June De Villa v.

The Director, New Bilibid Prisons

G.R. No. 158802, November 17, 2004
Associate Justice Ynares-Santiago
Facts: This is a petition for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus under
Rule 102 of the Rules of Court. Petitioner Reynaldo de Villa, joined by
his son, petitioner-relator June de Villa, seeks a two-fold relief: First, that
respondent Director of Prisons justify the basis for the imprisonment of
petitioner Reynaldo de Villa; and second, that petitioner be granted a new
trial. These reliefs are sought on the basis of purportedly exculpatory
evidence, gathered after performing deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) testing
on samples allegedly collected from the petitioner and a child born to the
victim of the rape.
Petitioner-relator in this case, June de Villa, is the son of Reynaldo. He
alleges that during the trial of the case, he was unaware that there was a
scientific test that could determine once and for all if Reynaldo was the
father of the victim's child, Leahlyn. Petitioner-relator was only informed
during the pendency of the automatic review of petitioner's case that DNA
testing could resolve the issue of paternity. This information was
apparently furnished by the Free Legal Assistance Group (FLAG) AntiDeath Penalty Task Force, which took over as counsel for petitioner.
Thus, petitioner's brief in People v. de Villa sought the conduct of a blood
type test and DNA test in order to determine the paternity of the child
allegedly conceived as a result of the rape. This relief was implicitly
denied in our Decision of February 21, 2001.
Issue: Whether or not petitioner is the father of the child Leahlyn
Mendoza, hence his conviction of rape based on the fact that Leahlyn was
sired as a result of the alleged rape cannot stand and must be set aside.
Ruling: It must be stressed that the issue of Leahlyn Mendoza's paternity
is not central to the issue of petitioner's guilt or innocence. The rape of the
victim Aileen Mendoza is an entirely different question, separate and
distinct from the question of the father of her child. Pregnancy is not an
essential element of the crime of rape. Whether the child which the victim
bore was fathered by the purported rapist, or by some unknown individual,
is of no moment in determining an individual's guilt. Petitioner-relator's
claim that he was "unaware" of the existence of DNA testing until the trial
was concluded carries no weight with this Court.

Even with all of the compelling and persuasive scientific evidence

presented by petitioner and his counsel, we are not convinced that
Reynaldo de Villa is entitled to outright acquittal. As correctly pointed out
by the Solicitor General, even if it is conclusively proven that Reynaldo de
Villa is not the father of Leahlyn Mendoza, his conviction could, in
theory, still stand, with Aileen Mendoza's testimony and positive
identification as its bases.

People of the Philippines v. Alex Watamama y Esil

G.R. No. 194945, July 30, 2012
Associate Justice Martin Villarama, Jr.
Facts: This is an appeal of the March 5, 2010 Decision of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR HC No. 03295, affirming the Decision of

the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 103, of Quezon City, finding
appellant Alex Watamama y Esil guilty of violating Section 5 of Republic
Act (R.A.) No. 9165.
At around 10 o clock in the morning of September 25, 2005, an
informant reported to SPO2 Dante Nagera in the Quezon City Anti-Drug
Action Center, PNP Central Police District, Quezon City Hall Compound,
that a certain "Alex" was selling drugs in Barangay Payatas, Quezon City.
SPO2 Nagera relayed the information to his superior P/Supt. Gerardo
Ratuita who then formed a team consisting of SPO2 Nagera, PO3
Leonardo Ramos, PO1 Teresita Reyes, PO1 Alexander Jimenez, and PO1
Peggy Lynne Vargas to conduct a buy-bust operation. PO1 Vargas was
designated as the poseur buyer and was given two P100 bills which she
marked with her initials "PV".
The RTC rendered a decision convicting appellant of illegal sale of 0.18
grams of shabu and sentenced him to suffer the penalty of life
imprisonment and to pay a fine of P500,000. The CA denied the appeal
and affirmed the RTC Decision. The CA found that the prosecution was
able to establish every link in the chain of custody of the shabu from the
moment of seizure to receipt for examination and safekeeping in the PNP
Crime Laboratory to safekeeping for presentation in court.
Issue: Whether there was chain of custody attendant in the case.
Ruling: The Supreme Court ruled granted the appeal filed by the
appellant. It ruled that in all prosecutions for the violation of the
Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002, the existence of the
prohibited drug has to be proved.
The chain of custody rule requires that testimony be presented about every
link in the chain, from the moment the item was seized up to the time it is
offered in evidence. To this end, the prosecution must ensure that the
substance presented in court is the same substance seized from the
accused.
The prosecution failed to show how the seized evidence changed hands
from the time PO1 Vargas turned it over to the investigator up to the time
they were presented in court as evidence. The prosecution did not adduce
evidence on how the evidence was handled or stored before its
presentation at the trial. Since the failure to establish every link in the
chain of custody of the drug compromised its identity and integrity, which
is the corpus delicti of the crimes charged against appellant, his acquittal is
therefore in order.

People of the Philippines v. Reynaldo Belocura y Perez

G.R. No. 173474, August 29, 2012
Associate Justice Lucas Bersamin
Facts: The credibility of the evidence of the corpus delicti in a
prosecution for illegal possession of marij11ana under Republic Act No.
6425, as amended, depends on the integrity of the chain of custody of
the marijuana from the time of its seizure until the time of its presentation
as evidence in court. Short of that, the accused is entitled to an acquittal
because the State fails to establish the guilt of the accused beyond
reasonable doubt.
Reynaldo Belocura y Perez, a police officer charged with illegal
possession of 1,789.823 grams of marijuana in violation of Republic

Act No. 6425 (Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972), as amended by Republic

Act No. 7659, was found guilty of the crime charged on April 22,
2003 by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Manila, and sentenced to
suffer reclusion perpetua and to pay a fine of P500,000.00.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed the conviction on January
23, 2006. Hence, this final appeal for his acquittal.
Issue: Whether the trial court erred in admitting in evidence the marijuana
despite the illegality of its seizure due to the absence of a valid search
warrant.
Ruling: After a meticulous examination of the records, the Court
concludes that a reversal of the conviction is justified and called for. The
Prosecution failed to establish the identity of the prohibited drug that
constituted the corpus delicti itself. The omission naturally raises grave
doubt about any search being actually conducted and warrants the
suspicion that the prohibited drugs were planted evidence.
In every criminal prosecution for possession of illegal drugs, the
Prosecution must account for the custody of the incriminating evidence
from the moment of seizure and confiscation until the moment it is offered
in evidence. The chain-of-custody requirement ensures that all doubts
concerning the identity of the evidence are removed. The chain of custody
is essential in establishing the link between the article confiscated from the
accused to the evidence that is ultimately presented to the court for its
appreciation.

The Court holds that the guilt of Belocura for the crime
proved beyond reasonable doubt. Mere suspicion of his
how strong, should not sway judgment against him.
favoring him must be duly considered. Indeed, the
innocence in his favor was not overcome. Hence, his
follow.

charged was not

guilt, no matter
Every evidence
presumption of
acquittal should

People of the Philippines v. Andrew Roble

G.R. No. 192188, April 11, 2011
Associate Justice Presbitero Velasco, Jr.
Facts: This is an appeal from the July 14, 2009 Decision of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CEB CR-H.C. No. 00746, which affirmed
the May 2, 2007 Decision in Criminal Case No. DNO-2989 of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 25 in Danao City. The RTC found
accused-appellant Andrew Roble (Roble) guilty of violating Section 5
Article II of Republic Act No. (RA) 9165 or the Comprehensive
Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002.

On or about March 12, 2003 at 6:30 o'clock in the evening more or

less, in Looc, Danao City, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, in a buy-bust operation, did
then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously sell and deliver two
(2) plastic packets containing "shabu" powder/granule a regulated drug
with a total weight of zero point zero six (0.06) gram to a poseur-buyer
for a total consideration of Three Hundred (P300) pesos without any
corresponding license or prescription from the proper authorities as
provided by law; and the aforesaid packets of "shabu" was turned over by
the poseur-buyer to the police as evidence.
After trial, the RTC found Roble guilty of the crime charged. On July 14,
2009, the CA affirmed the judgment of the lower court based on the
time-honored doctrine that the assessment by the trial court of the
credibility of the witnesses and their testimonies deserves great respect.
Issue: Whether the trial court erred in convicting the accused-appellant of
the crime charged despite failure of the prosecution to prove his guilt
beyond reasonable doubt.
Ruling: In the crime of sale of dangerous drugs, the prosecution must be
able to successfully prove the following elements: "(1) identities of the
buyer and seller, the object, and the consideration; and (2) the delivery of
the thing sold and the payment therefor." Similarly, it is essential that the
transaction or sale be proved to have actually taken place coupled with the
presentation in court of evidence of corpus delicti Corpus delicti means
the "actual commission by someone of the particular crime charged." In
the instant case, the prosecution has failed to prove all the elements of the
crime with moral certainty.

The evidence presented by the prosecution is insufficient to prove that the

plastic sachets of shabu allegedly seized from accused-appellant are the
very same objects tested by the crime laboratory and offered in court as
evidence. The chain of custody of the drugs is patently broken.
Undoubtedly, the prosecution failed to meet the required quantum of
evidence sufficient to support a conviction, in which case, the
constitutional presumption of innocence prevails.

