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G.R.No.97471

TodayisWednesday,January27,2016

RepublicofthePhilippines
SUPREMECOURT
Manila
SECONDDIVISION

G.R.No.97471February17,1993
PEOPLEOFTHEPHILIPPINES,plaintiffappellee,
vs.
ISABELOPUNOyGUEVARRA,alias"Beloy,"andENRIQUEAMURAOyPUNO,alias"Enry,"accused
appellants.
TheSolicitorGeneralforplaintiffappellee.
EdwardC.Castaedaforaccusedappellants.

REGALADO,J.:
Theprimalissueforresolutioninthiscaseiswhetheraccusedappellantscommittedthefelonyofkidnappingfor
ransomunderArticle267oftheRevisedPenalCode,aschargedintheinformationoraviolationofPresidential
DecreeNo.532(AntiPiracyandAntiHighwayRobberyLawof1974),ascontendedbytheSolicitorGeneraland
found by the trial court or the offense of simple robbery punished by Paragraph 5, Article 294 of the Revised
PenalCode,asclaimedbythedefense.
In an information dated and filed on May 31, 1989 in the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 103, as
CriminalCaseNo.Q57404thereof,appellantswerechargedwithkidnappingforransomallegedlycommittedin
thefollowingmanner:
Thatonoraboutthe13thdayofJanuary,1988inQuezonCity,Philippinesandwithinthejurisdiction
of this Honorable Court, the said accused, being then private individuals, conspiring together,
confederating with and mutually helping each other, did, then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniouslykidnapandcarryawayoneMARIADELSOCORROSARMIENTOyMUTUC*for the purpose
of extorting ransom, to the damage and prejudice of the said offended party in such amount as may be awarded to her under the
provisionsoftheCivilCode.1

Onapleaofnotguiltywhenarraigned,2appellantswenttotrialwhichultimatelyresultedinajudgmentpromulgatedon
September 26, 1990 finding them guilty of robbery with extortion committed on a highway, punishable under Presidential
DecreeNo.532,withthisdispositioninthefallothereof:

ACCORDINGLY, judgment is hereby rendered finding the accused ISABELO PUNO and ENRIQUE
AMURAOGUILTYasprincipalsofrobberywithextortioncommittedonahighwayand,inaccordance
withP.D.532,theyarebothsentencedtoajailtermofreclusionperpetua.
The two accused are likewise ordered to pay jointly and severally the offended private victim Ma.
Socorro M. Sarmiento the sum of P7,000.00 as actual damages and P3,000.00 as temperate
damages.3
Before us now in this appeal, appellants contend that the court a quo erred (1) in convicting them under
PresidentialDecreeNo.532sincetheywerenotexpresslychargedwithacrimetherein(2)inapplyingSections
4and5,Rule120oftheRulesofCourtsincethechargeundersaidpresidentialdecreeisnottheoffenseproved
andcannotrightlybeusedastheoffenseprovedwhichisnecessarilyincludedintheoffensecharged.4
Forthematerialantecedentsofthiscase,wequotewithapprovalthefollowingcounterstatementoffactsinthe
People'sbrief5whichadoptedtheestablishedfindingsofthecourtaquo,documentingthesamewithpagereferencesto
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thetranscriptsoftheproceedings,andwhichwenotearewithoutanysubstantialdivergenceintheversionprofferedbythe
defense.

