World Affairs Institute

Review: MAKING THE BOMB: Pakistan's Nuclear Journey

Author(s): Shehzad H. Qazi
Review by: Shehzad H. Qazi
Source: World Affairs, Vol. 176, No. 2 (JULY / AUGUST 2013), pp. 88-92
Published by: Sage Publications, Inc.
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/43554785
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REVIEW
ESSAY

MAKING THE BOMB

Pakistan 's Nuclear Journey

by Shehzad H. Qazi

Feroz H. Khan, Eating Grass :

would Pakistan, even if it had to "eat

The Making of the Pakistani Bomb grass, or leaves or even go hungry") is

Stanford: Stanford UP, 2012

important because it presents a com-

plete account of Pakistan's quest for

nuclear weapons, with close focus on
the role played by culture, personality,

Developed in secrecy and tested

domestic, regional, and global poliin defiance, Pakistan's nuclear weaptics, and technical challenges in the
ons program has been a point of development
pride
of the "Islamic Bomb."
The book's author is a former Pakifor Pakistanis, a worrisome portent for

Indians, a source of profit for nuclear

stan Army officer and senior official

proliferators, and a security concern

in the National Command Authority.
for US policymakers. While much
Khaniswas not only a key policymaker
Pakistan's nuclear command and
feared, little is really known in
about
Pakistan's nuclear program. Retired
control system, but played important
Brigadier General Feroz Khan's Eating
roles in negotiations with American

Grass (the title comes from a 1965

and Indian officials over the nuclear

statement by Pakistan's then Prime program, especially regarding PakiMinister Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto proclaim- stan's force posture.
ing that if India acquired the bomb, so
Shehzad H. Qazi is a research associate
at the Institute for Social Policy and
Understanding.

Drawing on primary and secondary sources, his own experiences, and

numerous interviews with decision-

makers and former scientists who were

88 WORLD AFFAIRS

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Shehzad H. Qazi
intimately involved in the program,

Laboratories to develop and claim

Khan recapitulates Pakistan's nuclear credit for the weapon.

The role of foreign countries
its leaders that shaped the trzyectory was a significant part of this nuclear
of Pakistan's strategic capabilities and journey. Once Canada stopped supits foreign relations, bureaucratic dis- plying nuclear technology, Pakistan
putes over the program, and compe- received loans and investments worth

journey. He analyzes key decisions by

tition between actors in the scientific

hundreds of millions of dollars from

Libya, along with yellowcake from

community trying to put their individual stamp on the bomb.

Niger and uranium from Chad. China

provided high enriched uranium and
a bomb design, and helped in missile
production.

Lating Grass begins in the 1960s, No history of Pakistan's march

toward nuclearization would be comduring General Ayub Khan's military dictatorship, when many Pakiplete, of course, without the sub-narstani leaders were reluctant to pursue
rative of complications caused in relations between Pakistan and the US,
nuclear weapons because they felt the

which was initially strongly opposed

country could not afford them. The
author then provides a blow-by-blow
to the nuclear program, but later
became covertly complicit in it, only
account of several major decisions
subsequently to punish Pakistan
that created a weapons program, and
then the cold tests in 1983, and finally
and ultimately grudgingly accept its
membership in the international
the testing of the bomb itself in 1998.
nuclear
club.
Inside this chronology, Khan
Khan also discusses Pakistan's
also explores the technological and
capacity challenges Pakistani scientists nuclear doctrine, the development
faced, especially as the global nonpro- of its command and control system,
liferation regime made nuclear trade and the way the notorious scientist
increasingly difficult. He details how A.Q. Khan became the government's
they developed uranium enrichment proliferator in chief, selling Pakistan's
and plutonium production capabili- nuclear innovations to the North
ties and the secret procurement net- Koreans, Iranians, and others.
The fundamental question driving
works to supply the clandestine prothis
book is why Pakistan decided to
gram. Along the way, Khan reveals the
intense rivalry that developed between acquire nuclear weapons in the first
the Pakistan Atomic Energy Commis- place. Khan attributes this decision
sion (PAEC) and the Khan Research
to "Pakistan's unique strategic culJULY/AUGUST 2013 89

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Review Essay
ture" - that is, the beliefs, values, and

historical experiences of the ruling

on board. Thus the desire to pursue

nuclear weapons predated the 1971

elite that influenced how it perceives

war or India's 1974 tests. In Khan's

and responds to the security environ-

own words, with Bhutto's rise, "the

ment. He contends that the defeat

bomb lobby was now in power."

and dismemberment of Pakistan in

the 1971 war and India's 1974 nucle-

ar tests, which altered the balance of

power, became central components of

According to weapons specialist

Pakistan's strategic culture, leading to Bhumitra Chakma, Pakistan's nuclear

the perception that nuclear weapons program has faced two key challenges: the absence of a formally declared
were a national necessity.
But between the lines of the
nuclear doctrine, including ambiguity
about the
"redline risks" that could
book is a slightly different story:
that

domestic politics rather than

prompt
national
use, and the lack of an institusecurity per se was key to the
tionalized
decisionand transparent command
control system.
to go forward with a nuclear and
program.

