[G.R. No. 85976. November 15, 1990.

]
JOSE CESAR D. SIMPAO, Petitioner, v. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, BUREAU OF
INTERNAL REVENUE, and RAUL DE OCERA, Respondents.
FACTS:
Simpao was appointed Supervising Revenue Enforcement Officer of the Bureau of Internal
Revenue (BIR), pursuant to the reorganization of the BIR under Executive Order No. 127 dated
January 20, 1987. The appointment was actually a reappointment because prior to the
reorganization Simpao was holding the same position of Supervising Revenue Enforcement
Officer assigned to the Manufacturing Division I by virtue of Revenue Travel Assignment Order
No. On April 28, 1988, private respondent Raul de Ocera filed his protest contesting the
appointment of petitioner Jose Cesar D. Simpao as Supervising Revenue Enforcement Officer on
the ground that he has better qualifications and is more competent than Simpao.
Assistant Commissioner of the BIR, Fortunato Aguas, Section Operations Officer, evaluate the
protest and made some comments.
On May 24, 1988, the Bureau of Internal Revenue-Reorganization Appeals Board.
On May 26, 1988, Ocera appealed to the Civil Service Commission. Simpao was never notified
by the former of the appeal. Neither did the respondent Commission give any notice thereof to
Simpao .He came to know of it only when the questioned resolution of September 27, 1988 that
was promulgated.
On October 17, 1988, Simpao filed with the respondent Commission a Motion for
Reconsideration with Urgent Prayer to Stay Execution. In its resolution of November 24, 1988,
the CSC found no cogent reason to warrant reversal and denied reconsideration.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the respondent Commission denied petitioners right to due process and
compounding the violation of constitutional rights.
HELD:
The claim of Simpao that he was deprived of his right to due process has been cured by his filing
of a Motion for Reconsideration subsequently upon having learned of the questioned resolution
of September 27, 1988. In the case of Sumadchat v. Court of Appeals, January 30, 1982, 111
SCRA 501, this Court held that "in the application of the principle of due process, what is sought
to be safeguarded is not lack of previous notice but the denial of opportunity to be heard . . ."
(Bermejo v. Barrios, L-23614; Camorin v. Barrios, L-23615, February 27, 1980, 31 SCRA 764,
775-776 cited in Corjeo v. Secretary of Justice, June 28, 1974, 57 SCRA 663). "Absence of

previous notice is not itself a substantial defect; what the law abhors is the lack of opportunity to
be heard . . ." (Manuel v. Villalena, Et Al., L-28218, February 27, 1970, 37 SCRA 745, 751). The
records disclose that petitioner moved for reconsideration of the CSC decision. In the case of
Dominador L. Galura v. Civil Service Commission, Et Al., G.R. No. 85812, June 1, 1989, En
Banc, Minute Resolution, this Court held that "a Motion for Reconsideration constitutes
sufficient opportunity for the party who feels aggrieved to inform the tribunal concerned of his
side in the controversy (Maglasang v. Ople, 63 SCRA 508 [1975]; Dormitorio v. Fernandez, 72
SCRA 388 [1976]; Sumadchat v. Court of Appeals, 111 SCRA 488 [1982])."

G.R. No. 105752 September 2, 1993

INOCENCIO GONZALES, petitioner,
vs.
HONORABLE CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, respondent.
FACTS:
It took petitioner Inocencio Gonzales thirty six (36) years to ascend to his position of
Administrative Officer III of the Agricultural Training Institute (ATI), an agency of the
Department of Agriculture. On his 25th year of service, he received a merit award recognizing
his continuous, dedicated, and faithful service in the government. On his 30th year, he repeated
the feat. His record of service is without any wart of malfeasance or misfeasance in office.
Early in 1990, certain problems beset his two (2)children in the United States. He had to fly to
the United States to attend to his children. He applied for and was granted leaves with pay from
February 2, to July 16, 1990. After six (6) months, however, the family problem had not gone
away and he decided to spend more time with his children.
On June 25, 1990, petitioner wrote to the Director of ATI requesting approval of a leave without
pay starting from the second week of July to December 31,1991. He cited as additional reason
his desire to take advantage of ". . . a physical check-up free of charge due to my childrens'
medical plan benefits". The letter was personally delivered by petitioner's wife. It carried his
address in the United States at 149 Declaration Way, San Jose, California, 95116.
For unknown reason, the Director of ATI did not act on the letter-request. It was neither approved
nor disapproved. Three (3) months later, ATI started acting adversely on petitioner's request. On
September 5, 1990, Atty. Ildefonso del Rosario, ATI's Assistant Director and OIC, wrote to
petitioner declaring him absent without official leave for more than thirty (30) days and warning
him that should he not report within five (5) days from receipt of the letter, he would be dropped
from the rolls. The letter was addressed at 30 Ventura St., BF Homes, Quezon City, petitioner's
house. The letter, however, was returned to sender (ATI) on September 27, 1990. 2