This is a prosecution for kidnapping for ransom allegedly done on January 13, 1988 by the two
accused(tsn,Jan.8,1990,p.7).
Mrs.MariaSocorroMutucSarmientoownsabakeshopinAranetaAvenue,QuezonCitycalledNika
CakesandPastries.Shehasadriverofherownjustasherhusbanddoes(Ibid.,pp.46).
Ataround5:00intheafternoonofJanuary13,1988,theaccusedIsabeloPuno,whoisthepersonal
driver of Mrs. Sarmiento's husband (who was then away in Davao purportedly on account of local
electionthere)arrivedatthebakeshop.HetoldMrs.SocorrothatherowndriverFredhadtogoto
Pampangaonanemergency(somethingbadbefellachild),soIsabelowilltemporary(sic) take his
place(Id.,pp.89).
Mrs.Socorro'stimetogohometoValleVerdeinPasigcameandsoshegotintotheMercedesBenz
ofherhusbandwithIsabeloon(sic)thewheel.Afterthecarturnedrightin(sic)acornerofAraneta
Avenue,itstopped.Ayoungman,accusedEnriqueAmurao,boardedthecarbesidethedriver(Id.,
pp.910).
Onceinside,EnriqueclamberedontopofthebacksideofthefrontseatandwentontowhereMa.
Socorrowasseatedattherear.Hepoke(sic)agunather(Id.,p.10).
Isabelo,whoearliertoldherthatEnriqueishisnephewannounced,"ma'm,youknow,Iwanttoget
moneyfromyou."Shesaidshehasmoneyinsideherbagandtheymaygetitjustsotheywilllether
go.ThebagcontainedP7,000.00andwastaken(Id.,pp.1114).
Furtheron,thetwotoldhertheywantedP100,000.00more.Ma.Socorroagreedtogivethemthat
but would they drop her at her gas station in Kamagong St., Makati where the money is? The car
wentabouttheSta.Mesaarea.Meanwhile,Ma.SocorroclutchedherRosaryandprayed.Enrique's
gunwasmenacinglystoring(sic)athersoftbread(sic)brown,perfumedneck.HesaidheisanNPA
andthreatenedher(Id.,p.15).
ThecarspedoffnorthtowardstheNorthsuperhighway.ThereIsabelo,Beloyasheiscalled,asked
Ma. Socorro to issue a check for P100,000.00. Ma. Socorro complied. She drafted 3 checks in
denominationsoftwoforP30thousandandoneforP40thousand.Enriqueorderedhertoswallowa
pillbutsherefused(Id.,pp.1723).
BeloyturnedthecararoundtowardsMetroManila.Later,hechangedhismindandturnedthecar
againtowardsPampanga.Ma.Socorro,accordingtoher,jumpedoutofthecarthen,crossedtothe
other side of the superhighway and, after some vehicles ignored her, she was finally able to flag
downafishvendorsvan.Herdresshadbloodbecause,accordingtoMa.Socorro,shefelldownon
thegroundandwasinjuredwhenshejumpedoutofthecar.Herdresswastorntoo(Id.,pp.2326).
OnreachingBalintawak,Ma.SocorroreportedthemattertoCAPCOM(Id.,p.27).
Both accused were, day after, arrested. Enrique was arrested trying to encash Ma. Socorro's
P40,000.00checkatPCIBank,Makati.(tsn,Oct.18,1989,pp.1013)6
As observed by the court below, the defense does not dispute said narrative of complainant, except that,
accordingtoappellantPuno,hestoppedthecaratNorthDiversionandfreelyallowedcomplainanttostepoutof
thecar.Heevenslowedthecardownashedroveaway,untilhesawthathisemployerhadgottenaride,andhe
claimedthatshefelldownwhenshestubbedhertoewhilerunningacrossthehighway.7
AppellantsfurthertestifiedthattheybroughttheMercedezBenzcartoDolores,SanFernando,Pampangaand
parkeditnearabarangayorpoliceoutpost.Theythereafterateatarestaurantanddividedtheirloot.8Much later,
whenhetookthestandatthetrialofthiscase,appellantPunotriedtomitigatehisliabilitybyexplainingthathewasindire
needofmoneyforthemedicationofhisulcers.9