People of the Philippines v. Alberto Gonzales y Santos

G.R. No. 182417, April 3, 2013
Associate Justice Lucas Bersamin
Facts: Alberto S. Gonzales, also known as Takyo, appeals the affirmance
by the Court of Appeal (CA) of his conviction for violating Section 5,
Article II, of Republic Act No. 9165 (Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs
Act of 2002) handed down by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in
Malolos, Bulacan.
On June 16, 2003, Gonzales was formally charged in the RTC with a
violation of Section 5, Article II, of Republic Act No. 9165 under the
following information, to wit:
That on or about the 13th day of June, 2003, in the
Municipality of San Rafael, Province of Bulacan, Philippines,
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the abovenamed accused, without authority of law and legal
justification, did then and there willfully, unlawfully, and
feloniously sell, trade, deliver, give away, dispatch in transit
and transport dangerous drug consisting of one (1) heat-

sealed transparent plastic sachet of methylamphetamine

hydrochloride weighing 0.194 gram.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Giving credence to the narrative of PO1 Dimla as the Prosecution's sole
witness, the RTC convicted Gonzales of the crime charged. Finding no
error on the part of the RTC, however, the CA affirmed the conviction of
Gonzales.
Issue: Whether the accused is guilty for violation of Section 5, Article II
of Republic Act No. 9165 beyond reasonable doubt.
Ruling: A further review of the records underscores that poseur-buyer
PO1Dimla nowhere recalled in court that he and PO2 Chua had conducted
the physical inventory and photographing of the shabu subject of the sale
by Gonzales. By way of exception, Republic Act No. 9165 and its IRR
both state that the non-compliance with the procedures thereby delineated
and set would not necessarily invalidate the seizure and custody of the
dangerous drugs provided there were justifiable grounds for the noncompliance, and provided that the integrity of the evidence of the corpus
delicti was preserved.
The absolution of Gonzales should then follow, for we cannot deny that
the observance of the chain of custody as defined by the law was the only
assurance to him that his incrimination for the very serious crime had been
legitimate and insulated from either invention or malice.
In this connection, the Court states that the unexplained non-compliance
with the procedures for preserving the chain of custody of the dangerous
drugs has frequently caused the Court to absolve those found guilty by the
lower courts.

People of the Philippines v. Gerry Yable y Usman

G.R. No. 200358, April 7, 2014
Associate Justice Jose Portugal Perez
Facts: On 3 May 2005, an Information was filed against Gerry before
the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Quezon City for violation of Section 5,
Article II of R.A No. 9165, to wit:
That on or about the 27th day of April 2005, in Quezon
City, Philippines, the said accused, not being authorized by
law to sell, dispense, deliver, transport or distribute any
dangerous drug, did then and there willfully and unlawfully
sell, dispense, deliver, transport, distribute or act as broker in
the said transaction, one (1) sachet of white crystalline
substance containing zero point fifteen (0.15) gram of
[Methamphetamine] Hydrochloride, a dangerous drug.
On 28 March 2008, the trial court rendered a Decision finding Gerry
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the offense charged. The CA affirmed
the Decision of the RTC, upon a finding that all of the elements of illegal
sale of dangerous drug have been sufficiently established by the
prosecution.
Issue: Whether the trial court gravely erred in convicting the accusedappellant despite the prosecutions failure to establish the chain of custody
of the alleged confiscated drug.
Ruling: The appeal is bereft of merit. As correctly ruled by the CA, the
prosecution was able to establish the integrity of corpus delicti and the
unbroken chain of custody. PO1 Vargas identified in open court the sachet

of shabu that was offered in evidence against Gerry as the same one she
seized from the latter and marked immediately thereafter in the presence of
the police investigator. The police investigator continued the chain when
he testified that he saw PO1 Vargas making the appropriate markings on
the sachet, as well as issuance of an inventory receipt as evidence of
transfer of custody.
Furthermore, this Court has consistently ruled that even in instances where
the arresting officers failed to take a photograph of the seized drugs as
required under Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165, such procedural lapse is
not fatal and will not render the items seized inadmissible in
evidence. What is of utmost importance is the preservation of the integrity
and evidentiary value of the seized items, as the same would be utilized in
the determination of the guilt or innocence of the accused.

People of the Philippines v. Jayson Cijrillan Hambora

G.R. No. 198701, December 10, 2012
Associate Justice Bienvenido Reyes
Facts: This is an appeal filed by Jayson C. Hambora (Hambora) from the
Decision dated July 29, 2011 of the Court of Appeals (CA). The CA
affirmed the Decision dated October 1, 2009 of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Butuan City, Branch 4, finding him guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of violating Section 5, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165.

The accusatory portion of the Information reads as follows:

That on or about 12:05 oclock in the afternoon of February 13, 2004
at Montilla Street, Butuan City, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, without authority of law,
did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously sell, deliver to a
poseur-buyer for a consideration of FOUR HUNDRED ([P]400.00)
PESOS, Philippine Currency, one (1) sachet of methamphetamine
hydrochloride, otherwise known as shabu, weighing a total of zero point
zero seven four three (0.0743) grams (sic), which is a dangerous drug.
The RTC rendered a Decision convicting Hambora for illegal sale
of shabu pursuant to Section 5, Article II of R.A. 9165 as it gave full
credence to the testimonies of the police officers who conducted the buybust operation vis--vis Hamboras denial of the charge against him. On
appeal, the CA upheld the findings of the RTC.
Issue: Whether the accused is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating
Section 5, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165.

Ruling: The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Court of

Appeals. The prosecution competently and convincingly established the
essential elements for illegal sale of shabu, to wit: (a) the identities of the
buyer and the seller, the object of the sale, and the consideration; and (b)
the delivery of the thing sold and the payment for the thing. What is
material in prosecutions for illegal sale of shabu is the proof that the
transaction or sale actually took place, coupled with the presentation in
court of the corpus delicti as evidence.

A thorough examination of the records herein confirms the presence of all

these elements, viz: (1) PO2 Lasco acted as poseur-buyer to entrap
persons suspected of selling shabu during a legitimate buy-bust operation;
(2) Hambora approached PO2 Lasco and asked if the latter wanted to
buy shabu from him; (3) PO2 Lasco, as poseur-buyer, tendered four (4)
marked P100.00 bills to Hambora; and (3) Hambora, in return, handed
one (1) sachet of shabu to PO2 Lasco. The chemistry report conducted on
the specimen resulted in shabu with a total weight of 0.0743 gram.
Thus, no cogent reason exists to disturb the factual findings of the RTC,
as affirmed by the CA.

People of the Philippines v. Jose Almodiel

G.R. No. 200951, September 5, 2012
Associate Justice Antonio Carpio
Facts: Before the Supreme Court is an appeal assailing the Decision of the
Court of Appeals, Cagayan de Oro City, (CA). The CA affirmed the
Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Butuan City, Branch 4 (RTC), in
Criminal Case No. 9840 convicting appellant Jose Almodiel alias
"Dodong Astrobal" (accused) of violation of Section 5, Article II (Sale of
Dangerous Drugs) of Republic Act No. 9165 (RA 9165) or The
Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002.
The Information dated 16 May 2003 filed against the accused states:
That at or about 2:00 oclock in the afternoon of March 20,
2003 at Purok 9, Brgy. 15, Langihan Road, Butuan City,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused, without authority of law,
did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously sell,
trade, deliver two (2) sachets of methamphetamine
hydrochloride, otherwise known as shabu weighing zero point
one two zero five (0.1205) grams, a dangerous drug.
The RTC found the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation of
RA 9165. The RTC found that the elements of the crime of illegal sale of
shabu were proven by the prosecution. The CA affirmed the RTCs
Decision against the accused.
Issue: Whether the court a quo gravely erred in convicting accusedappellant when the chain of custody was not established.
Ruling: The Supreme Court ruled that the appeal lacks merit. In the
prosecution of drug cases, it is of paramount importance that the existence

of the drug, the corpus delicti of the crime, be established beyond

doubt. It is precisely in this regard that RA 9165, particularly its Section
21, prescribes the procedure to ensure the existence and identity of the
drug seized from the accused and submitted to the court.

The Court consistently held that what is of utmost importance is the

preservation of the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items, as
the same would be utilized in the determination of the guilt or innocence
of the accused.
The evidence for the prosecution established that during a buy-bust
operation, the accused was caught in flagrante delicto in the act of selling
two sachets of shabu to a police officer, who acted as a poseur-buyer.
Thus, the guilt of the accused had been proven in the instant case beyond
reasonable doubt.

