Taneo, Jr. v. CA [G.R. No. 108532.

March 9, 1999]
Facts:
The issues in this case are not novel: whether or not the conveyance made by way of the sheriffs
sale pursuant to the wit of execution issued by the trial court in Civil Case No. 590 is prohibited
under Sec. 118 of Commonwealth Act No. 141; and whether or not the family home is exempt
from execution.
As a result of a judgment in Civil Case for recovery of property in favor of ABDON GILIG, private
respondent, 2 of PABLITO TANEO, JR., JOSE TANEO, NENA T. CATUBIG and HUSBAND, CILIA T.
MORING and HUSBAND's (petitioners) properties were levied to satisfy the judgment. The subject
properties were sold at public auction on February 12, 1966 to ABDON GILIG as the highest
bidder. Consequently, after petitioners failure to redeem the same, a final deed of conveyance
was executed on February 9, 1968, definitely selling, transferring, and conveying said properties
to the private respondent.
To forestall such conveyance, petitioners filed an action to declare the deed of conveyance void
and to quiet title over the land with a prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction. In their
complaint, it was alleged that petitioners are the children and heirs of Pablo Taneo and Narcisa
Valaceras who died on February 12, 1977 and September 12, 1984, respectively. Upon their
death, they left the subject property covered and Free Patent. Considering that said property has
been acquired through free patent, such property is therefore inalienable and not subject to any
encumbrance for the payment of debt, pursuant to Commonwealth Act. No. 141. Petitioners
further alleged that they were in continuous, open and peaceful possession of the land and that
on February 9, 1968, Deputy Provincial Sheriff Jose V. Yasay issued a Sheriffs Deed of Conveyance
in favor of the private respondent over the subject property including their family home which
was extrajudicially constituted in accordance with law. As a result of the alleged illegal deed of
conveyance, private respondent was able to obtain in his name over the land, thus casting a
cloud of doubt over the title and ownership of petitioners over said property.
Private respondent refuted petitioners contentions alleging that he lawfully acquired the
subject properties which was a private land, by virtue of a Sheriffs Sale on February 12,
1966. Said sale has become final as no redemption was made within one year from the
registration of the Sheriffs Certificate of Sale. The validity of the sale in favor of Abdon Gilig was
even confirmed by the Court of appeals in a related case where one Rufino Arriola also claimed
ownership over the subject property.
Private respondent averred that the subject land was originally owned by Lazaro Ba-a who
sold the land to Pablo Taneo on September 18, 1941, as evidenced by an Escritura de
Venta. Despite it being a private land, Pablo Taneo filed an application for free patent which was
made final only in 1979.
As counterclaim, private respondent alleged that since petitioners are still in possession of
the subject property, he has been deprived of acts of ownership and possession and therefore,
prayed for payment of rentals from February, 1968 until possession has been restored to them.
In its decision of March 27, 1989, the RTC dismissed the complaint.
The dispositive portion thereof reads as follows:

Premises considered, Judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the defendant and against the
plaintiffs, ordering the dismissal of the complaint filed by the plaintiffs;
a) Declaring the property covered and Free Patent in name of Pablo Taneo as null and
void and directing the Register of Deeds to cancel the same, without prejudice
however on the part of the defendant to institute legal proceedings for the transfer of
the said title in the name of defendant Abdon Gilig;
b) Declaring Abdon Gilig as the absolute and legal owner of the land, and hence entitled
to the possession of the same and as a necessary concomitant, admonishing the
plaintiffs to refrain from disturbing the peaceful possession of the defendant over the
land in question;
c) Likewise declaring the defendant Abdon Gilig as the true and absolute owner of the
house in; ordering the plaintiffs or any of their representatives to vacate and return the
possession of the same to defendant Abdon Gilig;
d) Ordering the plaintiffs, except the nominal parties herein, to pay to defendant Abdon a
reasonable rental of the house in question to be reckoned from February 9, 1968 until
the possession of the same is returned to the defendant.
e) To pay to defendant attorneys fees and to pay the costs.

In resolving the issues, the lower court made the following findings of fact which this Court
finds no cogent reason to disturb:
1. That the land in question originally belonged to Lazaro Ba-a who sold the same to the
late Pablito (sic) Taneo father of the herein plaintiff on September 18, 1941, by virtue
of an Escritura de Venta identified as Reg. Not. 50; pages 53, Foleo Not. V, Series of
1941 of the Notarial Register of Ernie Pelaez (Exh. 10);
2. That on July 19, 1951 Abdon Gilig with his wife filed a Civil Case No. 590 for recovery of
property against Pablo Taneo, et al., wherein Judgment was rendered on June 24, 1964,
in favor of Abdon Gilig and against Pablo Taneo ordering the latter to pay damages in
the amount of P5,000.00 (Exh. 2);
3. That by virtue of said decision, a writ of Execution was issued on November 22, 1965
against the properties of Pablo Taneo and on December 1, 1965, a Notice of Levy was
executed by the Clerk of Court Pedro Perez wherein the properties in question were
among the properties levied by the Sheriff (Exh. 3);
4. That the said properties were sold at public auction wherein the defendant Abdon Gilig
came out as the highest bidder and on February 12, 1965, a Sheriffs Certificate of Sale
was executed by Ex-Oficio Provincial Sheriff Pedro Perez (Exh. 1) ceding the said
properties in favor of Abdon Gilig and which Certificate of Sale was registered with the
Register of Deeds of March 2, 1966;
5. That for failure to redeem the said property within the reglementary period, a Sheriffs
final Deed of Conveyance was executed by same Provincial Sheriff Jose V. Yasay on
February 1968, (Exhs. 4, 4-A) conveying the property definitely to Abdon Gilig.

