[G.R. No. L-3474. September 20, 1907.

and now is the property of the plaintiffs.

RAFAEL ENRIQUEZ, ET AL., Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. FRANCISCO ENRIQUEZ, ET

AL.,Defendants-Appellants.
W. A. Kincaid, for Appellants.
Hartigan, Rohde & Gutierrez, for Appellees.
SYLLABUS
1. APPEAL; ASSIGNMENT OF ERRORS. Where upon an appeal by both the plaintiff
and the defendant it appears that the plaintiff made no assignment of errors against the
rulings or against the decision of the lower court. so much of the judgment as may be
adverse
to
the
plaintiff
can
not
be
considered
by
this
court.
2. MARRIAGE; SUFFICIENCY OF PROOF. When a marriage ceremony is duly
celebrated between two persons upon a certain date, in order to show that the same
persons are lawfully married before that time it is necessary to prove that a marriage
ceremony had theretofore been celebrated between them. The fact of having had children
prior to the celebration of the latter ceremony does not prove a former marriage.
3. COMMON-LAW MARRIAGE. What are known as common-law marriages in England
and the United States were never recognized by the Spanish law in force in these Islands.
No valid marriage could exist under the Spanish law unless some ecclesiastical or civil
functionary intervened in its celebration.
DECISION
WILLARD, J. :
The plaintiffs brought this action in the Court of First Instance of Manila on the 2d day of
June, 1902, asking that a deed made by Antonio Enriquez on the 27th of March, 1883,
conveying to the defendant Carmen de la Cavada certain real estate in the city of Manila, be
annulled and set aside. Judgment was rendered in the court below to the effect that the
plaintiffs were the owners of an undivided half of the said real estate, and that the defendant
Carmen de la Cavada should pay to the plaintiffs upward of 1,300 pesos, as rents and
profits thereof. Both parties moved for a new trial on the ground of the insufficiency of the
evidence, by the plaintiffs in this court have neither assigned as errors the rulings made
against them, by the lower court nor have they discussed any such rulings in their brief. So
much of the decision, therefore, as is adverse to the plaintiffs we can not consider, and the
questions to be resolved are those presented by the appeal of the defendants.
The decision of the court below was based upon the following facts, deemed to be
established by the evidence, namely, that Antonio Enriquez and Doa Ciriaca Villanueva
were legally married prior to the year 1860; that in 1861 the property in question was
acquired by Antonio Enriquez; that it thereby became a part of the property belonging to the
conjugal partnership; that Doa Ciriaca Villanueva died in 1882; that upon her death an
undivided half of the property passed to her heirs, the plaintiffs; that when, in 1883, Antonio
Enriquez undertook to convey the entire property to the defendant Doa Carmen de la
Cavada he, as matter of law, conveyed one half thereof, and that the other half remained

The correctness of this decision depends upon the question as to whether Antonio Enriquez
and Doa Ciriaca Villanueva were legally married in 1861. The court below found and, the
evidence sustains that finding, that a marriage ceremony was duly performed between
these persons in 1865, but held that the fact that prior to 1861 they had lived together as
husband and wife, had been recognized as such, and had children who were baptized as
the legitimate children of their lawful marriage was sufficient evidence to raise the
presumption that they were at the time legally married.
A marriage ceremony having been duly celebrated between these persons in 1865, it is
necessary, in order to show that they were legally married before that time, to prove that the
same kind of a marriage ceremony had theretofore been celebrated. Although, as held by
the Supreme Court of the United States, by the common law of England, a valid marriage
might be contacted without the intervention of any ecclesiastical or civil functionary
(Traverse v. Rheinhardt, 27 Sup. Ct. Rep., 563, decided April 15, 1907), yet such was never
the law in these Islands during the Spanish domination here. During the entire period of that
domination no valid marriage could exist unless some ecclesiastical or civil functionary
intervened in its celebration, and the intervention of civil functionaries was limited to the
short time elapsing between the 8th day of December, 1889, when the Civil Code took effect
here, and the 29th day of the same month, when the provisions of Title IV, Book I, of that
code were suspended. During the time covered by the lives of Antonio Enriquez and Doa
Ciriaca Villanueva no valid marriage between them could be contracted by their mere
agreement to live together as husband and wife.
There is no proof in this case that a marriage, valid in accordance with the laws then in force
in these Islands, was celebrated between these persons in 1865. In order to show that they
were before that time husband and wife, it was necessary to prove that a marriage
ceremony in which an ecclesiastical functionary intervened was duly celebrated. No proof of
any such marriage was offered. As has been said, the fact that prior to 1865 they lived
together as husband and wife and had children is not evidence in this case to show that
they were married prior to that time. Nor is the fact that in the certificates of baptism of these
children it is stated that they were the legitimate children of the lawful marriage of their
parents.
The court below said:
"Loss of the record of the first marriage, or some like reason, might have made the second
ceremony seem necessary and for that reason it was celebrated."cralaw virtua1aw library
This consideration is to our minds entirely insufficient to explain the celebration of the
second marriage. If the former marriage had taken place, it must have been celebrated
before some priest or other officer of the Roman Catholic Church. The law required that a
record of such marriages should be kept in the parish registry, and if such marriage in fact
had been performed, it probably would have been easy to have obtained a certified copy of
such record. No evidence was offered in this case of any attempt to obtain such record or
that the records of the church were the ceremony had been performed had been destroyed.
In fact, no proof whatever was offered in the case to show the celebration of such prior
marriage, except the facts hereinbefore stated, that the parties lived together as husband
and wife and had children who were baptized as aforesaid. We hold that this evidence is

insufficient to prove in this case a prior marriage, where it appears that a marriage
ceremony was duly performed between the parties at a later date; and we therefore hold
that Antonio Enriquez and Doa Ciriaca Villanueva were not legally married prior to 1865,
and that, therefore, when this property was acquired by Antonio in 1861 it did not become a
part of the property belonging to the conjugal partnership, but on the contrary was a part of
the capital which he brought to the marriage. Being a part of the capital brought to the
marriage by the husband, upon the death of the wife the husband surviving her no
interest whatever therein passed to her heirs.
The judgment of the court below, which rests solely upon the proposition that at the time of
the death of Doa Ciriaca Villanueva one-half of this property passed to her heirs, can not,
therefore, be sustained. That judgment is reversed, without costs to either in this court,
judgment is entered acquitting the defendants of the complaint, with the costs of the first
instance against the plaintiffs. So ordered.

G.R. No. 85140 May 17, 1990

TOMAS EUGENIO, SR., petitioner,
vs.
HON. ALEJANDRO M. VELEZ, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch 20,
Cagayan de Oro City, DEPUTY SHERIFF JOHNSON TAN, JR., Deputy Sheriff of
Branch 20, Regional Trial Court, Cagayan de Oro City, and the Private Respondents,
the petitioners in Sp. Proc. No. 88-55, for "Habeas Corpus", namely: CRISANTA
VARGAS-SANCHEZ, SANTOS and NARCISA VARGAS-BENTULAN, respondents.
G.R. No. 86470 May 17, 1990.
TOMAS EUGENIO, petitioner-appellant,
vs.
HON. ALEJANDRO M. VELEZ, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch 20,
Cagayan de Oro City, CRISANTA VARGAS-SANCHEZ, FELIX VARGAS, ERNESTO
VARGAS, NATIVIDAD VARGAS-CAGAPE, NENITA VARGAS-CADENAS, LUDIVINA
VARGAS-DE LOS SANTOS and NARCISA VARGAS-BENTULAN, respondentsappellees.
Maximo G. Rodriguez for petitioner.
Erasmo B. Damasing and Oliver Asis Improso for respondents.
PADILLA, J.:
On 5 October 1988, petitioner came to this Court with a petition for certiorari and prohibition
with application for restraining order and/or injunction (docketed as G.R. No. 85140) seeking
to enjoin respondent Judge from proceeding with the Habeas Corpus case (Sp. Proc. No.
88- 55, RTC, Branch 20, Cagayan de Oro City), * the respondent Sheriff from enforcing and
implementing the writ and orders of the respondent Judge dated 28, 29, and 30 September
1988, and to declare said writ and orders as null and void. In a resolution issued on 11
October 1988, this Court required comment from the respondents on the petition but denied
the application for a temporary restraining order.
The records disclose the following:

Unaware of the death on 28 August 1988 of (Vitaliana Vargas Vitaliana for brevity), her full
blood brothers and sisters, herein private respondents (Vargases', for brevity) filed on 27
September 1988, a petition for habeas corpus before the RTC of Misamis Oriental (Branch
20, Cagayan de Oro City) alleging that Vitaliana was forcibly taken from her residence
sometime in 1987 and confined by herein petitioner in his palacial residence in Jasaan,
Misamis Oriental. Despite her desire to escape, Vitaliana was allegedly deprived of her
liberty without any legal authority. At the time the petition was filed, it was alleged that
Vitaliana was 25 years of age, single, and living with petitioner Tomas Eugenio.
The respondent court in an order dated 28 September 1988 issued the writ of habeas
corpus, but the writ was returned unsatisfied. Petitioner refused to surrender the body of
Vitaliana (who had died on 28 August 1988) to the respondent sheriff, reasoning that a
corpse cannot be the subject of habeas corpus proceedings; besides, according to
petitioner, he had already obtained a burial permit from the Undersecretary of the
Department of Health, authorizing the burial at the palace quadrangle of the Philippine
Benevolent Christian Missionary, Inc. (PBCM), a registered religious sect, of which he
(petitioner) is the Supreme President and Founder.
Petitioner also alleged that Vitaliana died of heart failure due to toxemia of pregnancy in his
residence on 28 August 1988. As her common law husband, petitioner claimed legal
custody of her body. These reasons were incorporated in an explanation filed before the
respondent court. Two (2) orders dated 29 and 30 September 1988 were then issued by
respondent court, directing delivery of the deceased's body to a funeral parlor in Cagayan
de Oro City and its autopsy.
Petitioner (as respondent in the habeas corpus proceedings) filed an urgent motion to
dismiss the petition therein, claiming lack of jurisdiction of the court over the nature of the
action under sec. 1(b) of Rule 16 in relation to sec. 2, Rule 72 of the Rules of Court. 1 A
special proceeding for habeas corpus, petitioner argued, is not applicable to a dead person
but extends only to all cases of illegal confinement or detention of a live person.
Before resolving the motion to dismiss, private respondents (as petitioners below) were
granted leave to amend their petition. 2 Claiming to have knowledge of the death of Vitaliana
only on 28 September 1988 (or after the filing of thehabeas corpus petition), private
respondents (Vargases') alleged that petitioner Tomas Eugenia who is not in any way
related to Vitaliana was wrongfully interfering with their (Vargases') duty to bury her.
Invoking Arts. 305 and 308 of the Civil Code, 3the Vargases contended that, as the next of
kin in the Philippines, they are the legal custodians of the dead body of their sister Vitaliana.
An exchange of pleadings followed. The motion to dismiss was finally submitted for
resolution on 21 October 1988.
In the absence of a restraining order from this Court, proceedings continued before the
respondent court; the body was placed in a coffin, transferred to the Greenhills Memorial

Homes in Cagayan de Oro City, viewed by the presiding Judge of respondent court, and
examined by a duly authorized government pathologist. 4
Denying the motion to dismiss filed by petitioner, the court a quo held in an order, 5 dated 17
November 1988, that:
It should be noted from the original petition, to the first amended petition,
up to the second amended petition that the ultimate facts show that if the
person of Vitaliana Vargas turns out to be dead then this Court is being
prayed to declare the petitioners as the persons entitled to the custody,
interment and/or burial of the body of said deceased. The Court,
considering the circumstance that Vitaliana Vargas was already dead on
August 28, 1988 but only revealed to the Court on September 29, 1988 by
respondent's counsel, did not lose jurisdiction over the nature and subject
matter of this case because it may entertain this case thru the allegations
in the body of the petition on the determination as to who is entitled to the
custody of the dead body of the late Vitaliana Vargas as well as the burial
or interment thereof, for the reason that under the provisions of Sec. 19 of
Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, which reads as follows:
Sec. 19. Jurisdiction in civil cases. Regional Trial Courts shall exercise
exclusive original jurisdiction:
(1) In all civil actions in which the subject of the litigation
is incapable of pecuniary estimation;
xxx xxx xxx
(5) In all actions involving the contract of marriage and
marital relations;
(6) In all cases not within the exclusive jurisdiction of
any court, tribunal, person or body exercising judicial or
quasi-judicial functions:
xxx xxx xxx
it so provides that the Regional Trial Court has exclusive original
jurisdiction to try this case. The authority to try the issue of custody and
burial of a dead person is within the lawful jurisdiction of this Court
because of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 and because of the allegations of

the pleadings in this case, which are enumerated in Sec. 19, pars. 1, 5
and 6 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129.
Thereafter, the court a quo proceeded as in or civil cases and, in due course, rendered a
decision on 17 January 1989, 6 resolving the main issue of whether or not said court
acquired jurisdiction over the case by treating it as an action for custody of a dead body,
without the petitioners having to file a separate civil action for such relief, and without the
Court first dismissing the original petition for habeas corpus.
Citing Sections 19 and 20 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 (the Judiciary Reorganization Act of
1981), 7 Sections 5 and 6 of Rule 135 of the Rules of Court 8 Articles 305 and 308 in relation
to Article 294 of the Civil Code and Section 1104 of the Revised Administrative Code, 9 the
decision stated:
. . . . By a mere reading of the petition the court observed that the
allegations in the original petition as well as in the two amended petitions
show that Vitaliana Vargas has been restrained of her liberty and if she
were dead then relief was prayed for the custody and burial of said dead
person. The amendments to the petition were but elaborations but the
ultimate facts remained the same, hence, this court strongly finds that this
court has ample jurisdiction to entertain and sit on this case as an action
for custody and burial of the dead body because the body of the petition
controls and is binding and since this case was raffled to this court to the
exclusion of all other courts, it is the primary duty of this court to decide
and dispose of this case. . . . . 10
Satisfied with its jurisdiction, the respondent court then proceeded to the matter of rightful
custody over the dead body, (for purposes of burial thereof). The order of preference to give
support under Art. 294 was used as the basis of the award. Since there was no surviving
spouse, ascendants or descendants, the brothers and sisters were preferred over petitioner
who was merely a common law spouse, the latter being himself legally married to another
woman. 11
On 23 January 1989, a new petition for review with application for a temporary restraining
order and/or preliminary injunction was filed with this Court (G.R. No. 86470). Raised
therein were pure questions of law, basically Identical to those raised in the earlier petition
(G.R. No. 85140); hence, the consolidation of both cases. 12 On 7 February 1989, petitioner
filed an urgent motion for the issuance of an injunction to maintain status quo pending
appeal, which this Court denied in a resolution dated 23 February 1989 stating that "Tomas
Eugenio has so far failed to sufficiently establish a clear legal right to the custody of the
dead body of Vitaliana Vargas, which now needs a decent burial." The petitions were then
submitted for decision without further pleadings.

Between the two (2) consolidated petitions, the following issues are raised:
1. propriety of a habeas corpus proceeding under Rule 102 of the Rules
of Court to recover custody of the dead body of a 25 year old female,
single, whose nearest surviving claimants are full blood brothers and
sisters and a common law husband.
2. jurisdiction of the RTC over such proceedings and/or its authority to
treat the action as one for custody/possession/authority to bury the
deceased/recovery of the dead.
3. interpretation of par. 1, Art. 294 of the Civil Code (Art.
199 of the new Family Code) which states:
Art. 294. The claim for support, when proper and two or
more persons are obliged to give it, shall be made in
the following order:
(1) From the
spouse;
xxx xxx xxx
Section 19, Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 provides for the exclusive original jurisdiction of the
Regional Trial Courts over civil cases. Under Sec. 2, Rule 102 of the Rules of Court, the writ
of habeas corpus may be granted by a Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial Court). It
is an elementary rule of procedure that what controls is not the caption of the complaint or
petition; but the allegations therein determine the nature of the action, and even without the
prayer for a specific remedy, proper relief may nevertheless be granted by the court if the
facts alleged in the complaint and the evidence introduced so warrant. 13
When the petition for habeas corpus was filed before the court a quo, it was not certain
whether Vitaliana was dead or alive. While habeas corpus is a writ of right, it will not issue
as a matter of course or as a mere perfimetory operation on the filing of the petition. Judicial
discretion is exercised in its issuance, and such facts must be made to appear to the judge
to whom the petition is presented as, in his judgment, prima facie entitle the petitioner to the
writ. 14 While the court may refuse to grant the writ if the petition is insufficient in form and
substance, the writ should issue if the petition complies with the legal requirements and its
averments make a prima facie case for relief. However, a judge who is asked to issue a writ
of habeas corpus need not be very critical in looking into the petition for very clear grounds
for the exercise of this jurisdiction. The latter's power to make full inquiry into the cause of
commitment or detention will enable him to correct any errors or defects in the petition. 15

In Macazo and Nunez vs. Nunez, 16 the Court frowned upon the dismissal of a habeas
corpus petition filed by a brother to obtain custody of a minor sister, stating:
All these circumstances notwithstanding, we believe that the case should
not have been dismissed. The court below should not have overlooked
that by dismissing the petition, it was virtually sanctioning the continuance
of an adulterous and scandalous relation between the minor and her
married employer, respondent Benildo Nunez against all principles of law
and morality. It is no excuse that the minor has expressed preference for
remaining with said respondent, because the minor may not chose to
continue an illicit relation that morals and law repudiate.
xxx xxx xxx
The minor's welfare being the paramount consideration, the court below
should not allow the technicality, that Teofilo Macazo was not originally
made a party, to stand in the way of its giving the child full protection.
Even in a habeas corpus proceeding the court had power to award
temporary custody to the petitioner herein, or some other suitable person,
after summoning and hearing all parties concerned. What matters is that
the immoral situation disclosed by the records be not allowed to
continue. 17
After the fact of Vitaliana's death was made known to the petitioners in the habeas
corpus proceedings,amendment of the petition for habeas corpus, not dismissal, was proper
to avoid multiplicity of suits. Amendments to pleadings are generally favored and should be
liberally allowed in furtherance of justice in order that every case may so far as possible be
determined on its real facts and in order to expedite the trial of cases or prevent circuity of
action and unnecessary expense, unless there are circumstances such as inexcusable
delay or the taking of the adverse party by surprise or the like, which justify a refusal of
permission to amend. 18 As correctly alleged by respondents, the writ of habeas corpus as a
remedy became moot and academic due to the death of the person allegedly restrained of
liberty, but the issue of custody remained, which the court a quo had to resolve.
Petitioner claims he is the spouse contemplated under Art. 294 of the Civil Code, the term
spouse used therein not being preceded by any qualification; hence, in the absence of such
qualification, he is the rightful custodian of Vitaliana's body. Vitaliana's brothers and sisters
contend otherwise. Indeed, Philippine Law does not recognize common law marriages. A
man and woman not legally married who cohabit for many years as husband and wife, who
represent themselves to the public as husband and wife, and who are reputed to be
husband and wife in the community where they live may be considered legally mauled in
common law jurisdictions but not in the Philippines.19

While it is true that our laws do not just brush aside the fact that such relationships are
present in our society, and that they produce a community of properties and interests which
is governed by law, 20 authority exists in case law to the effect that such form of coownership requires that the man and woman living together must not in any way be
incapacitated to contract marriage. 21 In any case, herein petitioner has a subsisting
marriage with another woman, a legal impediment which disqualified him from even legally
marrying Vitaliana. In Santero vs. CFI of Cavite, 22 ,the Court, thru Mr. Justice Paras,
interpreting Art. 188 of the Civil Code (Support of Surviving Spouse and Children During
Liquidation of Inventoried Property) stated: "Be it noted however that with respect to
'spouse', the same must be the legitimate 'spouse' (not common-law spouses)."
There is a view that under Article 332 of the Revised Penal Code, the term "spouse"
embraces common law relation for purposes of exemption from criminal liability in cases of
theft, swindling and malicious mischief committed or caused mutually by spouses. The
Penal Code article, it is said, makes no distinction between a couple whose cohabitation is
sanctioned by a sacrament or legal tie and another who are husband and wife de
facto. 23 But this view cannot even apply to the facts of the case at bar. We hold that the
provisions of the Civil Code, unless expressly providing to the contrary as in Article 144,
when referring to a "spouse" contemplate a lawfully wedded spouse. Petitioner vis-a-vis
Vitaliana was not a lawfully-wedded spouse to her; in fact, he was not legally capacitated to
marry her in her lifetime.
Custody of the dead body of Vitaliana was correctly awarded to her surviving brothers and
sisters (the Vargases). Section 1103 of the Revised Administrative Code provides:
Sec. 1103. Persons charged with duty of burial. The immediate duty of
burying the body of a deceased person, regardless of the ultimate liability
for the expense thereof, shall devolve upon the persons hereinbelow
specified:
xxx xxx xxx
(b) If the deceased was an unmarried man or woman,
or a child, and left any kin, the duty of burial shall
devolve upon the nearest of kin of the deceased, if they
be adults and within the Philippines and in possession
of sufficient means to defray the necessary expenses.
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is AFFIRMED. Both petitions are hereby
DISMISSED. No Costs.
SO ORDERED.

HON. ANDREA D. DOMINGO, COMMISSIONER OF THE BOARD OF IMMIGRATION,

HON. REGINO R. SANTIAGO and HON. JORGE V. SARMIENTO, COMMISSIONERS
BUREAU OF IMMIGRATION AND DEPORTATION, respondents.
QUIASON, J.:
This is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court with preliminary
injunction, to reverse and set aside the Decision dated September 27, 1990 of the
Commission on Immigration and Deportation (CID), ordering the deportation of petitioner
and its Resolution dated January 29, 1991, denying the motion for reconsideration.
I
Bernard Banez, the husband of Marina Cabael, went to Indonesia as a contract worker.
On April 3, 1974, he embraced and was converted to Islam. On May 17, 1974, he married
petitioner in accordance with Islamic rites. He returned to the Philippines in January 1979.
On January 13, 1979, petitioner and her two children with Banez, (two-year old Marina and
nine-month old Nikulas) arrived in Manila as the "guests" of Banez. The latter made it
appear that he was just a friend of the family of petitioner and was merely repaying the
hospitability extended to him during his stay in Indonesia.
When petitioner and her two children arrived at the Ninoy Aquino International Airport on
January 13, 1979, Banez, together with Marina Cabael, met them.
Banez executed an "Affidavit of Guaranty and Support," for his "guests," stating inter alia,
that:
That I am the guarantor for the entry into the Philippines of Mrs.
Djumantan, 42 years old, and her two minor children, MARINA, 2 years
old, and NIKULAS, 9 months old, all Indonesian citizens, who are coming
as temporary visitors.
That I am willing to guaranty them out of gratitude to their family for the
hospitality they have accorded me during the few years that I have stayed
in Indonesia in connection with my employment thereat.
G.R. No. 99358 January 30, 1995
DJUMANTAN, petitioner,
vs.

That I guaranty they are law abiding citizens and I guaranty their behavior
while they are in the Philippines; I also guaranty their support and that
they will not become a public charge.

That I guaranty their voluntary departure upon the termination of the

authorized stay granted them by the Government (Rollo, p. 41).

On September 20, 1994, Leonardo C. Banez manifested that his father died on August 14,
1994 and that he and his mother were withdrawing their objection to the granting of a
permanent resident visa to petitioner (Rollo, pp. 173-175).

As "guests," petitioner and her two children lived in the house of Banez.
II
Petitioner and her children were admitted to the Philippines as temporary visitors under
Section 9(a) of the Immigration Act of 1940.
In 1981, Marina Cabael discovered the true relationship of her husband and petitioner. She
filed a complaint for "concubinage" with the Municipal Trial Court of Urdaneta, Pangasinan
against the two. This case was, however, dismissed for lack of merit.
On March 25, 1982, the immigration status of petitioner was changed from temporary visitor
to that of permanent resident under Section 13(a) of the same law. On April 14, 1982,
petitioner was issued an alien certificate of registration.
Not accepting the set-back, Banez' eldest son, Leonardo, filed a letter complaint with the
Ombudsman, who subsequently referred the letter to the CID. On the basis of the said
letter, petitioner was detained at the CID detention cell. She later released pending the
deportation proceedings (DEP Case No. 90-400) after posting a cash bond (Rollo, pp. 1516). Thereafter, she manifested to the CID that she be allowed to depart voluntarily from the
Philippines and asked for time to purchase her airline ticket (Rollo, p. 10). However, she a
change of heart and moved for the dismissal of the deportation case on the ground that she
was validly married to a Filipino citizen (Rollo, pp. 11-12).
In the Decision dated September 27, 1990, the CID, through public respondents, disposed
as follows:
WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the Board of
Commissioners finds the second marriage of Bernardo Banes to
respondent Djumantan irregular and not in accordance with the laws of
the Philippines. We revoke the Section 13(a) visa previously granted to
her (Rollo, p. 23).
Public respondents denied petitioner's motion for reconsideration in their Resolution dated
January 29, 1991 (Rollo, pp. 31-33).
Hence, this petition.
We issued a temporary restraining order, directing public respondents to cease and desist
from executing or implementing the Decision dated September 27, 1990 and the Resolution
dated January 29, 1991 (Rollo, pp. 34-36).

Petitioner claims that her marriage to Banez was valid under Article 27 of P.D. No. 1085, the
Muslim Code, which recognizes the practice of polyandry by Muslim males. From that
premise, she argues that under Articles 109 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, Article 68 of
the Family Code and Article 34 of the Muslim Code, the husband and wife are obliged to live
together and under Article 110 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, the husband is given the
right to fix the conjugal residence. She claims that public respondents have no right to order
the couple to live separately (Rollo, pp. 5-7).
When asked to comment on the petition, the Solicitor General took the position that the CID
could not order petitioner's deportation because its power to do so had prescribed under
Section 37 (b) of the Immigration Act of 1940 (Rollo, pp. 57-74).
III
We need not resolve the validity of petitioner's marriage to Banez, if under the law the CID
can validly deport petitioner as an "undesirable alien" regardless of her marriage to a
Filipino citizen. Therefore, to be first resolved is the question on petitioner's immigration
status, particularly the legality of her admission into the country and the change of her
status from temporary visitor to permanent resident. Upon a finding that she was not lawfully
admitted into the country and she did not lawfully acquire permanent residency, the next
question is whether the power to deport her has prescribed.
There was a blatant abuse of our immigration laws in effecting petitioner's entry into the
country and the change of her immigration status from temporary visitor to permanent
resident. All such privileges were obtained through misinterpretation.
Never was the marriage of petitioner to Banez disclosed to the immigration authorities in her
applications for temporary visitor's visa and for permanent residency.
The civil status of an alien applicant for admission as a temporary visitor is a matter that
could influence the exercise of discretion on the part of the immigration authorities. The
immigration authorities would be less inclined to allow the entry of a woman who claims to
have entered into a marriage with a Filipino citizen, who is married to another woman
(Cf. Shiu Shin Man v. Galang, 3 SCRA 871 [1961]).

Generally, the right of the President to expel or deport aliens whose presence is deemed
inimical to the public interest is as absolute and unqualified as the right to prohibit and
prevent their entry into the country (Annotations, 8 ALR 1286). this right is based on the fact
that since the aliens are not part of the nation, their admission into the territory is a matter of
pure permission and simple tolerance which creates no obligation on the part of the
government to permit them to stay (3 Am. Jur. 2d. 72).

proceedings is made within five years after the cause for deportation
arises. Deportation under clauses 3 and 4 shall not be effected if the
court, or judge thereof, when sentencing the alien, shall recommend to
the Commissioner of Immigration that the alien be not deported (As
amended by Rep. Act No. 503).
Section 37(a) of the said law mentioned in Section 37(b) thereof provides:

The interest, which an alien has in being admitted into or allowed to continue to reside in the
country, is protected only so far as Congress may choose to protect it (United States ex rel.
Kaloudis v. Shauhnessy 180 F. 2d. 489).
There is no law guaranteeing aliens married to Filipino citizens the right to be admitted,
much less to be given permanent residency, in the Philippines.

The following aliens shall be arrested upon the warrant of the

Commissioner of Immigration or of any other officer designated by him for
the purpose and deported upon the warrant of the Commissioner of
Immigration after a determination by the Board of Commissioners of the
existence of the ground for deportation as charged against the alien:

The fact of marriage by an alien to a citizen does not withdraw her from the operation of the
immigration laws governing the admission and exclusion of aliens (United States ex rel.
Knauff v. Shauhnessy, 338 US 537 94 L. Ed. 317, 70 S. Ct. 309 [1950]; Low Wah Suey v.
Backus, 225 US 460 56 L. Ed. 1165, 32 S. Ct. 734 [1912]; Annotations, 71 ALR 1213).
Marriage of an alien woman to a Filipino husband does not ipso facto make her a Filipino
citizen and does not excuse her from her failure to depart from the country upon the
expiration of her extended stay here as an alien (Joaquin v. Galang, 33 SCRA 362 [1970]).

1) Any alien who enters the Philippines after the effective date of this Act
by means of false and misleading statements or without inspection and
admission by the immigration authorities at a designating port of entry or
at any place other than at a designated port of entry.

Under Section 9 of the Immigration Act of 1940, it is not mandatory for the CID to admit any
alien who applies for a visitor's visa. Once admitted into the country, the alien has no right to
an indefinite stay. Under Section 13 of the law, an alien allowed to stay temporarily may
apply for a change of status and "may be admitted" as a permanent resident. Among those
considered qualified to apply for permanent residency if the wife or husband of a Philippine
citizen (Immigration Act of 1940, Sec. 13[a]). The entry of aliens into the country and their
admission as immigrants is not a matter of right, even if they are legally married to Filipino
citizens.

3) Any alien who, after the effective date of this Act, is convicted in the
Philippines and sentenced for a term of one year or more for a crime
involving moral turpitude committed within five years after his entry, is so
convicted and sentenced more than once;

IV
We now address the issue raised by the Solicitor General that the right of public
respondents to deport petitioner has prescribed, citing Section 37(b) of the Immigration Act
of 1940.
Said Section 37(b) provides:
Deportation may be effected under clauses 2, 7, 8, 11 and 12 of
paragraph (a) of this section at any time after entry, but shall not be
effected under any clause unless the arrest in the deportation

2) Any alien who enters the Philippines after the effective date of this Act,
who was not lawfully admissible at the time of entry;

4) Any alien who is convicted and sentenced for a violation of the law
governing prohibited drugs;
5) Any alien who practices prostitution or is an inmate of a house of
prostitution or is connected with the management of a house of
prostitution, or is a procurer;
6) Any alien who becomes a public charge within five years after entry
from causes not affirmatively shown to have arisen subsequent to entry;
7) Any alien who remains in the Philippines in violation of any limitation or
condition under which he was admitted a non-immigrant;
8) Any alien who believes in, advises, advocates or teaches the overthrow
by force and violence of the Government of the Philippines, or of

constituted law and authority, or who disbelieves in or is opposed to

organized government, or who advises, advocates, or teaches the assault
or assassination of public officials because of their office, or who advises,
advocates, or teaches the unlawful destruction of property, or who is a
member of or affiliated with any organization entertaining, advocating or
teaching such doctrines, or who on any manner whatsoever lends
assistance, financial or otherwise, to the dissemination of such doctrines;

The deportation of an alien under said clause of Section 37(a) has a prescriptive period and
"shall not be effected ... unless the arrest in the deportation proceedings is made within five
years after the cause for deportation arises" (Immigration Act of 1940, Sec. 37[b]).

9) Any alien who commits any of the acts described in Sections forty-five
and forty-six of this Act, independent of criminal action which may be
brought against him: Provided, That in the case of an alien who, for any
reason, is convicted and sentenced to suffer both imprisonment and
deportation, said alien shall first serve the entire period of his
imprisonment before he is actually deported:Provided, however, That the
imprisonment may be waived by the Commissioner of Immigration with
the consent of the Department Head, and upon payment by the alien
concerned of such amount as the Commissioner may fix and approved by
the Department Head, and upon payment by the alien concerned of such
amount as the Commissioner may fix and approved by the Department
Head (as amended by R.A. No. 144);

In Board of Commissioners (CID) v. Dela Rosa, 197 SCRA 853 (1991), we held that under
Section 37(b) of the Immigration Act of 1940, the deportation of an alien may be barred after
the lapse of five years after the cause of deportation arises. Justice Feliciano, in his
dissenting opinion, qualified the broad statement of the law as follows:

10) Any alien who, at any time within five years after entry, shall have
been convicted of violating the provisions of the Philippine
Commonwealth Act Numbered Six hundred and fifty-three, otherwise
known as the Philippine Alien Registration Act of 1941 (now Republic Act
No. 562), or who, at any time after entry, shall have been convicted more
than once of violating the provisions of the same Act;

Justice Davide, in his dissenting opinion, clarified:

11) Any alien who engages in profiteering, hoarding, or black-marketing,

independent of any criminal action which may be brought against him;
12) Any alien who is convicted of any offense penalized under
Commonwealth Act Numbered Four hundred and seventy-three,
otherwise known as the Revised Naturalization Laws of the Philippines, or
any law relating to acquisition of Philippine citizenship;
13) Any alien who defrauds his creditor by absconding or alienating
properties, to prevent them from being attached or executed.
Under clause 1 of Section 37(a), an "alien who enters the Philippines after the effective date
of this Act by means of false and misleading statements or without inspection and admission
by the immigration authorities at a designated port of entry or at any place other than at a
designated port of entry" is subject to deportation.

