (with highly
similar wording). Plutarch adds the reflection that the notion to heal one thing
through another applies even more to souls, because souls perceive what happens
to other souls and use their imagination. As a consequence they will adapt their
behaviour. This explains why teachers and generals occasionally single out one
individual for punishment, thereby giving a lesson to the whole group: cf. 560A110. Plutarchs explanation makes better sense of the medical comparison: the
comparandum is indeed how one soul is healed through (perceiving) the corrective
punishment of another (a form of sym-pathy) namely in the way one part of the
body is healed through treatment of another part, based on the principle of
co-affection. Proclus has detached the comparison from this context, and makes his
argument rest on the idea that the offspring has the same bad disposition and
hence needs to be corrected (an idea used by Plutarch too; see n. 425 below).
421. Reading melei for mellei (fiet g) BS].
422. Hermias connects the medical comparison with the idea of timing: in
Phaedr. 96,24-6.
423. Reading hoi for dia (per) g [BS].
424. cf. Plut. De sera 561D2-9; 562A13-D9.
425. Plutarch also argues that the similarity in character and (evil) dispositions
may be inherited from distant forefathers and may skip generations, just like an
inherited skin colour may stem from a distant forefather. Cf. De sera 562F5-563B5
(the passage also contains a comparable observation on warts, birth marks and
moles, quoted at Dub. 61,11-13 = De sera 563A4-6). Compare Arist. GA 1.18,
722a9-11. This is connected to the idea that the offspring is not actually being
punished for the moral shortcomings of another, but for its own shortcomings, even
if they are not yet apparent. Therefore it is the similarity of character that counts.
The punishment is accordingly not retributive, but corrective (of the disposition)
and pre-emptive (relative to the deed). Cf. 561C1-562F4.
426. cf. Prov. 21,9-11: For similarity everywhere connects beings with one
another; and that which is assimilated enjoys the same regime as that to which it
is assimilated, and also the same leader of this regime.
427. Plutarch sees a strong connection between the survival of the soul after
death and individual providence, but discusses this merely in the context of
eschatological punishment. He does not develop the idea, as Proclus does, that a
soul may be rewarded or punished during its earthly life for a previous earthly life.
428. Reading diaxousan for degentem and taking deuteron khronon (translated
by Moerbeke as secondo tempore) as the object of diaxousan.
429. cf. Philostr. VA 4,45: Apollonius saves a young, still unmarried, bride
believed to be dead. The story told by Philostratus is about what happens to the
girl resurrected by Apollonius, not about two different lives of Apollonius. There is
an unsatisfactory element to Proclus version of the story: one would expect there
to be some relation between Apollonius in the second of his lives mentioned here
and the young woman saved by him, for otherwise the details about the woman
being unmarried and then married in the extra time she got by being resuscitated
are pointless. One would above all want to know more about this second, divine life
of Apollonius. H. Boese, followed by Bhme 1975, 103, suggests that Proclus has
conflated the story of the resuscitation of the young girl (according to Philostratus
it is unclear whether she was really or merely seemingly dead) with an earlier
episode in which Apollonius tells that in a previous life he was a sailor whose only

144

Notes to page 115

laudable feat appears to have been not to betray his ship to pirates (VA 3,23-4;
Boese 1960, 98). Yet except for the reference to reincarnation there is nothing that
connects this passage with the version given by Proclus: neither is there a reference to a divine life, nor to a life subsequent to the life as thaumaturge.
Philostratus reports that Apollonius was considered a supernatural and divine
person (VA 1,2: daimonios te kai theios nomisthnai) and later sources go even
further (cf. Eunapius, VS 2,1,4). His divinity, however, refers to his life as a
thaumaturge, not to some later life. A possible connection, however, is with the
second to last chapter of Philostratus Life (8,30). One of the stories surrounding
his death has it that he disappeared from the temple of Dictynna while a chorus of
maidens was heard singing Hasten thou from earth, hasten thou to Heaven,
hasten. From this passage Eusebius infers that the pagans believed that Apollonius went to heaven in his physical body accompanied by hymns (Contra Hier. 8,
p. 377,23-4; 40, p. 408,3-15 Kayser). This is at least a clear reference to a second,
divine life in which he consorted with the gods. None of the extant sources,
however, connect Apollonius heavenly life with the episode featuring the young
bride. Proclus source probably embroidered the account in Philostratus VA 4,45 to
the extent that it represented Apollonius divine life as his reward for resuscitating the young girl. There need not be a reference to his possible ascension, though
there may be. It should be noted that what Proclus goes on to argue after having
given the Apollonius example would seem to be a different point: if we accept the
Apollonius case, then we should also accept the reincarnation case. This may
confirm the interpretation that the second life of Apollonius is not a second earthly
life, but the divine life among the gods. We thank Danny Praet and Christopher
Jones for sharing their knowledge on Apollonius of Tyana.
430. Indeed, according to the Platonic theory of incarnation the souls themselves choose their lives and in their choice are determined by their history, which
has made them what they are. Cf. Resp. 10, 617D6-618E2. Cf. Procl. in Remp.
2,304,23-305,17. Hermias, too, connects the choice of the souls explicitly with the
issue of inherited guilt. See in Phaedr. 96,13-14: For the one who deserves to suffer
this is introduced into such a family.
431. People born into the same family or into the same city are not the same
(they are not numerically identical) in the sense in which souls transmigrating
from one body to another are the same.
432. cf. Plat. Gorg. 523E1-6; Plut. De sera 565B11-15.
433. Reading Teiresiou in [Peiresii g] [BS].
434. Proclus may be alluding to the tragic tales of doomed families (e.g. the
house of Atreus), in which an error is passed on from generation to generation, but
the point he is making is a different one: just as one actor plays many roles, so one
soul in its reincarnations becomes different persons. Proclus refers to Pelops in the
context of inherited guilt at in Crat. 93, p. 46,12-21.
435. i.e. in their own previous lives.
436. For the metaphor of the stage, see Prov. 2,8; Plut. De sera 554B5-C4;
E5-F1; but especially Plot. 3.2 [47] 11,13; 3.2 [47] 15-17. At 15,21-9 Plotinus
compares, as Proclus does in our text, the actor playing different characters to the
metempsychoses of the soul.
437. cf. n. 320.
438. The argument amounts to the claim that these souls are not, in fact, being
punished for crimes of others, but rather for their own bad disposition. In his
commentary on Hesiod Proclus expresses the same idea: see Procl. Schol. in Hes.
122, pp. 104-7 Marzillo. It is possible that the fragment in question, a scholium to

Notes to pages 115-116

145

Hesiod, Works and Days 282-4, goes back to Plutarch of Chaeronea (fr. 39 Sandbach), whose commentary on Hesiod appears to have been an important source for
Proclus. The scholium is also close to the argument of De sera, esp. 559D-E,
562C-D, 563A.
439. cf. Plut. De sera 553C5: rhizan ponran.
440. cf. Dub. 50,10, with our n. 292.
441. cf. Plut. De sera 562C5-11 (tr. De Lacy-Einarson): One might as well fancy
that scorpions grow their dart when they sting, and generate their venom when
they strike a foolish notion, for the various kinds of wicked men do not at the
same time become wicked and show themselves wicked; rather, the thief and the
tyrant possess their vice from the outset, but put their thievery and lawlessness
into effect when they find the occasion and the power.
442. cf. Plut. De sera 562C11-D9.
443. Plutarch discusses the pre-emptive working of providence extensively: De
sera 561C10-562F4.
444. hsper epilpsin hupophuoumenn. Cf. Plut. De sera 562D8-9 (tr. De
Lacy-Einarson): his purpose is to cure them, removing the vice, like an epilepsy,
before the seizure.
445. en paisin: genitis is an alternative translation for natis [BS].
446. A literal quotation of Plut. De sera 563A4-6.
447. This cross-reference is unclear (see Appendix 1).
448. On the tenth problem, see Introduction, pp. 48-50.
449. The wording especially the use of the expression prosths } ton kolophna is closely inspired by Plut. De sera 549D11-E1.
450. Proclus often uses this expression that is inspired by the Phaedrus, e.g. in
Remp. 1,52,10-11; 2,99,7-8; 2,177,28-9: in Alc. 149,1-6; in Tim. 3,284,20-1;
3,296,25-6. Cf. Phaedr. 246C1-2: panta ton kosmon dioikei.
451. cf. Dub. 4-5.
452. tn then: diis g [BS].
453. cf. ET 120, p. 104,31-2 (tr. Dodds, modified): Every god embraces in his
existence the exercise of providence over the universe; and the primary providence
resides in the gods.
454. cf. Dub. 4-5. See also our n. 19.
455. agathottes, literally goodnesses. The use of the word form in our translation may be misleading, as it is suggestive of the realm of Being, i.e. the
Intelligible, which is, however, inferior to that of the Henads-Gods.
456. They are autoteleis. Cf. n. 457.
457. Reading autn for aitin (causis g) [BS]. Cf. ET 64 cor., p. 62,5-6; 114, p.
100,18-21; in Parm. 707,6-7; 1062,23-6. The more general principle is that every
originating principle gives rise to two series, one consisting of entities complete in
themselves (autoteleis), the other of irradiations which derive their being from
something else (ET 64). See n. 67 above. Applied to the One this means that its
series, that of the henads, is likewise twofold: true, self-subsistent henads, i.e.
gods, on the one hand, and derivative unities, on the other.
458. Reading autohen for autothen (ex se g) [BS].
459. This is the triad that explains the presence of characteristics at three
levels: in their cause (kataitian), at their own substantial rank (kathhuparxin)
and in the participants (kata methexin). Cf. ET 65. Applied to the One/Good and
its series these three levels map onto (1) the One/Good itself; (2) the henads that
are complete in themselves (autoteleis); (3) the henads in the form of irradiations,
i.e. as existing in the participants.