People of the Philippines v. Garyzaldy Guzon

G.R. No. 199901, October 9, 2013
Associate Justice Bienvenido Reyes
Facts: This is an appeal from the Decision dated June 29 2010 of the
Court of Appeals (CA), which affirmed the Decision dated June 15,
2007 of the Regional Trial Court RTC) of Laoag City, Branch 13 in
Criminal Case No. 11968-13, finding accused-appellant Garyzaldy
Guzon Guzon) guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of illegal sale
of shabu.
Guzon was accused of violating Section 5, Article II of Republic Act
(R.A.) No. 9165, also known as the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs
Act of 2002, in an Information dated November 23, 2005, the
accusatory portion of which reads:
That on or about November 22, 2005 at 3:00 oclock in the
afternoon, in the municipality of San Nicolas, province of
Ilocos Norte, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously sell one (1) heatsealed plastic sachet of methamphetamine hydrochloride
otherwise known as "shabu", a dangerous drug, weighing
0.06 gram to a police asset of PNP San Nicolas, Ilocos
Norte, who posed as buyer in a buy[-]bust operation without
authority to do so.
The RTC rendered its Decision finding Guzon guilty as charged. The CA
rendered its Decision denying the appeal. It reasoned that Guzons
defenses of denial and frame-up are common and could easily be
fabricated; they could not prevail over the positive identification of the
accused by the police officer who testified for the prosecution.
Issue: Whether that chain of custody was established in this case.
Ruling: The Supreme Court declared that appeal to be meritorious. The
Court acquits Guzon for the prosecutions failure to prove his guilt beyond
reasonable doubt.
A buy-bust operation is a legally effective and proven procedure,
sanctioned by law, for apprehending drug peddlers and distributors. As in
all drugs cases, compliance with the chain of custody rule is crucial in any
prosecution that follows such operation. Chain of custody means the duly

recorded authorized movements and custody of seized drugs or controlled

chemicals from the time of seizure/confiscation to receipt in the forensic
laboratory to safekeeping to presentation in court for destruction.
The rule is imperative, as it is essential that the prohibited drug
confiscated or recovered from the suspect is the very same substance
offered in court as exhibit; and that the identity of said drug is established
with the same unwavering exactitude as that requisite to make a finding of
guilt.

People of the Philippines v. Levi Sumarago

G.R. No. 140873-77, February 6, 2004

Associate Justice Callejo, Sr.
Facts: The Spouses Vivencio and Teodora Brigole had four children.Two
of them were girls Norelyn, who was born on December 24, 1984, and
her older sister Doneza, who was born in 1983.However, Teodora left
Vivencio and kept custody of their children.
In the morning of March 5, 1995, Norelyn, who was then barely ten
years old, was gathering firewood with the appellant in the latters
farmland. While they were nearing a guava tree, the appellant suddenly
boxed her on the stomach. Norelyn lost consciousness. She had her clothes
when she woke up. It was about noon. She had a terrible headache and
felt pain in her vagina. She also had a bruise in the middle portion of her
right leg. The appellant warned her not to tell her mother about it,
otherwise he would kill her. The sexual assaults were repeated several
times so she decided to tell her sister and eventually her mother. The trial
court found the accused guilty of the crime rape and sentenced him to
death.
Issue: Whether the accused is guilty of the crime charged against him.
Ruling: The Supreme Court found the accused guilty of the crime charged
against him. For the accused to be held guilty of consummated rape, the
prosecution must prove beyond reasonable doubt that: 1) there had been
carnal knowledge of the victim by the accused; 2) the accused achieves
the act through force or intimidation upon the victim because the latter is
deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious.
This Court has ruled that when a woman states that she has been raped,
she says in effect all that would necessary to show rape did take place.
However, the testimony of the victim must be scrutinized with extreme
caution. The prosecution must stand or fall on its own merits.
The credibility of Norelyn and the probative weight of her testimony
cannot be assailed simply because her admission that it took the appellant
only short time to insert his penis into her vagina and to satiate his lust.
The mere entry of his penis into the labia of the pudendum, even if only
for a short while, is enough insofar as the consummation of the crime of
rape is concerned, the brevity of time that the appellant inserted penis into
the victims vagina is of no particular importance.

Artemio Yadao v. People of the Philippines

G.R. No. 150917, September 27, 2006

Associate Justice Chico-Nazario
Facts: Petitioner Artemio Yadao (Yadao) prays for the reversal of the
decision finding him "guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
homicide as charged in the information defined and penalized under
Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code for the death of Deogracias
Gundran (Gundran), and sentencing him to suffer the "indeterminate
penalty of FOUR (4) YEARS, TWO (2) MONTHS and ONE (1) DAY
of prision correccional in its maximum period, as Minimum to EIGHT
(8) YEARS of prision mayor in its minimum period, as Maximum.
On 21 April 1989, petitioner Yadao was charged with the crime
of homicide before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bauang, La Union,
Branch 33, for allegedly mauling one Deogracias Gundran.
During the trial of the case, Dr. Alambra testified for the defense. She
stated under oath that immediately after the death of the victim, she
conducted the autopsy of the body of said victim; that during the
procedure, she made an internal, as well as external, examination of the
body of the victim. Dr. Alambra then confirmed that the cause of death of
the victim was cardio-respiratory arrest due to pulmonary tuberculosis that
was already so far advanced with massive pleural adhesions.
Issue: Whether the accused is guilty of the crime charged against him.
Ruling: In convicting Petitioner Yadao, the RTC and the Court of Appeals
principally relied upon the testimony of Dr. Llavore in addition to the
latter's autopsy report, both essentially stating that the injury sustained by
the victim in the head caused massive hematoma and/or cerebral edema.
However, we find said testimonial and documentary evidence utterly
insufficient on which to anchor a judgment of conviction for homicide.
From the foregoing, the inevitable conclusion is that the guilt of petitioner
Yadao has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt. The facts of the
case, the autopsy reports, as well as the testimony of Dr. Llavore do not
definitely establish that the assault was the proximate cause of the death of
the victim. Even assuming for the sake of argument that the blow inflicted
on the head of the victim resulted in an edematous condition of the brain,
petitioner Yadao would still not be held liable for the death as the
prosecution failed to present proof that said act was the efficient and
proximate cause of the victim's demise.
An acquittal based on reasonable doubt will prosper even though the
accused's innocence may be doubted. It is better to free a guilty man than
to unjustly keep in prison one whose guilt has not been proved by the

required quantum of evidence. For only when there is proof beyond any
shadow of doubt that those responsible should be made answerable.

People of the Philippines v. Edmundo Briones Aytalin

G.R. No. 134138, June 21, 2001
Justice Artemio Panganiban
Facts: This is an appeal filed by Edmundo Briones Aytalin, assailing the
May 13, 1998 Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City
(Branch 97) in Criminal Case No. Q-91-26824. The Decision convicted
him of murder, sentenced him to reclusion perpetua, and ordered him to
indemnify the heirs of the victim in the amount ofP500,000.

In the Information dated November 25, 1995, Assistant City Prosecutor

Nelson E. Kallos charged appellant with murder allegedly committed as
follows:
That on or about the 23rd day of December 1990, in Quezon City,
Metro Manila, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of the this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused, with intent to kill, with evident
premeditation and by means of treachery, did, then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously and without any justifiable cause, attack,
assault and employ personal violence upon the person of one ELEAZAR
AQUINO, by then and there shooting [the victim] with a gun (cal. 22,
Rev. SN 683541) several times, hitting him on the different parts of his
body, thereby inflicting upon him serious and mortal wounds which were
the direct and immediate cause of his death, to the damage and prejudice
of the heirs of said victim in such amount as may be awarded under the
provisions of the New Civil Code.
The trial court found the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime charged.
Issue: Whether or not the accused is guilty of the crime charged beyond
reasonable doubt.
Ruling: The criminal liability of appellant is clearly indicated by the
definitive statements of prosecution witnesses who were able to describe
with reasonable certainty the fact of the killing, as well as to identify him
positively as the assailant. Their minor inconsistencies in reporting the
injuries or gunshot wounds sustained by the victim were not at all essential
in establishing the crime committed. In a case of murder or homicide, it is
enough that the death of the victim and the identity of the perpetrator be
proven beyond reasonable doubt.

Appellant asserts that no documentary evidence was presented to prove the

cause of the victim's death. Contrary to his claim, the records of the case
show that the Certificate of Death and the Autopsy Report were presented
by the prosecution. Both documents clearly stated that the cause of death
of Eleazar Aquino was hemorrhage due to a gunshot wound in the head.
In this regard, we may well point out that, there being no rule requiring
the production of these documentary proofs, the guilt of appellant may still
be established even without them.

