INTRODUCTION

Knowing where you are relative to others is perhaps nowhere more important than
on the
There has long been a need for interoperable data communications
for fighter aircraft. Today, most U.S. and NATO allies fighters
communicate using unsecure analog radios that provide only
interactive voice communications. This severely limits the coalition
partners ability to reliably share a wide range of combat data in
addition to voice over a secure, jam-resistant communications
network.
Communications systems that include TADIL capabilities offer a
near-term solution for exchanging digital data over a common network
that is continuously and automatically updated. Precise
quantitative information (data) can be sent faster and more reliably
via direct digital (i.e., computer-to-computer) communications. In
addition, text messages need only a small fraction of the communications
resources that interactive voice messages require and can
also be delivered much more reliably than voice in high-stress combat
conditions.
Moreover, digital modulation1 offers many advantages over analog
modulation. Four of these are particularly important: the ability to
send data; the ability to encrypt voice or data;2 the use of error detection
and correction coding, which increases the reliability andbattlefield. And having that

information in real-time is essential. Data links are critical to enabling the digital
battlespace, providing the warfighter with situational awareness, the exchange of
critical data and battlefield execution capabilities.
ensure effective management of intelligence information for operational command and
control. In addition to traditional mobility and security requirements, defence communication
solutions need to meet rising demand for bandwidth and interoperability between multiple
systems. Military standards are continually being enhanced to ensure better communications
security and efficiency.

Several communications systems have been developed over many

years to support TADIL communications, or the near-real-time exchange
of data among tactical data systems. Each such system is
specified by hardware/software characteristics (e.g., waveform,
modulation, data rates, transmission media, etc.) as well as by
message and protocol standards. The most recent system is the
JTIDS/TADIL J system, which is commonly referred to as Link 16 in
the United States. Link 16 is an encrypted, jam-resistant, nodeless
tactical digital data link network established by JTIDS-compatible
communication terminals that transmit and receive data messages in
the TADIL J message catalog.
Link 16 data communications standards and technology were developed
in the U.S. JTIDS program, which began in 1975. The first
JTIDS terminals or Class 1 terminals were large and were installed

only on AWACS and at U.S., U.K., and NATO ground-control facilities.

Smaller JTIDS terminals (Class 2) were also developed. However,
because of their high cost, large size, and reliability issues, only
a limited number of such terminals were procured to equip U.S.
fighters specificallyU.S. Navy F-14Ds and a single squadron of U.S.
Air Force F-15Cs.
The MIDS program was created to put small, lightweight Link 16
terminals on U.S. and participating allies fighter aircraft. MIDS is a
major international program led by the United States, specifically the
U.S. Navy, and has a Navy captain as its program manager. By
international agreement, the deputy program manager MIDS is a
French military officer.3 The countries funding the development of
MIDS are the United States, France, Germany, Italy, and Spain

Link 16 can provide a range of combat information in near-real time

to U.S. and NATO allies combat aircraft and C2 centers. The displayed
information includes an integrated air picture with both
friendly and hostile aircraft locations, general situational awareness
data, and amplifying data on air and ground targets, including air
defense threats. This will contribute to the integrated control of
fighters by either ground-based or airborne controllers and will
greatly increase the fighters situational awareness and ability either
to engage targets designated by controllers or to avoid threats,
thereby increasing mission effectiveness and reducing fratricide and
attrition.
The JTIDS-compliant radio equipment and the TADIL J message
formats and protocols are clearly illustrated. The definition of
Link 16 provided above includes just these two components. A
broader definition of Link 16 is depicted in Figure 9.2. This systemofsystems concept includes the systems used by the aircrews to
perform the functions to move the information from one aircrew to
another. Although this broader definition is not used in this report, it
clearly depicts the aircrews role in Link 16 and the need for
interoperability at the aircrew level.
Within the United States, confusion arises when JTIDS and Link 16
are used interchangeably for the data link. JTIDS and JTIDScompliant
radio equipment (such as MIDS) are just the communications
element. There is also confusion surrounding the use of
TADIL J. Some want the term to apply to the link, and others want
the term to apply only to the message formats and protocols (as
NATO has a different view of this terminology. The TADIL J messages
and protocols become Link 16 (STANAG 5516), while the
JTIDS communication element becomes MIDS (STANAG 4175).
Thus, NATO uses Link 16 in a narrower sense than that used in the
United States. There are also differences in standard operating
procedures: The
The United States uses the Joint Multi-TADIL Operating
Procedures (JMTOP) (Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff Manual CJCSM
6120.01), and NATO uses Allied Data Publication-1