146

Notes to page 117

460. The Greek term is agathoeides. Here the eidos-component truly refers to
the formal aspect of a thing. Compare our n. 455.
461. cf. n. 456.
462. cf. ET 114.
463. cf. ET 64 cor., p. 62,6-9 (tr. Dodds): and of intelligences some are
self-complete substances, while others are intellective perfections; and of souls
some belong to themselves, while others belong to ensouled bodies, as being but
phantasms of souls.
464. The Greek term is henoeides. Cf. n. 460.
465. The self-complete intellects encompass the totality of the first intellect, but
each in a different manner. On the series of intellects, see ET 166 (tr. Dodds):
there is both unparticipated and participated intelligence; and the latter is participated either by supra-mundane or by intra-mundane souls. For the
self-complete intellects in sun and moon, see in Tim. 1,159,26-7 (Asclepius is a
lunar, Apollo a solar intellect); 1,404,18; 1,422,21-6.
466. Reading hoi de ellampseis for ho de ellampsis (hic autem illustratio g) [BS].
467. All souls stem from intellects and revert to them: ET 193.
468. Reading ousai for noousai (intelligentes g) [BS].
469. Entelechy or actuality. Aristotle defined the soul as the (first) actuality of
a potentially living body (or: of an organic body), but this definition according to
the Neoplatonists is only applicable to the lowest irradiation of soul. Cf. Ar. DA 2.1,
412a21-2; 27-8; b5-6. For Proclus criticism of Aristotles definition of soul, cf.
Trouillard 1982, 207-15. See also Plot. 4.7 [2] 85,25-8 (Plotinus rejects the Aristotelian definition and even the attempt at harmonisation consisting in identifying
soul as entelechy with the vegetative); Porph. in Eus. PE 15,11,4 = 249 F 2-4 Smith
(cf. Chiaradonna 2002, 94-5). Proclus identifies entelechy with the vegetative; he
argues it dies with the body: cf. in Tim. 3,300,2-5.
470. Tim. 38E5; cf. Procl. in Tim. 3,72,16-18. For souls too, Proclus distinguishes between souls proper and irradiations of souls, i.e. the so-called shadows
of souls or irrational souls. This double procession of souls is again in accordance
with the general principle stated in ET 64 (p. 62,8-9 for the application to souls).
For the shadows of souls, see our nn. 194, 245, 276 and 279.
471. The One, intellect, and soul are the three main hypostases that rank as
principles, the arkhikai hupostaseis. On the three primary hypostases (Peri tn
trin arkhikn hupostasen) is the Porphyrian title of Plotinus Ennead 5.1 [10].
Porphyry probably understood the title as referring to the realms produced by One,
intellect and soul (see Sent. 30), yet in Phil. hist. he used the expression to refer to
these three principles themselves (fr. 221 Smith; cf. Chitchaline 1992). This is also
the usage in the later tradition: cf. Procl. in Parm. 1135,17; 1213,1-7. These are
also the levels of reality Proclus analyses in ET.
472. cf. ET 64.
473. Within the category of participants (irradiations) Proclus distinguishes
four levels: the three superior kinds angels, heroes, demons and human souls.
The three superior kinds figure prominently in Iamblichus, yet he uses the
expression also for other higher beings, namely for all beings transcending the soul
but inferior to intellect. Cf. Iambl. DA 40, p. 68,7-11 (Finamore-Dillon) = Stob.
1,455,1-5 W; in Parm. fr. 2 Dillon. See already Orig. Contra Cels. 7,68. For a
discussion of the three superior kinds by Proclus, see Mal. 14-19. For their
ontological rank, see esp. Mal. 15,11-25.
474. In TP 1,15,3-4 the One of the soul is identified with the so-called flower of
intellect, an expression stemming from the Chaldean Oracles (fr. 1 and 49 Des

Notes to pages 117-119

147

Places). In his commentary on the Chaldean Oracles, however, Proclus distinguishes the flower of intellect a supra-intellective mode of knowledge through
which we are connected with the intelligible Father from the One of the soul,
through which we are connected with the One. Whereas the flower of intellect is
the summit of our intellective faculty, the One of the soul is the summit of the
entire soul. Cf. De phil. chald. 4, pp. 209-11 Des Places (esp. 210,28-31; 211,4-12).
Cf. Majercik 1989, 138; Steel 1994, 98.
475. <holn> [BS]. Literally: over wholes. The providence of gods is universal
and extends over universal beings (analogously to the first demiurgy: cf. Opsomer
2000).
476. BS reads ontes for pantes (omnes g).
477. cf. ET 114 (tr. Dodds): Every god is a self-complete henad, and every
self-complete henad is a god.
478. cf. ET 120, p. 104,33-4 (tr. Dodds): For all things else, being posterior to
the gods, exercise providence in virtue of divine compresence, whereas the gods do
so by their very nature.
479. hs: hois (quibus g) (D. Isaac).
480. Or alternatively: as in the case of our politicians.
481. labousai (Boese).
482. Reading dianontai for nontai (intelliguntur g).
483. Reading sunhnntai for coniuncti g (cf. Isaak, Dub. 65,24). Or correcting
coniuncti into couniti [BS].
484. i.e. like (the) one (henoeids).
485. i.e. their huparxis, or highest foundation of being, pure existence. Cf. Steel
1994, 91-5.
486. i.e. their ousia. The substantial being can be considered as being caused by
huparxis acting as limit upon the unlimited potentiality (limit and unlimited being
themselves produced by god). The resulting mixture, third term of the triad, is
substantial being. Cf. TP 3,8-9 (esp. 3,31,14-32,2; 34,25-35; 36,13-15; 37,21-8).
487. i.e. the ousia corresponding to that specific huparxis.
488. The One is even above providence.
489. cf. ET 120, p. 106,8.

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and related texts
1.1 Proclus
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Bibliography, by P. dHoine, C. Helmig, C. Mac, L. Van Campe, under the
direction of C. Steel, Gttingen [= Lustrum 44 (2002); published 2005].
Procli philosophi Platonici opera inedita quae primus olim e codd. mss. Parisinis
Italicisque vulgaverat nunc secundis curis emendavit et auxit Victor Cousin,
Parisiis, 1864 [= Frankfurt am Main, 1962].
Procli Diadochi Tria Opuscula (De providentia, libertate, malo). Latine Guilelmo
de Moerbeka vertente et Graece ex Isaacii Sebastocratoris aliorumque scriptis
collecta, edidit Helmut Boese (Quellen und Studien zur Geschichte der Philosophie, 1), Berolini, 1960.
Proclus. On Providence. Translated by Carlos Steel (Ancient Commentators on
Aristotle), London, 2007.
Proclus. On the Existence of Evils. Translated by Jan Opsomer and Carlos Steel
(Ancient Commentators on Aristotle), London, 2003.
Taylor, Thomas, The Six Books of Proclus the Platonic Successor, On the Theology
of Plato translated from the Greek [}]. To which are added a translation of the
treatise of Proclus, On providence and fate; a translation of extracts from his
treatise, entitled, Ten doubts concerning providence; and a translation of extracts from his treatise On the subsistence of evil; as preserved in the Bibliotheca
Gr. of Fabricius, London, 1816.
Taylor, Thomas, Two Treatises of Proclus, the Platonic Successor; the former
consisting of Ten doubts concerning Providence, and a solution of those doubts;
and the latter containing a development of the nature of evil, London 1833.
Proklos Diadochos. Zehn Aporien ber die Vorsehung. Frage 1-5 ( 1-31) bersetzt
und erklrt von K. Feldbusch, diss. inaug., Kln, 1972.
Proklos Diadochos. Zehn Aporien ber die Vorsehung. Frage 6-10 bersetzt und
erklrt von Ingeborg Bhme, diss. inaug., Kln, 1975.
Proklos Diadochos. ber die Vorsehung, das Schicksal und den freien Willen an
Theodoros, den Ingenieur (Mechaniker). Nach Vorarbeiten von Theo Borger,
bersetzt und erlutert von Michael Erler (Beitrge zur klassischen Philologie,
121), Meisenheim am Glan, 1980.
Proklos Diadochos. ber die Existenz des Bsen. bersetzt und erlutert von
Michael Erler (Beitrge zur klassischen Philologie, 102), Meisenheim am Glan,
1978.
Proclus. Trois tudes sur la Providence, I, Dix problmes concernant la Providence.
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potere delluomo. Sullesistenza del male. Introduzione, traduzione, note e apparati di Francesco D. Paparella; testo greco a cura di Alberto Bellanti (Il Pensiero
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Procli Diadochi in Platonis Rem Publicam commentarii. Edidit Guilelmus Kroll
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Proclus. Commentaire sur le Time. Traduction et notes par A.J. Festugire, tomes
I-V, Paris, 1966-8.
Runia, D.T. and Share, M., Proclus. Commentary on Platos Timaeus, volume II,
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and commentary by E.R. Dodds, 2nd edn, Oxford, 1963.
Proclus. Thologie platonicienne. Texte tabli et traduit par H.D. Saffrey et L.G.
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Plotini opera ediderunt Paul Henry et Hans-Rudolf Schwyzer, tomus I, Porphyrii
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Appendix 1
The place of the tria opuscula
within Proclus work
In the introduction to our translation of the treatise On the Existence of Evil we
laid out several arguments for dating the composition of the tria opuscula to
Proclus later career. These arguments were nothing but a summary and development of what Helmut Boese said in the introduction of his edition. To our surprise,
these brief comments came under intensive scrutiny by Segonds and Luna who
argued polemically that la datation tardive des Tria Opuscula doit tre dfinitivement rejete.1 The completion of the present translation of the three opuscula
affords an opportunity to reconsider our views after this criticism and discuss the
arguments in more detail. In this matter, the philosophical importance of which is
negligible, certainty is unattainable.
In order to situate the opuscula within the whole work, cross-references could
give us an important clue. However, as Segonds and Luna rightly observe,2
cross-references are difficult to evaluate. They are often imprecise (and could refer
to different works in which similar ideas were discussed), they may have been
added afterwards or may refer not yet to the final (edited) redaction of a commentary, but to a course (sunousia). The publication of the commentaries, for example,
does not necessarily correspond to the sequence in the teaching curriculum. We
agree with their conclusion that it is impossible to propose a general coherent
chronology of Proclus works. The best we can hope for is a relative chronology for
some texts. The only established facts are that Proclus worked at the end of his
career on the Platonic Theology and that the Commentary on the Parmenides was
composed shortly before. What then are the arguments for a relative chronology of
the three treatises? The fact that they have been transmitted in the order Dub.
Prov. Mal. does not necessarily correspond to their order of composition. We shall
first examine the internal references and indications we find in the three treatises
and then discuss what may be references to these treatises in the other works of
Proclus. We start with the treatise On Providence, where we find some indications
suggesting that it was composed rather late in Proclus career.3
On Providence
1. The treatise is a reply to a letter sent to Proclus by Theodore, who is
introduced as somebody known to Proclus a long while ago, nobis olim (palai)
noti, sicut estimo et ipse scripsisti (1,8-9). He may have been once a disciple of
Syrianus in Athens together with Proclus. The fact that he addresses Proclus from
abroad to ask for his view on a number of problems regarding free choice and
providence, shows that he considers Proclus as an authority. How many years have
passed since they first met will remain an open question. But he certainly was no
longer a young man.
2. In chapter 45 Proclus indirectly indicates that he is already an older man.

