1)

[G.R. No. 149295. September 23, 2003]

PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK, petitioner,
vs.
GENEROSO DE JESUS, represented by his Attorney-in-Fact, CHRISTIAN DE
JESUS, respondent.
VITUG, J.:
Facts:
This is a case penned by Justice Vitug in 2003 involving recovery of
ownership and possession over a questioned property in Occidental
Mindoro. Generoso filed a complaint against Philippine National Bank
alleging that he is the owner of a 1,144 square meters parcel of land, that
he had caused a verification survey over the property, and discovered that
the northern portion of the land was being encroached by a building of PNB
to the extent of 124 sq m. PNB, on the other hand, contends that it
acquired the lot and building from Mayor Bienvenido Ignacio, but the
encroachment already exists. The remedy for such encroachment is to buy
the questioned area. But the sale between PNB and Ignacio did nit
materialize because the latter mortgaged the land to the Development
Bank of the Philippines. Trial court rendered a decision in favor of De Jesus
as the rightful owner of the questioned portion of the land and ordered PNB
to surrender possession. CA affirmed RTC's decision. PNB now contends
that it is a builder in good faith pursuant to Article 448 of NCC.

Sometime in 1972, when DUMLAO constructed his house on his lot, the
kitchen thereof had encroached on an area of thirty four (34) square
meters of DEPRA's property, After the encroachment was discovered in a
relocation survey of DEPRA's lot made on November 2,1972, his mother,
Beatriz Depra after writing a demand letter asking DUMLAO to move back
from his encroachment, filed an action for Unlawful Detainer on February
6,1973 against DUMLAO in the Municipal Court of of Dumangas, docketed
as Civil Case No 1, Said complaint was later amended to include DEPRA as
a party plain. plaintiff.
After trial, the Municipal Court found that DUMLAO was a builder in good
faith, and applying Article 448 of the Civil Code, rendered judgment on
September 29, 1973.
From the foregoing judgment, neither party appeal so that, ff it were a
valid judgment, it would have ordinarily lapsed into finality, but even then,
DEPRA did not accept payment of rentals so that DUMLAO deposited such
rentals with the Municipal Court.
On July 15,1974, DEPRA filed a Complaint for Quieting of Title against
DUMLAO before the then Court of First Instance of Iloilo, Branch IV (Trial
Court), involving the very same 34 square meters, which was the bone of
contention in the Municipal Court. DUMLAO, in his Answer, admitted the
encroachment but alleged, in the main, that the present suit is barred
by res judicata by virtue of the Decision of the Municipal Court, which had
become final and executory.

Issue: Whether or not PNB acquired is a builder in good faith.

Held: Applied to possession, a builder in good faith is one who, not being
the owner of the land, builds on that land believing himself to be its owner
and unaware of any defect in his title or mode of acquisition. Based on the
findings, PNB was quite aware and indeed advised prior to its acquisition of
the land and building from Ignacio that a part of the building sold to it
stood on the land not covered by the land conveyed to PNB. Thus, PNB is
not a builder in good faith and is not in a valid position to invoke provisions
of Article 448 of the Civil Code.

Rebutting the argument of res judicata relied upon by DUMLAO, DEPRA

claims that the Decision of the Municipal Court was null and void ab
initio because its jurisdiction is limited to the sole issue of possession,
whereas decisions affecting lease, which is an encumbrance on real
property, may only be rendered by Courts of First Instance.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the decision of the municipal trial court is valid.

2) G.R. No. L-57348 May 16, 1985

FRANCISCO DEPRA, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
AGUSTIN DUMLAO, defendant-appellant.
FACTS:
Plaintiff-appellee, Francisco Depra, is the owner of a parcel of land
registered under Transfer Certificate of Title No. T3087, known as Lot No.
685, situated in the municipality of Dumangas, Iloilo, with an area of
approximately 8,870 square meters. Agustin Dumlao, defendant-appellant,
owns an adjoining lot, designated as Lot No. 683, with an approximate area
of 231 sq. ms.

