PILAPIL v IBAY-SOMERA174SCRA653FACTS:

On September 7, 1979, Imelda Manalaysay Pilapil, a Filipina and therespondent to the case, and Erich
Geiling, a German national, were married atFriedenweiler in the Federal Republic of Germany. After
about three and a half years of marriage, Geiling initiated a divorce proceeding against Pilapil
in Germanyin January 1983 while Pilapil filed an action for legal separation, support andseparation of
property before RTC of Manila in January 23, 1983 where it is stillpending as a civil case. On January 15,
1986, the local Court of Germanypromulgated a divorce decree on the ground of failure of marriage of
the spouses. The custody of the child,Isabella Pilapil Geiling, was granted to petitioner.On June 27,
1986, private respondent filed two complaints for adultery alleging that,while still married to respondent,
petitioner had an affair with a certain William Chiaand Jesus Chua sometime in 1982 and
1983 respectively. The respondent city fiscalapproved a resolution directing the filing of two complaints
for adultery againstpetitioner. Thereafter, petitioner filed a motion in both criminal cases to defer
herarraignment and to suspend further proceedings thereon. Respondent judge merelyreset the date of the
arraignment but before such scheduled date, petitioner movedfor the suspension of proceedings. On
September 8, 1987, respondent judge deniedthe motion to quash and also directed the arraignment of both
accused. Petitionerrefused to be arraigned and thus charged with direct contempt and fined.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the private respondents adultery charges against thepetitioner is still valid given the
fact that both had been divorced prior to the filingofcharges.

HELD:
The law provides that in prosecutions for adultery and concubinage theperson who can legally file the
complaint should only be the offended spouse. Thefact that private respondent obtained a valid divorce
in his country in 1983, isadmitted. According to Article 15 of the Civil Code, with relation to the status
of Filipino citizens both here and abroad, since the legal separation of the petitionerand respondent has
been finalized through the courts in Germany and the RTC inManila, the marriage of the couple
were already finished, thus giving no merit to thecharges the respondent filed against the petitioner.
Private respondent, being nolonger married to petitioner holds no legal merit to commence the adultery
case asthe offended spouse at the time he filed suit in 1986. The temporary restrainingorderissuedinthiscase
wasmadepermanent.

Van Dorn vs. Romillo Jr. 139 SCRA 139

October 8, 1985
Fact of the Case:
Petitioner Alicia Reyes Van is citizen of the Philippines while private respondentRichard Upton
is a citizen of the United States, were married on 1972 at Hongkong. On1982, they got divorced in
Nevada, United States; and the petitioner remarried toTheodore Van Dorn.
On July 8, 1983, private respondent filed suit against petitioner, asking that thepetitioner be
ordered to render an accounting of her business in Ermita, Manila, and bedeclared with right to manage
the conjugal property. Petitioner moved to dismiss the caseon the ground that the cause of action is barred
by previous judgement in the divorceproceeding before Nevada Court where respondent acknowledged
that they had nocommunity property. The lower court denied the motion to dismiss on the ground that
theproperty involved is located in the Philippines, that the Divorce Decree has no bearing inthe case.
Respondent avers that Divorce Decree abroad cannot prevail over theprohibitive laws of the Philippines.
Issue:
(1)Whether or not the divorce obtained the spouse valid to each of them.
(2)Whether or not Richard Upton may assert his right on conjugal properties.
Held:
As to Richard Upton the divorce is binding on him as an American Citizen.As heis bound by the
Decision of his own countrys Court, which validly exercised jurisdictionover him, and whose decision he
does not repudiate, he is estopped by his ownrepresentation before said Court from asserting his right
over the alleged conjugalproperty. Only Philippine Nationals are covered by the policy against absolute
divorcethe same being considered contrary to our concept of public policy and morality. AliciaReyes
under our National law is still considered married to private respondent. However,petitioner should not be
obliged to live together with, observe respect and fidelity, andrender support to private respondent. The
latter should not continue to be one of her heirswith possible rights to conjugal property. She should not
be discriminated against herown country if the ends of justice are to be served.
Labo, Jr. vs COMELEC, [176 SCRA 1; GR 86564, August 1, 1989]
Posted by Pius Morados on November 6, 2011
(Municipal Corporation, Qualification, 2nd Highest Number of Votes)
Facts: Petitioner and Respondent were candidates for the office of the Mayor of Baguio City during
Elections. Having garnered the highest number of votes, Petitioner was elected and proclaimed winner

while Respondent garnered the second highest number of votes. Subsequently Respondent filed a petition
for quo warranto contesting the election of the Petitioner on the ground that the latter is a naturalized
Australian citizen and was divested of his Philippine citizenship having sworn allegiance to the Queen of
Australia. Petitioner opposes to the contrary.
Section 42 of the Local Government Code provides for the qualifications that an elective official must be
a citizen of the Philippines.

From the evidence adduced, it was found out that citizenship requirements were not possessed by the
petitioner during elections. He was disqualified from running as mayor and, although elected, is not now
qualified to serve as such.

Issue: WON private respondent, having garnered the 2nd highest number of votes, can replace the
petitioner as mayor.
Held: No. The simple reason is that he obtained only the second highest number of votes in the election,
he was obviously not the choice of the people of Baguio City.
The fact that the candidate who obtained the highest number of votes is later declared to be disqualified or
not eligible for the office to which he was elected does not necessarily entitle the candidate who obtained
the second highest number of votes to be declared the winner of the elective office.

Note:
1.

Dual citizenship is not a bar in running for elections, dual allegiance is.

2.

Mere repatriation is not enough to run for elections.

3.

A written certification of an oath of allegiance to the Philippines must be attached together with t