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Appendix 1

For when discussing Theodores hedonistic views, he declares that it is unworthy

of his philosophical conviction and of his age to entertain and discuss such views.
That a young man should entertain such an opinion would not surprise me, [}]
but for someone who has made the intellect, which is characteristic of a mature age
(presbutikon),4 leader, intellectual thoughts of prudent judgment are fitting (45,49). Of course, the vocabulary of presbus does not necessarily designate old age as
in contemporary usage, but Segonds and Luna slightly exaggerate when they say
that any person partir dune trentaine dannes (XCI) could be considered as
presbus. It is unlikely that the term presbutikos would be used for someone
younger than forty.
3. In chapter 22 Proclus seems to refer to a dramatic event in his life, that was
also known to Theodore, since he mentioned it in his letter: for also the accidents
that, as you mentioned, recently came over us from outside, have deprived us of
walls and stones, my friend, and have reduced wooden beams to ashes, all of which
are mortal and inflammable things, and have ruined our wealth. According to
Westerink, this could be a hint to the destruction by Christians of the temple of
Asclepius, which may also have caused serious damage to the school, which was
adjacent to it. This may also have been the reason for Proclus precipitous flight to
Lydia.5 As we know from Marinus, Proclus spent a year in Lydia before it was safe
to return to Athens.6 If Proclus allusion to a personal experience is related to the
destruction of the temple, this may have happened in the fifties.7 Though all this
remains very speculative, it seems reasonable to suppose that the attack on his
property happened when Proclus was already an established scholar with reputation.
4. There is one cross-reference in Prov. 50,11-12 where Proclus refers to an
earlier study wherein he examined the authenticity of the Epinomis (olim enim
nos). This question is discussed in the anonymous Prolegomena to the Philosophy
of Plato (25,3-12), which depends on a similar introduction by Proclus. Proclus may
refer here to that earlier work.8 The use of the term olim (palai) indicates that he
studied that question a considerable time ago.
5. Finally, there is one external argument that would seem to put the composition of Prov. after Proclus Commentary on the last section of the Republic, the
celebrated myth of Er. After having explained the whole myth in detail, Proclus
wants to formulate, before he finishes the work, some seminal ideas on what
depends on us, fate, and providence:
Let this be the end of [our explanation] of the myth. I too shall conclude my
essay, but only after having added to the preceding some small seeds (smikra
spermata) regarding Platos doctrine on what depends on us, on fate and
providence (in Remp. 2,355,8-11).
In what follows he first explains what, according to Plato, is to eph hmin or choice
(what is up to us) and how it differs from what is wanted (hekousion); this is
followed by an account of what fate is (not a god, not a divine soul, but the nature
of the universe), and finally by an account of divine providence as that which
connects our free choice and fate (the passage is mostly a long quotation of Laws
10, 904A6-D3). One finds similar, but much more developed, views in the treatise
On Providence: 57,60 on the difference between boulsis and choice (or what
depends on us); 11-12 on fate understood as nature; 14 on fate not being god; 13
on providence; 35 comments on Laws 10, 904B. Most surprising is the fact that
the description of the subject of these seminal ideas corresponds exactly to the title

Appendix 1

159

of the treatise On Providence, except, of course, for the dedication to Theodore: peri
tou eph hmin kai heimarmens kai pronoias. It seems that Proclus took the letter
of Theodore as an opportunity to compose the treatise On what depends on us, on
fate and providence that he had intended to write later after having finished his
commentary on the Republic. If he had himself already composed a work with this
threefold title, he would most probably have referred to it. It seems thus reasonable to place the composition of the treatise some years after Proclus had finished
the redaction of the commentary on the Republic. Unfortunately, we do not know
when the Commentary on the Republic was composed, but in any case it must be
situated after the Commentary on the Timaeus.9 In fact, the in Rempublicam is not
really a commentary, but a collection of essays on diverse issues related to the
Republic, which may have been written at different points in time. It reached its
final form, however, after the edition of the commentary on the Timaeus. The
sixteenth essay on the last section of the dialogue, the myth of Er, was probably
also the concluding essay.10
All these arguments seem to put the composition of On Providence later in
Proclus career. This does not entail, however as we had concluded all too hastily
that the two other treatises were also composed at that time. Let us now see what
evidence there is for the other two treatises.
Ten Problems Concerning Providence
The text contains two cross-references, and both are problematic.
Dub. 15,1-3: That also the beings superior to us must have knowledge of the
indeterminate if this too is to partake of order and not be, as it were, an
episode unconnected to the universe let this be granted since it has been
demonstrated elsewhere (allakhou dedeigmenon).
What Proclus takes as having been demonstrated elsewhere is the idea that
contingent indeterminate events are not pure chance events falling outside the
order of providence. This is only possible if there is some connection of the
indeterminate to determinate things, and this connection depends on divine
providence. This corresponds rather well to the argument at in Tim. 1,262,1-29,
where Proclus demonstrates that the world is a coherent system in which all
phenomena, including contingent events, are explained through a concatenation
of causes coming from divine providence. Besides invoking the same quotation
from Aristotle (Metaph. 12, 1090b17), Proclus also uses there the terms heirmos
and taxis (1,262,18; 20). For that reason Boese refers in his apparatus to this text;
but he also notices that it remains uncertain whether Proclus is really referring to
this passage, since in the Timaeus Commentary too Proclus notices at the end of
its argument (1,262,29) that he had discussed this in other works. Again it is not
clear where he might have done so. Segonds and Luna (2007, XCV) suppose that
Proclus refers in Dub. 15 to what he had said in Dub. 8. But it is unlikely that
Proclus would use the term elsewhere (allakhou) to refer to an earlier passage in
the same work. Maybe, however, we should not search for a specific reference. It
may be a rhetorical phrase to indicate that a thesis is here taken for granted as
being demonstrated elsewhere, that is, outside the present discussion. In the
present chapter, Proclus wants to investigate the how, not the that. For a parallel
phrase see Galenus, De san. tuenda 6,12,5.
61,18: Let this then be clear on the basis of these arguments, as I am also

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Appendix 1

aware that I have elaborated them in other works (et novi etiam a me ipso in
aliis elaboratum).
In this chapter Proclus is discussing the question why later generations may suffer
punishment for the sins of their ancestors. A possible explanation may be that
there is some hidden similarity between the wrongdoer and the person punished.
In what other text could Proclus have discussed this problem? Proclus could be
referring to in Crat. 93, where he comments on what Plato says in Crat. 395C-D
about Pelops who had no foresight of the effects it would have on his descendants.
According to Proclus this text teaches that children partake of the punishment of
their ancestors sins. For childrens souls become participants in injustice through
their association with unjust persons, while their bodies are instituted from bad
seeds and their external goods had their source in sinful conducts (tr. B. Duvick).
The author also refers to Phaedrus 244D-E where it is said how the souls can be
purified from inherited sin through certain rituals. As Segonds and Luna notice
(XCVI), Proclus might have discussed the problem of inherited sin also in his
commentary on the Phaedrus. This commentary is lost, but in the commentary of
Hermias, who attended with Proclus Syrianus seminar on that dialogue, we find
indeed an explanation similar to Proclus arguments: see p. 96,2-28. Finally in
Proclus scholia on Hesiod we find similar arguments; see CVII and CXXII in the
edition of Marzillo (2010). If we can use the parallel text of Hermias as an indirect
proof of what Proclus himself developed in his now lost commentary on the
Phaedrus, it may seem that he is referring to that commentary. The commentary
on the Phaedrus (at least the lectures on which it was based) is prior to the final
version of his commentary on the Timaeus, since Proclus refers to it (in Tim. 3,
295,3-14).
On the Existence of Evils
Mal. 1,17-18: In short, we have to consider all the questions we usually raise
in our commentaries.
As Segonds and Luna rightly observe (LXIX-LXXVII), this cannot be taken as a
cross-reference to commentaries previously written by Proclus. With the plural
form Proclus refers to the tradition in the Platonic school where different questions
on evil were discussed in relation to problems raised in dialogues of Plato, above
all in the Timaeus, Republic, Theaetetus and Parmenides. This text can therefore
not constitute an argument for situating On the Existence of Evils after the
composition of these commentaries. Of course, this does not exclude that Proclus
had himself already given seminars or even composed commentaries on some
dialogues dealing with the problem of evil.
Mal. 7,1-3: What then shall we say is the necessity of evil? Is it its opposition
to the good, as Socrates suggests to us? As we have said in other works (in
aliis) [}]
Proclus argues that evil cannot be avoided because there should not only exist
eternal beings, but also intermittent participants. Cousin refers to ET 63 where
indeed the distinction between two orders of participants is made (see also Dodds
1963, p. 234). This distinction is, however, so common that one may find it in
almost all works of Proclus. Besides, in the ET there is no explicit connection with

Appendix 1

161

the problem of evil. This connection with evil (as parhupostasis) is made in in Alc.
117,22-118,25 (cf. nn. 5-6 of Segonds 1985, 189-90). Could Proclus be referring to
that dialogue?
Mal. 34,14: Ut in aliis dictum est.
This is not a reference to another work of Proclus, but to another text of Plato,
namely the Republic.
Possible references to the tria opuscula in other works of Proclus
in Remp. 1,37,22-3
This cross-reference comes in the fourth essay of Proclus Commentary on the
Republic that deals with the patterns (tupoi) one should follow in speaking about
the gods (cf. Plato, Resp. 2, 379B-383C). Proclus concludes from his explanation of
the text that one should hold on to the following principles: the gods are good and
cannot be held responsible for evil; the gods cannot alter themselves; the gods do
not deceive us by falsehoods in deeds or words. Next Proclus mentions three
difficulties that may be raised regarding Platos conclusions: (1) If the gods are only
responsible for what is good, whence comes evil? (2) if gods cannot alter themselves, how can one explain that they may appear in different forms, human and
animal, or even without specific shape, in the form of light;11 (3) if the gods cannot
deceive, why do they deceive us by rendering false oracles (37,3-22)? Proclus
addresses these three questions in the sections that follow: (1) on the origin of evil
(37,23-39,1); (2) on the apparitions of the gods (39,1-40,5); (3) on false oracles
(40,5-41,2). Yet, as he observes, it is not the first time he discusses these issues:
These problems (peri toutn) have been discussed at length in other works
(en allois). Now too, however, let us state succinctly, if you please, with
respect to the first aporia, that } (37,22-5).
This text should not be taken as a reference to a previous discussion of only the
first problem, that of evil. As is clear from the use of the plural form peri toutn,
Proclus refers to his earlier discussion of the three aporiae, as is also confirmed by
the use of the particles men/de/de: pros men tn prtn (37,24), } pros de tn
deuteran (39,1), } pros de tn tritn (40,5). After having discussed in short the
three problems Proclus concludes in 41,2-3:
These matters, then, have received a sufficient examination also in other
works (en allois).
This conclusion again shows that the reference in 37,22-5 (en allois) concerns the
discussion of the three problems and not only that of the question of evil. It is in
this context that we should also interpret the scholion in the Laurentianus 80.9,
which is an attempt (dating from late antiquity) to determine the vague reference
in 37,22-5:
One [problem] is discussed in the monograph On the Existence of Evils, the
other in the commentary on the speech of Diotima. There is [also] a discussion on the existence of evils in the commentary on the Theaetetus [where he