Rolito Rabanal v. People of the Philippines and Hon. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 160858, February 28, 2006
Associate Justice Dante Tinga
Facts: This is a petition for certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
filed by Rolito Rabanal (petitioner) impugning the (1) Decision of the
Court of Appeals dated 31 March 2003 affirming the Decision of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City, Branch 97 convicting
petitioner of homicide and (2) its Resolution dated 11 November 2003
denying his motion for reconsideration.
Petitioner, along with Salvador Impistan alias "Ador" and Eloy Labatique
(Eloy) were charged with homicide in an Information which reads:
That on or about the 16th day of November, [sic] 1986, in Quezon City,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the abovenamed accused conspiring together, confederating with [and] mutually

helping each other, with intent to kill, with evident premeditation and
treachery, and without any justifiable cause, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and employ personal violence
upon the person of FELIPE SALES Y NACHOR by then and there
stab[b]ing him with a bladed weapon hitting the victim on different parts
of his body thereby inflicting upon him serious and mortal wounds which
were the direct and immediate cause of his death, to the damage and
prejudice of the [heirs] of the said FELIPE SALES Y NACHOR in such
amount as may be awarded under the provisions of the Civil Code.
Issue: Whether the accused is guilty of the crime of homicide.
Ruling: Physical evidence is a mute but eloquent manifestation of truth
and rates highly in the hierarchy of trustworthy evidence. It enjoys a far
more superior probative weight than corroborative testimonies. In the
instant case, the autopsy report negates the lone witnesss account of the
participation of petitioner in the stabbing of the victim.
The inconsistency between the positive testimony of Javier and the
physical evidence, particularly the autopsy report, further diminishes the
credibility of the lone eyewitness.
A conviction in a criminal case must be
reasonable doubt, which means a moral
guilty. The prosecution failed to establish
beyond reasonable doubt. Hence, we
conviction.

supported by proof beyond

certainty that petitioner is
the identity of the assailant
cannot sustain petitioners

DR. MILAGROS L. CANTRE, Petitioner, versus SPS. JOHNDAVID Z.

GO and NORA S. GO, Respondents.
G.R. No. 160889, April 27, 2007
Associate Justice Quisumbing
Facts: Petitioner Dr. Milagros L. Cantre is a specialist in Obstetrics and
Gynecology at the Dr. Jesus Delgado Memorial Hospital. She was the
attending physician of respondent Nora S. Go, who was admitted at the
said hospital on April 19, 1992.While in the recovery room, her
husband, respondent John David Z. Go noticed a fresh gaping wound two
and a half (2 ) by three and a half (3 ) inches in the inner
portion of her left arm, close to the armpit. He asked the nurses what
caused the injury. He was informed it was a burn. Forthwith, on April 22,
1992, John David filed a request for investigation. In response, Dr.
Rainerio S. Abad, the medical director of the hospital, called petitioner
and the assisting resident physician to explain what happened. Petitioner
said the blood pressure cuff caused the injury.
On May 7, 1992, John David brought Nora to the National Bureau of

Investigation for a physical examination, which was conducted by medicolegal officer Dr. Floresto Arizala, Jr. The medico-legal officer later
testified that Nora's injury appeared to be a burn and that a droplight when
placed near the skin for about 10 minutes could cause such burn. On May
22, 1992, Nora's injury was referred to a plastic surgeon at the Dr. Jesus
Delgado Memorial Hospital for skin grafting. Unfortunately, Nora's arm
would never be the same. Aside from the unsightly mark, the pain in her
left arm remains. When sleeping, she has to cradle her wounded arm. Her
movements now are also restricted. Her children cannot play with the left
side of her body as they might accidentally bump the injured arm, which
aches at the slightest touch. Thus, on June 21, 1993, respondent spouses
filed a complaint for damages against petitioner, Dr. Abad, and the
hospital. Finding in favor of respondent spouses
Issue/s: (1) Whether the questioned additional exhibits admissible in
evidence? (2) Whether or not the petitioner is liable for the injury suffered
by respondent Nora Go?
Ruling: As to the first issue, we agree with the Court of Appeals that
said exhibits are admissible in evidence. We note that the questioned
exhibits consist mostly of Nora's medical records, which were produced
by the hospital during trial pursuant to a subpoena duces tecum.
Petitioner's counsel admitted the existence of the same when they were
formally offered for admission by the trial court. In any case, given the
particular circumstances of this case, a ruling on the negligence of
petitioner may be made based on the res ipsa loquitur doctrine even in the
absence of such additional exhibits.
The Hippocratic Oath mandates physicians to give primordial
consideration to the well-being of their patients. If a doctor fails to live up
to this precept, he is accountable for his acts. This notwithstanding, courts
face a unique restraint in adjudicating medical negligence cases because
physicians are not
guarantors of care and, they never set out to intentionally cause injury to
their patients. However, intent is immaterial in negligence cases because
where negligence exists and is proven, it automatically gives the injured a
right to reparation for the damage caused.
In cases involving medical negligence, the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur
allows the mere existence of an injury to justify a presumption of
negligence on the part of the person who controls the instrument
causing the injury, provided that the following requisites
concur: 1. The accident is of a kind which ordinarily does not
occur in the absence of someone's negligence; 2. It is caused
by an instrumentality within the exclusive control of the
defendant or defendants; and 3. The possibility of

contributing conduct which

responsible is eliminated.

would

make

the

plaintif

As to the first requirement, the gaping wound on Nora's arm

is certainly not an ordinary occurrence in the act of
delivering a baby, far removed as the arm is from the organs
involved in the process of giving birth. Such injury could not
have happened unless negligence had set in somewhere.
Second, whether the injury was caused by the droplight or
by the blood pressure cuf is of no moment. Both
instruments are deemed within the exclusive control of the
physician in charge under the "captain of the ship" doctrine.
This doctrine holds the surgeon in charge of an operation
liable for the negligence of his assistants during the time
when those assistants are under the surgeon's control.
Third, the gaping wound on Nora's left arm, by its very
nature and considering her condition, could only be caused
by something external to her and outside her control as she
was unconscious while in hypovolemic shock. Hence, Nora
could not, by any stretch of the imagination, have
contributed to her own injury.
Petitioner's defense that Nora's wound was caused not by
the droplight but by the constant taking of her blood
pressure, even if the latter was necessary given her
condition, does not absolve her from liability. As testified to
by the medico-legal officer, Dr. Arizala, Jr., the medical
practice is to deflate the blood pressure cuf immediately
after each use. Otherwise, the inflated band can cause injury
to the patient similar to what could have happened in this
case.

DR. NINEVETCH CRUZ, petitioner vs. COURT OF APPEALS and

LYDIA UMALI, respondents.
G.R. No. 122445, 1997-11-18
Justice Francisco
Facts: The present case against petitioner is in the nature of
a medical malpractice suit, which in simplest terms is the
type of claim which a victim has available to him or her to
redress a wrong committed by a medical professional which
has caused bodily harm. 2 In this jurisdiction, however, such

claims are most often brought as a civil action for damages

under Article 2176 of the Civil Code, 3 and in some
instances, as a criminal case under Article 365 of the
Revised Penal Code 4 with which the civil action for damages
is impliedly instituted. It is via the latter type of action that
the heirs of the deceased sought redress for the petitioner's
alleged imprudence and negligence in treating the deceased
thereby causing her death. The petitioner and one Dr. Lina
Ercillo who was the attending anaesthesiologist during the
operation of the deceased were charged with "reckless
imprudence and negligence resulting to (sic) homicide".
Issue: Whether or not petitioner's conviction of the crime of
reckless imprudence resulting in homicide, arising from an
alleged medical malpractice, is supported by the evidence
on record.
Ruling: This Court, however, holds diferently and finds the
foregoing circumstances insufficient to sustain a judgment of
conviction against the petitioner for the crime of reckless
imprudence resulting in homicide. The elements of reckless
imprudence are: (1) that the ofender does or fails to do an
act; (2) that the doing or the failure to do that act is
voluntary; (3) that it be without malice; (4) that material
damage results from the reckless imprudence; and (5) that
there is inexcusable lack of precaution on the part of the
ofender, taking into consideration his employment or
occupation, degree of intelligence, physical condition, and
other circumstances regarding persons, time and place.
Whether or not a physician has committed an "inexcusable
lack of precaution" in the treatment of his patient is to be
determined according to the standard of care observed by
other members of the profession in good standing under
similar circumstances bearing in mind the advanced state of
the profession at the time of treatment or the present state
of medical science.
This Court has no recourse but to rely on the expert
testimonies rendered by both prosecution and defense
witnesses that substantiate rather than contradict
petitioner's allegation that the cause of Lydia's death was
"Disseminated Intravascular Coagulation (DIC)" which, as
attested to by an expert witness, cannot be attributed to the
petitioner's fault or negligence.

The probability that Lydia's death was caused by DIC was

unrebutted during trial and has engendered in the mind of
this Court a reasonable doubt as to the petitioner's guilt.

Thus, her acquittal of the crime of reckless imprudence

resulting in homicide. While we condole with the family of
Lydia Umali, our hands are bound by the dictates of justice
and fair dealing which hold inviolable the right of an accused
to be presumed innocent until proven guilty beyond
reasonable doubt. Nevertheless, this Court finds the
petitioner civilly liable for the death of Lydia Umali, for while
a conviction of a crime requires proof beyond reasonable
doubt, only a preponderance of evidence is required to
establish civil liability.
The petitioner is a doctor in whose hands a patient
puts his life and limb. For insufficiency of evidence this
Court was not able to render a sentence of conviction
but it is not blind to the reckless and imprudent
manner in which the petitioner carried out her duties.
A precious life has been lost and the circumstances
leading thereto exacerbated the grief of those left
behind. The heirs of the deceased continue to feel the
loss of their mother up to the present time 46 and this
Court is aware that no amount of compassion and
commiseration nor words of bereavement can suffice
to assuage the sorrow felt for the loss of a loved one.
Certainly, the award of moral and exemplary damages
in favor of the heirs of Lydia Umali are proper in the
instant case.

