1

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

consider as an just resolution deliberately and

knowingly promulgated by the First Division of the
Supreme Court of which you are a member.

G.R. No. L-68635 March 12, 1987

xxx xxx xxx

IN THE MATTER OF PROCEEDINGS FOR DISCIPLINARY

ACTION AGAINST ATTY. WENCESLAO LAURETA, AND OF
CONTEMPT PROCEEDINGS AGAINST EVA MARAVILLAILUSTRE in G.R. NO. 68635, entitled "EVA MARAVILLA-ILUSTRE
vs. HON. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, ET AL.

We consider the three minute-resolution: the first

dated 14 May 1986; the second, dated 9 July 1986;
and the third, 3 September 1986, railroaded with
such hurry/ promptitude unequaled in the entire
history of the Supreme Court under circumstances
that have gone beyond the limits of legal and judicial
ethic.

RESOLUTION
PER CURIAM:

xxx xxx xxx

In almost identical letters dated 20 October 1986, personally sent to

Justices Andres R. Narvasa, Ameurfina M. Herrera, and Isagani A.
Cruz, and a fourth letter, dated 22 October 1986 addressed to
Justice Florentino P. Feliciano, all members of the First Division of
this COURT, (mcorporated herein by reference), in feigned ignorance
of the Constitutional requirement that the Court's Divisions are
composed of, and must act through, at least five (5) members, and in
a stance of dangling threats to effect a change of the Court's adverse
resolution, petitioner Eva Maravilla Ilustre wrote in part:

Your attention is called to minute-resolution of 9 July

1986 which writes finish to our case before the
Supreme Court (... THIS IS FINAL.) There is nothing
final in this world We assure you that this case is far
from finished by a long shot For at the proper time,
we shall so act and bring this case before another
forum where the members of the Court can no
longer deny our action with minute resolutions that
are not only unjust but are knowingly and deuberat
only promulgated. The people deserve to know how
the members of the highest tribunal of the land
perform in the task of decision making by affixing
their respective signed on judgments that they
render on petitions that they themselves give due
course.

Please forgive us for taking the Liberty of addressing

you this letter which we do hope you will read very
carefully.
It is important to call your attention to the dismissal
of Case No. G.R. 68635 entitled Eva Maravilla
Ilustre vs. Hon. Intermediate Appellate Court, et al.
by an untenable minute-resolution although an
extended one, dated 14 May 1986 which we

Please understand that we are pursuing further

remedies in our quest for justice under the law. We
intend to hold responsible members of the First
Division who participated in the promulgation of

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these three minute- resolutions in question. For the
members thereof cannot claim immunity when their
action runs afoul with penal sanctions, even in the
performance of official functions; like others, none of
the division members are above the law.
In our quest for justice, we wish to avoid doing
injustice to anyone, particularly the members of the
First Division, providing that they had no hand in the
promulgation of the resolution in question. That is
why we are requesting you to inform us your
participation in the promulgation of these resolutions
in question. Even we who are poor are also capable
of playing fair even to those who take advantage of
our poverty by sheer power and influence. We shall
then wait for your reply. If, however, we do not hear
from you after a week, then we will consider your
silence that you supported the dismissal of our
petition. We will then be guided accordingly.
(Emphasis supplied).

the Supreme Court still recognizes Atty. Sedfrey A.

Ordonez as counsel for respondents, even as he is
already the Solicitor General. For not withdrawing
from the case formally Atty. Ordonez has manifested
his unmitigated arrogance that he does not respect
the Canons of Professional Ethics, to the actuation
of his law partner, Associate Justice Pedro Yap,
Chairman of the First Division of the Supreme Court,
an act that further aggravates the growing wrinkles
in the domain of judicial statesmanship, impressed
as it is, with very serious and dangerous
implications.
(9) By 11 April 1986, date of the
reorganization of the First Division,
Atty. Sedfrey A. Ordonez already
became the Solicitor General. With
such
amazingly
magical
coincidence, Dr. Pedro Yap, law
partner of Atty. Sedfrey A. Ordonez
in the law firm Salonga, Ordonez
Yap, Padian became the Chairman
of the Division.