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says] but it is not possible that evils will be abolished [176A5] and in the
commentary on the third Ennead, Whence come evils?12
All scholars so far (including ourselves) have understood this scholion as offering
a list of works in which Proclus discusses the problem of evil. This is, of course, true
of the first reference, the one to the treatise On the Existence of Evils, and also for
the last part of the scholion, where two lost works are mentioned that presumably
contain a discussion of the problem of evil: the commentaries on the Theaetetus and
the Enneads (the scholiast mentions the third Ennead, but the reference Whence
come evils is clearly to Enn. 1.8 [51], Plotinus treatise on evil; the passage from
the Theaetetus figures in almost all Platonic discussions of evil: see Opsomer-Steel
2003, 10-11). The problem is the reference to Diotimas speech: it is not evident
what in this speech may have occasioned a discussion of evil.13 Scholars, however,
have overlooked the fact that the scholiast in the first section gives references for
two different points, as indicated by to men } to de } If, however, en allois is not
just a reference to the discussion of the first aporia, but to all three problems, it
becomes easier to understand what the scholiast is explaining. The first point (to
men) clearly corresponds to the first puzzle mentioned by Proclus, namely the
explanation for evil: here the reference is obviously the monograph On the Existence of Evils. The second point (to de) should then be related to the two other
aporiae, which concern the apparitions of the gods and the possible deception
involved in the communication through oracles. Both aporiae are somehow related,
for if the gods can change and take on different shapes they may also deceive,
which contradicts Platos second tupos theologias. The question remains why this
problem should be discussed in the context of Diotimas speech. In a comment at
the very end of his digression Proclus attributes the deception in oracles to the role
of some demons (41,11-29). As is well known, Diotimas speech, and in particular
202E-203A, was considered by Platonists as the locus classicus for an account of
the nature and function of demonic beings. Diotima also mentions the role of
demons in witchcraft (goteia) (202E7-A1), which may have offered Proclus an
opportunity to discuss the second and third aporiae in his commentary.14 In
fact, Socrates in Resp. 2, 380Dff. explicitly denies that gods and demonic beings
could be like sorcerers able to appear under different forms in order to deceive
humans. Proclus has difficulties reconciling theurgic practice with this theological model (cf. in Remp. 1,109,11-114,29). It is very well possible that he also
devoted a long commentary to Symp. 202E-A1 and tried to solve the aporiae
mentioned in the Commentary on the Republic. Be that as it may, the idea that
the scholiast mentions the commentary on Diotimas speech in a list of works on
evil proves to be unfounded.
For our purpose, however, only the reference to a text on the origin of evils is of
interest. Does Proclus here refer to his treatise On the Existence of Evils, as the
ancient scholiast supposes? In his concise reply to the aporia Proclus first observes
that one should not search for a principal cause of evil: gods are not causes of evil;
there are neither intelligible forms nor formal causes of evil; neither can matter
itself be considered as evil, for it is necessary for the existence of corporeal beings
and hence for the universe. As a matter of fact, there is no single cause of evil, but
merely a variety of particular causes. Further, evil is never absolute pure evil, but
always mixed with some trace of the good. Evil comes about as a parhupostasis.
This answer is just the standard view on evil that Proclus exposes in many works
and most extensively in On the Existence of Evils. As Kroll already noticed, there
are obvious parallels, also terminological, with the discussion on the causes of evils

Appendix 1

163

in Mal. 40; 47-9, and with the refutation of the Plotinian view on matter/evil in
Mal. 36. In the passage from in Remp., Proclus also distinguishes between the evil
in bodies, which is due to a disproportion of their composing parts, and evil in souls
which results from a conflict between the different forms of life (rational/irrational). Though this distinction is also present in On the Existence of Evils, the
closest parallel is with the fifth problem from Ten Problems Concerning Providence. He insists for instance on the necessity of an intermediate irrational soul to
make the incarnation of the rational soul possible without harming it too much.
Although evil may result from the mixture of forms of life, this mixture is needed,
as Proclus explains in his commentary on the Republic. For if the rational souls
were implanted in the bodies without the irrational soul, they would themselves
both act and suffer what is proper to irrational souls, have desires, sense perceptions and imaginations. For mortal beings need these, if they have to keep
themselves alive even for a short time (in Remp. 1,38,17-22). This is almost a
summary of the long argument in Dub. 31,13-33, for which there is no parallel in
On the Existence of Evils.
What then is the conclusion from the cross-reference in the fourth essay of the
Republic commentary? In the last section of his answer Proclus most probably
refers to the fifth Problem of the Ten Problems Concerning Providence. Yet this
work is not mentioned by the scholiast. In the first part of his answer Proclus
summarises the standard view on evil, set out at length in On the Existence of
Evils, but probably also expounded in the two commentaries that are now lost (in
Theaet. and in Enn.). It is intriguing that the scholiast first identifies the reference
as one to the treatise on evils, and in the second section of his note quotes other
works in which Proclus probably discussed the same problem.
in Tim. 1,381,12-15
On evils, on how they come to exist, on the nature of providence even they
meet with from the gods, this is enough for present purposes; they have been
discussed at greater length in other writing [of ours].15
This reference comes at the end of a long digression on the problem of evil
(1,373,22-381,22), which Proclus inserted in his commentary of the lemma Tim.
30A1 (God wanted everything to be good). If divine providence wants everything
to be good, he asks, how can there be evils in the universe? The problem is
formulated as a dilemma in a way similar to that of the beginning of the fifth
problem of Dub. (26) and of Mal. 58,2-7:
Starting from this puzzle, some have gone as far as to totally do away with
evil, while others have despaired of providence, the former believing that if
providence exists all things are good, the latter being unable to believe that
things are governed by providence if evil things exist. (373,24-28)
In his reply Proclus sets out the view of his master Syrianus (374,4-375,5).16 He
makes a distinction between the divine perspective, from which all is good, and our
human perspective. Evil does not exist for the whole, but for parts in their
interaction. There is no absolute evil. Evil can only exist insofar as it is somehow
mixed with good things. Evil things are given measure and limit by the demiurge
according to the capacity of the subjects. The rejection of absolute evil was a

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fundamental presupposition of the late Neoplatonic discussion of evil. Syrianus

had the following argument against the thesis of an absolute evil.
For if you conceive of this thing we call evil as devoid of all good, you are
putting it beyond even absolute non-being. Just as the Good-itself is prior to
Being, so is Evil-itself posterior to the nothingness of non-being; for the thing
which is furthest removed from the Good is evil and not absolute non-being.
So if absolute non-being has more existence than Evil-itself, but is among the
things that cannot exist, then [evil] is to a much greater degree unable to
exist. (in Tim. 1,374,14-20)
Interestingly, in Mal. 3,1-9 Proclus uses this very argument in order to refute those
who pretend that evil does not exist.17
After having set out Syrianus views, Proclus answers to the objection that the
demiurge himself must be responsible for evils because he brought particular
beings into existence. To refute this objection he first (1,375,6-376,15) adduces a
number of texts of Plato from outside the Timaeus: Politicus 273B-C, Resp. 2, 379C
and Theaet. 176A. The same texts are also quoted and commented in the treatise
On the Existence of Evils.18 After the explanation of the Platonic texts Proclus
addresses the problem in a more systematic way, distinguishing different classes
of beings (1,376,15-378,22):
There are wholes (1) and parts (2).
Among the parts some (2a) keep their well-being for ever, for instance particular
intellects, others only have it temporarily (2b).
Among the latter, some are moved by themselves (2b1) others are moved by
other things (2b2).
In the first category we have again to make a distinction between those who
only make evil choices (2b1a) and those who go beyond mere intentions and
perpetrate the act following from their evil choice (2b1b).
Evil is only found, in different degrees, in partial beings that cannot keep their
good forever.
Even though this systematic division is not found as such in Mal., the different
elements are there: to begin with, the fundamental difference between whole and
parts; and then, among the parts, between parts keeping their wholeness (such as
the intellect and the divine universal souls) and the really particularised beings,
including human souls. The distinction between evil in souls (self-movers) and
bodies is fundamental both in the fifth problem of Dub., and in Mal. The distinction
between evil choice and evil action (377,7-378,22) is also found at the end of Mal.
58 and in Mal. 59. Proclus also explain why all levels of beings down to the most
inferior where evil occurs are needed for the plenitude of the universe (in Tim.
1,378,22-379,26), again a standard idea developed in almost all his works. Finally,
Proclus addresses the question again whether God wanted or did not want evil to
exist. The answer is: both. He wanted evil in so far as he makes everything exist,
but he did not want it qua something evil. If evil exists at all it is coloured by the
good. Even if some souls appear to suffer, they in fact benefit from the evil to which
they are subjected, as is clear in the case of punishment (1,380,8-24). Inspired by
Laws 5, 728C, Proclus compares the divine punishment with medical treatment,
such as the opening of abscesses, which may be painful, but is ultimately for the
good of the sufferer. We find a very similar argument in Mal. 59, but also in Dub.

