Marquez vs.

Disierto
G.R. No. 135882 June 27, 2001

FACTS: The Office of the Ombudsman requested the

Sandiganbayan to issue subpoena duces tecum against the Urban
Bank relative to the case against President Joseph Estrada.

FACTS: Respondent Ombudsman Desierto ordered petitioner

Marquez to produce several bank documents for purposes of
inspection in camera relative to various accounts maintained at
Union Bank of the Philippines, Julia Vargas Branch, where petitioner
is the branch manager.

Ms. Dela Paz, receiver of the Urban Bank, furnished the Office of the
Ombudsman certified copies of manager checks detailed in
thesubpoena duces tecum. The Sandiganbayan granted the same.

The order is based on a pending investigation at the Office of the

Ombudsman against Amado Lagdameo, et. al. for violation of R.A.
No. 3019, Sec. 3 (e) and (g) relative to the Joint Venture Agreement
between the Public Estates Authority and AMARI.
Petitioner wanted to be clarified first as to how she would comply
with the orders without her breaking any law, particularly RA. No.
1405.
ISSUE:
Whether the order of the Ombudsman to have an in camera
inspection of the questioned account is allowed as an exception to
the law on secrecy of bank deposits (R.A. No.1405).
HELD: No.
We rule that before an in camera inspection may be allowed, there
must be a pending case before a court of competent jurisdiction.
Further, the account must be clearly identified, the inspection
limited to the subject matter of the pending case before the court
of competent jurisdiction. The bank personnel and the account
holder must be notified to be present during the inspection, and
such inspection may cover only the account identified in the
pending case

JOSEPH VICTOR G. EJERCITO v. SANDIGANBAYAN

509 SCRA 190 (2006), EN BANC (Carpio Morales, J.)
The Ombudsman has the power to issue subpoena duces
tecum/ad testificandum in relation to cases pending before
it.

However, Ejercito claims that the subpoenas issued by the

Sandiganbayan are invalid and may not be enforced because the
information found therein, given their extremely detailed
character and could only have been obtained by the Special
Prosecution Panel through an illegal disclosure by the bank officials.
Ejercito thus contended that, following the fruit of the poisonous
tree doctrine, the subpoenas must be quashed. Moreover, the
extremely-detailed information obtained by the Ombudsman from
the bank officials concerned during a previous investigation of the
charges against him, such inquiry into his bank accounts would
itself be illegal.

ISSUE: Whether or not subpoena duces tecum/ad testificandum

may be issued to order the production of statement of bank
accounts even before a case for plunder is filed in court
HELD: The Supreme Court held that plunder is analogous to
bribery, and therefore, the exception to R.A. 1405 must also apply
to cases of plunder. The court also reiterated the ruling in Marquez
v. Desierto that before an in camera inspection may be allowed
there must be a pending case before a court of competent
jurisdiction. Further, the account must be clearly identified, the
inspection limited to the subject matter of pending case before the
court of competent jurisdiction.
As no plunder case against then President Estrada had yet been
filed before a court of competent jurisdiction at the time the
Ombudsman conducted an investigation, he concludes that the
information about his bank accounts were acquired illegally, hence,
it may not be lawfully used to facilitate a subsequent inquiry into
the same bank accounts. Thus, his attempt to make the
exclusionary rule applicable to the instant case fails.
The high Court, however, rejected the arguments of the petitioner
Ejercito that the bank accounts which where demanded from

certain banks even before the case was filed before the proper
court is inadmissible in evidence being fruits of poisonous tree. This
is because the Ombudsman issued the subpoenas bearing on the
bank accounts of Ejercito about four months before Marquez was
promulgated on June 27, 2001. While judicial interpretations of
statutes, such as that made in Marquez with respect to R.A. No.
6770 or the Ombudsman Act of 1989, are deemed part of the
statute as of the date it was originally passed, the rule is not
absolute. Thus, the Court referred to the teaching of Columbia
Pictures Inc., v. Court of Appeals, that: It is consequently clear that
a judicial interpretation becomes a part of the law as of the date
that law was originally passed, subject only to the qualification that
when a doctrine of this Court is overruled and a different view is
adopted, and more so when there is a reversal thereof, the new
doctrine should be applied prospectively and should not apply to
parties who relied on the old doctrine and acted in good faith.

Republic v Judge Eugenio G.R. No. 174629, February

14, 2008
MARCH 16, 2014LEAVE A COMMENT
Sec. 2 of the Bank Secrecy Act itself prescribes exceptions whereby
these bank accounts may be examined by any person, government
official, bureau or offial; namely when: (1) upon written permission
of the depositor; (2) in cases of impeachment; (3) the examination
of bank accounts is upon order of a competent court in cases of
bribery or dereliction of duty of public officials; and (4) the money
deposited or invested is the subject matter of the litigation. Section
8 of R.A. Act No. 3019, the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, has
been recognized by this Court as constituting an additional
exception to the rule of absolute confidentiality, and there have
been other similar recognitions as well.[
Facts: Under the authority granted by the Resolution, the AMLC
filed an application to inquire into or examine the deposits or
investments of Alvarez, Trinidad, Liongson and Cheng Yong before
the RTC of Makati, Branch 138, presided by Judge (now Court of
Appeals Justice) Sixto Marella, Jr. The application was docketed as
AMLC No. 05-005. The Makati RTC heard the testimony of the
Deputy Director of the AMLC, Richard David C. Funk II, and received

the documentary evidence of the AMLC.[14] Thereafter, on 4 July

2005, the Makati RTC rendered an Order (Makati RTC bank inquiry
order) granting the AMLC the authority to inquire and examine the
subject bank accounts of Alvarez, Trinidad, Liongson and Cheng
Yong, the trial court being satisfied that there existed p]robable
cause [to] believe that the deposits in various bank accounts,
details of which appear in paragraph 1 of the Application, are
related to the offense of violation of Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act now the subject of criminal prosecution before the
Sandiganbayan as attested to by the Informations, Exhibits C, D, E,
F, and G Pursuant to the Makati RTC bank inquiry order, the CIS
proceeded to inquire and examine the deposits, investments and
related web accounts of the four.[16]
Meanwhile, the Special Prosecutor of the Office of the Ombudsman,
Dennis Villa-Ignacio, wrote a letter dated 2 November 2005,
requesting the AMLC to investigate the accounts of Alvarez, PIATCO,
and several other entities involved in the nullified contract. The
letter adverted to probable cause to believe that the bank accounts
were used in the commission of unlawful activities that were
committed a in relation to the criminal cases then pending before
the Sandiganbayan. Attached to the letter was a memorandum on
why the investigation of the [accounts] is necessary in the
prosecution of the above criminal cases before the Sandiganbayan.
In response to the letter of the Special Prosecutor, the AMLC
promulgated on 9 December 2005 Resolution No. 121 Series of
2005,[19] which authorized the executive director of the AMLC to
inquire into and examine the accounts named in the letter,
including one maintained by Alvarez with DBS Bank and two other
accounts in the name of Cheng Yong with Metrobank. The
Resolution characterized the memorandum attached to the Special
Prosecutors letter as extensively justif[ying] the existence of
probable cause that the bank accounts of the persons and entities
mentioned in the letter are related to the unlawful activity of
violation of Sections 3(g) and 3(e) of Rep. Act No. 3019, as
amended.
Issue: Whether or not the bank accounts of respondents can be
examined.
Held: Any exception to the rule of absolute confidentiality must be
specifically legislated. Section 2 of the Bank Secrecy Act itself
prescribes exceptions whereby these bank accounts may be
examined by any person, government official, bureau or offial;

namely when: (1) upon written permission of the depositor; (2) in

cases of impeachment; (3) the examination of bank accounts is
upon order of a competent court in cases of bribery or dereliction of
duty of public officials; and (4) the money deposited or invested is
the subject matter of the litigation. Section 8 of R.A. Act No. 3019,
the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, has been recognized by
this Court as constituting an additional exception to the rule of
absolute confidentiality, and there have been other similar
recognitions as well.
The AMLA also provides exceptions to the Bank Secrecy Act. Under
Section 11, the AMLC may inquire into a bank account upon order
of any competent court in cases of violation of the AMLA, it having
been established that there is probable cause that the deposits or
investments are related to unlawful activities as defined in Section
3(i) of the law, or a money laundering offense under Section 4
thereof. Further, in instances where there is probable cause that the
deposits or investments are related to kidnapping for ransom,
[certain violations of the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of
2002,hijacking and other violations under R.A. No. 6235,
destructive arson and murder, then there is no need for the AMLC
to obtain a court order before it could inquire into such accounts. It
cannot be successfully argued the proceedings relating to the bank
inquiry order under Section 11 of the AMLA is a litigation
encompassed in one of the exceptions to the Bank Secrecy Act
which is when money deposited or invested is the subject matter of
the litigation. The orientation of the bank inquiry order is simply to
serve as a provisional relief or remedy. As earlier stated, the
application for such does not entail a full-blown trial. Nevertheless,
just because the AMLA establishes additional exceptions to the
Bank Secrecy Act it does not mean that the later law has dispensed
with the general principle established in the older law that all
deposits of whatever nature with banks or banking institutions in
the Philippines x x x are hereby considered as of an absolutely
confidential nature. Indeed, by force of statute, all bank deposits
are absolutely confidential, and that nature is unaltered even by
the legislated exceptions referred to above.