What ATI did was to publish a notice of similar import in the October 4, 11 and 18, 1990 issues
of the Philippine Journal, a newspaper, of general circulation. On October 24, 1990, ATI dropped
petitioner from its rolls. He was not furnished a copy of the order. When he came back from the
United States and reported for work on November 19, 1990, he found out that Mercedes
Puruganan had been appointed to his position. By himself, he protested to the Civil Service
Commission on December 14, 1990. His letter-protest was endorsed to the Merit Systems
Protection Board (MPSB) for appropriate action. On April 30, 1991, the Board ruled that
petitioner was duly notified before he was dropped from the roll. His appeal was dismissed. His
motion for reconsideration was rejected.
Petitioner appealed to the Civil Service Commission. Again, petitioner lost. In its Resolution No.
92-640, dated May 7, 1992, the Commission held:
1) That the requirement of notice was "substantially" complied with by the ATI, and (2) that the
failure of ATI to act on his request for leave without pay was of "no moment".
ISSUE:
WHETHER OR NOT GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION WAS LIKEWISE COMMITTED
WHEN PETITIONER WAS SUMMARILY, HASTILY AND INORDINATELY DROPPED
FROM THE ROLLS AND HIS REPLACEMENT HURRIEDLY APPOINTED WITHOUT THE
OBSERVANCE OF THE REQUISITE DUE PROCESS.
HELD:
In the Comment of Solicitor General Raul Goco dated September 14, 1992, conceded that
petitioner was denied due process and hence, illegally dismissed. The Civil Service Commission,
thru its Legal Department, then defended itself. In its own Comment dated December 14, 1992 it
contended that petitioner had "constructive notice" of the letter ordering him to return to work
and which he failed to heed.

G.R. No. L-83882 January 24, 1989

IN RE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF WILLIE YU, petitioner,
vs.
MIRIAM DEFENSOR-SANTIAGO, BIENVENIDO P. ALANO, JR., MAJOR PABALAN,
DELEO HERNANDEZ, BLODDY HERNANDEZ, BENNY REYES and JUN ESPIRITU
SANTO, respondent.

THE CASE
Petitioner filed a petition for habeas corpus (right to due process) with a prayer to be released from
arbitrarydetention as he claims that his continued Philippine citizenship is meritorious.
FACTS:
Willie Yu- a Portuguese National acquired a Philippine citizenship by naturalization on Feb. 10, 1978. Despite
naturalization, on 21 July 1981, petitioner applied for and was issued a renewed Portuguese Passport No. 35/81
serial N. 1517410 by the Consular Section of the Portuguese Embassy in Tokyo. Said Consular Office certifies
that his Portuguese passport expired on 20 July 1986. Yu though a naturalized Filipino signed commercial
documents stating his citizenship as Portuguese without the authentication of an appropriate Philippine Consul. Yu
was detained by the CID for obtaining a Foreign passport while (at the same time) holding aFilipino citizenship as
well.
Respondents argue that the petitioner was in full knowledge and legal capacity when he applied for APhilippine
citizenship through naturalization he consequently recognizes, identifies and agrees to theoath taken which states to
renounce absolutely and forever all allegiance and fidelity to any foreign prince, potentate, state or
sovereignty and pledged to maintain true faith and allegiance to the Republicof the Philippines,".
Hence, petitioner then knows the limitations or restrictions once solemnizing saidoath and it succeeding
consequences should they be violated.
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner Mr. Willie Yus acts constitute a renunciation of his PhilippineCitizenship?
HELD: Yes.
The Court, considering the facts stated ruled that the acts of the petitioner constitute an express
renunciation of petitioners Philippine citizenship through naturalization. Express renunciation
means renunciation made known distinctly and explicitly, and not that which is implied. After
having acquired Philippine citizenship, with full knowledge, petitioner resumed his prior status
as a Portuguese citizen by applying for a renewal of his Portuguese passport, and representing
himself as a Portuguese in official and commercial documents. The Court found that such acts
are grossly inconsistent with the maintenance of petitioners Philippine citizenship.
The Court stated that normally the question of whether or not a person has renounced his
Philippine citizenship should be heard before a trial court of law in adversary proceedings, but
this would now be unnecessary due to the facts stated and which are not even disputed by the