6. That on April 20, 1966, after his third-party claim which he filed with the Sheriff in Civil
Case No. 590 was not given due course, Rufino Arriola filed Civil Case No. 2667
entitled Arriola vs. Abdon Gilig, et al., for Recovery of Property and/or annulment of
Sale with Damages;
7. That Judgment was rendered by the Court thru Judge Bernardo Teves dismissing the
case with costs on February 21, 1969;
8. That said decision was appealed to the Court of Appeals which affirmed the decision in
toto on June 20, 1979; declaring the alleged Deed of Sale executed by Abdon Gilig in
favor of the plaintiff as null and void for being simulated or fictitious and executed in
fraud or (sic) creditors;
9. That on March 7, 1964, Pablo Taneo constituted the house in question erected on the
land of Plutarco Vacalares as a family home (Exh. F) but was however, notarized only
on May 2, 1965 and registered with the Register of Deeds on June 24, 1966;
10. That in the meanwhile, unknown to the defendant, Pablo Taneo applied for a free
patent on the land in question which was approved on October 13, 1973, (Exh. B) and
the Patent and Title issued on December 10, 1980 (Oct No. P-12820-Exh. 12);
11. On November 3, 1985, the plaintiff filed the present action. [2]
Petitioners contend that under Section 118 of Commonwealth Act No. 141, the subject land
which they inherited from their father under free patent cannot be alienated or encumbered in
violation of the law. Citing in particular the cases of Oliveros v. Porciongcola[3] and Gonzaga v.
Court of Appeals,[4] the execution or auction sale of the litigated land falls within the prohibited
period and is, likewise, a disavowal of the rationale of the law which is to give the homesteader
or patentee every chance to preserve for himself and his family the land which the State had
gratuitously given to him as a reward for his labor in cleaning and cultivating it. [5]
We are not unmindful of the intent of the law. In fact, in Republic v. Court of Appeals,[6] the
Court elucidated, to wit:
It is well-known that the homestead laws were designed to distribute disposable agricultural lots
of the State to land-destitute citizens for their home and cultivation. Pursuant to such benevolent
intention the State prohibits the sale or encumbrance of the homestead (Section 116) within five
years after the grant of the patent. After that five-year period the law impliedly permits
alienation of the homestead; but in line with the primordial purpose to favor the homesteader
and his family the statute provides that such alienation or conveyance (Section 117) shall be
subject to the right of repurchase by the homesteader, his widow or heirs within five years. This
Section 117 is undoubtedly a complement of Section 116. It aims to preserve and keep in the
family of the homesteader that portion of public land which the State had gratuitously given to
him. It would, therefore, be in keeping with this fundamental idea to hold, as we hold, that the
right to repurchase exists not only when the original homesteader makes the conveyance, but
also when it is made by his widow or heirs. This construction is clearly deducible from the terms
of the statute.
The intent of the law is undisputable but under the facts of the case, the prohibition invoked
by the petitioners under Section 118 does not apply to them.
Section 118 of Commonwealth Act No. 141 reads:

Except in favor of the Government or any of its branches, units or institutions, or legally
constituted banking corporations, lands acquired under free patent or homestead provisions shall
not be subject to encumbrance or alienation from the date of the approval of the application and
for a term of five years from and after the date of issuance of the patent or grant, nor shall they
become liable to the satisfaction of any debt contracted prior to the expiration of said period, but
the improvements or crops on the land may be mortgaged or pledged to qualified persons,
associations, or corporations.
x x x.
The prohibition against alienation of lands acquired by homestead or free patent commences
on the date of the approval of the application for free patent and the five-year period is counted
from the issuance of the patent. The reckoning point is actually the date of approval of the
application. In Amper v. Presiding Judge,[7] the Court held that:
x x x The date when the prohibition against the alienation of lands acquired by homesteads or
free patents commences is the date of the approval of the application and the prohibition
embraces the entire five-year period from and after the date of issuance of the patent or
grant. As stated inBeniga v. Bugas, (35 SCRA 111), the provision would make no sense if the
prohibition starting from the date of the approval of the application would have no termination
date.
The specific period of five years within which the alienation or encumbrance of a homestead is
restricted starts to be computed from the date of the issuance of the patent. But the prohibition
of alienation commences from the date the application is approved which comes
earlier. (Underlining ours.)
Following this ruling, we agree with the respondent court that the conveyance made by way
of the sheriffs sale was not violative of the law. The judgment obligation of the petitioners against
Abdon Gilig arose on June 24, 1964. The properties were levied and sold at public auction with
Abdon Gilig as the highest bidder on February 12, 1966. On February 9, 1968, the final deed of
conveyance ceding the subject property to Abdon Gilig was issued after the petitioners failed to
redeem the property after the reglementary period. Pablo Taneos application for free patent was
approved only on October 19, 1973.
The sequence of the events leads us to the inescapable conclusion that even before the
application for homestead had been approved, Pablo Taneo was no longer the owner of the land.
The Deed of conveyance issued on February 9, 1968 finally transferred the property to Abdon
Gilig. As of that date, Pablo Taneo did not actually have anymore rights over the land which he
could have transferred to herein petitioners. The petitioners are not the owners of the land and
cannot claim to be such by invoking Commonwealth Act No. 141. The prohibition does not apply
since it is clear from the records that the judgment debt and the execution sale took
place prior to the approval of the application for free patent. We quote with favor the respondent
courts valid observation on the matter:
x x x the application of Pablo Taneo for a free patent was approved only on 19 October 1973 and
Free Patent was issued on 10 December 1980. Under the aforecited provision, the subject land
could not be made liable for the satisfaction of any debt contracted from the time of the
application and during the 5-year period following 10 December 1980, or until 10 December
1985. However, debts contracted prior to the approval of the application for free patent, that is
prior to 18 October 1973, are not covered by the prohibition. This is because they do not fall
within the scope of the prohibited period. In this case, the judgment debt in favor of defendant-