PEOPLE vs. TURCO

G.R. No. 137757; August 14, 2000
Justice Melo
Facts: Accused-appellant Rodegelio Turco, Jr. (aka Totong)
was charged with the rape of his neighbor 13-year-old
Escelea Tabada. Escelea was about to sleep when she heard
a familiar voice calling her from outside her house. She
recognized appellant Turco immediately as she had known
him for 4 years and he is her second cousin. Unaware of the
danger that was about to befall her, Escelea opened the
door. Turco, with the use of towel, covered Esceleas face,
placed his right hand on the latters neck and bid her to
walk. When they reached a grassy part, near the pig pen
which was about 12 meters away from the victims house,
appellant lost no time in laying the victim on the grass, laid
on top of the victim and took of her short pants and panty
and succeeded in pursuing his evil design-by forcibly
inserting his penis inside Esceleas private part despite
Esceleas resistance. Appellant then threatened her that he
will kill her if she reports the incident to anybody.
For almost 10 days, she just kept the incident to herself until
she was able to muster enough courage to tell her brotherin-law, Orlando Pioquinto, who in turn informed Alejandro,
the victims father, about the rape of his daughter. Alejandro
did not waste time and immediately asked Escelea to see a
doctor for medical examination and eventually file a
complaint after the issuance of the medical certificate. Turco,
meanwhile,
alleged
that
he
and
Escelea
were
sweethearts.The trial court found Turco guilty of the charge.
In his appeal, Turco argues, among others, that no actual
proof was presented that the rape of the complainant
actually happened considering that although a medical
certificate was presented, the medico-legal officer who
prepared the same was not presented in court to explain the
same.

Issue/s: a) Whether or not the lower court erred in finding

the appellant guilty of rape. b) Whether or not the
appellants contention that the medical certificate may not
be considered is with merit.
Ruling: a) No. The Supreme Court agrees with the lower
courts finding of credibility in the testimony and evidence
presented by the victim, and finds the appellant guilty of
rape beyond reasonable doubt. As aptly recalled by the trial
court, there are three guiding principles in the review of rape
cases, to wit: (1) an accusation of rape can be made with
facility; it is difficult to prove but more difficult for the person
accused, although innocent, to disprove; (2) in view of the
intrinsic nature of the crime of rape where only two persons
are usually involved, the testimony of the complainant is
scrutinized with extreme caution; and (3) the evidence for
the prosecution stands or falls on its own merits and cannot
be allowed to draw strength from the weakness of the
defense
b) Yes. With regards to appellants argument on the proof of
medical certificate, while the certificate could be admitted as
an exception to the hearsay rule since entries in official
records constitute exceptions to the hearsay evidence rule,
since it involved an opinion of one who must first be
established as an expert witness, it could not be given
weight or credit unless the doctor who issued it is presented
in court to show his qualifications. Emphasis must be placed
on the distinction between admissibility of evidence and the
probative value thereof. Evidence is admissible when it is
relevant to the issue and is not excluded by the law or the
rules or is competent. Since admissibility of evidence is
determined by its relevance and competence, admissibility
is, therefore, an afair of logic and law. On the other hand,
the weight to be given to such evidence, once admitted,
depends on judicial evaluation within the guidelines provided
in Rule 133 and the jurisprudence laid down by the Court.
Thus, while evidence may be admissible, it may be entitled
to little or no weight at all. Conversely, evidence which may
have evidentiary weight may be inadmissible because a
special rule forbids its reception.

Withal, although the medical certificate is an exception to

the hearsay rule, hence admissible as evidence, it has very
little probative value due to the absence of the examining
physician. Nevertheless, it cannot be said that the

prosecution relied solely on the medical certificate. In fact,

reliance was made on the testimony of the victim herself
which, standing alone even without medical examination, is
sufficient to convict. It is well-settled that a medical
examination is not indispensable in the prosecution of rape.
The absence of medical findings by a medico-legal officer
does not disprove the occurrence of rape. It is enough that
the evidence on hand convinces the court that conviction is
proper. In the instant case, the victims testimony alone is
credible and sufficient to convict.

People vs. Paras

Criminal Case Nos. 85974-85978, May 5, 1999
Regional Trial Court, Branch 163 Pasig City
Judge Aurelio C. Trampe
Facts: The victim, Evangeline Ocray, stated that she was
raped by the accused on New Years Eve, 1990. In her later
testimonies, however, the victim stated that the rape
occurred at 4:00 p.m. on December 31, 1990, both at
noontime. Only these three incidents of rape were stated by
the victim in her testimony. She gave birth to Joanna Ocray
on November 8, 1990.
Meanwhile, the victims mother, Mrs. Maura Ocray, testified
that her daughter informed her of these three incidents of
rape as well as two additional counts of rape that occurred in
the fourth week of January and the first week of February
1990. Overall, the testimonies and the subsequent crossexamination of the victim and her mother contained several
inconsistencies.

Issue: Whether the accused is indeed the father of Joanna

Ocray.
Ruling: The date of the last incidence of rape stated by the
victim (January 19, 1990) was important information for the
court vis--vis the fact that the child was born ten months
(November 8, 1990) after the said date. According to the
court, these facts would be in violation of the rule of
nature. This was further reinforced by the results derived
from DNA analysis.
The
results
of
the
laboratory
examination,
the
inconsistencies of the victims testimony and the testimony
of the victims mother as well as other evidences presented
by the defense in Court on the whereabouts of the accused
during the stated time and dates of the incidences of rape
cast very serious doubt in the mind of the court as to the
guilt of the accused, Victoriano Paras, on the five
informations of rape filed against him.

Jimenez, et al vs. Commission on Ecumenical Mission and

Relations of the United Presbyterian Church in the United
States of America, et al
G.R. No. 140472, June 10, 2002
Justice Artemio Panganiban
Facts: The lot was donated by the Commission to the
United Church, as evidenced by a TCT and a Deed of
Donation. Jimenez claims that their parents never sold the
lot to the Commission and United Church and that the
purported signatures of their parents have been found to be
forgeries by government handwriting experts.
Issue: Whether the CA erred when it disregarded the factual
findings of the RTC which had given weight, credibility and

reliability to the handwriting experts from both the NBI and

the PC.
Ruling: Opinions of handwriting experts are not binding
upon courts. A finding of forgery does not depend entirely on
the testimonies of handwriting experts, because the judge
must conduct an independent examination of the questioned
signature in order to arrive at a reasonable conclusion as to
its authenticity. Resort to these experts is not mandatory or
indispensable to the examination or the comparison of
handwriting.

People vs. Villaluna

G.R. No. 117666, February 23, 1999
Justice Bernardo P. Pardo
Facts: Beverly Villaluna charged his father with rape, by
reason of which she gave birth to a child. Accused denied
that he raped or had sexual intercourse with his daughter.
On September 10, 1991, complainant had a physical
examination by a medico-legal expert.
The findings
indicated no evident signs of extra-genital physical injury on
the body of the complainant. Her hymen was reduced to
hymenal tags, brought about by childbirth. No injuries were
found on the body from head to foot excluding the genitalia.

Issue: Whether the absence of external signs or physical

injuries on the victim negates the commission of rape.
Ruling: No. The delay in reporting the incident made any
physical findings of the rape inconclusive. The medico-legal
expert who examined complainant a year after the rape
incident could only conclude that the complainant was
impregnated and had delivered a baby but could not say
definitely whether she was a victim of a sexual intercourse
by force. In any case, absence of external signs or physical
injuries on the victim does not negate the commission of
rape, especially in this situation where complainant filed the
rape case a year after the incident, when the injuries have
healed.

ONG v. CA
272 SCRA 725
Justice Mendoza
Facts: Petitioner Miguela Campos Ong is the surviving
spouse of Manuel Ong. The latter died on May 21, 1990,
while the case was pending appeal in the Court of Appeals.
On the other hand, private respondents Alfredo Ong, Jr. and
Robert Ong are children of Saturnina Caballes allegedly by
Manuel Ong. They brought this case to compel Manuel Ong
to recognize them as his illegitimate children and to give
them support. It was asserted that on December 20, 1953,
Manuel Ong, representing himself as Alfredo Go, was

introduced to Saturnina Caballes at the Yarrow Beach Resort,

a night club in Talisay, Cebu, by Constancia Lim and Vicente
Sy. In no time, the two had a relationship and lived together.
Saturnina bore him two sons.
Later, Manuel Ong stopped seeing her and financially
supporting her, causing Saturnina to look for him. It was then
that she discovered his true identity and was able to ask for
his financial support of their children. Manuel refused to do
so. On September 30, 1982, Alfredo filed a complaint for
recognition and support against Manuel Ong. The complaint
was amended on November 25, 1982 to include Robert as
co-plaintif. After trial, private respondents were found to be
the illegitimate children of Manuel Ong. Trial court ordered
Manuel Ong to pay the said plaintifs the monthly support of
P600, efective from the date of this decision. CA affirmed
decision of lower court. Hence, this petition.
Issues: WON the testimony of Saturnina Caballes is credible,
considering the inconsistencies thereof.
WON private respondents are the illegitimate sons of Manuel
Ong, considering that the latter was presumed to be sterile.
Ruling: The discrepancies concern minor details and, if at
all, only show that Saturnina Caballes was an uncoached
witness. Saturnina Caballes admitted having cohabited with
another man before meeting Manuel Ong. The records show,
however, that the man, who was a paralytic, was taken by
his mother in 1953, before Saturnina started having an afair
with Manuel Ong in 1954. Private respondent Alfredo Ong, Jr.
was born on June 28, 1955, more than a year after the
paralytic had left Saturnina. The other private respondent,
Robert Caballes, was born on August 17, 1956. Hence,
private respondents could not have been conceived during
the period of cohabitation of their mother with the
unidentified paralytic.