petitioner. A rehearing with the CID would only be superfluous, and the petitioner was already
given the opportunity to show proof of his continued Philippine citizenship but he failed. The
Court emphasized that Philippine citizenship is not a commodity to be displayed when required
and suppressed when convenient
MANUEL C. ROXAS, et al. vs. CONRADO M. VASQUEZ, et al. [G.R. No. 114944, May
29, 2002]
FACTS:
Petitioner Roxas was the Chairman, while Nacpil was a Member, of the Bids and
Awards Committee of the Philippine Constabulary-Integrated National Police (PC-INP). The PCINP invited bids for the supply of sixty-five units of fire trucks. The Bids and Awards Committee
voted to award the contract to the Tahei Co., Ltd., manufacturer of Nikko-Hino. Accordingly, the
contract was executed between PC-INP and Tahei Co.
The COA subsequently discovered that there was a discrepancy in the amounts indicatedon the
disbursement voucher and the purchase order. Consequently, the DILG Secretary filed a
complaint with the Ombudsman against the respondents.
After preliminary investigation, the Deputy Ombudsman for the Military recommended the
indictment of all respondents, except Ramirez. On review, the Office of the Special
Prosecutor r e c o m m e n d e d t h e d i s m i s s a l o f t h e c o m p l a i n t s a g a i n s t R o x a s , N a c
p i l , C o d o y, K a i r a n a n d R a m i r e z . F o r m a l c h a r g e s w e r e f i l e d w i t h t h e
S a n d i g a n b a y a n a g a i n s t N a z a r e n o , F l o r e s , Tanchanco, Custodio, Osia, Espea
and Santos. Petitioners were not included in the criminal information. Flores and
Tanchanco moved for a reinvestigation, which was granted. Thereafter, the Office of the Special
Prosecutor recommended the dismissal of the charges against Flores and Tanchanco. In the same
resolution, however, the Special Prosecutor made a sudden turn about as regards Roxas, Nacpil
and Kairan, and ordered their inclusion as accused.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the inclusion of the petitioners as accused violated their right to due process.
HELD:
YES. It appears that the charge against respondents was previously dismissed. For this reason,
there being no motion for reconsideration filed by the complainant, said respondents ceased to be
parties. Consequently, the mere filing of motions for reconsideration by those previously
indicted, without questioning the dismissal of the charge against the said respondents, could not
and should not be made the basis for impleading them as accused in this case without violating
their right to due process. Furthermore, it appears that petitioners were deprived of due process

when the Special Prosecutor reinstated the complaint against them without their knowledge.
Due process of law requires that every litigant must be given an opportunity to be heard. He has
the right to be present and defend himself in person at every stage of the proceedings.
G.R. No. 78524 January 20, 1989
PLANTERS PRODUCTS, INC., petitioner,
vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, LABOR ARBITER VIRGINIA G.
SON, RENATO ABEJAR, ERNESTO ABELLA, DOMINADOR ABITONG, PEDRO
ALBAYALDE, ELIZABETH ACUZAR, GIL JUAN ADAMOS, ET AL., respondents.
G.R. No. 78739 January 20, 1989
RENATO ABEJAR, ERNESTO ABELLA, DOMINADOR ABITONG, PEDRO
ALBAYALDE, EMILIA ACUZAR, GIL JUAN ADAMOS, ARTURO ALCID, RENATO
ALDE, RAMON AMBROCIO, CESAR ANGELES, DIOMEDES ARANDEZ, BENIGNO
ATIENZA, ET AL., petitioners,
vs.
PLANTERS PRODUCTS, INC., and NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION
(NLRC), respondents.