HELD:
Addressing out selves to the issue of validity of the Decision of the
Municipal Court, we hold the same to be null and void. The judgment in a
detainer case is effective in respect of possession only (Sec. 7, Rule 70,
Rules of Court). 1 The Municipal Court over-stepped its bounds when it
imposed upon the parties a situation of "forced lease", which like "forced
co-ownership" is not favored in law. Furthermore, a lease is an interest in
real property, jurisdiction over which belongs to Courts of First Instance
(now Regional Trial Courts) (Sec. 44(b), Judiciary Act of 1948; 2 Sec. 19 (2)
Batas Pambansa Blg. 129). 3 Since the Municipal Court, acted without
jurisdiction, its Decision was null and void and cannot operate as res
judicata to the subject complaint for Queting of Title. Besides, even if the

Decision were valid, the rule on res judicata would not apply due to
difference in cause of action. In the Municipal Court, the cause of action
was the deprivation of possession, while in the action to quiet title, the
cause of action was based on ownership. Furthermore, Sec. 7, Rule 70 of
the Rules of Court explicitly provides that judgment in a detainer case
"shall not bar an action between the same parties respecting title to the
land. "

3)
G.R. No. 82220 July 14, 1995
PABLITO MENESES and LORENZO MENESES, petitioners,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, EDUARDO QUISUMBING,
NORBERTO QUISUMBING, HEIRS OF EMILIO QUISUMBING (Carlos,
Manuel and Paz, all surnamed Quisumbing), HEIRS OF FERNANDO
QUISUMBING (Perla, Josefina, Napoleon, Honorato, Remedios and
Alfonso, all surnamed Quisumbing), HEIRS OF MANUEL
QUISUMBING, SR. (Petrona, Natividad, Manuel, Jr., Dolores and
Lilia, all surnamed Quisumbing) and HEIRS OF FRANCISCO
QUISUMBING (Fe, Johnny, Ma. Luisa, Norberto, Jimmy, Ma. Victoria,
Elsa and Oscar, all surnamed Quisumbing), all represented by Atty.
Galileo Brion, respondents.
FACTS:
On March 1, 1977, Darum, then the District Land Officer of Los
Baos, Laguna, issued to Pablito Meneses 2 Free Patent and 2 OCT
covering lots located in Los Baos, Laguna.
Pablito acquired said property from Bautista through a Deed of Waiver and
Transfer of Rights executed in 1975 in consideration of Bautistas love and
affection for and some monetary obligations in favor of Meneses. After
the execution of said document, Meneses took possession of the land,
introduced improvements thereon, declared the land as his own for tax
purposes and paid the corresponding realty taxes. In turn, Bautista
acquired the land from his aunt. He had been occupying the land since
1956.

In 1979, the Quisumbings filed a case before the CFI of Calamba

against Lorenzo and Pablito Meneses, Darum and Almendral for
nullification of the free patents and titles issued to Pablito Meneses. They
alleged that Lorenzo Menesis, then the Mayor of Los Baos, using his
brother Pablito as a tool and dummy, illegally occupied their private
accretion land and confederating with District Land Officer Darum and
Land Inspector Almendral, obtained free patents and OCTs to the land.
In 1984, the trial court rendered the decision finding that the lands
registered by the Meneses brothers are accretion lands to which the
Quisumbings have a valid right as owners of the riparian land to which
nature had gradually deposited the disputed lots. (The lots occupied by
Meneses, as found by the court, are to be accretion lands forming parts of
the bigger accretion land owned by the Quisumbings. )
Meanwhile, the Meneses brothers and Darum appealed the to the
CA, which affirmed in toto the lower courts decision.The defendantsappellants filed two MRs of the CA decision but it was denied, hence this
petition for review on certiorari.
ISSUE:
Whether or not
1. The lands in question were not accretion lands but lands of the
public domain
2.

HELD: WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision CA is AFFIRMED

While the lots occupied by Villamor and Lanuzo may not be the very same
lots petitioners are claiming here, the two cases refer to the same
accretion lands northwest of the original land owned by the Quisumbings.
1.

On the other hand, the Quisumbing family traces ownership of

their land as far back as 1919 when their matriarch was issued an OCT
covering a lot, with the Laguna de Bay as its northwestern boundary. The
same parcel of land was registered on 1973 under a TCT in the names of
her heirs, all surnamed Quisumbing.
The Quisumbings applied for registration and confirmation of title
over an additional area which had gradually accrued to their property by
the natural action of the waters of Laguna de Bay. The CFI of Bian
confirmed the Quisumbings title thereto.