RAMOS v. CA
321 SCRA 584
Justice Kapunan

Facts: Erlinda Ramos, a robust 47-year old woman was

advised by Dr. Hosaka to undergo an operation to remove a
stone in her gallbladder due to the discomfort she felt that
somehow interfered with her normal ways. The scheduled
operation would be on June 17, 1985 9 am at DLSMC. When
asked for an anesthesiologist, Dr. Hosaka claimed he would
get a good one without giving a name. At around 7:30 am of
June 17, she was prepared for the operation by the hospital
staf. Her sister-in-law, Herminda Cruz, Dean of the College
of Nursing of Capitol Medical Center, was there and was
allowed to be in the operating room to give moral support.
Cruz saw two or three nurses and Dr. Perfecta Gutierrez,
another defendant, who was to administer the anesthesia.
Dr. Hosaka arrived at the hospital at almost 12 noon and
then by 12:15, final preparations for the operation began.
They had problems intubating the patient and Dr. Gutierrez
noticed that the patient's tummy was getting bloated and
that her nail beds had a bluish discoloration. Dr. Hosaka then
called for another anesthesiologist, Dr. Calderon. The
patient, as Herminda Cruz observed, was placed in a
tredelenburg position - a position where the head of the
patient is placed in a position lower than her feet which is an
indication that there is a decrease of blood supply to the
patients brain.
At around 3pm of that day, the patient was taken to the
Intensive Care Unit (ICU). Since that fateful afternoon of
June 17, 1985, Erlinda has been in a comatose condition. She
sufered brain damage as a result of the absence of oxygen
in her brain for four to five minutes. After being discharged
from the hospital, she has been staying in their residence,
still needing constant medical attention, with her husband
Rogelio incurring a monthly expense ranging from P8,000.00
to P10,000.00. She was also diagnosed to be sufering from
difuse cerebral parenchymal damage.
Thus, petitioners filed a civil case for damages in the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City against herein private
respondents alleging negligence in the management and
care of Erlinda Ramos. Respondents claimed that the
damage was Erlindas allergic reaction to the anesthetic
agent, Thiopental Sodium (Penthonal). RTC rendered
judgment in favor of petitioners, holding private defendants
guilty of negligence in the performance of their duty to the
plaintif-patient and liable for damages. It also found DLSMC

liable for the acts of negligence of the doctors in their

`practice of medicine' in the operating room.
Moreover, the hospital is liable for failing through its
responsible officials, to cancel the scheduled operation after
Dr. Hosaka inexcusably failed to arrive on time. Private
respondents seasonably interposed an appeal to the Court of
Appeals. The appellate court rendered a Decision, dated 29
May 1995, reversing the findings of the trial court.
Issue: Whether the surgeon, the anesthesiologist and the
hospital should be made liable for the unfortunate comatose
condition of a patient scheduled for cholecystectomy
(surgical excision of the gallbladder).
Ruling: The Supreme Court ruled in the affirmative. Res ipsa
loquitur has been applied when the circumstances attendant
upon the harm are themselves of such a character as to
justify an inference of negligence as the cause of that harm.
Although generally, expert medical testimony is relied upon
in malpractice suits to prove that a physician has done a
negligent act or that he has deviated from the standard
medical procedure, when the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is
availed by the plaintif, the need for expert medical
testimony is dispensed with because the injury itself
provides the proof of negligence. Hence, in cases where the
res ipsa loquitur is applicable, the court is permitted to find a
physician negligent upon proper proof of injury to the
patient, without the aid of expert testimony, where the court
from its fund of common knowledge can determine the
proper standard of care.
Thus, the testimony of Cruz is admissible as evidence.
Although witness Cruz is not an anesthesiologist, she can
very well testify upon matters on which she is capable of
observing such as, the statements and acts of the physician
and surgeon, external appearances, and manifest conditions
which are observable by any one. It is the accepted rule that
expert testimony is not necessary for the proof of negligence
in non-technical matters or those of which an ordinary
person may be expected to have knowledge, or where the
lack of skill or want of care is so obvious as to render expert
testimony unnecessary. The Court takes judicial notice of the
fact that anesthesia procedures have become so common,
that even an ordinary person can tell if it was administered

properly. As such, it would not be too difficult to tell if the

tube was properly inserted. This kind of observation, we
believe, does not require a medical degree to be acceptable.
Respondent Dra. Gutierrez act of seeing her patient for the
first time only an hour before the scheduled operative
procedure was, therefore, an act of exceptional negligence
and professional irresponsibility. The measures cautioning
prudence and vigilance in dealing with human lives lie at the
core of the physicians centuries-old Hippocratic Oath. Her
failure to follow this medical procedure is, therefore, clear
indicia of her negligence.
Respondent Dr. Hosakas negligence can be found in his
failure to exercise the proper authority (as the captain of
the operative team) in not determining if his anesthesiologist
observed proper anesthesia protocols. In fact, no evidence
on record exists to show that respondent Dr. Hosaka verified
if respondent Dra. Gutierrez properly intubated the patient.
Furthermore, Dr. Hosaka had scheduled another procedure in
a diferent hospital at the same time as Erlindas
cholecystectomy, and was in fact over three hours late for
the latters operation. Because of this, he had little or no
time to confer with his anesthesiologist regarding the
anesthesia delivery. This indicates that he was remiss in his
professional duties towards his patient. Thus, he shares
equal responsibility for the events which resulted in Erlindas
condition.
Respondent hospital, apart from a general denial of its
responsibility over respondent physicians, failed to adduce
evidence showing that it exercised the diligence of a good
father of a family in the hiring and supervision of the latter.
It failed to adduce evidence with regard to the degree of
supervision which it exercised over its physicians.
In
neglecting to ofer such proof, or proof of a similar nature,
respondent hospital thereby failed to discharge its burden
under the last paragraph of Article 2180 considers a person
accountable not only for his own acts but also for those of
others based on the formers responsibility under a
relationship of patria potestas. Having failed to do this,
respondent hospital is consequently solidarily responsible
with its physicians for Erlindas condition.

The Court of Appeals erred in accepting and relying on the

testimonies of the witnesses for the private respondents.
Private respondents are solidarily liable for damages under
Article 2176 of the Civil Code.

Airedale National Health Service Trust vs. Bland

[1993] 1 All ER 821
Lords Keith of Kinkel, Gof of Chieveley, Lowry, BrowneWilkinson, Mustill
Facts: The appellant in this case is Bland, acting by his
Guardian ad Litem while the respondent is Airedale National
Health Service Trust. This is a 1993 case in United Kingdom
before the Court House of Lords.
Bland was injured in the Hillsborough Field soccer crisis when
he was 17 1/2 years old, and has been in a persistent
vegetative state ever since, with no signs of ever leaving
that state. He can breathe by himself, but requires a feeding
tube and numerous antibiotics, as well as full care to ensure
that he remains in relative good health. His parents have
decided that he would not want this, and have asked the
doctors to remove the feeding tube to put an end to his life.
The lower courts allowed the removal of the tube which his
guardian appealed.

Issue: Whether or not a life support ever be withdrawn from

a patient who cannot give informed consent about the
matter?
Ruling: Appeal dismissed. The Lords struggle with the
ethical issues related to this decision. They state that there
is no question that Bland is still alive and that in general the
sanctity of human life must give way to the principle of selfdetermination. The doctors also generally have a duty to act
in the best interests of their patients. However, they state
that there is not an absolute and unqualified duty for doctors
to prolong patient's lives, particularly where the necessary
procedures to do so are quite invasive and dangerous.
Further, an important distinction must be drawn between
cases where doctors simply omit from continuing lifeprolonging procedures, and cases where they actively assist
in death (euthanasia).
The most important factor is that the doctor has a duty to
treat the patient in a way that is in the best interests of the
patient thus the question is whether it is in Bland's best
interests to have his life prolonged by this type of care. Lord
Gof states that you must diferentiate between cases where
the prolonging is not in the patient's best interests because
of the nature of the procedures and cases such as this where
it is not in the best interests because there is no prospect of
any improvement in his condition. In cases such as this one,
the treatment is efectively useless because the condition
will never improve. Lord Gof says that treatment cannot be
said to be appropriate when it is futile as there is no prospect
of an improvement in the patient's condition. Therefore,
because the treatment is not in the best interests of the
patient, the doctors have no duty to administer the
treatment. He then discusses whether this is really the same
as an "act" leading to death, and determines that it is not.
While this would result in a slow death from starvation he
states that artificial feeding is a medical treatment, similar to
an iron lung, and the decision to use or discontinue use is
solely related to what is in the best interests of the patient.
Lord Mustill, in a concurring judgment, says much the same
but focuses on the fact that the cessation of the treatment is
ethically justified because there was never a duty upon the
doctors to administer the treatment, thus there will be no

criminal liability flowing from the discontinuation of the

feeding mechanism.
Treatment that is necessary to sustain life can be withdrawn
from a patient who cannot give informed consent if
withdrawal is seen as being in the best interests of the
patient. You only turn to this test if the patient cannot
express their own wishes, or has not left something
expressly stating their wishes. Doctors are never under a
duty to administer treatment to keep someone alive at all
costs if the required treatment is very invasive.