The letter also attacked the participation in the case of Justice Pedro
L. Yap, Chairman of the First Division in this wise:
As Division Chairman, Associate Justice Pedro Yap,
as a copy of Resolution dated 14 May 1986 we
received indicate, did not even have the elementary
courtesy of putting on record that he voluntarily
inhibited himself from participating in the
promulgation of this minute-resolution, although an
extended one, which he should have done
consistent with judicial decorum and the Canons of
Judicial Ethics. After he is the law partner of Atty.
Sedfrey A. Ordonez counsel for respondents, now
the distinguished Solicitor General ... indicative that
even at this stage of the proceeding in point of time,

xxx xxx xxx

(11) So we see that on 11 August
1986 to 14 May 1986 when some
members of the Division were still
busy putting their respective offices
in order and had possibly have no
Idea about the Maravilla case.
Was it possible for Chairman Yap to
have
convinced
the
Division
members that Maravilla petition is

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without merit and since the
members the new ones knew
nothing about the case, readily
agreed to the dismissal of the
petition by a minute. resolution
an extended one. After all, this was
the case of the Solicitor General. If
this is what happened, then we are
sorry to say that you were
deliberately "had"
After ala the 14 May 1986 untenable
minute resolution although an
extended one, does not bear the
signatures of the Division members.
The members should have signed
the resolution, after ala the Supreme
Court had given the petition due
course, indicating whether they
concur, dissent or otherwise abstain
from voting.
The letter to Justice Herrera went on to state:
We assume, of course, that you had studied the
case thoroughly since you were with the original
First Division under the chairmanship of then Justice
Claudio Teehankee. We assure you that we will
bring this case before another forum to hold
responsible the members of the Division who
participated in the dismissal of the case by the
unjust minute-resolutions, knowingly rendered for
intended objective that your conscience you are
aware.
xxx xxx xxx

We leave the next move to you by informing us your

participation in the promulgation of the minuteresolutions in question Please do not take this
matter rightly for we know justice in the end will
prevail. For if we do not hear from you within a week,
we will consider your silence as your admission that
you supported the dismissal of the petition. In this
way, we shall then be guided accordingly. The
moment we take action in the plans we are
completing, we will then call a press conference with
TV and radio coverage. Arrangements in this regard
are being done. The people should or ought to know
why we were thwarted in our quest for plain justice.
xxx xxx xxx
Finally, in view of action that we are prepared to take
in this case, that will no doubt cause nationwide
attention, and there should be anyone that will
cause me harm personally, may we request you to
show this letter to the authorities concerned so that
they will know where to look, when it becomes
necessary. (Emphasis supplied)
The aforesaid letters were included in the Agenda of the First
Division of 22 October 1986, were "Noted," and referred en consulta
to the Court en banc.
On 28 October 1986, the Court en banc took up the background and
history of the case, found no reason to take any further action, and
referred the case back to the First Division 11 as set forth in the
latter's resolution of October 27, 1986. " In this Resolution, the First
Division traced the history of the case, clarified that Justice Yap
assumed his position in this Court only on 2 May 1986; that when the
resolution of dismissal was issued on 14 May 1986, Justice Abad
Santos was the incumbent Chairman of the First Division, and that

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Justice Yap was unaware that Atty. Ordonez was private
respondents' counsel; that upon realization thereof, Justice Yap
inhibited himself from further participation in the case; and that
Justice Yap was designated Chairman of the First Division only on 14
July 1986, after the compulsory retirement of Justice Vicente Abad
Santos on 12 July 1986. The Resolution of the First Division
(incorporated herein by reference) concluded thus:
The dispositions in this case were arrived at after
careful study. Because a case is resolved against
the interests of a party, does not mean that it is an
"unjust decision" or that it has been "railroaded".
This Division declares without hesitation that it has
consistently rendered justice without fear or favor.
YAP, J., took no part.
On 3 November 1986, petitioner again addressed similar letters to
Justices Narvasa, Herrera, and Cruz, (incorporated herein by
reference), excerpts from which follow:
It is rather amazing that when we wrote you our
previous letter, we never dreamed that you would
rush, as you did rush for assistance en consults with
the Honorable Court en banc. The unfortunate part
of it all is the fact that the Court en banc had to
promulgate its resolution dated 28 October 1986
which to us when considered in its entirety, is just as
untenable as the First Division extended and
unsigned minute-resolution of 14 May 1986.
Evidently you misunderstood our point of inquiry, to
wit: 'Did you or did you not approve the dismissal of
our petition under
1) The l4 May l986 minute resolution? Yes or No.

2) The 9 July l986 minute resolution? Yes or No.