Ontheserelativelysimplefacts,andasnotedatthestartofthisopinion,threetheorieshavebeenadvancedasto
what crime was committed by appellants. The trial court cohered with the submission of the defense that the
crimecouldnotbekidnappingforransomaschargedintheinformation.Welikewiseagree.
Prefatorily,itisworthrecallinganacceptedtenetincriminallawthatinthedeterminationofthecrimeforwhich
theaccusedshouldbeheldliableinthoseinstanceswherehisactspartakeofthenatureofvariantoffenses,and
the same holds true with regard to the modifying or qualifying circumstances thereof, his motive and specific
intentinperpetratingtheactscomplainedofareinvaluableaidsinarrivingatacorrectappreciationandaccurate
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conclusionthereon.
Thus,toillustrate,themotiveoftheaccusedhasbeenheldtoberelevantoressentialtodeterminethespecific
natureofthecrimeas,forinstance,whetheramurderwascommittedinthefurtheranceofrebellioninwhichcase
the latter absorbs the former, or whether the accused had his own personal motives for committing the murder
independentofhismembershipintherebelliousmovementinwhichcaserebellionandmurderwouldconstitute
separate offenses. 10 Also, where injuries were inflicted on a person in authority who was not then in the actual
performance of his official duties, the motive of the offender assumes importance because if the attack was by reason of
thepreviousperformanceofofficialdutiesbythepersoninauthority,thecrimewouldbedirectassaultotherwise,itwould
onlybephysicalinjuries.11

Inthecaseatbar,thereisnoshowingwhatsoeverthatappellantshadanymotive,nurturedpriortooratthetime
they committed the wrongful acts against complainant, other than the extortion of money from her under the
compulsion of threats or intimidation. This much is admitted by both appellants, without any other esoteric
qualificationordubiousjustification.AppellantPuno,asalreadystated,candidlylaidtheblameforhispredicament
onhisneedforfundsfor,inhisowntestimony,"(w)hilewewerealongthewayMam(sic)Corinawastellingme
"Beloy,IknowyourfamilyverywellandIknowthatyour(sic)not(a)badperson,whyareyoudoingthis?"Itold
her"Mam,(sic),becauseIneedmoneyandIhadanulcerandthatIhavebeengettingan(sic)advancesfrom
ourofficebuttheyrefusedtogivemeanybale(sic)...."12
Withrespecttothespecificintentofappellantsvisavis the charge that they had kidnapped the victim, we can
relyontheproverbialruleofancientrespectabilitythatforthiscrimetoexist,theremustbeindubitableproofthat
theactualintentofthemalefactorswastodeprivetheoffendedpartyofherliberty, 13andnotwheresuchrestraint
of her freedom of action was merely an incident in the commission of another offense primarily intended by the offenders.
Hence, as early as United States vs. Ancheta, 14 and consistently reiterated thereafter, 15 it has been held that the
detention and/or forcible taking away of the victims by the accused, even for an appreciable period of time but for the
primary and ultimate purpose of killing them, holds the offenders liable for taking their lives or such other offenses they
committedinrelationthereto,buttheincidentaldeprivationofthevictims'libertydoesnotconstitutekidnappingorserious
illegaldetention.