appellee was rendered on 24 June 1964, the writ of execution issued on 22 November 1965,
notice of levy made on 1 December 1965, the execution sale held on 12 February 1966, and the
certificate of sale registered on 2 March 1966, all before Pablo Taneos application for free patent
was approved on 19 October 1973. The execution, therefore, was not violative of the law. [8]
Anent the second issue, petitioners aver that the house which their father constituted as
family home is exempt from execution. In a last ditch effort to save their property, petitioners
invoke the benefits accorded to the family home under the Family Code.
A family home is the dwelling place of a person and his family. It is said, however, that the
family home is a real right, which is gratuitous, inalienable and free from attachment, constituted
over the dwelling place and the land on which it is situated, which confers upon a particular
family the right to enjoy such properties, which must remain with the person constituting it and
his heirs.[9] It cannot be seized by creditors except in certain special cases.
Under the Civil Code (Articles 224 to 251), a family home may be constituted judicially and
extrajudicially, the former by the filing of the petition and with the approval of the proper court,
and the latter by the recording of a public instrument in the proper registry of property declaring
the establishment of the family home. The operative act then which created the family home
extrajudicially was the registration in the Registry of Property of the declaration prescribed by
Articles 240 and 241 of the Civil Code.[10]
Under the Family Code, however, registration was no longer necessary. Article 153 of the
Family Code provides that the family home is deemed constituted on a house and lot from the
time it is occupied in the family residence. It reads:
The family home is deemed constituted on a house and lot from the time it is occupied as family
residence. From the time of its constitution and so long as its beneficiaries actually resides
therein, the family home continues to be such and is exempt from execution, forced sale
or attachment,except as hereinafter provided and to the extent of the value allowed by law.
It is under the foregoing provision which petitioners seek refuge to avert execution of the
family home arguing that as early as 1964, Pablo Taneo had already constituted the house in
question as their family home. However, the retroactive effect of the Family Code, particularly on
the provisions on the family home has been clearly laid down by the court as explained in the
case of Manacop v. Court of Appeals[11] to wit:
Finally, the petitioner insists that the attached property is a family home, having been occupied
by him and his family since 1972, and is therefore exempt from attachment.
The contention is not well-taken.
While Article 153 of the Family Code provides that the family home is deemed constituted on a
house and lot from the time it is occupied as a family residence, it does not mean that said
article has a retroactive effect such that all existing family residences, petitioners included, are
deemed to have been constituted as family homes at the time of their occupation prior to the
effectivity of the Family Code and henceforth, are exempt from execution for the payment of
obligations incurred before the effectivity of the Family Code on August 3, 1988 (Modequillo vs.
Breva, 185 SCRA 766). Neither does Article 162 of said Code state that the provisions of Chapter
2, Title V thereof have retroactive effect. It simply means that all existing family residences at
the time of the effectivity of the Family Code are considered family homes and are prospectively
entitled to the benefits accorded to a family home under the Family Code (Modequillo vs.

Breva, supra). Since petitioners debt was incurred as early as November 25, 1987, it preceded
the effectivity of the Family Code. His property is therefore not exempt from attachment (Annex
O, Plaintiffs Position Paper and Memorandum of Authorities, p. 78). (pp. 5-6, Decision; pp. 6465, Rollo) (underscoring ours)
The applicable law, therefore, in the case at bar is still the Civil Code where registration of
the declaration of a family home is a prerequisite. Nonetheless, the law provides certain
instances where the family home is not exempted from execution, forced sale or attachment.
Article 243 reads:
The family home extrajudicially formed shall be exempt from execution, forced sale or
attachment, except:
(1) For nonpayment of taxes;
(2) For debts incurred before the declaration was recorded in the Registry of Property;
(3) For debts secured by mortgages on the premises before or after such record of the
declaration;
(4) For debts due to laborers, mechanics, architects, builders, material-men and others who have
rendered service or furnished material for the construction of the building. [12]
The trial court found that on March 7, 1964, Pablo Taneo constituted the house in question,
erected on the land of Plutarco Vacalares, as the family home. The instrument constituting the
family home was registered only on January 24, 1966. The money judgment against Pablo Taneo
was rendered on January 24, 1964. Thus, at that time when the debt was incurred, the family
home was not yet constituted or even registered. Clearly, petitioners alleged family home, as
constituted by their father is not exempt as it falls under the exception of Article 243(2).
Moreover, the constitution of the family home by Pablo Taneo is even doubtful considering
that such constitution did not comply with the requirements of the law. The trial court found that
the house was erected not on the land which the Taneos owned but on the land of one Plutarco
Vacalares. By the very definition of the law that the family home is the dwelling house where a
person and his family resides and the land on which it is situated, [13] it is understood that the
house should be constructed on a land not belonging to another. Apparently, the constitution of a
family home by Pablo Taneo in the instant case was merely an afterthought in order to escape
execution of their property but to no avail.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 200969, August 03, 2015