3) The 3 Sept. 1986 minute resolution? Yes or No.
That was we asked. The other matters contained in
our letter were intended merely to give you the
highlights of our case. This is what we wanted to
know to properly guide us when we finally bring our
case to the other forum of justice.
Did it ever occur to you that when you and the other
members of the First Division referred our letters to
the Honorable Court en banc en consults it was all
your fault that the Court en banc had to promulgate
its unsigned extended minute-resolution that
unfortunately exposed the distinguished members of
the newly reorganized Supreme Court and, at the
same time, convicted themselves as guilty of
distorting facts involved in our petition?
This, we are sure, will come as a shock to you. We
will show you why.
xxx xxx xxx
This is just a sample of what we will expose to the
nation before the other forum of justice where we
will soon bring this case beyond the reach of the
newly reorganized Supreme Court We are prepared
to expose many more of this kind of judicial
performance readily constituting truvesty of justice
Ponder upon this well because it is our very firm
conviction that the people deserve to know how the
distinguished members of the highest tribunal of the
land perform in duties in this most sensitive area of
decision making.

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Anyhow, whether you referred our letter to the Court
en banc consults) or not, the situation remains the
same. At the proper time, as we said, we will bring
this case before another forum of justice where the
members of the First Division, in fact the Honorable
Court en banc may no longer deny our action by
mere untenable and unjust minute resolutions.
Better believe it that we intend to hold responsible
members of the First Division who took part in the
promulgation of the untenable and unjust extended
minute-resolution that is not even signed by any of
those who promulgated it; therefore, to us, is clearly
bereft of judicial integrity from its very inception on
14 May 1986.

unbelievable picture of Division Chairman Justice

Yap. It states

xxx xxx xxx

Ignoramus that we are, unschooled in the domain of

law and procedure, but we are learning a few as we
promulgated our case within legitimate that we state
here that both resolutions that promulgated by the
Court en banc of 28 October 1986 and that
promulgated by the First Division dated 27 October
1986, are nothing but a desperate attempt when
both are considered in their respective entirety, to
maneuver without success, some semblance of
justification on the untenable and unjust 14 May
1986 extended and unsigned minute-resolution that
is bereft of judicial integrity.

Thus, we will bring this case before another forum of

justice as Eva Maravilla Ilustre against the
distinguished members of the First Division, in fact
against the entire membership of the newly
organized Supreme Court (because of its en banc
unsigned extended minute-resolution that is without
judicial integrity, dated 28 October 1986). But do not
be mislead (sic) for we are not alone in this fight.
Other lawyers, not just by their mere sympathy for
me personally and my case, but by their firm
conviction that judicial statesmanship must be
maintained at nines in the highest tribunal of justice
in the land, that they have offered their free legal
services when the legal confrontation begins.
xxx xxx xxx
Paragraph 4, found on page 3 of the en banc
resolution projects the most fantastic, most

...When the resolution of dismissal

on May 14, 1986, Justice Yap was
unaware that Atty. Sedfrey A.
Ordonez was private respondent's
counsel.
The Honorable Court en banc must think everybody
stupid to swallow this statement hook, line and
sinker For Justice Yap we say. Tell that to the
marines. But more than this, we leave this matter to
the conscience of Justice Yap.

xxx xxx xxx

Thus, if the members of the First Division and those
of the Honorable Court en banc think for one minute
that because of their respective 4-page minute but
extended resolutions apparently impressive for their
lack of merit deliberately unsigned that exposed
their lack of judicial integrity, that we win now give up

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the fight, just forget it. Ignoramus that we are, better
believe it when we say we are prepared to carry the
fight before another forum of justice. When we do,
we shall call for a press conference with TV and
radio coverage, so that we can present to the entire
nation our quest for justice against the steam-roller
of power and influence and, at the same time, to call
the attention of the people to the manner in which
the members of the highest tribunal of the land
perform their respective individual and collective
functions in the domain of this most sensitive area of
decision making.
Allow us to restate our previous and now, our
present inquiry, to wit:
Did you or did you not approve the dismissal of our
petition under
a) The l4 May l986 minute resolution? Yes or No.
b) The 9 July l986 minute resolution? Yes or No.
c) The 3 Sept. 1986 minute resolution? Yes or No.
(Emphasis supplied).
True to her threats, after having lost her case before this Court,
petitioner filed on 16 December 1986 an Affidavit-Complaint before
the Tanodbayan, totally disregarding the facts and circumstances
and legal considerations set forth in this Court's aforecited
Resolutions of the First Division and en banc. Some Members of this
Court were maliciously charged with having knowingly and
deliberately rendered, with bad faith, an unjust, extended Minute
Resolution "making" her opponents the "illegal owners" of vast
estates. Some Justices of the Court of Appeals were similarly
maliciously charged with knowingly rendering their "unjust resolution"