Congress may impose a limitation of time for the deportation of alien from the country
(Costanzo v. Tillinghast, 287 US 341 77 L. Ed. 350, 53 S. Ct. 152 [1932]; Guiney v. Bonham
[CA 9] 261 F. 582, 8 ALR 1282).

Examination of the above quoted Section 37 (b) shows that the five (5)
year limitation is applicable only where deportation is sought to be
effected under clauses of Section 37 (a) other than clauses 2, 7, 8, 11 and
12; that where deportation or exclusion is sought to be effected under
clauses of Section 37(a), no period of limitation is applicable; and that to
the contrary, deportation or exclusion may be effected "at any time after
entry."

Note that the five-year period applies only to clauses other than 2, 7, 8, 11
and 12 of paragraph (a) of the Section. In respect to clauses 2, 7, 8, 11,
and 12, the limitation does not apply.
In Lam Shee v. Bengzon, 93 Phil. 1065 (1953), the alien admitted that she had gained
entrance into the Philippines fraudulently by making use of the name of a Chinese residentmerchant other than that of her lawful husband. The Court, however, held that she could no
longer be deported "for the simple reason that more than 5 years had elapsed from the date
of her admission."
The right of public respondents to deport petitioner has prescribed.
Petitioner was admitted and allowed entry into the Philippines on January 13, 1979 on the
basis of false and misleading statements in her application and in the other supporting
documents submitted to the immigration authorities. Leonardo C. Banez first complained
with the CID on November 19, 1980 about the manner petitioner was admitted into the
country and asked for her deportation (Rollo, pp. 77-78). After the EDSA Revolution, he sent
a follow-up letter to the CID requesting action on his 1980 letter-complaint (Rollo, p. 78).

Tolling the prescriptive period from November 19, 1980, when Leonardo C. Banez informed
the CID of the illegal entry of petitioner into the country, more than five years had elapsed
before the issuance of the order of her deportation on September 27, 1990.
In their Comment, public respondents urged that what is barred under Section 37(b) is the
deportation of an alien and claimed that what they ordered was not the deportation of
petitioner but merely the revocation of Section 13(a) which refers to the visa previously
granted her (Rollo, p. 102).
The "arrest" contemplated by Section 37(b) refers to the arrest for the purpose of carrying
out an order for deportation and not the arrest prior to proceedings to determine the right of
the alien to stay in the country. When public respondents revoked the permanent residence
visa issued to petitioner, they, in effect, ordered her arrest and deportation as an overstaying
alien.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and the temporary restraining order issued on
June 4, 1991 is MADE PERMANENT.
The Decision of the Board of Commissioners dated September 27, 1990 revoking the
issuance of the permanent resident visa to petitioner and the Resolution dated January 29,
1991 are REVERSED.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 11263

November 2, 1916 ELOISA GOITIA DE LA CAMARA, plaintiffappellant,
vs.
JOSE CAMPOS RUEDA, defendant-appellee.
Eduardo Gutierrez Repide and Felix Socias for appellant.
Sanz, Opisso and Luzuriaga for appellee.
TRENT, J.:
This is an action by the wife against her husband for support outside of the conjugal
domicile. From a judgment sustaining the defendant's demurrer upon the ground that the

facts alleged in the complaint do not state a cause of action, followed by an order dismissing
the case after the plaintiff declined to amend, the latter appealed.

obtainable. With these principles to guide us, we will inquire into the status of the law
touching and governing the question under consideration.

It was urged in the first instance, and the court so held, that the defendant cannot be
compelled to support the plaintiff, except in his own house, unless it be by virtue of a judicial
decree granting her a divorce or separation from the defendant.

Articles 42 to 107 of the Civil Code are not in force in the Philippine Islands (Benedicto vs.
De la Rama, 3 Phil .Rep., 34). Articles 44 to 78 of the Law of Civil Marriage of 1870, in force
in the Peninsula, were extended to the Philippine Islands by royal decree on April 13, 1883
(Ebreo vs. Sichon, 4 Phil. Rep., 705). Articles 44, 45, and 48 of this law read:

The parties were legally married in the city of Manila on January 7, 1915, and immediately
thereafter established their residence at 115 Calle San Marcelino, where they lived together
for about a month, when the plaintiff returned to the home of her parents. The pertinent
allegations of the complaint are as follows:
That the defendant, one month after he had contracted marriage with the plaintiff,
demanded of her that she perform unchaste and lascivious acts on his genital
organs; that the plaintiff spurned the obscene demands of the defendant and
refused to perform any act other than legal and valid cohabitation; that the
defendant, since that date had continually on other successive dates, made similar
lewd and indecorous demands on his wife, the plaintiff, who always spurned them,
which just refusals of the plaintiff exasperated the defendant and induce him to
maltreat her by word and deed and inflict injuries upon her lips, her face and
different parts of her body; and that, as the plaintiff was unable by any means to
induce the defendant to desist from his repugnant desires and cease from
maltreating her, she was obliged to leave the conjugal abode and take refuge in
the home of her parents.
Marriage in this jurisdiction is a contract entered into in the manner and with the solemnities
established by General Orders No. 68, in so far as its civil effects are concerned requiring
the consent of the parties. (Garcia vs. Montague, 12 Phil. Rep., 480, citing article 1261 of
Civil Code.) Upon the termination of the marriage ceremony, a conjugal partnership is
formed between the parties. (Sy Joc Lieng vs. Encarnacion, 16 Phil. Rep., 137.) To this
extent a marriage partakes of the nature of an ordinary contract. But it is something more
than a mere contract. It is a new relation, the rights, duties, and obligations of which rest not
upon the agreement of the parties but upon the general law which defines and prescribes
those rights, duties, and obligations .Marriage is an institution, in the maintenance of which
in its purity the public is deeply interested. It is a relation for life and the parties cannot
terminate it at any shorter period by virtue of any contract they may make .The reciprocal
rights arising from this relation, so long as it continues, are such as the law determines from
time to time, and none other. When the legal existence of the parties is merged into one by
marriage, the new relation is regulated and controlled by the state or government upon
principles of public policy for the benefit of society as well as the parties. And when the
object of a marriage is defeated by rendering its continuance intolerable to one of the
parties and productive of no possible good to the community, relief in some way should be

ART. 44. The spouses are obliged to be faithful to each other and to mutually
assist each other.
ART. 45. The husband must live with and protect his wife. (The second paragraph
deals with the management of the wife's property.)
ART. 48. The wife must obey her husband, live with him, and follow him when he
charges his domicile or residence.
Notwithstanding the provisions of the foregoing paragraph, the court may for just
cause relieve her from this duty when the husband removes his residence to a
foreign country.
And articles 143 and 149 of the Civil Code are as follows:
ART. 143. The following are obliged to support each other reciprocally to the whole
extent specified in the preceding article.
1. The consorts.
xxx

xxx

xxx

ART. (149) 49. The person obliged to give support may, at his option, satisfy it,
either by paying the pension that may be fixed or by receiving and maintaining in
his own home the person having the right to the same.
Article 152 of the Civil Code gives the instances when the obligation to give support shall
cease. The failure of the wife to live with her husband is not one of them.
The above quoted provisions of the Law of Civil Marriage and the Civil Code fix the duties
and obligations of the spouses. The spouses must be faithful to, assist, and support each
other. The husband must live with and protect his wife. The wife must obey and live with her
husband and follow him when he changes his domicile or residence, except when he

removes to a foreign country. But the husband who is obliged to support his wife may, at his
option, do so by paying her a fixed pension or by receiving and maintaining her in his own
home. May the husband, on account of his conduct toward his wife, lose this option and be
compelled to pay the pension? Is the rule established by article 149 of the Civil Code
absolute? The supreme court of Spain in its decision of December 5, 1903, held:.
That in accordance with the ruling of the supreme court of Spain in its decisions
dated May 11, 1897, November 25, 1899, and July 5, 1901, the option which article
149 grants the person, obliged to furnish subsistence, between paying the pension
fixed or receiving and keeping in his own house the party who is entitled to the
same, is not so absolute as to prevent cases being considered wherein, either
because this right would be opposed to the exercise of a preferential right or
because of the existence of some justifiable cause morally opposed to the removal
of the party enjoying the maintenance, the right of selection must be understood as
being thereby restricted.
Whereas the only question discussed in the case which gave rise to this appeal
was whether there was any reason to prevent the exercise of the option granted by
article 149 of the Civil Code to the person obliged to furnish subsistence, to receive
and maintain in his own house the one who is entitled to receive it; and inasmuch
as nothing has been alleged or discussed with regard to the parental authority of
Pedro Alcantara Calvo, which he ha not exercised, and it having been set forth that
the natural father simply claims his child for the purpose of thus better attending to
her maintenance, no action having been taken by him toward providing the support
until, owing to such negligence, the mother was obliged to demand it; it is seen that
these circumstances, together with the fact of the marriage of Pedro Alcantara, and
that it would be difficult for the mother to maintain relations with her daughter, all
constitute an impediment of such a nature as to prevent the exercise of the option
in the present case, without prejudice to such decision as may be deemed proper
with regard to the other questions previously cited in respect to which no opinion
should be expressed at this time.
The above was quoted with approval in United States and De Jesus vs. Alvir (9 Phil. Rep.,
576), wherein the court held that the rule laid down in article 149 of the Civil Code "is not
absolute." but it is insisted that there existed a preexisting or preferential right in each of
these cases which was opposed to the removal of the one entitled to support. It is true that
in the first the person claiming the option was the natural father of the child and had married
a woman other than the child's mother, and in the second the right to support had already
been established by a final judgment in a criminal case. Notwithstanding these facts the two
cases clearly established the proposition that the option given by article 149 of the Civil
Code may not be exercised in any and all cases.

Counsel for the defendant cite, in support of their contention, the decision of the supreme
court of Spain, dated November 3, 1905. In this case Don Berno Comas, as a result of
certain business reverses and in order no to prejudice his wife, conferred upon her powers
to administer and dispose of her property. When she left him he gave her all the muniments
of title, mortgage credits, notes, P10,000 in accounts receivable, and the key to the safe in
which he kept a large amount of jewels, thus depriving himself of all his possessions and
being reduced in consequence to want. Subsequently he instituted this civil action against
his wife, who was then living in opulence, for support and the revocation of the powers
heretofore granted in reference to the administration and disposal of her property. In her
answer the wife claimed that the plaintiff (her husband) was not legally in a situation to claim
support and that the powers voluntarily conferred and accepted by her were bilateral and
could not be canceled by the plaintiff. From a judgment in favor of the plaintiff the defendant
wife appealed to the Audencia Territorialwherein, after due trial, judgment was rendered in
her favor dismissing the action upon the merits. The plaintiff appealed to the supreme court
and that high tribunal, in affirming the judgment of the Audencia Territorial, said:
Considering that article 143, No. 1, of the Civil Code, providing that the spouses
are mutually obliged to provide each other with support, cannot but be subordinate
to the other provisions of said Code which regulates the family organization and
the duties of spouses not legally separated, among which duties are those of their
living together and mutually helping each other, as provided in article 56 of the
aforementioned code; and taking this for granted, the obligation of the spouse who
has property to furnish support to the one who has no property and is in need of it
for subsistence, is to be understood as limited to the case where, in accordance
with law, their separation has been decreed, either temporarily or finally and this
case, with respect to the husband, cannot occur until a judgment of divorce is
rendered, since, until then, if he is culpable, he is not deprived of the management
of his wife's property and of the product of the other property belonging to the
conjugal partnership; and
Considering that, should the doctrine maintained in the appeal prevail, it would
allow married persons to disregard the marriage bond and separate from each
other of their own free will, thus establishing, contrary to the legal provision
contained in said article 56 of the Civil Code, a legal status entirely incompatible
with the nature and effects of marriage in disregard of the duties inherent therein
and disturbing the unity of the family, in opposition to what the law, in conformity
with good morals, has established; and.
Considering that, as the spouses D. Ramon Benso and Doa Adela Galindo are
not legally separated, it is their duty to live together and afford each other help and
support; and for this reason, it cannot be held that the former has need of support
from his wife so that he may live apart from her without the conjugal abode where it
is his place to be, nor of her conferring power upon him to dispose even of the

fruits of her property in order therewith to pay the matrimonial expenses and,
consequently, those of his own support without need of going to his wife; wherefore
the judgment appealed from, denying the petition of D. Ramon Benso for support,
has not violated the articles of the Civil Code and the doctrine invoked in the
assignments of error 1 and 5 of the appeal.
From a careful reading of the case just cited and quoted from it appears quite clearly that
the spouses separated voluntarily in accordance with an agreement previously made. At
least there are strong indications to this effect, for the court says, "should the doctrine
maintained in the appeal prevail, it would allow married persons to disregard the marriage
bond and separate from each other of their own free will." If this be the true basis upon
which the supreme court of Spain rested its decision, then the doctrine therein enunciated
would not be controlling in cases where one of the spouses was compelled to leave the
conjugal abode by the other or where the husband voluntarily abandons such abode and
the wife seeks to force him to furnish support. That this is true appears from the decision of
the same high tribunal, dated October 16, 1903. In this case the wife brought an action for
support against her husband who had willfully and voluntarily abandoned the conjugal
abode without any cause whatever. The supreme court, reversing the judgment absolving
the defendant upon the ground that no action for divorce, etc., had been instituted, said:
In the case at bar, it has been proven that it was Don Teodoro Exposito who left the
conjugal abode, although he claims, without however proving his contention, that
the person responsible for this situation was his wife, as she turned him out of the
house. From this state of affairs it results that it is the wife who is party abandoned,
the husband not having prosecuted any action to keep her in his company and he
therefore finds himself, as long as he consents to the situation, under the
ineluctable obligation to support his wife in fulfillment of the natural duty sanctioned
in article 56 of the Code in relation with paragraph 1 of article 143. In not so
holding, the trial court, on the mistaken ground that for the fulfillment of this duty
the situation or relation of the spouses should be regulated in the manner it
indicates, has made the errors of law assigned in the first three grounds alleged,
because the nature of the duty of affording mutual support is compatible and
enforcible in all situations, so long as the needy spouse does not create any illicit
situation of the court above described.lawphil.net
If we are in error as to the doctrine enunciated by the supreme court of Spain in its decision
of November 3, 1905, and if the court did hold, as contended by counsel for the defendant
in the case under consideration, that neither spouse can be compelled to support the other
outside of the conjugal abode, unless it be by virtue of a final judgment granting the injured
one a divorce or separation from the other, still such doctrine or holding would not
necessarily control in this jurisdiction for the reason that the substantive law is not in every
particular the same here as it is in Spain. As we have already stated, articles 42 to 107 of
the Civil Code in force in the Peninsula are not in force in the Philippine Islands. The law

governing the duties and obligations of husband and wife in this country are articles 44 to 78
of the Law of Civil Marriage of 1870 .In Spain the complaining spouse has, under article 105
of the Civil Code, various causes for divorce, such as adultery on the part of the wife in
every case and on the part of the husband when public scandal or disgrace of the wife
results therefrom; personal violence actually inflicted or grave insults: violence exercised by
the husband toward the wife in order to force her to change her religion; the proposal of the
husband to prostitute his wife; the attempts of the husband or wife to corrupt their sons or to
prostitute their daughters; the connivance in their corruption or prostitution; and the
condemnation of a spouse to perpetual chains or hard labor, while in this jurisdiction the
only ground for a divorce is adultery. (Benedicto vs. De la Rama, 3 Phil .Rep., 34, 45.) This
positive and absolute doctrine was announced by this court in the case just cited after an
exhaustive examination of the entire subject. Although the case was appealed to the
Supreme Court of the United States and the judgment rendered by this court was there
reversed, the reversal did not affect in any way or weaken the doctrine in reference to
adultery being the only ground for a divorce. And since the decision was promulgated by
this court in that case in December, 1903, no change or modification of the rule has been
announced. It is, therefore, the well settled and accepted doctrine in this jurisdiction.
But it is argued that to grant support in an independent suit is equivalent to granting divorce
or separation, as it necessitates a determination of the question whether the wife has a
good and sufficient cause for living separate from her husband; and, consequently, if a court
lacks power to decree a divorce, as in the instant case, power to grant a separate
maintenance must also be lacking. The weakness of this argument lies in the assumption
that the power to grant support in a separate action is dependent upon a power to grant a
divorce. That the one is not dependent upon the other is apparent from the very nature of
the marital obligations of the spouses. The mere act of marriage creates an obligation on
the part of the husband to support his wife. This obligation is founded not so much on the
express or implied terms of the contract of marriage as on the natural and legal duty of the
husband; an obligation, the enforcement of which is of such vital concern to the state itself
that the laws will not permit him to terminate it by his own wrongful acts in driving his wife to
seek protection in the parental home. A judgment for separate maintenance is not due and
payable either as damages or as a penalty; nor is it a debt in the strict legal sense of the
term, but rather a judgment calling for the performance of a duty made specific by the
mandate of the sovereign. This is done from necessity and with a view to preserve the
public peace and the purity of the wife; as where the husband makes so base demands
upon his wife and indulges in the habit of assaulting her. The pro tanto separation resulting
from a decree for separate support is not an impeachment of that public policy by which
marriage is regarded as so sacred and inviolable in its nature; it is merely a stronger policy
overruling a weaker one; and except in so far only as such separation is tolerated as a
means of preserving the public peace and morals may be considered, it does not in any
respect whatever impair the marriage contract or for any purpose place the wife in the
situation of a feme sole.

The foregoing are the grounds upon which our short opinion and order for judgment,
heretofore filed in this case, rest.

G.R. No. L-17014

August 11, 1921

MARIANO B. ARROYO, plaintiff-appellant,

vs.
DOLORES C. VASQUEZ DE ARROYO, defendant-appellee.
Fisher & DeWitt for appellant.
Powell & Hill for appellee.
STREET, J.:
Mariano B. Arroyo and Dolores C. Vasquez de Arroyo were united in the bonds of wedlock
by marriage in the year 1910, and since that date, with a few short intervals of separation,
they have lived together as man and wife in the city of Iloilo until July 4, 1920, when the wife
went away from their common home with the intention of living thenceforth separate from
her husband. After efforts had been made by the husband without avail to induce her to
resume marital relations, this action was initiated by him to compel her to return to the
matrimonial home and live with him as a dutiful wife. The defendant answered, admitting the
fact of marriage, and that she had left her husband's home without his consent; but she
averred by way of defense and cross-complaint that she had been compelled to leave by

cruel treatment on the part of her husband. Accordingly she in turn prayed for affirmative
relief, to consist of (1) a decree of separation; (2) a liquidation of the conjugal partnership;
(3) and an allowance for counsel fees and permanent separate maintenance. Upon hearing
the cause the lower court gave judgment in favor of the defendant, authorizing her to live
apart from her husband, granting her alimony at the rate of P400 per month, and directing
that the plaintiff should pay to the defendant's attorney the sum of P1,000 for his services to
defendant in the trial of the case. The plaintiff thereupon removed the case with the usual
formalities by appeal to this court.
The trial judge, upon consideration of the evidence before him, reached the conclusion that
the husband was more to blame than his wife and that his continued ill-treatment of her
furnished sufficient justification for her abandonment of the conjugal home and the
permanent breaking off of marital relations with him. We have carefully examined and
weighed every line of the proof, and are of the opinion that the conclusion stated is wholly
untenable. The evidence shows that the wife is afflicted with a disposition of jealousy
towards her husband in an aggravated degree; and to his cause are chiefly traceable
without a doubt the many miseries that have attended their married life. In view of the
decision which we are to pronounce nothing will be said in this opinion which will make the
resumption of married relations more difficult to them or serve as a reminder to either of the
mistakes of the past; and we prefer to record the fact that so far as the proof in this record
shows neither of the spouses has at any time been guilty of conjugal infidelity, or has given
just cause to the other to suspect illicit relations with any person. The tales of cruelty on the
part of the husband towards the wife, which are the basis of the cross-action, are in our
opinion no more than highly colored versions of personal wrangles in which the spouses
have allowed themselves from time to time to become involved and would have little
significance apart from the morbid condition exhibited by the wife. The judgment must
therefore be recorded that the abandonment by her of the marital home was without
sufficient justification in fact.
In examining the legal questions involved, it will be found convenient to dispose first of the
defendant's cross-complaint. To begin with, the obligation which the law imposes on the
husband to maintain the wife is a duty universally recognized in civil society and is clearly
expressed in articles 142 and 143 of the Civil code. The enforcement of this obligation by
the wife against the husband is not conditioned upon the procurance of a divorce by her, nor
even upon the existence of a cause for divorce. Accordingly it had been determined that
where the wife is forced to leave the matrimonial abode and to live apart from her husband,
she can, in this jurisdiction, compel him to make provision for her separate maintenance
(Goitia vs. Campos Rueda, 35 Phil., 252); and he may be required to pay the expenses,
including attorney's fees, necessarily incurred in enforcing such obligation,
(Mercado vs. Ostrand and Ruiz, 37 Phil., 179.) Nevertheless, the interests of both parties as
well as of society at large require that the courts should move with caution in enforcing the
duty to provide for the separate maintenance of the wife, for this step involves a recognition
of the de facto separation of the spouses a state which is abnormal and fraught with

grave danger to all concerned. From this consideration it follows that provision should not
be made for separate maintenance in favor of the wife unless it appears that the continued
cohabitation of the pair has become impossible and separation necessary from the fault of
the husband.
In Davidson vs Davidson, the Supreme Court of Michigan, speaking through the eminent
jurist, Judge Thomas M. Cooley, held that an action for the support of the wife separate from
the husband will only be sustained when the reasons for it are imperative (47 Mich., 151).
That imperative necessity is the only ground on which such a proceeding can be maintained
also appears from the decision in Schindel vs. Schindel (12 Md., 294). In the State of South
Carolina, where judicial divorces have never been procurable on any ground, the Supreme
court fully recognizes the right of the wife to have provision for separate maintenance,
where it is impossible for her to continue safely to cohabit with her husband; but the same
court has more than once rejected the petition of the wife for separate maintenance where it
appeared that the husband's alleged cruelty or ill-treatment was provoked by the wife's own
improper conduct. (Rhame vs. Rhame, 1 McCord's Chan. [S. Car.], 197; 16 Am. Dec., 597;
Boydvs. Boyd, Har. Eq. [S. Car.], 144.)
Upon one occasion Sir William Scott, pronouncing the judgment of the English
Ecclesiastical Court in a case where cruelty on the part of the husband was relied upon to
secure a divorce for the wife, made use of the following eloquent words, which are
perhaps even more applicable in a proceeding for separate maintenance in a jurisdiction
where, as here, a divorce cannot be obtained except on the single ground of adultery and
this, too, after the conviction of the guilty spouse in a criminal prosecution for that crime.
Said he:
That the duty of cohabitation is released by the cruelty of one of the parties is
admitted, but the question occurs, What is cruelty? . . .
What merely wounds the mental feelings is in few cases to be admitted where they
are not accompanied with bodily injury, either actual or menaced. Mere austerity of
temper, petulance of manners, rudeness of language, a want of civil attention and
accommodation, even occasional sallies of passion, if they do not threaten bodily
harm, do not amount to legal cruelty: they are high moral offenses in the marriagestate undoubtedly, not innocent surely in any state of life, but still they are not that
cruelty against which the law can relieve. Under such misconduct of either of the
parties, for it may exist on the one side as well as on the other, the suffering party
must bear in some degree the consequences of an injudicious connection; must
subdue by decent resistance or by prudent conciliation; and if this cannot be done,
both must suffer in silence. . . .
The humanity of the court has been loudly and repeatedly invoked. Humanity is the
second virtue of courts, but undoubtedly the first is justice. If it were a question of

humanity simply, and of humanity which confined its views merely to the happiness
of the present parties, it would be a question easily decided upon first impressions.
Every body must feel a wish to sever those who wish to live separate from each
other, who cannot live together with any degree of harmony, and consequently with
any degree of happiness; but my situation does not allow me to indulge the
feelings, much less the first feelings of an individual. The law has said that married
persons shall not be legally separated upon the mere disinclination of one or both
to cohabit together. . . .
To vindicate the policy of the law is no necessary part of the office of a judge; but if
it were, it would not be difficult to show that the law in this respect has acted with
its usual wisdom and humanity with that true wisdom, and that real humanity, that
regards the general interests of mankind. For though in particular cases the
repugnance of the law to dissolve the obligations of matrimonial cohabitation may
operate with great severity upon individual, yet it must be carefully remembered
that the general happiness of the married life is secured by its indissolubility. When
people understand that they must live together, except for a very few reasons
known to the law, they learn to soften by mutual accommodation that yoke which
they know cannot shake off; they become good husbands and good wives form the
necessity of remaining husbands and wives; for necessity is a powerful master in
teaching the duties which it imposes. . . . In this case, as in many others, the
happiness of some individuals must be sacrificed to the greater and more general
good. (Evans vs. Evans, 1 Hag. Con., 35; 161 Eng. Reprint, 466, 467.)
In the light of the considerations stated, it is obvious that the cross-complaint is not well
founded and none of the relief sought therein can be granted.
The same considerations that require the dismissal of the cross-complaint conclusively
prove that the plaintiff, Mariano B. Arroyo, has done nothing to forfeit his right to the marital
society of his wife and that she is under an obligation, both moral and legal, to return to the
common home and cohabit with him. The only question which here arises is as to the
character and extent of the relief which may be properly conceded to him by judicial decree.
The action is one by which the plaintiff seeks the restitution of conjugal rights; and it is
supposed in the petitory part of the complaint that he is entitled to a permanent mandatory
injunction requiring the defendant to return to the conjugal home and live with him as a wife
according to the precepts of law and morality. Of course if such a decree were entered, in
unqualified terms, the defendant would be liable to attachment for contempt, in case she
should refuse to obey it; and, so far as the present writer is aware, the question is raised for
the first time in this jurisdiction whether it is competent for the court to make such an order.
Upon examination of the authorities we are convinced that it is not within the province of the
courts of this country to attempt to compel one of the spouses to cohabit with, and render

conjugal rights to, the other. Of course where the property rights of one of the pair are
invaled, an action for restitution of such rights can be maintained. But we are disinclined to
sanction the doctrine that an order, enforcible by process of contempt, may be entered to
compel the restitution of the purely personal rights of consortium. At best such an order can
be effective for no other purpose than to compel the spouses to live under the same roof;
and the experience of these countries where the court of justice have assumed to compel
the cohabitation of married people shows that the policy of the practice is extremely
questionable. Thus in England, formerly the Ecclesiastical Court entertained suits for the
restitution of conjugal rights at the instance of either husband or wife; and if the facts were
found to warrant it that court would make a mandatory decree, enforcible by process of
contempt in case of disobedience, requiring the delinquent party to live with the other and
render conjugal rights. Yet this practice was sometimes criticized even by the judges who
felt bound to enforce such orders, and in Weldon vs. Weldon (9 P. D., 52), decided in 1883,
Sir James Hannen, President in the Probate, Divorce and Admiralty Division of the High
Court of Justice, expressed his regret that the English law on the subject was not the same
as that which prevailed in Scotland, where a decree of adherence, equivalent to the decree
for the restitution of conjugal rights in England, could be obtained by the injured spouse, but
could not be enforced by imprisonment. Accordingly, in obedience to the growing sentiment
against the practice, the Matrimonial Causes Act (1884) abolished the remedy of
imprisonment; though a decree for the restitution of conjugal rights can still be procured,
and in case of disobedience may serve in appropriate cases as the basis of an order for the
periodical payment of a stipend in the character of alimony.
In the voluminous jurisprudence of the United States, only one court, so far as we can
discover, has ever attempted to make a peremptory order requiring one of the spouses to
live with the other; and that was in a case where a wife was ordered to follow and live with
her husband, who had changed his domicile to the City of New Orleans. The decision
referred to (Gahn vs. Darby, 36 La. Ann., 70) was based on a provision of the Civil Code of
Louisiana similar to article 56 of the Spanish Civil Code. It was decided many years ago,
and the doctrine evidently has not been fruitful even in the State of Louisiana. In other
states of the American Union the idea of enforcing cohabitation by process of contempt is
rejected. (21 Cyc., 1148.)
In a decision of January 2, 1909, the supreme court of Spain appears to have affirmed an
order of the Audencia Territorial de Valladolid requiring a wife to return to the marital
domicile, and in the alternative, upon her failure to do so, to make a particular disposition of
certain money and effects then in her possession and to deliver to her husband, as
administrator of the ganancial property, all income, rents, and interest which might accrue to
her from the property which she had brought to the marriage. (113 Jur. Civ., pp. 1, 11.) but it
does not appear that this order for the return of the wife to the marital domicile was
sanctioned by any other penalty than the consequences that would be visited upon her in
respect to the use and control of her property; and it does not appear that her disobedience
to that order would necessarily have been followed by imprisonment for contempt.

We are therefore unable to hold that Mariano B. Arroyo in this case is entitled to the
unconditional and absolute order for the return of the wife to the marital domicile, which is
sought in the petitory part of the complaint; though he is, without doubt, entitled to a judicial
declaration that his wife has presented herself without sufficient cause and that it is her duty
to return.
Therefore, reversing the judgment appealed from, in respect both to the original complaint
and the cross-bill, it is declared that Dolores Vasquez de Arroyo has absented herself from
the marital home without sufficient cause; and she is admonished that it is her duty to
return. The plaintiff is absolved from the cross-complaint, without special pronouncement as
to costs of either instance. So ordered.

G.R. No. L-19671

November 29, 1965

PASTOR B. TENCHAVEZ, plaintiff-appellant,

vs.
VICENTA F. ESCAO, ET AL., defendants-appellees.
I. V. Binamira & F. B. Barria for plaintiff-appellant.
Jalandoni & Jarnir for defendants-appellees.
REYES, J.B.L., J.:
Direct appeal, on factual and legal questions, from the judgment of the Court of First
Instance of Cebu, in its Civil Case No. R-4177, denying the claim of the plaintiff-appellant,
Pastor B. Tenchavez, for legal separation and one million pesos in damages against his wife
and parents-in-law, the defendants-appellees, Vicente, Mamerto and Mena,1 all surnamed
"Escao," respectively.2
The facts, supported by the evidence of record, are the following:
Missing her late afternoon classes on 24 February 1948 in the University of San Carlos,
Cebu City, where she was then enrolled as a second year student of commerce, Vicenta
Escao, 27 years of age (scion of a well-to-do and socially prominent Filipino family of
Spanish ancestry and a "sheltered colegiala"), exchanged marriage vows with Pastor
Tenchavez, 32 years of age, an engineer, ex-army officer and of undistinguished stock,
without the knowledge of her parents, before a Catholic chaplain, Lt. Moises Lavares, in the
house of one Juan Alburo in the said city. The marriage was the culmination of a previous
love affair and was duly registered with the local civil register.
Vicenta's letters to Pastor, and his to her, before the marriage, indicate that the couple were
deeply in love. Together with a friend, Pacita Noel, their matchmaker and go-between, they
had planned out their marital future whereby Pacita would be the governess of their firstborn; they started saving money in a piggy bank. A few weeks before their secret marriage,
their engagement was broken; Vicenta returned the engagement ring and accepted another
suitor, Joseling Lao. Her love for Pastor beckoned; she pleaded for his return, and they

reconciled. This time they planned to get married and then elope. To facilitate the
elopement, Vicenta had brought some of her clothes to the room of Pacita Noel in St. Mary's
Hall, which was their usual trysting place.

In 1951 Mamerto and Mena Escao filed a petition with the Archbishop of Cebu to annul
their daughter's marriage to Pastor (Exh. "D"). On 10 September 1954, Vicenta sought
papal dispensation of her marriage (Exh. "D"-2).