People vs. Chua Ho San [GR 128222, 17 June 1999]

En Banc, Davide Jr. (CJ): 13 concur, 1 on leave

Facts: In response to reports of rampant smuggling of firearms and

other contraband, Jim Lagasca Cid, as Chief of Police of the
Bacnotan Police Station, of La Union began patrolling the Bacnotan
coastline with his officers. While monitoring the coastal area of
Barangay Bulala on 29 March 1995, he intercepted a radio call at
around 12:45 p.m. from Barangay Captain Juan Almoite of
Barangay Tammocalao requesting police assistance regarding an
unfamiliar speedboat the latter had spotted, which looked different
from the boats ordinarily used by fisherfolk of the area and was
poised to dock at Tammocalao shores. Cid and 6 of his men led by
his Chief Investigator, SPO1 Reynoso Badua, proceeded forthwith to
Tammocalao beach, conferred with Almoite, and observed that the
speedboat ferried a lone male passenger. When the speedboat
landed, the male passenger alighted, and using both hands, carried
what appeared a multicolored strawbag, and walked towards the
road. By this time, Almoite, Cid and Badua, the latter two
conspicuous in their uniform and issued side-arms, became
suspicious of the man as he suddenly changed direction and broke
into a run upon seeing the approaching officers. Badua, prevented
the man from fleeing by holding on to his right arm. Although Cid
introduced themselves as police officers, the man appeared
impassive. Speaking in English, then in Tagalog, and later in
Ilocano, Cid then requested the man to open his bag, but he
seemed not to understand. Cid then resorted to "sign language,"
motioning with his hands for the man to open the bag. The man
apparently understood and acceded to the request. A search of the
bag yielded several transparent plastic packets containing
yellowish crystalline substances. As Cid wished to proceed to the
police station, he signaled the man to follow, but the latter did not
comprehend. Hence, Cid placed his arm around the shoulders of
the man and escorted the latter to the police headquarters. At the
police station, Cid then "recited and informed the man of his
constitutional rights" to remain silent, to have the assistance of a
counsel, etc. Eliciting no response from the man, Cid ordered his
men to find a resident of the area who spoke Chinese to act as an
interpreter. In the meantime, Badua opened the bag and counted
29 plastic packets containing yellowish crystalline substances. The
interpreter, Mr. Go Ping Guan, finally arrived, through whom the
man was "apprised of his constitutional rights." When the
policemen asked the man several questions, he retreated to his
obstinate reticence and merely showed his ID with the name Chua
Ho San printed thereon. Chua's bag and its contents were sent to
the PNP Crime Laboratory at Camp Diego Silang, Carlatan, San

Fernando, La Union for laboratory examination. In the meantime,

Chua was detained at the Bacnotan Police Station. Later, Police
Chief Inspector and Forensic Chemist Theresa Ann Bugayong Cid
(wife of Cid), conducted a laboratory examination of 29 plastic
packets, adn in her Chemistry Report D-025-95, she stated that her
qualitative examination established the contents of the plastic
packets, weighing 28.7 kilos, to be positive of methamphetamine
hydrochloride or shabu, a regulated drug. Chua was initially
charged with illegal possession of methamphetamine hydrochloride
before the RTC (Criminal Case 4037). However, pursuant to the
recommendation of the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of San
Fernando, La Union, the information was subsequently amended to
allege that Chua was in violation of Section 15, Article III of RA 6425
as amended by RA 7659 (illegal transport of a regulated drug). At
his arraignment on 31 July 1995, where the amended complaint
was read to him by a Fukien-speaking interpreter, Chua entered a
plea of not guilty. Trial finally ensued, with interpreters assigned to
Chua (upon the RTC's direct request to the Taipei Economic and
Cultural Office in the Philippines, after its failure to acquire one from
the Department of Foreign Affairs). Chua provided a completely
different story, claiming that the bags belong to his employer Cho
Chu Rong, who he accompanied in the speedboat; that they
decided to dock when they were low on fuel and telephone battery;
that the police, with nary any spoken word but only gestures and
hand movements, escorted him to the precinct where he was
handcuffed and tied to a chair; that the police, led by an officer,
arrived with the motor engine of the speedboat and a bag, which
they presented to him; that the police inspected opened the bag,
weighed the contents, then proclaimed them as methamphetamine
hydrochloride. In a decision promulgated on 10 February 1997, the
RTC convicted Chua for transporting 28.7 kilos of
methamphetamine hydrochloride without legal authority to do so.
Chua prays for the reversal of the RTC decision and his acquittal
before the Supreme Court. Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 10 )
Narratives (Berne Guerrero)
Issue:
Whether persistent reports of rampant smuggling of firearm and
other contraband articles, Chua's watercraft differing in appearance
from the usual fishing boats that commonly cruise over the
Bacnotan seas, Chuas illegal entry into the Philippines, Chuas
suspicious behavior, i.e. he attempted to flee when he saw the

police authorities, and the apparent ease by which Chua can return
to and navigate his speedboat with immediate dispatch towards the
high seas, constitute "probable cause."
Held: No. Enshrined in the Constitution is the inviolable right to
privacy of home and person. It explicitly ordains that people have
the right to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects
against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature
and for any purpose. Inseparable, and not merely corollary or
incidental to said right and equally hallowed in and by the
Constitution, is the exclusionary principle which decrees that any
evidence obtained in violation of said right is inadmissible for any
purpose in any proceeding. The Constitutional proscription against
unreasonable searches and seizures does not, of course, forestall
reasonable searches and seizure. This interdiction against
warrantless searches and seizures, however, is not absolute and
such warrantless searches and seizures have long been deemed
permissible by jurisprudence. The Rules of Court recognize
permissible warrantless arrests, to wit: (1) arrests in flagrante
delicto, (2) arrests effected in hot pursuit, and (3) arrests of
escaped prisoners. The prosecution and the defense painted
extremely divergent versions of the incident, but the Court is
certain that Chua was arrested and his bag searched without the
benefit of a warrant. There are no facts on record reasonably
suggestive or demonstrative of Chuas participation in an ongoing
criminal enterprise that could have spurred police officers from
conducting the obtrusive search. The RTC never took the pains of
pointing to such facts, but predicated mainly its decision on the
finding that "accused was caught red-handed carrying the bagful of
shabu when apprehended." In short, there is no probable cause.
Persistent reports of rampant smuggling of firearm and other
contraband articles, Chua's watercraft differing in appearance from
the usual fishing boats that commonly cruise over the Bacnotan
seas, Chuas illegal entry into the Philippines, Chuas suspicious
behavior, i.e. he attempted to flee when he saw the police
authorities, and the apparent ease by which Chua can return to and
navigate his speedboat with immediate dispatch towards the high
seas, do not constitute "probable cause." None of the telltale clues,
e.g., bag or package emanating the pungent odor of marijuana or
other prohibited drug, 20 confidential report and/or positive
identification by informers of courier(s) of prohibited drug and/or
the time and place where they will transport/deliver the same,
suspicious demeanor or behavior and suspicious bulge in the waist

 accepted by the Court as sufficient to justify a warrantless arrest

exists in the case. There was no classified information that a
foreigner would disembark at Tammocalao beach bearing
prohibited drug on the date in question. Chua was not identified as
a drug courier by a police informer or agent. The fact that the
vessel that ferried him to shore bore no resemblance to the fishing
boats of the area did not automatically mark him as in the process
of perpetrating an offense. The search cannot therefore be
denominated as incidental to an arrest. To reiterate, the search was
not incidental to an arrest. There was no warrant of arrest and the
warrantless arrest did not fall under the exemptions allowed by the
Rules of Court as already shown. From all indications, the search
was nothing but a fishing expedition. Casting aside the regulated
substance as evidence, the same being the fruit of a poisonous
tree, the remaining evidence on record are insufficient, feeble and
ineffectual to sustain Chuas conviction.

CASE DIGEST ON PADILLA v. COURT OF APPEALS [269 SCRA

402 (1997)]
Nature: Petition for review on certiorari of a decision of the
CA.
Facts: Padilla figured in a hit and run accident in Oct 26, 1992. He
was later on apprehended with the help pf a civilian witness. Upon
arrest following high powered firearms were found in his
possession:
1.

.357 caliber revolver with 6 live ammunition

2.

M-16 Baby Armalite magazine with ammo

3.

.380 pietro beretta with 8 ammo

4.

6 live double action ammo of .38 caliber revolver

Padilla claimed papers of guns were at home. His arrest for hit and
run incident modified to include grounds of Illegal Possession of
firearms. He had no papers. On Dec. 3, 1994, Padilla was found
guilty of Illegal Possession of Firearms under PD 1866 by the RTC of
Angeles City. He was convicted and sentenced to an indeterminate
penalty from 17 years. 4 months, 1 day of reclusion temporal as
minimum to 21 years of reclusion perpetua as maximum. The Court
of Appeals confirmed decision and cancelled bailbond. RTC of

Angeles City was directed to issue order of arrest. Motion for

reconsideration was denied by Court of Appeals. Padilla filed lots of
other petitions and all of a sudden, the Solicitor General made a
complete turnaround and filed Manifestation in Lieu of Comment
praying for acquittal (nabayaran siguro).
Issues:
1.
WARRANTLESS ARREST: WON his was illegal and
consequently, the firearms and ammunitions taken in the
course thereof are inadmissible in evidence under the
exclusionary rule
No. Anent the first defense, petitioner questions the legality of his
arrest. There is no dispute that no warrant was issued for the arrest
of petitioner, but that per se did not make his apprehension at the
Abacan Bridge illegal. Warrantless arrests are sanctioned in Sec. 5,
Rule 113 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedurea peace
officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person
(a) when in his presence the person to be arrested has committed,
is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense.
When caught in flagrante delicto with possession of an unlicensed
firearm and ammo, petitioners warrantless arrest was proper since
he was actually committing another offence in the presence of all
those officers. There was no supervening event or a considerable
lapse of time between the hit and run and the actual apprehension.
Because arrest was legal, the pieces of evidence are admissible.
Instances when warrantless search and seizure of property is valid:
?
Seizure of evidence in plain view, elements of which are
(a) prior valid intrusion based on valid warrantless arrest in which
police are legally present in pursuit of official duties, (b) evidence
inadvertedly discovered by police who had the right to be there, (c)
evidence immediately apparent, and (d) plain view justified mere
seizure of evidence without further search (People v. Evaristo:
objects whose possession are prohibited by law inadvertedly found
in plain view are subject to seizure even without a warrant)
?