There is conspiracy to commit fraud, deceit and bad faith attended

the issuance of the free patent and titles to Pablito Meneses

The submersion in water of a portion of the land in question is due

to the rains falling directly on or flowing into Laguna de Bay from
different sources. Since the inundation of a portion of the land is
not due to flux and reflux of tides it cannot be considered a
foreshore land. The land sought to be registered not being part of
the bed or basin of Laguna de Bay, nor a foreshore land as claimed
by the Director of Lands, it is not a public land and therefore
capable of registration as private property provided that the
applicant proves that he has a registerable title.

Additionally, the provision of the law on waters will govern in determining

the natural bed or basin of the lake. And accordingly, to Art. 84 of the Law
of Waters of August 3, 1866:
Accretions deposited gradually upon land contiguous to creeks, streams,
rivers and lakes by accessions or sediments from the waters thereof,
belong to the owners of such lands.
As pointed out by the lower court, no act of appropriation is necessary in
order to acquire ownership of the alluvial formation as the law does not
require the same.
2.
As found by the CA, petitioners conspired in the approval and
grant of the free patents heirs Quisumbing. Such fraud was confirmed by
this Court in Meneses v. People, which held the petitioners therein liable for
violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act in the issuance of the
same free patents and titles. In due course, the Sandiganbayan rendered a
decision finding the defendants guilty as charged. The judgment of
conviction was affirmed.
4)
G.R. No. 98045 June 26, 1996
DESAMPARADO VDA. DE NAZARENO and LETICIA NAZARENO
TAPIA, petitioners,
vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS, MR. & MRS. JOSE SALASALAN, MR. &
MRS. LEO RABAYA, AVELINO LABIS, HON. ROBERTO G. HILARIO,
ROLLEO I. IGNACIO, ALBERTO M. GILLERA and HON. ABELARDO G.
PALAD, JR., in their official and/or private capacities, respondents.

Facts
The subject of this controversy is a parcel of land situated in
Telegrapo, Puntod, Cagayan de Oro City. Said land was formed as a result
of sawdust dumped into the dried-up Balacanas Creek and along the banks
of the Cagayan River.
Sometime in 1979, private respondents Jose Salasalan and Leo
Rabaya leased the subject lots on which their houses stood from one
Antonio Nazareno, petitioners' predecessor-in-interest. In the latter part of
1982, private respondents allegedly stopped paying rentals. As a result,
Antonio Nazareno and petitioners filed a case for ejectment with the
Municipal Trial Court of Cagayan de Oro City. A decision was rendered
against private respondents, which decision was affirmed by the Regional
Trial Court of Misamis Oriental.
Before he died, Antonio Nazareno caused the approval by the
Bureau of Lands of the survey plan designated as Plan Csd-106-00571 with

a view to perfecting his title over the accretion area being claimed by him.
Before the approved survey plan could be released to the applicant,
however, it was protested by private respondents before the Bureau of
Lands.
Upon the denial of the late Antonio Nazareno's motion for
reconsideration, petitioners Desamparado Vda. de Nazareno and Leticia
Tapia Nazareno, filed a case before the RTC, Branch 22 for annulment of
the following: order of investigation by respondent Gillera, report and
recommendation by respondent Labis, decision by respondent Hilario,
order by respondent Ignacio affirming the decision of respondent Hilario
and order of execution by respondent Palad. The RTC dismissed the
complaint for failure to exhaust administrative remedies which resulted in
the finality of the administrative decision of the Bureau of Lands.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the RTC
dismissing the complaint.
Issue
Whether or not the subject land is public land
Ruling
Petitioners claim that the subject land is private land being an
accretion to his titled property, applying Article 457 of the Civil Code which
provides:
To the owners of lands adjoining the banks of rivers belong
the accretion which they gradually receive from the effects
of the current of the waters.
In the case of Meneses v. CA, 2 this Court held that accretion, as a
mode of acquiring property under Art. 457 of the Civil Code, requires the
concurrence of these requisites : (1) that the deposition of soil or sediment
be gradual and imperceptible; (2) that it be the result of the action of the
waters of the river (or sea); and (3) that the land where accretion takes
place is adjacent to the banks of rivers (or the sea coast). These are called
the rules on alluvion which if present in a case, give to the owners of lands
adjoining the banks of rivers or streams any accretion gradually received
from the effects of the current of waters.
For petitioners to insist on the application of these rules on alluvion
to their case, the above-mentioned requisites must be present. However,
they admit that the accretion was formed by the dumping of boulders, soil
and other filling materials on portions of the Balacanas Creek and the
Cagayan River bounding their land. 3 It cannot be claimed, therefore, that
the accumulation of such boulders, soil and other filling materials was
gradual and imperceptible, resulting from the action of the waters or the
current of the Balacanas Creek and the Cagayan River. In Hilario v. City of
Manila, 4 this Court held that the word "current" indicates the participation
of the body of water in the ebb and flow of waters due to high and low tide.
Petitioners' submission not having met the first and second requirements
of the rules on alluvion, they cannot claim the rights of a riparian owner.
In any case, this court agrees with private respondents that