That appellants in this case had no intention whatsoever to kidnap or deprive the complainant of her personal
libertyisclearlydemonstratedintheveritablyconfessionaltestimonyofappellantPuno:
QAtwhatpointdidMrs.Sarmientohanded(sic)thebagcontainingtheP7,000.00to
yournephew?
ASantoDomingoExit.
QAndhowaboutthechecks,wherewereyoualreadywhenthecheckswas(sic)being
handedtoyou?
AAlsoattheSto.Domingoexitwhenshesignedthechecks.
QIfyourintentionwasjusttorobbed(sic)her,whyisitthatyoustilldidnotallowherto
stayatSto.Domingo,afterallyoualreadyreceivedthemoneyandthechecks?
ABecausewehadanagreementwithherthatwhenshesignedthecheckswewilltake
hertoherhouseatVilla(sic)Verde.
QAndwhydidyounotbringherbacktoherhouseatValleVerdewhensheis(sic)
alreadygivenyouthechecks?
ABecausewhilewewereonthewaybackI(sic)cametomymindthatifwereach
Balintawakorsomeotherplacealongthewaywemightbeapprehendedbythepolice.
SowhenwereachedSantaRitaexitItoldher"Mam(sic)wewillalreadystopandallow
youtogetoutofthecar."16
Neithercanweconsidertheamountsgiventoappellantsasequivalenttoorinthenatureofransom,considering
the immediacy of their obtention thereof from the complainant personally. Ransom, in municipal criminal law, is
themoney,priceorconsiderationpaidordemandedforredemptionofacapturedpersonorpersons,apayment
that releases from captivity. 17 It can hardly be assumed that when complainant readily gave the cash and checks
demanded from her at gun point, what she gave under the circumstances of this case can be equated with or was in the
concept of ransom in the law of kidnapping. These were merely amounts involuntarily surrendered by the victim upon the
occasion of a robbery or of which she was summarily divested by appellants. Accordingly, while we hold that the crime
committed is robbery as defined in Article 293 of the Code, we, however, reject the theory of the trial court that the same
constitutesthehighwayrobberycontemplatedinandpunishedbyPresidentialDecreeNo.532.
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Thelowercourt,insupportofitstheory,offersthisratiocination:
Thecourtagreesthatthecrimeisrobbery.Butitisalsoclearfromtheallegationintheinformation
that the victim was carried away and extorted for more money. The accused admitted that the
robberywascarriedonfromAranetaAvenueuptotheNorthSuperhighway.Theylikewiseadmitted
thatalongthewaytheyintimidatedMa.Socorrotoproducemoremoneythatshehadwithheratthe
timeforwhichreasonMa.Socorro,nothavingmorecash,drewoutthreechecks....
Inviewoftheforegoingthecourtisoftheopinionthatthecrimescommittedisthatpunishableunder
P.D. 532 (AntiPiracy and AntiHighway Robbery Law of 1974) under which where robbery on the
highwayisaccompaniedbyextortionthepenaltyisreclusionperpetua.18
The Solicitor General concurs, with the observation that pursuant to the repealing clause in Section 5 of said
decree,"P.D.No532isamodificationoftheprovisionsoftheRevisedPenalCode,particularlyArticle267which
areinconsistentwithit." 19 Such opinion and complementary submission consequently necessitate an evaluation of the
correct interplay between and the legal effects of Presidential Decree No. 532 on the pertinent Provisions of the Revised
PenalCode,onwhichmatterwearenotawarethatanydefinitivepronouncementhasasyetbeenmade.

ContrarytothepostulationoftheSolicitorGeneral,PresidentialDecreeNo.532isnotamodificationofArticle267
of the Revised Penal Code on kidnapping and serious illegal detention, but of Articles 306 and 307 on
brigandage. This is evident from the fact that the relevant portion thereof which treats of "highway robbery"
invariably uses this term in the alternative and synonymously with brigandage, that is, as "highway
robbery/brigandage." This is but in line with our previous ruling, and which still holds sway in criminal law, that
highwayrobbers(ladrones)andbrigandsaresynonymous.20
Harkingbacktotheoriginofourlawonbrigandage(bandolerismo)inordertoputourdiscussionthereoninthe
proper context and perspective, we find that a band of brigands, also known as highwaymen or freebooters, is
more than a gang of ordinary robbers. Jurisprudence on the matter reveals that during the early part of the
American occupation of our country, roving bands were organized for robbery and pillage and since the then
existinglawagainstrobberywasinadequatetocopewithsuchmovingbandsofoutlaws,theBrigandageLawwas
passed.21
The following salient distinctions between brigandage and robbery are succinctly explained in a treatise on the
subjectandareofcontinuingvalidity:
ThemainobjectoftheBrigandageLawistopreventtheformationofbandsofrobbers.Theheartof
theoffenseconsistsintheformationofabandbymorethanthreearmedpersonsforthepurpose
indicatedinart.306.Suchformationissufficienttoconstituteaviolationofart.306.Itwouldnotbe
necessary to show, in a prosecution under it, that a member or members of the band actually
committed robbery or kidnapping or any other purpose attainable by violent means. The crime is
provenwhentheorganizationandpurposeofthebandareshowntobesuchasarecontemplated
byart306.Ontheotherhand,ifrobberyiscommittedbyaband,whosememberswerenotprimarily
organized for the purpose of committing robbery or kidnapping, etc., the crime would not be
brigandage,butonlyrobbery.Simplybecauserobberywascommittedbyabandofmorethanthree
armedpersons,itwouldnotfollowthatitwascommittedbyabandofbrigands.IntheSpanishtextof
art. 306, it is required that the band "sala a los campos para dedicarse a robar." 22 (Emphasis
supplied).