Although planned for the midnight following their marriage, the elopement did not, however,
materialize because when Vicente went back to her classes after the marriage, her mother,
who got wind of the intended nuptials, was already waiting for her at the college. Vicenta
was taken home where she admitted that she had already married Pastor. Mamerto and
Mena Escao were surprised, because Pastor never asked for the hand of Vicente, and
were disgusted because of the great scandal that the clandestine marriage would provoke
(t.s.n., vol. III, pp. 1105-06). The following morning, the Escao spouses sought priestly
advice. Father Reynes suggested a recelebration to validate what he believed to be an
invalid marriage, from the standpoint of the Church, due to the lack of authority from the
Archbishop or the parish priest for the officiating chaplain to celebrate the marriage. The
recelebration did not take place, because on 26 February 1948 Mamerto Escao was
handed by a maid, whose name he claims he does not remember, a letter purportedly
coming from San Carlos college students and disclosing an amorous relationship between
Pastor Tenchavez and Pacita Noel; Vicenta translated the letter to her father, and thereafter
would not agree to a new marriage. Vicenta and Pastor met that day in the house of Mrs.
Pilar Mendezona. Thereafter, Vicenta continued living with her parents while Pastor
returned to his job in Manila. Her letter of 22 March 1948 (Exh. "M"), while still solicitous of
her husband's welfare, was not as endearing as her previous letters when their love was
aflame.

On 13 September 1954, Vicenta married an American, Russell Leo Moran, in Nevada. She
now lives with him in California, and, by him, has begotten children. She acquired American
citizenship on 8 August 1958.

Vicenta was bred in Catholic ways but is of a changeable disposition, and Pastor knew it.
She fondly accepted her being called a "jellyfish." She was not prevented by her parents
from communicating with Pastor (Exh. "1-Escao"), but her letters became less frequent as
the days passed. As of June, 1948 the newlyweds were already estranged (Exh. "2Escao"). Vicenta had gone to Jimenez, Misamis Occidental, to escape from the scandal
that her marriage stirred in Cebu society. There, a lawyer filed for her a petition, drafted by
then Senator Emmanuel Pelaez, to annul her marriage. She did not sign the petition (Exh.
"B-5"). The case was dismissed without prejudice because of her non-appearance at the
hearing (Exh. "B-4").

The appellant ascribes, as errors of the trial court, the following:

On 24 June 1950, without informing her husband, she applied for a passport, indicating in
her application that she was single, that her purpose was to study, and she was domiciled in
Cebu City, and that she intended to return after two years. The application was approved,
and she left for the United States. On 22 August 1950, she filed a verified complaint for
divorce against the herein plaintiff in the Second Judicial District Court of the State of
Nevada in and for the County of Washoe, on the ground of "extreme cruelty, entirely mental
in character." On 21 October 1950, a decree of divorce, "final and absolute", was issued in
open court by the said tribunal.

But on 30 July 1955, Tenchavez had initiated the proceedings at bar by a complaint in the
Court of First Instance of Cebu, and amended on 31 May 1956, against Vicenta F. Escao,
her parents, Mamerto and Mena Escao, whom he charged with having dissuaded and
discouraged Vicenta from joining her husband, and alienating her affections, and against
the Roman Catholic Church, for having, through its Diocesan Tribunal, decreed the
annulment of the marriage, and asked for legal separation and one million pesos in
damages. Vicenta claimed a valid divorce from plaintiff and an equally valid marriage to her
present husband, Russell Leo Moran; while her parents denied that they had in any way
influenced their daughter's acts, and counterclaimed for moral damages.
The appealed judgment did not decree a legal separation, but freed the plaintiff from
supporting his wife and to acquire property to the exclusion of his wife. It allowed the
counterclaim of Mamerto Escao and Mena Escao for moral and exemplary damages and
attorney's fees against the plaintiff-appellant, to the extent of P45,000.00, and plaintiff
resorted directly to this Court.

1. In not declaring legal separation; in not holding defendant Vicenta F. Escao

liable for damages and in dismissing the complaint;.
2. In not holding the defendant parents Mamerto Escano and the heirs of Doa
Mena Escao liable for damages;.
3 In holding the plaintiff liable for and requiring him to pay the damages to the
defendant parents on their counterclaims; and.
4. In dismissing the complaint and in denying the relief sought by the plaintiff.
That on 24 February 1948 the plaintiff-appellant, Pastor Tenchavez, and the defendantappellee, Vicenta Escao, were validly married to each other, from the standpoint of our civil
law, is clearly established by the record before us. Both parties were then above the age of
majority, and otherwise qualified; and both consented to the marriage, which was performed
by a Catholic priest (army chaplain Lavares) in the presence of competent witnesses. It is

nowhere shown that said priest was not duly authorized under civil law to solemnize
marriages.
The chaplain's alleged lack of ecclesiastical authorization from the parish priest and the
Ordinary, as required by Canon law, is irrelevant in our civil law, not only because of the
separation of Church and State but also because Act 3613 of the Philippine Legislature
(which was the marriage law in force at the time) expressly provided that
SEC. 1. Essential requisites. Essential requisites for marriage are the legal
capacity of the contracting parties and consent. (Emphasis supplied)
The actual authority of the solemnizing officer was thus only a formal requirement, and,
therefore, not essential to give the marriage civil effects,3 and this is emphasized by section
27 of said marriage act, which provided the following:
SEC. 27. Failure to comply with formal requirements. No marriage shall be
declared invalid because of the absence of one or several of the formal
requirements of this Act if, when it was performed, the spouses or one of them
believed in good faith that the person who solemnized the marriage was actually
empowered to do so, and that the marriage was perfectly legal.
The good faith of all the parties to the marriage (and hence the validity of their marriage) will
be presumed until the contrary is positively proved (Lao vs. Dee Tim, 45 Phil. 739, 745;
Francisco vs. Jason, 60 Phil. 442, 448). It is well to note here that in the case at bar, doubts
as to the authority of the solemnizing priest arose only after the marriage, when Vicenta's
parents consulted Father Reynes and the archbishop of Cebu. Moreover, the very act of
Vicenta in abandoning her original action for annulment and subsequently suing for divorce
implies an admission that her marriage to plaintiff was valid and binding.
Defendant Vicenta Escao argues that when she contracted the marriage she was under
the undue influence of Pacita Noel, whom she charges to have been in conspiracy with
appellant Tenchavez. Even granting, for argument's sake, the truth of that contention, and
assuming that Vicenta's consent was vitiated by fraud and undue influence, such vices did
not render her marriage ab initio void, but merely voidable, and the marriage remained valid
until annulled by a competent civil court. This was never done, and admittedly, Vicenta's suit
for annulment in the Court of First Instance of Misamis was dismissed for non-prosecution.
It is equally clear from the record that the valid marriage between Pastor Tenchavez and
Vicenta Escao remained subsisting and undissolved under Philippine law, notwithstanding
the decree of absolute divorce that the wife sought and obtained on 21 October 1950 from
the Second Judicial District Court of Washoe County, State of Nevada, on grounds of
"extreme cruelty, entirely mental in character." At the time the divorce decree was issued,

Vicenta Escao, like her husband, was still a Filipino citizen.4 She was then subject to
Philippine law, and Article 15 of the Civil Code of the Philippines (Rep. Act No. 386), already
in force at the time, expressly provided:
Laws relating to family rights and duties or to the status, condition and legal
capacity of persons are binding upon the citizens of the Philippines, even though
living abroad.
The Civil Code of the Philippines, now in force, does not admit absolute divorce, quo ad
vinculo matrimonii; and in fact does not even use that term, to further emphasize its
restrictive policy on the matter, in contrast to the preceding legislation that admitted absolute
divorce on grounds of adultery of the wife or concubinage of the husband (Act 2710).
Instead of divorce, the present Civil Code only provides for legal separation (Title IV, Book
1, Arts. 97 to 108), and, even in that case, it expressly prescribes that "the marriage bonds
shall not be severed" (Art. 106, subpar. 1).
For the Philippine courts to recognize and give recognition or effect to a foreign decree of
absolute divorce betiveen Filipino citizens could be a patent violation of the declared public
policy of the state, specially in view of the third paragraph of Article 17 of the Civil Code that
prescribes the following:
Prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts or property, and those which have
for their object public order, policy and good customs, shall not be rendered
ineffective by laws or judgments promulgated, or by determinations or conventions
agreed upon in a foreign country.
Even more, the grant of effectivity in this jurisdiction to such foreign divorce decrees would,
in effect, give rise to an irritating and scandalous discrimination in favor of wealthy citizens,
to the detriment of those members of our polity whose means do not permit them to sojourn
abroad and obtain absolute divorces outside the Philippines.
From this point of view, it is irrelevant that appellant Pastor Tenchavez should have
appeared in the Nevada divorce court. Primarily because the policy of our law cannot be
nullified by acts of private parties (Civil Code,Art. 17, jam quot.); and additionally, because
the mere appearance of a non-resident consort cannot confer jurisdiction where the court
originally had none (Area vs. Javier, 95 Phil. 579).
From the preceding facts and considerations, there flows as a necessary consequence that
in this jurisdiction Vicenta Escao's divorce and second marriage are not entitled to
recognition as valid; for her previous union to plaintiff Tenchavez must be declared to be
existent and undissolved. It follows, likewise, that her refusal to perform her wifely duties,
and her denial of consortium and her desertion of her husband constitute in law a wrong

caused through her fault, for which the husband is entitled to the corresponding indemnity
(Civil Code, Art. 2176). Neither an unsubstantiated charge of deceit nor an anonymous letter
charging immorality against the husband constitute, contrary to her claim, adequate excuse.
Wherefore, her marriage and cohabitation with Russell Leo Moran is technically "intercourse
with a person not her husband" from the standpoint of Philippine Law, and entitles plaintiffappellant Tenchavez to a decree of "legal separation under our law, on the basis of adultery"
(Revised Penal Code, Art. 333).
The foregoing conclusions as to the untoward effect of a marriage after an invalid divorce
are in accord with the previous doctrines and rulings of this court on the subject, particularly
those that were rendered under our laws prior to the approval of the absolute divorce act
(Act 2710 of the Philippine Legislature). As a matter of legal history, our statutes did not
recognize divorces a vinculo before 1917, when Act 2710 became effective; and the present
Civil Code of the Philippines, in disregarding absolute divorces, in effect merely reverted to
the policies on the subject prevailing before Act 2710. The rulings, therefore, under the Civil
Code of 1889, prior to the Act above-mentioned, are now, fully applicable. Of these, the
decision in Ramirez vs. Gmur, 42 Phil. 855, is of particular interest. Said this Court in that
case:
As the divorce granted by the French Court must be ignored, it results that the
marriage of Dr. Mory and Leona Castro, celebrated in London in 1905, could not
legalize their relations; and the circumstance that they afterwards passed for
husband and wife in Switzerland until her death is wholly without legal significance.
The claims of the very children to participate in the estate of Samuel Bishop must
therefore be rejected. The right to inherit is limited to legitimate, legitimated and
acknowledged natural children. The children of adulterous relations are wholly
excluded. The word "descendants" as used in Article 941 of the Civil Code cannot
be interpreted to include illegitimates born of adulterous relations. (Emphasis
supplied)
Except for the fact that the successional rights of the children, begotten from Vicenta's
marriage to Leo Moran after the invalid divorce, are not involved in the case at bar,
the Gmur case is authority for the proposition that such union is adulterous in this
jurisdiction, and, therefore, justifies an action for legal separation on the part of the innocent
consort of the first marriage, that stands undissolved in Philippine law. In not so declaring,
the trial court committed error.
True it is that our ruling gives rise to anomalous situations where the status of a person
(whether divorced or not) would depend on the territory where the question arises.
Anomalies of this kind are not new in the Philippines, and the answer to them was given
in Barretto vs. Gonzales, 58 Phil. 667:

The hardship of the existing divorce laws in the Philippine Islands are well known
to the members of the Legislature. It is the duty of the Courts to enforce the laws of
divorce as written by Legislature if they are constitutional. Courts have no right to
say that such laws are too strict or too liberal. (p. 72)
The appellant's first assignment of error is, therefore, sustained.
However, the plaintiff-appellant's charge that his wife's parents, Dr. Mamerto Escao and his
wife, the late Doa Mena Escao, alienated the affections of their daughter and influenced
her conduct toward her husband are not supported by credible evidence. The testimony of
Pastor Tenchavez about the Escao's animosity toward him strikes us to be merely
conjecture and exaggeration, and are belied by Pastor's own letters written before this suit
was begun (Exh. "2-Escao" and "Vicenta," Rec. on App., pp. 270-274). In these letters he
expressly apologized to the defendants for "misjudging them" and for the "great
unhappiness" caused by his "impulsive blunders" and "sinful pride," "effrontery and
audacity" [sic]. Plaintiff was admitted to the Escao house to visit and court Vicenta, and the
record shows nothing to prove that he would not have been accepted to marry Vicente had
he openly asked for her hand, as good manners and breeding demanded. Even after
learning of the clandestine marriage, and despite their shock at such unexpected event, the
parents of Vicenta proposed and arranged that the marriage be recelebrated in strict
conformity with the canons of their religion upon advice that the previous one was
canonically defective. If no recelebration of the marriage ceremony was had it was not due
to defendants Mamerto Escao and his wife, but to the refusal of Vicenta to proceed with it.
That the spouses Escao did not seek to compel or induce their daughter to assent to the
recelebration but respected her decision, or that they abided by her resolve, does not
constitute in law an alienation of affections. Neither does the fact that Vicenta's parents sent
her money while she was in the United States; for it was natural that they should not wish
their daughter to live in penury even if they did not concur in her decision to divorce
Tenchavez (27 Am. Jur. 130-132).
There is no evidence that the parents of Vicenta, out of improper motives, aided and
abetted her original suit for annulment, or her subsequent divorce; she appears to have
acted independently, and being of age, she was entitled to judge what was best for her and
ask that her decisions be respected. Her parents, in so doing, certainly cannot be charged
with alienation of affections in the absence of malice or unworthy motives, which have not
been shown, good faith being always presumed until the contrary is proved.
SEC. 529. Liability of Parents, Guardians or Kin. The law distinguishes between
the right of a parent to interest himself in the marital affairs of his child and the
absence of rights in a stranger to intermeddle in such affairs. However, such
distinction between the liability of parents and that of strangers is only in regard to
what will justify interference. A parent isliable for alienation of affections resulting
from his own malicious conduct, as where he wrongfully entices his son or

daughter to leave his or her spouse, but he is not liable unless he acts maliciously,
without justification and from unworthy motives. He is not liable where he acts and
advises his child in good faith with respect to his child's marital relations in the
interest of his child as he sees it, the marriage of his child not terminating his right
and liberty to interest himself in, and be extremely solicitous for, his child's welfare
and happiness, even where his conduct and advice suggest or result in the
separation of the spouses or the obtaining of a divorce or annulment, or where he
acts under mistake or misinformation, or where his advice or interference are
indiscreet or unfortunate, although it has been held that the parent is liable for
consequences resulting from recklessness. He may in good faith take his child into
his home and afford him or her protection and support, so long as he has not
maliciously enticed his child away, or does not maliciously entice or cause him or
her to stay away, from his or her spouse. This rule has more frequently been
applied in the case of advice given to a married daughter, but it is equally
applicable in the case of advice given to a son.
Plaintiff Tenchavez, in falsely charging Vicenta's aged parents with racial or social
discrimination and with having exerted efforts and pressured her to seek annulment and
divorce, unquestionably caused them unrest and anxiety, entitling them to recover
damages. While this suit may not have been impelled by actual malice, the charges were
certainly reckless in the face of the proven facts and circumstances. Court actions are not
established for parties to give vent to their prejudices or spleen.
In the assessment of the moral damages recoverable by appellant Pastor Tenchavez from
defendant Vicente Escao, it is proper to take into account, against his patently
unreasonable claim for a million pesos in damages, that (a) the marriage was celebrated in
secret, and its failure was not characterized by publicity or undue humiliation on appellant's
part; (b) that the parties never lived together; and (c) that there is evidence that appellant
had originally agreed to the annulment of the marriage, although such a promise was legally
invalid, being against public policy (cf. Art. 88, Civ. Code). While appellant is unable to
remarry under our law, this fact is a consequence of the indissoluble character of the union
that appellant entered into voluntarily and with open eyes rather than of her divorce and her
second marriage. All told, we are of the opinion that appellant should recover P25,000 only
by way of moral damages and attorney's fees.
With regard to the P45,000 damages awarded to the defendants, Dr. Mamerto Escao and
Mena Escao, by the court below, we opine that the same are excessive. While the filing of
this unfounded suit must have wounded said defendants' feelings and caused them anxiety,
the same could in no way have seriously injured their reputation, or otherwise prejudiced
them, lawsuits having become a common occurrence in present society. What is important,
and has been correctly established in the decision of the court below, is that said
defendants were not guilty of any improper conduct in the whole deplorable affair. This
Court, therefore, reduces the damages awarded to P5,000 only.

Summing up, the Court rules:

(1) That a foreign divorce between Filipino citizens, sought and decreed after the effectivity
of the present Civil Code (Rep. Act 386), is not entitled to recognition as valid in this
jurisdiction; and neither is the marriage contracted with another party by the divorced
consort, subsequently to the foreign decree of divorce, entitled to validity in the country;
(2) That the remarriage of divorced wife and her co-habitation with a person other than the
lawful husband entitle the latter to a decree of legal separation conformably to Philippine
law;
(3) That the desertion and securing of an invalid divorce decree by one consort entitles the
other to recover damages;
(4) That an action for alienation of affections against the parents of one consort does not lie
in the absence of proof of malice or unworthy motives on their part.
WHEREFORE, the decision under appeal is hereby modified as follows;
(1) Adjudging plaintiff-appellant Pastor Tenchavez entitled to a decree of legal separation
from defendant Vicenta F. Escao;
(2) Sentencing defendant-appellee Vicenta Escao to pay plaintiff-appellant Tenchavez the
amount of P25,000 for damages and attorneys' fees;
(3) Sentencing appellant Pastor Tenchavez to pay the appellee, Mamerto Escao and the
estate of his wife, the deceased Mena Escao, P5,000 by way of damages and attorneys'
fees.
Neither party to recover costs.

the error committed which, in such a case, is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. 1 Prohibition
would then lie since it would be useless and a waste of time to go ahead with the
proceedings. 2 Weconsider the petition filed in this case within the exception, and we have
given it due course.
G.R. No. L-68470 October 8, 1985
ALICE REYES VAN DORN, petitioner,
vs.
HON. MANUEL V. ROMILLO, JR., as Presiding Judge of Branch CX, Regional Trial
Court of the National Capital Region Pasay City and RICHARD UPTON respondents.

For resolution is the effect of the foreign divorce on the parties and their alleged conjugal
property in the Philippines.

MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:\

Petitioner contends that respondent is estopped from laying claim on the alleged conjugal
property because of the representation he made in the divorce proceedings before the
American Court that they had no community of property; that the Galleon Shop was not
established through conjugal funds, and that respondent's claim is barred by prior judgment.

In this Petition for certiorari and Prohibition, petitioner Alice Reyes Van Dorn seeks to set
aside the Orders, dated September 15, 1983 and August 3, 1984, in Civil Case No. 1075-P,
issued by respondent Judge, which denied her Motion to Dismiss said case, and her Motion
for Reconsideration of the Dismissal Order, respectively.

For his part, respondent avers that the Divorce Decree issued by the Nevada Court cannot
prevail over the prohibitive laws of the Philippines and its declared national policy; that the
acts and declaration of a foreign Court cannot, especially if the same is contrary to public
policy, divest Philippine Courts of jurisdiction to entertain matters within its jurisdiction.

The basic background facts are that petitioner is a citizen of the Philippines while private
respondent is a citizen of the United States; that they were married in Hongkong in 1972;
that, after the marriage, they established their residence in the Philippines; that they begot
two children born on April 4, 1973 and December 18, 1975, respectively; that the parties
were divorced in Nevada, United States, in 1982; and that petitioner has re-married also in
Nevada, this time to Theodore Van Dorn.

For the resolution of this case, it is not necessary to determine whether the property
relations between petitioner and private respondent, after their marriage, were upon
absolute or relative community property, upon complete separation of property, or upon any
other regime. The pivotal fact in this case is the Nevada divorce of the parties.

Dated June 8, 1983, private respondent filed suit against petitioner in Civil Case No. 1075-P
of the Regional Trial Court, Branch CXV, in Pasay City, stating that petitioner's business in
Ermita, Manila, (the Galleon Shop, for short), is conjugal property of the parties, and asking
that petitioner be ordered to render an accounting of that business, and that private
respondent be declared with right to manage the conjugal property. Petitioner moved to
dismiss the case on the ground that the cause of action is barred by previous judgment in
the divorce proceedings before the Nevada Court wherein respondent had acknowledged
that he and petitioner had "no community property" as of June 11, 1982. The Court below
denied the Motion to Dismiss in the mentioned case on the ground that the property
involved is located in the Philippines so that the Divorce Decree has no bearing in the case.
The denial is now the subject of this certiorari proceeding.
Generally, the denial of a Motion to Dismiss in a civil case is interlocutory and is not subject
to appeal. certiorari and Prohibition are neither the remedies to question the propriety of an
interlocutory order of the trial Court. However, when a grave abuse of discretion was
patently committed, or the lower Court acted capriciously and whimsically, then it devolves
upon this Court in a certiorari proceeding to exercise its supervisory authority and to correct

The Nevada District Court, which decreed the divorce, had obtained jurisdiction over
petitioner who appeared in person before the Court during the trial of the case. It also
obtained jurisdiction over private respondent who, giving his address as No. 381 Bush
Street, San Francisco, California, authorized his attorneys in the divorce case, Karp & Gradt
Ltd., to agree to the divorce on the ground of incompatibility in the understanding that there
were neither community property nor community obligations. 3 As explicitly stated in the
Power of Attorney he executed in favor of the law firm of KARP & GRAD LTD., 336 W.
Liberty, Reno, Nevada, to represent him in the divorce proceedings:
xxx xxx xxx
You are hereby authorized to accept service of Summons, to file an
Answer, appear on my behalf and do an things necessary and proper to
represent me, without further contesting, subject to the following:
1. That my spouse seeks a divorce on the ground of incompatibility.
2. That there is no community of property to be adjudicated by the Court.

3. 'I'hat there are no community obligations to be adjudicated by the court.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is granted, and respondent Judge is hereby ordered to dismiss
the Complaint filed in Civil Case No. 1075-P of his Court.

xxx xxx xxx 4

Without costs.
There can be no question as to the validity of that Nevada divorce in any of the States of the
United States. The decree is binding on private respondent as an American citizen. For
instance, private respondent cannot sue petitioner, as her husband, in any State of the
Union. What he is contending in this case is that the divorce is not valid and binding in this
jurisdiction, the same being contrary to local law and public policy.
It is true that owing to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code, 5 only
Philippine nationals are covered by the policy against absolute divorces the same being
considered contrary to our concept of public police and morality. However, aliens may obtain
divorces abroad, which may be recognized in the Philippines, provided they are valid
according to their national law. 6 In this case, the divorce in Nevada released private
respondent from the marriage from the standards of American law, under which divorce
dissolves the marriage. As stated by the Federal Supreme Court of the United States in
Atherton vs. Atherton, 45 L. Ed. 794, 799:
The purpose and effect of a decree of divorce from the bond of matrimony
by a court of competent jurisdiction are to change the existing status or
domestic relation of husband and wife, and to free them both from the
bond. The marriage tie when thus severed as to one party, ceases to bind
either. A husband without a wife, or a wife without a husband, is unknown
to the law. When the law provides, in the nature of a penalty. that the
guilty party shall not marry again, that party, as well as the other, is still
absolutely freed from the bond of the former marriage.
Thus, pursuant to his national law, private respondent is no longer the husband of petitioner.
He would have no standing to sue in the case below as petitioner's husband entitled to
exercise control over conjugal assets. As he is bound by the Decision of his own country's
Court, which validly exercised jurisdiction over him, and whose decision he does not
repudiate, he is estopped by his own representation before said Court from asserting his
right over the alleged conjugal property.
To maintain, as private respondent does, that, under our laws, petitioner has to be
considered still married to private respondent and still subject to a wife's obligations under
Article 109, et. seq. of the Civil Code cannot be just. Petitioner should not be obliged to live
together with, observe respect and fidelity, and render support to private respondent. The
latter should not continue to be one of her heirs with possible rights to conjugal property.
She should not be discriminated against in her own country if the ends of justice are to be
served.

SO ORDERED.

After about three and a half years of marriage, such connubial disharmony eventuated in
private respondent initiating a divorce proceeding against petitioner in Germany before the
Schoneberg Local Court in January, 1983. He claimed that there was failure of their
marriage and that they had been living apart since April, 1982. 2
Petitioner, on the other hand, filed an action for legal separation, support and separation of
property before the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch XXXII, on January 23, 1983
where the same is still pending as Civil Case No. 83-15866. 3
On January 15, 1986, Division 20 of the Schoneberg Local Court, Federal Republic of
Germany, promulgated a decree of divorce on the ground of failure of marriage of the
spouses. The custody of the child was granted to petitioner. The records show that under
German law said court was locally and internationally competent for the divorce proceeding
and that the dissolution of said marriage was legally founded on and authorized by the
applicable law of that foreign jurisdiction. 4

G.R. No. 80116 June 30, 1989

IMELDA MANALAYSAY PILAPIL, petitioner,
vs.
HON. CORONA IBAY-SOMERA, in her capacity as Presiding Judge of the Regional
Trial Court of Manila, Branch XXVI; HON. LUIS C. VICTOR, in his capacity as the City
Fiscal of Manila; and ERICH EKKEHARD GEILING, respondents.
REGALADO, J.:
An ill-starred marriage of a Filipina and a foreigner which ended in a foreign absolute
divorce, only to be followed by a criminal infidelity suit of the latter against the former,
provides Us the opportunity to lay down a decisional rule on what hitherto appears to be an
unresolved jurisdictional question.
On September 7, 1979, petitioner Imelda Manalaysay Pilapil, a Filipino citizen, and private
respondent Erich Ekkehard Geiling, a German national, were married before the Registrar
of Births, Marriages and Deaths at Friedensweiler in the Federal Republic of Germany. The
marriage started auspiciously enough, and the couple lived together for some time in
Malate, Manila where their only child, Isabella Pilapil Geiling, was born on April 20, 1980. 1
Thereafter, marital discord set in, with mutual recriminations between the spouses, followed
by a separation de facto between them.

On June 27, 1986, or more than five months after the issuance of the divorce decree,
private respondent filed two complaints for adultery before the City Fiscal of Manila alleging
that, while still married to said respondent, petitioner "had an affair with a certain William
Chia as early as 1982 and with yet another man named Jesus Chua sometime in 1983".
Assistant Fiscal Jacinto A. de los Reyes, Jr., after the corresponding investigation,
recommended the dismissal of the cases on the ground of insufficiency of
evidence. 5 However, upon review, the respondent city fiscal approved a resolution, dated
January 8, 1986, directing the filing of two complaints for adultery against the
petitioner. 6 The complaints were accordingly filed and were eventually raffled to two
branches of the Regional Trial Court of Manila. The case entitled "People of the Philippines
vs. Imelda Pilapil and William Chia", docketed as Criminal Case No. 87-52435, was
assigned to Branch XXVI presided by the respondent judge; while the other case, "People
of the Philippines vs. Imelda Pilapil and James Chua", docketed as Criminal Case No. 8752434 went to the sala of Judge Leonardo Cruz, Branch XXV, of the same court. 7
On March 14, 1987, petitioner filed a petition with the Secretary of Justice asking that the
aforesaid resolution of respondent fiscal be set aside and the cases against her be
dismissed. 8 A similar petition was filed by James Chua, her co-accused in Criminal Case
No. 87-52434. The Secretary of Justice, through the Chief State Prosecutor, gave due
course to both petitions and directed the respondent city fiscal to inform the Department of
Justice "if the accused have already been arraigned and if not yet arraigned, to move to
defer further proceedings" and to elevate the entire records of both cases to his office for
review. 9
Petitioner thereafter filed a motion in both criminal cases to defer her arraignment and to
suspend further proceedings thereon. 10 As a consequence, Judge Leonardo Cruz
suspended proceedings in Criminal Case No. 87-52434. On the other hand, respondent

judge merely reset the date of the arraignment in Criminal Case No. 87-52435 to April 6,
1987. Before such scheduled date, petitioner moved for the cancellation of the arraignment
and for the suspension of proceedings in said Criminal Case No. 87-52435 until after the
resolution of the petition for review then pending before the Secretary of Justice. 11 A motion
to quash was also filed in the same case on the ground of lack of jurisdiction, 12 which
motion was denied by the respondent judge in an order dated September 8, 1987. The
same order also directed the arraignment of both accused therein, that is, petitioner and
William Chia. The latter entered a plea of not guilty while the petitioner refused to be
arraigned. Such refusal of the petitioner being considered by respondent judge as direct
contempt, she and her counsel were fined and the former was ordered detained until she
submitted herself for arraignment. 13 Later, private respondent entered a plea of not guilty. 14
On October 27, 1987, petitioner filed this special civil action for certiorari and prohibition,
with a prayer for a temporary restraining order, seeking the annulment of the order of the
lower court denying her motion to quash. The petition is anchored on the main ground that
the court is without jurisdiction "to try and decide the charge of adultery, which is a private
offense that cannot be prosecuted de officio (sic), since the purported complainant, a
foreigner, does not qualify as an offended spouse having obtained a final divorce decree
under his national law prior to his filing the criminal complaint." 15
On October 21, 1987, this Court issued a temporary restraining order enjoining the
respondents from implementing the aforesaid order of September 8, 1987 and from further
proceeding with Criminal Case No. 87-52435. Subsequently, on March 23, 1988 Secretary
of Justice Sedfrey A. Ordoez acted on the aforesaid petitions for review and, upholding
petitioner's ratiocinations, issued a resolution directing the respondent city fiscal to move for
the dismissal of the complaints against the petitioner. 16
We find this petition meritorious. The writs prayed for shall accordingly issue.
Under Article 344 of the Revised Penal Code, 17 the crime of adultery, as well as four other
crimes against chastity, cannot be prosecuted except upon a sworn written complaint filed
by the offended spouse. It has long since been established, with unwavering consistency,
that compliance with this rule is a jurisdictional, and not merely a formal,
requirement. 18 While in point of strict law the jurisdiction of the court over the offense is
vested in it by the Judiciary Law, the requirement for a sworn written complaint is just as
jurisdictional a mandate since it is that complaint which starts the prosecutory
proceeding 19 and without which the court cannot exercise its jurisdiction to try the case.
Now, the law specifically provides that in prosecutions for adultery and concubinage the
person who can legally file the complaint should be the offended spouse, and nobody else.
Unlike the offenses of seduction, abduction, rape and acts of lasciviousness, no provision is
made for the prosecution of the crimes of adultery and concubinage by the parents,
grandparents or guardian of the offended party. The so-called exclusive and successive rule

in the prosecution of the first four offenses above mentioned do not apply to adultery and
concubinage. It is significant that while the State, as parens patriae, was added and vested
by the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure with the power to initiate the criminal action for a
deceased or incapacitated victim in the aforesaid offenses of seduction, abduction, rape and
acts of lasciviousness, in default of her parents, grandparents or guardian, such amendment
did not include the crimes of adultery and concubinage. In other words, only the offended
spouse, and no other, is authorized by law to initiate the action therefor.
Corollary to such exclusive grant of power to the offended spouse to institute the action, it
necessarily follows that such initiator must have the status, capacity or legal representation
to do so at the time of the filing of the criminal action. This is a familiar and express rule in
civil actions; in fact, lack of legal capacity to sue, as a ground for a motion to dismiss in civil
cases, is determined as of the filing of the complaint or petition.
The absence of an equivalent explicit rule in the prosecution of criminal cases does not
mean that the same requirement and rationale would not apply. Understandably, it may not
have been found necessary since criminal actions are generally and fundamentally
commenced by the State, through the People of the Philippines, the offended party being
merely the complaining witness therein. However, in the so-called "private crimes" or those
which cannot be prosecuted de oficio, and the present prosecution for adultery is of such
genre, the offended spouse assumes a more predominant role since the right to commence
the action, or to refrain therefrom, is a matter exclusively within his power and option.
This policy was adopted out of consideration for the aggrieved party who might prefer to
suffer the outrage in silence rather than go through the scandal of a public trial. 20 Hence, as
cogently argued by petitioner, Article 344 of the Revised Penal Code thus presupposes that
the marital relationship is still subsisting at the time of the institution of the criminal action
for, adultery. This is a logical consequence since the raison d'etre of said provision of law
would be absent where the supposed offended party had ceased to be the spouse of the
alleged offender at the time of the filing of the criminal case. 21
In these cases, therefore, it is indispensable that the status and capacity of the complainant
to commence the action be definitely established and, as already demonstrated, such status
or capacity must indubitably exist as of the time he initiates the action. It would be absurd if
his capacity to bring the action would be determined by his status before or subsequent to
the commencement thereof, where such capacity or status existed prior to but ceased
before, or was acquired subsequent to but did not exist at the time of, the institution of the
case. We would thereby have the anomalous spectacle of a party bringing suit at the very
time when he is without the legal capacity to do so.
To repeat, there does not appear to be any local precedential jurisprudence on the specific
issue as to when precisely the status of a complainant as an offended spouse must exist
where a criminal prosecution can be commenced only by one who in law can be

categorized as possessed of such status. Stated differently and with reference to the
present case, the inquiry ;would be whether it is necessary in the commencement of a
criminal action for adultery that the marital bonds between the complainant and the accused
be unsevered and existing at the time of the institution of the action by the former against
the latter.
American jurisprudence, on cases involving statutes in that jurisdiction which are in pari
materia with ours, yields the rule that after a divorce has been decreed, the innocent
spouse no longer has the right to institute proceedings against the offenders where the
statute provides that the innocent spouse shall have the exclusive right to institute a
prosecution for adultery. Where, however, proceedings have been properly commenced, a
divorce subsequently granted can have no legal effect on the prosecution of the criminal
proceedings to a conclusion. 22

granted the right to manage the business. Rejecting his pretensions, this Court
perspicuously demonstrated the error of such stance, thus:
There can be no question as to the validity of that Nevada divorce in any
of the States of the United States. The decree is binding on private
respondent as an American citizen. For instance, private respondent
cannot sue petitioner, as her husband, in any State of the Union. ...
It is true that owing to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of
the Civil Code, only Philippine nationals are covered by the policy against
absolute divorces the same being considered contrary to our concept of
public policy and morality. However, aliens may obtain divorces abroad,
which may be recognized in the Philippines, provided they are valid
according to their national law. ...