of 20 January 1984 "through manifest and evident bad faith," when

their Resolution had in fact and law been upheld by this Court.
Additionally, Solicitor General Sedfrey A. Ordonez and Justice Pedro
Yap of this Court were also maliciously charged with having used
their power and influence in persuading and inducing the members
of the First Division of this Court into promulgating their "unjust
extended Minute Resolution of 14 May 1986."
All the foregoing, in complete disregard of the Resolutions of this
Court, as the tribunal of last resort, 1) upholding the challenged
judgment of the Court of Appeals; 2) dismissing the Petition on the
ground that the doctrine of res judicata was clearly applicable not
only as to the probate of the Will of the decedent but also as to the
heirship of petitioner, among others, and their right to intervene and
participate in the proceedings; and 3) finding that there was no
attempt whatsoever on the part of Justice Yap nor Solicitor General
Ordonez to unduly influence the members of the First Division.
The Complaint before the Tanodbayan (incorporated herein by
reference) was allegedly filed "in my quest for justice, something that
has been closed to me by the Supreme Court forever" and
specifically charged:
CHARGE NO. ONE
Atty. Sedfrey A. Ordonez and Justice Pedro Yap of
1) "persuading, inducing, influencing the members of
the newly organized First Division ... into
promulgating their unjust, extended minute
RESOLUTION of 14 May 1986, knowingly with
deliberate intent with such unusual hurry
promptitude unequaled in the entire history of the
Supreme Court base on insignificant issues and
deliberately
evading/prevaricating
the
more
important substantial ones raised in my petition, in

7
violation of Section 3, sub-letter (a) of Republic Act
No. 3019, as amended, ... ; and

Cruz, Andres Narvasa, Ameurfina M. Herrera and

Pedro Yap, ...

(2) Under the same Section 3, sub-letter (e) of the

same Republic Act ... for causing me and the other
heirs of Ponciano Maravilla undue injury by using
their power and influence as Solicitor-General and
Associate Justice, respectively. ...

1) For knowingly and deliberately rendering their

unjust extended MINUTE RESOLUTION of 14 May
1986 dismissing my petition in G.R. No. 68635, ...
with manifest and evident bad faith to make the
clients of Atty. Sedfrey A. Ordonez now the
distinguished Solicitor General the 'illegal owners' of
the vast estates of my aunt Digna Maravilla ...;

CHARGE NO. TWO

Associate Justices Luis Javellana, Vicente Mendoza
and Serafin Cuevas, members of the then FOURTH
SPECIAL CASES DIVISION, Intermediate Appellate
Court
1)
For
knowingly
rendering
their
unjust
RESOLUTION dated 20 January 1984 in the
exercise of their functions through manifest and
evident bad faith in CA-G.R. No. SP-13680, entitled
"Francisco Q. Maravilla, et al. v. Hon. Antonia
Corpus Macandog, et al." in violation of article 204
of the revised Penal Code,2) For causing me and the other heirs such undue
injury' by deliberately, knowingly rendering their
unjust RESOLUTION dated 20 January 1984 ... in
violation of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended,
Section 3 (e) thereof.
CHARGE NO THREE
Associate Justice Vicente Abad Santos (retired) then
Chairman of the First Division of the Supreme Court
as of 14 May 1986, and Associate Justice Isagani

2) Under Section 3, sub-letter (e) Republic Act No.

3019, as amended, ... for deliberately causing us
heirs of Ponciano Maravilla undue injury by depriving
us of our rights over my aunt's vast estates because
of their manifest and evident bad faith in knowingly
promulgating their unjust extended minute
RESOLUTION of 14 May 1986, deliberately
intended to make the clients of Atty. Sedfrey A.
Ordonez, now the Solicitor General the "illegal
owners" of my aunt Digna Maravilla's estates when
under the law, these Ordonez clients are not entitled
to own these vast properties whether under testate
or intestate succession or mixed succession
(Emphasis supplied).
Atty. Laureta himself reportedly circulated copies of the Complaint to
the press, which was widely publicized in almost all dailies on 23
December 1986, without any copy furnished this Court nor the
members who were charged. The issue of the Daily Express of 23
December 1986 published a banner headline reading
ORDONEZ, 8 JUSTICES FACE GRAFT CHARGES
thereby making it unjustly appear that the Justices of this Court and
the other respondents were charged with "graft and corruption" when

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the Complaint was actually filed by a disgruntled litigant and her
counsel after having lost her case thrice in this Court.