Infine,thepurposeofbrigandageis,interalia,indiscriminatehighwayrobbery.Ifthepurposeisonlyaparticular
robbery,thecrimeisonlyrobbery,orrobberyinbandifthereareatleastfourarmedparticipants. 23 The martial
lawlegislator,increatingandpromulgatingPresidentialDecreeNo.532fortheobjectivesannouncedtherein,couldnothave
beenunawareofthatdistinctionandispresumedtohaveadoptedthesame,therebeingnoindicationtothecontrary.This
conclusion is buttressed by the rule on contemporaneous construction, since it is one drawn from the time when and the
circumstancesunderwhichthedecreetobeconstruedoriginated.Contemporaneousexpositionorconstructionisthebest
andstrongestinthelaw.24

Further, that Presidential Decree No. 532 punishes as highway robbery or brigandage only acts of robbery
perpetratedbyoutlawsindiscriminatelyagainstanypersonorpersonsonPhilippinehighwaysasdefinedtherein,
and not acts of robbery committed against only a predetermined or particular victim, is evident from the
preambularclausesthereof,towit:
WHEREAS,reportsfromlawenforcementagenciesrevealthatlawlesselementsarestillcommitting
acts of depredation upon the persons and properties of innocent and defenseless inhabitants who
travelfromoneplacetoanother,therebydisturbingthepeace,orderandtranquilityofthenationand
stuntingtheeconomicandsocialprogressofthepeople:
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WHEREAS,suchactsofdepredationsconstitute...highwayrobbery/brigandagewhichareamong
thehighestformsoflawlessnesscondemnedbythepenalstatutesofallcountries
WHEREAS,itisimperativethatsaidlawlesselementsbediscouragedfromperpetratingsuchactsof
depredaions by imposing heavy penalty on the offenders, with the end in view of eliminating all
obstacles to the economic, social, educational and community progress of the people. (Emphasis
supplied).
Indeed,itishardtoconceiveofhowasingleactofrobberyagainstaparticularpersonchosenbytheaccusedas
their specific victim could be considered as committed on the "innocent and defenseless inhabitants who travel
fromoneplacetoanother,"andwhichsingleactofdepredationwouldbecapableof"stuntingtheeconomicand
socialprogressofthepeople"astobeconsidered"amongthehighestformsoflawlessnesscondemnedbythe
penalstatutesofallcountries,"andwouldaccordinglyconstituteanobstacle"totheeconomic,social,educational
and community progress of the people, " such that said isolated act would constitute the highway robbery or
brigandage contemplated and punished in said decree. This would be an exaggeration bordering on the
ridiculous.
True,PresidentialDecreeNo.532didintroduceamendmentstoArticles306and307oftheRevisedPenalCode
by increasing the penalties, albeit limiting its applicability to the offenses stated therein when committed on the
highways and without prejudice to the liability for such acts if committed. Furthermore, the decree does not
require that there be at least four armed persons forming a band of robbers and the presumption in the Code
thatsaidaccusedarebrigandsiftheyuseunlicensedfirearmsnolongerobtainsunderthedecree.But,andthis
webroadlyunderline,theessenceofbrigandageundertheCodeasacrimeofdepredationwhereintheunlawful
actsaredirectednotonlyagainstspecific,intendedorpreconceivedvictims,butagainstanyandallprospective
victims anywhere on the highway and whosoever they may potentially be, is the same as the concept of
brigandage which is maintained in Presidential Decree No. 532, in the same manner as it was under its
aforementionedprecursorintheCodeand,forthatmatter,undertheoldBrigandageLaw.25
Erroneousadvertenceisneverthelessmadebythecourtbelowtothefactthatthecrimeofrobberycommittedby
appellantsshouldbecoveredbythesaidamendatorydecreejustbecauseitwascommittedonahighway.Aside
fromwhathasalreadybeenstressedregardingtheabsenceoftherequisiteelementswhichtherebynecessarily
putstheoffensechargedoutsidethepurviewandintendmentofthatpresidentialissuance,itwouldbeabsurdto
adopt a literal interpretation that any unlawful taking of property committed on our highways would be covered
thereby. It is an elementary rule of statutory construction that the spirit or intent of the law should not be
subordinatedtotheletterthereof.Triteasitmayappear,wehaveperforcetostresstheelementarycaveatthat
hewhoconsidersmerelytheletterofaninstrumentgoesbutskindeepintoitsmeaning, 26 and the fundamental
rulethatcriminaljusticeinclinesinfavorofthemilderformofliabilityincaseofdoubt.