Shuttleworth v Vancouver General Hospital

[1927] 2 DLR 573
Murphy J
Facts: The plaintif in this case is Shuttleworth, a
homeowner while the defendant herein is Vancouver General

Hospital. This is a case before the British Columbia Supreme

Court in British Columbia in Canada.
Shuttleworth's house is across the street from the new
infectious disease ward at the hospital and the plaintif can
see into the rooms of the hospital but not into the beds
specifically. The plaintif claims that this creates a nuisance,
both because he can see into the hospital, because he will
hear the crying of child patients, and because he will be at
risk of infection.
Issue:
Whether there is a nuisance and if so, should
there be a quia timet injunction granted before any damages
have been sufered by the plaintif?
Ruling: The case was dismissed with costs. The judge
dismisses the first two claims due to a lack of evidence but
states that the third must be considered. He then employs a
test to see if an injunction is warrantable:
1. Is the apprehension well founded?
2. Is there proof of a real threat of danger?
3. Is there a strong probability that this will become an
actionable nuisance?
There was no proof provided to show that there was a real
threat of danger, or that the apprehension was well founded,
and therefore the injunction cannot be granted. The plaintif
also complained of the value of his property decreasing,
however the judge also dismissed this due to the fact that no
proof was provided, and no legal wrong led to the
depreciation.
A court will grant a quia timet injunction if warranted, but
evidence must be adduced that there will be a nuisance
caused by the defendant's actions.

Barnett v Chelsea & Kensington Hospital Management

Committee
[1968] 3 All ER 1068
Nield J:
Facts: The plaintif in this case is Barnett, the widow of
William Patrick Barnett while the defendant is the Chelsea &
Kensington Hospital Management Committee. This is a case
before Queen's Bench Division in the United States. It deals
with the causation as to whether defendants negligence the
cause of the death, or would it have inevitably happened
anyway?
William Patrick Barnet, Barnett's husband died from arsenic
poisoning. He felt sick after drinking tea at work and went to
the hospital. He was not admitted and treated, but was told
to go home. The doctor was at home and would not have
been able to first see the man until approximately 11:00 AM.
Barnett subsequently died at about 1:30 PM.
Issue: Whether or not the defendants negligence was the
cause of the death, or would it have inevitably
happened anyway?
Ruling: The judgment is in favor for the defendant. The
burden of proof is on the plaintif to prove that the negligent
actions of the defendant caused the outcome, i.e. they must
establish that if the negligent act did not occur, then the
damage would not have happened. Nield, based on the
evidence, decides that even if the man had been admitted to
the hospital upon his arrival he would likely have died. There
was only one antidote for arsenic poisoning, and it was not
readily available and could probably not have been
administered in time to save his life.
In cases of cause in fact the burden is on the plaintif to
prove that the defendants negligence caused the harm.
That means that they must prove that without the
negligence, the harm would not have occurred. The wife
does not do this here, as it is probable that the man would
have died even without the hospital's negligent refusal.

State v. Hemphill
No. 9029SC791.
HEDRICK, Chief Judge.
Facts: Defendant charged with second degree murder for
the death of his baby daughter. When defendant
brought his baby to the pediatrician it was shown that
she had been dead for 3-4 hours. The autopsy showed
there was swelling of the brain, bleeding in the skull,
and bruises on the brain and hemorrhage in the lungs.
The testifying physician stated that he believed the
injuries were the result of shaken baby syndrome and
that the injury typically occurs when an infants head
is shaken violently while being held so that the skull
itself is maintained within the persons grasp and the
brain is shaken inside the head.
Defendant testified that after feeding his daughter she
vomited and was not breathing and then took her to the
hospital. Defendant later testified, upon learning that
the cause of death was declared as shaken baby
syndrome, that he had shaken the baby three or four
times because she was choking. He testified that he
did not intend to harm the child when shaking her.
Accused was adjudged guilty at trial hence this appeal.

Issue: Whether the evidence presented in the facts is

sufficient to support conviction, even though there was
no established intent to injure.

Ruling: Yes. The evidence that defendant shook the baby in

the manner he did, causing the injuries he did was
sufficient to show he acted with recklessness of
consequences, though there may be no intention to
injure a particular person. The trial court did not error.
Malice comprehends not only particular animosity but also
wickedness of disposition, hardness of heart, cruelty,
recklessness of consequences and a mind regardless of
social duty and deliberately bent on mischief, though
there may be no intention to injure a particular person.
An act that indicates a total disregard for human life is
sufficient to supply the malice necessary to support the
crime of second degree murder. Malice does not
necessarily mean an actual intent to take human life; it
can be implied when an act which imports danger to
another is done so recklessly or wantonly as to manifest
depravity of mind and disregard of human life.
Dissent
Defendant testified that because he was scared when the
baby began to throw up that the child was choking he
shook her to clear the airway. This evidence is
uncontradicted and should be taken as true. The
issue, therefore, is whether the defendant acted with
recklessness of consequences and therefore malice.
The evidence shows that defendant feared for the
welfare of the child, which caused him to act as he did.
Moreover, the evidence shows he continued his care for
the childs wellbeing by taking her to the hospital.
Evidence shows he was beside himself with grief and
that he personally requested an autopsy be performed.
This case presents evidence at most for conviction of
involuntary manslaughter.

Spencer v. Murray
5 F.3d 758, September 16, 1993
Circuit Judge Widener
Facts: This is a consolidated case. Spencer's first reported
victim was thirty-five-year-old Debbie Dudley Davis. Miss
Davis was murdered sometime between 9:00 p.m. on
September 18, 1987 and 9:30 a.m. on September 19,
1987. The victims body was found on her bed by officers of
the Richmond
Bureauof Police. She had been strangled by the use of a sock
and vacuum cleaner hose, which had been assembled into
what the Virginia Court called a ligature and ratchet-type
device. Two weeks later, Dr. Susan Hellams was found dead
and partially stripped in her bedroom wardrobe. The medical
examiner testified at trial that the cause of Dr. Hellams's
death was ligature strangulation, apparently caused by two
belts found around her neck. The medical examiner also
testified that Dr. Hellams sustained other injuries, including a
fractured nose, a blunt force injury to the lower lip, various
bruises and scrapes, and an injury consistent with one made
by a shoe on the back of her right leg. On the twenty-second
of November, another victim was found in her apartment
outside the city, this was Diane Cho, a teenage student.
Fifteen-year-old Diane Cho was murdered in her bedroom
while her brother and her parents slept nearby. Her hands
were tied. She was strangled with a rope. A piece of duct
tape across her mouth kept her from crying out. She was
raped, and there were semen stains on the sheets. Spencer's
final victim, Susan Tucker, age forty-four, was reported
missing in December. After a week her body was found in her
apartment. Her injuries left detectives certain that her death
was caused by the murderer now dubbed by the press as the

"Southside Strangler." Later that month, Spencer was

arrested by Arlington police and charged with the murder of
Susan Tucker, his most recent victim.
DNA evidence later connected him to the murders of Davis
and Hellams. He was also convicted in the Cho murder
though DNA evidence wasn't used at trial. DNA evidence also
tied him to the 1984 murder of Carol Hamm, a crime which
David Vasquez had been convicted of. Vasquez was
eventually acquitted after having served five years of a
thirty-five year prison sentence and was the first American to
be exonerated based on DNA evidence. Spencer's first trial
was in July of 1988, charged with the murder of Susan
Tucker, he was convicted with DNA evidence, the first case in
Virginia in which DNA was used to prove identity, and
sentenced to life imprisonment. At a series of trials in 1988
and 1989, Spencer was found guilty of raping and murdering
Debbie Davis, Diane Cho, and Susan Hellams, and sentenced
to death.