Court and/or official actions of the Justices

concerned, which statements, unless satisfactorily
explained, transcend the permissible bounds of
propriety and undermine and degrade the
administration of justice; and

On 26 December 1986, the Tanodbayan (Ombudsman) dismissed

petitioner's Complaint and decreed in the dispositive portion of his
Resolution (herein incorporated by reference) that:

(2) Atty. Wenceslao Laureta, as an officer of the

Court, to show cause, within ten (10) days from
notice, why no disciplinary action should be taken
against him for the aforecited statements, conduct,
acts and charges against the Supreme Court and
the official actions of the Justices concerned, and for
hiding therefrom in anonymity behind his client's
name, in an alleged quest for justice but with the
manifest intent to bring the Justices into disrepute
and to subvert public confidence in the Courts and
the orderly administration of justice. (pp. 383-384,
Rollo).

WHEREFORE, all the premises considered, this

Office resolves to dismiss the complaint against
Justices Pedro Yap, Isagani Cruz, Andres Narvasa,
Ameurfina Melencio-Herrera, Vicente Abad Santos,
and will continue evaluating the complaint against
Justices Serafin Cuevas, Luis Javellana and Vicente
Mendoza, Solicitor General Sedfrey Ordonez and
the private respondents.
The aforestated Resolution indicated at the bottom of the last page:
Copy Furnished:
(1)
DEAN WENCESLAO LAURETA
Counsel for the Complainant
919 Prudencio Street
Sampaloc, Manila
In the Resolution of this Court en banc, dated January 29, 1986, it
required:
(1) Petitioner Eva Maravilla Ilustre to show cause,
with in ten (10) days from notice, why she should not
be held in contempt for her aforecited statements,
conduct, acts and charges against the Supreme

In her Compliance-Answer filed on February 9, 1987, wherein Eva

Maravilla Ilustre prays that the contempt proceedings against her be
dismissed, she contends, in essence, that: (1) "there was no
intention to affront the honor and dignity" of the Court; (2) the letters
addressed to the individual Justices were private in character and
were never meant for anybody, much less the Supreme Court en
banc, "there (being) a constitutional mandate affording protection to
privacy of communications;" (3) if her statements in those letters
were really contemptuous, the Court "should have immediately taken
disciplinary proceedings" against her, and not having done so, the
Court has "forfeited" that right and is now "estopped" from doing so;
this citation for contempt is a "vindictive reprisal" for her having filed
the complaint before the Tanodbayan, "an action that lacks sincerity,
taken not in the spirit of judicial statemanship;" (4) she instituted the
complaint before the Tanodbayan "in my honest behalf that I lost my

9
case before the Supreme Court not because of lack of merit or of its
own merits, assisted by attorneys who offered their services in the
prosecution of my case;" (5) the newspaper publicity of this case
"was no fault of mine; neither is it the fault of my former counsel
Dean Wenceslao Laureta, " who prevailed upon her to call off the
press conference with TV and radio coverage; that she is not a
"disgruntled litigant" who thrice lost before the Court, rather, she has
challenged the validity of the resolutions of the Court "containing
distortion of facts, conjectures and mistaken inferences" particularly,
in that (a) there is no res judicata, (b) the Court of Appeals in its
decision declared that the judgment of the trial Court had long
attained finality, so that it can no longer be set aside, (c) her 11
opponents," clients of Atty. Ordonez, are not entitled to own her
aunt's "vast properties" whether under the law of testate or intestate
succession or mixed succession," (d) that the statement in this
Court's Resolution that the Court of Appeals had denied intervention
is an "unadulterated distortion of the facts;" (b) the statement in the
en banc Resolution that some Justices of the Court of Appeals were
similarly maliciously charged with knowingly rendering their "unjust
resolution" of 20 January 1984 is a bit "premature, a pre-judgment
over a case over which this Court does not have jurisdiction;" (7)
Atty. Laureta is not her counsel in the case before the Tanodbayan;
(8) before the latter body, she has "established not only probable
cause but has also proved the collective culpability (of the Justices
concerned) as charged;" (9) and that her 53 page Motion for
Reconsideration before the Tanodbayan is made an integral part of
her Answer.
(2)
In his own Answer, Atty. Laureta maintains substantially that: (1) he is
not respondent Ilustre's counsel before the Tanodbayan and that she
has consulted and/or engaged the services of other attorneys in the
course of the prosecution of her case, fike Atty. Edgardo M.
Salandanan and Atty. Vedastro B. Gesmundo; that he just learned
from other sources that respondent llustre was planning to bring her