If the mere fact that the offense charged was committed on a highway would be the determinant for the
applicationofPresidentialDecreeNo.532,itwouldnotbefarfetchedtoexpectmischievous,ifnotabsurd,effects
on the corpus of our substantive criminal law. While we eschew resort to a reductio ad absurdum line of
reasoning,weapprehendthattheaforestatedtheoryadoptedbythetrialcourtfallsfarshortofthedesideratumin
the interpretation of laws, that is, to avoid absurdities and conflicts. For, if a motor vehicle, either stationary or
movingonahighway,isforciblytakenatgunpointbytheaccusedwhohappenedtotakeafancythereto,would
the location of the vehicle at the time of the unlawful taking necessarily put the offense within the ambit of
Presidential Decree No. 532, thus rendering nugatory the categorical provisions of the AntiCarnapping Act of
1972? 27 And, if the scenario is one where the subject matter of the unlawful asportation is large cattle which are
incidentally being herded along and traversing the same highway and are impulsively set upon by the accused, should we
apply Presidential Decree No. 532 and completely disregard the explicit prescriptions in the AntiCattle Rustling Law of
1974?28

We do not entertain any doubt, therefore, that the coincidental fact that the robbery in the present case was
committedinsideacarwhich,inthenaturalcourseofthings,wascasuallyoperatingonahighway,isnotwithin
the situation envisaged by Section 2(e) of the decree in its definition of terms. Besides, that particular provision
preciselydefines"highwayrobbery/brigandage"and,aswehaveamplydemonstrated,thesingleactofrobbery
conceivedandcommittedbyappellantsinthiscasedoesnotconstitutehighwayrobberyorbrigandage.
Accordingly, we hold that the offense committed by appellants is simple robbery defined in Article 293 and
punished under Paragraph 5 of Article 294 of the Revised Penal Code with prision correccional in its maximum
periodtoprisionmayorinitsmediumperiod.Appellantshaveindisputablyactedinconspiracyasshownbytheir
concerted acts evidentiary of a unity of thought and community of purpose. In the determination of their
respectiveliabilities,theaggravatingcircumstancesofcraft29shallbeappreciatedagainstbothappellantsandthatof
abuse of confidence shall be further applied against appellant Puno, with no mitigating circumstance in favor of either of
them. At any rate, the intimidation having been made with the use of a firearm, the penalty shall be imposed in the
maximumperiodasdecreedbyArticle295oftheCode.
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Wefurtherholdthatthereisnoproceduralobstacletotheconvictionofappellantsofthecrimeofsimplerobbery
uponaninformationchargingthemwithkidnappingforransom,sincetheformeroffensewhichhasbeenproved
isnecessarilyincludedinthelatteroffensewithwhichtheyarecharged.30Fortheformeroffense,itissufficientthat
the elements of unlawful taking, with intent to gain, of personal property through intimidation of the owner or possessor
thereofshallbe,asithasbeen,provedinthecaseatbar.Intenttogain(animuslucrandi)ispresumedtobeallegedinan
informationwhereitischargedthattherewasunlawfultaking(apoderamiento)andappropriationbytheoffenderofthethings
subjectoftherobbery.31