CONSOLACION D. ROMERO AND ROSARIO S.D. DOMINGO, Petitioners, v. ENGRACIA D. SINGSON,Respondent.
DECISION
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
This Petition for Review on Certiorari1 seeks to set aside the February 29, 2012 Decision2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CAG.R. SP No. 114363 which granted herein respondent's Petition for Review, reversed the December 11, 2009 Order 3 of the
Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 160 (RTC) in SCA No. 3144, and reinstated the said RTC's April 29, 2009 Decision. 4
Factual Antecedents
The parties herein - petitioners Consolacion Domingo Romero and Rosario S.D. Domingo and respondent Engracia Domingo
Singson - are siblings. Their parents, Macario and Felicidad Domingo, own a 223-square meter piece of property (the subject
property) located at 127 F. Sevilla Street, San Juan City, Metro Manila covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. (32600)
(23937) 845-R5 (TCT 845-R) which was issued in 1953. It appears that petitioners and other siblings, Rafael and Ramon
Domingo, are the actual occupants of the subject property, having stayed there with their parents since birth. On the other
hand, respondent took up residence in Mandaluyong City after getting married.
On February 22, 1981, Macario passed away, while Felicidad died on September 14, 1997. 6
On June 7, 2006, TCT 845-R was cancelled and a new certificate of title -Transfer Certificate of Title No. 12575-R 7 or
125758 (TCT 12575) - was issued in respondent's name, by virtue of a notarized "Absolute Deed of Sale" 9 ostensibly executed
on June 6, 2006 by and between Macario and Felicidad - as sellers, and respondent - as buyer. And this despite the fact that
Macario and Felicidad were then already deceased.
Soon thereafter, respondent sent letters to her siblings demanding that they vacate the subject property, under pain of
litigation.
Petitioners and their other siblings just as soon filed a Complaint 10 against respondent and the Register of Deeds of San Juan
City for annulment and cancellation of TCT 12575 and the June 6, 2006 deed of sale, reconveyance, and damages, on the
claim that the deed of sale is a forgery and that as heirs of Macario and Felicidad, the true owners of the subject property,
they were entitled to a reconveyance of the same. The case was docketed as Civil Case No. 70898-SJ and assigned to Branch
160 of the RTC of Pasig City.
Ruling of the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC)
On September 26, 2006, respondent filed an unlawful detainer suit against petitioners and her brothers Rafael and Ramon
before the MeTC of San Juan City. Docketed as Civil Case No. 9534 and assigned to MeTC Branch 58, respondent in her
Complaint11 sought to evict her siblings from the subject property on the claim that she is the owner of the same; that her
siblings' stay therein was merely tolerated; and that she now needed the premises to serve as her daughters' residence.
Thus, she prayed that her siblings be ordered to vacate the premises and pay monthly rent of P2,000.00 from date of
demand until they vacate the premises, as well as attorney's fees and costs of suit.
In their Answer,12 petitioners prayed for dismissal, claiming that the June 6, 2006 deed of sale was a forgery, and no
certificate of title in her name could be issued; that they thus remained co-owners of the subject property, and respondent
had no right to evict them; and that the pendency of Civil Case No. 70898-SJ bars the ejectment suit against them.
After proceedings or on September 17, 2007, the MeTC rendered a Decision, 13 decreeing as follows:
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Anent the first issue of jurisdiction, the Court answers in the affirmative xxx.
xxxx
From the above-quoted verse, the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts have the
exclusive original jurisdiction over this case. Moreover, in the case of Hilario vs. Court of Appeals, (260 SCRA 420,426 citing:
Refugia, Et al[.] vs. Court of Appeals, Et al[.,] G.R. No. 118284, July 4, 1996) the Supreme Court held: 'xxx inferior courts
retain jurisdiction over ejectment cases even if the question of possession cannot be resolved without passing upon the issue
of ownership; but this is subject to the caveat that the issue raised as to ownership be resolved by the Trial Court for the sole
purpose of determining the issue of possession x x x.' Thus, even where the defendants assert in their Answer, ownership of
or Title to the property, the inferior Court is not deprived of its jurisdiction, xxx
xxxx

As to the second issue as to whether or not plaintiff may validly eject the defendants, again this Court answers in the
affirmative, since the plaintiff is a holder of a Torrens Title which is a right in rem. The defendants in their defense that they
have filed a case before the Regional Trial Court questioning the Title of the plaintiff is their right and prerogative, unless
however restrained by higher court, this Court will proceed as mandated by law and jurisprudence. This action for unlawful
detainer is sanctioned by Rule 70 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure which provides:
xxxx
While the defendants claim that their parents are still the owner[s] of the subject property in litigation and during their
lifetime have not awarded nor alienated said property to anybody, why then has plaintiff the Title of said property? If it was
secured fraudulently, the same is of no moment since it has its own forum to address to [sic]. Moreover, the pendency of an
action questioning the ownership of the property does not bar the filing or consideration of an ejectment suit nor the
execution of the judgment therein xxx. As correctly pointed out by the plaintiff, 'ownership may be exercised over things or
rights,' Art. 427 of the New Civil Code. Likewise, Art. 428 of the same code provides that: 'the owner has the right to enjoy
and dispose of a thing, without other limitations than those established by law. The owner has also a right of action against
the holder and possessor of the thing in order to recover it.' Further, Art. 434 states that 'in an action to recover, the property
must be identified, and the plaintiff must rely on the strength of his Title and not on the weakness of the defendant's claim.'
The defendants therefore can be validly ejected from the premises in question since this is not accion publiciana as claimed
by the defendants.
Finally, on the third issue of damages and the side issue of reasonable compensation for the use of the subject premises, the
Supreme Court in the case of Balanon-Anicete vs. Balano, 402 SCRA 514 held: 'xxx persons who occupy the land of another
at the latter's tolerance or permission without any contract between them [are] necessarily bound by an implied promise that
they will vacate the same upon demand, failing in which a summary action for ejectment is the proper remedy against them.'
Hence, upon demand, plaintiff is entitled to collect reasonable compensation for the actual occupation of the subject property
which is P2,000.00 per month and the payment of attorney's fees. Since no evidence was presented relative to damages, the
Court cannot award the same.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:
1. Ordering the defendants and all persons claiming rights under them to vacate the subject property known as No. 127 F.
Sevilla St., San Juan, Metro Manila and to surrender peaceful possession thereof to the plaintiff in this case;
2. Ordering the defendants to pay plaintiff the amount of P2,000.00 per month for the actual use and occupation of the
subject property reckoned from date of extrajudicial demand which is August 7, 2006, until defendants shall have finally
vacated the premises;
3. Ordering the defendants to pay plaintiff the amount of P10,000.00 as and by way of attorney's fees; and
4. The costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.14