case to the Tanodbayan with the assistance of other lawyers who

offered her their legal services; (2) it was he who dissuaded her from
calling her intended press conference and from circulating copies of
her complaint "not only in the performance of duty as an officer of the
court, but also as a former president of Manila III Chapter of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines and as a professional lecturer in
Legal and Judicial Ethics in some Manila law schools in his desire to
protect and uphold the honor and dignity of the Supreme Court as
the highest tribunal of the land." He should, therefore, be given "a
little bit of credit for what he did" instead of taking this disciplinary
proceeding against him; that Ms. Ilustre is not a "disgruntled litigant"
who "lost her case thrice in this Court;" (3) he did not prepare
respondent Ilustre's letters to the individual Justices, I appearances
to the contrary notwithstanding," that these letters were "never, at
any time, considered as constituting contempt of court" in the
resolutions of this Court, otherwise, "it would have taken immediate
disciplinary action as it is doing now;" the Court has lost its right to
consider the statements in the letters as constituting contempt and it
is now "estopped" from proceeding with this disciplinary action; (4)
by doing so, this Court has "unmistakably revealed the intent and
character that underlie its present action as a vindictive judicial
vengeance, inconsistent with the spirit of judicial statesmanship by
hiding behind the well-recognized fact that the Supreme Court is
supreme in the domain of the administration of justice;" (5) "there
was no disregard intended to the Resolution of the Honorable Court,
as the tribunal of last resort, relative to its upholding the judgment of
the Court of Appeals;" he is just doing "his duty as an officer of the
court to put the records in this regard in their proper light;"
particularly (a) that the judgment of the trial court had attained its
finality long ago, (b) the doctrine of res judicata is inapplicable,
otherwise, this Court would not have remanded the case to the Court
of Appeals for review, (c) the observation in the First Division's
extended Resolution of 14 July 1986 that Justice Yap was unaware
that Atty. Ordonez was private respondents' counsel "defies every
vestige of human understanding," that Justice Yap had forthwith
inhibited himself from participating in the case is not borne out by the

10
record of this case. Justice Yap had "never voluntarily entered on the
record his inhibition" when he should have done so when respondent
Ilustre's petition was taken up; Justice Yap's partner, Atty. Ordonez,
continued to be recognized by this Court as counsel for private
respondents even as he was the Solicitor General; (b) finally,
"appearances to the contrary notwithstanding, he has not colted acts
unworthy of his profession. The truth of the matter is, he should at
least be credited in whatever small way for his acts and efforts taken
by him to protect and uphold the honor and dignity of the Honorable
Court.
We find the explanations of both Ms. Ilustre and Atty. Laureta
unsatisfactory. Their claims that they had done nothing that could
constitute an affront to the honor and dignity of this Court dissipate in
the face of attendant facts and circumstances and "defy every
vestige of human understanding," to use their own language. Indeed,
they should not "think that they will win a hearing by the sheer
multiplication of words." (Mathew 6:7).
Respondents' reliance on the "privacy of communication" is
misplaced. Letters addressed to individual Justices, in connection
with the performance of their judicial functions become part of the
judicial record and are a matter of concern for the entire Court. The
contumacious character of those letters constrained the First Division
to refer the same to the Court en banc, en consults and so that the
Court en banc could pass upon the judicial acts of the Division. It
was only in the exercise of forbearance by the Court that it refrained
from issuing immediately a show cause order in the expectancy that
after having read the Resolution of the Court en banc of October 28,
1986, respondents would realize the unjustness and unfairness of
their accusations.