These foregoing elements are necessarily included in the information filed against appellants which, as
formulated, allege that they wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously kidnapped and extorted ransom from the
complainant.Suchallegations,ifnotexpresslybutattheveryleastbynecessaryimplication,clearlyconveythat
thetakingofcomplainant'smoneyandchecks(inaccuratelytermedasransom)wasunlawful,withintenttogain,
and through intimidation. It cannot be logically argued that such a charge of kidnapping for ransom does not
includebutcouldnegatethepresenceofanyoftheelementsofrobberythroughintimidationofpersons.32
WHEREFORE, the assailed judgment of the trial court is hereby SET ASIDE and another one is rendered
CONVICTINGaccusedappellantsIsabeloPunoyGuevarraandEnriqueAmuraoyPunoofrobberyasPunished
in Paragraph 5 of Article 294, in relation to Article 295, of the Revised Penal Code and IMPOSING on each of
themanindeterminatesentenceoffour(4)yearsandtwo(2)monthsofprisioncorreccional,asminimum,toten
(10)yearsofprisionmayor,asmaximum,andjointlyandseverallypaytheoffendedparty,MariadelSocorroM.
Sarmiento,theamountsofP7,000.00asactualdamagesandP20,000.00asmoraldamages,withcosts.
SOORDERED.
Narvasa,C.J.,Feliciano,NoconandCampos,Jr.,JJ.,concur.

#Footnotes
*Complainanttestifiedunderthenameof"CorinaMutucSarmiento"butmadetheclarificationthat
herbaptismalnameis"MariadelSocorroMutucSarmiento"(TSN,January8,1990,4).
1OriginalRecord,1.
2Ibid.,72.
3Ibid.,137perJudgeJaimeN.Salazar,Jr.
4Appellant'sBrief,5Rollo,47.
5BriefforthePlaintiffAppelleeRollo,6884.
6Ibid.,7375.
7TSN,August13,1990,1415.
8Ibid.,id.,16September5,1990,18,2526.
9Ibid.,id.,11.
10Peoplevs.Geronimo,100Phil.90(1956).
11Peoplevs.Cadag,etal.,2SCRA388(1961).
12TSN,August,30,1990,11.
13Forthisreason,kidnappingandseriousillegaldetentionarejointlyprovidedforinArticle267
underChapterOne,TitleNine,BookTwooftheRevisedPenalCodeonCrimesAgainstLiberty.
141Phil.165(1902)seealsoU.S.vs.DeLeon,1Phil.163(1902).
15Peoplevs.Remalante,92Phil.48(1952)Peoplevs.Guerrero,103Phil.1136(1958)Peoplevs.
Ong,etal.,62SCRA174(1975)Peoplevs.TySuiWong,etal.,83SCRA125(1978)Peoplevs.
Jimenez,etal.,105SCRA721(1981).
16TSN,August13,1990,2122.
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17Keithvs.State,120Fla.847,163So.136Peoplevs.Akiran,etal.,18SCRA239,246(1966).
18OriginalRecord,136.
19Rollo,79.
20U.S.vs.Ibaez,19Phil.463(1911).Art.306oftheCodealsospecificallyreferstothemas
"highwayrobbersorbrigands."
21U.S.vs.Carlos,15Phil.47(1910).
22Aquino,R.C.,TheRevisedPenalCode,VolumeThree,1989ed.,p.174,citingU.S.vs.Decusin,
2Phil.536(1903)andU.S.vs.Maao,2Phil.718(1903).
23U.S.vs.Feliciano,3Phil.422(1904).
24Contemporaneaexpositioestoptimaetfortissimainlege(2Inst.11Black'sLawDictionary,
FourthEdition,390).
25Act518,asamendedbyAct2036.
26Quihaeretinliterahaeretincortice(Co.Litt.289Broom,Max.685Black'sLawDictionary,
FourthEdition,1413).
27RepublicActNo.6539.
28PresidentialDecreeNo.533.
29Peoplevs.SanPedro,95SCRA306(1980)Peoplevs.Masilang,142SCRA673(1986).
30Section4,Rule120,1985RulesofCriminalProcedure.
31U.S.vs.SanPedro,4Phil.405(1905)U.S.vs.alabot,38Phil.698(1918).
32SeeSection5,Rule120,1985RulesofCriminalProcedure.
TheLawphilProjectArellanoLawFoundation

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