Search of moving vehicle

?
Warrantless search incidental to lawful arrest recognized
under section 12, Rule 126 of Rules of Court and by prevailing
jurisprudence where the test of incidental search (not excluded by
exclusionary rule) is that item to be searched must be within

arrestees custody or area of immediate control and search

contemporaneous with arrest.
Petitioner would nonetheless insist on the illegality of his arrest by
arguing that the policemen who actually arrested him were not at
the scene of the hit and run. The court begs to disagree. It is a
reality that curbing lawlessness gains more success when law
enforcers function in collaboration with private citizens.
Furthermore, in accordance with settled jurisprudence, any
objection, defect or irregularity attending an arrest must be made
before the accused enters his plea.
2.
LICENSE TO CARRY: WON the petitioner is
authorized, under a Mission Order and Memorandum
Receipt, to carry the subject firearms
No. In crimes involving illegal possession of firearm, two requisites
must be established, viz.: (1) the existence of the subject firearm
and, (2) the fact that the accused who owned or possessed the
firearm does not have the corresponding license or permit to
possess. The first element is beyond dispute as the subject firearms
and ammunitions were seized from petitioners possession via a
valid warrantless search, identified and offered in evidence during
trial. As to the second element, the same was convincingly proven
by the prosecution. Indeed, petitioners purported Mission Order
and Memorandum Receipt are inferior in the face of the more
formidable evidence for the prosecution as our meticulous review of
the records reveals that the Mission Order and Memorandum
Receipt were mere afterthoughts contrived and issued under
suspicious circumstances. On this score, we lift from respondent
courts incisive observation. Furthermore, the Memorandum Receipt
is also unsupported by a certification as required by the March 5,
1988 Memorandum of the Secretary of Defense. Petitioner is not in
the Plantilla of Non-Uniform personnel or in list of Civilian Agents of
Employees of the PNP, which would justify issuance of mission
order (as stated in PD 1866). Lastly, the M-16 and any short
firearms higher than 0.38 caliber cannot be licensed to a civilian.
3.
PENALTY: WON penalty for simple illegal possession
constitutes excessive and cruel punishment proscribed by
the 1987 Constitution
Anent his third defense, petitioner faults respondent court in
applying P.D. 1866 in a democratic ambience (sic) and a non-

subversive context and adds that respondent court should have

applied instead the previous laws on illegal possession of firearms
since the reason for the penalty imposed under P.D. 1866 no longer
exists. He stresses that the penalty of 17 years and 4 months to 21
years for simple illegal possession of firearm is cruel and excessive
in contravention of the Constitution.
The contentions do not merit serious consideration. The trial court
and the respondent court are bound to apply the governing law at
the time of appellants commission of the offense for it is a rule that
laws are repealed only by subsequent ones. Indeed, it is the duty of
judicial officers to respect and apply the law as it stands. And until
its repeal, respondent court can not be faulted for applying P.D.
1866 which abrogated the previous statutes adverted to by
petitioner.
Equally lacking in merit is appellants allegation that the penalty for
simple illegal possession is unconstitutional. The penalty for simple
possession of firearm, it should be stressed, ranges from reclusion
temporal maximum to reclusion perpetua contrary to appellants
erroneous averment. The severity of a penalty does not ipso facto
make the same cruel and excessive.
Moreover, every law has in its favor the presumption of
constitutionality. The burden of proving the invalidity of the statute
in question lies with the appellant which burden, we note, was not
convincingly discharged. To justify nullification of the law, there
must be a clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution, not a
doubtful and argumentative implication, as in this case. In fact, the
constitutionality of P.D. 1866 has been upheld twice by this Court.
Just recently, the Court declared that the pertinent laws on illegal
possession of firearms [are not] contrary to any provision of the
Constitution Appellants grievances on the wisdom of the
prescribed penalty should not be addressed to us. Courts are not
concerned with the wisdom, efficacy or morality of laws. That
question falls exclusively within the province of Congress which
enacts them and the Chief Executive who approves or vetoes them.
The only function of the courts, we reiterate, is to interpret and
apply the laws

Held: WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision of the CA

sustaining petitioners conviction by the lower court of the crime of

simple illegal possession of firearms & ammunitions is AFFIRMED

EXCEPT that petitioners indeterminate penalty is MODIFIED to 10
yrs & 1 day, as min. to 18 yrs, 8 months & 1 day, as maximum.

revolver was recovered. Malacat and Casan were then brought to

Police Station 3 where Yu placed an "X" mark at the bottom of the
grenade and thereafter gave it to his commander. Yu did not issue
any receipt for the grenade he allegedly recovered from Malacat.
On 30 August 1990, Malacat was charged with violating Section 3
of Presidential Decree 1866. At arraignment on 9 October 1990,

Malacat vs. Court of Appeals [GR 123595, 12 December

1997]
En Banc, Davide Jr. (J): 11 concur
Facts:

On 27 August 1990, at about 6:30 p.m., allegedly in

response to bomb threats reported seven days earlier, Rodolfo Yu of

the Western Police District, Metropolitan Police Force of the
Integrated National Police, Police Station No. 3, Quiapo, Manila, was
on foot patrol with three other police officers (all of them in
uniform) along Quezon Boulevard, Quiapo, Manila, near the Mercury
Drug store at Plaza Miranda. They chanced upon two groups of
Muslim-looking men, with each group, comprised of three to four
men, posted at opposite sides of the corner of Quezon Boulevard
near the Mercury Drug Store. These men were acting suspiciously
with "their eyes moving very fast." Yu and his companions
positioned themselves at strategic points and observed both groups
for about 30 minutes. The police officers then approached one
group of men, who then fled in different directions. As the
policemen gave chase, Yu caught up with and apprehended Sammy
Malacat y Mandar (who Yu recognized, inasmuch as allegedly the
previous Saturday, 25 August 1990, likewise at Plaza Miranda, Yu
saw Malacat and 2 others attempt to detonate a grenade). Upon
searching Malacat, Yu found a fragmentation grenade tucked inside
the latter's "front waist line." Yu's companion, police officer Rogelio
Malibiran, apprehended Abdul Casan from whom a .38 caliber

petitioner, assisted by counsel de officio, entered a plea of not

guilty. Malacat denied the charges and explained that he only
recently arrived in Manila. However, several Constitutional Law II,
2005 ( 74 ) Narratives (Berne Guerrero) other police officers mauled
him, hitting him with benches and guns. Petitioner was once again
searched, but nothing was found on him. He saw the grenade only
in court when it was presented. In its decision dated 10 February
1994 but promulgated on 15 February 1994, the trial court ruled
that the warrantless search and seizure of Malacat was akin to a
"stop and frisk," where a "warrant and seizure can be effected
without necessarily being preceded by an arrest" and "whose object
is either to maintain the status quo momentarily while the police
officer seeks to obtain more information"; and that the seizure of
the grenade from Malacat was incidental to a lawful arrest. The trial
court thus found Malacat guilty of the crime of illegal possession of
explosives under Section 3 of PD 1866, and sentenced him to suffer
the penalty of not less than 17 years, 4 months and 1 day of
Reclusion Temporal, as minimum, and not more than 30 years of
Reclusion Perpetua, as maximum. On 18 February 1994, Malacat
filed a notice of appeal indicating that he was appealing to the
Supreme Court. However, the record of the case was forwarded to
the Court of Appeals (CA-GR CR 15988). In its decision of 24
January 1996, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court. Manalili
filed a petition for review with the Supreme Court.
Issue: Whether the search made on Malacat is valid, pursuant to

the exception of stop and frisk.

Held: The general rule as regards arrests, searches and seizures is
that a warrant is needed in order to validly effect the same. The
Constitutional prohibition against unreasonable arrests, searches
and seizures refers to those effected without a validly issued
warrant, subject to certain exceptions. As regards valid warrantless
arrests, these are found in Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court.
A warrantless arrest under the circumstances contemplated under
Section 5(a) has been denominated as one "in flagrante delicto,"
while that under Section 5(b) has been described as a "hot pursuit"
arrest. Turning to valid warrantless searches, they are limited to the
following: (1) customs searches; (2) search of moving vehicles; (3)
seizure of evidence in plain view; (4) consent searches; (5) a search
incidental to a lawful arrest; and (6) a "stop and frisk." The
concepts of a "stop-and-frisk" and of a search incidental to a lawful
arrest must not be confused. These two types of warrantless
searches differ in terms of the requisite quantum of proof before
they may be validly effected and in their allowable scope. In a
search incidental to a lawful arrest, as the precedent arrest
determines the validity of the incidental search. Here, there could
have been no valid in flagrante delicto or hot pursuit arrest
preceding the search in light of the lack of personal knowledge on
the part of Yu, the arresting officer, or an overt physical act, on the
part of Malacat, indicating that a crime had just been committed,
was being committed or was going to be committed. Plainly, the
search conducted on Malacat could not have been one incidental to
a lawful arrest. On the other hand, while probable cause is not
required to conduct a "stop and frisk," it nevertheless holds that
mere suspicion or a hunch will not validate a "stop and frisk." A
genuine reason must exist, in light of the police officer's experience

and surrounding conditions, to warrant the belief that the person

detained has weapons concealed about him. Finally, a "stop-andfrisk" serves a two-fold interest: (1) the general interest of effective
crime prevention and detection, which underlies the recognition
that a police officer may, under appropriate circumstances and in
an appropriate manner, approach a person for purposes of
investigating possible criminal behavior even without probable
cause; and (2) the more pressing interest of safety and selfpreservation which permit the police officer to take steps to assure
himself that the person with whom he deals is not armed with a
deadly weapon that could unexpectedly and fatally be used against
the police officer. Here, there are at least three (3) reasons why the
"stop-and-frisk" was invalid: First, there is grave doubts as to Yu's
claim that Malacat was a member of the group which attempted to
bomb Plaza Miranda 2 days earlier. This claim is neither supported
by any police report or record nor corroborated by any other police
officer who allegedly chased that group. Second, there was nothing
in Malacat's behavior or conduct which could have reasonably
elicited even mere suspicion other than that his eyes were "moving
very fast" an observation which leaves us incredulous since Yu
and his teammates were nowhere near Malacat and it was already
6:30 p.m., thus presumably dusk. Malacat and his companions were
merely standing at the corner and were not creating any
commotion or trouble. Third, there was at all no ground, probable or
otherwise, to believe that Malacat was armed with a deadly
weapon. None was visible to Yu, for as he admitted, the alleged
grenade was "discovered" "inside the front waistline" of Malacat,
and from all indications as to the distance between Yu and Malacat,
any telltale bulge, assuming that Malacat was indeed Constitutional
Law II, 2005 ( 75 ) Narratives (Berne Guerrero) hiding a grenade,
could not have been visible to Yu. What is unequivocal then are

blatant violations of Malacat's rights solemnly guaranteed in

Sections 2 and 12(1) of Article III of the Constitution.