In the cited Loftus case, the Supreme Court of Iowa held that
'No prosecution for adultery can be commenced except on the complaint
of the husband or wife.' Section 4932, Code. Though Loftus was husband
of defendant when the offense is said to have been committed, he had
ceased to be such when the prosecution was begun; and appellant insists
that his status was not such as to entitle him to make the complaint. We
have repeatedly said that the offense is against the unoffending spouse,
as well as the state, in explaining the reason for this provision in the
statute; and we are of the opinion that the unoffending spouse must be
such when the prosecution is commenced. (Emphasis supplied.)
We see no reason why the same doctrinal rule should not apply in this case and in our
jurisdiction, considering our statutory law and jural policy on the matter. We are convinced
that in cases of such nature, the status of the complainant vis-a-vis the accused must be
determined as of the time the complaint was filed. Thus, the person who initiates the
adultery case must be an offended spouse, and by this is meant that he is still married to
the accused spouse, at the time of the filing of the complaint.
In the present case, the fact that private respondent obtained a valid divorce in his country,
the Federal Republic of Germany, is admitted. Said divorce and its legal effects may be
recognized in the Philippines insofar as private respondent is concerned 23 in view of the
nationality principle in our civil law on the matter of status of persons.
Thus, in the recent case of Van Dorn vs. Romillo, Jr., et al., 24 after a divorce was granted by
a United States court between Alice Van Dornja Filipina, and her American husband, the
latter filed a civil case in a trial court here alleging that her business concern was conjugal
property and praying that she be ordered to render an accounting and that the plaintiff be

Thus, pursuant to his national law, private respondent is no longer the

husband of petitioner. He would have no standing to sue in the case
below as petitioner's husband entitled to exercise control over conjugal
assets. ... 25
Under the same considerations and rationale, private respondent, being no longer the
husband of petitioner, had no legal standing to commence the adultery case under the
imposture that he was the offended spouse at the time he filed suit.
The allegation of private respondent that he could not have brought this case before the
decree of divorce for lack of knowledge, even if true, is of no legal significance or
consequence in this case. When said respondent initiated the divorce proceeding, he
obviously knew that there would no longer be a family nor marriage vows to protect once a
dissolution of the marriage is decreed. Neither would there be a danger of introducing
spurious heirs into the family, which is said to be one of the reasons for the particular
formulation of our law on adultery, 26 since there would thenceforth be no spousal
relationship to speak of. The severance of the marital bond had the effect of dissociating the
former spouses from each other, hence the actuations of one would not affect or cast
obloquy on the other.
The aforecited case of United States vs. Mata cannot be successfully relied upon by private
respondent. In applying Article 433 of the old Penal Code, substantially the same as Article
333 of the Revised Penal Code, which punished adultery "although the marriage be
afterwards declared void", the Court merely stated that "the lawmakers intended to declare
adulterous the infidelity of a married woman to her marital vows, even though it should be
made to appear that she is entitled to have her marriage contract declared null and void,
until and unless she actually secures a formal judicial declaration to that effect". Definitely, it
cannot be logically inferred therefrom that the complaint can still be filed after the

declaration of nullity because such declaration that the marriage is void ab initio is
equivalent to stating that it never existed. There being no marriage from the beginning, any
complaint for adultery filed after said declaration of nullity would no longer have a leg to
stand on. Moreover, what was consequently contemplated and within the purview of the
decision in said case is the situation where the criminal action for adultery was
filed before the termination of the marriage by a judicial declaration of its nullity ab initio. The
same rule and requisite would necessarily apply where the termination of the marriage was
effected, as in this case, by a valid foreign divorce.
Private respondent's invocation of Donio-Teves, et al. vs. Vamenta, hereinbefore
cited, 27 must suffer the same fate of inapplicability. A cursory reading of said case reveals
that the offended spouse therein had duly and seasonably filed a complaint for adultery,
although an issue was raised as to its sufficiency but which was resolved in favor of the
complainant. Said case did not involve a factual situation akin to the one at bar or any issue
determinative of the controversy herein.
WHEREFORE, the questioned order denying petitioner's motion to quash is SET
ASIDE and another one enteredDISMISSING the complaint in Criminal Case No. 87-52435
for lack of jurisdiction. The temporary restraining order issued in this case on October 21,
1987 is hereby made permanent.
SO ORDERED.

BELLOSILLO, J .:
FE D. QUITA and Arturo T. Padlan, both Filipinos, were married in the Philippines on
18 May 1941. They were not however blessed with children. Somewhere along the way
their relationship soured.Eventually Fe sued Arturo for divorce in San Francisco, California,
U.S.A. She submitted in the divorce proceedings a private writing dated 19 July 1950
evidencing their agreement to live separately from each other and a settlement of their
conjugal properties. On 23 July 1954 she obtained a final judgment of divorce. Three (3)
weeks thereafter she married a certain Felix Tupaz in the same locality but their relationship
also ended in a divorce. Still in the U.S.A., she married for the third time, to a certain
Wernimont.
On 16 April 1972 Arturo died. He left no will. On 31 August 1972 Lino Javier Inciong
filed a petition with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City for issuance of letters of
administration concerning the estate of Arturo in favor of the Philippine Trust
Company. Respondent Blandina Dandan (also referred to as Blandina Padlan), claiming to
be the surviving spouse of Arturo Padlan, and Claro, Alexis, Ricardo, Emmanuel, Zenaida
and Yolanda, all surnamed Padlan, named in the petition as surviving children of Arturo
Padlan, opposed the petition and prayed for the appointment instead of Atty. Leonardo
Cabasal, which was resolved in favor of the latter. Upon motion of the oppositors
themselves, Atty. Cabasal was later replaced by Higino Castillon. On 30 April 1973 the
oppositors (Blandina and the Padlan children) submitted certified photocopies of the 19 July
1950 private writing and the final judgment of divorce between petitioner and Arturo. Later
Ruperto T. Padlan, claiming to be the sole surviving brother of the deceased Arturo,
intervened.
On 7 October 1987 petitioner moved for the immediate declaration of heirs of the
decedent and the distribution of his estate. At the scheduled hearing on 23 October 1987,
private respondent as well as the six (6) Padlan children and Ruperto failed to appear
despite due notice. On the same day, the trial court required the submission of the records
of birth of the Padlan children within ten (10) days from receipt thereof, after which, with or
without the documents, the issue on the declaration of heirs would be considered submitted
for resolution. The prescribed period lapsed without the required documents being
submitted.

[G.R. No. 124862. December 22, 1998]

FE

D.

QUITA, petitioner, vs.

DANDAN,* respondents.

COURT

OF

DECISION

APPEALS

and

BLANDINA

The trial court invoking Tenchavez v. Escao[1] which held that "a foreign divorce
between Filipino citizens sought and decreed after the effectivity of the present Civil Code
(Rep. Act 386) was not entitled to recognition as valid in this jurisdiction,"[2] disregarded the
divorce between petitioner and Arturo. Consequently, it expressed the view that their
marriage subsisted until the death of Arturo in 1972.Neither did it consider valid their
extrajudicial settlement of conjugal properties due to lack of judicial approval. [3] On the other
hand, it opined that there was no showing that marriage existed between private respondent
and Arturo, much less was it shown that the alleged Padlan children had been

acknowledged by the deceased as his children with her. As regards Ruperto, it found that
he was a brother of Arturo.On 27 November 1987[4] only petitioner and Ruperto were
declared the intestate heirs of Arturo. Accordingly, equal adjudication of the net hereditary
estate was ordered in favor of the two intestate heirs.[5]
On motion for reconsideration, Blandina and the Padlan children were allowed to
present proofs that the recognition of the children by the deceased as his legitimate
children, except Alexis who was recognized as his illegitimate child, had been made in their
respective records of birth. Thus on 15 February 1988[6] partial reconsideration was granted
declaring the Padlan children, with the exception of Alexis, entitled to one-half of the estate
to the exclusion of Ruperto Padlan, and petitioner to the other half. [7] Private respondent
was not declared an heir. Although it was stated in the aforementioned records of birth that
she and Arturo were married on 22 April 1947, their marriage was clearly void since it was
celebrated during the existence of his previous marriage to petitioner.
In their appeal to the Court of Appeals, Blandina and her children assigned as one of
the errors allegedly committed by the trial court the circumstance that the case was decided
without a hearing, in violation of Sec. 1, Rule 90, of the Rules of Court, which provides
that if there is a controversy before the court as to who are the lawful heirs of the deceased
person or as to the distributive shares to which each person is entitled under the law, the
controversy shall be heard and decided as in ordinary cases.
Respondent appellate court found this ground alone sufficient to sustain the appeal;
hence, on 11 September 1995 it declared null and void the 27 November 1987 decision and
15 February 1988 order of the trial court, and directed the remand of the case to the trial
court for further proceedings.[8] On 18 April 1996 it denied reconsideration.[9]
Should this case be remanded to the lower court for further proceedings? Petitioner
insists that there is no need because, first, no legal or factual issue obtains for resolution
either as to the heirship of the Padlan children or as to their respective shares in the
intestate estate of the decedent; and, second, the issue as to who between petitioner and
private respondent is the proper heir of the decedent is one of law which can be resolved in
the present petition based on established facts and admissions of the parties.
We cannot sustain petitioner. The provision relied upon by respondent court is clear: If
there is a controversy before the court as to who are the lawful heirs of the deceased
person or as to the distributive shares to which each person is entitled under the law, the
controversy shall be heard and decided as in ordinary cases.
We agree with petitioner that no dispute exists either as to the right of the six (6)
Padlan children to inherit from the decedent because there are proofs that they have been
duly acknowledged by him and petitioner herself even recognizes them as heirs of Arturo
Padlan;[10] nor as to their respective hereditary shares. But controversy remains as to who is

the legitimate surviving spouse of Arturo. The trial court, after the parties other than
petitioner failed to appear during the scheduled hearing on 23 October 1987 of the motion
for immediate declaration of heirs and distribution of estate, simply issued an order requiring
the submission of the records of birth of the Padlan children within ten (10) days from
receipt thereof, after which, with or without the documents, the issue on declaration of heirs
would be deemed submitted for resolution.
We note that in her comment to petitioner's motion private respondent raised, among
others, the issue as to whether petitioner was still entitled to inherit from the decedent
considering that she had secured a divorce in the U.S.A. and in fact had twice
remarried. She also invoked the above quoted procedural rule. [11] To this, petitioner replied
that Arturo was a Filipino and as such remained legally married to her in spite of the divorce
they obtained.[12] Reading between the lines, the implication is that petitioner was no longer
a Filipino citizen at the time of her divorce from Arturo. This should have prompted the trial
court to conduct a hearing to establish her citizenship. The purpose of a hearing is to
ascertain the truth of the matters in issue with the aid of documentary and testimonial
evidence as well as the arguments of the parties either supporting or opposing the
evidence. Instead, the lower court perfunctorily settled her claim in her favor by merely
applying the ruling in Tenchavez v. Escao.
Then in private respondent's motion to set aside and/or reconsider the lower court's
decision she stressed that the citizenship of petitioner was relevant in the light of the ruling
in Van Dorn v. Romillo Jr.[13] that aliens may obtain divorces abroad, which may be
recognized in the Philippines, provided they are valid according to their national law. She
prayed therefore that the case be set for hearing.[14] Petitioner opposed the motion but failed
to squarely address the issue on her citizenship. [15] The trial court did not grant private
respondent's prayer for a hearing but proceeded to resolve her motion with the finding that
both petitioner and Arturo were "Filipino citizens and were married in the Philippines." [16] It
maintained that their divorce obtained in 1954 in San Francisco, California, U.S.A., was not
valid
in
Philippine
jurisdiction. We
deduce
that
the
finding
on
their
citizenship pertained solely to the time of their marriage as the trial court was not supplied
with
a
basis
to
determine
petitioner's
citizenship
at
the
time
of
their divorce. The doubt persisted as to whether she was still a Filipino citizen when their
divorce was decreed. The trial court must have overlooked the materiality of this
aspect. Once proved that she was no longer a Filipino citizen at the time of their
divorce, Van Dorn would become applicable and petitioner could very well lose her right to
inherit from Arturo.
Respondent again raised in her appeal the issue on petitioner's citizenship; [17] it did not
merit enlightenment however from petitioner.[18] In the present proceeding, petitioner's
citizenship is brought anew to the fore by private respondent. She even furnishes the Court
with the transcript of stenographic notes taken on 5 May 1995 during the hearing for the
reconstitution of the original of a certain transfer certificate title as well as the issuance of

new owner's duplicate copy thereof before another trial court. When asked whether she was
an American citizen petitioner answered that she was since 1954.[19] Significantly, the decree
of divorce of petitioner and Arturo was obtained in the same year. Petitioner however did not
bother to file a reply memorandum to erase the uncertainty about her citizenship at the time
of their divorce, a factual issue requiring hearings to be conducted by the trial
court. Consequently, respondent appellate court did not err in ordering the case returned to
the trial court for further proceedings.
We emphasize however that the question to be determined by the trial court should be
limited only to the right of petitioner to inherit from Arturo as his surviving spouse. Private
respondent's claim to heirship was already resolved by the trial court. She and Arturo were
married on 22 April 1947 while the prior marriage of petitioner and Arturo was subsisting
thereby resulting in a bigamous marriage considered void from the beginning under Arts. 80
and 83 of the Civil Code. Consequently, she is not a surviving spouse that can inherit from
him as this status presupposes a legitimate relationship.[20]
As regards the motion of private respondent for petitioner and her counsel to be
declared in contempt of court and that the present petition be dismissed for forum shopping,
[21]
the same lacks merit. For forum shopping to exist the actions must involve the same
transactions and same essential facts and circumstances. There must also be identical
causes of action, subject matter and issue. [22] The present petition deals with declaration of
heirship while the subsequent petitions filed before the three (3) trial courts concern the
issuance of new owner's duplicate copies of titles of certain properties belonging to the
estate of Arturo. Obviously, there is no reason to declare the existence of forum shopping.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The decision of respondent Court of Appeals
ordering the remand of the case to the court of origin for further proceedings and declaring
null and void its decision holding petitioner Fe D. Quita and Ruperto T. Padlan as intestate
heirs is AFFIRMED. The order of the appellate court modifying its previous decision by
granting one-half (1/2) of the net hereditary estate to the Padlan children, namely, Claro,
Ricardo, Emmanuel, Zenaida and Yolanda, with the exception of Alexis, all surnamed
Padlan, instead of Arturo's brother Ruperto Padlan, is likewise AFFIRMED.The Court
however emphasizes that the reception of evidence by the trial court should be limited to the
hereditary rights of petitioner as the surviving spouse of Arturo Padlan.
The motion to declare petitioner and her counsel in contempt of court and to dismiss
the present petition for forum shopping is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,

Petitioner,

G.R. No. 152577

Present:
PUNO,
Chairman,

AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CALLEJO, SR.,
TINGA, and
CHICO-NAZARIO, JJ.
Promulgated:

- versus-

CRASUS L. IYOY,
September 21, 2005
R e s p o n d e n t.
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DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
In this Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court,
petitioner Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Office of the Solicitor General,
prays for the reversal of the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 62539,
dated 30 July 2001,[1] affirming the Judgment of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Cebu City,
Branch 22, in Civil Case No. CEB-20077, dated 30 October 1998,[2] declaring the marriage
between respondent Crasus L. Iyoy and Fely Ada Rosal-Iyoy null and void on the basis of
Article 36 of the Family Code of the Philippines.
The proceedings before the RTC commenced with the filing of a Complaint [3] for declaration
of nullity of marriage by respondent Crasus on 25 March 1997. According to the said
Complaint, respondent Crasus married Fely on 16 December 1961 at Bradford Memorial
Church, Jones Avenue, Cebu City. As a result of their union, they had five children Crasus,
Jr., Daphne, Debbie, Calvert, and Carlos who are now all of legal ages. After the celebration
of their marriage, respondent Crasus discovered that Fely was hot-tempered, a nagger and
extravagant. In 1984, Fely left the Philippines for the United States of America (U.S.A.),
leaving all of their five children, the youngest then being only six years old, to the care of
respondent Crasus. Barely a year after Fely left for the U.S.A., respondent Crasus received
a letter from her requesting that he sign the enclosed divorce papers; he disregarded the
said request. Sometime in 1985, respondent Crasus learned, through the letters sent by
Fely to their children, that Fely got married to an American, with whom she eventually had a
child. In 1987, Fely came back to the Philippines with her American family, staying at Cebu
Plaza Hotel in Cebu City. Respondent Crasus did not bother to talk to Fely because he was
afraid he might not be able to bear the sorrow and the pain she had caused him. Fely
returned to the Philippines several times more: in 1990, for the wedding of their eldest child,
Crasus, Jr.; in 1992, for the brain operation of their fourth child, Calvert; and in 1995, for
unknown reasons. Fely continued to live with her American family in New Jersey, U.S.A.
She had been openly using the surname of her American husband in the Philippines and in
the U.S.A. For the wedding of Crasus, Jr., Fely herself had invitations made in which she
was named as Mrs. Fely Ada Micklus. At the time the Complaint was filed, it had been 13
years since Fely left and abandoned respondent Crasus, and there was no more possibility
of reconciliation between them. Respondent Crasus finally alleged in his Complaint that
Felys acts brought danger and dishonor to the family, and clearly demonstrated her
psychological incapacity to perform the essential obligations of marriage. Such incapacity,

being incurable and continuing, constitutes a ground for declaration of nullity of marriage
under Article 36, in relation to Articles 68, 70, and 72, of the Family Code of the Philippines.
Fely filed her Answer and Counterclaim[4] with the RTC on 05 June 1997. She
asserted therein that she was already an American citizen since 1988 and was now married
to Stephen Micklus. While she admitted being previously married to respondent Crasus and
having five children with him, Fely refuted the other allegations made by respondent Crasus
in his Complaint. She explained that she was no more hot-tempered than any normal
person, and she may had been indignant at respondent Crasus on certain occasions but it
was because of the latters drunkenness, womanizing, and lack of sincere effort to find
employment and to contribute to the maintenance of their household. She could not have
been extravagant since the family hardly had enough money for basic needs. Indeed, Fely
left for abroad for financial reasons as respondent Crasus had no job and what she was
then earning as the sole breadwinner in the Philippines was insufficient to support their
family. Although she left all of her children with respondent Crasus, she continued to provide
financial support to them, as well as, to respondent Crasus. Subsequently, Fely was able to
bring her children to the U.S.A., except for one, Calvert, who had to stay behind for medical
reasons. While she did file for divorce from respondent Crasus, she denied having herself
sent a letter to respondent Crasus requesting him to sign the enclosed divorce papers. After
securing a divorce from respondent Crasus, Fely married her American husband and
acquired American citizenship. She argued that her marriage to her American husband was
legal because now being an American citizen, her status shall be governed by the law of her
present nationality. Fely also pointed out that respondent Crasus himself was presently
living with another woman who bore him a child. She also accused respondent Crasus of
misusing the amount of P90,000.00 which she advanced to him to finance the brain
operation of their son, Calvert. On the basis of the foregoing, Fely also prayed that the RTC
declare her marriage to respondent Crasus null and void; and that respondent Crasus be
ordered to pay to Fely the P90,000.00 she advanced to him, with interest, plus, moral and
exemplary damages, attorneys fees, and litigation expenses.
After respondent Crasus and Fely had filed their respective Pre-Trial Briefs,[5] the RTC
afforded both parties the opportunity to present their evidence. Petitioner Republic
participated in the trial through the Provincial Prosecutor of Cebu.[6]
Respondent Crasus submitted the following pieces of evidence in support of his Complaint:
(1) his own testimony on 08 September 1997, in which he essentially reiterated the
allegations in his Complaint;[7] (2) the Certification, dated 13 April 1989, by the Health
Department of Cebu City, on the recording of the Marriage Contract between respondent
Crasus and Fely in the Register of Deeds, such marriage celebration taking place on 16
December 1961;[8] and (3) the invitation to the wedding of Crasus, Jr., their eldest son,
wherein Fely openly used her American husbands surname, Micklus.[9]
Felys counsel filed a Notice,[10] and, later on, a Motion,[11] to take the deposition of witnesses,
namely, Fely and her children, Crasus, Jr. and Daphne, upon written interrogatories, before
the consular officers of the Philippines in New York and California, U.S.A, where the said
witnesses reside. Despite the Orders[12] and Commissions[13] issued by the RTC to the
Philippine Consuls of New York and California, U.S.A., to take the depositions of the
witnesses upon written interrogatories, not a single deposition was ever submitted to the
RTC. Taking into account that it had been over a year since respondent Crasus had
presented his evidence and that Fely failed to exert effort to have the case progress, the

RTC issued an Order, dated 05 October 1998, [14] considering Fely to have waived her right
to present her evidence. The case was thus deemed submitted for decision.
Not long after, on 30 October 1998, the RTC promulgated its Judgment declaring the
marriage of respondent Crasus and Fely null and void ab initio, on the basis of the following
findings
The ground bearing defendants psychological incapacity
deserves a reasonable consideration. As observed, plaintiffs testimony is
decidedly credible. The Court finds that defendant had indeed exhibited
unmistakable signs of psychological incapacity to comply with her marital
duties such as striving for family unity, observing fidelity, mutual love,
respect, help and support. From the evidence presented, plaintiff
adequately established that the defendant practically abandoned him.
She obtained a divorce decree in the United States of America and
married another man and has establish [sic] another family of her own.
Plaintiff is in an anomalous situation, wherein he is married to a wife who
is already married to another man in another country.
Defendants intolerable traits may not have been apparent or
manifest before the marriage, the FAMILY CODE nonetheless allows the
annulment of the marriage provided that these were eventually
manifested after the wedding. It appears to be the case in this instance.
Certainly defendants posture being an irresponsible wife erringly
reveals her very low regard for that sacred and inviolable institution of
marriage which is the foundation of human society throughout the civilized
world. It is quite evident that the defendant is bereft of the mind, will and
heart to comply with her marital obligations, such incapacity was already
there at the time of the marriage in question is shown by defendants own
attitude towards her marriage to plaintiff.
In sum, the ground invoked by plaintiff which is defendants
psychological incapacity to comply with the essential marital obligations
which already existed at the time of the marriage in question has been
satisfactorily proven. The evidence in herein case establishes the
irresponsibility of defendant Fely Ada Rosal Iyoy, firmly.
Going over plaintiffs testimony which is decidedly credible, the
Court finds that the defendant had indeed exhibited unmistakable signs of
such psychological incapacity to comply with her marital obligations.
These are her excessive disposition to material things over and above the
marital stability. That such incapacity was already there at the time of the
marriage in question is shown by defendants own attitude towards her
marriage to plaintiff. And for these reasons there is a legal ground to
declare the marriage of plaintiff Crasus L. Iyoy and defendant Fely Ada
Rosal Iyoy null and void ab initio.[15]

Petitioner Republic, believing that the afore-quoted Judgment of the RTC was contrary to
law and evidence, filed an appeal with the Court of Appeals. The appellate court, though, in
its Decision, dated 30 July 2001, affirmed the appealed Judgment of the RTC, finding no
reversible error therein. It even offered additional ratiocination for declaring the marriage
between respondent Crasus and Fely null and void, to wit

Defendant secured a divorce from plaintiff-appellee abroad, has

remarried, and is now permanently residing in the United States. Plaintiffappellee categorically stated this as one of his reasons for seeking the
declaration of nullity of their marriage
Article 26 of the Family Code provides:
Art. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the
Philippines in accordance with the laws in force in the
country where they were solemnized, and valid there as
such, shall also be valid in this country, except those
prohibited under Articles 35(1), (4), (5) and (6), 36, 37
and 38.
WHERE A MARRIAGE BETWEEN A FILIPINO
CITIZEN AND A FOREIGNER IS VALIDLY
CELEBRATED AND A DIVORCE IS THEREAFTER
VALIDLY OBTAINED ABROAD BY THE ALIEN
SPOUSE CAPACITATING HIM OR HER TO
REMARRY, THE FILIPINO SPOUSE SHALL LIKEWISE
HAVE CAPACITY TO REMARRY UNDER PHILIPPINE
LAW.
The rationale behind the second paragraph of the above-quoted
provision is to avoid the absurd and unjust situation of a Filipino citizen
still being married to his or her alien spouse, although the latter is no
longer married to the Filipino spouse because he or she has obtained a
divorce abroad. In the case at bench, the defendant has undoubtedly
acquired her American husbands citizenship and thus has become an
alien as well. This Court cannot see why the benefits of Art. 26
aforequoted can not be extended to a Filipino citizen whose spouse
eventually embraces another citizenship and thus becomes herself an
alien.
It would be the height of unfairness if, under these
circumstances, plaintiff would still be considered as married to defendant,

given her total incapacity to honor her marital covenants to the former. To
condemn plaintiff to remain shackled in a marriage that in truth and in fact
does not exist and to remain married to a spouse who is incapacitated to
discharge essential marital covenants, is verily to condemn him to a
perpetual disadvantage which this Court finds abhorrent and will not
countenance. Justice dictates that plaintiff be given relief by affirming the
trial courts declaration of the nullity of the marriage of the parties.[16]
After the Court of Appeals, in a Resolution, dated 08 March 2002,[17] denied its
Motion for Reconsideration, petitioner Republic filed the instant Petition before this Court,
based on the following arguments/grounds
I. Abandonment by and sexual infidelity of respondents wife do
not per se constitute psychological incapacity.
II. The Court of Appeals has decided questions of substance not
in accord with law and jurisprudence considering that the Court of
Appeals committed serious errors of law in ruling that Article 26,
paragraph 2 of the Family Code is inapplicable to the case at bar.[18]

In his Comment[19] to the Petition, respondent Crasus maintained that Felys psychological
incapacity was clearly established after a full-blown trial, and that paragraph 2 of Article 26
of the Family Code of the Philippines was indeed applicable to the marriage of respondent
Crasus and Fely, because the latter had already become an American citizen. He further
questioned the personality of petitioner Republic, represented by the Office of the Solicitor
General, to institute the instant Petition, because Article 48 of the Family Code of the
Philippines authorizes the prosecuting attorney or fiscal assigned to the trial court, not the
Solicitor General, to intervene on behalf of the State, in proceedings for annulment and
declaration of nullity of marriages.
After having reviewed the records of this case and the applicable laws and jurisprudence,
this Court finds the instant Petition to be meritorious.
I
The totality of evidence presented during trial is insufficient to support the
finding of psychological incapacity of Fely.

essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if

such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization.

Issues most commonly arise as to what constitutes psychological incapacity. In a series of

cases, this Court laid down guidelines for determining its existence.
In Santos v. Court of Appeals,[20] the term psychological incapacity was defined, thus
. . . [P]sychological incapacity should refer to no less than a mental (not
physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly cognitive of the basic
marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged
by the parties to the marriage which, as so expressed by Article 68 of the
Family Code, include their mutual obligations to live together, observe
love, respect and fidelity and render help and support. There is hardly any
doubt that the intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of
psychological incapacity to the most serious cases of personality
disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give
meaning and significance to the marriage. This psychological condition
must exist at the time the marriage is celebrated[21]

The psychological incapacity must be characterized by

(a)

incapable of carrying out the ordinary duties required in a marriage;

(b)

ART. 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of

the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the

Juridical Antecedence It must be rooted in the history of the party

antedating the marriage, although the overt manifestations may emerge only after the
marriage; and
(c)

Article 36, concededly one of the more controversial provisions of the Family Code
of the Philippines, reads

Gravity It must be grave or serious such that the party would be

Incurability It must be incurable or, even if it were otherwise, the cure

would be beyond the means of the party involved.[22]

More definitive guidelines in the interpretation and application of Article 36 of the
Family Code of the Philippines were handed down by this Court in Republic v. Court of
Appeals and Molina,[23] which, although quite lengthy, by its significance, deserves to be
reproduced below

(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage

belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in favor of the
existence and continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and
nullity. This is rooted in the fact that both our Constitution and our laws
cherish the validity of marriage and unity of the family. Thus, our
Constitution devotes an entire Article on the Family, recognizing it as the
foundation of the nation. It decrees marriage as legally inviolable, thereby
protecting it from dissolution at the whim of the parties. Both the family
and marriage are to be protected by the state.
The Family Code echoes this constitutional edict on marriage
and the family and emphasizes their permanence, inviolability and
solidarity.
(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a)
medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c)
sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision.
Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the incapacity must be
psychological - not physical, although its manifestations and/or symptoms
may be physical. The evidence must convince the court that the parties,
or one of them, was mentally or psychically ill to such an extent that the
person could not have known the obligations he was assuming, or
knowing them, could not have given valid assumption thereof. Although
no example of such incapacity need be given here so as not to limit the
application of the provision under the principle of ejusdem generis,
nevertheless such root cause must be identified as a psychological illness
and its incapacitating nature fully explained. Expert evidence may be
given by qualified psychiatrists and clinical psychologists.
(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at the time of
the celebration of the marriage. The evidence must show that the illness
was existing when the parties exchanged their I do's. The manifestation of
the illness need not be perceivable at such time, but the illness itself must
have attached at such moment, or prior thereto.
(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or
clinically permanent or incurable. Such incurability may be absolute or
even relative only in regard to the other spouse, not necessarily
absolutely against everyone of the same sex. Furthermore, such
incapacity must be relevant to the assumption of marriage obligations, not
necessarily to those not related to marriage, like the exercise of a
profession or employment in a job
(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the
disability of the party to assume the essential obligations of marriage.
Thus, mild characteriological peculiarities, mood changes, occasional
emotional outbursts cannot be accepted as root causes. The illness must
be shown as downright incapacity or inability, not a refusal, neglect or
difficulty, much less ill will. In other words, there is a natal or supervening
disabling factor in the person, an adverse integral element in the

personality structure that effectively incapacitates the person from really

accepting and thereby complying with the obligations essential to
marriage.
(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by
Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code as regards the husband and wife
as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in regard to
parents and their children. Such non-complied marital obligation(s) must
also be stated in the petition, proven by evidence and included in the text
of the decision.
(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial
Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or
decisive, should be given great respect by our courts
(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal
and the Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the state. No decision
shall be handed down unless the Solicitor General issues a certification,
which will be quoted in the decision, briefly stating therein his reasons for
his agreement or opposition, as the case may be, to the petition. The
Solicitor General, along with the prosecuting attorney, shall submit to the
court such certification within fifteen (15) days from the date the case is
deemed submitted for resolution of the court. The Solicitor General shall
discharge the equivalent function of the defensor vinculi contemplated
under Canon 1095.[24]

A later case, Marcos v. Marcos,[25] further clarified that there is no requirement that
the defendant/respondent spouse should be personally examined by a physician or
psychologist as a condition sine qua non for the declaration of nullity of marriage based on
psychological incapacity. Such psychological incapacity, however, must be established by
the totality of the evidence presented during the trial.