Pakistan's ten-point nuclear docAs Scott Sagan, a renowned scholis India-focused, and has three
ar of nuclear weapons, hastrine
argued,
major principles: minimum credcountries acquire nuclear weapons
because individuals within the nucle-

ible deterrence, nuclear first use,

and massive retaliation. While arguar energy establishment and research

laboratories (who benefit financially
ing that counterforce targeting is
and in terms of prestige), the milincreasingly becoming a principle for
both Pakistan and India, Khan also
itary, and political leaders become
reports that Pakistan is operationalchief advocates for acquisition of
izing its minimal deterrence concept
these weapons, seeing them as tools
to accomplish parochial politicalbyor
continually improving its delivery
bureaucratic goals.
means, by inducting ballistic and
missiles, and by developing a
In the case at hand, Zulfiqar cruise
Ali
Bhutto, the prime minister (1973-77)
second-strike capability.
who made the decision to go nucleWhat's missing in this book is an
ar, already belonged to a coalition
investigation into Pakistan's redline
risks beyond what is already known.
comprising PAEC scientists and some
foreign-ministry bureaucrats whoKhan
had states that the nuclear program
been strongly advocating such a capahas two objectives: deterring India
bility since at least 1965. By the time
from overwhelming Pakistan with a
he took office, the military was also
conventional attack and using nuclear
90 WORLD AFFAIRS

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Shehzad H . Qazi
weapons in the event of an Indian assessment tools, such as Personnel
invasion, the sizable destruction of its
and Human Reliability Programs, to
armed forces, or Indian-perpetrated screen personnel, and created a secupolitical destabilization and economic

rity force with an intelligence unit to

strangulation. While Khan acknowl- counter assaults, espionage, and other

edges that these criteria are "delib- threats against nuclear installations
erately imprecise," the ambiguity, he and weapons.
But while the author describes
argues, is a non-issue because with
"the unlikelihood of Pakistan's accept-

the reforms in command and control,

ing a no-first-use policy, the doctrinal

explains that Pakistan undertakes a

variety of assessments to ensure the
"secrecy, dispersal, and survivability"

puzzle of the Pakistani nuclear program is put to rest."

But the author does provide an

of its strategic weapons against foreign

insightful analysis of the most criti-

attacks, and mentions that safety mea-

cal issue: Pakistan's nuclear command

sures are in place for weapons storage

and control architecture. Since 2000

and transport, he inexplicably fails to

the National Command Authority,

address directly the threat of terrorists
composed of chief civilian and milacquiring Pakistan's nuclear weapons
itary leaders, has been responsible
and materials, perhaps the greatest
for decisionmaking on the program's
concern among US and international
policy, planning, procurement, and
policymakers today.
use. Nevertheless this oversight andThere has been a steady accumulation of books on Pakistan's nuclecontrol system was developed almost

forty-five years after the weapons proar weapons program, ranging from

gram began. The author attributesaccounts

A.
by former Pakistani military
Q. Khan's ability to erect an alternaofficers giving their views about why
tive universe of proliferation to this
Pakistan sought the bomb, to academabsence of oversight, explaining that
ic analyses exploring nuclear deterKhan's significant autonomy in secretrence and stability in South Asia, to

ly procuring nuclear technologyjournalistic

for
accounts focusing on
Pakistan and immunity from regularPakistan's covert acquisition of nucle-

ly reporting to a government body

ar technology, the Khan Network's
allowed his private and illicit operaproliferation, and America's secret
tions to go undetected.
In the aftermath of the "Khan

Network" fiasco, Pakistan revised its

export control laws, while the Strate-

compliance in exchange for assistance

during the Soviet-Afghan war and the
War on Terror.

Khan's book is a bit of all of this,

gic Plans Division (SPD) began using framed by an insider account of PakiJULY/AUGUST 2013 91

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Review Essay
stani decisionmaking that can help

tions they made, and how they view

policymakers better understand how

the world. A nuanced narrative acces-

Pakistani leaders thought through

sible to a general readership, Eating

some of the most crucial decisions of

Grass is a comprehensive study on how

and why Pakistan went nuclear.

the country's history, what assump-

92 WORLD AFFAIRS

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