Appendix 1

165

52, in Remp. 1,102,29 and in Alc. 119,12-16. Proclus concludes that we find evil as
a parhupostasis only in particular souls and particular bodies, not in their essence
and powers, but in their activities.
There are undeniably several parallels between what Proclus says in this
digression and what we find in Mal. To be sure, it is a traditional doctrine, it goes
back at least to Syrianus, and it also may have figured in other works of Proclus.
Still it is reasonable to suppose that Proclus here refers to his On the Existence of
Evils. This treatise (or an early version of it) would then have been composed
before the (final redaction of the) Commentary on the Timaeus. According to his
biographer Marinus (Vita Procli 13), Proclus had already finished the composition
of this commentary at the age of 27. This is surprisingly early, and difficult to
accept given the existence of other cross-references, in particular to the in Remp.19
So probably we should make a distinction between an initial version and a later,
possibly much more developed, version.
What can we conclude from all these cross-references and other indications? It
seems plausible to situate Prov. after Remp. X and rather late in Proclus career.
Dub. and Mal. are prior to Remp. IV and Mal. is prior to in Tim. Can anything be
ascertained about the relative chronology of the tria opuscula? There are no
cross-references between the three. Yet, if one compares the fifth problem of Dub.,
the one devoted to the problem of evil, to Mal., it seems to offer a less sophisticated
view on the nature of evil than Mal. (see above, pp. 27-32). The fifth problem is
certainly not a summary of the views one finds in Mal. There may be other reasons
for considering Dub. as a relatively early work. In particular the fact that Proclus
relies so heavily on earlier sources and borrows many arguments from Plutarch
could suggest an early date. If we compare, however, the discussion of contingency
and divine foreknowledge in Prov. 63-5 with Dub. II-III, one gets the impression
that Proclus in Prov. summarises what he discussed before and at greater length
in Dub.: there is no real development in thought. As to the relation between Prov.
and Mal.: there are no indications for a relative chronology, as there are no parallel
discussions of the same issues.
Notes
1. See Segonds-Luna 2007, LXIX-XCVIII.
2. See Segonds-Luna 2007, XVIII n. 1.
3. See also Steel 2007, 1-3 for arguments regarding the chronology of this treatise.
4. intellectum autem senilem presidem statuenti. One may discuss whether
senilem characterises intellectum, as in Steels translation (the older intellect)
or presidem as Segonds-Luna (2007, XCI: un chef experiment comme un veillard) and B. Strobel interpret it. The fact that Proclus uses the term presbutikos
and not presbuts or presbuteros could speak against the latter interpretation.
5. See Westerink 1962, 162-3, and Saffrey 1975, 555-7.
6. See Marinus, Vita Procli 15, 15-17 with Saffrey 2002, n. 2 (pp. 119-20).
7. Saffrey 1975, 555-6 dates the event peu aprs 450, but his calculation is
based on many fragile suppositions.
8. See Steel 2007, 239; Segonds-Luna 2007, XCVII.
9. According to Marinus, the commentary on the Timaeus was one of the first
works of Proclus (Vita Procli 13). It is probable, however, that Proclus reworked
it later (see Saffreys note at 13, 14-17, p. 112). In his commentary on the Republic,
Proclus refers to it as an already published work (in Remp. 2,335,20: ekdidomenois).

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Appendix 1

10. This refutation of Aristotles critique of Platos political views in the Republic was probably an independent treatise, added later as an appendix to the
commentary.
11. On the apparitions of the gods in theurgic rituals see Chaldean Oracles 146
and Proclus comments further down in the same essay (in Remp. 1,110,21-114,29).
12. The scholion is published by Kroll in his edition of the commentary on the
Republic, 2,371,10-18.
13. Segonds-Luna 2007, LXXX n. 2 suppose that it may have been a discussion
of 205E-206A1, but this text does not deal directly with the problem of evil.
14. Proclus refers twice to this section of Diotimas speech in an explanation of
demonic witchcraft: in Remp. 2,337,14-20 and in Parm. 836,9.
15. We quote from the translation of Runia and Share. The translators cite
several parallels to Mal. (Runia-Share 2008, 238-48).
16. It is always difficult to determine where Proclus stops following Syrianus
and gives his own views. According to Festugire 1967 (and Runia-Share 2008) the
views of Syrianus are stated in the first section (374,2-375,5). From 375,6 onwards
begins the discussion of an objection. One may however assume that Proclus whole
answer is concordant with Syrianus views.
17. See Runia-Share 2008, 239 n. 154.
18. See the indices in Opsomer-Steel 2003.
19. See Segonds-Luna 2007, XVIII n. 1 on circularity in the references between
the two commentaries.

Appendix 2
Addenda and corrigenda to the translation
of De malorum subsistentia
A comparison of our translation of De malorum subsistentia (Proclus: On the
Existence of Evils, 2003) with Benedikt Strobels forthcoming annotated Greek
retroversion of this treatise made it possible to correct mistakes and to integrate
some of his new conjectures. Of course, it is not possible to enter here into a full
discussion of all difficult passages. We limit ourselves to a list of corrections that
may have a bearing on the argument. References are to Boeses edition (also
indicated in the margin of our translation), with first the published text and after
the bracket the proposed revised version.
1,19 we will give the impression] probably we will have to admit (if reputabimur
stands for oithsometha [BS]).
2,14 and before it is being it is one] for the One is before being.
2,20-1 either there is no principle or evil does not exist and has not been generated] either evil does not at all exist or it is not evil and has not been produced
as evil (aut neque esse principium aut neque esse malum [aut] neque factum esse
malum). As Strobel observes, principium (tn arkhn) is here not the subject of
esse, but is used in an adverbial sense: mde einai tn arkhn: not to exist at
all.
3,22 for this is not right for him] for this is not right for it (i.e. evil agency).
6,31-4 for their existence } belongs to beings, but also because] for to be
necessary is also to be good. But Plato says that it is necessary that evil exists;
therefore it is good that evil exists. If, however, it is good that evil exists, evil
certainly exists, according to his argument, not only because it has been so
produced that it will not cease to exist that is certainly also true but also
because.
10,6-7 However } them] yet it is inescapable that there is evil for particular
things of which he removes the good, dividing nature according to grades.
13,11 the first henads] first the henads (cf. ET 21, p. 24,30-1).
13,12 For the good } evil] Let this not be allowed!
13,21 unholy] unacceptable (tolerabile = anekton); cf. Theaet. 154C4-5 [BS].
13,22 For that } not good] For what is not good is not congenial with the good
(reading with Strobel bonum non for to m agathon).
13,24-6 For that which } activity] For similarity is in accordance with the One
and what is eternal stems from what is before eternity, and that which is
established unchangingly in activity is the first to receive existence from that
which is superior to the property of activity.
13,30 and a god is whatever is good] and a god, each one, is good.
14,5 delete it does not know that it is such .
14,12 inside the One] in the One.

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Appendix 2

17,9-10 for the latter may be both] for where there is (correcting with BS homou
[simul] into hopou).
17,14 those who make mistakes] persequentibus fluctuose = tois plmmels metadikousi. The verb metadikein requires an object (to pursue something). It could be
taxin, as Erler and Strobel suppose, or a word like bion could have been omitted in
the Greek text or in the Latin translation: those who lead a wrongful <life>.
18,6-7 For <nor> } also evil] For always means power, whereas evil is a lack of
power of those things for which it is also evil. We read with D. Isaac hoc enim
impotentia instead of hoc enim in potentia.
18,10 a demon or a hero] a demon or a god.
18,14 and other so called evils stemmed from] and all such [emotions] stemmed
for those that are allegedly evil from (dictis malis refers to demons, see further
19,16-17) [BS].
18,18-19 itself } its } its] himself } his } his.
19,30 have received a fine treatment from us] have become somehow propitious
to us; as Westerink notices, misericorditer stands for ilea (cf. Phaedo 95A4-5).
21,11-12 they are perfected] they perform this. We follow Strobels conjecture
epiteloi<e>n <tou>to for epitelointo (perficiuntur g).
24,14 contemplate the plane of oblivion] at the plane of oblivion (adding <eis>
with BS and Plato, Resp. 621A1).
26,7 replete with these things] maybe replete with passions (if one accepts
Strobels conjecture: pathn for autn [ipsis g]).
26,13 prior to its activity] from its nature (reading with Strobel para for pro [ante g]).
27,4 being] body.
27,17 To this } strange] To the nature of other things other species [are contrary
to their nature].
33,18-19 separated } powerlessness] distinguished [from one another] through
their own power and powerlessness.
36,7 it will be a god (deus erit)] maybe it will be godless (if one accepts the
conjecture of Strobel: <a>theos [cf. in Tim. 1,368,5-6]).
37,21 prior to them] containing them (keeping with Strobel circa [peri], a quotation from Tim. 31A6-7).
38,10 both are not identical] the being of both is not identical (reading with
Strobel hekaterou for hekateron [utrumque g]; cf. ET 34,9 and Dub. 20,13-14).
39,21-2 whereas <that } power or> substance] whereas that which is [destructive] of either power <or> substance is contrary.
40,10 from different suppositions] from foreign [i.e. non-Platonic] suppositions
(accepting Strobels conjecture ali<en>is [allotrin]).
41,13-14 Hence the whole is good. And } is in the gods] Hence the whole good
and } are in the gods.
43,2 pertain to them] stem from them (reading ex his (instead of et hiis) with AOV
and D. Isaac).
44,4 cause to be evil] cause for evil.
45,7 life?] life in accordance with the same rank?
45,13 originates] is woven [onto the soul] (exoritur translates proshuphainetai
[BS]); see our n. 183.
45,14 Indeed } good] Indeed, their offspring too is all good.
45,20-1 activities, we must } be made good] activities, and even that evil is not
permanent, but <}>, as I have said before [cf. 25,9-12], because this soul too is
somehow made good (sed quod aliquando dictum est a me: pote (= aliquando)
may be a corruption of prosthen).

Appendix 2

169

46,1-2 be absurd } evils] also be absurd to make such a soul the cause, so to
speak, of all evils (accepting Strobels proposal to understand in totum as a
translation of the adverbial to holon, which is itself a corruption of to holn).
46,8 does disorder affect our] are we deprived of (accepting Strobels conjecture
ateuksia for ataksia [inordinatio]).
46,21 from itself] by itself.
50,23-4 causes } appear through causes] a principle } appear from a principle.
50,39-40 evil is } nature] evil exists in a divided nature and is not one.
50,42 winged nature] winged chariot (understanding with Strobel hama (simul
g) as a corruption of harma; cf. Phaedr. 246E5).
51,25 withdrawal] paralysis (following Strobels conjecture, restoring paresis for
parairesis [exclusio g], cf. in Remp. 2,95,19-20).
52,14 because } evil] because when it [i.e. injustice] has brought forth vitality,
imparts even to an evil person (following Strobels conjecture endidsi for on
didsi [ens dat g] and understanding ipsum vitale as to ztikon).
53,9 whereby [the bodys] natural capacity to act disappears] whereby nature is
annihilated (following Strobel in considering eis to poiein [ad facere g] as a
corruption of eis to m on).
54,15-17 For privation } activity] For what is capable of producing something or
is capable of something in general is not a privation, and what has of itself no
capacity or activity is not a contrary.
57,8 rational souls } images] contrary to what we claimed in n. 391, there seems
to be a lacuna after rationalibus autem, which may be filled as follows: tois logikois
<ho nous; hste tais men psuchais dia> to pro autn to agathon. Maybe to pro autn
(quod ante ipsas) is a corruption for ton ptra (= patera) autn. Proclus characterises
the demiurgic intellect as the father of the souls: see TP 6,15,19; in Parm. 950,5-6;
in Tim. 1,211,1. The translation would then be rational souls <the intellect. Hence
for souls the good is due to their father>, for images.
58,6 and this is indeed a troubling problem] this too is something that delights
the soul; as Strobel observes, inquinat here stands for sainei, which means to
gladden/to cheer (cf. Arist., Metaph. 1090a36-7).
58,14 deny that it exists] deny that it is evil.
59,6 he does evil, and he gives in to the] he gives in to an evil and foul self-love
and to the (following Strobels reconstruction kakn kai atopon heautou
<philian> kai; cf. Prov. 34,5-6).
Corrections in the Philological Appendix (pp. 133-45)
7,21 ante hec] ante for pro, not for anti (as we claimed previously) [BS].
13,12 keep ad hec (pros tauta) [BS].
18,7 delete.
25,25 laxans corresponds to khalasas or khaln [BS].
27,7 delete.
36,14 for illis (ekeinois g) read alllois with Isaak.
37,21 delete.
39,21 the proposed addition in the text makes the argument more explicit, but is
not needed. It suffices to add <aut> after potentie.
43,29 delete.
45,20-3 delete.
46,1 delete.

