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SENATE COMMITTEE
G.R. No. 180643, September 4, 2008
Ponente: Leonard-de Castro, J.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------FACTS:
September 26, 2007 Romulo Neri appeared before respondent Committees and
testified for about eleven (11) hours on matters concerning the National Broadband
Project, a project awarded by the Department of Transportation and
Communications ("DOTC") to Zhong Xing Telecommunications Equipment ("ZTE").
Neri disclosed that then COMELEC Chairman Benjamin Abalos offered him P200
Million in exchange for his approval of the NBN Project. He further narrated that he
informed President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo of the bribery attempt and that she
instructed him not to accept the bribe. However, when probed further on President
Arroyo and petitioners discussions relating to the NBN Project, petitioner refused to
answer, invoking "executive privilege." To be specific, petitioner refused to answer
questions on:
a.
b.
c.
November 20, 2007 - Neri did not appear before respondent Committees upon
orders of the President invoking executive privilege.
January 30, 2008 - Respondent Committees issued an Order citing petitioner in
contempt of respondent Committees and ordering his arrest and detention at the
Office of the Senate Sergeant-at-Arms until such time that he would appear and
give his testimony.
ISSUES
1. Whether or not there is a recognized presumptive presidential
communications privilege in our legal system;
2. Whether or not there is factual or legal basis to hold that the communications
elicited by the three (3) questions are covered by executive privilege;
3. Whether or not respondent Committees have shown that the communications
elicited by the three (3) questions are critical to the exercise of their
functions; and
4. Whether or not respondent Committees committed grave abuse of discretion
in issuing the contempt order.
HELD
1.
The "doctrine of operational proximity" was laid down precisely to limit the scope of
the presidential communications privilege but, in any case, it is not conclusive. In
the case at bar, the danger of expanding the privilege "to a large swath of the
executive branch" (a fear apparently entertained by respondents) is absent because
the official involved here is a member of the Cabinet, thus, properly within the term
"advisor" of the President; in fact, her alter ego and a member of her official family.
Also, it must be stressed that the Presidents claim of executive privilege is not
merely founded on her generalized interest in confidentiality. The Letter dated
November 15, 2007 of Executive Secretary Ermita specified presidential
communications privilege in relation to diplomatic and economic relations with
another sovereign nation as the bases for the claim.
In upholding executive privilege with respect to three (3) specific questions, it did
not in any way curb the publics right to information or diminish the importance of
public accountability and transparency.
This Court did not rule that the Senate has no power to investigate the NBN Project
in aid of legislation. There is nothing in the assailed Decision that prohibits
respondent Committees from inquiring into the NBN Project. They could continue
the investigation and even call petitioner Neri to testify again. He himself has
repeatedly expressed his willingness to do so. Our Decision merely excludes from
the scope of respondents investigation the three (3) questions that elicit answers
covered by executive privilege and rules that petitioner cannot be compelled to
appear before respondents to answer the said questions. We have discussed the
reasons why these answers are covered by executive privilege. That there is a
recognized public interest in the confidentiality of such information is a recognized
principle in other democratic States. To put it simply, the right to information is not
an absolute right.
3.
NO. The three (3) questions are not critical to the Legislatures function.
In the case at bar, we are not confronted with a courts need for facts in order to
adjudge liability in a criminal case but rather with the Senates need for information
in relation to its legislative functions. This leads us to consider once again just how
critical is the subject information in the discharge of respondent Committees
functions. The burden to show this is on the respondent Committees, since they
seek to intrude into the sphere of competence of the President in order to gather
information which, according to said respondents, would "aid" them in crafting
legislation.
Anent the function to curb graft and corruption, it must be stressed that respondent
Committees need for information in the exercise of this function is not as
compelling as in instances when the purpose of the inquiry is legislative in nature.
This is because curbing graft and corruption is merely an oversight function of
Congress. And if this is the primary objective of respondent Committees in asking
the three (3) questions covered by privilege, it may even contradict their claim that
their purpose is legislative in nature and not oversight. In any event, whether or not
investigating graft and corruption is a legislative or oversight function of Congress,
respondent Committees investigation cannot transgress bounds set by the
Constitution.
Congress is neither a law enforcement nor a trial agency. Moreover, it bears
stressing that no inquiry is an end in itself; it must be related to, and in furtherance
of, a legitimate task of the Congress, i.e. legislation. Investigations conducted solely
to gather incriminatory evidence and "punish" those investigated are indefensible.
There is no Congressional power to expose for the sake of exposure.
4.
YES. The Senate committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing the contempt
order.
The deliberation of the respondent Committees that led to the issuance of the
contempt order is flawed. Instead of being submitted to a full debate by all the
members of the respondent Committees, the contempt order was prepared and
thereafter presented to the other members for signing. As a result, the contempt
order which was issued on January 30, 2008 was not a faithful representation of the
proceedings that took place on said date. Records clearly show that not all of those
who signed the contempt order were present during the January 30, 2008
deliberation when the matter was taken up.