petitioners are estopped from denying the public character of the subject
land. Thus, petition is dismissed.

5)
EN BANC

the latter included a considerable portion of the land owned by her

2.
The municipality of San Pedro Macati: also filed opposition to
the requested registration, alleging that the land occupied by the
municipal building and the public school had been in the possession of the
town from time immemorial, and that all the land occupied by roads,
highways, lanes, and public landing places belonged to the public domain
and should be excluded from registration in favor of the petitioner.
3.

G.R. No. L-3788 December 21, 1907

PEDRO P. ROXAS, petitioner-appellee,
vs.
JULIA TUASON, THE MUNICIPALITY OF SAN PEDRO MACATI, AND
ALEJANDRO AND CONSOLACION AGUIRRE, respondents-appellants.
TORRES, J.:
FACTS:
Pedro P. Roxas, applied for the registration of the estate owned by
the said Roxas, known as the Hacienda de San Pedro Macati, in accordance
with the provisions of the Land Registration Act; said hacienda was
acquired by the petitioner by inheritance under the will of his late father,
Jose Bonifacio Roxas, y Ubaldo. The property consists of four different
parcels of land, irregular shape, designated on the accompanying plan
under the letters "A", "B", "C", and "D", containing a total area of 1,761
hectares 51 ares and 5 centares, equivalent to 17,615,105 square meters,
and according to the last assessment for the purpose of taxation assessed
at P415,221.34, of which P59,904 corresponded to the portion of said
hacienda included within the limits of the city of Manila and P256,769
corresponded to that portion situated in the Province of Rozal. The building
constructed of strong materials, called the "Casa-Quinta" or "Casa de
Ingenieros," belonging also to said Roxas, is erected within parcel "C,"
occupying, together with its appurtenances, an area of 8,430 square
meters, and was assessed at P98,557.34. It does not appear that said
hacienda is mortgaged nor that any person has any right to or any interest
therein; and it is almost wholly occupied at the present time, under lease,
by about 429 tenants whose names, residences, and postal addresses, as
well as the residence of the owner of the property and of his attorney in
fact, are stated in the application.
the petitioner requested the summoning of the persons therein
named, and stated in addition that the total area of the hacienda is
17,613,595.91 square meters, as specified in the corrections made to the
technical description.
OPPOSITIONS FILED BY OCCUPANTS OF ADJOINING LOTS:
1.
Julia Tuason, appeared and by a document set forth her
opposition to the registration and authentication of the title of the
petitioner, Roxas, as regards the parcel marked "C," for the reason that two
old monuments which had separated their respective properties had been
pulled down and new ones erected without her consent, and in her opinion

3.

Alejandro Aguirre and Consolacion Aguirre also filed opposition to

said application for registration alleging that the two parcels of land
owned by them had been improperly included within the bounds of
said hacienda in the parcel marked "C," the second said parcels, which
is the only subject of the respective bill of exceptions and appeal
interposed by them,

Lower court decision: overruled the opposition made by Julia Tuason, by

the municipality of San Pedro Macati, and by Alejandro and Consolacion
Aguirre as to the second parcel, and ordered the registration of the
Hacienda of San Pedro Macati in favor of Pedro Roxas,

ISSUE:
1. As to Julia Tuason: question of the boundary line, between their
respective contiguous premises.
2.