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Index of Passages
References are to the chapter and line numbers of Boeses edition.
ARCHIMEDES

fr. 15: 37,27-8

ARISTOTLE

DA 3.2, 426b19: 4,20-1

EE 8.14, 1248a28-9: 4,11
Metaph. 1.6, 988a7: 12,4-7
Metaph. 14.3, 1090b19: 15,2-3
Meteor. 1.14, 352a29: 55,28
Phys. 1.2, 185a30: 21,7-8
Phys. 1.5, 188a33: 39,16
Pol. 1.3, 1253b27-30: 39,22
Pol. 1.5, 1255a1-2: 12,13
Rhet. 2.24, 1401a21-2: 1,21

CRATES THEBANUS

fr. 4-12 (Giannantoni): 36,15-16

EURIPIDES

Tr. 887-8: 2,4-5

PLATO

Alc. 1 133D2-3: 44,22

Gorg. 478D4-6: 50,10-15
Gorg. 479D5-6: 52,16
Gorg. 480A: 53,27-30
Gorg. 507E3: 42,25
Gorg. 509A1-2: 1,1-2
Gorg. 523B3: 57,8
Leg. 4, 709B7-8: 51,10-11
Leg. 4, 717C6-D3: 46,9-10
Leg. 10, 899B9: 16,9-10
Leg. 10, 901E-903A: 15,32-8
Leg. 10, 902E7-903A3: 18,14-15
Leg. 10, 903A10-B1: 1,2
Leg. 10, 903B9: 16,5-6
Parm. 130E4-135E3: 21,2-4
Phaedr. 246C1-2: 62,5

Pol. 275E5-76E11: 16,5

Resp. 2, 366A7: 58,12-13
Resp. 4, 420B6-8: 38,3-6
Resp. 4, 617E4: 39,5
Resp. 5, 473D5: 42,24
Resp. 5, 586A1-B6: 42,13-14
Resp. 6, 491D1-E5: 56,13
Resp. 6, 519E1-520A4: 38,3-6
Resp. 7, 533D2: 25,24
Soph. 231C8: 21,1
Soph. 245A8-9: 5,15
Symp. 173B8: 1,14-15
Theaet. 150C1-3: 1,11
Theaet. 176B1: 54,9; 12-13
Theaet. 179A9: 38,9
Theaet. 179D3-4: 1,11-12
Theaet. 189E6-190A6: 1,15-16
Tim. 27B5-6: 59,15-16
Tim. 30B8-C1: 1,4-5
Tim. 37A7: 1,15
Tim. 38E5: 63,35
Tim. 39B4-5: 54,4-5
Tim. 41C1-4: 28,5-6; 31,8
Tim. 41C3-4: 29,6-7
Tim. 41E2-3: 55,34
Tim. 45B3: 54,5-6
Tim. 45B6-7: 54,6
Tim. 45C3-4: 54,7-8
PLOTINUS

Enn. 1.3 [20] 2,6: 25,22

Enn. 3.2 [47] 13,8-9: 44,18

THALES

DK A 22: 16,9-10

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Index of Names
References are to chapter and line numbers of Boeses edition.
Anactorium, 56,33
Apollodorus (of Cassandreia), 57,28
Apollonia, 56,32
Apollonius of Tyana, 60,6
[Archimedes] (= some engineer),
37,26-7
Archytas (of Tarentum), 54,22
[Aristotle], 63,34
Asclepius the Saviour, 53,7; 53,9
Carthaginians, 56,30
Crates, 36,15-16
Dionysius (I of Syracuse), 56,29
Egyptians, 56,19
Gods of absolution (Lusioi), 58,12
Hades, 57,9
Hermes, 1,22; 3,1
Leucas, 56,32
Nemesis, 46,10
Oedipus, 60,22

Oracles, 1,7
Periander (of Corinth), 56,30
Persians, 56,28
philosophers (Peripatetics), 1,5
philosophers (Stoics), 1,4
Plato, 1,1; 1,6-7; 18,14; [32,14]; 36,14;
38,3; 39,5; 54,4; 54,20; 66,9
Ptolemy Ceraunus, 57,30-1
Pythia, 56,28
Scythians, 57,29
Seleucus, 57,32
Sicily, 56,29
Socrates, 53,27
Theano, 54,24
Themistocles, 56,26
Timaeus, 28,5
Tiresias, 60,22
Zeus, 32,13

This page intentionally left blank

Index of Subjects
Numbers in bold refer to the notes to the introduction (pp. 61-7). Numbers in italic
refer to the notes to the translation (pp. 121-47). Other references are to the page
numbers of this book.
action, life of, 97
actions determine our situation, 35,
98
affections, see passions
Ammonius on future contingents, 11,
14-15, 31, 33, 37-8, 40
angels, see superior kinds
anger, 109, 344, 352
animals (irrational and mortal), 3942, 100-5, 66, 72, 78, 81, 83
eating each other, 101, 243
apatheia, 355, 358
Apollonius of Tyana, 47, 115, 429
apparitions of gods and demons, 41,
103, 272
Aristotle on geometric equality, 32, 68
assimilation to god, 22, 44, 99, 83,
109, 23, 88, 341, 343
athlete of virtue, 97, 203
autotels, see self-complete
bad luck, see fortune
beauty, 33, 95-6, 367
becoming, 97, 108
escape from realm of, 97, 214
being, living, thinking (triad), 25, 87
belief
cultural differences, 103
needed when understanding
unattainable, 37, 58-9
Bion, 53, 115
body
akin to and ruled by fate, 41, 103-4
chastisement, 96
disease, 33, 40, 96, 98-9, 107, 114
exercise, 94
good condition, 33, 94, 96
health, 40, 94, 96, 100-1
instrument of soul, 96

parts of, 47, 57, 99, 103, 107-8, 114,

324
three types (earthy, pneumatic and
ethereal), 93, 176
treated with contempt, 95
Boethius on future contingents, 13,
24, 26
calamity, see fortune
chain (of beings), 65, 231, 256
character, 94-5
choice, 78, 103, 202, 430
and possibility, 36
bodies lack it, 35
characteristic of rational life, 35, 98
different from will, 158
entails responsibility, 35, 40
soul chooses amongst its logoi, 202
undeserved misfortune compatible
with free choice, 32-3, 98
vs. action, 164
Christianity, 9, 53, 158, 83, 409
chronology of the Tria opuscula, 159-65
circle, 74, 34
city
a living being, 114, 406, 411
destruction, 37, 98
strong identity/unity, 47, 56,
113-14, 406
co-affection (sumpatheia) (between
parts of a whole; between parts
and whole), 41, 47, 57, 99, 104,
114-15, 419-20
see also body, parts of
collateral damage, 38, 229
common notions or preconceptions, 7,
17, 71-2, 76-7, 84-5, 105, 10, 53,
104, 271
common sense (sensus communis), 6

176

Index of Subjects

conjectural predictions of future

events, 15, 19, 81, 79
conscience, see remorse, repentance
contemplation, 94, 97
contingency, 159
and free choice, 15-16, 27
compatibility with divine
foreknowledge, 9-16, 74-6, 81
terminates in necessity, 81, 79
see also Ammonius; Boethius;
Iamblichus
contraries, 29, 91-2
coordination (suntaxis), 46
see also fate; providence
corruptible bodies are needed for the
plenitude of the universe, 29, 901, 156
corruption for the sake of generation,
29, 91
courage, 96
craftsmanship, see tekhn
Crates of Thebes, 33, 198
crime, immoral behaviour, 5-9, 42-3,
46-8, 51-5, 105-6, 111, 116, 116,
125, 314, 330, 323, 361, 395, 398,
438, 443
criterion of knowledge, 6-7, 15, 73, 23
cycle
life cycle, cosmic cycle, 38, 40, 45-6,
59, 99, 101-2, 111, 113, 115, 247-8
death, 57, 100, 104
see also soul; reincarnation;
underworld
declension (huphesis), 79, 84, 63, 103
demerit, see merit
demiurge, 2, 14, 21, 82, 91, 163-4, 169,
67, 90, 111, 134, 475
demon(s), 21, 26, 89, 58, 139
allotted to individuals, 102
demon of Socrates, 85
demonic providence, 21-3, 39, 82-3,
89, 94
demons as herdsmen, 102, 256
exactors of punishment, 106
family demons, 46
irrational demons, 175
know indeterminate things, 82, 85
leaders of animal chains, 94
secondary agents of providence,
20-2, 81-2

witchcraft, 162, 166

derivative being, see irradiations;
henads; intellect
desire (epithumia), 163, 196
destiny, see fate
destruction, 104
determent, see punishment, preventive
determinacy and indeterminacy combined, 10-11, 76
determination in indeterminate
things, 19
determinism, 10-16, 35, 19
dialectics, 89, 143
disease, see body; soul
disposition, see power
bad, evil, 45, 55-6, 96, 110, 201
inveterate bad disposition, 110, 125,
361
distribution of goods, distributive justice, 32-8, 94-100, 106
dream therapy, 41, 103, 272
dualism, 28, 90
earth, different regions suited for oracles, 88, 134
not so great, 97, 112
engineer, 97, 209
see also Theodore
Epicurus, 51
epilepsy, 116, 444
Epinomis, 158, 5
equality, 94
arithmetical, 37, 94, 98-100
geometrical, 32, 94-8, 68, 37, 183-5
equanimity, 38, 42, 44-5, 99, 109
Er (myth of), 35, 51, 98, 158, 163, 27,
78, 103, 202, 218-20, 263, 430
erotic striving for beauty, 96
error (erroneous judgment), 45, 110
eternity of the world and celestial
spheres is restored, 85, 111, 121
Euripides, 51, 111, 116, 12, 398
evil
absolute (pure primary), 164
apparent evils, 34, 91, 97
contrariety to nature (evil of
bodies), 29, 92-3, 316
contributes to the good of the whole,
29, 91, 164
different account in Mal., 27-31,
161-5