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Ruling of the Regional Trial Court

In an appeal before the RTC docketed as SCA Case No. 3144, petitioners and their co-defendants argued that the MeTC erred
in not resolving the issue of ownership, in ordering them to vacate the premises, in deciding issues which were not framed by
the parties, and in not granting them damages and awarding the same instead to respondent.
On April, 29, 2009, the RTC rendered its Decision,15 pronouncing as follows:
Stripped of its non-essentials, the appeal primarily hinges on the lower court's failure to rule upon the issue on the validity of
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 12575 of the lot, subject of the ejectment suit.
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Upon a judicious consideration of the arguments raised by the parties in their respective memorandum vis-a-vis the decision
of the court a quo, this court opines and so holds that the said court did not err in its findings. The validity of a transfer
certificate of title cannot be raised in the said ejectment suit as it partakes of a collateral attack against the said title. This is
not allowed under the principle of indefeasibility of a Torrens title. The issue on the validity of title i.e., whether or not it was
fraudulently issued, can only be raised in an action expressly instituted for that purpose.
The ruling of the Supreme Court in the case of Raymundo and Perla De Guzman vs. Praxides J. Agbagala, G.R. No. 163566,
February 19, 2008 is revelatory, thus:
'Indeed, a decree of registration or patent and the certificate of title issued pursuant thereto may be attacked on the ground
of falsification or fraud within one year from the date of their issuance. Such an attack must be direct and not by a collateral
proceeding. The rationale is this:
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xxx [The] public should be able to rely on the registered title. The Torrens System was adopted in this country because it was
believed to be the most effective measure to guarantee the integrity of land titles and to protect their indefeasibility once the
claim of ownership is established and recognized.'

For reasons aforestated, the appeal is hereby DENIED.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered affirming in toto in [sic] the decision of the lower court
dated September 17, 2007.
With costs against the appellant.
SO ORDERED.16

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On motion for reconsideration, however, the RTC reversed itself. Thus, in a December 11, 2009 Order,17 it held that 2. This Court's Findings
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At the outset, it should be mentioned that the court a quo should have dismissed the complaint outright for failure to comply
with a condition precedent under Section 10, Rule 16 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, the parties being siblings and there
being no allegations in the complaint as regards efforts at compromise having been exerted, a matter that was raised in the
answer of defendants Consolation Romero and Rosario D. Domingo.
2.1. The Issue of MeTC Jurisdiction
The court a quo is correct in ruling that it has jurisdiction over this case, the allegations in the complaint being so phrased as
to present one apparently for unlawful detainer. It did not matter that after answers were filed and further proceedings were
had, what emerged were issues of ownership and possession being intricately interwoven, the court being clothed with
jurisdiction to provisionally adjudicate the issue of ownership, it being necessary in resolving the question of possession.
2.2. The Issue of Whether or Not Plaintiff Can Eject Defendants
In Barnachea vs. Court of Appeals, et al., it was held that one of the features of an unlawful detainer case is possession of
property by defendant being at the start legal, becoming illegal by reason of the termination of right to possess based on his
contract or other arrangement with plaintiff.
hi this case, the legal possession of subject premises by defendants-appellants, they being the heirs of original owners
Macario and Felicidad Domingo, has not ceased. The basis for the claimed ownership by plaintiff-appellee is a deed of
absolute sale dated 06 June 2006 (Exhibit "2") showing the signatures of vendor Sps. Domingo whose respective death
certificates indicate that Macario died on 22 February 1981 and Felicidad on 14 September 1997. It is clear that the deed of
sale became the basis for the transfer of subject property in plaintiff-appellee's name under TCT No. 12575 (Exhibit "A"), a
fact that prompted herein defendants-appellants to file a complaint for annulment of sale and reconveyance of ownership,
docketed as Civil Case No. 70898-SJ earlier than this subject case.
It appearing that defendants-appellants' occupancy of subject property is premised on their right thereto as co-owners, being
compulsory heirs of their parents, and it not being established that they had alienated such right in favor of their sister,
herein plaintiff-appellee, the latter cannot eject them therefrom.
2.3. The Issue of Whether or Not Defendants are Entitled to Damages
While defendants Rafael and Ramon Domingo allege and pray for actual and moral damages and attorney's fees in their
answer and all [the] defendants do so in their position paper, the court can award only the last, it being established that they
were compelled to litigate to protect their right, and such award being just and equitable. As for actual and moral damages,
there is no sufficient basis for a grant thereof. It is noted that not a single affidavit of any of the four defendants is attached
to their position paper, as required under Section 10, Rule 70, Rules of Civil Procedure, and Section 9, Revised Rule on
Summary Procedure.
WHEREFORE, the foregoing considered, the court hereby grants the motion for reconsideration of its decision on appeal
affirming in toto the decision of the Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 58, San Juan City. Consequently, it hereby reverses said
decision by decreeing that plaintiff-appellee has no cause of action against herein defendants-appellants who are entitled to
possession of the subject premises, rendering the complaint dismissible and hereby dismisses it. Corrolarily, plaintiffappellee's motion for execution is hereby denied. Plaintiff-appellee is hereby ordered to pay defendants-appellants P8,000.00
each in attorney's fees. Costs against plaintiff-appellee.
SO ORDERED.18