Should all the land occupied by roads, highways, lanes, and public
landing places belong to the public domain and should be excluded
from registration in favor of the petitioner?

3.

Were the two parcels of land owned by them improperly included

within the bounds of said hacienda ?

HELD: the judgment appealed from should be affirmed as regards

the respondents who have appealed, Julia Tuason and the
municipality of San Pedro Macati; the appeal of Alejandro and
Consolacion Aguirre is hereby declared to be abandoned
1.

the present natural limit of both properties is the aforesaid creek

Article 366 of the Civil Code in dealing with the right of accession
to real property reads: lawphil.net
The accretions which banks of rivers may gradually receive
from the effects of the currents belong to the owners of the
estates bordering thereon.
The provision in this article is perfectly applicable to the strip of
land, which, on account of the accretion, has come to be undeniable
increase in the land of the hacienda inasmuch as it has increased all along
the bank of the creek, the gradual effect of the currents; and even though
the law does not require an express act of possession of the accretion

which has enlarged the estate, it is certain that the owner of the hacienda
has possessed it for more than thirty years through his tenants, who have
been cultivating their respective parcels of land together with the
corresponding portion of the said strip down to the bank of said creek.

mother, Patricia Angui, who inherited it from her parents Isidro Angui and
Ana Lopez. Sometime in 1930, they decided to have their land surveyed for
purposes of registration. The Land was surveyed and it was found out that
the northeastern boundary was the Cagayan River as stated in the title.

the question of the situation of the old monuments and the placing
of new ones in the intervening space is of no importance, inasmuch as it
has already been shown that the respondent has no title to the accretion
which by spontaneous increase formed the strip of land between the creek
and the monuments, and no proof is offered in the record that the land of
Julia Tuason reached the other side of the creek toward the Hacienda of
San Pedro Macati.

In 1958, a gradual accretion took place due to the action of the current of
the river, and an alluvial deposit of almost 20,000 sq.m. was added to the
registered area. The Grandes filed an action for a quieting of title against
the Calalungs on January 25, 1958 in the Court of First Instance alleging
that they and their predecessors-in-interest were formerly in continuous
possession of the land which was formed through accretion until
September 1948 when the respondents, Domingo and Esteban Calalung
under a claim of ownership. They then prayed to the CFI to rue in their
favour and to ask for damages as to the value of the fruits, attorneys fees
and the costs of the suit. In their answer, the respondents claim that they
have been in continuous, open, and undisturbed possession of the land
even before 1933.

2. the municipality of San Pedro Macati has only the usufruct of

the plot occupied by the municipal building as long as the same or
any other building of a public and official nature is erected
thereon; the municipality can not dispose of it as a property of its
own because, according to the documents offered in evidence by
the petitioner, the Spanish Government had recognized the
dominion of the petitioner's predecessor over the land occupied
by said municipal building and by the town cemetery, and the
grant made by the owner was ever understood to be only of the
usufruct thereof so long as used for public purposes, the same
being returnable to him upon ceasing to be used for such purpose.
In connection with the land occupied by the public school of said town, no
opposition based on ordinary or on extraordinary prescription may be
made by the municipality because the plot was granted only for the
purpose of erecting thereon a public school, and the possession thereof, on
the part of the municipality, was simply usufructuary, the government of
the Province of Manila having recognized the title thereto which pertained
to the petitioner, owner of the said hacienda, whereof the said plot forms a
part; moreover, the possession thereof by the municipality has been but
for a few years only. The school building having been destroyed, the land
was abandoned many years ago, and for this reason prescription can not
be invoked because the possession thereof was interrupted and ceased
many years since;
3. Appeal considered abandoned

6)
Grande, et.al. v. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. L-17652
June 30, 1962
Facts:
Petitioners, Ignacio, Eulogia, Alfonso, Eulalia, and Sofia Grande are the
owners of a parcel of land in barrio Ragan, Magsaysay (Tumaini), Isabela
with an area of 3.5032 hectares of land. The land was inherited from their