(h) after getting hold of the bag, Bautista alighted from the pick-up
and ran;
(i) seeing Bautista, Lara ran after him while firing his gun;

People v. Lara
G.R. No. 199877, August 13 2012
Motion to Quash
Rule 117 Section 9. (Failure to move to quash or to allege
any ground therefor)

FACTS: Sumulong, SPO1 Cruz and PO3 Calix were presented as

witnesses for the prosecution. Sumulong testified that:
(a) he was an accounting staff of San Sebastian Allied Services,
Inc.;
(b) on May 31, 2001 and at around 9:00 in the morning, he
withdrew the amount of P230,000.00 from the Metrobank-Mabini
Branch, Pasig City to defray the salaries of the
employees of San Sebastian;
(c) in going to the bank, he rode a pick-up and was accompanied by
Manacob, Atie and
Joselito Bautista;
(d) he placed the amount withdrawn in a black bag and
immediately left the bank;
(e) at around 10:30 in the morning, while they were at the
intersection of Mercedes and Market Avenues, Pasig City, Arturo
Lara suddenly appeared at the front passenger side of the pick-up
and pointed a gun at him stating, Akin na ang pera, iyong bag,
nasaan?;
(f) Bautista, who was seated at the back, shouted, Wag mong
ibigay;
(g) heeding Bautistas advice, he threw the bag in Bautistas
direction;

(j) when he had the chance to get out of the pick-up, he ran
towards Mercedes Plaza and called up the office of San Sebastian to
relay the incident;
(k) when he went back to where the pick-up was parked, he went to
the rear portion of the vehicle and saw blood on the ground;
(l) he was informed by one bystander that Bautista was shot and
the bag was taken away from him;
(m) when barangay officials and the police arrived, he and his two
other companions were brought to the police station for
investigation;
(n) on June 7, 2001, while on his way to Barangay Maybunga, Pasig
City, he saw Lara walking along Dr. Pilapil Street, Barangay San
Miguel, Pasig City;
(o) he alerted the police and Lara was thereafter arrested; and
(p) at the police station, he, Atie and Manacob identified Lara as the
one who shot and robbed them of San Sebastians money.
SPO1 Cruz testified that:
(a) he was assigned at the Follow-Up Unit of the Pasig City Police
Station;
(b) at around 7:55 in the evening of June 7, 2001, Sumulong went
to the police station and informed him that he saw Lara walking
along Dr. Pilapil Street;
(c) four police officers and Sumulong went to Dr. Pilapil Street
where they saw Lara, who Sumulong identified;
(d) they then approached Lara and invited him for questioning;
(e) at the police station, Lara was placed in a line-up where he was
positively identified by Sumulong, Manacob and Atie; and
(f) after being identified, Lara was informed of his rights and
subsequently detained.

PO3 Calix testified that:

(a) he was a member of the Criminal Investigation Unit of the Pasig
City Police Station;
(b) on May 31, 2001, he was informed of a robbery that took place
at the corner of Mercedes and Market Avenues, Pasig City;
(c) he, together with three other police officers, proceeded to the
crime scene;
(d) upon arriving thereat, one of the police officers who were able
to respond ahead of them, handed to him eleven pieces of empty
shells and six deformed slugs of a 9 mm pistol; (e) as part of his
investigation, he interviewed Sumulong, Atie, Manacob at the police
station; and
(f) before Bautista died, he was able to interview Bautista at the
hospital where the latter was brought after the incident.
In his defense, Lara testified that:
(a) he was a plumber who resided at Dr. Pilapil Street, San Miguel,
Pasig City;
(b) on May 31, 2001, he was at his house, digging a sewer trench
while his brother, Wilfredo, was constructing a comfort room;
(c) they were working from 8:00 in the morning until 3:00 in the
afternoon;
(d) on June 7, 2001 and at around 7:00 in the evening, while he was
at the house of one of his cousins, police officers arrived and asked
him if he was Arturo Lara;
(e) after confirming that he was Arturo Lara, the police officers
asked him to go with them to the Barangay Hall;
(f) he voluntarily went with them and while inside the patrol car,
one of the policemen said, You are lucky, we were able to caught
you in your house, if in another place we will kill you;
(g) he was brought to the police station and not the barangay hall
as he was earlier told where he was investigated for robbery with
homicide;

(h) when he told the police that he was at home when the subject
incident took place, the police challenged him to produce
witnesses;
(i) when his witnesses arrived at the station, one of the police
officers told them to come back the following day;
(j) while he was at the police line-up holding a name plate, a police
officer told Sumulong and Atie, Ituro nyo na yan at uuwi na tayo;
and
(k) when his witnesses arrived the following day, they were told
that he will be subjected to an inquest.
To corroborate his testimony, Lara presented one of his neighbors,
Simplicia Delos Reyes. She testified that on May 31, 2001, while
she was manning her store, she saw Lara working on a sewer
trench from 9:00 in the morning to 5:00 in the afternoon. Lara also
presented his sister, Edjosa Manalo, who testified that he was
working on a sewer line the whole day of May 31, 2001.
The RTC convicted Lara of robbery with homicide and was
sentenced to suffer the penalty of imprisonment of reclusion
perpetua. The RTC rejected Laras defense of alibi. The
prosecutions witness Sumulong positively identified Lara as the
person who carted away the payroll money of San Sebastian on
May 31, 2001 at around 10:30 oclock in the morning along the
corner of Mercedez and Market Ave., Pasig City and the one who
shot Bautista which caused his instantaneous death on the same
day.
For alibi to prosper, an accused must show he was at some other
place for such a period of time that it was impossible for him to
have been at the crime scene at the time of the commission of the
crime. Considering the proximity of the distance between the place
of the incident and the residence of the accused where he allegedly
stayed the whole day of May 31, 2001, it is not physically
impossible for him to be at the crime scene within the same
barangay.
The positive identification of the accused which were categorical
and consistent and without any showing of ill motive on the part of
the eyewitnesses, should prevail over the alibi and denial of the
accused whose testimony was not substantiated by clear and
convincing evidence.

On appeal, Lara pointed out several errors that supposedly

attended his conviction. One of which was that he was arrested
without a warrant under circumstances that do not justify a
warrantless arrest, rendering void all proceedings including those
that led to his conviction.
The CA affirmed Laras conviction. That Lara was supposedly
arrested without a warrant may not serve as a ground to invalidate
the proceedings leading to his conviction considering its belated
invocation. Further, that the accused was illegally arrested is not a
ground to set aside conviction duly arrived at and based on
evidence that sufficiently establishes culpability. Finally, the CA
found that Laras alibi failed to convince.
ISSUE: Whether or not the arrest was illegal and therefore, may be
raised for the first time on appeal for the purpose of nullifying his
conviction
HELD: No.
Any objections to the legality of the warrantless arrest should have
been raised in a motion to quash duly filed before the accused
enters his plea; otherwise, it is deemed waived.
It is a shopworn doctrine that any objection involving a warrant of
arrest or the acquisition of jurisdiction over the person of an
accused must be made before he enters his plea, otherwise the
objection is deemed waived. In voluntarily submitting himself to the
court by entering a plea, instead of filing a motion to quash the
information for lack of jurisdiction over his person, accused is
deemed to have waived his right to assail the legality of his arrest.
Applying the foregoing jurisprudential touchstone, accused is
estopped from questioning the validity of his arrest since he never
raised this issue before arraignment or moved to quash the
Information.
What is more, the illegal arrest of an accused is not sufficient cause
for setting aside a valid judgment rendered upon a sufficient
complaint after trial free from error. The warrantless arrest, even if
illegal, cannot render void all other proceedings including those
leading to the conviction of the accused, nor can the state be
deprived of its right to convict the guilty when all the facts on
record point to their culpability.

Jurisdiction over the person of the accused may be acquired

through compulsory process such as a warrant of arrest or through
his voluntary appearance, such as when he surrenders to the police
or to the court. Any objection to the arrest or acquisition of
jurisdiction over the person of the accused must be made before he
enters his plea, otherwise the objection is deemed waived. An
accused submits to the jurisdiction of the trial court upon entering a
plea and participating actively in the trial and this precludes him
invoking any irregularities that may have attended his arrest.
Furthermore, the illegal arrest of an accused is not a sufficient
ground to reverse and set aside a conviction that was arrived upon
a complaint duly filed and a trial conducted without error. As
Section 9, Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure
provides:
Sec. 9. Failure to move to quash or to allege any ground therefor.
The failure of the accused to assert any ground of a motion to
quash before he pleads to the complaint or information, either
because he did not file a motion to quash or failed to allege the
same in said motion, shall be deemed a waiver of any objections
except those based on the grounds
provided for in paragraphs (a), (b), (g) and (i) of Section 3 of this
Rule.
The CA addressed Laras claim that the prosecutions failure to
present a witness who actually saw him commit the crime charged.
Accused takes umbrage at the alleged failure of the prosecution to
present an eyewitness to prove that he shot the victim and took the
money. Such posture is unpersuasive. Contrary to his assertion,
prosecution witness Sumulong actually saw him shoot Bautista, the
victim. Sumulong vividly recounted that when Bautista alighted the
vehicle with the bag containing money, he ran around the vehicle
and towards the rear, Lara, who went at the back of the vehicle as
well, followed Bautista and fired a gun at him several times. And
that when Sumulong stepped down from the vehicle, he saw
Bautista shot. Despite the fact that he did not personally see who
fired the firearm, Sumulong presumed that it was Lara who fired the
gun because at that time, it was the accused who was holding the
gun.