PAK Scenario
A recent report on the Pakistan Air Force (PAF)s Combat Commanders School (CCS) by Wajahat S. Khan offered a
number of informative details on the inner-workings of the PAFs flagship training program. CCS is basically an
institution devoted to preparing and transitioning highly promising mid-career officers for their first leadership posts
in the PAF.
Not only are these officers put through rigorous training and strict testing, but they are also educated to further their
understanding of modern air warfare, and are thus pushed to develop the capacity to tailor effective solutions for
various tactical obstacles the PAF expects to face in a war.
We will certainly take a deeper look at CCS in the near future, but for this article, we want to draw our readers
attention towards another interesting gem, one worth discussing in detail.
In the midst of all that activity shown at PAF Mushaf (the home of CCS), there was a monitor displaying a feed, and
under that monitor was a label with the term Link-17 printed onto it. Link-17 is the PAFs indigenous data-link
system, which we touched upon in one of our pieces about Pakistans C4ISR system.
Tactical data-links (TDL) are networks that enable secure and jam-resistant voice and data exchanges between
connected assets. Within that framework, TDLs also enable networked participants to view in real-time (or at least
near real-time) each others sensor feeds, which could come from radars, sonars, electro-optical (EO) systems such
as cameras, and others.
TDLs are essential components of a network-centric system, which in turn is designed to enable the right
respondents to acquire new information in a timely manner. A practical example would be that of a fighter aircraft
picking up an intruding enemy fighter using the radar feed of a friendly airborne early warning and control
(AEW&C) aircraft. Thanks to the AEW&Cs feed, the friendly fighter is made aware of a possible threat well in
advance, thus enabling the friendly fighter to comfortably adapt and address the threat.
The technical aspects of TDLs and how they are used are covered in additional detail in a previous article, but for
this piece, it would be worth looking at why the availability of Link-17 is significant for the PAF, the Army, the
Navy, and potentially beyond as well.
Link-17 has given the PAF a network protocol that it can use with a wide range of aerial assets, especially
domestically driven programs, such as the JF-17 Thunder. The tactical operational benefits are certainly present. As
with any modern TDL, the JF-17 (as well as the Mirage ROSE) can utilize the extended range air surveillance
coverage offered by the radars on-board the Erieye and Karakoram Eagle AEW&C platforms, which in turn can
open up a number of advantageous tactical scenarios.
For example, the JF-17 can engage in lock-on after-launch (LOAL) maneuvers using the SD-10 beyond-visualrange air-to-air missile (BVRAAM). In LOAL, the missile is deployed to a waypoint near an approaching target, and
when the BVRAAM is in the acquisition-bracket, its terminal active radar-homing seeker will activate and engage
the target. In the case of the JF-17, an Erieye AEW&C could detect a target several hundred kilometers away; the
JF-17 could use the feed to deploy the SD-10, and in turn, the SD-10 itself could benefit from course updates by
data-link from the JF-17 or potentially even the AEW&C.

This is merely one example among many, but there is a universal point worth considering i.e. control. With Link17, the PAF has absolute control over its communications protocol, and in turn, it can exercise that control by freely
applying Link-17 to the systems of its choice. Of course, there is an exception i.e. U.S. origin systems such as the
F-16, but beyond that, the world is open to the PAF. In time, the PAF could opt to equip Link-17 onto unmanned
aerial vehicles (UAV), additional ISR [intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance] assets, and even air-to-air and
air-to-surface munitions.

INDIA

One of the most prominent equipment fitted on the super structure is the Resistor-E radar
complex. Resistor-E is the automated system designed for providing air traffic control,
approach/landing and short range navigation for ship borne aircraft. This complex along with its
various sub-systems provides navigation and flight data to ship borne aircraft operating at
extended ranges from the mother ship. The precision approach guidance system aids the fighters
on approach to be directed down to a distance of 30 meters short of flight deck. INS
Vikramaditya also boasts of a very modern communication complex, CCS MK II, to meet her
external communication requirement. Installation of Link II tactical data system allows her to be
fully integrated with the Indian Navys network centric operations.
BEL has been a silent partner to some of the most advanced programmes of the Indian Navy, has
supplied all the major sensors and electronic systems onboard INS Kamorta. These include a 3-D
Surveillance Radar (Revathi), Active-cum-Passive Integrated Sonar System (Humsa-NG), EW
System Sanket, Combat Management System, Fire Control System (Lynx), Ship Data Network,
Composite Communication System (CCS Mk III) and Data Link (Link II).
BEL has been a silent partner to some of the most advanced programmes of the Indian Navy, has
supplied all the major sensors and electronic systems onboard INS Kamorta. These include a 3-D
Surveillance Radar (Revathi), Active-cum-Passive Integrated Sonar System (Humsa-NG), EW
System Sanket, Combat Management System, Fire Control System (Lynx), Ship Data Network,
Composite Communication System (CCS Mk III) and Data Link (Link II).
Gripen NG is a Network Centric fighter. This means that the aircraft has
the possibility to communicate two ways with all armed units. It has a
secure and multi-frequency data links system that provides total
situation awareness for all involved participants in an operation.
The communication is secured by the usage of encryption. The codes
for the encryption are under control of the customer.
The acquired information along with information about each Gripens
position, fuel and weapon status is shared with other Gripen fighters
via the data link.

Communications summing up:

Secured communication with customer sovereignty over

encryption.
All type of information can be received or transmitted between
Gripen or from other sources
o For example fuel information, radar information
Different links:
o Gripen Tactical Data Link (TIDLS)
o National Tactical Data Link (TDL)
o Link 16
o Data Link with Forward Air control
o National links can be implemented
Within five years, the IAF would have its proprietary AFNET network fully
in place with
enhanced encryption features implemented. The Integrated Air Command
and Control
System (IACCS)10 should also be ready with all its modules including
encrypted jam
resistant wireless component, thus giving the IAF full networked war
fighting capabilities.
The data link system embedded in the IACCS architecture would enable
high situational
awareness for all war fighters and the battle commanders even at
remote from the
battlefield locations. The IAF would, in ten years, be moving towards
dynamic targeting
of ordnance. It would be in the process of developing capability to data
link with, say a
missile in flight, to reassign its target or modify its attack profile on the
fly.11