Index of Subjects
existence denied, 27-8, 90, 164, 150
exists in corruptible bodies, in
particular souls, 29, 90-4, 154
evil and providence, 10, 27-32, 90-4,
163
evil in souls is contrariety to reason,
29-30, 92-4
in realm of becoming, 97, 108, 236
necessity of evil, 160
not unmixed with the good, 29, 91,
163-4
origin, 28, 90
threat to the belief in providence,
27-8
see also vice
exile, 97
existence (huparxis), 485-7
existence, modes: causally (kat aitian), formally (kath huparxin),
participated (kata methexin), 77,
49, 116, 118, 46
external accidents of life, 94-5, 100
family, 46-8, 97, 113-16, 104, 407, 434
strong identity/unity, 57, 114, 407
as a living being, 114
fate
common revolution of fate, 99
connection (heirmos) of all events,
39, 159
co-ordinated fates, 37, 40, 99, 101-2
distinguished from providence, 41,
103
fate something divine, not god, 158
fate understood as nature, 158
interwoven with providence, 41, 45,
104, 111
law of fate, 111, 371
some believe there is fate, no
providence, 41, 103
some believe there is providence, no
fate, 41, 103
subordinated to providence, 39
see also providence; soul
fear, 1, 43, 45, 55, 109, 112-13, 330,
391, 393
flower of intellect, 474
foreknowledge, see providence
Forms, 5, 73
of individuals, 5-6
fortune, 32, 94

177

misfortune, bad fortune, 32-4, 36,

40, 42, 51, 95, 97, 99, 101, 104-5
external circumstances as
opportunities, 34, 97
free action, 39, 158
free choice, 14-16, 98, 158, 27
and animals, 39
free will, 1, 158-9
friends, 97
future contingents: knowledge of, 1216
see also Ammonius; Boethius
generation and corruption, 29, 91
geometry, 32, 37, 95
as introduction to dialectics, 26, 89,
144
see also equality, geometrical
gods
all is full of gods, 83, 85, 95, 112
ancestral gods, 97
appear in different shapes, 161-2
are self-complete henads (s.v.), 50,
116-18, 457
derive their providence from the
One/Good, 119
enjoy tranquillity, 38, 100
exercise universal providence, 475
exist according to the One and the
Good, 6, 8, 72-4, 161
gods, not the superior kinds,
primary agents of providence,
20-2, 48-9, 81-2, 116-19, 453
gods of absolution, 113
not responsible for evil, 161, 78
presiding and attendant gods, 89,
147
proceed from the One/Good, 49, 116
superior to intellect and thinking,
72, 21
unchanging, 39
will and power concordant, 21-3, 82,
85, 88, 107
younger gods cooperate with
demiurge, 90
Good (the)
identical with the One, 7, 17, 72-3,
76-7, 22, 27, 54
see also gods; henads; providence
good(s)
apparent goods, 34, 94, 97, 100

178

Index of Subjects

apparent goods are insecure, 28, 33

different degrees, 24, 85
external goods, 32, 35, 95, 100, 193
external goods as punishment of the
wicked, 96
external goods instruments of
virtue and vice, 32, 34, 96-7, 199
of bodies, 24
of souls, 24
stem from providence, 22-3, 77
the more important among the
apparent goods, 100
true goods are lasting, 33
true goods, 33-4, 38, 100
great natures, 43, 45, 54, 111-12, 374-5
greatness of mind (megalopsukhia),
96-7, 110, 193
greediness (pleonexia), 101, 250
Growing Argument, 46, 56, 121, 406
grudge, bearing a g. against providence, 58, 105-6
Hades, see underworld
happiness, 34-5
heimarmen, see fate
henad(s), 4, 6, 8, 16, 21, 26, 41, 49,
116-17
self-complete vs. derivative
(participatory), 49, 116-17, 457
herd-keeping, 82, 92
Hermes, our common logos, 71-2, 10
Hermias of Alexandria, 46-7, 49, 160,
125, 397, 402, 422, 430
heroes as intermediaries of providence, 26, 39, 49-50, 81, 89, 113-16
see also superior kinds
high-mindedness (megaloprepeia), 193
human being(s)
definition: soul using body and a
mortal form of life, 96, 23, 194
good nature of people, 54, 96
intermediary between divine beings
and brutes, 39, 93, 175
humour, good, 100
hypostases, 49, 117, 471
Iamblichus
mode of knowledge determined by
the knowing subject, 11, 2, 21
on foreknowledge of contingents, 11,
116

on the superior kinds, 47

virtue its own (and only) reward, 70
ignorance, 367
illumination, different types, 89
image, 97
imagination, 41, 72, 82, 87, 102, 163,
267, 391, 420
necessary for animals, 82
two types of imagination, 267
immortal irrational animals, 31
immortality, 55, 57, 100
inclination
determines guilt, 35, 98
individual(s)
knowledge of, 72-4
individuals and providence, 6-8,
39-40, 47, 51, 72-5, 101, 113, 265
see also Forms; providence; superior
beings
indivisibility and division, 8, 10-11,
74, 76-7, 84, 118, 23-4
inequality of lives, 32-8, 40, 56, 94100, 101
infinite, infinity
degrees, 18, 78
either limit or infinity dominates,
79-81
infinity and limit, 16
infinity in determinate things, 19
infinity of power, 17, 78-9
quantitative vs. non-quantitative,
18, 78, 45, 60
see also limit (unlimitedness)
injustice, 34, 40, 46, 53, 55, 96, 101,
112, 113
inspiration, 26, 50, 88, 118
instruments of providence, 35-6, 40,
54, 87, 98, 101, 239
the perpetrator owes some
suffering, 107, 313
unjustly for the offender, justly for
the victim, 35, 40, 98, 101, 252
intellect
a primary hypostasis, 49, 117
comprehensive vs. particular, 72, 16
contains logoi of corporeal and
incorporeal things, 18
intellect in us, 96
intellective (intuitive) knowledge, 72
kinship with providence, 41, 103, 65
lunar and solar, 49, 117

Index of Subjects
one-many, 78, 57
self-complete vs. derivative, 49, 117,
463, 465
thinking is its primary activity, 118
universal vs. particular, 6, 7, 72-3,
111-18, 16, 17, 465
intemperance, 96
intermediaries, 22-4, 89, 123
their function in divine
illumination, 26-7, 89
invocation of gods, 76, 50
irradiations (derivative, vs. self-complete), 49, 79, 116-17, 67, 457,
459, 469-70, 473
see also henads; intellect
irrational knowledge, 72, 75
justice, 40, 43, 51, 98, 101, 107-9, 1835, 271, 307, 319, 321, 404
distributive, 185
kairos, 42-3, 54, 59, 106-7, 299, 302
knowledge, cognition
as perfection, 75
character of knowledge stems from
knower, 8, 75-6
intermediate between knower and
known, 9, 25, 75, 86-7
knowledge and production
concordant in gods, 8
knowledge by the cause, 76
knowledge of gods beyond intellect,
6, 14
knowledge of providence always
determinate, 9-13, 77-84
knowledge of the gods unitary, 6-8,
72-5
like known by the like, 7, 73, 26
non-temporal knowledge of
temporal events, 11-16, 82, 118
six modes and three types, 6, 7, 72,
14
see also Ammonius; Boethius;
Iamblichus; providence
labours of soul, 76, 52
libertarianism, 35-6
light, 22, 25, 83, 87, 108-9, 118, 161,
126
limit (peras) and infinity (apeiron) as

179

principles of production, 16-17,

19, 77-8, 80, 44, 74, 486
logos (reason principle), 41, 103, 202
epistemic and creative function,
18-20, 79, 68
in seed, 10, 75-7, 44, 47
two types in intellect, 78
two types in the soul, 79
see also choice; soul
love of honour (philotimia), 96, 196
magnanimity, see greatness of mind
mechanics, mechanical, 97, 209
see also engineer; Theodore
merit, principle of, 5, 7, 32-8, 41, 44-5,
47, 51, 71, 94-100, 104, 110-11,
113, 115, 12, 185, 363
in the case of animals, 39-42, 100-5
mirror, 25, 88, 128
monad, 8, 74, 67
moon, 99
eclipse, 25, 88, 136-7
lunar intellect, 49, 117
moonlight blended with sunlight,
87, 126
morally bad/inferior people, 42, 54, 59,
100, 105
incurable criminals, 54, 59
morally good/superior people, 42, 100,
105
mortal form of life, 41, 96, 102, 194
murder, 37
mysteries, 47, 113
nature
according to nature, 29, 31, 73, 91-2,
163, 316
contrary to (para) nature, 28, 29,
31, 73, 90-2, 94, 28, 130
natural (inanimate) causes, 40, 101
natural impulse, 39
natural place, 317
ruling principle of bodies; and of
plants, 98, 102, 106, 306
necessity (in us), kinship with fate,
41, 103, 88
see also reason
Nemesis, 103, 271
New Academy, 58, 69, 110
oligarchy, 194

180

Index of Subjects

One (the)
a primary hypostasis, 49, 117
beyond the intellect, 49, 73, 116
common to all, 7, 8, 73
extends to all things, 73
final cause of everything, 119
first principle, 118-19
omniscience, 116
participation in the One, 117, 73
produces and preserves all, 8, 74, 78
the first cause of providence, 119
the One different from the universal
one, the individual one, and the
material one, 8, 17, 73-4, 29-30, 55
the one in us, 117
the One of providence, 102
the One of the soul, 50, 118, 474
transcends providence, 50, 118-19,
488
union of the soul with the One, 50,
117-18
opinion (doxa), 6-7, 72
oracles
Chaldean, 71, 4, 474
deceptive, 161-2
intermittence, 25, 88, 129-32
oracle of the Pythia to Themistocles,
380
providence perceived in oracles, 41,
103, 272
others, other people, 35-6, 98
paradigm, see Forms
parasitical existence, see parhupostasis
parhupostasis, 28, 30-1, 91-2, 160-2,
165, 28, 162-3
participation, 22-5, 49, 73, 83-4, 86,
116, 52, 25
difference stems from participants,
25, 87
inaptitude for participation, 23-5,
83, 87-8, 96
intermediate between participated
and participants, 25, 86-7
intermittence due to weakness of
participants, 23-5, 50, 87-8, 118,
160
need for intermediaries
participation in providence in many
ways, 22, 24-7, 83-90
receptivity of participants, 23-4, 83-7

see also One, 84

parts and wholes, 35, 47, 98-9, 113-14,
163-4, 229, 316
passions, 31, 38, 40, 92-4, 96, 100-1,
409
see also soul, disease
patience, 43-5, 102
Pelops, 160, 434
Peripatetics, 3, 5, 10, 39
perishing, common perishing, 45, 101,
104, 107, 109-10
Philo of Alexandria, 53, 69, 114, 118,
120, 127
Philoponus
against Proclus on eternity, 24-5, 53
loves Proclus characterisation of
providence, 8-9, 32
piety, 51
plants, 39, 41, 102, 104
Plato
chose to live in a pestilential region,
33, 96
Laws, 71, 1, 2
on geometric equality, 32, 94, 68
on providence, 5, 72, 1, 2
Plato on assimilation to god, 44, 109
Platos ideal state, its classes, 34, 97
refrains from punishing when
angry, 54, 109
Timaeus, 11, 71
pleasure, 45, 100, 104, 112
an apparent good, 100
plenitude of the universe, 29, 91, 98,
164
Plotinus, 2, 5, 37, 39, 162-3, 69, 81,
19, 21, 44, 52, 72, 252, 436
Plutarch of Chaeronea
as source of Proclus, 42-3, 46-47,
50-9, 165, 108, 286-7, 289, 290-1,
294, 296-7, 303-4, 307-8, 311-12,
318, 322, 324-5, 327, 330-3, 340-2,
344, 347, 350, 353-7, 359, 360-5,
367, 372, 374-9, 381-2, 385,
388-395, 397-400, 404, 406-7, 409,
411, 416-17, 419-20, 424-5, 427,
432, 436, 438-9, 441-4, 446, 449
on the deficiency of oracles, 26, 129,
132
Plutarch (Pseudo-) On Fate, 39
poison, 55, 115-16, 441
politics, operates by conjecture, 118

