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Review
Author(s): Erich S. Gruen
Review by: Erich S. Gruen
Source: The Journal of Interdisciplinary History, Vol. 8, No. 3 (Winter, 1978), pp. 563-566
Published by: The MIT Press
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/202923
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Reviews
The Grand Strategy of the Roman Empire: From the First Century A.D. to the
Third. By Edward N. Luttwak (Baltimore, The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1976) 255 pp. $I2.95
Historians become wary, even defensive, when a political scientist ventures onto their turf to instruct them on matters they thought they had
Yet Luttwak has produced a book that Roman historians will read
with profit. He did his homework conscientiously. Not, to be sure, in
the primary sources. Although references to ancient evidence-whether
literary, epigraphical, or archaeological-are sprinkled here and there in
scene. The comparisons are important and lurk behind the whole analysis
cletian and Constantine, evolved a third system, one of "defense-indepth." Here self-contained strongholds took prominence. Mobile forces
continued to exist, but they functioned for "rearward" defense rather
than "forward" defense. The enemy, no longer intercepted in advance of
the frontier, had to be dealt with inside imperial territory, a strategy
which, even when successful, entailed heavy costs in an undefended
countryside and a peasant society. Maintenance of security had now
reached the limits of the empire's resources.
The schemata merit consideration even when they fail to satisfy
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peripheral security against border infiltration . . . (They) could contribute both their own interposed forces and their capacity to absorb the
threat-in other words they provide geographic depth" (24-26). What
could better characterize buffer-states? The distinction is needless and
serves only to confuse. More troublesome, the transition from JulioClaudian dependence on client-kingdoms to Flavian development of firm
borders is described rather than explained. Absence of explanation stands
out most strikingly in the matter ofJudaea's subjugation. It was accomplished by Vespasian and Titus through the successful collaboration of
client-rulers in the East. "And yet it was none other than Vespasian, the
direct beneficiary of the client-state system, who presided over its sub-
Trajan "Dacia had to be annexed, paradoxically enough, because the empire had become visibly defensist, and its rulers reluctant to annex" (I 15).
in-depth," one is never quite certain whether Luttwak sees the system as
engendered by the third-century crisis or as a later response by Diocletian
and Constantine. The process is murky and the motivation left in doubt.
Further, there are suggestions awkwardly inserted and insufficiently
integrated. The discussion of the limitanei (I71-172) seems to bear little
relevance to the strategic pattern which Luttwak discerns in the later
Empire. The same holds for development of central field armies (I82-188). And we receive neither preparation nor explanation for Luttwak's
allusive comment about Rome's cultural and economic influence creating
"a cultural and political basis for common action against it" (I93). The
trails lead in a number of directions that never get followed up.
Luttwak's experiences in U.S. defense strategy play a muted and
unobtrusive role. Yet their impact is felt throughout as an undercurrent
to the argument. They surface with explicitness in the appendix entitled
"Power and Force: Definitions and Implications." Efficient exercise of
power stands in inverse proportion to the overt use of force. When
power must be demonstrated, its effectiveness correspondingly diminishes. It is "perceived power" that counts (I97-200). We are in the
realm here of a strategy of "deterrence"; no one needs to be told the
modern context from which that notion arises. Luttwak's message on
Rome is clear: her policy rode to success while clients could visualize her
power without having to feel it; deterioration came when Roman authority sank to the level of actual resources.
does not press it very hard. For Rome had no single major adversary who
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REVIEWS 565
tial foes. There was little in common between Decebalus and Parthia, between barbarous Britons and the nomad tribesmen of the Sahara, and be-
tween Gothic invaders and Sassanian Persia. The distinctions, when recognized, place a heavy strain on Luttwak's theory. He acknowledges
them briefly but offers a dubious resolution: the primitive peoples of continental Europe had to be kept in line with the direct application of force,
erable. Yet all this is dismissed: the small number of legions, he asserts,
was determined by "a rational scheme of deployment, in which it was
the desired level of forces that set the costs, rather than the other way
round" (I6-I7). The Roman frontier in Britain was shifted more than
once in response to the difficulties of pacification, and the establishment
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Rome.
Erich S. Gruen
ing in Zurich and devotes the remainder of the book to Zwingli's nearly
ter's treatment. He skillfully weaves Zwingli's development as a reformer into the internal policies of Zurich, the political and religious
conflicts within the Swiss Confederation, the barely concealed rivalry be-
tween Zurich and Berne, and Zurich's relationships with the South Ger-
man cities and territories. The fluidity of the situation along the northern
borders of the Swiss Confederation and the possibility that parts of Ger-
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