Using the guidelines established by the afore-mentioned jurisprudence, this Court

finds that the totality of evidence presented by respondent Crasus failed miserably to
establish the alleged psychological incapacity of his wife Fely; therefore, there is no basis
for declaring their marriage null and void under Article 36 of the Family Code of the
Philippines.
The only substantial evidence presented by respondent Crasus before the RTC
was his testimony, which can be easily put into question for being self-serving, in the

absence of any other corroborating evidence. He submitted only two other pieces of
evidence: (1) the Certification on the recording with the Register of Deeds of the Marriage
Contract between respondent Crasus and Fely, such marriage being celebrated on 16
December 1961; and (2) the invitation to the wedding of Crasus, Jr., their eldest son, in
which Fely used her American husbands surname. Even considering the admissions made
by Fely herself in her Answer to respondent Crasuss Complaint filed with the RTC, the
evidence is not enough to convince this Court that Fely had such a grave mental illness that
prevented her from assuming the essential obligations of marriage.
It is worthy to emphasize that Article 36 of the Family Code of the Philippines contemplates
downright incapacity or inability to take cognizance of and to assume the basic marital
obligations; not a mere refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less, ill will, on the part of the
errant spouse.[26] Irreconcilable differences, conflicting personalities, emotional immaturity
and irresponsibility, physical abuse, habitual alcoholism, sexual infidelity or perversion, and
abandonment, by themselves, also do not warrant a finding of psychological incapacity
under the said Article.[27]
As has already been stressed by this Court in previous cases, Article 36 is not to be
confused with a divorce law that cuts the marital bond at the time the causes therefore
manifest themselves. It refers to a serious psychological illness afflicting a party even before
the celebration of marriage. It is a malady so grave and so permanent as to deprive one of
awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond one is about to
assume.[28]
The evidence may have proven that Fely committed acts that hurt and embarrassed
respondent Crasus and the rest of the family. Her hot-temper, nagging, and extravagance;
her abandonment of respondent Crasus; her marriage to an American; and even her
flaunting of her American family and her American surname, may indeed be manifestations
of her alleged incapacity to comply with her marital obligations; nonetheless, the root cause
for such was not identified. If the root cause of the incapacity was not identified, then it
cannot be satisfactorily established as a psychological or mental defect that is serious or
grave; neither could it be proven to be in existence at the time of celebration of the
marriage; nor that it is incurable. While the personal examination of Fely by a psychiatrist or
psychologist is no longer mandatory for the declaration of nullity of their marriage under
Article 36 of the Family Code of the Philippines, by virtue of this Courts ruling in Marcos v.
Marcos,[29]respondent Crasus must still have complied with the requirement laid down
in Republic v. Court of Appeals and Molina[30] that the root cause of the incapacity be
identified as a psychological illness and that its incapacitating nature be fully explained.

Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is

validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by
the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse
shall likewise have capacity to remarry under Philippine law.
As it is worded, Article 26, paragraph 2, refers to a special situation wherein one of
the couple getting married is a Filipino citizen and the other a foreigner at the time the
marriage was celebrated. By its plain and literal interpretation, the said provision
cannot be applied to the case of respondent Crasus and his wife Fely because at the
time Fely obtained her divorce, she was still a Filipino citizen. Although the exact date
was not established, Fely herself admitted in her Answer filed before the RTC that she
obtained a divorce from respondent Crasus sometime after she left for the United States in
1984, after which she married her American husband in 1985. In the same Answer, she
alleged that she had been an American citizen since 1988. At the time she filed for divorce,
Fely was still a Filipino citizen, and pursuant to the nationality principle embodied in Article
15 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, she was still bound by Philippine laws on family
rights and duties, status, condition, and legal capacity, even when she was already living
abroad. Philippine laws, then and even until now, do not allow and recognize divorce
between Filipino spouses. Thus, Fely could not have validly obtained a divorce from
respondent Crasus.
III
The Solicitor General is authorized to intervene, on behalf of the
Republic, in proceedings for annulment and declaration of nullity of
marriages.

Invoking Article 48 of the Family Code of the Philippines, respondent Crasus

argued that only the prosecuting attorney or fiscal assigned to the RTC may intervene on
behalf of the State in proceedings for annulment or declaration of nullity of marriages;
hence, the Office of the Solicitor General had no personality to file the instant Petition on
behalf of the State. Article 48 provides
ART. 48. In all cases of annulment or declaration of absolute
nullity of marriage, the Court shall order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal
assigned to it to appear on behalf of the State to take steps to prevent
collusion between the parties and to take care that the evidence is not
fabricated or suppressed.

In any case, any doubt shall be resolved in favor of the validity of the marriage. [31] No less
than the Constitution of 1987 sets the policy to protect and strengthen the family as the
basic social institution and marriage as the foundation of the family.[32]
II
Article 26, paragraph 2 of the Family Code of the Philippines is not
applicable to the case at bar.
According to Article 26, paragraph 2 of the Family Code of the Philippines

That Article 48 does not expressly mention the Solicitor General does not bar him or his
Office from intervening in proceedings for annulment or declaration of nullity of marriages.
Executive Order No. 292, otherwise known as the Administrative Code of 1987, appoints the
Solicitor General as the principal law officer and legal defender of the Government. [33] His
Office is tasked to represent the Government of the Philippines, its agencies and
instrumentalities and its officials and agents in any litigation, proceeding, investigation or
matter requiring the services of lawyers. The Office of the Solicitor General shall constitute

the law office of the Government and, as such, shall discharge duties requiring the services
of lawyers.[34]
The intent of Article 48 of the Family Code of the Philippines is to ensure that the interest of
the State is represented and protected in proceedings for annulment and declaration of
nullity of marriages by preventing collusion between the parties, or the fabrication or
suppression of evidence; and, bearing in mind that the Solicitor General is the principal law
officer and legal defender of the land, then his intervention in such proceedings could only
serve and contribute to the realization of such intent, rather than thwart it.
Furthermore, the general rule is that only the Solicitor General is authorized to bring or
defend actions on behalf of the People or the Republic of the Philippines once the case is
brought before this Court or the Court of Appeals. [35] While it is the prosecuting attorney or
fiscal who actively participates, on behalf of the State, in a proceeding for annulment or
declaration of nullity of marriage before the RTC, the Office of the Solicitor General takes
over when the case is elevated to the Court of Appeals or this Court. Since it shall be
eventually responsible for taking the case to the appellate courts when circumstances
demand, then it is only reasonable and practical that even while the proceeding is still being
held before the RTC, the Office of the Solicitor General can already exercise supervision
and control over the conduct of the prosecuting attorney or fiscal therein to better guarantee
the protection of the interests of the State.
In fact, this Court had already recognized and affirmed the role of the Solicitor General in
several cases for annulment and declaration of nullity of marriages that were appealed
before it, summarized as follows in the case of Ancheta v. Ancheta[36]
In the case of Republic v. Court of Appeals [268 SCRA 198 (1997)], this
Court laid down the guidelines in the interpretation and application of Art.
48 of the Family Code, one of which concerns the role of the prosecuting
attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the
State:
(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting
attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear as
counsel for the state. No decision shall be handed
down unless the Solicitor General issues a certification,
which will be quoted in the decision, briefly stating
therein his reasons for his agreement or opposition, as
the case may be, to the petition. The Solicitor General,
along with the prosecuting attorney, shall submit to the
court such certification within fifteen (15) days from the
date the case is deemed submitted for resolution of the
court. The Solicitor General shall discharge the
equivalent function of the defensor vinculi contemplated
under Canon 1095. [Id., at 213]
This Court in the case of Malcampo-Sin v. Sin [355 SCRA 285
(2001)] reiterated its pronouncement in Republic v. Court of
Appeals [Supra.] regarding the role of the prosecuting attorney or fiscal
and the Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the State[37]

Finally, the issuance of this Court of the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void
Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages,[38] which became effective on 15 March
2003, should dispel any other doubts of respondent Crasus as to the authority of the
Solicitor General to file the instant Petition on behalf of the State. The Rule recognizes the
authority of the Solicitor General to intervene and take part in the proceedings for annulment
and declaration of nullity of marriages before the RTC and on appeal to higher courts. The
pertinent provisions of the said Rule are reproduced below
Sec. 5. Contents and form of petition.
(4) It shall be filed in six copies. The petitioner shall serve a copy
of the petition on the Office of the Solicitor General and the Office of the
City or Provincial Prosecutor, within five days from the date of its filing and
submit to the court proof of such service within the same period.
Sec. 18. Memoranda. The court may require the parties and the
public prosecutor, in consultation with the Office of the Solicitor General,
to file their respective memoranda in support of their claims within fifteen
days from the date the trial is terminated. It may require the Office of the
Solicitor General to file its own memorandum if the case is of significant
interest to the State. No other pleadings or papers may be submitted
without leave of court. After the lapse of the period herein provided, the
case will be considered submitted for decision, with or without the
memoranda.
Sec. 19. Decision.
(2) The parties, including the Solicitor General and the public
prosecutor, shall be served with copies of the decision personally or by
registered mail. If the respondent summoned by publication failed to
appear in the action, the dispositive part of the decision shall be published
once in a newspaper of general circulation.
(3) The decision becomes final upon the expiration of fifteen
days from notice to the parties. Entry of judgment shall be made if no
motion for reconsideration or new trial, or appeal is filed by any of the
parties, the public prosecutor, or the Solicitor General.
Sec. 20. Appeal.
(2) Notice of Appeal. An aggrieved party or the Solicitor General
may appeal from the decision by filing a Notice of Appeal within fifteen
days from notice of denial of the motion for reconsideration or new trial.
The appellant shall serve a copy of the notice of appeal on the adverse
parties.

DECISION
Given the foregoing, this Court arrives at a conclusion contrary to those of the RTC and the
Court of Appeals, and sustains the validity and existence of the marriage between
respondent Crasus and Fely. At most, Felys abandonment, sexual infidelity, and bigamy,
give respondent Crasus grounds to file for legal separation under Article 55 of the Family
Code of the Philippines, but not for declaration of nullity of marriage under Article 36 of the
same Code. While this Court commiserates with respondent Crasus for being continuously
shackled to what is now a hopeless and loveless marriage, this is one of those situations
where neither law nor society can provide the specific answer to every individual problem.[39]
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED and the assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R. CV No. 62539, dated 30 July 2001, affirming the Judgment of the RTC of Cebu
City, Branch 22, in Civil Case No. CEB-20077, dated 30 October 1998, is REVERSED and
SET ASIDE.
The marriage of respondent Crasus L. Iyoy and Fely Ada Rosal-Iyoy remains valid and
subsisting.
SO ORDERED.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,

G.R. No. 154380

Given a valid marriage between two Filipino citizens, where one party is later
naturalized as a foreign citizen and obtains a valid divorce decree capacitating him or her to
remarry, can the Filipino spouse likewise remarry under Philippine law?
Before us is a case of first impression that behooves the Court to make a definite
ruling on this apparently novel question, presented as a pure question of law.
In this petition for review, the Solicitor General assails the Decision[1] dated May
15, 2002, of the Regional Trial Court of Molave, Zamboanga del Sur, Branch 23 and
its Resolution[2] dated July 4, 2002 denying the motion for reconsideration. The court a
quo had declared that herein respondent Cipriano Orbecido III is capacitated to remarry.
The fallo of the impugned Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, by virtue of the provision of the second paragraph of Art.
26 of the Family Code and by reason of the divorce decree obtained
against him by his American wife, the petitioner is given the capacity to
remarry under the Philippine Law.

Petitioner,

Present:

- versus -

IT IS SO ORDERED.[3]

Davide, Jr., C.J.,

The factual antecedents, as narrated by the trial court, are as follows.

(Chairman),

On May 24, 1981, Cipriano Orbecido III married Lady Myros M. Villanueva at the United
Church of Christ in the Philippines in Lam-an, Ozamis City. Their marriage was blessed with
a son and a daughter, Kristoffer Simbortriz V. Orbecido and Lady Kimberly V. Orbecido.

Quisumbing,
Ynares-Santiago,
Carpio, and
Azcuna, JJ.
CIPRIANO ORBECIDO III,
Respondent.

QUISUMBING, J.:

Promulgated:
October 5, 2005

x--------------------------------------------------x

In 1986, Ciprianos wife left for the United States bringing along their son Kristoffer.
A few years later, Cipriano discovered that his wife had been naturalized as an American
citizen.
Sometime in 2000, Cipriano learned from his son that his wife had obtained a
divorce decree and then married a certain Innocent Stanley. She, Stanley and her child by
him currently live at 5566 A. Walnut Grove Avenue, San Gabriel, California.
Cipriano thereafter filed with the trial court a petition for authority to remarry invoking
Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code. No opposition was filed. Finding merit in the
petition, the court granted the same. The Republic, herein petitioner, through the Office of
the Solicitor General (OSG), sought reconsideration but it was denied.
In this petition, the OSG raises a pure question of law:

WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENT CAN REMARRY UNDER ARTICLE

26 OF THE FAMILY CODE[4]

The OSG contends that Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code is not applicable to the
instant case because it only applies to a valid mixed marriage; that is, a marriage celebrated
between a Filipino citizen and an alien. The proper remedy, according to the OSG, is to file
a petition for annulment or for legal separation. [5]Furthermore, the OSG argues there is no
law that governs respondents situation. The OSG posits that this is a matter of legislation
and not of judicial determination.[6]
For his part, respondent admits that Article 26 is not directly applicable to his case but
insists that when his naturalized alien wife obtained a divorce decree which capacitated her
to remarry, he is likewise capacitated by operation of law pursuant to Section 12, Article II of
the Constitution.[7]
At the outset, we note that the petition for authority to remarry filed before the trial court
actually constituted a petition for declaratory relief. In this connection, Section 1, Rule 63 of
the Rules of Court provides:
RULE 63
DECLARATORY RELIEF AND SIMILAR REMEDIES

Section 1. Who may file petitionAny person interested under a deed, will,
contract or other written instrument, or whose rights are affected by a
statute, executive order or regulation, ordinance, or other governmental
regulation may, before breach or violation thereof, bring an action in the
appropriate Regional Trial Court to determine any question of construction
or validity arising, and for a declaration of his rights or duties, thereunder.
The requisites of a petition for declaratory relief are: (1) there must be a justiciable
controversy; (2) the controversy must be between persons whose interests are adverse; (3)
that the party seeking the relief has a legal interest in the controversy; and (4) that the issue
is ripe for judicial determination.[8]
This case concerns the applicability of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 to a marriage
between two Filipino citizens where one later acquired alien citizenship, obtained a divorce
decree, and remarried while in the U.S.A. The interests of the parties are also adverse, as
petitioner representing the State asserts its duty to protect the institution of marriage while
respondent, a private citizen, insists on a declaration of his capacity to remarry.
Respondent, praying for relief, has legal interest in the controversy. The issue raised is also
ripe for judicial determination inasmuch as when respondent remarries, litigation ensues
and puts into question the validity of his second marriage.

Coming now to the substantive issue, does Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code
apply to the case of respondent? Necessarily, we must dwell on how this provision had
come about in the first place, and what was the intent of the legislators in its enactment?

Brief Historical Background

On July 6, 1987, then President Corazon Aquino signed into law Executive Order
No. 209, otherwise known as the Family Code, which took effect on August 3, 1988. Article
26 thereof states:
All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines in accordance
with the laws in force in the country where they were solemnized, and
valid there as such, shall also be valid in this country, except those
prohibited under Articles 35, 37, and 38.

On July 17, 1987, shortly after the signing of the original Family Code, Executive
Order No. 227 was likewise signed into law, amending Articles 26, 36, and 39 of the Family
Code. A second paragraph was added to Article 26. As so amended, it now provides:
ART. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines in
accordance with the laws in force in the country where they were
solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this country,
except those prohibited under Articles 35(1), (4), (5) and (6), 36, 37 and
38.
Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is
validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by
the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse
shall have capacity to remarry under Philippine law. (Emphasis supplied)
On its face, the foregoing provision does not appear to govern the
situation presented by the case at hand. It seems to apply only to cases where at
the time of the celebration of the marriage, the parties are a Filipino citizen and a
foreigner. The instant case is one where at the time the marriage was solemnized,
the parties were two Filipino citizens, but later on, the wife was naturalized as an
American citizen and subsequently obtained a divorce granting her capacity to
remarry, and indeed she remarried an American citizen while residing in the U.S.A.

Noteworthy, in the Report of the Public Hearings [9] on the Family Code, the
Catholic Bishops Conference of the Philippines (CBCP) registered the following objections

spouse is valid in the Philippines, and consequently, the Filipino spouse is capacitated to
remarry under Philippine law.

to Paragraph 2 of Article 26:

1.

2.

The rule is discriminatory. It discriminates against those

whose spouses are Filipinos who divorce them abroad. These
spouses who are divorced will not be able to re-marry, while the
spouses of foreigners who validly divorce them abroad can.
This is the beginning of the recognition of the validity of
divorce even for Filipino citizens. For those whose foreign
spouses validly divorce them abroad will also be considered to
be validly divorced here and can re-marry. We propose that this
be deleted and made into law only after more widespread
consultation. (Emphasis supplied.)

Does the same principle apply to a case where at the time of the celebration of the
marriage, the parties were Filipino citizens, but later on, one of them obtains a foreign
citizenship by naturalization?

The jurisprudential answer lies latent in the 1998 case of Quita v. Court of Appeals.
[11]

In Quita, the parties were, as in this case, Filipino citizens when they got married. The

wife became a naturalized American citizen in 1954 and obtained a divorce in the same
Legislative Intent

Records of the proceedings of the Family Code deliberations showed that the

year. The Court therein hinted, by way of obiter dictum, that a Filipino divorced by his
naturalized foreign spouse is no longer married under Philippine law and can thus remarry.

intent of Paragraph 2 of Article 26, according to Judge Alicia Sempio-Diy, a member of

Thus, taking into consideration the legislative intent and applying the rule of

the Civil Code Revision Committee, is to avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino

reason, we hold that Paragraph 2 of Article 26 should be interpreted to include cases

spouse remains married to the alien spouse who, after obtaining a divorce, is no longer

involving parties who, at the time of the celebration of the marriage were Filipino citizens,

married to the Filipino spouse.

but later on, one of them becomes naturalized as a foreign citizen and obtains a divorce

Interestingly, Paragraph 2 of Article 26 traces its origin to the 1985 case of Van
Dorn v. Romillo, Jr.[10] The Van Dorn case involved a marriage between a Filipino citizen and
a foreigner. The Court held therein that a divorce decree validly obtained by the alien

decree. The Filipino spouse should likewise be allowed to remarry as if the other party were
a foreigner at the time of the solemnization of the marriage. To rule otherwise would be to
sanction absurdity and injustice. Where the interpretation of a statute according to its exact

and literal import would lead to mischievous results or contravene the clear purpose of the

In this case, when Ciprianos wife was naturalized as an American citizen, there

legislature, it should be construed according to its spirit and reason, disregarding as far as

was still a valid marriage that has been celebrated between her and Cipriano. As fate would

necessary the letter of the law. A statute may therefore be extended to cases not within the

have it, the naturalized alien wife subsequently obtained a valid divorce capacitating her to

literal meaning of its terms, so long as they come within its spirit or intent.[12]

remarry. Clearly, the twin requisites for the application of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 are both
present in this case. Thus Cipriano, the divorced Filipino spouse, should be allowed to

If we are to give meaning to the legislative intent to avoid the absurd situation
remarry.
where the Filipino spouse remains married to the alien spouse who, after obtaining a
divorce is no longer married to the Filipino spouse, then the instant case must be deemed
as coming within the contemplation of Paragraph 2 of Article 26.

We are also unable to sustain the OSGs theory that the proper remedy of the
Filipino spouse is to file either a petition for annulment or a petition for legal separation.
Annulment would be a long and tedious process, and in this particular case, not even

In view of the foregoing, we state the twin elements for the application of
feasible, considering that the marriage of the parties appears to have all the badges of
Paragraph 2 of Article 26 as follows:
1.

2.

There is a valid marriage that has been celebrated between

a Filipino citizen and a foreigner; and
A valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse
capacitating him or her to remarry.

validity. On the other hand, legal separation would not be a sufficient remedy for it would not
sever the marriage tie; hence, the legally separated Filipino spouse would still remain
married to the naturalized alien spouse.

However, we note that the records are bereft of competent evidence duly submitted by
The reckoning point is not the citizenship of the parties at the time of the celebration
respondent concerning the divorce decree and the naturalization of respondents wife. It is
of the marriage, but their citizenship at the time a valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien
settled rule that one who alleges a fact has the burden of proving it and mere allegation is
spouse capacitating the latter to remarry.
not evidence.[13]

Accordingly, for his plea to prosper, respondent herein must prove his allegation that

ACCORDINGLY, the petition by the Republic of the Philippines is GRANTED. The

his wife was naturalized as an American citizen. Likewise, before a foreign divorce decree

assailed Decision dated May 15, 2002, and Resolution dated July 4, 2002, of the Regional

can be recognized by our own courts, the party pleading it must prove the divorce as a fact

Trial Court of Molave, Zamboanga del Sur, Branch 23, are hereby SET ASIDE.

and demonstrate its conformity to the foreign law allowing it. [14]Such foreign law must also
No pronouncement as to costs.
be proved as our courts cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws. Like any other fact, such
laws must be alleged and proved. [15]Furthermore, respondent must also show that the

SO ORDERED.

divorce decree allows his former wife to remarry as specifically required in Article 26.
[G.R. No. 138322. October 2, 2001]
Otherwise, there would be no evidence sufficient to declare that he is capacitated to enter
into another marriage.

GRACE J. GARCIA, a.k.a. GRACE J. GARCIA-RECIO, petitioner, vs. REDERICK A.

RECIO, respondent.
DECISION

Nevertheless, we are unanimous in our holding that Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family
PANGANIBAN, J.:
Code (E.O. No. 209, as amended by E.O. No. 227), should be interpreted to allow a Filipino
citizen, who has been divorced by a spouse who had acquired foreign citizenship and
remarried, also to remarry. However, considering that in the present petition there is no

A divorce obtained abroad by an alien may be recognized in our jurisdiction, provided

such decree is valid according to the national law of the foreigner. However, the divorce
decree and the governing personal law of the alien spouse who obtained the divorce must
be proven. Our courts do not take judicial notice of foreign laws and judgments; hence, like
any other facts, both the divorce decree and the national law of the alien must be alleged
and proven according to our law on evidence.

sufficient evidence submitted and on record, we are unable to declare, based on

respondents bare allegations that his wife, who was naturalized as an American citizen, had
obtained a divorce decree and had remarried an American, that respondent is now
capacitated to remarry. Such declaration could only be made properly upon respondents
submission of the aforecited evidence in his favor.

The Case
Before us is a Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, seeking to
nullify the January 7, 1999 Decision [1] and the March 24, 1999 Order [2] of the Regional Trial
Court of Cabanatuan City, Branch 28, in Civil Case No. 3026AF. The assailed Decision
disposed as follows:

WHEREFORE, this Court declares the marriage between Grace J. Garcia and Rederick A.
Recio solemnized on January 12, 1994 at Cabanatuan City as dissolved and both parties
can now remarry under existing and applicable laws to any and/or both parties.[3]
The assailed Order denied reconsideration of the above-quoted Decision.

The trial court declared the marriage dissolved on the ground that the divorce issued
in Australia was valid and recognized in the Philippines. It deemed the marriage ended, but
not on the basis of any defect in an essential element of the marriage; that is, respondents
alleged lack of legal capacity to remarry. Rather, it based its Decision on the divorce decree
obtained by respondent. The Australian divorce had ended the marriage; thus, there was no
more marital union to nullify or annul.
Hence, this Petition.[18]

The Facts
Rederick A. Recio, a Filipino, was married to Editha Samson, an Australian citizen, in
Malabon, Rizal, on March 1, 1987.[4] They lived together as husband and wife in
Australia. On May 18, 1989, [5] a decree of divorce, purportedly dissolving the marriage, was
issued by an Australian family court.
On June 26, 1992, respondent became an Australian citizen, as shown by a Certificate
of Australian Citizenship issued by the Australian government.[6] Petitioner -- a Filipina -- and
respondent were married on January 12, 1994 in Our Lady of Perpetual Help Church in
Cabanatuan City.[7] In their application for a marriage license, respondent was declared as
single and Filipino.[8]
Starting October 22, 1995, petitioner and respondent lived separately without prior
judicial dissolution of their marriage. While the two were still in Australia, their conjugal
assets were divided on May 16, 1996, in accordance with their Statutory Declarations
secured in Australia.[9]
On March 3, 1998, petitioner filed a Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of
Marriage[10] in the court a quo, on the ground of bigamy -- respondent allegedly had a prior
subsisting marriage at the time he married her on January 12, 1994. She claimed that she
learned of respondents marriage to Editha Samson only in November, 1997.

Issues
Petitioner submits the following issues for our consideration:
1
The trial court gravely erred in finding that the divorce decree obtained in Australia by the
respondent ipso facto terminated his first marriage to Editha Samson thereby capacitating
him to contract a second marriage with the petitioner.
2
The failure of the respondent, who is now a naturalized Australian, to present a certificate of
legal capacity to marry constitutes absence of a substantial requisite voiding the petitioners
marriage to the respondent
3

In his Answer, respondent averred that, as far back as 1993, he had revealed to
petitioner his prior marriage and its subsequent dissolution.[11] He contended that his first
marriage to an Australian citizen had been validly dissolved by a divorce decree obtained in
Australia in 1989;[12] thus, he was legally capacitated to marry petitioner in 1994.

The trial court seriously erred in the application of Art. 26 of the Family Code in this case.

On July 7, 1998 -- or about five years after the couples wedding and while the suit for
the declaration of nullity was pending -- respondent was able to secure a divorce decree
from a family court in Sydney, Australia because the marriage ha[d] irretrievably broken
down.[13]

The trial court patently and grievously erred in disregarding Arts. 11, 13, 21, 35, 40, 52 and
53 of the Family Code as the applicable provisions in this case.

Respondent prayed in his Answer that the Complaint be dismissed on the ground that
it stated no cause of action.[14] The Office of the Solicitor General agreed with respondent.
[15]
The court marked and admitted the documentary evidence of both parties. [16] After they
submitted their respective memoranda, the case was submitted for resolution.[17]
Thereafter, the trial court rendered the assailed Decision and Order.

Ruling of the Trial Court

5
The trial court gravely erred in pronouncing that the divorce decree obtained by the
respondent in Australia ipso facto capacitated the parties to remarry, without first securing a
recognition of the judgment granting the divorce decree before our courts.[19]
The Petition raises five issues, but for purposes of this Decision, we shall concentrate
on two pivotal ones: (1) whether the divorce between respondent and Editha Samson was
proven, and (2) whether respondent was proven to be legally capacitated to marry

petitioner. Because of our ruling on these two, there is no more necessity to take up the
rest.

The Courts Ruling

The Petition is partly meritorious.

ART. 11. Where a marriage license is required, each of the contracting parties shall file
separately a sworn application for such license with the proper local civil registrar which
shall specify the following:
xxxxxxxxx
(5) If previously married, how, when and where the previous marriage was dissolved or
annulled;
xxxxxxxxx

First Issue:
Proving the Divorce Between Respondent and Editha Samson

ART. 13. In case either of the contracting parties has been previously married, the applicant
shall be required to

Petitioner assails the trial courts recognition of the divorce between respondent and
Editha Samson. Citing Adong v. Cheong Seng Gee,[20] petitioner argues that the divorce
decree, like any other foreign judgment, may be given recognition in this jurisdiction only
upon proof of the existence of (1) the foreign law allowing absolute divorce and (2) the
alleged divorce decree itself. She adds that respondent miserably failed to establish these
elements.

ART. 13. In case either of the contracting parties has been previously married, the applicant
shall be required to furnish, instead of the birth or baptismal certificate required in the last
preceding article, the death certificate of the deceased spouse or the judicial decree of the
absolute divorce, or the judicial decree of annulment or declaration of nullity of his or her
previous marriage. x x x.

Petitioner adds that, based on the first paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code,
marriages solemnized abroad are governed by the law of the place where they were
celebrated (the lex loci celebrationis). In effect, the Code requires the presentation of the
foreign law to show the conformity of the marriage in question to the legal requirements of
the place where the marriage was performed.

ART. 52. The judgment of annulment or of absolute nullity of the marriage, the partition and
distribution of the properties of the spouses, and the delivery of the childrens presumptive
legitimes shall be recorded in the appropriate civil registry and registries of property;
otherwise, the same shall not affect their persons.