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Respondent filed a Motion for Reconsideration,19 which the RTC denied in a subsequent Order 20 dated May 17, 2010. The trial
court held:
In essence, plaintiff argues that possession and not ownership should have been the central issue in this appealed ejectment
suit. As the subject property is titled in plaintiffs name, necessarily, she has better right of possession than defendants.
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The court is not persuaded. Germane is Section 16, Rule 70 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, to wit:
Section 16. Resolving defense of ownership. - When the defendant raises the defense of ownership in his pleadings and the
question of possession cannot be resolved without deciding the issue of ownership, the issue of ownership shall be resolved
only to determine the issue of possession.
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Having determined the ownership issue in resolving defendants' right of possession pursuant to the aforestated rule, the
court hereby finds no cogent reason or sufficient justification to reconsider its previous ruling dated 11 December 2009.
WHEREFORE, the motion for reconsideration is hereby DENIED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.21

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Ruling of the Court of Appeals

Respondent filed a Petition for Review22 with the CA, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 114363. On February 29, 2012, the CA
rendered judgment, as follows:
Petitioner seeks to reverse and set aside the assailed Orders since the RTC allegedly erred:
'I.
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IN RULING THAT THE RESPONDENTS CANNOT BE EJECTED FROM THE SUBJECT PREMISES, THEIR OCCUPANCY BEING
PREMISED ON THEIR RIGHT AS CO-OWNERS, BEING COMPULSORY HEIRS OF THEIR [PETITIONER] PARENTS AND IT NOT
BEING ESTABLISHED THAT THEY HAD ALIENATED SUCH RIGHT IN FAVOR OF THE PETITIONER.
II.
IN RULING THAT THE RESPONDENTS ARE ENTITLED TO THE AWARD OF ATTORNEY'S FEES.'
This Court's Ruling
Contending that the RTC erred when it held that respondents cannot be ejected from the subject lot because they are coowners thereof and heirs of their deceased parents, petitioner points out that the only issue that should be tackled in an
unlawfol detainer case is the right of a plaintiff to possession de facto over the property in question.
For their part, respondents argue that they have legal and actual possession of the subject lot as they are the heirs of their
deceased parents who are the registered owners of said subject lot. On the other hand, the title to the subject lot that was
registered under petitioner's name is null and void for it was issued based on a forged deed of absolute sale.
The petition has merit.
In an unlawful detainer case, the defendant's possession of a property becomes illegal when he is demanded by the plaintiff
to vacate therefrom due to the expiration or termination of his right to possess the same under the contract but the
defendant refuses to heed such demand. Thus, the sole issue to be resolved is who between the parties have [sic] a right to
the physical or material possession of the property involved, independently of any claim of ownership by any of the parties.
However, where the issue of ownership is raised by any of the parties, the rule in Sec. 16, Rule 70 of the Revised Rules of
Court is explicit:
Section 16. Resolving defense of ownership. - When the defendant raises the defense of ownership in his pleadings and the
question of possession cannot be resolved without deciding the issue of ownership, the issue of ownership shall be resolved
only to determine the issue of possession.
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In other words, while only possession de facto is the issue to be determined in an ejectment case, the issue of ownership
may be tackled if raised by any of the parties and only for the purpose of reaching a conclusion on the issue of possession.
Thus, in Esmaquel vs. Coprada, the Supreme Court had the occasion to once again hold that:
'The sole issue for resolution in an unlawful detainer case is physical or material possession of the property involved,
independent of any claim of ownership by any of the parties. Where the issue of ownership is raised by any of the parties,
the courts may pass upon the same in order to determine who has the right to possess the property. The adjudication is,
however, merely provisional and would not bar or prejudice an action between the same parties involving title to the
property. Since the issue of ownership was raised in the unlawful detainer case, its resolution boils down to which of the
parties' respective evidence deserves more weight.'
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In the case at bar, both petitioner and respondents are claiming ownership over the subject lot. On the part of petitioner, she
maintains that she has a right to possession because she is the registered owner thereof, as evidenced by TCT No. 12575-R
which was issued in her name in 2006. On the other hand, respondents maintain that they cannot be ejected from the
subject lot because they are the compulsory heirs of their deceased parents under whose names the subject lot was
registered, as shown in TCT No. 845-R.
As between the two parties, this Court rules in favor of petitioner for she holds a more recently-issued certificate of title, i.e.,
2006, than that of their deceased parents whose certificate of title was issued in 1953. The issuance of the certificate of title
in 2006 may be traced from TCT No. 845-R wherein at the last page of its Memorandum of [E]ncumbrances is an entry which
explicitly states that the title was transferred to the name of petitioner on June 6, 2006 for a consideration of
Php1,000.000.00. Clearly, the certificate of title of the deceased parents was effectively cancelled in favor of petitioner.
Hence, petitioner has a better right to the possession de facto of the subject lot for, as held in Asuncion Urieta Vda. de
Aguilar vs. Alfaro, 'the titleholder is entitled to all the attributes of ownership of the property, including possession.'
Respondents' insistence that the Torrens Certificate of petitioner should not be given any probative weight because it is null