Under Section 4, Rule 133, of the Rules of Court, circumstantial

evidence is sufficient for conviction if the following requisites
concur:

Under Section 4, Rule 133 of the Revised Rules on Criminal

Procedure, circumstantial evidence sufficed to convict upon the
concurrence of the following requisites:

(a) There is more than one circumstance;

(a) there is more than one circumstance;

(b) The facts from which the inferences are derived are proven;

(b) the facts from which the inferences are derived are proven;

(c) The combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a

conviction beyond reasonable doubt

(c) the combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a

conviction beyond reasonable doubt

Here, the following circumstantial evidence are tellingly sufficient to

prove that the guilt of accused is beyond reasonable doubt.

It is not only by direct evidence that an accused may be convicted

of the crime for which he is charged. Resort to circumstantial
evidence is essential since to insist on direct testimony would, in
many cases, result in setting felons free and denying proper
protection to the community.

(a) While the vehicle was at the intersection of Mercedes and

Market Avenues, Pasig City, accused suddenly emerged and
pointed a gun at prosecution witness Sumulong, demanding from
him to produce the bag containing the money
(b) Prosecution witness Sumulong threw the bag to the victim who
was then seated at the backseat of the vehicle
(c) The victim alighted from vehicle carrying the bag
(d) Appellant chased and fired several shots at the victim
(e) The victim sustained several gunshot wounds
(f) The police officers recovered from the scene of the crime six
deformed empty shells
It is apparent from the assailed decision of the CA that the finding
of guilt against Lara is based on circumstantial evidence. The CA
allegedly erred in this wise considering that only direct and not
circumstantial evidence can overcome the presumption of
innocence.
However, well-settled is the rule that direct evidence of the
commission of the crime is not the only matrix wherefrom a trial
court may draw its conclusion and finding of guilt. Even in the
absence of direct evidence, conviction can be had if the established
circumstances constitute an unbroken chain, consistent with each
other and to the hypothesis that the accused is guilty, to the
exclusion of all other hypothesis that he is not.

As the CA correctly ruled, the following circumstances established

by the evidence for the prosecution strongly indicate Laras guilt:
(a) while the vehicle Sumulong, Atie, Manacob and Bautista were
riding was at the intersection of Mercedes and Market Avenues, he
appeared at the front passenger side thereof armed with a gun;
(b) while pointing the gun at Sumulong who was at the front
passenger seat, Lara demanded that Sumulong give him the bag
containing the money;
(c) instead of giving the bag to Lara, Sumulong gave it to Bautista
who was seated at the back of the pick-up;
(d) when Bautista got hold of the bag, he alighted and ran towards
the back of the pick-up; (e) Lara ran after Bautista and while doing
so, fired his gun at Bautistas direction;
(f) Bautista sustained several gunshot wounds;
(g) Bautistas blood was on the crime scene and empty shells were
recovered therefrom
Indeed, in cases of robbery with homicide, the taking of personal
property with intent to gain must itself be established beyond
reasonable doubt. Conclusive evidence proving the physical act of
asportation by the accused must be presented by the prosecution.
It must be shown that the original criminal design of the culprit was
robbery and the homicide was perpetrated with a view to the
consummation of the robbery by reason or on the occasion of the

robbery.The mere presence of the accused at the crime scene is not

enough to implicate him. It is essential to prove the intent to rob
and the use of violence was necessary to realize such intent.
In this case, Laras intent to gain is proven by Sumulongs positive
narration that it was Lara who pointed the gun at him and
demanded that the bag containing the money be turned over to
him. That Lara resorted to violence in order to actualize his intent
to gain is proven by Sumulongs testimony that he saw Lara fire the
gun at the direction of Bautista, who was
running away from the pick-up in order to prevent Lara from taking
possession of the money.
Notably, the incident took place in broad daylight and in the middle
of a street. Thus, where considerations of visibility are favorable
and the witness does not appear to be biased against the accused,
his or her assertions as to the identity of the malefactor should be
normally accepted.
Lara did not allege, much less, convincingly demonstrate that
Sumulong was impelled by improper or malicious motives to impute
upon him, however perjurious, such a serious charge. Thus, his
testimony, which the trial court found to be forthright and credible,
is worthy of full faith and credit and should not be disturbed. If an
accused had nothing to do with the crime, it is against the natural
order of events and of human nature and against the presumption
of good faith that a prosecution witness would falsely testify against
the former.
Deeply embedded in our jurisprudence is the rule that positive
identification of the accused, where categorical and consistent,
without any showing of ill motive on the part of the eyewitness
testifying, should prevail over the alibi and denial of appellants,
whose testimonies are not substantiated by clear and convincing
evidence.
All the more, to establish alibi the accused must prove (a) that he
was present at another place at the time of the perpetration of the
crime, and (b) that it was physically impossible for him to be at the
scene of the crime. Physical impossibility refers to the distance
between the place where the accused was when the crime
transpired and the place where it was committed, as well as the
facility of access between the two places.

Appellant miserably failed to prove the physical impossibility of his

presence at the locus criminis at the time of the perpetration of the
felonious act. He himself admitted that his house was just a stones
throw (about three minutes away) from the crime scene.
In view of Sumulongs positive identification of Lara, the CA was
correct in denying Laras alibi outright. It is well-settled that
positive identification prevails over alibi, which is inherently a weak
defense. Such is the rule, for as a defense, alibi is easy to concoct,
and difficult to disapprove.
Moreover, in order for the defense of alibi to prosper, it is not
enough to prove that the accused was somewhere else when the
offense was committed, but it must likewise be demonstrated that
he was so far away that it was not possible for him to have been
physically present at the place of the crime or its immediate vicinity
at the time of its commission. Due to its doubtful nature, alibi must
be supported by clear and convincing proof. In this case, the
proximity of Laras house at the scene of the crime wholly negates
his alibi. Assuming as true Laras claim and that of his witnesses
that he was digging a sewer trench on the day of the incident, it is
possible that his witnesses may not have noticed him leaving and
returning given that the distance between his house and the place
where the subject incident took place can be negotiated, even by
walking, in just a matter of minutes. Simply put, Lara and his
witnesses failed to prove that it is wellnigh impossible for him to be
at the scene of the crime.
The Decision of the CA was AFFIRMED.
RATIO: Rule 117 Section 9. Failure to move to quash or to allege
any ground therefor. The failure of the accused to assert any
ground of a motion to quash before he pleads to the complaint or
information, either because he did not file a motion to quash or
failed to allege the same in said motion, shall be deemed a waiver
of any objections except those based on the grounds provided for in
paragraphs (a), (b), (g) and (i) of Section 3 of this Rule.

Caballes vs. Court of Appeals [GR 136292, 15 January 2002]

First Division, Puno (J): 4 concur Constitutional Law II, 2005
( 41 ) Narratives (Berne Guerrero)

Facts: About 9:15 p.m. of 28 June 1989, Sgt. Victorino Noceja and
Pat. Alex de Castro, while on a routine patrol in Barangay
Sampalucan, Pagsanjan, Laguna, spotted a passenger jeep
unusually covered with "kakawati" leaves. Suspecting that the jeep
was loaded with smuggled goods, the two police officers flagged
down the vehicle. The jeep was driven by Rudy Caballes y Taio.
When asked what was loaded on the jeep, he did not answer, but
he appeared pale and nervous. With Caballes' consent, the police
officers checked the cargo and they discovered bundles of 3.08 mm
aluminum/galvanized conductor wires exclusively owned by
National Power Corporation (NAOCOR). The conductor wires
weighed 700 kilos and valued at P55,244.45. Noceja asked Caballes
where the wires came from and Caballes answered that they came
from Cavinti, a town approximately 8 kilometers away from
Sampalucan. Thereafter, Caballes and the vehicle with the
highvoltage wires were brought to the Pagsanjan Police Station.
Danilo Cabale took pictures of Caballes and the jeep loaded with
the wires which were turned over to the Police Station Commander
of Pagsanjan, Laguna. Caballes was incarcerated for 7 days in the
Municipal jail. Caballes was charged with the crime of theft in an
information dated 16 October 1989. During the arraignment,
Caballes pleaded not guilty and hence, trial on the merits ensued.
On 27 April 1993, Regional Trial Court of Santa Cruz, Laguna
rendered judgment, finding Caballes, guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of theft. In a resolution dated 9 November 1998,
the trial court denied Caballes' motion for reconsideration. The
Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court decision on 15 September
1998. Caballes appealed the decision by certiorari.
Issue: Whether Caballes passive submission to the statement of
Sgt. Noceja that the latter "will look at the contents of his vehicle
and he answered in the positive" be considered as waiver on
Caballes part on warrantless search and seizure.
Held: Enshrined in our Constitution is the inviolable right of the
people to be secure in their persons and properties against
unreasonable searches and seizures, as defined under Section 2,
Article III thereof. The exclusionary rule under Section 3(2), Article
III of the Constitution bars the admission of evidence obtained in
violation of such right. The constitutional proscription against
warrantless searches and seizures is not absolute but admits of
certain exceptions, namely: (1) warrantless search incidental to a
lawful arrest recognized under Section 12, Rule 126 of the Rules of

Court and by prevailing jurisprudence; (2) seizure of evidence in

plain view; (3) search of moving vehicles; (4) consented warrantless
search; (5) customs search; (6) stop and frisk situations (Terry
search); and (7) exigent and emergency circumstances. In cases
where warrant is necessary, the steps prescribed by the
Constitution and reiterated in the Rules of Court must be complied
with. In the exceptional events where warrant is not necessary to
effect a valid search or seizure, or when the latter cannot be
performed except without a warrant, what constitutes a reasonable
or unreasonable search or seizure is purely a judicial question,
determinable from the uniqueness of the circumstances involved,
including the purpose of the search or seizure, the presence or
absence of probable cause, the manner in which the search and
seizure was made, the place or thing searched and the character of
the articles procured. It is not controverted that the search and
seizure conducted by the police officers was not authorized by a
search warrant. The mere mobility of these vehicles, however, does
not give the police officers unlimited discretion to conduct
indiscriminate searches without warrants if made within the interior
of the territory and in the absence of probable cause. Herein, the
police officers did not merely conduct a visual search or visual
inspection of Caballes' vehicle. They had to reach inside the
vehicle, lift the kakawati leaves and look inside the sacks before
they were able to see the cable wires. It thus cannot be considered
a simple routine check. Also, Caballes' vehicle was flagged down
because the police officers who were on routine patrol became
suspicious when they saw that the back of the vehicle was covered
with kakawati leaves which, according to them, was unusual and
uncommon. The fact that the vehicle looked suspicious simply
because it is not common for such to be covered with kakawati
leaves does not constitute "probable cause" as would justify the
conduct of a search without a warrant. In addition, the police
authorities do not claim to have received any confidential report or
tipped information that petitioner was carrying stolen cable wires in
his vehicle which could otherwise have sustained their suspicion.
Philippine jurisprudence is replete with cases where tipped
information has become a sufficient probable cause to effect a
warrantless search and seizure. Unfortunately, Constitutional Law II,
2005 ( 42 ) Narratives (Berne Guerrero) none exists in the present
case. Further, the evidence is lacking that Caballes intentionally
surrendered his right against unreasonable searches. The manner
by which the two police officers allegedly obtained the consent of
Caballes for them to conduct the search leaves much to be desired.