At the outset, we lay the following basic legal principles as the take-off points for our
discussion. Philippine law does not provide for absolute divorce; hence, our courts cannot
grant it.[21] A marriage between two Filipinos cannot be dissolved even by a divorce obtained
abroad, because of Articles 15[22] and 17[23] of the Civil Code.[24] In mixed marriages involving
a Filipino and a foreigner, Article 26[25]of the Family Code allows the former to contract a
subsequent marriage in case the divorce is validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse
capacitating him or her to remarry.[26] A divorce obtained abroad by a couple, who are both
aliens, may be recognized in the Philippines, provided it is consistent with their respective
national laws.[27]
A comparison between marriage and divorce, as far as pleading and proof are
concerned, can be made. Van Dorn v. Romillo Jr. decrees that aliens may obtain divorces
abroad, which may be recognized in the Philippines, provided they are valid according to
their national law.[28] Therefore, before a foreign divorce decree can be recognized by our
courts, the party pleading it must prove the divorce as a fact and demonstrate its conformity
to the foreign law allowing it.[29] Presentation solely of the divorce decree is insufficient.
Divorce as a Question of Fact
Petitioner insists that before a divorce decree can be admitted in evidence, it must first
comply with the registration requirements under Articles 11, 13 and 52 of the Family
Code. These articles read as follows:

Respondent, on the other hand, argues that the Australian divorce decree is a public
document -- a written official act of an Australian family court. Therefore, it requires no
further proof of its authenticity and due execution.
Respondent is getting ahead of himself. Before a foreign judgment is given
presumptive evidentiary value, the document must first be presented and admitted in
evidence.[30] A divorce obtained abroad is proven by the divorce decree itself. Indeed the
best evidence of a judgment is the judgment itself. [31] The decree purports to be a written act
or record of an act of an official body or tribunal of a foreign country.[32]
Under Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132, on the other hand, a writing or document may
be proven as a public or official record of a foreign country by either (1) an official
publication or (2) a copy thereof attested [33] by the officer having legal custody of the
document. If the record is not kept in the Philippines, such copy must be (a) accompanied
by a certificate issued by the proper diplomatic or consular officer in the Philippine foreign
service stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept and (b) authenticated by
the seal of his office. [34]
The divorce decree between respondent and Editha Samson appears to be an
authentic one issued by an Australian family court. [35] However, appearance is not sufficient;
compliance with the aforementioned rules on evidence must be demonstrated.
Fortunately for respondents cause, when the divorce decree of May 18, 1989 was
submitted in evidence, counsel for petitioner objected, not to its admissibility, but only to the

fact that it had not been registered in the Local Civil Registry of Cabanatuan City.[36] The trial
court ruled that it was admissible, subject to petitioners qualification. [37] Hence, it was
admitted in evidence and accorded weight by the judge. Indeed, petitioners failure to object
properly rendered the divorce decree admissible as a written act of the Family Court of
Sydney, Australia.[38]
Compliance with the quoted articles (11, 13 and 52) of the Family Code is not
necessary; respondent was no longer bound by Philippine personal laws after he acquired
Australian citizenship in 1992.[39]Naturalization is the legal act of adopting an alien and
clothing him with the political and civil rights belonging to a citizen. [40] Naturalized citizens,
freed from the protective cloak of their former states, don the attires of their adoptive
countries. By becoming an Australian, respondent severed his allegiance to the Philippines
and the vinculum juris that had tied him to Philippine personal laws.
Burden of Proving Australian Law
Respondent contends that the burden to prove Australian divorce law falls upon
petitioner, because she is the party challenging the validity of a foreign judgment. He
contends that petitioner was satisfied with the original of the divorce decree and was
cognizant of the marital laws of Australia, because she had lived and worked in that country
for quite a long time. Besides, the Australian divorce law is allegedly known by Philippine
courts; thus, judges may take judicial notice of foreign laws in the exercise of sound
discretion.
We are not persuaded. The burden of proof lies with the party who alleges the
existence of a fact or thing necessary in the prosecution or defense of an action.[41] In civil
cases, plaintiffs have the burden of proving the material allegations of the complaint when
those are denied by the answer; and defendants have the burden of proving the material
allegations in their answer when they introduce new matters. [42]Since the divorce was a
defense raised by respondent, the burden of proving the pertinent Australian law validating it
falls squarely upon him.
It is well-settled in our jurisdiction that our courts cannot take judicial notice of foreign
laws. Like any other facts, they must be alleged and proved. Australian marital laws are
not among those matters that judges are supposed to know by reason of their judicial
function.[44] The power of judicial notice must be exercised with caution, and every
reasonable doubt upon the subject should be resolved in the negative.
[43]

Second Issue: Respondents Legal Capacity to Remarry

Petitioner contends that, in view of the insufficient proof of the divorce, respondent was
legally incapacitated to marry her in 1994. Hence, she concludes that their marriage was
void ab initio.
Respondent replies that the Australian divorce decree, which was validly admitted in
evidence, adequately established his legal capacity to marry under Australian law.
Respondents contention is untenable. In its strict legal sense, divorce means the legal
dissolution of a lawful union for a cause arising after marriage. But divorces are of different

types. The two basic ones are (1) absolute divorce or a vinculo matrimonii and (2) limited
divorce or a mensa et thoro. The first kind terminates the marriage, while the second
suspends it and leaves the bond in full force.[45] There is no showing in the case at bar which
type of divorce was procured by respondent.
Respondent presented a decree nisi or an interlocutory decree -- a conditional or
provisional judgment of divorce. It is in effect the same as a separation from bed and board,
although an absolute divorce may follow after the lapse of the prescribed period during
which no reconciliation is effected.[46]
Even after the divorce becomes absolute, the court may under some foreign statutes
and practices, still restrict remarriage. Under some other jurisdictions, remarriage may be
limited by statute; thus, the guilty party in a divorce which was granted on the ground of
adultery may be prohibited from marrying again. The court may allow a remarriage only
after proof of good behavior.[47]
On its face, the herein Australian divorce decree contains a restriction that reads:
1. A party to a marriage who marries again before this decree becomes absolute
(unless the other party has died) commits the offence of bigamy.[48]
This quotation bolsters our contention that the divorce obtained by respondent may
have been restricted. It did not absolutely establish his legal capacity to remarry according
to his national law. Hence, we find no basis for the ruling of the trial court, which erroneously
assumed that the Australian divorce ipso facto restored respondents capacity to remarry
despite the paucity of evidence on this matter.
We also reject the claim of respondent that the divorce decree raises a disputable
presumption or presumptive evidence as to his civil status based on Section 48, Rule
39[49] of the Rules of Court, for the simple reason that no proof has been presented on the
legal effects of the divorce decree obtained under Australian laws.
Significance of the Certificate of Legal Capacity
Petitioner argues that the certificate of legal capacity required by Article 21 of the
Family Code was not submitted together with the application for a marriage
license. According to her, its absence is proof that respondent did not have legal capacity to
remarry.
We clarify. To repeat, the legal capacity to contract marriage is determined by the
national law of the party concerned. The certificate mentioned in Article 21 of the Family
Code would have been sufficient to establish the legal capacity of respondent, had he duly
presented it in court. A duly authenticated and admitted certificate is prima facie evidence of
legal capacity to marry on the part of the alien applicant for a marriage license.[50]
As it is, however, there is absolutely no evidence that proves respondents legal
capacity to marry petitioner. A review of the records before this Court shows that only the
following exhibits were presented before the lower court: (1) for petitioner: (a) Exhibit A
Complaint;[51] (b) Exhibit B Certificate of Marriage Between Rederick A. Recio (FilipinoAustralian) and Grace J. Garcia (Filipino) on January 12, 1994 in Cabanatuan City, Nueva
Ecija;[52] (c) Exhibit C Certificate of Marriage Between Rederick A. Recio (Filipino) and
Editha D. Samson (Australian) on March 1, 1987 in Malabon, Metro Manila; [53] (d) Exhibit D
Office of the City Registrar of Cabanatuan City Certification that no information of annulment

between Rederick A. Recio and Editha D. Samson was in its records; [54] and (e) Exhibit E
Certificate of Australian Citizenship of Rederick A. Recio;[55] (2) for respondent: (a) Exhibit 1
-- Amended Answer;[56] (b) Exhibit 2 Family Law Act 1975 Decree Nisi of Dissolution of
Marriage in the Family Court of Australia;[57] (c) Exhibit 3 Certificate of Australian Citizenship
of Rederick A. Recio;[58] (d) Exhibit 4 Decree Nisi of Dissolution of Marriage in the Family
Court of Australia Certificate;[59]and Exhibit 5 -- Statutory Declaration of the Legal Separation
Between Rederick A. Recio and Grace J. Garcia Recio since October 22, 1995.[60]

GERBERT R. CORPUZ,
Petitioner,

G.R. No. 186571

Present:

CARPIO MORALES, J., Chairperson,

BRION,

Based on the above records, we cannot conclude that respondent, who was then a
naturalized Australian citizen, was legally capacitated to marry petitioner on January 12,
1994. We agree with petitioners contention that the court a quo erred in finding that the
divorce decree ipso facto clothed respondent with the legal capacity to remarry without
requiring him to adduce sufficient evidence to show the Australian personal law governing
his status; or at the very least, to prove his legal capacity to contract the second marriage.

BERSAMIN,
-

versus -

SO ORDERED.

ABAD, and

VILLARAMA, JR., JJ.

Neither can we grant petitioners prayer to declare her marriage to respondent null and
void on the ground of bigamy. After all, it may turn out that under Australian law, he was
really capacitated to marry petitioner as a direct result of the divorce decree. Hence, we
believe that the most judicious course is to remand this case to the trial court to receive
evidence, if any, which show petitioners legal capacity to marry petitioner. Failing in that,
then the court a quo may declare a nullity of the parties marriage on the ground of bigamy,
there being already in evidence two existing marriage certificates, which were both obtained
in the Philippines, one in Malabon, Metro Manila dated March 1, 1987 and the other, in
Cabanatuan City dated January 12, 1994.
WHEREFORE, in the interest of orderly procedure and substantial justice,
we REMAND the case to the court a quo for the purpose of receiving evidence which
conclusively show respondents legal capacity to marry petitioner; and failing in that, of
declaring the parties marriage void on the ground of bigamy, as above discussed. No costs.

Promulgated:
August 11, 2010
DAISYLYN TIROL STO. TOMAS and The
SOLICITOR GENERAL,
Respondents. -- x--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

DECISION
BRION, J.:

Before the Court is a direct appeal from the decision [1] of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Laoag City, Branch 11, elevated via a petition for review oncertiorari[2] under Rule
45 of the Rules of Court (present petition).

Petitioner Gerbert R. Corpuz was a former Filipino citizen who acquired Canadian
citizenship through naturalization on November 29, 2000.[3] On January 18, 2005, Gerbert
married respondent Daisylyn T. Sto. Tomas, a Filipina, in Pasig City.[4] Due to work and other
professional commitments, Gerbert left for Canada soon after the wedding. He returned to
the Philippines sometime in April 2005 to surprise Daisylyn, but was shocked to discover
that his wife was having an affair with another man. Hurt and disappointed, Gerbert returned
to Canada and

filed

petition

for

divorce. The

Superior

Court

of

Justice, Windsor, Ontario, Canada granted Gerberts petition for divorce on December 8,

In its October 30, 2008 decision,[7] the RTC denied Gerberts petition. The RTC
concluded that Gerbert was not the proper party to institute the action for judicial recognition
of the foreign divorce decree as he is a naturalized Canadian citizen. It ruled that only the
Filipino spouse can avail of the remedy, under the second paragraph of Article 26 of the
Family Code,[8] in order for him or her to be able to remarry under Philippine law.[9] Article 26
of the Family Code reads:

2005. The divorce decree took effect a month later, on January 8, 2006.[5]

Two years after the divorce, Gerbert has moved on and has found another Filipina

Art. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines, in

accordance with the laws in force in the country where they were
solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this country,
except those prohibited under Articles 35(1), (4), (5) and (6), 36, 37 and
38.

to love. Desirous of marrying his new Filipina fiance in the Philippines, Gerbert went to the
Pasig City Civil Registry Office and registered the Canadian divorce decree on his and
Daisylyns marriage certificate. Despite the registration of the divorce decree, an official of
the National Statistics Office (NSO) informed Gerbert that the marriage between him and
Daisylyn still subsists under Philippine law; to be enforceable, the foreign divorce decree
must first be judicially recognized by a competent Philippine court, pursuant to NSO Circular

Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner

is validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained
abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the
Filipino spouse shall likewise have capacity to remarry under
Philippine law.

No. 4, series of 1982.[6]

This conclusion, the RTC stated, is consistent with the legislative intent behind the
Accordingly, Gerbert filed a petition for judicial recognition of foreign divorce
and/or declaration of marriage as dissolved (petition) with the RTC.Although summoned,
Daisylyn did not file any responsive pleading but submitted instead a notarized
letter/manifestation to the trial court. She offered no opposition to Gerberts petition and, in

enactment of the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, as determined by the
Court in Republic v. Orbecido III;[10] the provision was enacted to avoid the absurd situation
where the Filipino spouse remains married to the alien spouse who, after obtaining a
divorce, is no longer married to the Filipino spouse.[11]

fact, alleged her desire to file a similar case herself but was prevented by financial and
personal circumstances. She, thus, requested that she be considered as a party-in-interest
with a similar prayer to Gerberts.

THE PETITION

From the RTCs ruling,[12] Gerbert filed the present petition.[13]

Gerbert asserts that his petition before the RTC is essentially for declaratory relief,

The resolution of the issue requires a review of the legislative history and intent behind the
second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code.

similar to that filed in Orbecido; he, thus, similarly asks for a determination of his rights
under the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code. Taking into account the
rationale behind the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, he contends that
the provision applies as well to the benefit of the alien spouse. He claims that the RTC
ruling unduly stretched the doctrine in Orbecido by limiting the standing to file the petition
only to the Filipino spouse an interpretation he claims to be contrary to the essence of the
second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code. He considers himself as a proper party,

The Family Code recognizes only two types of defective marriages void [15] and
voidable[16] marriages. In both cases, the basis for the judicial declaration of absolute nullity
or annulment of the marriage exists before or at the time of the marriage. Divorce, on the
other hand, contemplates the dissolution of the lawful union for cause arising after the
marriage.[17] Our family laws do not recognize absolute divorce between Filipino citizens.[18]

vested with sufficient legal interest, to institute the case, as there is a possibility that he

Recognizing the reality that divorce is a possibility in marriages between a Filipino

might be prosecuted for bigamy if he marries his Filipina fiance in the Philippines since two

and an alien, President Corazon C. Aquino, in the exercise of her legislative powers under

marriage certificates, involving him, would be on file with the Civil Registry Office. The Office

the Freedom Constitution,[19] enacted Executive Order No. (EO) 227, amending Article 26 of

of the Solicitor General and Daisylyn, in their respective Comments,[14] both support

the Family Code to its present wording, as follows:

Gerberts position.

Essentially, the petition raises the issue of whether the second paragraph of Article 26 of
the Family Code extends to aliens the right to petition a court of this jurisdiction for

Art. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines, in

accordance with the laws in force in the country where they were
solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this country,
except those prohibited under Articles 35(1), (4), (5) and (6), 36, 37 and
38.

the recognition of a foreign divorce decree.

THE COURTS RULING

The alien spouse can claim no

right under the second paragraph
of Article 26 of the Family Code as
the substantive right it establishes
is in favor of the Filipino spouse

Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner

is validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained
abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the
Filipino spouse shall likewise have capacity to remarry under
Philippine law.

Through the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, EO 227 effectively
incorporated into the law this Courts holding in Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr.

[20]

andPilapil v. Ibay-

Somera.[21] In both cases, the Court refused to acknowledge the alien spouses assertion of

second paragraph in Article 26 of the Family Code provides the direct exception to this rule
and serves as basis for recognizing the dissolution of the marriage between the Filipino
spouse and his or her alien spouse.

marital rights after a foreign courts divorce decree between the alien and the Filipino. The
Court, thus, recognized that the foreign divorce had already severed the marital bond
between the spouses. The Court reasoned in Van Dorn v. Romillo that:

Additionally, an action based on the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code is
not limited to the recognition of the foreign divorce decree. If the court finds that the decree

To maintain x x x that, under our laws, [the Filipino spouse] has to

be considered still married to [the alien spouse] and still subject to a
wife's obligations x x x cannot be just.[The Filipino spouse] should not
be obliged to live together with, observe respect and fidelity, and render
support to [the alien spouse]. The latter should not continue to be one of
her heirs with possible rights to conjugal property. She should not be
discriminated against in her own country if the ends of justice are to
be served.[22]

capacitated the alien spouse to remarry, the courts can declare that the Filipino spouse is
likewise capacitated to contract another marriage. No court in this jurisdiction, however, can
make a similar declaration for the alien spouse (other than that already established by the
decree), whose status and legal capacity are generally governed by his national law.[26]

Given the rationale and intent behind the enactment, and the purpose of the
second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, the RTC was correct in limiting the
applicability of the provision for the benefit of the Filipino spouse. In other words, only the
As the RTC correctly stated, the provision was included in the law to avoid the
absurd situation where the Filipino spouse remains married to the alien spouse who, after
obtaining a divorce, is no longer married to the Filipino spouse.

[23]

Filipino spouse can invoke the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code; the alien
spouse can claim no right under this provision.

The legislative intent is for

the benefit of the Filipino spouse, by clarifying his or her marital status, settling the doubts
created by the divorce decree. Essentially, the second paragraph of Article 26 of the
Family Code provided the Filipino spouse a substantive right to have his or her
marriage to the alien spouse considered as dissolved, capacitating him or her to
remarry.[24] Without the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, the judicial

The foreign divorce decree is

presumptive evidence of a right
that clothes the party with legal
interest to petition for its
recognition in this jurisdiction

recognition of the foreign decree of divorce, whether in a proceeding instituted precisely for
that purpose or as a related issue in another proceeding, would be of no significance to the
Filipino spouse since our laws do not recognize divorce as a mode of severing the marital
bond;

[25]

Article 17 of the Civil Code provides that the policy against absolute divorces

cannot be subverted by judgments promulgated in a foreign country. The inclusion of the

We qualify our above conclusion i.e., that the second paragraph of Article 26 of the
Family Code bestows no rights in favor of aliens with the complementary statement that this

conclusion is not sufficient basis to dismiss Gerberts petition before the RTC. In other
words, the unavailability of the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code to aliens
does not necessarily strip Gerbert of legal interest to petition the RTC for the recognition of
his foreign divorce decree. The foreign divorce decree itself, after its authenticity and
conformity with the aliens national law have been duly proven according to our rules of
evidence, serves as a presumptive evidence of right in favor of Gerbert, pursuant to Section
48, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court which provides for the effect of foreign judgments. This
Section states:
SEC. 48. Effect of foreign judgments or final orders.The effect
of a judgment or final order of a tribunal of a foreign country, having
jurisdiction to render the judgment or final order is as follows:
(a)

In case of a judgment or final order upon a specific

thing, the judgment or final order is conclusive upon the
title of the thing; and

(b)

In case of a judgment or final order against a

person, the judgment or final order is presumptive
evidence of a right as between the parties and their
successors in interest by a subsequent title.

In either case, the judgment or final order may be repelled by

evidence of a want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion,
fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact.
To our mind, direct involvement or being the subject of the foreign judgment is sufficient to
clothe a party with the requisite interest to institute an action before our courts for the
recognition of the foreign judgment. In a divorce situation, we have declared, no less, that
the divorce obtained by an alien abroad may be recognized in the Philippines, provided the
divorce is valid according to his or her national law.[27]
The starting point in any recognition of a foreign divorce judgment is the
acknowledgment that our courts do not take judicial notice of foreign judgments and
laws. Justice Herrera explained that, as a rule, no sovereign is bound to give effect within its
dominion to a judgment rendered by a tribunal of another country.[28] This means that the
foreign judgment and its authenticity must be proven as facts under our rules on evidence,
together with the aliens applicable national law to show the effect of the judgment on the
alien himself or herself.[29] The recognition may be made in an action instituted specifically
for the purpose or in another action where a party invokes the foreign decree as an integral
aspect of his claim or defense.
In Gerberts case, since both the foreign divorce decree and the national law of the
alien, recognizing his or her capacity to obtain a divorce, purport to be official acts of a
sovereign authority, Section 24, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court comes into play. This
Section requires proof, either by (1) official publications or (2) copies attested by the officer
having legal custody of the documents. If the copies of official records are not kept in
the Philippines, these must be (a) accompanied by a certificate issued by the proper
diplomatic or consular officer in the Philippine foreign service stationed in the foreign
country in which the record is kept and (b) authenticated by the seal of his office.

The records show that Gerbert attached to his petition a copy of the divorce
decree, as well as the required certificates proving its authenticity,[30] but failed to include a
copy of the Canadian law on divorce. [31] Under this situation, we can, at this point, simply
dismiss the petition for insufficiency of supporting evidence, unless we deem it more
appropriate to remand the case to the RTC to determine whether the divorce decree is
consistent with the Canadian divorce law.
We deem it more appropriate to take this latter course of action, given the Article
26 interests that will be served and the Filipina wifes (Daisylyns) obvious conformity with the
petition. A remand, at the same time, will allow other interested parties to oppose the foreign
judgment and overcome a petitioners presumptive evidence of a right by proving want of
jurisdiction, want of notice to a party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or
fact. Needless to state, every precaution must be taken to ensure conformity with our laws
before a recognition is made, as the foreign judgment, once recognized, shall have the
effect of res judicata[32] between the parties, as provided in Section 48, Rule 39 of the Rules
of Court.[33]
In fact, more than the principle of comity that is served by the practice of reciprocal
recognition of foreign judgments between nations, the res judicata effect of the foreign
judgments of divorce serves as the deeper basis for extending judicial recognition and for
considering the alien spouse bound by its terms. This same effect, as discussed above, will
not obtain for the Filipino spouse were it not for the substantive rule that the second
paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code provides.
Considerations beyond the
recognition of the foreign divorce
decree
As a matter of housekeeping concern, we note that the Pasig City Civil Registry
Office has already recorded the divorce decree on Gerbert and Daisylyns marriage
certificate based on the mere presentation of the decree. [34] We consider the recording
to be legally improper; hence, the need to draw attention of the bench and the bar to what
had been done.
Article 407 of the Civil Code states that [a]cts, events and judicial decrees concerning the
civil status of persons shall be recorded in the civil register. The law requires the entry in the
civil registry of judicial decrees that produce legal consequences touching upon a persons
legal capacity and status, i.e., those affecting all his personal qualities and relations, more
or less permanent in nature, not ordinarily terminable at his own will, such as his being
legitimate or illegitimate, or his being married or not.[35]
A judgment of divorce is a judicial decree, although a foreign one, affecting a
persons legal capacity and status that must be recorded. In fact, Act No. 3753 or the Law on
Registry of Civil Status specifically requires the registration of divorce decrees in the civil
registry:
Sec. 1. Civil Register. A civil register is established for recording
the civil status of persons, in which shall be entered:
(a)

births;

(b)
(c)
(d)
(e)
(f)
(g)
(h)
(i)
(j)

deaths;
marriages;
annulments of marriages;
divorces;
legitimations;
adoptions;
acknowledgment of natural children;
naturalization; and
changes of name.
xxxx

Sec. 4. Civil Register Books. The local registrars shall keep and
preserve in their offices the following books, in which they shall,
respectively make the proper entries concerning the civil status of
persons:
(1) Birth and death register;
(2) Marriage register, in which shall be entered not only the
marriages solemnized but also divorces and dissolved
marriages.
(3) Legitimation, acknowledgment, adoption, change of name
and naturalization register.

But while the law requires the entry of the divorce decree in the civil registry, the law and the
submission of the decree by themselves do not ipso facto authorize the
decrees registration. The law should be read in relation with the requirement of a judicial
recognition of the foreign judgment before it can be given res judicata effect.In the context of
the present case, no judicial order as yet exists recognizing the foreign divorce
decree. Thus, the Pasig City Civil Registry Office acted totally out of turn and without
authority of law when it annotated the Canadian divorce decree on Gerbert and Daisylyns
marriage certificate, on the strength alone of the foreign decree presented by Gerbert.
Evidently, the Pasig City Civil Registry Office was aware of the requirement of a
court recognition, as it cited NSO Circular No. 4, series of 1982, [36] and Department of
Justice Opinion No. 181, series of 1982 [37] both of which required a final order from a
competent Philippine court before a foreign judgment, dissolving a marriage, can be
registered in the civil registry, but it, nonetheless, allowed the registration of the decree. For
being contrary to law, the registration of the foreign divorce decree without the requisite
judicial recognition is patently void and cannot produce any legal effect.
Another point we wish to draw attention to is that the recognition that the RTC may
extend to the Canadian divorce decree does not, by itself, authorize thecancellation of the
entry in the civil registry. A petition for recognition of a foreign judgment is not the proper

proceeding, contemplated under the Rules of Court, for the cancellation of entries in the civil
registry.
Article 412 of the Civil Code declares that no entry in a civil register shall be
changed or corrected, without judicial order. The Rules of Court supplements Article 412 of
the Civil Code by specifically providing for a special remedial proceeding by which entries in
the civil registry may be judicially cancelled or corrected.Rule 108 of the Rules of Court sets
in detail the jurisdictional and procedural requirements that must be complied with before a
judgment, authorizing the cancellation or correction, may be annotated in the civil registry. It
also requires, among others, that the verified petition must be filed with the RTC of the
province where the corresponding civil registry is located; [38] that the civil registrar and all
persons who have or claim any interest must be made parties to the proceedings; [39] and
that the time and place for hearing must be published in a newspaper of general circulation.
[40]
As these basic jurisdictional requirements have not been met in the present case, we
cannot consider the petition Gerbert filed with the RTC as one filed under Rule 108 of the
Rules of Court.
We hasten to point out, however, that this ruling should not be construed as requiring two
separate proceedings for the registration of a foreign divorce decree in the civil registry one
for recognition of the foreign decree and another specifically for cancellation of the entry
under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court. The recognition of the foreign divorce decree may be
made in a Rule 108 proceeding itself, as the object of special proceedings (such as that in
Rule 108 of the Rules of Court) is precisely to establish the status or right of a party or a
particular fact. Moreover, Rule 108 of the Rules of Court can serve as the appropriate
adversarial proceeding[41] by which the applicability of the foreign judgment can be
measured and tested in terms of jurisdictional infirmities, want of notice to the party,
collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact.
WHEREFORE,
we GRANT the
petition
for
review
on certiorari,
and REVERSE the October 30, 2008 decision of the Regional Trial Court of Laoag City,
Branch 11, as well as its February 17, 2009 order. We order the REMAND of the case to the
trial court for further proceedings in accordance with our ruling above.Let a copy of this
Decision be furnished the Civil Registrar General. No costs.
SO ORDERED.

[G.R. No. L-21951. November 27, 1964.]IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION OF THE
MINOR CHARLES JOSEPH BLANCAFLOR WEEKS. UGGI LINDAMAND THERKELSEN
and ERLINDA G. BLANCAFLOR, Petitioners-Appellants, v. REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES, Respondent-Appellee.
Campos, Mendoza & Hernandez for Petitioners-Appellants.

warrant the approval of the adoption sought herein. Petitioner husband is a Danish subject,
who has been granted permanent residence in the Philippines (Exhs. "D" and "E"). A former
employee of Scandinavian Airlines System, he is now Manager of M. Y. Travel International
Hongkong Ltd., with a monthly salary of P1,200.00, plus allowances. It does not appear that
either petitioner has been convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude. On the other hand,
the minor sought to be adopted has been living with them ever since the marriage of
petitioners. Petitioner husband has treated the minor as his son, and the latter calls him
"Daddy." Although the possibility exists that petitioners may yet have their own children, the
adoption at this time, before any such children is begotten, may strengthen, rather than
disrupt, future domestic relations."cralaw virtua1aw library

Solicitor General and J. Domingo de Leon for Respondent-Appellee.

The court a quo denied the adoption sought, saying:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
SYLLABUS

1. ADOPTION; DISQUALIFICATIONS; ALIENAGE BY ITSELF DOES NOT DISQUALIFY

FOREIGNER FROM ADOPTING A FILIPINO. The present Civil Code in force (Article
335) only disqualifies from being adopters those aliens that are either (a) non-resident or (b)
who are resident but the Republic of the Philippines has broken diplomatic relations with
their government. Outside of these two cases, alienage by itself alone does not disqualify a
foreigner from adopting a person under our laws.
2. ID.; ID.; ACQUISITION BY ADOPTED OF CITIZENSHIP OF ADOPTING PARENT NOT
REQUIRED. It is not a condition for the approval of an adoption that the process should
result in the acquisition, by the person adopted, of the alien citizenship of the adopting
parent.

DECISION

REYES, J.B.L., J.:

This appeal was taken against a decision of the Manila Juvenile and Domestic Relations
Court, in its special proceedings No. D-00007, denying appellants application for adoption
of the minor Charles Joseph Blancaflor Weeks.
The factual background of the case is stated in the decision appealed from to be as
follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"In this adoption proceeding, the petitioners are husband and wife who were married on
June 2, 1962, or barely a year ago. The minor sought to be adopted, born on February 16,
1960, is the natural child of petitioners wife. His father was Charles Joseph Weeks, who
abandoned mother and child after the latters birth. He is said to have gone back to the
United States.
Except for the legal impediment hereinafter to be mentioned, the facts before the Court may

"In Sp. Proc. No. D-00011, adoption of Benigno Lim, this court has had occasion to rule that
a Filipino cannot adopt an alien (Chinese) minor about 19 years old. The adoption would not
confer Philippine citizenship on the Chinese, but could definitely: legalize his stay in this
country. It was also stated that conversely, an alien cannot adopt a Filipino unless the
adoption would make the Filipino minor a citizen of the aliens country. As petitioner
husband in this case is a Danish subject, it has to be held that he cannot legally adopt the
minor Charles Joseph Blancaflor Weeks, whose citizenship is of this country, following that
of his natural mother."cralaw virtua1aw library
If we understand the decision correctly, the adoption was denied solely because the same
would not result in the loss of the minors Filipino citizenship and the acquisition by him of
the citizenship of his adopter. Unfortunately, the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court did
not expound the reasons for its opinion; but it is clear that, if pursued to its logical
consequences, the judgment appealed from would operate to impose a further prerequisite
on adoptions by aliens beyond those required by law. As pointed out by the Solicitor
General in his brief, the present Civil Code in force (Article 335) only disqualifies from being
adopters those aliens that are either (a) non-resident or (b) who are resident but the
Republic of the Philippines has broken diplomatic relations with their government. Outside
of these two cases, alienage by itself alone does not disqualify a foreigner from adopting a
person under our law. Petitioners admittedly do not fall in either class.
The criterion adopted by the Court a quo would demand as a condition for the approval of
the adoption that the process should result in the acquisition, by the person adopted, of the
alien citizenship of the adopting parent. This finds no support in the law, for, as observed by
this Court in Ching Leng v. Galang, G.R. No. L-11931, promulgated on 27 October 1958, the
citizenship of the adopter is a matter political, and not civil, in nature, and the ways in which
it should be conferred lay outside the ambit of the Civil Code. It is not within the province of
our civil law to determine how or when citizenship in a foreign state is to be acquired. The
disapproval of the adoption of an alien child in order to forestall circumvention of our
exclusion laws does not warrant denial of the adoption of a Filipino minor by qualified alien
adopting parents, since it is not shown that our public policy would be thereby subverted.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the decision appealed from is reversed, and the court a
quo is directed to allow the adoption sought. Without costs.

G.R. No. L-43955-56 July 30, 1979 RENATO LAZATIN alias RENATO STA.
CLARA, petitioner,
vs.
HONORABLE JUDGE JOSE C. CAMPOS, JR., NORA L. DE LEON, BERNARDO DE
LEON, ARLENE DE LEON and IRMA L. VELOSO, respondents.
TEEHANKEE, J.:1wph1.t
The Court dismisses the petition which seeks to overrule respondent judge's orders
declaring that petitioner has failed to establish by competent evidence his alleged status as
an adopted child of the deceased Lazatin spouses and prays for judgment of this Court
"declaring as established the fact of (his) adoption as a son of the deceased spouses
entitling him to succeed in their estates as such." Respondent judge correctly ruled that he
could not allow petitioner (who had filed a motion to intervene in the proceedings to probate
the will of the late Margarita de Asis Vda. de Lazatin and to settle her estate as her adopted
son, after having earlier filed a motion to intervene in the intestate proceedings of her predeceased husband as his admitted illegitimate [not natural] son), over the opposition of
private respondents, to introduce evidence that he had "enjoyed ... the status of an adopted
child of the without his first producing competent and documentary that there had been
judicial proceedings for his by the said spouses which resulted in the final judgment of a
competent court decreeing his adoption.
On January 13, 1974, Dr. Mariano M. Lazatin diamond intestate in Pasay City, survived by
his wife, Margarita de Asis, and his adopted twin daughters, respondent Nora L. de Leon,
married to respondent Bernardo de Leon, and respondent Irma Lazatin, married to
Francisco Veloso.
One month after Mariano's death, his widow, Margarita de Asis, commenced an intestate
proceeding before the Court of First Instance of Pasay, docketed as Sp. Proc. No. 2326-P.
Mariano, Oscar, Virgilio and Yvonne, claiming to be admitted illegitimate (not natural)
children of Dr. Lazatin with one Helen Munoz, intervened. Subsequently, one Lily Lazatin
also intervened, claiming to be another admitted illegitimate (not natural) child.
Two months after or on April 11, 1974, the widow, Margarita de Asis, also died, leaving a &
holographic will executed on May 29, 1970, providing, among others, for a legacy of cash,
jewelry, and stocks to respondent Arlene de Leon, a granddaughter; a legacy of support to
Rodolfo Gallardo, a son of her late sister; and a legacy of education to Ramon Sta. Clara,
son of petitioner Renato Lazatin alias Renato Sta. Clara.

During her lifetime, Margarita de Asis kept a safety deposit box at the People's Bank and
Trust Company, Roxas Boulevard branch, which either she or respondent Nora L. de Leon
could open. Five days after Margarita's death, respondent Nora L. de Leon, accompanied
by her husband, respondent Bernardo de Leon, opened the safety deposit box and removed
its contents: (a) shares of stock; (b) her adoption papers and those of her sister, respondent
Irma L. Veloso; and (c) jewelry belonging to her and to her mother. Respondent Nora L. de
Leon claims that she opened the safety deposit box in good faith, believing that it was held
jointly by her and her deceased mother. Her sole reason for opening the box was to get her
stock certificates and other small items deposited therein. When she was to close the
deposit box, the bank personnel informed her that she needed an authority from the court to
do so, in view of her mother's death and so, she removed everything from the box.
On June 3, 1974, private respondents filed a petition to probate the will of the late Margarita
de Asis, before docketed as Sp. Proc. No. 2341-P of respondent Court, Days after having
learned that respondent Nora L. de Leon had opened this safety deposit box, petitioner's
son, Ramon Sta. Clara, filed a motion in the probate court, claiming that the deceased had
executed a will subsequent to that submitted for probate and demanding its production. He
likewise prayed for the opening of the safety deposit box. Respondent Nora L. de Leon
admitted that she opened the box but there was no will or any document resembling a will
therein.
Upon the order of the probate court, presided over by Judge Arsenio B. Alcantara, the safety
deposit box was opened on November 6, 1974, at which time it was found to be empty,
because prior thereto respondent Nora L. de Leon had already removed its contents.
On November 22, 1974, or seven months after, the death of Margarita de Asis, petitioner
intervened for the first time in the proceedings to settle the estate of the late Dr. Mariano M.
Lazatin (Sp. Proc. No. 2326- P), as an admitted illegitimate (not natural) child.
Under the same date of November 22, 1974, petitioner's son, Ramon, filed a petition in the
estate proceedings of Margarita de Asis to examine private respondents on the contents of
the safety deposit box, Whereupon, on January 31, 1975, the probate court ordered
respondent Nora L. de Leon to deliver the properties taken from the safety deposit box to
the Clerk of Court. Subsequently, however, the two cases (Sp. Proc. No. 2326-P, Mariano
Lazatin, and 2341-P, Margarita de Asis) were transferred to the sala of respondent Judge
Jose C. Campos, Jr.
On May 29, 1975, Judge Campos issued an order requiring counsel for respondents Nora
L. de Leon and Bernardo de Leon to produce all those papers and items removed from the
safety deposit box and to deliver the same to the custody of the court within one week.
Within the period ordered, respondent Nora L. de Leon deposited with the Clerk of Court,
not the items themselves, but two keys to a new safety deposit box which could only be
opened upon order of the court.

