1/27/2016

G.R.No.504

TodayisWednesday,January27,2016

RepublicofthePhilippines
SUPREMECOURT
Manila
ENBANC
G.R.No.504September16,1902
THEUNITEDSTATES,complainantappellant,
vs.
TOMASADELOSREYES,defendantappellee.
OfficeoftheSolicitorGeneralAraneta,forappellant.
ManuelTorres,forprivateprosecutor.
AlfredoChicote,forappellee.
LADD,J.:
ThisisanappealfromtheCourtofFirstInstanceofManila,takenbythecomplainingwitness,JulianGonzalez,
fromajudgmentofacquittal,uponacomplaintforbigamyunderarticle471ofthePenalCode.
ThedefendantwasmarriedtothecomplainingwitnessinManila,May27,1897.AfterlivingtogetherinManilafor
a time they separated, the defendant remaining in the house where they had been previously living until some
timesubsequenttoJuly12,1900.OnthatdayshewasmarriedinManilabyaProtestantclergymantoRamon
Martinez.HerdefenseisthatshehonestlybelievedherfirsthusbandwasdeadwhenshemarriedMartinez.
It appears that the mother and some other relatives of Gonzalez lived, after the separation, in the same house
with the defendant. Gonzalez testifies that the separation took place in March, 1900, and that he also lived for
somemonthsinthelowerstoryofthesamehouse,thedefendantlivingintheupperstory.Hefurthertestifiesthat
afterheleftthishouseandwenttoliveelsewherehevisitedhisrelativestherenearlyeverydaydowntoafew
days before the trial, which took place in September, 1901. He says that he often saw his wife at these times,
supplyingherwithmeansforhersupportthroughhisrelatives,butthatheneverspokewithher.Ashorttimeafter
hersecondmarriagethedefendantmovedawayfromthehouseandhassincelivedelsewhere.
The defendant testifies that she and Gonzalez had been living together a year and two months when the
separationtookplace.ThatwouldfixthedateoftheseparationinJuly,1898.Shetestifiesthatsometimeduring
theyearfollowingtheseparationshewastoldbythemotherofGonzalezthatshehadbeeninformedthatherson
wasdead,thatthereuponprayersweresaidforhissoulforninenights,andthatsheputonmourningandworeit
a year. She says that she contracted the second marriage with the consent of the mother of Gonzalez, and
believingthattheinformationwhichshehadreceivedfromherastothedeathofGonzalezwastrue.Themother
ofGonzalezdiedbeforethetrial.
Therewassomefurtherevidencefromotherwitnessesonbothsides,butitwasofsuchacharacterastothrow
butlittlelightuponthefactsofthecase.Onthewhole,wehavereachedtheconclusion,thoughnotwithoutsome
hesitation, that the story told by the defendant is in the main more likely to be true than false, and that she
probablydidcontractthesecondmarriageunderabonafidebeliefthatthefirstmarriagehadbeendissolvedby
thedeathofGonzalez.
Wehaverecentlyheld,intheUnitedStatesvs.MarcosaPealosaandEnriqueRodriguez,decidedJanuary27,
1902,thattherecanbenoconvictionunderarticle475ofthePenalCode,wherebyreasonofamistakeoffact
the intention to commit the crime does not exist, and we think the same principle must apply to this case. The
defendantwasthereforeproperlyacquittedofthecrimechargedinthecomplaint.
We are, however, of the opinion that the defendant is chargeable with criminal negligence in contracting the
secondmarriage,andshouldhavebeenconvictedunderarticle568ofthePenalCode.(SeeG.O.,No.58,sec.
29.) It does not appear that she made any attempt to ascertain for herself whether the information received by
her motherinlaw as to the death of Gonzalez was to be relied upon. She never even saw or communicated
directlyinanywaywiththepersonswhogavehermotherinlawthisinformation.Moreover,viewingthetestimony
inthelightmostfavorabletoher,shewaitedlessthantwoyearsafterhearingthedeathofherhusbandbefore
http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1902/sep1902/gr_504_1902.html

1/2

1/27/2016

G.R.No.504

contractingthesecondmarriage.Thediligencewithwhichthelawrequirestheindividualatalltimestogovernhis
conductvarieswiththenatureofthesituationinwhichheistoperform.Inamattersoimportanttothegoodorder
ofsocietyasthatinquestion,wheretheconsequencesofamistakearenecessarilysoserious,nothinglessthan
thehighestdegreeofdiligencewillsatisfythestandardprescribedbythelaw.Wecannotsaythatthedefendant
hasactedwiththatdiligenceinthepresentcase.
Applyingtheprovisionsofarticle568ofthePenalCode,theactofcontractingasecondorsubsequentmarriage,
the prior marriage not having been lawfully dissolved, being one which, if done with malice, would constitute a
gravecrime,theoffensecommittedbythedefendantispunishablebyarrestomayor in its maximum degree to
prision correccional in its minimum degree. There being no aggravating circumstance, and as we think the
extenuating circumstance of article 11 of the Penal Code may properly be considered in this case, this penalty
shouldbeappliedinitsminimumdegree.
Wethereforesentencethedefendanttofourmonthsandonedayofarrestomayorandcosts.Thejudgmentof
thecourtbelowwillbemodifiedinaccordancewiththisopinion.Soordered.
Arellano,C.J.,Cooper,Smith,Willard,andMapa,JJ.,concur.
TheLawphilProjectArellanoLawFoundation

http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1902/sep1902/gr_504_1902.html

2/2