When Caballes' vehicle was flagged down, Sgt. Noceja approached

Caballes and "told him I will look at the contents of his vehicle and
he answered in the positive." By uttering those words, it cannot be
said the police officers were asking or requesting for permission
that they be allowed to search the vehicle of Caballes. For all
intents and purposes, they were informing, nay, imposing upon
Caballes that they will search his vehicle. The "consent" given
under intimidating or coercive circumstances is no consent within
the purview of the constitutional guaranty. In addition, in cases
where the Court upheld the validity of consented search, it will be
noted that the police authorities expressly asked, in no uncertain
terms, for the consent of the accused to be searched. And the
consent of the accused was established by clear and positive proof.
Neither can Caballes' passive submission be construed as an
implied acquiescence to the warrantless search. Casting aside the
cable wires as evidence, the remaining evidence on record are
insufficient to sustain Caballes' conviction. His guilt can only be
established without violating the constitutional right of the accused
against unreasonable search and seizure.

People vs. Montilla

Facts: On 19 June 1994 at about 2pm, police officers Talingting and

Clarin were informed by an asset that a drug courier would be
arriving from Baguio to Dasmarias carrying an undetermined
amount of marijuana. The next day, the informant pointed at
Montilla as the courier who was waiting in a waiting shed Brgy
Salitran, Dasmarias. Montilla was then apprehended and he was
caught in possession of a bag and a carton worth 28 kilos of
marijuana. Montilla denied the allegation and he said he came to
Cavite from Baguio for work and he does not have any effects with
him at that time except for some pocket money. He was sentenced
to death thereafter. He averred that the search and seizure
conducted was illegal for there was no warrant and that he should
have been given the opportunity to cross examine the informant.
He said that if the informant has given the cops the information

about his arrival as early as the day before his apprehension, the
cops should have ample time to secure a search warrant.
ISSUE: Whether or not the warrantless arrest conducted is legal.
HELD: The SC ruled that the warrantless arrest is legal and so was
the warrantless search. Sec 2 Art 3 of the Constitution has its
exception when it comes to warrantless searches, they are:
(1) customs searches;
(2) searches of moving vehicles,
(3) seizure of evidence in plain view;
(4) consented searches;
(5) searches incidental to a lawful arrest;
(6) stop and frisk measures have been invariably recognized as
the traditional exceptions.
In the case at bar, it should be noted that the information relayed
by informant to the cops was that there would be delivery of
marijuana at Barangay Salitran by a courier coming from Baguio in
the early morning of June 20, 1994. Even assuming that the
policemen were not pressed for time, this would be beside the point
for, under these circumstances, the information relayed was too
sketchy and not detailed enough for the obtention of the
corresponding arrest or search warrant. While there is an indication
that the informant knew the courier, the records do not reveal that
he knew him by name.
On such bare information, the police authorities could not have
properly applied for a warrant, assuming that they could readily
have access to a judge or a court that was still open by the time
they could make preparations for applying therefor, and on which
there is no evidence presented by the defense. In determining the
opportunity for obtaining warrants, not only the intervening time is
controlling but all the coincident and ambient circumstances should
be considered, especially in rural areas.
A legitimate warrantless arrest, as above contemplated, necessarily
cloaks the arresting police officer with authority to validly search
and seize from the offender
(1) dangerous weapons, and

(2) those that may be used as proof of the commission of an

offense.

People vs. Johnson [GR 138881, 18 December 2000] Second

Division,
Mendoza (J): 4 concur
Facts: Leila Reyes Johnson was, at the time of the incident, 58
years old, a widow, and a resident of Ocean Side, California, U.S.A.
She is a former Filipino citizen who was naturalized as an American
on 16 June 1968 and had since been working as a registered nurse,
taking care of geriatric patients and those with Alzheimer's disease,
in convalescent homes in the United States. On 16 June 1998, she
arrived in the Philippines to visit her son's family in Calamba,
Laguna. She was due to fly back to the United States on July 26. On
July 25, she checked in at the Philippine Village Hotel to avoid the
traffic on the way to the Ninoy Aquino International Airport (NAIA)
and checked out at 5:30 p.m. the next day, 26 June 1998. At around
7:30 p.m. of that day, Olivia Ramirez was on duty as a lady frisker
at Gate 16 of the NAIA departure area. Her duty was to frisk
departing passengers, employees, and crew and check for
weapons, bombs, prohibited drugs, contraband Constitutional Law
II, 2005 ( 67 ) Narratives (Berne Guerrero) goods, and explosives.
When she frisked Johnson, a departing passenger bound for the
United States via Continental Airlines CS-912, she felt something
hard on the latter's abdominal area. Upon inquiry, Mrs. Johnson
explained she needed to wear two panty girdles as she had just
undergone an operation as a result of an ectopic pregnancy. Not
satisfied with the explanation, Ramirez reported the matter to her
superior, SPO4 Reynaldo Embile, saying "Sir, hindi po ako
naniniwalang panty lang po iyon." She was directed to take Johnson
to the nearest women's room for inspection. Ramirez took Johnson
to the rest room, accompanied by SPO1 Rizalina Bernal. Embile
stayed outside. Inside the women's room, Johnson was asked again
by Ramirez what the hard object on her stomach was and Johnson
gave the same answer she had previously given. Ramirez then
asked her "to bring out the thing under her girdle." Johnson brought
out three plastic packs, which Ramirez then turned over to Embile,
outside the women's room. The confiscated packs contained a total
of 580.2 grams of a substance which was fount by NBI Chemist
George de Lara to be methamphetamine hydrochloride or "shabu."

Embile took Johnson and the plastic packs to the 1st Regional
Aviation and Security Office (1st RASO) at the arrival area of the
NAIA, where Johnson's passport and ticket were taken and her
luggage opened. Pictures were taken and her personal belongings
were itemized. Johnson was charged for the possession of 3 plastic
bages of methamphetamine hydrochloride, a regulated drug,
weighing a total of 580.2 grams; a violation of 16 of RA 6425
(Dangerous Drugs Act), as amended by RA 7659. On 14 May 1999,
the Regional Trial Court, Branch 110, Pasay City, found Johnson
guilty and sentenced her to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua
and to pay a fine of P500,000.00 and the costs of the suit. Johnson
appealed.
Issue: Whether the extensive search made on Johnson at the
airport violates her right against unreasonable search and seizure.
Held: The constitutional right of the accused was not violated as
she was never placed under custodial investigation but was validly
arrested without warrant pursuant to the provisions of Section 5,
Rule 113 of tie 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure which provides
that "A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant,
arrest a person: (a) when in his presence, the person to be arrested
has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit
an offense; (b) when an offense has in fact just been committed
and person to be arrested has committed it; and xxx." The
circumstances surrounding the arrest of the accused falls in either
paragraph (a) or (b) of the Rule above cited, hence the allegation
that she has been subjected to custodial investigation is far from
being accurate. The methamphetamine hydrochloride seized from
her during the routine frisk at the airport was acquired legitimately
pursuant to airport security procedures. Persons may lose the
protection of the search and seizure clause by exposure of their
persons or property to the public in a manner reflecting a lack of
subjective expectation of privacy, which expectation society is
prepared to recognize as reasonable. Such recognition is implicit in
airport security procedures. With increased concern over airplane
hijacking and terrorism has come increased security at the nation's
airports. Passengers attempting to board an aircraft routinely pass
through metal detectors; their carry-on baggage as well as checked
luggage are routinely subjected to x-ray scans. Should these
procedures suggest the presence of suspicious objects, physical
searches are conducted to determine what the objects are. There is
little question that such searches are reasonable, given their

minimal intrusiveness, the gravity of the safety interests involved,

and the reduced privacy expectations associated with airline travel.
Indeed, travelers are often notified through airport public address
systems, signs, and notices in their airline tickets that they are
subject to search and, if any prohibited materials or substances are
found, such would be subject to seizure. These announcements
place passengers on notice that ordinary constitutional protections
against warrantless searches and seizures do not apply to routine
airport procedures. The packs of methamphetamine hydrochloride
having thus been obtained through a valid warrantless search, they
are admissible in evidence against Johnson. Corollarily, her
subsequent arrest, although likewise without warrant, was justified
since it was effected upon the discovery and recovery of "shabu" in
her person in flagrante delicto

seized from her: (1) three bags of methamphetamine hydrochloride

or shabu approximately 1,100 grams; (2) one American passport
bearing Number 700389994; (3) one Continental Micronesia plane
ticket with stock control number 0414381077; and (4) two panty
girdles. He said that he informed Susan of her constitutional rights
but admitted that she did not have a counsel when she signed the
receipt. Yet he told her that she had the option to sign or not to sign
the receipt.