Issue: Whether the DNA evidence was improperly admitted,

resulting to his denial of due process.
Ruling: No. Spencer's claimed that he was denied due
process of law because the trial court improperly admitted
the results of the DNA testing. It has been settled for years
that a claim about the admissibility of evidence under state
law rarely is a claim upon which federal habeas corpus relief
can
be granted. In 1960 the court decided: Normally, the
admissibility of evidence, the sufficiency of evidence, and
instructions to the jury in state trials are matters of state law
and procedure not involving federal constitutional issues. It
is only in circumstances impugning fundamental fairness or
infringing specific constitutional protections that a federal
question is presented. The role of a federal habeas corpus
petition is not to serve as an additional appeal.
The Supreme Court recently issued a similar holding in
Estelle v. McGuire. In McGuire, the Supreme Court was
confronted with a ruling under California law that allowed

prosecutors to introduce evidence of prior injuries to a child

to prove "battered child syndrome" in the context of a
murder trial. The Court of Appeals held that the defendant's
due process rights were violated in part because the court
concluded that the evidence was improperly admitted under
state law. The Supreme Court stated that "[s]uch an inquiry"
into the application of state evidence law is no part of a
federal court's habeas review of a state conviction. We have
stated many times that federal habeas corpus relief does not
lie for errors of state law. Today we reemphasize that it is not
the province of a federal habeas court to reexamine state
court determinations on state law questions. In conducting
habeas review, a federal court is limited to deciding whether
a conviction violated the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the
United States. In light of the Supreme Court's directive and
the trial courts own precedent on this subject, the admission
of the DNA test results into evidence did not create
"circumstances impugning fundamental fairness or infringing
specific constitutional protections." The errors Spencer
argues might have occurred with his DNA test, are not even
remotely suggested by the record in this case. The
admissibility of the DNA evidence was contested at trial
despite the fact that the defense could find no expert
witnesses to assist it. On direct review the Virginia Supreme
Court applied the Virginia admissibility test of O'Dell v.
Commonwealth, , and specifically found DNA evidence in
general and in this case in particular to be admissible. After
reviewing the trial record, the Court noted: The record is
replete with uncontradicted expert testimony that no
"dissent whatsoever [exists] in the scientific community"
concerning the reliability of the DNA printing technique.

Unrebutted expert testimony further established that the

testing procedure performed in this case was conducted in a
reliable manner. Spencer also claimed that his counsel was
inefective in handling the DNA evidence in his petition for
appeal from the instant court's decision on his habeas
petition. He was denied to file his petition out of time. This
claim in the state habeas case was not presented to the
highest state court for review. It is denied for failure to
exhaust. Therefore the court does not review any of
Spencer's DNA evidence claim.

State of New York v. Castro

143 Misc.2d 276, August 14, 1989
Judge Gerald Sheindlin
Facts: Castro was accused of two counts of murder in the
second degree, it being alleged that on February 5, 1987 he
stabbed to death 20-year-old Vilma Ponce, who was 7
months pregnant at the time, and her 2-year-old daughter. A
wristwatch worn by the defendant at the time of his arrest

was seized. What appeared to be bloodstains on the watch

were noted by the detectives. The defendant stated that the
blood was his own. The People, intending to prove at trial
that the origin of the bloodstains on defendant's wristwatch
was the blood of the adult victim, and not the blood of the
defendant, seek to introduce evidence of DNA identification
tests. The hearing took place over a 12-week period
producing a transcript of approximately 5,000 pages. It
quickly developed into an intense and technical examination
of DNA identification tests as applied to forensics and the
methods employed by Lifecodes Corp. in this particular case.
Issue: Whether the use of DNA as evidence is admissible.
Ruling: Yes. The court held the following: (1) DNA
identification theory and practice are generally accepted
among the scientific community. (2) DNA forensic
identification techniques are generally accepted by the
scientific community. (3) Pretrial hearings are required to
determine whether the testing laboratory's methodology was
substantially in accord with scientific standards and
produced reliable results for jury consideration. The court
supported the proposition that DNA identification evidence of
exclusion is more presumptively admissible than DNA
identification evidence of inclusion. In Castro, the court ruled
that DNA tests could be used to show that blood on Castro's
watch was not his, but tests could not be used to show that
the blood was that of his victims. In Castro, the court also
recommended extensive discovery requirements for future
proceedings, including copies of all laboratory results and
reports; explanation of statistical probability calculations;
explanations for any observed defects or laboratory errors,
including observed contaminants; and chain of custody of
documents. These recommendations soon were expanded
upon by the Minnesota Supreme Court, in Schwartz v. State,
which noted, "...ideally, a defendant should be provided with
the actual DNA sample(s) in order to reproduce the results.
As a practical matter, this may not be possible because
forensic samples are often so small that the entire sample is
used in testing. Consequently, access to the data,
methodology, and actual results is crucial...for an
independent expert review."

In Schwartz, the Supreme Court of Minnesota refused to

admit the DNA evidence analyzed by a private forensic
laboratory; the court noted the laboratory did not comply
with appropriate standards and controls. In particular, the
court was troubled by failure of the laboratory to reveal its
underlying population data and testing methods. Such
secrecy precluded replication of the test. In summary, courts
have successfully challenged improper application of DNA
scientific techniques to particular cases, especially when
used to declare "matches" based on frequency estimates.
However, DNA testing properly applied is generally accepted
as admissible under Frye or Daubert standards. As stated in
the National Research Council's 1996 report on DNA
evidence, "The state of the profiling technology and the
methods for estimating frequencies and related statistics
have progressed to the point where the admissibility of
properly collected and analyzed DNA data should not be in
doubt."

Thomas v. State
1999 WL 1267801, December 30, 1999
PER CURIAM
Facts: The victim and her husband, who lived in a duplex
apartment, had an argument about the former needing
money. Eventually, the husband left, apologized to his
neighbor Johnson about the noise during the argument, and
went to a party. The victim was left crying just outside her
apartment. She was comforted by Johnson along with his
mother and sister. During that time, Thomas walked into the
group and consoled the victim as well. When Johnsons
mother and his sister left, Thomas and the victim walked
across the street towards a telephone booth. After the
victim made the call, the victim came back to the duplex
alone, and Thomas walked down the street. During the
victims conversation with Johnson, she revealed that she
and
Thomas attended school together. In the meantime, Thomas
went to his friends place to get high. He drank and
smoked cocaine, and later on, he left. During the late night,
Johnson spotted Thomas walking towards the duplex.
Johnson greeted him, but Thomas didnt acknowledge him.
Then later on, Johnson heard loud noises and went around
investigating. When the noises stopped, Thomas appeared
out of nowhere and asked Johnson for a cigarette (though he
didnt have one at a time). He went in his apartment, armed
himself with a kitchen knife, and when he went back out,
Thomas was gone. Johnson didnt see the victims husbands
car at their apartment that night, nor did he see it there the
next morning. When morning came, the victims brother
arrived at the victims home to check on her but he found
her lying face down on her bed. When he touched her, she
was stif. A piece of a curtain and a cord were around her
neck. (Forensics collected a piece of cord from a Nintendo
videogame unit from the bed.) Her panties were pulled down
and were around her right leg. Her shirt was pulled up
around her neck. A moderate amount of blood was visible,
and a knife was on the bed. After noting that the baby was
asleep in her crib a few feet from her mother's body, the
victim's brother went to a telephone booth across the street
and summoned help by calling 911.
The victims husband, upon his return, was questioned by
the police, without being told that his wife was murdered.

The police seized his clothing that he was wearing for

examination (no bloodstains were found). When he was
allowed to return to his residence, he discovered some
missing items. Forensic scientists examined the window
debris on the floor with prints on it which matched Thomas
known fingerprints. No print belonging to Thomas was found
on the knife found on the bed or anywhere in the bedroom.
The pathologist, after further investigation through autopsy,
concluded that the victim died from ligature strangulation
and sharp-force injuries to her neck. DNA extracted from
vaginal fluid recovered from the victims body and from
Thomas blood were compared to determine whether
Thomas could have been the source of the semen present in
the victims body.

The DNA profiles from the vaginal fluid matched the DNA
profiles from Thomas blood. During the trial, Thomas called
no witnesses in his defense, but he advanced his theory of
defense throughout the trial that the victims husband
caught him and the victim having consensual intercourse,
that he ran away to avoid an altercation with the husband,
and that the husband, in a jealous rage, killed the wife.
Issue: Whether the DNA
circumstantial evidence.

evidence

is

direct

or

Ruling: Circumstantial evidence in this respect is

intrinsically no diferent from testimonial evidence.
Admittedly, circumstantial evidence may in some cases point
to a wholly incorrect result. Yet this is equally true of
testimonial evidence. In both instances, a jury is asked to
weigh the chances that the evidence correctly points to guilt
against the possibility of inaccuracy or ambiguous inference.
In both, the jury must use its experience with people and
events in weighing the probabilities. If the jury is convinced
beyond a reasonable doubt, we can require no more. This
case is neither close nor doubtful; Thomas' guilt was clearly
and
convincingly
established
by
compelling
and
overwhelming evidence. Taken as a whole, the evidence did
not support any reasonable hypothesis consistent with his
innocence; the evidence presented no other reasonable
hypothesis that could account for the circumstances
presented here. Although he did attempt to explain the

damning circumstances pointing solely to his guilt, [a]n

hypothesis which is at best merely possible cannot be
equated to a reasonable hypothesis. The evidence and all
reasonable
deductions
therefrom
were
completely
inconsistent with a reasonable hypothesis of innocence. To
reverse on a finding of plain error under the facts before us
would be a perversion of justice.