FACTS:
This case involves about 440 retrenched employees of the respondent from its Bataan and
Makati-based operations. It was filed by the complainants as individuals, and jointly with their
respective unions, as a class suit on behalf of Bataan-based Planters Products, Inc. ('PPI'
hereafter) employees similarly situated under Section 12, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, on
January 16, 1986., The intervenors, on June 20, 1986, in their behalf and in behalf of similarly
situated Makati-based employees, moved for leave to intervene because they were similarly
situated as the complainants
The complainants and complainants-Interveners were all regular
e m p l o y e e s o f respondent PPI until their respective dates of retirement retrenchment.
The Unions of these former employees of respondent PPI have always had
collective bargaining agreements.
On October 11, 1982, the Respondent instituted a Retirement and Pension Plan (RPP' hereafter
for brevity) for all employees, which was to be effective retroactive to March 31, 1982.

On February 23, 1984, PPI to institutionalize the RPP, entered into a Trust Agreement with
Philippine Trust Co., Inc. ('PTC' for brevity), under the terms of which, PTC shall administer and
manage the fund.
On September 28, 1984 a CBA for 1984-1987 was signed between PPI and the directors and
principal officers of its unions, assisted by their lawyer, Atty. Gabriel Manansala.
In the said CBA, the provisions in the previous CBA on termination allowance
or benefit was modified and limited its scope to separation from the service of PPI by reason
solely of disability.
On September 15, 1985, without formally informing the PPI employees-beneficiaries of the RPP,
the RPP was unilaterally amended by the company.
On September 26, 1985 a circular was issued to all employees of RPI (Exh.'H/'16') announcing
that employees laid off from its Bataan operations on July 8 and August 15, 1985, were being
terminated effective as of September 30, 1985; while those laid off from its Makati office would
be terminated effective as of October 15, 1985. Between their lay-off dates and their announced
termination/retirement dates, all of the concerned employees did not render service to PPI.
PPI, issued to the individual Complainants/Complainants- Intervenors computer print-outs
reflecting the respective computations of their separation benefits for all employees terminated
during the said periods, shows that the separation pay granted to the Bataan-based and Makatibased employees who were not retireable, was only one (1) month of basic pay for each year of
service with one- half paid from the RPP and the balance from PPI operating funds. As shown by
the same Exhibits, all employees entitled to optional or forced retirement, were granted
retirement benefits based on their basic pay. These benefits ranged from 1.02 to 1.43 months of
basic pay per year of service as computed in accordance with the RPP. These computations were
used in paying the Complainants and the Complainants-Intervenors the sums indicated on the
print outs.
The questioned provision in the 1984-1987 collective Bargaining agreement limited the
application of the termination allowance only to those separated from the service due to
disability. The prior CBA from 1975 upwards granted a termination allowance upon the
employees separation of at least three " weeks to one months pay for each year of service
depending& upon the total years of service.
If the prior CBA is applied the complainants' complainants-intervenors would be entitled to
termination allowance under the CBA over and above the benefits extended under the RPP.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the NLRC and the Labor Arbiter have jurisdiction over the present suit.

HELD:
PPI contends that the public respondents have no jurisdiction over the case as there is no longer
an existing employer-employee relationship between the private parties. The relationship having
been severed, it is believed that the complainants should have sought reinstatement for the
present action to fall under said respondents' jurisdiction. The contention is without merit.
An employee need not seek reinstatement in order to file a complaint before the Labor Arbiter.
(A. Consteel Construction Co., Inc. v. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. No. 64673, Oct. 21,
1988). Money claims of workers as in the instant case, fall within the original and exclusive
jurisdiction of labor arbiters when these claims have some reasonable causal connection with the
employer-employee relationship (San Miguel Corp. v. National Labor Relations Commission,
G.R. No. 80774, May 31, 1988; Oreshoot Mining Co. v. Arellano, G.R. Nos. 75746-48, Dec. 14,
1987; Vargas v. Akai Phils., Inc., UDK-7927, Dec. 14, 1987; Samahang Manggagawa ng Liberty
Commercial Center v. Pimentel, G.R. No. 78621, Dec. 2, 1987; and Tuvera v. Dayrit, G.R. No.
50096, April 15, 1988).
It is a fact that the complainants and complainants-intervenors were all regular employees of PPI
until their respective dates of retirement/retrenchment (p. 46, Rollo- 78524). They now seek to
improve the terminal benefits granted to them on the allegation that a different computation was
used for the other employees. Their claims clearly arose from the employer-employee
relationship.
PPI next contends that this should be a purely civil suit against the duly designated corporate
trustee because it is specifically against the Retirement Fund which was separately administered
and managed by said trustee.