On August 20, 1975, petitioner Renato to Lazatin alias Renato Sta. Clara filed a motion to
intervene in the estate of Margarita de Asis, Sp. Proc. No. 2341-P, as an adopted child, on
the basis of an affidavit executed by Benjamin Lazatin, brother of the deceased Dr. Mariano
M. Lazatin, the petitioner was an "illegitimate son" of Dr. Lazatin and was later adopted by
him. This affidavit was later modified on August 19, 1975 to state that petitioner was
adopted by both Mariano M. Lazatin and his wife Margarita de Asis.
On September 29, 1975, Judge Campos found respondent' Nora L. de Leon guilty of
contempt of court for not complying with the orders of January 31, 1975 and May 29, 1975,
requiring her to produce and deliver to the court an the papers and items removed from the
safety deposit box. Her former counsel was also found guilty of contempt, sentenced to pay
a fine of P00.00 and suspended from appearing in the two cases (Sp. Proc. No. 2326-P,
Mariano M. Lazatin, and Sp. Proc. No. 2341-P, Margarita de Asis), on her testimony that
she, Nora L. de Leon, acted upon his advice.
Respondent court heard petitioner's motion to intervene as an adopted son in the estate of
Margarita de Asis, Sp. Proc. No. 2341-P, at which hearings petitioner presented no decree
of adoption in his, favor. Instead, petitioner attempted to prove, over private respondents'
objections, that he had recognized the deceased spouses as his parents; he had been
supported by them until their death; formerly he was known as "Renato Lazatin" but was
compelled to change his surname to "Sta. Clara" when the deceased spouses refused to
give consent to his marriage to his present wife; that at first, he and his wife stayed at the
residence of Engracio de Asis, father of Margarita, but a few months later, they transferred
to the Mercy Hospital at Taft Avenue, Manila, owned by the deceased spouses, where they
continuously resided up to the present. Photographs were also intended to be presented by
petitioner, e.g., photograph of Irma Veloso where she addressed herself as sister of
petitioner; photograph of deceased Margarita de Asis and petitioner when he was a boy;
document showing that petitioners real name is "Renato Lazatin." 1
Respondent court first reserved its ruling on private respondents' objections to the
admission of petitioner's evidence, but on November 14, 1975, when petitioner could not
present evidence on the issue of his alleged legal adoption, respondent court discontinued
the hearing and gave the parties time to file memoranda on the question of the admissibility
of the evidence sought to be introduced by petitioner.
On March 4, 1976, respondent court barred the introduction of petitioner's evidence
because: t.hqw
All the evidence submitted by Renato and Ramon Sta. Clara through their
counsel do not prove or have no tendency to prove the existence of any
judicial proceeding where the adoption of the parties above named were
taken up by any court. Neither do the evidence tend to establish the
presence of any record of a proceeding in court where the adoption of the

above named persons was held. The evidence, however, tends to prove
a status of a recognized natural child which, however, is not the legal
basis for which Renato and Ramon seek to intervene in this
proceedings. In view thereof, and taking into consideration the evidence
heretofore presented by the petitioners, any further introduction of similar
evidence, documentary or oral, would not prove or tend to prove the fact
of their adoption but rather of a recognized natural child.
Petitioner then filed on March 16, 1976, in both cases, a motion to declare as established
the fact of adoption in view of respondent Nora L. de Leon's refusal to comply with the
orders of respondent court to deposit the items she had removed from the safety deposit
box of Margarita de Asis. As authority therefor, petitioner invokes the sanction of Rule 29,
Section 3 of the Rules of Court, since according to him, the order of the court for the
production of the items in the safety deposit box can be considered as an order for
production and inspection of documents under Rule 27.
Private respondents opposed the motion, and on March 26, 1976, respondent court denied
petitioner's motion. On April 26, 1976, respondent Nora L. de Leon deposited with
respondent court the items she had removed from the safety deposit box. An inventory was
conducted by respondent court, with notice to the parties, and the items surrendered
consisted only of pieces of jewelry and stock certificates.
On June 3,1976, respondent court, ruling on petitioners motion for definite resolution on his
previous n declare as established the fact of adoption, issued the f order: t.hqw
As far as the case of Renato Sta. Clara is his Petition to establish his
status as an adopted child, The Court has ruled that he has failed to
establish such status. The any motion for reconsideration unless based
on some documentary proof.
Hence, the petition at bar.
We find the ruling of the respondent court to be in conformity with law and jurisprudence.
1. Adoption is a juridical act, a proceeding in rem 2 which creates between two persons a
relationship similar to that which results from legitimate paternity and filiation. 3 Only an
adoption made through the court, or in pursuance with the procedure laid down under Rule
99 of the Rules of Court is valid in this jurisdiction. 4 It is not of natural law at all, but is
wholly and entirely artificial. 5 To establish the relation, the statutory requirements must be
strictly carried out, otherwise, the adoption is an absolute nullity. 6 The fact of adoption is
never presumed, but must be affirmatively proved by the person claiming its existence. The
destruction by fire of a public building in which the adoption papers would have been filed if

existent does not give rise to a presumption of adoption nor is the destruction of the records
of an adoption proceeding to be presumed. On the contrary, the absence of a record of
adoption has been said to evolve a presumption of its non-existence.7 Where, under the
provisions of the statute, an adoption is effected by a court order, the records of such court
constitute the evidence by which such adoption may be established. 8
2. Petitioner's flow of evidence in the case below does not lead us to any proof of judicial
adoption. We can not pluck from his chain of evidence any link to the real existence of a
court decree of adoption in his favor. Petitioner's proofs do not show or tend to show that at
one time or another a specific court of competent jurisdiction rendered in an adoption
proceeding initiated by the late spouses an order approving his adoption as a child of the
latter. No judicial records of such adoption or copies thereof are presented or attempted to
be presented. Petitioner merely proceeds from a nebulous assumption that he was judicially
adopted between the years 1928 and 1932. By what particular court was the adoption
decreed or by whom was the petition heard, petitioner does not even manifest, much less
show. There are no witnesses cited to that adoption proceeding or to the adoption decree.
Apparently on the assumption that the adoption was commenced in Manila, petitioner's
counsel secured a certification from the Court of first Instance of Manila which, however,
negatively reported "(T)hat among the salvaged records now available in this Office, there
has not been found, after a diligent search, any record regarding the adoption of Mr. Renato
Lazatin alias Renato Sta. Clara allegedly filed sometime in the years 1928 to 1931 by the
spouses Dr. Mariano M. Lazatin and Margarita de Asis Lazatin." The certification of the
Local Civil Registrar of Manila "(T)hat our pre-war records relative to decisions of the Court
of First Instance were either destroyed or burned during the Liberation of the City of Manila,"
does not furnish any legal basis for a presumption of adoption in favor of petitioner. This is
because there was no proof that petitioner was really adopted in Manila or that an adoption
petition was filed in the Court of first Instance of Manila by the deceased spouses, where,
after hearing, a judgment of approval was rendered by said court. Moreover, if there was
really such adoption, petitioner could have conveniently secured a copy of the newpaper
publication of the adoption as required under Section 4, Rule 99 of the Rules of Court
(formerly Section 4, Rule 100) or a certification of the publishing house to that effect.
Petitioner's failure on this point is anotherer strong indication of the non-existence of the one
who gave the written consent of the non-existence of the adoption paper. We also observed
to the adoption (Section 3, Rule 99, Rules of Court), whether the parents or orphanage,
does not appear on this point is not so difficult and such proof must be presented if only to
prove the real existence of the adoption. And of course, if the war, the clear right and duty of
petitioner was to duly reconstitute the records as provided by law.
3. The absence of proof of such order of adoption by the court, as provided by the statute,
cannot be substituted by parol evidence that a child has lived with a person, not his parent,
and has been treated as a child to establish such adoption. 9 Even evidence of declaration
of the deceased, made in his lifetime, that he intended to adopt a child as his heir, and that
he had adopted him, and of the fact that the child resided with the deceased, as a member

of his family, from infancy until he attained his majority, is not sufficient to establish the fact
of adoption. 10 Nor does the fact that the deceased spouses fed, clothed, educated,
recognized and referred to one like petitioner as an adopted child, recognized and referred
to one like petitioner as an adopted child, necessarily establish adoption of the
child. 11 Withal, the attempts of petitioner to prove his adoption by acts and declarations of
the deceased do not discharge the mandatory presentation of the judicial decree of
adoption. The thrust of petitioner's evidence is rather to establish his status as an admitted
illegitimate child, not an adopted child which status of an admitted illegitimate child was
the very basis of his petitioner for intervention in the estate proceedings of the late Dr.
Lazatin, as above stated. (Supra, at page 3 hereof)
We do not discount though that declarations in regard to pedigree, although hearsay, are
admitted on the principle that they are natural expressions of persons who must know the
truth. 12 Pedigree testimony is admitted because it is the best that the nature of the case
admits and because greater evil might arise from the rejection of such proof than from its
admission. 13 But, in proving an adoption, there is a better proof available and it should be
produced. The whereabouts of the child's family and circulation of the jurisdiction in which
they resided and investigation in those courts where adoption are usually granted would
surely produce an adoption order, if indeed there was an order. 14 Besides, since the point in
favor of receiving hearsay evidence upon matters of family history or pedigree is its
reliability, it has been set forth as a condition upon which such evidence is received that it
emanate from a source within the family. Pursuant to this view, before a declaration of a
deceased person can be admitted to prove pedigree, or ancestry, the relationship of the
declarant, by either of blood or affinity to the family in question, or a branch thereof, must
ordinarily be established by competent evidence. 15 Section 33 of Rule 130 states: "The act
or declaration of a person deceased, or outside of the Philippines, or unable to testify, in
respect to the pedigree of another person related to him by birth or marriage, may be
received in evidence where it occurred before the controversy, and the relationship between
the two persons is shown by evidence other than such actor declaration ..."
4. Secondary evidence is nonetheless admissible where the records of adoption
proceedings were actually lost or destroyed. But, prior to the introduction of such secondary
evidence, the proponent must establish the former existence of the instrument. The correct
order of proof is as follows: Existence; execution; loss; contents; although this order may be
changed if necessary in the discretion of the court. 16 The sufficiency of the proof offered as
a predicate for the admission of an alleged lost deed lies within the judicial discretion of the
trial court under all the circumstances of the particular case. 17 As earlier pointed out,
petitioner failed to establish the former existence of the adoption paper and its subsequent
loss or destruction. Secondary proof may only be introduced if it has first beer. established
that such adoption paper really existed and was lost. This is indispensable. 18 Petitioner's
supposed adoption was only testified to by him and is allegedly to be testified to a brother of
the deceased Mariano M. Lazatin or others who have witnessed that the deceased spouses
treated petitioner as their child. If adoption was really made, the records thereof should have

existed and the same presented at the hearing or subsequent thereto or a reasonable
explanation of loss or destruction thereof, if that be the case, adduced. 19
Assuming the mere fact that the deceased spouses treated petitioner as their child does not
justify the conclusion that petitioner had been in fact judicially adopted by the spouses nor
does it constitute admissible proof of adoption.
We cannot entertain the plea of petitioner that the sanction of Rule 29 should be applied to
consider as established the fact of his adoption due to the refusal of respondent Nora L. de
Leon to produce the document of adoption, because first, the fact or real existence of
petitioner's adoption had not been established; second, there is no proof that such
document of adoption is in the possession of respondent Nora L. de Leon; third, the motu
proprio order of the court for Nora de Leon to produce the items retrieved from the safety
deposit box cannot be treated as a mode of discovery of production and inspection of
documents under Rule 27; and fourth, the items deposited in the safety deposit box have
already been surrendered by respondent Nora L. de Leon on April 26; 1976 and no
document of adoption in favor of petitioner was listed as found in the safety deposit box.
5. As a necessary consequence, petitioner Renato Lazatin alias Renato Sta. Clara cannot
properly intervene in the settlement of the estate of Margarita de Asis, Sp. Proc. No. 2341-P
as an adopted child because of lack of proof thereof. For one to intervene in an estate
proceeding, it is a requisite that he has an interest in the estate, either as one who would be
benefited as an heir or one who has a claim against the estate like a creditor. 20 A child by
adoption cannot inherit from the parent creditor. by adoption unless the act of adoption has
been done in strict accord with the statue. Until this is done, no rights are acquired by the
child and neither the supposed adopting parent or adopted child could be bound
thereby. 21 The burden of proof in establishing adoption is upon the person claiming such
relationship. He must prove compliance with the statutes relating to adoption in the
jurisdiction where the adoption occurred.22 A fortiori if no hereditary interest in the estate can
be gained by a claimant who failed to submit proof thereof, whether the will is probated or
not, intervention should be denied as it would merely result in unnecessary
complication. 23 To succeed, a child must be ligitimate, legitimated, adopted, acknowledged
illegitimate natural child or natural child by legal fiction or recognized spurious child. 24
In the face of the verified pleadings of record (constituting judicial admissions) which show
that petitioner sought to intervene on November 22, 1974 in the estate proceedings of his
alleged adoptive father Dr. Mariano M. Lazatin (Sp. Proc. No. 2326-P) as an admitted
illegitimate (not natural) child, 25 while his intervention on August 20, 1975 in the estate of
Margarita de Asis, widow of the deceased Dr. Lazatin (Sp. Proc. No. 2341-P) was as her
adopted child on the basis of the affidavit of a brother of the deceased Dr. Lazatin, Benjamin
Lazatin, executed August 19, 1975 (which affidavit modified a first affidavit executed on May
31, 1975, which failed to estate by "oversight" petitioner, but stated that affiant knew
petitioner to be "an illegitimate son" of Dr. Lazatin who later "legally adopted (him) as a son

before the Court of First Instance of Manila sometime between the years 1928 and 1921")
and prescinding from the question of whether a natural or spurious child may be legally
adopted by the putative father, we hold that no grave abuse of discretion nor error of law as
committed by respondent judge in issuing the questioned orders of March 4, 1976, March
26, 1976 and June 3, 1976 denying petitioner's petition "to declare as established in this
proceeding the fact of adoption" and denying "any motion for reconsideration unless based
on some documentary proof." The Court finds no basis to grant the affirmative relief sought
in this proceeding by petitioner for a rendition of judgment "declaring as established the fact
of your petitioner's adoption as a son of the deceased spouses entitling him to succeed in
their estates as such in accordance with the applicable law on succession as to his
inheritance."
Upon the filing of the petition, the Court issued on June 16, 1976 a temporary restraining
order; which as amended on July 21, 1976, restrained respondent judge "from proceeding
with the hearing scheduled on June 17, 1976 at 8:30 a.m., requiring the submission of
evidence to establish heirship in Special Proceedings No. 2326-P entitled 'Intestate Estate
of the Late Mariano M. Lazatin' and Special Proceedings No. 2341-P, entitled 'Testate
Estate of the late Margarita de Asis Vda. de Lazatin,' and from proceeding with the probate
of the alleged holographic will of the deceased Do;a Margarita de Asis Vda. de Lazatin
scheduled on June 29, 1976, August 10 and 12, 1976 and on any other dates." With the
Court's determination of the issues as herein set forth, there is no longer any need for
restraining the proceedings below and the said restraining order shall be immediately lifted.
On January 24, 1977, the Court upon petitioner's motion resolved to conditionally allow
respondent judge "to take the deposition of petitioner's witnesses to perpetuate their
testimonies pursuant to Rule 134, Section 7 of the Rules of Court, subject to the Court's
ruling in due course on the admissibility of such testimonies." The Court thereby permitted in
effect the advance testimonies of petitioner's witnesses, principally among them Rafael
Lazatin and Esteban L. Lazatin, both brothers of the deceased Dr. Mariano L. Lazatin and
as stated in petitioner's motion of January 11, 1977: t.hqw
Substantially, the testimony of the above-named witnesses will be on the
fact that they had been informed by the deceased spouses, Mariano and
Margarita Lazatin that your petitioner was their [Mariano's and
Margarita's] judicially adopted son and to elicit further from them the fact
that your petitioner enjoys the reputation of being their judicially adopted
son in the Lazatin family.
The Court's resolution allowing the advance testimonies of petitioner's witnesses was but in
application of the Court's long standing admonition to trial courts is reaffirmed in Lamagan
vs. De la Cruz, 26, "to be liberal in accepting proferred evidence since even if they were to
refuse to accept the evidence, the affected party will nevertheless be allowed to spread the
excluded evidence on the record, for review on appeal." The Court therein once again

stressed the established rule that "it is beyond question that rulings of the trial court on
procedural questions and on admissibility of evidence during the course of the trial are
interlocutory in nature and may not be the subject of separate appeal or review on certiorari,
but are to be assigned as errors and reviewed in the appeal properly taken from the
decision rendered by the trial court on the merits of the case," 27 and that a party's recourse
when proferred evidence is rejected by the trial court is to make a offer stating on the record
what a party or witness would have testified to were his testimony not excluded, as well as
to attach to the record any rejected exhibits.
At the continuation of the proceedings below for declaration of heirship and for probate of
the alleged holographic the deceased Margarita de Asis Vda. de Lazatin, pet who has failed
to establish his status as an alleged ;m child of Margarita de Asis (unless, as reserved to
him by the court below, he can show some documentary proof),and whose intervention in
the estate of the deceased Dr. Mariano Lazatin is as an admitted illegitimate child, win have
to decide whether he will pursue his first theory of having the of such admitted illegitimate
child of said deceased. Whatever be his theory and his course of action and whether or not
he may be duly snowed to intervene in the proceedings below as such alleged admitted
illegitimate child, his recourse in the event of an adverse ruling against him is to make a
formal offer of proof and of his excluded evidence, oral and documentary, and seek a
reversal on an appeal in due course.
ACCORDINGLY, the petition is dismissed and the questioned orders denying petitioner's
petition below "to declare as established in this proceeding the fact of [his] adoption" are
hereby affirmed. The temporary restraining order issued on June 16, 1976 and amended on
July 21, 1976 is ordered lifted, effective immediately. Without costs.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 92326 January 24, 1992 REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and ZENAIDA C. BOBILES, respondents.
REGALADO, J.:
Dissatisfied with the decision of respondent Court of Appeals promulgated on February 20,
1990 1 which affirmed in toto the decision of Branch 2 of the Regional Trial Court of Legaspi
City 2 granting the petition of herein private respondent to adopt the minor Jason Condat,
petitioner seeks the reversal thereof in the present petition for review on certiorari.
On February 2, 1988, Zenaida Corteza Bobiles filed a petition to adopt Jason Condat, then
six (6) years old and who had been living with her family since he was four (4) months old,
before the Regional Trial Court of Legaspi City, docketed therein as Special Proceeding No.
1386. 3
The court a quo, finding the petition to be sufficient in form and substance, issued an order
dated February 15, 1988 setting the petition for hearing on March 28, 1988. 4 The order was
duly published, with copies thereof seasonably served on the Solicitor General; Assistant
Provincial Fiscal Mediavillo, Jr. of Albay; Salvador Condat, father of the child; and the social
worker assigned to the court. A copy of said order was posted on the bulletin board of the
court and in the other places it had required for that purpose. Nobody appeared to oppose
the petition. 5
Compliance with the jurisdictional requirements having been proved at the hearing, the
testimonies of herein private respondent, together with that of her husband, Dioscoro
Bobiles, and one Ma. Luz Salameno of the Department of Social Welfare and Development
were taken and admitted in the proceedings.
On March 20, 1988, the trial court rendered judgment disposing as follows:
ACCORDINGLY, it is declared that henceforth, the minor child, JASON
CONDAT, be freed from all legal obligations of obedience and
maintenance with respect to his natural parents, and be, to all intents and
purposes, the child of the spouses Dioscoro and Zenaida Bobiles, and the
surname of the child be changed to "Bobiles" which is the surname of the
petitioner.

Furnish the Office of the Solicitor General, Manila, the Department of

Social Welfare and Development, Regional Office, Region V, Legaspi City,
and the Local Civil Registrar of Tiwi, Albay, with copies of this decision. 6
Herein petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals which, as earlier stated, affirmed the
aforesaid decision of the court below. Hence, this present petition with the following
assignment of errors:
1. The Honorable Court of Appeals erred in ruling that the Family Code
cannot be applied retroactively to the petition for adoption filed by Zenaida
C. Bobiles; and
2 The Honorable Court of Appeals erred in affirming the trial court's
decision which granted the petition to adopt Jason Condat in favor of
spouses Dioscoro Bobiles and Zenaida C. Bobiles. 7
The petition for adoption was filed by private respondent Zenaida C. Bobiles on February 2,
1988, when the law applicable was Presidential Decree No. 603, the Child and Youth
Welfare Code. Under said code, a petition for adoption may be filed by either of the spouses
or by both of them. However, after the trial court rendered its decision and while the case
was pending on appeal in the Court of Appeals, Executive Order No. 209, the Family Code,
took effect on August 3, 1988. Under the said new law, joint adoption by husband and wife
is mandatory.
On the foregoing consideration, petitioner contends that the petition for adoption should be
dismissed outright for it was filed solely by private respondent without joining her husband,
in violation of Article 185 of the Family Code which requires joint adoption by the spouses. It
argues that the Family Code must be applied retroactively to the petition filed by Mrs.
Bobiles, as the latter did not acquire a vested right to adopt Jason Condat by the mere filing
of her petition for adoption. We are not persuaded.
Preliminarily, we observe that petitioner's theory implies that the non-inclusion of Dioscoro
Bobiles as a co-petitioner is a jurisdictional defect, hence its prayer for an outright dismissal
on that score. It could not be taking exception only on the ground of non-joinder since
petitioner must be aware that non-joinder is not a ground for the dismissal of an action or a
special proceeding. 8 We further apprehend that this objection has been raised for the first
time on appeal in respondent court. Nonetheless, we shall clarify petitioner's misgivings as
postulated in its aforestated assignment of errors.

Article 246 of the Family Code provides for retroactive effect of appropriate relevant
provisions thereof, subject to the qualification that such retrospective application
will not prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights in accordance with the Civil Code or
other laws.
A vested right is one whose existence, effectivity and extent does not depend upon events
foreign to the will of the holder. 9 The term expresses the concept of present fixed interest
which in right reason and natural justice should be protected against arbitrary State action,
or an innately just and imperative right which enlightened free society, sensitive to inherent
and irrefragable individual rights, cannot deny. 10 Vested rights include not only legal or
equitable title to the enforcement of a demand, but also an exemption from new obligations
created after the right has vested. 11
Under the Child and Youth Welfare Code, private respondent had the right to file a petition
for adoption by herself, without joining her husband therein. When Mrs. Bobiles filed her
petition, she was exercising her explicit and unconditional right under said law. Upon her
filing thereof, her right to file such petition alone and to have the same proceed to final
adjudication, in accordance with the law in force at the time, was already vested and cannot
be prejudiced or impaired by the enactment of a new law.
When private respondent filed her petition in Special Proceeding No. 1386, the trial court
acquired jurisdiction thereover in accordance with the governing law. Jurisdiction being a
matter of substantive law, the established rule is that the jurisdiction of the court is
determined by the statute in force at the time of the commencement of the action. 12 We do
not find in the present case such facts as would constitute it as an exception to the rule.
The first error assigned by petitioner warrants a review of applicable local and foreign
jurisprudence. For that purpose, we start with the premise that Article 185 of the Family
Code is remedial in nature. Procedural statutes are ordinarily accorded a retrospective
construction in the sense that they may be applied to pending actions and proceedings, as
well as to future actions. However, they will not be so applied as to defeat procedural steps
completed before their enactment. 13
Procedural matters are governed by the law in force when they arise, and procedural
statutes are generally retroactive in that they apply to pending proceedings and are not
confined to those begun after their enactment although, with respect to such pending
proceedings, they affect only procedural steps taken after their enactment.14
The rule that a statutory change in matters of procedure will affect pending actions and
proceedings, unless the language of the act excludes them from its operation, is not so
extensive that it may be used to validate or invalidate proceedings taken before it goes into
effect, since procedure must be governed by the law regulating it at the time the question of
procedure arises. 15

The jurisdictional, as distinguished from the purely procedural, aspect of a case is

substantive in nature and is subject to a more stringent rule. A petition cannot be dismissed
by reason of failure to comply with a law which was not yet in force and effect at the time. As
long as the petition for adoption was sufficient in form and substance in accordance with the
law in governance at the time it was filed, the court acquires jurisdiction and retains it until it
fully disposes of the case. 16 To repeat, the jurisdiction of the court is determined by the
statute in force at the time of the commencement of the action. Such jurisdiction of a court,
whether in criminal or civil cases, once it attaches cannot be ousted by subsequent
happenings or events, although of a character which would have prevented jurisdiction from
attaching in the first instance. 17
On the second issue, petitioner argues that, even assuming that the Family Code should not
apply retroactively, the Court of Appeals should have modified the trial court's decision by
granting the adoption in favor of private respondent Zenaida C. Bobiles only, her husband
not being a petitioner. We do not consider this as a tenable position and, accordingly, reject
the same.
Although Dioscoro Bobiles was not named as one of the petitioners in the petition for
adoption filed by his wife, his affidavit of consent, attached to the petition as Annex "B" and
expressly made an integral part thereof, shows that he himself actually joined his wife in
adopting the child. The pertinent parts of his written consent read as follows:
xxx xxx xxx
2. That my wife, ZENAIDA O. CORTEZA BOBILES and I mutually desire
to adopt as our child, a boy named JASON CONDAT, still a minor being
six (6) years old, likewise residing at 18 C. Imperial Street, Legaspi City,
Albay, also in the Philippines;
3. That we are filing the corresponding Petition for Adoption of said minor
child, JASON CONDAT, before the Juvenile and Domestic Relations
court, now the Regional Trial Court in Legaspi City, Albay in the
Philippines;
4. That I, Dioscoro C. Bobiles as the husband and father, am giving my
lawful consent to this adoption of said minor child, JASON CONDAT;
5. That further, my wife ZENAIDA O. CORTEZA BOBILES, and I have
continuously reared and cared for this minor child, JASON CONDAT since
birth;

6. That as a result thereof, my wife and I have developed a kind of

maternal and paternal love for the boy as our very own, exercising therein
the care, concern and diligence of a good father toward him;
7. That I am executing this document, an AFFIDAVIT OF CONSENT for
whatever it is worth in the premises as to the matter of adoption of this
minor child, JASON CONDAT, by my wife ZENAIDA O. CORTEZA
BOBILES and by me, DIOSCORO C. BOBILES, in any court of justice;
(Emphasis supplied.) 18
xxx xxx xxx
The foregoing declarations, and his subsequent confirmatory testimony in open court, are
sufficient to make him a co-petitioner. Under the circumstances then obtaining, and by
reason of his foreign residence, he must have yielded to the legal advice that an affidavit of
consent on his part sufficed to make him a party to the petition. This is evident from the text
of his affidavit. Punctiliousness in language and pedantry in the formal requirements should
yield to and be eschewed in the higher considerations of substantial justice. The future of an
innocent child must not be compromised by arbitrary insistence of rigid adherence to
procedural rules on the form of pleadings.
We see no reason why the following doctrines in American law should not apply to this case
and, for that matter, in our jurisdiction. It is a settled rule therein that adoption statutes, as
well as matters of procedure leading up to adoption, should be liberally construed to carry
out the beneficent purposes of the adoption institution and to protect the adopted child in the
rights and privileges coming to it as a result of the adoption. 19 The modern tendency of the
courts is to hold that there need not be more than a substantial compliance with statutory
requirements to sustain the validity of the proceeding; to refuse would be to indulge in such
a narrow and technical construction of the statute as to defeat its intention and beneficial
results or to invalidate proceedings where every material requirement of the statute was
complied with.
In support of this rule it is said that it is not the duty of the courts to bring the judicial
microscope to bear upon the case in order that every slight defect may be enlarged and
magnified so that a reason may be found for declaring invalid an act consummated years
before, but rather to approach the case with the inclination to uphold such acts if it is found
that there was a substantial compliance with the statute. 20 The technical rules of pleading
should not be stringently applied to adoption proceedings, and it is deemed more important
that the petition should contain facts relating to the child and its parents, which may give
information to those interested, than that it should be formally correct as a pleading.
Accordingly, it is generally held that a petition will confer jurisdiction if it substantially
complies with the adoption statute, alleging all facts necessary to give the court
jurisdiction. 21

In determining whether or not to set aside the decree of adoption the interests and welfare
of the child are of primary and paramount consideration. 22 The welfare of a child is of
paramount consideration in proceedings involving its custody and the propriety of its
adoption by another, and the courts to which the application for adoption is made is charged
with the duty of protecting the child and its interests and, to bring those interests fully before
it, it has authority to make rules to accomplish that end. 23 Ordinarily, the approval of the
adoption rests in the sound discretion of the court. This discretion should be exercised in
accordance with the best interests of the child, as long as the natural rights of the parents
over the child are not disregarded. In the absence of a showing of grave abuse, the exercise
of this discretion by the approving official will not be disturbed. 24
In the case at bar, the rights concomitant to and conferred by the decree of adoption will be
for the best interests of the child. His adoption is with the consent of his natural
parents. 25 The representative of the Department of Social Welfare and Development
unqualifiedly recommended the approval of the petition for adoption 26 and the trial court
dispensed with the trial custody for several commendatory reasons, especially since the
child had been living with the adopting parents since infancy. 27 Further, the said petition
was with the sworn written consent of the children of the adopters.
The trial court and respondent court acted correctly in granting the petition for adoption and
we find no reason to disturb the same. As found and aptly stated by respondent court:
"Given the facts and circumstances of the case and considered in the light of the foregoing
doctrine, 28 We are of the opinion and so hold that the decree of adoption issued by the
court a quo would go a long way towards promoting the welfare of the child and the
enhancement of his opportunities for a useful and happy life." 29
Adoption statutes, being humane and salutary, hold the interests and welfare of the child to
be of paramount consideration. They are designed to provide homes, parental care and
education for unfortunate, needy or orphaned children and give them the protection of
society and family in the person of the adopted, as well as to allow childless couples or
persons to experience the joys of parenthood and give them legally a child in the person of
the adopted for the manifestation of their natural parental instincts. Every reasonable
intendment should be sustained to promote and fulfill these noble and compassionate
objectives of the law. 30
[G.R. No. 125932. April 21, 1999]
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DENIED.
SO ORDERED.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. CLAUDE A. MILLER and JUMRUS S.

MILLER, respondents.
DECISION
PARDO, J.:

The Republic of the Philippines, through the Solicitor General, appealed originally to
the Court of Appeals from a decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 59, Angeles City,
granting the petition of respondent spouses to adopt the minor Michael Magno Madayag.
In its decision promulgated on April 17, 1996, the Court of Appeals certified the case to
the Supreme Court because the petition raised only questions of law.
By resolution adopted on September 23, 1996, we accepted the appeal. We shall treat
the appeal as one via certiorari from a decision of the Regional Trial Court under the
Supreme Court Circular 2-90, dated March 9, 1990, on pure questions of law.
The facts are undisputed and may be related as follows:

that respondents were morally, emotionally and financially fit to be adoptive parents and that
the adoption would be to the minor's best interest and welfare."[2]
On May 12, 1989, the trial court rendered decision granting the petition for adoption,
the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:
"WHEREFORE, finding that petitioners possess all the qualifications and none of the
disqualifications for adoption, the instant petition is hereby Granted, and this Court decrees
the minor MICHAEL MAGNO MADAYAG freed from all obligation of obedience and support
with respect to natural parents and is hereby declared the child of the herein petitioners by
adoption. The minor's surname shall be changed from "MADAYAG" to "MILLER", which is
the surname of the herein petitioners."[3]

On July 29, 1988, the spouses Claude A. Miller and Jumrus S. Miller, filed with the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 59, Angeles City, a verified petition to adopt the minor Michael
Magno Madayag.