The CFI ruled in favour of the Grandes and ordered the Calalungs to vacate
the property, deliver the possessions, and to pay the damages amounting
to P250.00 as damages and costs.
The case was then brought to the CA for appeal. The CA reversed the
decision of the CFI and ruled in favour of the Calalungs.
Issue:
Whether the respondents have acquired the alluvial property in question
through prescription.
Held:
One reason is under Art. 457, it dictates that, alluvium deposits on land
belong to the owners of the adjacent land. However, this does not ipso jure
become theirs merely believing that said land have become
imprescriptible. The land of the Grandes only specifies a specific portion, of
which the alluvial deposits are not included, and are thus, subject to
acquisition by prescription. Since the Calalungs proved that they have
been in possession of the land since 1934 via two credible witnesses, as
opposed to the Grandes single witness who claims that the Calalungs only
entered the land in 1948, the Calalungs have been held to have acquired
the land created by the alluvial deposits by prescription.
Further, the possession of the Calalungs to the questioned portion of land
took place in 1934, when the law to be followed was Act 190, and not the
New Civil Code, which only took effect in 1950.
Hence, the Court affirmed the decision of the CA that the respondents
acquired alluvial lot in question by acquisitive prescription is in accordance
with law.

7)

G.R. Nos. L-66075-76 July 5, 1990

EULOGIO AGUSTIN, HEIRS OF BALDOMERO LANGCAY, ARTURO
BALISI & JUAN LANGCAY, petitioners,
vs.
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, MARIA MELAD, TIMOTEO
MELAD, PABLO BINAYUG & GERONIMA UBINA, respondents.
Antonio N. Laggui for petitioners.
Pedro R. Perez, Jr. for private respondents.

Whether or not the private respondents lost their ownership of the

accretions following the sudden change of course of the river
Resolution:
The Court affirmed in toto the decision of the IAC, now Court of
Appeals. The Court reiterated the finding of the Court of Appeals that there
had been accretions to the lots of the private respondents who did not lose
the ownership of such accretions even after they were separated from the
principal lots by the sudden change of course of the river, is a finding of
fact which is conclusive on this Court. That finding is supported by Art. 457
of the New Civil Code which provides:
Art. 457. To the owners of lands adjoining the banks of
rivers belong the accretion which they gradually receive
from the effects of the current of the waters. (366)

GRIO-AQUINO, J.:
Facts:
The Cagayan River separates the towns of Solana on the west and
Tuguegarao on the east in the province of Cagayan. According to the
unrebutted testimony of Romeo Rigor, Geodetic Engineer of the Bureau of
Lands, in 1919 the lands east of the river were covered by the Tuguegarao
Cadastre.

Accretion benefits a riparian owner when the following requisites are

present: (1) that the deposit be gradual and imperceptible; (2) that it
resulted from the effects of the current of the water; and (3) that the land
where accretion takes place is adjacent to the bank of a river (Republic vs.
CA, 132 SCRA 514).

As the years went by, the Cagayan River moved gradually

eastward, depositing silt on the western bank. The shifting of the river and
the siltation continued until 1968. In 1950, all lands west of the river were
included in the Solana Cadastre. Among these occupying lands covered by
the Solana Cadastre were plaintiffs-private respondents, namely, Pablo
Binayug, who has been in possession of several Lots. An area of eight (8)
hectares was planted to tobacco and corn while 12 hectares were
overgrown with talahib, along with Maria Melad, substituted by Macario
Melad as the processor-in-interest.

The appellate court confirmed that the accretion on the western

bank of the Cagayan River had been going on from 1919 up to 1968 or for
a period of 49 years. It was gradual and imperceptible. These accretions
belong to riparian owners upon whose lands the alluvial deposits were
made (Roxas vs. Tuason, 9 Phil. 408; Director of Lands vs. Rizal, 87 Phil.
806). The reason for this principle is because, if lands bordering on streams
are exposed to floods and other damage due to the destructive force of the
waters, and if by virtue of law they are subject to encumbrances and
various kinds of easements, it is only just that such risks or dangers as
may prejudice the owners thereof should in some way be compensated by
the right of accretion (Cortes vs. City of Manila, 10 Phil. 567)