and void is of no moment. The validity of a certificate of title cannot be collaterally attacked. Rather, the attack should be
made in an action instituted mainly for that purpose, x x x
xxxx
In short, a Torrens Certificate is evidence of the indefeasibility of the title to the property and the person whose name
appears therein is entitled to the possession of the property unless and until his title is nullified. The reason being that the
Torrens System was adopted as it is the most effective measure that will guarantee the integrity of land titles and protect
their indefeasibility once the claim of ownership is established and recognized. Hence, the age-old rule that 'the person who
has a Torrens Title over a land is entitled to possession thereof.'
Unless there is already a judgment declaring petitioner's certificate of title as null and void, the presumption of its validity
must prevail, x x x
xxxx
All said, petitioner's right to possession over the subject lot must be respected in view of the certificate of title thereto issued
in her name.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Orders of the Regional Trial Court, Pasig City, Branch 160 are REVERSED
and SET ASIDE. Its Decision dated April 29, 2009 affirming the Decision dated September 17, 2007 of the Metropolitan Trial
Court, San Juan City, Branch 58 is REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.23

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Hence, the instant Petition.

In a July 10, 2013 Resolution,24 this Court resolved to give due course to the Petition.

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Issues
Petitioners raise the following issues for resolution:
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A
THE COURT OF APPEALS (TWELFTH DIVISION) OBVIOUSLY ERRED IN FAILING TO DISMISS THE COMPLAINT (ANNEX H)
BECAUSE IT DID NOT COMPLY WITH THE JURISDICTIONAL ELEMENT REQUIRED BY LAW (SEC. 3, RULE 8, REVISED RULE OF
COURT).
B
THE DECISION GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT HAVING RULED THAT RESPONDENT'S CAUSE OF ACTION IN HER EJECTMENT
COMPLAINT (ANNEX H) IS INDISPENSABLY INTERTWINED WITH THE ISSUE OF OWNERSHIP RAISED BY PETITIONERS'
DEFENSE, THUS RENDERING SAID COMPLAINT NOT AN UNLAWFUL DETAINER CASE OVER WHICH THE MeTC HAS
JURISDICTION, AS DECIDED IN THE ORDER DATED DECEMBER 9, 2009 (ANNEX X).
C
THE DECISION IS SERIOUSLY MISTAKEN IN NOT HAVING UPHELD THE AWARD OF DAMAGES BY JUDGE MYRNA Y. LMVERANO IN FAVOR OF DEFENDANTS AND AGAINST RESPONDENT WHO OBVIOUSLY OBAINED HER TITLE (ANNEX F) USING
AN UNDISPUTABLY FRAUDULENT DEED OF ABSOLUTE SALE (ANNEX G).
D
THE DECISION INCORRECTLY RULED THAT PETITIONERS IN RAISING OWNERSHIP AS THEIR DEFENSE (SEC. 16 IN
RELATION TO SEC. 18, RULE 70, REVISED RULES OF COURT) CONSTITUTE A COLLATERAL ATTACK ON THE TITLE OF
RESPONDENT OBVIOUSLY AND UNDENIABLY PROCURED THRU FRAUD.25
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Petitioners' Arguments

In their Petition and Reply26 seeking reversal of the assailed CA dispositions and reinstatement of the RTC's December 11,
2009 Order dismissing respondent's ejectment case, petitioners essentially argue that since the parties to the case are
siblings and no attempt at compromise was made by the respondent prior to the filing of Civil Case No. 9534, then it should
be dismissed for failure to comply with Rule 16, Section 1(j) of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure 27 in relation to Article 151 of
the Family Code28and Article 222 of the Civil Code;29 that they could not be evicted from the subject property since they are
co-owners of the same, having inherited it from their deceased parents; that respondent's title was derived from a forged
deed of sale, which does not make her the sole owner of the subject property; that as co-owners and since respondent's title
is void, they have a right of possession over the subject property and they may not be evicted therefrom; that their defense
that respondent obtained her title through a forged deed of sale does not constitute a collateral attack on such title, but is
allowed in order to prove their legal right of possession and ownership over the subject property.