People of the Philippines vs. Canton

3.
Whether or not Susan was lawfully arrested without a
warrant.

FACTS:
On February 12, 1998, at about 1:30 p. m., Susan Canton
was at the Ninoy Aquino International Airport, being a departing
passenger bound for Saigon, Vietnam. When the metal detector
alarmed while Susan was passing through, Mylene Cabunoc, a
civilian employee of the National Action Committee on Hijacking
and Terrorism (NACHT) and the frisker on duty at that time, made a
pat down search on the former. Upon Frisking, Susan, Mylene felt
something bulging at her abdominal area and when the latter
inserted her hand under the skirt of Susan, She noticed that the
packages contained what felt like rice granules. Mylene then
reported the matter tom SPO4 Victorio de los Santos, her supervisor
on duty. The supervisor then instructed Mylene to call Customs
Examiner Lorna Jalac and bring Susan to a comfort room for a
thorough physical investigation. Upon further frisking, Mylene and
Lorna discovered three packages individually wrapped and sealed
in grey colored packing tape which Susan voluntarily handed to
them. Mylene turned over the packages to SPO4 De los Santos and
after laboratory examination, it yielded positive results for
methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu, a regulated drug.
SPO2 Jerome Cause, an investigator of the First Regional
Aviation Office, testified that no investigation was ever conducted
on Susan. However, Susan signed a receipt of the following articles

ISSUES:
1.
Whether or not the search conducted on Susan was
incidental to a lawful arrest.
2.
Whether or not the scope of a search pursuant to airport
security is confined only to search weapons under Terry Search
doctrine.

4.
Whether or not the constitutional right to counsel afforded an
accused under custodial investigation was violated.
5.
Whether or not Susans conviction and penalty on her are
correct.
RULING:
The Supreme Court did not agree with the trial court and
the OSG that the search and seizure conducted in this case were
incidental to a lawful arrest. In a search incidental to a lawful arrest,
the law requires that there be first a lawful arrest before a search
can be made; the process cannot be reversed. Susans arrest did
not precede the search. . It was only after the strip search upon the
discovery by the police officers of the white crystalline substances
inside the packages, which they believed to be shabu, that SUSAN
was arrested.
Under Section 9 of Republic Act No. 6235, the provision is
clear that the search, unlike in the Terry search, is not limited to
weapons. The Terry search or the stop and frisk situation refers to
a case where a police officer approaches a person who is acting
suspiciously, for purposes of investigating possibly criminal
behavior in line with the general interest of effective crime
prevention and detection. To assure himself that the person with

whom he is dealing is not armed with a weapon that could

unexpectedly and fatally be used against him, he could validly
conduct a carefully limited search of the outer clothing of such
person to discover weapons which might be used to assault him. In
this case, after the metal detector alarmed Susan, R.A. No. 6235
authorizes search for prohibited materials or substances. Thus, the
strip search in the ladies room was justified under the
circumstance.
Warrantless search and seizure were legal. Armed with
the knowledge that Susan was committing a crime, the airport
security personnel and police authorities were duty-bound to arrest
her, under paragraph (a) of Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of
Court.
As testified to by the lone witness for the defense, SPO2
Jerome Cause, no custodial investigation was conducted after
Susans arrest. She affixed her signature to the receipt of the
articles seized from her, but before she did so, she was told that
she had the option to sign or not to sign it. In any event, her
signature to the packages was not relied upon by the prosecution
to prove its case. Moreover, no statement was taken from her
during her detention and used in evidence against her. Hence, her
claim of violation of her right to counsel has no leg to stand on.
As regards the fine, courts may fix any amount within the
limits established by law. For possession of regulated drugs, the
law fixes the range of the fine from P500,000 to P10 million. In
view of the net weight of methamphetamine hydrochloride found in
the possession of Susan, the trial courts imposition of fine in the
amount of P1 million is well within the range prescribed by law.
Susan Canton was found guilty beyong reasonable doubt
of the violation of Section 16, Article III of the Dangerous Act of
1972 ( Republic Act No. 6425) as amended and sentenced her to
suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and pay a fine of One
Million Pesos (P1,000,000.00). The appellants passport, plane
tickets, and girdles are hereby ordered to be returned to her.

Bureau of Customs vs. Ogario [GR 138081, 30 March 2000]

Second Division,
Mendoza (J): 4 concur

Facts: On 9 December 1998, Felipe A. Bartolome, District Collector

of Customs of Cebu, issued a Warrant of Seizure and Detention of
25,000 bags of rice, bearing the name of "SNOWMAN, Milled in
Palawan" shipped on board the M/V "Alberto," which was then
docked at Pier 6 in Cebu City. The warrant was issued on the basis
of the report of the Economic Intelligence and Investigation Bureau
(EIIB), Region VII that the rice had been illegally imported. The
report stated that the rice was landed in Palawan by a foreign
vessel and then placed in sacks marked "SNOWMAN, Milled in
Palawan." It was then shipped to Cebu City on board the vessel M/V
"Alberto." Forfeiture proceedings were started in the customs office
in Cebu (Cebu Seizure Identification Case 17-98). On 10 December
1998, Mark Montelibano, the consignee of the sacks of rice, and his
buyer, Nelson Ogario, filed a complaint for injunction (Civil Case
CEB-23077) in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Cebu City. In
separate motions, the Bureau of Customs (BOC), Port of Cebu and
the EIIB, as well as the Philippine Navy and Coast Guard, sought the
dismissal of the complaint on the ground that the RTC had no
jurisdiction, but their motions were denied in a resolution dated 11
January 1999. BOC and EIIB moved for a reconsideration, but their
motion was denied by the RTC in its order dated 25 January 1999.
In the same order, the RTC also increased the amount of Ogario and
Montelibanos bond to P22,500,000.00. On certiorari to the Court of
Appeals, the resolution and order of the RTC were sustained on 15
April 1999. Accordingly, on 26 April 1999, upon motion of Ogario,
et. al., the RTC ordered the sheriff to place in their possession the
25,000 bags of rice. Meanwhile, in the forfeiture proceedings before
the Collector of Customs of Cebu, a decision was rendered forfeiting
the vessel M/V "Alberto"; the 25,000 bags of rice brand "Snowman";
and the two (2) trucks bearing Plates GCC 844 and GHZ 388 in
favor of the government to be disposed of in the manner prescribed
by law while releasing the 7 trucks bearing Plates GFX 557; GFX
247; TPV 726; GBY 874; GVE 989; and GDF 548 in favor of their
respective owners upon proper identification and compliance with
pertinent laws, rules and regulations. Montelibano did not take part
in the proceedings before the District Collector of Customs despite
due notice sent to his counsel because he refused to recognize the
validity of the forfeiture proceedings On 30 April 1999, Ogario and
Montelibano filed the petition for review on certiorari of the decision
of the Court of Appeals.

Issue: Whether the Regional Trial Courts are competent to pass

upon the validity or regularity of the seizure and forfeiture
proceedings conducted by the Bureau of Customs.

Held: Regional Trial Courts are devoid of any competence to pass

upon the validity or regularity of seizure and forfeiture proceedings
conducted by the Bureau of Customs and to enjoin or otherwise
interfere with these proceedings. The Collector of Customs sitting in
seizure and forfeiture proceedings has exclusive jurisdiction to hear
and determine all questions touching on the seizure and forfeiture
of dutiable goods. The Regional Trial Courts are precluded from
assuming cognizance over such matters even through petitions of
certiorari, prohibition or mandamus. Under the law, the question of
whether probable cause exists for the seizure of the subject sacks
of rice is not for the Regional Trial Court to determine. The customs
authorities do not have to prove to the satisfaction of the court that
the articles on board a vessel were imported from abroad
Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 70 ) Narratives (Berne Guerrero) or are
intended to be shipped abroad before they may exercise the power
to effect customs searches, seizures, or arrests provided by law
and continue with the administrative hearings.

People v. Musa [GR 96177, 27 January 1993] Third Division,

Romero (J): 4 concur
Facts: On 13 December 1989, the Narcotics Command (NARCOM)
in Zamboanga City conducted surveillance and test buy on a
certain Mari Musa of Suterville, Zamboanga City. Information
received from civilian informer was that this Mari Musa was
engaged in selling marijuana in said place. The Narcom agent (Sgt.
Ani) was able to buy one newspaper-wrapped dried marijuana for
P10.00, which was turned over to the Narcom office. The next day,
a buy-bust was planned with Sgt. Ani being the poseur-buyer.
NARCOM teams proceeded to the target site in 2 civilian vehicles.
Ani gave Musa the P20.00 marked money. Musa returned to his
house and gave Ani 2 newspaper wrappers containing dried
marijuana. The signal to apprehend Musa was given. The NARCOM
team rushed to the location of Ani, and a NARCOM officer (Sgt.
Belarga) frisked Musa but did not find the marked money. The
money was given to Musas wife who was able to slip away. Later,

Belarga found a plastic bag containing dried marijuana inside it

somewhere in the kitchen. Musa was placed under arrest and was
brought to the NARCOM office. One newspaper-wrapper marijuana
and the plastic bag containing more marijuana was sent to the PC
Crime Laboratory, the test of which gave positive results for the
presence of marijuana. On the other hand, Mari Musa alleged that
the NARCOM agents, dressed in civilian clothes, got inside his
house without any search warrant, neither his permission to enter
the house. The NARCOM agents searched the house and allegedly
found a red plastic bag whose contents, Mari Musa said, he did not
know. He also did not know if the plastic bag belonged to his
brother, Faisal, who was living with him, or his father, who was
living in another house about ten arms-length away. Mari Musa was
handcuffed and was taken to the NARCOM office where he was
joined by his wife. Musa claimed that he was subjected to torture
when he refused to sign the document containing details of the
investigation. The next day, he was taken to the fiscals office to
which he was allegedly made to answer to a single question: that if
he owned the marijuana. He allegedly was not able to tell the fiscal
that he had been maltreated by the NARCOM agents because he
was afraid he might be maltreated in the fiscal's office. Mari Musa
was brought to the City Jail. Still, an information against Musa was
filed on 15 December 1989. Upon his arraignment on 11 January
1990, Musa pleaded not guilty. After trial and on 31 August 1990,
the RTC Zamboanga City (Branch XII) found him guilty of selling
marijuana in violation of Article II, Section 4 of RA 6425. Musa
Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 55 ) Narratives (Berne Guerrero)
appealed to the Supreme Court.
Issue: Whether the contents of the red plastic bag found in the
kitchen may be admitted as evidence as evidence acquired
incidental to a lawful arrest.
Held: Warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest authorizes
the arresting officer to make a search upon the person of the
person arrested. An officer making an arrest may take from the
person arrested and money or property found upon his person
which was used in the commission of the crime or was the fruit of
the crime or which might furnish the prisoner with the means of
committing violence or of escaping, or which may be used as
evidence in the trial of the cause. Hence, in a buy-bust operation
conducted to entrap a drug-pusher, the law enforcement agents
may seize the marked money found on the person of the pusher