Through the years, the Cagayan River eroded lands of the

Tuguegarao Cadastre on its eastern bank among which was defendantpetitioner Eulogio Agustin's Lot depositing the alluvium as accretion on the
land possessed by Pablo Binayug on the western bank. However, in 1968,
after a big flood, the Cagayan River changed its course, returned to its
1919 bed, and, in the process, cut across the lands of Maria Melad,
Timoteo Melad, and the spouses Pablo Binayug and Geronima Ubina whose
lands were transferred on the eastern, or Tuguegarao, side of the river. To
cultivate those lots they had to cross the river.
In April, 1969, while the private respondents and their tenants were
planting corn on their lots located on the eastern side of the Cagayan
River, the petitioners, accompanied by the mayor and some policemen of
Tuguegarao, claimed the same lands as their own and drove away the
private respondents from the premises. Private respondents filed separate
complaints for the recovery of their lots in the trial court.
The Trial Court rendered a decision in favor of herein respondents.
Upon appeal, The IAC rendered a decision affirming in toto the judgment of
the trial court.
Issue:

The private respondents' ownership of the accretion to their lands

was not lost upon the sudden and abrupt change of the course of the
Cagayan River in 1968 or 1969 when it reverted to its old 1919 bed, and
separated or transferred said accretions to the other side (or eastern bank)
of the river.

8)
[ G.R. No. 144208, September 11, 2007 ]
EFREN TANDOG, FELIX TANDOG, FELIPE TANDOG, JOSEFINO
TANDOG, HELEN TANDOG, CATALINA TANDOG, ROMEO TANDOG,
DOMINGO TANDOG, CATALINA SANTOS, MARIA BAUTISTA
CATANYAG, ARTEMIO CATANYAG, ANGELES CATANYAG, APOLONIA
CATANYAG, ADORACION CATANYAG, ARCELY CATANYAG, AND
AMPARO CATANYAG, ALL REPRESENTED BY EFREN TANDOG,
PETITIONERS,

VS.
RENATO MACAPAGAL, SPOUSES ALFONSO AND MARINA CALDERON,
AND THE LANDS MANAGEMENT BUREAU, RESPONDENTS.
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:
FACTS:
The subject of the controversy is a land consisting of 147,991
square meters situated at Sitio Inarawan, Barangay Inuman, San
Isidro, Antipolo City. The above-named petitioners claim that they
and their predecessors-in-interest have been in actual, open,
continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession of the land since
time immemorial. They trace their rights to Casimiro Policarpio,
unmarried, who died in 1945. He was survived by his nephews and
nieces, now deceased, except Maria Bautista Catanyag. She and
Casimiro's grand nieces and grand nephews (herein petitioners)
have continued possessing and cultivating the land. When
petitioners decided to apply for the judicial registration of the
property, they found that portions of the land have been occupied
by spouses Alfonso and Marina Calderon and Renato Macapagal,
respondents. According to petitioners, spouses Calderon used
falsified documents to justify their possession of 20,116 square
meters of the land which they sold to the government. For his
part, Renato Macapagal applied for and was granted Free Patent
No. 045802-1165 which led to the issuance to him of Original
Certificate of Title (OCT) No. P-665 over an area of 18,787 square
meters. Because of these incidents, petitioners filed with the
Regional Trial Court, Bracnh 73, Antipolo City a complaint for

quieting of title, docketed as Civil Case No. 92-2418.

HELD:
Art. 476. Whenever there is a cloud on title to real property or any
interest therein, by reason of any instrument, record, claim,
encumbrance or proceeding which is apparently valid or effective
but is in truth and in fact invalid, ineffective, voidable, or
unenforceable, and may be prejudicial to said title, an action may
be brought to remove such cloud or to quiet the title. An action
may also be brought to prevent a cloud from being cast upon title
to real property or any interest therein. As a general rule, a cloud
which may be removed by suit to quiet title is not created by mere
verbal or parol assertion of ownership of or an interest in
property. This rule is subject to qualification, where there is a
written or factual basis for the asserted right. Thus, a claim of
right based on acquisitive prescription or adverse possession has
been held to constitute a removable cloud on title. While
petitioners alleged that respondents' claim of adverse possession
is a cloud on their (petitioners') interest in the land, however, such
allegation has not been proved. The alleged falsified documents
relied upon by respondents to justify their possession were merely
marked as exhibits but were never formally offered in evidence by
petitioners. We have consistently ruled that documents which may
have been marked as exhibits during the hearing, but which were
not formally offered in evidence, cannot be considered as
evidence, nor can they be given any evidentiary value.