Index of Subjects
poverty, 33, 95-6, 98
power (worldly), 33, 35, 94-6
power over greater things suffices for
smaller things, 84, 105
prestige, good reputation, 33, 35, 38,
95, 100
pride (megalophrosun), 96, 193
primary beings need providence, 85
principle
no principle of a principle, 41, 104,
282
ontological, 117
problems: on the importance of raising
problems, 71
procession and reversion, 23, 49, 467
projection (probol), 202
providence (pronoia)
1st problem: how can it know all,
6-8, 72-4, 116
2nd problem: how can it know
contingents, 9 -16, 74-7
3rd problem: cause of determinate
and indeterminate things, 16-24,
77-86
4th problem: diversity of
participation, 24-7, 86-90
5th problem: compatibility with
evil, 27-32, 90-4
6th problem: inequalities, 32-8,
94-100
7th problem: irrational mortal
animals, 39-42, 100-5
8th problem: punishment
postponed, 42-8, 51-5, 105-13
9th problem: inherited guilt, 46-8,
51, 113-16, 160, 106, 400, 411, 430
10th problem: lower providential
agents, 48-50, 116-19
a divine cause of good things, 17,
39, 51, 77
anticipates and occasionally
pre-empts, 10, 16, 48, 76, 80, 116,
11, 425, 443
coordinates, grants unity, 18, 40,
79, 102
decree of providence, 111
existence commonly accepted, 75
existence in virtue of the one/good,
6, 72-5
extends to all things, down to the

181

smallest parts and individual

beings, 5, 39, 72, 101
gifts of, 34, 95-6
its designs and modus operandi
obscure to us, vii, 37, 45-8, 58,
110-11, 116, 105, 361
knowledge of contingents, 9-10
knowledge of particulars, 107, 116
knows all in virtue of the One, 6-7,
72-5, 116, 25
operates and knows in a timeless
manner, 2, 10-15, 25, 68, 76-7, 86,
118, 121
pedagogical function, lessons of, 33,
43-4, 54, 95-6, 109
pro-noia, prior to thinking/intellect,
6, 72-3, 19, 21
rules over universe, 98, 101, 107
threefold hierarchy of providence
and fate, 39, 41, 103
transcendence, 81-2, 83
undeserved misfortune threatens
belief, 42, 94-5, 105
see also fate; gods; infinite; One;
punishment; superior kinds;
theodicy
Punishment, 32, 34, 36, 42-8, 50-9, 96,
105-16, 164, 201
carried out by demons, see demon
carried out by humans, 106
corrective, 34, 36, 40, 42, 44, 52, 54,
56-7, 102, 105, 108-9, 318, 420,
425
delayed, 42-8, 51-5, 59, 105-13
double punishment, 44, 47, 52-3, 109
eschatological (see also underworld),
38, 43, 45, 57-8, 112, 72, 78, 393,
411, 427
internal and external, 44, 109, 330
medical metaphors, 34, 42-3, 47, 57,
59, 96, 106-8, 110-11, 114-16, 164,
124, 307, 320, 420
not to be punished is the greatest
punishment, 43-4, 108-9, 319, 330
popular notions, 3, 42, 44, 47, 51,
53, 271, 330
preventive, 42, 44, 48, 52-3, 56-7,
106, 109-10, 116, 443
providential punishment tailored to
individual cases, 42-3, 45, 110

182

Index of Subjects

punishment of descendents, 46-8,

52-3, 55-9, 113-16, 160
punishment of innocents (denied),
46-8, 52, 55-6, 113, 400
retributive, 34, 40, 42, 44, 47, 52-3,
57, 99, 101-2, 106, 108, 112-15,
321, 406
purification of the soul, 98, 110-13
rank, 104-5
activities not in agreement with
ones rank, 41, 104
not meritorious, 105
not sensible to complain about ones
rank, 281
not subject to explanation, 42, 104
rape, 37
rational cognition, 72, 75
reason (logos), 30-2, 91-4, 169
and necessity, 39, 41, 103
ruling principle of (irrational) soul,
107, 307
reason principle(s), see logos
reincarnation, 37, 46-8, 58-9, 98-9,
105, 115-16, 103, 122, 429-31, 435
see also theatre
remorse, repentance, 44, 54-5, 109,
332, 360
reputation, see prestige
responsibility for actions (freely chosen), 35-6, 40, 98, 101, 158, 78
revenge, see punishment, retributive
reversion, 27, 86, 383
rewards, 32-3, 42-8, 105-16
science, 72
seed, 46, 160
see also logos
self-complete (autoteleis) beings, 4950, 79, 116-17, 67
see also irradiations
self-control, 109, 344
self-determination (autexousion), 35-6,
40, 98, 101, 220, 267
and irrational animals, 39-41, 101
self-movement, 35, 49, 101-2, 117-18,
164, 245
self-preservation, 78
self-sufficiency (autarkeia) derives
from the Good, 23, 85, 109

sense-perception, 41, 72, 82, 87, 102,

163, 267
common sense, 6, 73, 24
series, see chain (of beings)
shadow, 49, 88, 104, 65, 194, 245, 470
shame, 33, 37, 95, 101
ship, 95, 99
sight, 108, 329
similarity of lives, of souls, 38, 46-8,
99-100, 102, 113-15, 160, 425-6
slavery, 94
smallness of mind, 96
Socrates
cannot be harmed by others, 34
encourages self-denunciation, 109,
334
telestic rites for expiating inherited
guilt, 46
see also demon
soul
a primary hypostasis, 49, 117
attached to specific gods, 38, 99, 231
descent, 31, 34, 92-4, 97, 102, 67,
170-1, 179, 259, 267
divine souls, 48-50, 118, 450, 473
divine souls operate in a timeless
manner, 118
divine souls providential, by virtue
of the One, 50, 118
ensouled bonds, 49, 177, 470
entelechy, 49, 117, 469
eschatology, 37, 55, 57, 86, 100, 113
evil, disease, 43, 95-6, 106-8, 110,
115-16
human rational souls (divine part),
92-4, 108
irrational soul, needed for
incarnation, 30-1, 33, 36, 92-4,
163, 65, 179, 194, 245, 470
mortal part, 100, 194
participates in intellect, 49, 117, 467
providential, 31, 93-4
self-complete vs. derivative, 49, 117,
456-7
separable vs. inseparable, 267
vegetative, 49, 117, 176, 275, 275,
469
see also choice; One
spirits (pneumata), 26, 88, 131-2
stars, influence of, 41, 103
perceived to be the work of fate, 103

Index of Subjects
state (polis), 97
statues of gods: animation, 26, 88, 135
Stoics, 3, 5, 10, 35-6, 39, 53, 74-5, 39,
419
sun, 99
metaphor of participation, 25, 87-8
solar intellect, 49, 117
sunlight metaphor for divine
providence, 8
superior beings (occasionally including gods), 20, 39, 81, 89, 103, 80
knowledge of indeterminate and
individual events, 81, 159
superior kinds (angels, demons, heroes), and their role in
providence, 26, 39, 48-50, 89, 11619, 138, 231, 235, 473
providential in virtue of the One,
50, 118
their role in oracles, 88
with the help of the gods, 50, 118
Syrianus, 157, 160, 163-6, 168, 171,
174, 100
tekhn, craftsmanship, 42-3, 54, 106-7,
308, 311, 327
telestic rites, 26, 46-7, 88, 113, 125
temperance, 94, 97, 235
theatre, 48, 55, 115, 107, 124, 436
fate as the poet of a play, 48, 115,
124
incarnations as roles in a play, 48,
115
souls as actors in a play, 48, 55,
115, 434
spectators, 124
theodicy, 2, 32, 36, 98
see also evil; providence; punishment
Theodore the engineer against free
will, 157-8
Theodorus of Asine, 69
theurgy, 26, 88, 162, 135
time
length relative to observer, 45-7, 55,
59, 112-14, 100, 385, 388
particular versus infinite time, 86,
121
see also providence; soul
timocracy, 196
tyranny, tyrant, 54, 94, 351, 381-2,
395, 441

183

ugliness, 96
underworld, 45, 59, 112, 386-7, 389,
398
unity different at different levels, 18,
79
universe
agency of the universe, 35, 37, 98,
104
governed by gods, 51, 97, 117
human action part of the universe,
97-8
interaction between parts, 35, 98
law of the universe, 98
not all parts have the same value,
41, 99, 103-4, 229
nothing episodic, 81, 86, 11, 81
unity, coordination, 20, 23-4, 39,
81-2, 102, 159, 84
see also co-affection; parts and
wholes
unlimitedness, see limit
vice (kakia), badness, depravity, 33-4,
37, 43, 46, 52, 92, 94-5, 106-9,
167, 319
innate root of wickedness, 106, 292
its own punishment (see fear), 54,
322
victim, 35, 98
see also collateral damage;
punishment of innocents
virtue, 34, 94-5, 98
as perfection, 98
great and venerable, 33, 95, 97
its own ornament, 33, 96
its own reward, 33, 95-6, 70
love of virtue, 33, 96, 98
many forms, 97
sufficient for happiness, 34
virtue and merit, 32-8, 94-100, 131
wealth, 35, 40, 46, 94-6, 100-1, 196,
198
well-being, depending upon same principle as being, 104, 278
what depends upon us (to eph hmin),
98, 158
worries, trouble, 28, 90, 152, 235
Zeus verdict, 94