immediately after the arrest even without arrest and search

warrants. The warrantless search and seizure, as an incident to a
suspect's lawful arrest, may extend beyond the person of the one
arrested to include the premises or surroundings under his
immediate control. Objects in the "plain view" of an officer who has
the right to be in the position to have that view are subject to
seizure and may be presented as evidence. When the discovery of
the evidence did not constitute a search, but where the officer
merely saw what was placed before him in full view, the
warrantless seizure of the object was legal on the basis of the "plain
view" doctrine and upheld the admissibility of said evidence. The
"plain view" doctrine, however, may not be used to launch
unbridled searches and indiscriminate seizures nor to extend a
general exploratory search made solely to find evidence of
defendant's guilt. The "plain view" doctrine is usually applied where
a police officer is not searching for evidence against the accused,
but nonetheless inadvertently comes across an incriminating
object. What the 'plain view' cases have in common is that the
police officer in each of them had a prior justification for an
intrusion in the course of which he came inadvertently across a
piece of evidence incriminating the accused. The doctrine serves to
supplement the prior justification whether it be a warrant for
another object, hot pursuit, search incident to lawful arrest, or
some other legitimate reason for being present unconnected with a
search directed against the accused and permits the warrantless
seizure. Of course, the extension of the original justification is
legitimate only where it is immediately apparent to the police that
they have evidence before them; the 'plain view' doctrine may not
be used to extend a general exploratory search from one object to
another until something incriminating at last emerges. The "plain
view" doctrine neither justify the seizure of the object where the
incriminating nature of the object is not apparent from the "plain
view" of the object. Thus, the exclusion of the plastic bag
containing marijuana does not, however, diminish, in any way, the
damaging effect of the other pieces of evidence presented by the
prosecution to prove that the appellant sold marijuana, in violation
of Article II, Section 4 of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972. By virtue
of the testimonies of Sgt. Ani and T/Sgt. Belarga and the two
wrappings of marijuana sold by Musa to Sgt. Ani, among other
pieces of evidence, the guilt of Musa of the crime charged has been
proved beyond reasonable doubt.

Judge Felimon Abelita III vs P/Supt German Doria & SPO3

Cesar Ramirez
GR No. 170627

August 14, 2009

Facts:
Petitioner (Judge Abelita) filed a complaint for damages under Art.
32(4) and (9) of the Civil Code against Respondents (Doria and
Ramirez). Petitioner alleged that he and his wife was on their home
when the respondents accompanied by 10 unidentified police
officers,requested them to proceed to the PNP headquarters.
Petitioner alleged that he would proceed to to the PNP HQ after he
had brought his wife home. Petitoner alleged that when she parked
his car in front of their house, SPO3 Ramirez grabbed him and took
his car keys, bared into the vehicle and conducted as search
without a warrant. The search resulted to the seizure of a licensed
shotgun and a unlicensed .45 caliber pistol allegedly found inside
the vehicle.
However, the respondent has a different version of the case. Doria
alleged that they received a telephone call from a relative of Rosa
Sia about a shooting incident. He dispatched a team headed by
Ramirez to investigate the incident. Ramirez reported that a certain
William Sia is wounded while Petitioner and his wife just left the
place of the incident. Doria looked for the petitioner and when he
found him, he informed him about the incident, he requested
Petitioner to go with him in the PNP HQ but the petitioner suddenly
sped up his vehicle and proceeded to his residence, they caught up
with petitioner as he was about to run towards his house. The
police offices saw a gun in the form seat and a shotgun at the back.
They confiscated the firearms and charged Petitioner for illegal
possession of firearms and frustrated murder and an administrative
case.
Issue:
Whether or not the arrest and seizure was valid.
Whether or not the Respondents are liable for damages.
Whether the findings in the administrative case against petitioner is
conclusive in this case.

Ruling:
Yes, the seizure was valid under plain view doctrine, objects falling
in the plain view of an officer who has a right to be in the position
to have that view are subject to seizure and may be presented as
evidence. The requisites of plain view are:
the law enforcement officer in search of the evidence has a prior
justification for an intrusion or is in a position from which he can
view a particular area;

cases. While identity of causes of action is not required in the

application of res judicata in the concept of conclusiveness of
judgment, it is required that there must always be identity of
parties in the first and second cases. There is no identity of parties
since the administrative case was filed by Bejamin Sia Lao against
petitioner and Benjamin is not a party to this case.
JERRY VALEROSO VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
September 3, 2009
G.R. No. 164815

the discovery of evidence in plain view is inadvertent; and

it is immediately apparent to the police officers that the firearm
may be an evidence of a crime.
Hence, they were justified in seizing the firearms.

No, the court did not agree that petitioner was framed-up and that
the respondents were presumed to be performing their duties in
accordance with law. They should not be held liable for damages.

While the present case and the administrative case are based on
the same essential facts and circumstances, the doctrine of res
judicata will not apply. The requisites of res judicata are:
the former judgment must be final;
it must be a judgment or order on the merits, that is, it was
rendered after a consideration of the evidence or stipulation
submitted by the parties at the trial of the case;
it must have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the
subject matter and the parties;
there must be, between the first and second actions, identity of the
parties, of subject matter, and cause of action; this requisite is
satisfied f the two actions are substantially between the same
parties.
A administrative case deals with the administrative liability which
may be incurred by the respondent for the commission of the acts
complained of. This case deals with the civil liability for damages of
the police officers. There is no identity of causes of action in the

STATEMENT OF THE CASE: A petition for review on certiorari

involving the decision of the Hon. Court of Appeals which affirmed
that of the RTC of Quezon City in finding the petitioner-accused
Jerry Valeroso liable of illegal possession of firearm.
FACTS OF THE CASE: Petitioner was charged with illegal
possession of firearm and ammunition under P.D. 1866 and was
found liable as charged before the RTC of Quezon City.
On July 10, 1996, the Central District Command served a
duly issued warrant of arrest to Sr. Insp. Jerry Valeroso in a case of
kidnapping for ransom. Valeroso was found and arrested in INP
Central Station in Culiat, Quezon City where he was about to board
a tricycle. He was bodily searched and after which a firearm with
live ammunition was found tucked in his waist. The subject firearm
was later verified by the Firearms and Explosive Division at Camp
Crame and was confirmed and revealed to have not been issued to
the petitioner but to another person.
The defense on the other hand contended that Valeroso was
arrested and searched in the boarding house of his children in New
Era Quezon City. He was aroused from his slumber when four
heavily armed men in civilian clothes bolted the room. The pointed
their guns on him and pulled him out of the room as the raiding
team went back inside, searched and ransacked the room.
Moments later an operative came out of the room exclaiming that
he has found a gun inside. Adrian Yuson, an occupant to the
adjacent room testified for the defense. SPO3 Timbol, Jr. testified
that the firearm with live ammunition was issued to Jerry Valeroso
by virtue of a Memorandum Receipt.
The petitioner was found guilty as charged by the RTC. On
appeal, the appellate court affirmed the same. Hence this petition.

Petitioner raised the issue of legalilty of the search and the

admissibility and validity of the evidence obtained as the same was
the fruit of the poisonous tree.
ISSUE: Whether or not the warrantless search and seizure of the
firearm and ammunition valid.
RULING: WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the February 22,
2008 Decision and June 30, 2008 Resolution are RECONSIDERED
and SET ASIDE. Sr. Insp. Jerry Valeroso is hereby ACQUITTED of
illegal possession of firearm and ammunition.
RATIONALE/REASON: From the foregoing narration of facts, we
can readily conclude that the arresting officers served the warrant
of arrest without any resistance from Valeroso. They placed him
immediately under their control by pulling him out of the bed, and
bringing him out of the room with his hands tied. To be sure, the
cabinet which, according to Valeroso, was locked, could no longer
be considered as an "area within his immediate control" because
there was no way for him to take any weapon or to destroy any
evidence that could be used against him.
The arresting officers would have been justified in searching
the person of Valeroso, as well as the tables or drawers in front of
him, for any concealed weapon that might be used against the
former. But under the circumstances obtaining, there was no
comparable justification to search through all the desk drawers and
cabinets or the other closed or concealed areas in that room itself.
It is worthy to note that the purpose of the exception
(warrantless search as an incident to a lawful arrest) is to protect
the arresting officer from being harmed by the person arrested,
who might be armed with a concealed weapon, and to prevent the

latter from destroying evidence within reach. The exception,

therefore, should not be strained beyond what is needed to serve
its purpose. In the case before us, search was made in the locked
cabinet which cannot be said to have been within Valerosos
immediate control. Thus, the search exceeded the bounds of what
may be considered as an incident to a lawful arrest.
Nor can the warrantless search in this case be justified
under the "plain view doctrine."
The "plain view doctrine" may not be used to launch
unbridled searches and indiscriminate seizures or to extend a
general exploratory search made solely to find evidence of
defendants guilt. The doctrine is usually applied where a police
officer is not searching for evidence against the accused, but
nonetheless inadvertently comes across an incriminating object.
Indeed, the police officers were inside the boarding house of
Valerosos children, because they were supposed to serve a warrant
of arrest issued against Valeroso. In other words, the police officers
had a prior justification for the intrusion. Consequently, any
evidence that they would inadvertently discover may be used
against Valeroso. However, in this case, the police officers did not
just accidentally discover the subject firearm and ammunition; they
actually searched for evidence against Valeroso.
Clearly, the search made was illegal, a violation of
Valerosos right against unreasonable search and seizure.
Consequently, the evidence obtained in violation of said right is
inadmissible in evidence against him.