Respondent's Arguments
In her Comment30 seeking denial of the Petition, respondent claims that the Petition should have been dismissed since only
two of the respondents in CA-G.R. SP No. 114363 filed the Petition before this Court; that the findings of the CA do not merit
review and modification, the same being correct; and that the Petition is a mere reiteration of issues and arguments already
passed upon exhaustively below.
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Our Ruling
The Court grants the Petition.
The procedural issue of lack of attempts at compromise should be resolved in respondent's favor. True, no suit between
members of the same family shall prosper unless it should appear from the verified complaint or petition that earnest efforts
toward a compromise have been made. However, the failure of a party to comply with this condition precedent is not a
jurisdictional defect. If the opposing party fails to raise such defect in a motion to dismiss, such defect is deemed waived. 31
hi arriving at its pronouncement, the CA passed upon the issue or claim of ownership, which both parties raised. While the
procedure taken is allowed -under Section 16, Rule 70 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, 32 the issue of ownership may be
resolved only to determine the issue of possession - the CA nonetheless committed serious and patent error in concluding
that based solely on respondent's TCT 12575 issued in her name, she must be considered the singular owner of the subject
property and thus entitled to possession thereof- pursuant to the principle that "the person who has a Torrens Title over a
land is entitled to possession thereof." 33 Such provisional determination of ownership should have been resolved in
petitioners' favor.
When the deed of sale in favor of respondent was purportedly executed by the parties thereto and notarized on June 6, 2006,
it is perfectly obvious that the signatures of the vendors therein, Macario and Felicidad, were forged. They could not have
signed the same, because both were by then long deceased: Macario died on February 22, 1981, while Felicidad passed away
on September 14, 1997. This makes the June 6, 2006 deed of sale null and void; being so, it is "equivalent to nothing; it
produces no civil effect; and it does not create, modify or extinguish a juridical relation." 34
And while it is true that respondent has in her favor a Torrens title over the subject property, she nonetheless acquired no
right or title in her favor by virtue of the null and void June 6, 2006 deed. "Verily, when the instrument presented is forged,
even if accompanied by the owner's duplicate certificate of title, the registered owner does not thereby lose his title, and
neither does the assignee in the forged deed acquire any right or title to the property." 35
In sum, the fact that respondent has in her favor a certificate of title is of no moment; her title cannot be used to validate
the forgery or cure the void sale. As has been held in the past:
Insofar as a person who fraudulently obtained a property is concerned, the registration of the property in said
person's name would not be sufficient to vest in him or her the title to the property. A certificate of title merely
confirms or records title already existing and vested. The indefeasibility of the Torrens title should not be used
as a means to perpetrate fraud against the rightful owner of real property. Good faith must concur with registration
because, otherwise, registration would be an exercise in futility. A Torrens title does not furnish a shield for fraud,
notwithstanding the long-standing rule that registration is a constructive notice of title binding upon the whole
world. The legal principle is that if the registration of the land is fraudulent, the person in whose name the land is registered
holds it as a mere trustee.36 (Emphasis supplied)
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Since respondent acquired no right over the subject property, the same remained in the name of the original registered
owners, Macario and Felicidad. Being heirs of the owners, petitioners and respondent thus became, and remain co-owners by succession - of the subject property. As such, petitioners may exercise all attributes of ownership over the same, including
possession - whether de facto or dejure; respondent thus has no right to exclude them from this right through an action for
ejectment.
With the Court's determination that respondent's title is null and void, the matter of direct or collateral attack is a foregone
conclusion as well. "An action to declare the nullity of a void title does not prescribe and is susceptible to direct, as well as to
collateral, attack;"37 petitioners were not precluded from questioning the validity of respondent's title in the ejectment case.
It does not appear either that petitioners are claiming exclusive ownership or possession of the subject property. Quite the
contrary, they acknowledge all this time that the property belongs to all the Domingo siblings in co-ownership. In the
absence of an allegation - or evidence - that petitioners are claiming exclusive ownership over the co-owned property,
respondent has no alternative cause of action for ejectment which should prevent the dismissal of Civil Case No. 9534. The
pronouncement in a previous case applies here:
True it is that under Article 487 of the Civil Code,38 a co-owner may bring an action for ejectment against a co-owner who
takes exclusive possession and asserts exclusive ownership of a common property. It bears stressing, however, that in this
case, evidence is totally wanting to establish John's or Juliet's exclusive ownership of the property in question. Neither did
Juliet obtain possession thereof by virtue of a contract, express or implied, or thru intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth. As
borne by the record, Juliet was in possession of the subject structure and the sari-sari store thereat by virtue of her being a
co-owner thereof. As such, she is as much entitled to enjoy its possession and ownership as John. 39
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Indeed, it is respondent who is claiming exclusive ownership of the subject property owned in common.
Thus, left with no cause of action for ejectment against petitioners, respondent's ejectment case must be dismissed.
There is likewise no merit to respondent's argument that since only two of the defendants in the ejectment case filed the
instant Petition, the same must necessarily be dismissed. There is no rule which requires that all the parties in the
proceedings before the CA must jointly take recourse with this Court or else such recourse would be dismissible. The fact that
Ramon and Rafael did not join in the instant Petition does not bar petitioners from pursuing their case before this Court.
Moreover, since petitioners, Ramon and Rafael are siblings, co-heirs, co-owners, and occupants of the subject property, they
all have common interests, and their rights and liabilities are identical and so interwoven and dependent as to be inseparable.
The reversal of the assailed CA judgment should therefore inure to the benefit of Ramon and Rafael as well. The December
11, 2009 Order of the RTC decreeing dismissal as against petitioners, Ramon, and Rafael, as well as the payment of
attorney's fees to all of them - may be reinstated in all respects.
xxx This Court has always recognized the general rule that in appellate proceedings, the reversal of the judgment on appeal
is binding only on the parties in the appealed case and does not affect or inure to the benefit of those who did not join or
were not made parties to the appeal. An exception to the rule exists, however, where a judgment cannot be reversed as to
the party appealing without affecting the rights of his co-debtor, or where the rights and liabilities of the parties are so
interwoven and dependent on each other as to be inseparable, in which case a reversal as to one operates as a reversal as to
all. This exception, which is based on a communality of interest of said parties, is recognized in this jurisdiction. x x x 40
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WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The February 29, 2012 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
114363 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The December 11, 2009 Order of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 160
in SCA No. 3144 is REINSTATED and AFFIRMED.
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SO ORDERED.

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