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After the end of the Cold war, Policy makers and academics saw the ushering
of a new era of peace of prosperity.
Mearsheimer however was skeptical of this and as mentioned demolishes
the concept with his theory of offensive realism.
He mentions offensive realism in a pessimist view, in a world where
conflict never ends
Main Points
In sum. both the United Kingdom and the United States have consistently
acted as offshore balancers in Europe.
United States confront a potential hegemon in Europe or Northeast Asia they
prefer to buck-pass to other great powers rather than directly confront the
threat themselves.
It made no continental commitment during this period, despite the numerous Greatpower wars raging on the continent. did not intervene in either the Austro-Prussian
War ( 1866 ) or
the Franco-Prussian War ( 1 870-7 1 ) ,
The third period runs from 1 90 5 to 1 9 3 0 and was dominated by the
United Kingdom's efforts to contain Wilhelmine Germany. which emerged
as a potential hegemon in the early twentieth century
Conclusively both the United Kingdom and the United States have
consistently acted as offshore balancers in Europe
All of this behavior. as well as the U.S. drive for hegemony in the Western
Hemisphere during the nineteenth century. corresponds with the
predictions of offensive realism.
great powers are not seriously committed to maintaining peace but
instead aim to maximize their share of world power.
No American troops were sent across the Atlantic to help prevent World
War l or to stop the fighting after war broke out
In both cases. The United States eventually j oined the light against
Germany and helped win the war and create peace in Europe. But the
United States did not fight to make peace in either world war. Instead, it
fought to prevent a dangerous foe from achieving regional hegemony.
The same basic point holds for the Cold War: American military forces
were in Europe to contain the Soviet Union, not to maintain peace.
Buck passing
When a n aggressor comes o n the scene, a t least one other state will
eventually take direct responsibility for checking it.
The buck-passer simply wants someone else t o do the heavy lifting, but it
certainly wants the threat contained.
Buck-passing, o n the other hand, does not always occur when an
aggressor threatens to upset the balance of power. Passing the
buck may be the strategy o f choice for threatened great powers
In sum, both geography and the distribution of power play a key role in
determining whether threatened great powers form balancing coalitions or
buck-pass against dangerous aggressor.
There are three particular instances where it might seem that the
United Kingdom and the United States passed up opportunities to gain
power.
First, it is usually said that the United States achieved great-power
status in about 1898, when it won the Spanish-American War, which
gave it control over the fate of Cuba, Guam, the Philippines, and Puerto
Rico, and also when it began building a sizable military machine.
By 1 8 50, however, the United States already stretched from the Atlantic to
the Pacific and, as was shown in Table 6.2, clearly possessed the economic
wherewithal to become a great power and compete around the globe with
Europe's major powers.
Yet it did not build powerful military forces
between 1 8 5 0 and 1 898, and it made little effort to conquer territory in
the Western Hemisphere, much less outside of it. Fareed Zakaria describes
this period as a case of "imperial understretch. "4
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