Shepsle Kenneth A. y Mark S. Boncheck. 1997. Analyzing Politics.

Rationality, Behavior, and Institutions. New York: Norton Press.

IT ISNT ROCKET SCIENCE, BUT
_Since the end of the SWW, changes in political studies have been
numerous and many splendored. We shall concentrate on two of the
most significant shifts of emphasis the shifts from describing to
explaining, and from judging to analyzing.
Political science at the end of the SWW consisted of detailed
contemporary descriptions of political history writing. It was a thick
description, which is typically careful, detailed to a fault, and
comprehensive, in contrast to mere storytelling.
If postwar political science is more than storytelling, it is also more
than normative handwriting. The evaluative emphasis of postwar
political science consisted chiefly of reformist sentiments. In short, the
political science that a college student at the end of the SWW have
encountered was primarily descriptive and judgmental. It was much
less oriented toward explanation and analysis.
But it was not until the 1960s that systematic attention began to focus
on questions of why. This path constitutes significant movement along
scientific trajectory.
_Political science is not a rocket science, but this emphasis on
explanations and analysis moves it closer in form to the physical and
natural sciences than was the case in an earlier era.
_The main purpose of this book will be especially intent on acquainting
you with elementary models. These are stylization meant to
approximate in very crude fashion some real situation. Models are
purposely stripped-down versions of the real thing.
_These stripped-down historical cases come close to transforming a
specific model into a theory of something real. A theory, as we plan to
use the term, is an embellishment of a model in which features that are
somewhat vague and abstract in the model are made more concrete
and specific in the theory. A theory, then, is a specialized elaboration of
a model intended for a specific application.
_We believe that an understanding and application of the concepts
contained in this book will help you to predict and explain political
events.

_For the purposes of our discussion, we will take politics to be utterly

indistinguishable from the phenomena of group life generally.
RATIONALITY: THE MODEL OF CHOICE
_The people we model are neither all-knowing nor worldly-wise; they
are ordinary folks. As such they have wants and beliefs, both of which
affect their behavior.
_Individual wants, which we refer to as preferences, can be inspired by
any number of different sources. We do not pretend to know why people
want what they want. For us, preferences are one of the givens of a
situation and, for purposes of analysis, we assume that they dont
change much in the short run. In short, we take people, as we find
them.
_The world of preferences and priorities is an interior world. Indeed,
because a person does not wear her preferences on her forehead, and
sometimes, for subtle reasons, may not be all that she seems, we often
have to make assumptions about her preferences. Completing this
exterior world is an external environment in which people find
themselves. This environment is filled with uncertainty.
_We assume they have a behavioral portfolio available as well. If each
instrument leads to some distinct outcome, then the job of the rational
persona is simple: choose the instrument that leads to the outcome
preferred the most. However, the effectiveness of behavioral
instruments for the things an individual wants is only imperfectly
known. We describe the hunches an individual has concerning the
efficacy of a given instrument or behavior for obtaining something he or
she wants as that persons beliefs. Beliefs connect instruments to
outcomes. Acting in accord both with ones preferences and ones
beliefs is called instrumental rationality.
_We can only note in passing that the rational choice approach is a form
of methodological individualism. The individual is taken as the basic
unit of analysis.
_The modern theory of economics is a grands intellectual edifice
precisely because it has succeeded in constructing explanations
logically, rigorously, and in empirically meaningful ways. Is it possible,
in a manner precisely analogous to what has occurred in economics, to
create a science of politics?
_Mr. I is rational in the sense that his preferences have coherence and
that his ultimate choice bears a logical relationship to his preferences.

Pi is is strict preference relation and

Ii is is indifference relation.
An object is rational choice if no other available object is better
according to the choosers preferences. What we are seeking, in effect,
are properties of preferences relations that allow the chooser to order
the alternatives in terms of preference.
Property 1: Comparability (completeness). The alternatives are
comparable if, for any pair of them, the chooser either prefers the first
to the second, the second to the firs, or is indifferent between them.
Property 2: Transitivity: The strict preference relation is said to
be transitive of, for any three possible alternatives, if x Pi y and y Pi z
then x Pi z
_In fact, not all relations are complete or transitive (or both).
_We must content ourselves with the knowledge that, like other
sciences, simplifying assumptions are necessary in order to make
progress.
_The assumption of comparability and transitivity yield an ordering
principle they permit an individual to take a set of objects and place
them in an order, from highest to lowest, that reflects personal tastes
and values. Rationality is associated with both this capacity to order
and an aptitude to choose from the top of the order.
_A belief is a probability statement relating the effectiveness of a
specific action (or instrument) for various outcomes. When there is
certainty, rational behavior is pretty apparent: simply pick the action or
instrument that leads to your top-ranked alternative. When beliefs
about action-outcome relationships are more complex, the principle of
rational behavior requires more explanation.
_Making a decision under conditions of risk involves choosing among
alternatives lotteries. A rational choice entails choosing the best
lottery. The rule of rational choice is known as the Principle of Expected
Utility.
_The cause-and-effect relationship between actions and outcomes may
be well defined (certainty), probabilistic (risk), or only crudely known
(uncertainty).