In due time, the Solicitor General, in behalf of the Republic, interposed an appeal to
the Court of Appeals. As heretofore stated, the Court of Appeals certified the case to this
Court.

The trial court scheduled the petition for hearing on September 9, 1988, at 9:00 in the
morning. At the hearing, with the attendance of an assistant city fiscal of Angeles City, in
representation of the Solicitor General, respondents adduced evidence showing that:

The issue raised is whether the court may allow aliens to adopt a Filipino child despite
the prohibition under the Family Code,[4] effective on August 3, 1988[5] when the petition for
adoption was filed on July 29, 1988, under the provision of the Child and Youth Welfare
Code[6] which allowed aliens to adopt.

"Claude A. Miller, 38 years old and Jumrus S. Miller, 40 years of age, both American
citizens, are husband and wife, having been married on June 21, 1982.
They were childless and "do not expect to have sibling out of their union on account of a
medical problem of the wife."
Claude A. Miller was a member of the United States Air Force, as airman first class,
assigned at Clark Air Base since January 26, 1985.
"The family maintains their residence at Don Bonifacio Subdivision, Balibago, Angeles City,
since 1985."[1]
"The minor Michael Magno Madayag is the legitimate son of Marcelo S. Madayag, Jr. and
Zenaida Magno. Born on July 14, 1987, at San Fernando, La Union, the minor has been in
the custody of respondents since the first week of August 1987. Poverty and deep concern
for the future of their son prompted the natural parents who have no visible means of
livelihood to have their child adopted by respondents. They executed affidavits giving their
irrevocable consent to the adoption by respondents."
The Department of Social Welfare and Development, through its Regional Office at San
Fernando, Pampanga, recommended approval of the petition on the basis of its evaluation

The issue is not new. This Court has ruled that an alien qualified to adopt under the
Child and Youth Welfare Code, which was in force at the time of the filing of the petition,
acquired a vested right which could not be affected by the subsequent enactment of a new
law disqualifying him.[7] 7
Consequently, the enactment of the Family Code, effective August 3, 1988, will not
impair the right of respondents who are aliens to adopt a Filipino child because the right has
become vested at the time of filing of the petition for adoption and shall be governed by the
law then in force. "A vested right is one whose existence, effectivity and extent does not
depend upon events foreign to the will of the holder. The term expresses the concept of
present fixed interest which in right reason and natural justice should be protected against
arbitrary State action, or an innately just and imperative right which enlightened free society,
sensitive to inherent and irrefragable individual rights, cannot deny." [8] "Vested rights include
not only legal or equitable title to the enforcement of a demand, but also an exemption from
new obligations created after the right has vested."[9]
"As long as the petition for adoption was sufficient in form and substance in
accordance with the law in governance at the time it was filed, the court acquires jurisdiction
and retains it until it fully disposes of the case. To repeat, the jurisdiction of the court is
determined by the statute in force at the time of the commencement of the action. Such

jurisdiction of a court, whether in criminal or civil cases, once it attaches cannot be ousted
by a subsequent happenings or events, although of a character which would have
prevented jurisdiction from attaching in the first instance."[10]
Therefore, an alien who filed a petition for adoption before the effectivity of the Family
code, although denied the right to adopt under Art. 184 of said Code, may continue with his
petition under the law prevailing before the Family Code.[11]
"Adoption statutes, being humane and salutary, hold the interests and welfare of the
child to be of paramount consideration. They are designed to provide homes, parental care
and education for unfortunate, needy or orphaned children and give them the protection of
society and family in the person of the adopter, as well as childless couples or persons to
experience the joy of parenthood and give them legally a child in the person of the adopted
for the manifestation of their natural parent instincts. Every reasonable intendment should
be sustained to promote and fulfill these noble and compassionate objectives of the law."[12]
WHEREFORE, we hereby AFFIRM the appealed decision of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 59, Angeles City, in SP. Proc. No. 3562.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.

knowledge and consent. 7 An answer was filed in the names of both defendants, alleging
that (1) the property sold was paraphernal, having been purchased by Criselda with funds
exclusively belonging to her ("her own separate money"); (2) Thomas Cheesman, being an
American, was disqualified to have any interest or right of ownership in the land; and (3)
Estelita Padilla was a buyer in good faith.8
During the pre-trial conference, the parties agreed upon certain facts which were
subsequently set out in a pre-trial Order dated October 22, 1981, 9 as follows:
1. Both parties recognize the existence of the Deed of Sale over the residential
house located at No. 7 Granada St., Gordon Heights, Olongapo City, which was
acquired from Armando Altares on June 4, 1974 and sold by defendant Criselda
Cheesman to Estelita Padilla on July 12, 1981; and

G.R. No. 74833

January 21, 1991
THOMAS C. CHEESMAN, petitioner,
vs.
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT and ESTELITA PADILLA, respondents.
NARVASA, J.:
This appeal concerns the attempt by an American citizen (petitioner Thomas Cheesman) to
annul for lack of consent on his part the sale by his Filipino wife (Criselda) of a
residential lot and building to Estelita Padilla, also a Filipino.
Thomas Cheesman and Criselda P. Cheesman were married on December 4, 1970 but
have been separated since February 15,1981. 1
On June 4, 1974, a "Deed of Sale and Transfer of Possessory Rights" was executed by
Armando Altares conveying a parcel of unregistered land and the house thereon (at No. 7
Neptune Street, Gordon Heights, Olongapo City) in favor of "Criselda P. Cheesman, of legal
age, Filipino citizen, married to Thomas Cheesman, and residing at Lot No. 1, Blk. 8,
Filtration Road, Sta. Rita, Olongapo City . . ." 2 Thomas Cheesman, although aware of the
deed, did not object to the transfer being made only to his wife.3
Thereafterand again with the knowledge of Thomas Cheesman and also without any
protest by himtax declarations for the property purchased were issued in the name only of
Criselda Cheesman and Criselda assumed exclusive management and administration of
said property, leasing it to tenants. 4
On July 1, 1981, Criselda Cheesman sold the property to Estelita M. Padilla, without the
knowledge or consent of Thomas Cheesman. 5 The deed described Criselda as being" . . .
of legal age, married to an American citizen,. . ."6
Thirty days later, or on July 31, 1981, Thomas Cheesman brought suit in the Court of First
Instance at Olongapo City against his wife, Criselda, and Estelita Padilla, praying for the
annulment of the sale on the ground that the transaction had been executed without his

2. That the transaction regarding the transfer of their property took place during the
existence of their marriage as the couple were married on December 4, 1970 and
the questioned property was acquired sometime on June 4,1974.
The action resulted in a judgment dated June 24, 1982, 10 declaring void ab initio the sale
executed by Criselda Cheesman in favor of Estelita M. Padilla, and ordering the delivery of
the property to Thomas Cheesman as administrator of the conjugal partnership property,
and the payment to him of P5,000.00 as attorney's fees and expenses of litigation.11
The judgment was however set aside as regards Estelita Padilla on a petition for relief filed
by the latter, grounded on "fraud, mistake and/or excusable negligence" which had seriously
impaired her right to present her case adequately. 12 "After the petition for relief from
judgment was given due course," according to petitioner, "a new judge presided over the
case." 13
Estelita Padilla filed a supplemental pleading on December 20, 1982 as her own answer to
the complaint, and a motion for summary judgment on May 17, 1983. Although there was
initial opposition by Thomas Cheesman to the motion, the parties ultimately agreed on the
rendition by the court of a summary judgment after entering into a stipulation of facts, at the
hearing of the motion on June 21, 1983, the stipulation being of the following tenor: 14
(1) that the property in question was bought during the existence of the marriage
between the plaintiff and the defendant Criselda P. Cheesman;
(2) that the property bought during the marriage was registered in the name of
Criselda Cheesman and that the Deed of Sale and Transfer of Possessory Rights
executed by the former owner-vendor Armando Altares in favor of Criselda
Cheesman made no mention of the plaintiff;
(3) that the property, subject of the proceedings, was sold by defendant Criselda
Cheesman in favor of the other defendant Estelita M. Padilla, without the written
consent of the plaintiff.

Obviously upon the theory that no genuine issue existed any longer and there was hence no
need of a trial, the parties having in fact submitted, as also stipulated, their respective
memoranda each praying for a favorable verdict, the Trial Court 15 rendered a "Summary
Judgment" dated August 3, 1982 declaring "the sale executed by . . . Criselda Cheesman in
favor of . . . Estelita Padilla to be valid," dismissing Thomas Cheesman's complaint and
ordering him "to immediately turn over the possession of the house and lot subject of . . .
(the) case to . . . Estelita Padilla . . ." 16
The Trial Court found that
1) the evidence on record satisfactorily overcame the disputable presumption in
Article 160 of the Civil Codethat all property of the marriage belongs to the
conjugal partnership "unless it be proved that it pertains exclusively to the husband
or to the wife"and that the immovable in question was in truth Criselda's
paraphernal property;
2) that moreover, said legal presumption in Article 160 could not apply "inasmuch
as the husband-plaintiff is an American citizen and therefore disqualified under the
Constitution to acquire and own real properties; and
3) that the exercise by Criselda of exclusive acts of dominion with the knowledge of
her husband "had led . . . Estelita Padilla to believe that the properties were the
exclusive properties of Criselda Cheesman and on the faith of such a belief she
bought the properties from her and for value," and therefore, Thomas Cheesman
was, under Article 1473 of the Civil Code, estopped to impugn the transfer to
Estelita Padilla.
Thomas Cheesman appealed to the Intermediate Appellate Court. There he assailed the
Trial Court acts (1) of granting Estelita Padilla's petition for relief, and its resolution of
matters not subject of said petition; (2) of declaring valid the sale to Estelita Padilla despite
the lack of consent thereto by him, and the presumption of the conjugal character of the
property in question pursuant to Article 160 of the Civil Code; (3) of disregarding the
judgment of June 24, 1982 which, not having been set aside as against Criselda
Cheesman, continued to be binding on her; and (4) of making findings of fact not supported
by evidence. All of these contentions were found to be without merit by the Appellate
Tribunal which, on January 7, 1986, promulgated a decision (erroneously denominated,
"Report")17 affirming the "Summary Judgment complained of," "having found no reversible
error" therein.
Once more, Thomas Cheesman availed of the remedy of appeal, this time to this Court.
Here, he argues that it was reversible error for the Intermediate Appellate Court
1) to find that the presumption that the property in question is conjugal in accordance with
Article 160 had been satisfactorily overcome by Estelita Padilla; 18
2) to rule that Estelita Padilla was a purchaser of said property in good faith, it appearing:

a) that the deed by which the property was conveyed to Criselda

Cheesman described her as "married to Thomas C. Cheesman," as well
as the deed by which the property was later conveyed to Estelita Padilla
by Criselda Cheesman also described her as "married to an American
citizen," and both said descriptions had thus "placed Estelita on
knowledge of the conjugal nature of the property;" and
b) that furthermore, Estelita had admitted to stating in the deed by which
she acquired the property a price much lower than that actually paid "in
order to avoid payment of more obligation to the government;"19
3) to decline to declare that the evidence did not warrant the grant of Estelita Padilla's
petition for relief on the ground of "fraud, mistake and/or excusable negligence;" 20
4) to hold that Thomas Cheesman had waived his objection to Estelita's petition for relief by
failing to appeal from the order granting the same;
5) to accord to Estelita Padilla a relief other than that she had specifically prayed for in her
petition for relief, ie., "the restoration of the purchase price which Estelita allegedly paid to
Criselda;" 21 and
6) to fail to declare that Thomas Cheesman's citizenship is not a bar to his action to recover
the lot and house for the conjugal partnership.22
Such conclusions as that (1) fraud, mistake or excusable negligence existed in the premises
justifying relief to Estelita Padilla under Rule 38 of the Rules of Court, or (2) that Criselda
Cheesman had used money she had brought into her marriage to Thomas Cheesman to
purchase the lot and house in question, or (3) that Estelita Padilla believed in good faith that
Criselda Cheesman was the exclusive owner of the property that she (Estelita) intended to
and did in fact buyderived from the evidence adduced by the parties, the facts set out in
the pleadings or otherwise appearing on recordare conclusions or findings of fact. As
distinguished from a question of lawwhich exists "when the doubt or difference arises as
to what the law is on a certain state of facts" "there is a question of fact when the doubt
or difference arises as to the truth or the falsehood of alleged facts;"23 or when the "query
necessarily invites calibration of the whole evidence considering mainly the credibility of
witnesses, existence and relevancy of specific surrounding circumstances, their relation; to
each other and to the whole and the probabilities of the situation." 24
Now, it is axiomatic that only questions of law, distinctly set forth, may be raised in a petition
for the review oncertiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals presented to this Court. 25 As
everyone knows or ought to know, the appellate jurisdiction of this Court is limited to
reviewing errors of law, accepting as conclusive the factual findings of the lower court upon
its own assessment of the evidence. 26 The creation of the Court of Appeals was precisely
intended to take away from the Supreme Court the work of examining the evidence, and
confine its task to the determination of questions which do not call for the reading and study
of transcripts containing the testimony of witnesses.27 The rule of conclusiveness of the
factual findings or conclusions of the Court of Appeals is, to be sure, subject to certain
exceptions, 28 none of which however obtains in the case at bar.

It is noteworthy that both the Trial Court and the Intermediate Appellate Court reached the
same conclusions on the three (3) factual matters above set forth, after assessment of the
evidence and determination of the probative value thereof. Both Courts found that the facts
on record adequately proved fraud, mistake or excusable negligence by which Estelita
Padilla's rights had been substantially impaired; that the funds used by Criselda Cheesman
was money she had earned and saved prior to her marriage to Thomas Cheesman, and
that Estelita Padilla did believe in good faith that Criselda Cheesman was the sole owner of
the property in question. Consequently, these determinations of fact will not be here
disturbed, this Court having been cited to no reason for doing so.
These considerations dispose of the first three (3) points that petitioner Cheesman seeks to
make in his appeal.1wphi1They also make unnecessary an extended discussion of the
other issues raised by him. As to them, it should suffice to restate certain fundamental
propositions.
An order of a Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial Court) granting a petition for relief
under Rule 38 is interlocutory and is not appealable. Hence, the failure of the party who
opposed the petition to appeal from said order, or his participation in the proceedings
subsequently had, cannot be construed as a waiver of his objection to the petition for relief
so as to preclude his raising the same question on appeal from the judgment on the merits
of the main case. Such a party need not repeat his objections to the petition for relief, or
perform any act thereafter (e.g., take formal exception) in order to preserve his right to
question the same eventually, on appeal, it being sufficient for this purpose that he has
made of record "the action which he desires the court to take or his objection to the action of
the court and his grounds therefor." 29
Again, the prayer in a petition for relief from judgment under Rule 38 is not necessarily the
same prayer in the petitioner's complaint, answer or other basic pleading. This should be
obvious. Equally obvious is that once a petition for relief is granted and the judgment subject
thereof set aside, and further proceedings are thereafter had, the Court in its judgment on
the merits may properly grant the relief sought in the petitioner's basic pleadings, although
different from that stated in his petition for relief.
Finally, the fundamental law prohibits the sale to aliens of residential land. Section 14,
Article XIV of the 1973 Constitution ordains that, "Save in cases of hereditary succession,
no private land shall be transferred or conveyed except to individuals, corporations, or
associations qualified to acquire or hold lands of the public domain." 30 Petitioner Thomas
Cheesman was, of course, charged with knowledge of this prohibition. Thus, assuming that
it was his intention that the lot in question be purchased by him and his wife, he acquired no
right whatever over the property by virtue of that purchase; and in attempting to acquire a
right or interest in land, vicariously and clandestinely, he knowingly violated the Constitution;
the sale as to him was null and void. 31 In any event, he had and has no capacity or
personality to question the subsequent sale of the same property by his wife on the theory
that in so doing he is merely exercising the prerogative of a husband in respect of conjugal
property. To sustain such a theory would permit indirect controversion of the constitutional
prohibition. If the property were to be declared conjugal, this would accord to the alien
husband a not insubstantial interest and right over land, as he would then have a decisive
vote as to its transfer or disposition. This is a right that the Constitution does not permit him
to have.

As already observed, the finding that his wife had used her own money to purchase the
property cannot, and will not, at this stage of the proceedings be reviewed and overturned.
But even if it were a fact that said wife had used conjugal funds to make the acquisition, the
considerations just set out militate, on high constitutional grounds, against his recovering
and holding the property so acquired or any part thereof. And whether in such an event, he
may recover from his wife any share of the money used for the purchase or charge her with
unauthorized disposition or expenditure of conjugal funds is not now inquired into; that
would be, in the premises, a purely academic exercise. An equally decisive consideration is
that Estelita Padilla is a purchaser in good faith, both the Trial Court and the Appellate Court
having found that Cheesman's own conduct had led her to believe the property to be
exclusive property of the latter's wife, freely disposable by her without his consent or
intervention. An innocent buyer for value, she is entitled to the protection of the law in her
purchase, particularly as against Cheesman, who would assert rights to the property denied
him by both letter and spirit of the Constitution itself.
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is AFFIRMED, with costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.

However, Benjamin and Joselyn had a falling out, and Joselyn ran away with Kim
Philippsen. On June 8, 1992, Joselyn executed a Special Power of Attorney (SPA) in favor
of Benjamin, authorizing the latter to maintain, sell, lease, and sub-lease and otherwise
enter into contract with third parties with respect to their Boracay property.9
On July 20, 1992, Joselyn as lessor and petitioner Philip Matthews as lessee, entered into
an Agreement of Lease10 (Agreement) involving the Boracay property for a period of 25
years, with an annual rental of P12,000.00. The agreement was signed by the parties and
executed before a Notary Public. Petitioner thereafter took possession of the property and
renamed the resort as Music Garden Resort.1avvphi1
Claiming that the Agreement was null and void since it was entered into by Joselyn without
his (Benjamins) consent, Benjamin instituted an action for Declaration of Nullity of
Agreement of Lease with Damages11 against Joselyn and the petitioner. Benjamin claimed
that his funds were used in the acquisition and improvement of the Boracay property, and
coupled with the fact that he was Joselyns husband, any transaction involving said property
required his consent.
G.R. No. 164584

June 22, 2009

PHILIP MATTHEWS, Petitioner,

vs.
BENJAMIN A. TAYLOR and JOSELYN C. TAYLOR, Respondents.

No Answer was filed, hence, the RTC declared Joselyn and the petitioner in defeault. On
March 14, 1994, the RTC rendered judgment by default declaring the Agreement null and
void.12 The decision was, however, set aside by the CA in CA-G.R. SP No. 34054.13 The CA
also ordered the RTC to allow the petitioner to file his Answer, and to conduct further
proceedings.

DECISION
NACHURA, J.:
Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari are the Court of Appeals (CA) December 19,
2003 Decision1 and July 14, 2004 Resolution2 in CA-G.R. CV No. 59573. The assailed
decision affirmed and upheld the June 30, 1997 Decision3 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC),
Branch 8, Kalibo, Aklan in Civil Case No. 4632 for Declaration of Nullity of Agreement of
Lease with Damages.
On June 30, 1988, respondent Benjamin A. Taylor (Benjamin), a British subject, married
Joselyn C. Taylor (Joselyn), a 17-year old Filipina.4 On June 9, 1989, while their marriage
was subsisting, Joselyn bought from Diosa M. Martin a 1,294 square-meter lot (Boracay
property) situated at Manoc-Manoc, Boracay Island, Malay, Aklan, for and in consideration
of P129,000.00.5 The sale was allegedly financed by Benjamin.6 Joselyn and Benjamin, also
using the latters funds, constructed improvements thereon and eventually converted the
property to a vacation and tourist resort known as the Admiral Ben Bow Inn.7 All required
permits and licenses for the operation of the resort were obtained in the name of Ginna
Celestino, Joselyns sister.8

In his Answer,14 petitioner claimed good faith in transacting with Joselyn. Since Joselyn
appeared to be the owner of the Boracay property, he found it unnecessary to obtain the
consent of Benjamin. Moreover, as appearing in the Agreement, Benjamin signed as a
witness to the contract, indicating his knowledge of the transaction and, impliedly, his
conformity to the agreement entered into by his wife. Benjamin was, therefore, estopped
from questioning the validity of the Agreement.
There being no amicable settlement during the pre-trial, trial on the merits ensued.
On June 30, 1997, the RTC disposed of the case in this manner:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiff
and against the defendants as follows:
1. The Agreement of Lease dated July 20, 1992 consisting of eight (8) pages
(Exhibits "T", "T-1", "T-2", "T-3", "T-4", "T-5", "T-6" and "T-7") entered into by and
between Joselyn C. Taylor and Philip Matthews before Notary Public Lenito T.

Serrano under Doc. No. 390, Page 79, Book I, Series of 1992 is hereby declared
NULL and VOID;
2. Defendants are hereby ordered, jointly and severally, to pay plaintiff the sum of
SIXTEEN THOUSAND (P16,000.00) PESOS as damages representing unrealized
income for the residential building and cottages computed monthly from July 1992
up to the time the property in question is restored to plaintiff; and

4.1. THE MARITAL CONSENT OF RESPONDENT BENJAMIN TAYLOR IS NOT

REQUIRED IN THE AGREEMENT OF LEASE DATED 20 JULY 1992. GRANTING
ARGUENDO THAT HIS CONSENT IS REQUIRED, BENJAMIN TAYLOR IS
DEEMED TO HAVE GIVEN HIS CONSENT WHEN HE AFFIXED HIS SIGNATURE
IN THE AGREEMENT OF LEASE AS WITNESS IN THE LIGHT OF THE RULING
OF THE SUPREME COURT IN THE CASE OF SPOUSES PELAYO VS. MELKI
PEREZ, G.R. NO. 141323, JUNE 8, 2005.

3. Defendants are hereby ordered, jointly and severally, to pay plaintiff the sum of
TWENTY THOUSAND (P20,000.00) PESOS, Philippine Currency, for attorneys
fees and other incidental expenses.

4.2. THE PARCEL OF LAND SUBJECT OF THE AGREEMENT OF LEASE IS THE

EXCLUSIVE PROPERTY OF JOCELYN C. TAYLOR, A FILIPINO CITIZEN, IN THE
LIGHT OF CHEESMAN VS. IAC, G.R. NO. 74833, JANUARY 21, 1991.

SO ORDERED.15
The RTC considered the Boracay property as community property of Benjamin and Joselyn;
thus, the consent of the spouses was necessary to validate any contract involving the
property. Benjamins right over the Boracay property was bolstered by the courts findings
that the property was purchased and improved through funds provided by Benjamin.
Although the Agreement was evidenced by a public document, the trial court refused to
consider the alleged participation of Benjamin in the questioned transaction primarily
because his signature appeared only on the last page of the document and not on every
page thereof.
On appeal to the CA, petitioner still failed to obtain a favorable decision. In its December 19,
2003 Decision,16 the CA affirmed the conclusions made by the RTC. The appellate court
was of the view that if, indeed, Benjamin was a willing participant in the questioned
transaction, the parties to the Agreement should have used the phrase "with my consent"
instead of "signed in the presence of." The CA noted that Joselyn already prepared an SPA
in favor of Benjamin involving the Boracay property; it was therefore unnecessary for
Joselyn to participate in the execution of the Agreement. Taken together, these
circumstances yielded the inevitable conclusion that the contract was null and void having
been entered into by Joselyn without the consent of Benjamin.
Aggrieved, petitioner now comes before this Court in this petition for review on certiorari
based on the following grounds:

4.3. THE COURTS A QUO ERRONEOUSLY APPLIED ARTICLE 96 OF THE

FAMILY CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES WHICH IS A PROVISION REFERRING TO
THE ABSOLUTE COMMUNITY OF PROPERTY. THE PROPERTY REGIME
GOVERNING THE PROPERTY RELATIONS OF BENJAMIN TAYLOR AND
JOSELYN TAYLOR IS THE CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP OF GAINS BECAUSE
THEY WERE MARRIED ON 30 JUNE 1988 WHICH IS PRIOR TO THE
EFFECTIVITY OF THE FAMILY CODE. ARTICLE 96 OF THE FAMILY CODE OF
THE PHILIPPINES FINDS NO APPLICATION IN THIS CASE.
4.4. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS IGNORED THE PRESUMPTION
OF REGULARITY IN THE EXECUTION OF NOTARIAL DOCUMENTS.
4.5. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS FAILED TO PASS UPON THE
COUNTERCLAIM OF PETITIONER DESPITE THE FACT THAT IT WAS NOT
CONTESTED AND DESPITE THE PRESENTATION OF EVIDENCE
ESTABLISHING SAID CLAIM.17
The petition is impressed with merit.
In fine, we are called upon to determine the validity of an Agreement of Lease of a parcel of
land entered into by a Filipino wife without the consent of her British husband. In addressing
the matter before us, we are confronted not only with civil law or conflicts of law issues, but
more importantly, with a constitutional question.
It is undisputed that Joselyn acquired the Boracay property in 1989. Said acquisition was
evidenced by a Deed of Sale with Joselyn as the vendee. The property was also declared
for taxation purposes under her name. When Joselyn leased the property to petitioner,
Benjamin sought the nullification of the contract on two grounds: first, that he was the actual
owner of the property since he provided the funds used in purchasing the same; and

second, that Joselyn could not enter into a valid contract involving the subject property
without his consent.
The trial and appellate courts both focused on the property relations of petitioner and
respondent in light of the Civil Code and Family Code provisions. They, however, failed to
observe the applicable constitutional principles, which, in fact, are the more decisive.
Section 7, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution states:18
Section 7. Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private lands shall be transferred or
conveyed except to individuals, corporations, or associations qualified to acquire or hold
lands of the public domain.1avvphi1
Aliens, whether individuals or corporations, have been disqualified from acquiring lands of
the public domain. Hence, by virtue of the aforecited constitutional provision, they are also
disqualified from acquiring private lands.19The primary purpose of this constitutional
provision is the conservation of the national patrimony.20 Our fundamental law cannot be
any clearer. The right to acquire lands of the public domain is reserved only to Filipino
citizens or corporations at least sixty percent of the capital of which is owned by Filipinos.21
In Krivenko v. Register of Deeds,22 cited in Muller v. Muller,23 we had the occasion to explain
the constitutional prohibition:
Under Section 1 of Article XIII of the Constitution, "natural resources, with the exception of
public agricultural land, shall not be alienated," and with respect to public agricultural lands,
their alienation is limited to Filipino citizens. But this constitutional purpose conserving
agricultural resources in the hands of Filipino citizens may easily be defeated by the Filipino
citizens themselves who may alienate their agricultural lands in favor of aliens. It is partly to
prevent this result that Section 5 is included in Article XIII, and it reads as follows:
"Section 5. Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private agricultural land will be
transferred or assigned except to individuals, corporations, or associations qualified to
acquire or hold lands of the public domain in the Philippines."
This constitutional provision closes the only remaining avenue through which agricultural
resources may leak into aliens hands. It would certainly be futile to prohibit the alienation of
public agricultural lands to aliens if, after all, they may be freely so alienated upon their
becoming private agricultural lands in the hands of Filipino citizens. x x x
xxxx

If the term "private agricultural lands" is to be construed as not including residential lots or
lands not strictly agricultural, the result would be that "aliens may freely acquire and
possess not only residential lots and houses for themselves but entire subdivisions, and
whole towns and cities," and that "they may validly buy and hold in their names lands of any
area for building homes, factories, industrial plants, fisheries, hatcheries, schools, health
and vacation resorts, markets, golf courses, playgrounds, airfields, and a host of other uses
and purposes that are not, in appellants words, strictly agricultural." (Solicitor Generals
Brief, p. 6) That this is obnoxious to the conservative spirit of the Constitution is beyond
question.24
The rule is clear and inflexible: aliens are absolutely not allowed to acquire public or private
lands in the Philippines, save only in constitutionally recognized exceptions.25 There is no
rule more settled than this constitutional prohibition, as more and more aliens attempt to
circumvent the provision by trying to own lands through another. In a long line of cases, we
have settled issues that directly or indirectly involve the above constitutional provision. We
had cases where aliens wanted that a particular property be declared as part of their
fathers estate;26 that they be reimbursed the funds used in purchasing a property titled in
the name of another;27that an implied trust be declared in their (aliens) favor;28 and that a
contract of sale be nullified for their lack of consent.29
In Ting Ho, Jr. v. Teng Gui,30 Felix Ting Ho, a Chinese citizen, acquired a parcel of land,
together with the improvements thereon. Upon his death, his heirs (the petitioners therein)
claimed the properties as part of the estate of their deceased father, and sought the partition
of said properties among themselves. We, however, excluded the land and improvements
thereon from the estate of Felix Ting Ho, precisely because he never became the owner
thereof in light of the above-mentioned constitutional prohibition.
In Muller v. Muller,31 petitioner Elena Buenaventura Muller and respondent Helmut Muller
were married in Germany. During the subsistence of their marriage, respondent purchased
a parcel of land in Antipolo City and constructed a house thereon. The Antipolo property was
registered in the name of the petitioner. They eventually separated, prompting the
respondent to file a petition for separation of property. Specifically, respondent prayed for
reimbursement of the funds he paid for the acquisition of said property. In deciding the case
in favor of the petitioner, the Court held that respondent was aware that as an alien, he was
prohibited from owning a parcel of land situated in the Philippines. He had, in fact, declared
that when the spouses acquired the Antipolo property, he had it titled in the name of the
petitioner because of said prohibition. Hence, we denied his attempt at subsequently
asserting a right to the said property in the form of a claim for reimbursement. Neither did
the Court declare that an implied trust was created by operation of law in view of petitioners
marriage to respondent. We said that to rule otherwise would permit circumvention of the
constitutional prohibition.

In Frenzel v. Catito,32 petitioner, an Australian citizen, was married to Teresita Santos; while
respondent, a Filipina, was married to Klaus Muller. Petitioner and respondent met and later
cohabited in a common-law relationship, during which petitioner acquired real properties;
and since he was disqualified from owning lands in the Philippines, respondents name
appeared as the vendee in the deeds of sale. When their relationship turned sour, petitioner
filed an action for the recovery of the real properties registered in the name of respondent,
claiming that he was the real owner. Again, as in the other cases, the Court refused to
declare petitioner as the owner mainly because of the constitutional prohibition. The Court
added that being a party to an illegal contract, he could not come to court and ask to have
his illegal objective carried out. One who loses his money or property by knowingly
engaging in an illegal contract may not maintain an action for his losses.

he provided the funds for such acquisition. By entering into such contract knowing that it
was illegal, no implied trust was created in his favor; no reimbursement for his expenses
can be allowed; and no declaration can be made that the subject property was part of the
conjugal/community property of the spouses. In any event, he had and has no capacity or
personality to question the subsequent lease of the Boracay property by his wife on the
theory that in so doing, he was merely exercising the prerogative of a husband in respect of
conjugal property. To sustain such a theory would countenance indirect controversion of the
constitutional prohibition. If the property were to be declared conjugal, this would accord the
alien husband a substantial interest and right over the land, as he would then have a
decisive vote as to its transfer or disposition. This is a right that the Constitution does not
permit him to have.34

Finally, in Cheesman v. Intermediate Appellate Court,33 petitioner (an American citizen) and
Criselda Cheesman acquired a parcel of land that was later registered in the latters name.
Criselda subsequently sold the land to a third person without the knowledge of the
petitioner. The petitioner then sought the nullification of the sale as he did not give his
consent thereto. The Court held that assuming that it was his (petitioners) intention that the
lot in question be purchased by him and his wife, he acquired no right whatever over the
property by virtue of that purchase; and in attempting to acquire a right or interest in land,
vicariously and clandestinely, he knowingly violated the Constitution; thus, the sale as to him
was null and void.

In fine, the Agreement of Lease entered into between Joselyn and petitioner cannot be
nullified on the grounds advanced by Benjamin. Thus, we uphold its validity.

In light of the foregoing jurisprudence, we find and so hold that Benjamin has no right to
nullify the Agreement of Lease between Joselyn and petitioner. Benjamin, being an alien, is
absolutely prohibited from acquiring private and public lands in the Philippines. Considering
that Joselyn appeared to be the designated "vendee" in the Deed of Sale of said property,
she acquired sole ownership thereto. This is true even if we sustain Benjamins claim that

With the foregoing disquisition, we find it unnecessary to address the other issues raised by
the petitioner.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the December 19, 2003 Decision and July 14, 2004
Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 59573, are REVERSED and SET
ASIDE and a new one is entered DISMISSING the complaint against petitioner Philip
Matthews.
SO ORDERED.