The Court is far from "estopped" in initiating these proceedings. The

Chief Justice had promptly announced his Statement, dated
December 23, 1986, that "the Supreme Court will take appropriate
steps on the matter upon its resumption of sessions on the first
working day of the year. "
There is no vindicative reprisal involved. The Court's authority and
duty under the premises is unmistakable. It must act to preserve its
honor and dignity from the scurrilous attacks of an irate lawyer,
mouthed by his client, and to safeguard the morals and ethics of the
legal profession.
We are not convinced that Atty. Laureta had nothing to do with
respondent Ilustre's letters to the individual Justices, nor with the
com plaint filed before the Tanodbayan. In the Motion for
Reconsideration, dated June 11, 1986, filed by Atty. Laureta in the
main petition, he stressed:
10. The composition of the First Division was
reduced to five members. Strangely enough, about
one month later, the Honorable Court promulgated
its extended resolution with such promptitude in the
entire history of the Supreme Court, unequaled in a
manner of speaking, ...
In the Manifestation and Motion, dated June 25, 1986, filed by Atty.
Laureta (p. 311, Rollo), the same phrases were incanted:
the promptitude with which the Resolution of 14 May
1986 was promulgated (par. 9, Motion for
Reconsideration, p. 5) unequaled in the entire
history of the Supreme Court in so far as petitions
given due course is concerned ... (Emphasis given)

11
Those same terms are reproduced verbatim in the letters ostensibly
authored by respondent Ilustre addressed to the individual Justices
whom respondents have charged. Thus:
We consider the three minute resolutions ...
railroaded with such hurry/promptitude unequalled in
the entire history of the Supreme Court under
circumstances that have gone beyond the limits of
legal and judicial ethics" ltr., to Justice Narvasa, p. 2;
Itr., to Justice Herrera, p. 2; Itr., to Justice Cruz, p.
2).
xxx xxx xxx
with such unusual hurry/promptitude unequalled in
the entire history of the Supreme Court (Ltr., to
Justice Narvasa, p. 5; Itr., to Justice Herrera, p. 5;
Itr., to Justice Cruz, p. 5).
The same terminologies are reiterated in the Complaint and in the
Motion for Reconsideration filed before the Tanodbayan (p. 2).
Further, in his Manifestation & Motion, dated June 25, 1986, Atty.
Laureta stated:
counsel for petitioner personally inquired from
Division Clerk of Court Corazon Served the
following:
(1) When was the above-entitled case deliberated by
the First Division?
(2) Are there recorded minutes of such deliberation?

(3) Who among the members of the Division voted

for dismissal of the petition to be promulgated by
resolution and who did not, if any?
(4) Who prepared the Resolution? (p.312, Rollo).
Atty. Laureta's obsession to receive the answer to his queries
surfaces again in the second letters dated November 3, 1986 to the
individual Justices under the supposed signatures of respondent
Ilustre, thus:
Evidently you misunderstood our point of in our first
letter. It is a very simple inquiry, to wit Did you or did
you not approve the dismissal of our petition under
1) The l4 May l986 minute resoluTion? Yes or No
2) The 9 July l986 minute resoluTion? Yes or No
3) The 3 Sept. 1986 minute resolution? Yes or No.
(Emphasis supplied) ltr., to Justice Narvasa, p. 1; to
Justice Herrera, p. 1; to Justice Cruz, p. 1)
Additionally, the disparaging remarks like: exertion of "undue" and
"powerful influence" by Atty. Ordonez and Justice Yap; "distortion of
facts, conjectures and mistaken references"; "untenable minute
resolution although extend. "unjust minute resolution" repeated by
Atty. Laureta in his several pleadings, echoed and re-echoed in the
individual letters to the Justices, as well as in the Complaint and the
Motion for Reconsideration before the Tanodbayan, reveal the nottoo-hidden hand of Atty. Laureta.
The foregoing is bolstered by the reports received by the members of
the Court that copies of the complaint filed with the Tanodbayan were
distributed to the editors of the metropolitan newspapers in

12
envelopes bearing the name of respondent Laureta, who was heard
over the radio speaking on the same complaint, and that he was
following up the complaint and the motion for reconsideration of the
order of dismissal of the Tanodbayan.
Furthermore, respondent Laureta as his co-respondent Ilustre's
lawyer had control of the proceedings. As stressed by this Court in
an early case, as such lawyer, "Whatever steps his client takes
should be within his knowledge and responsibility. Indeed, Canon 16
of the Canons of Legal E times should be reminded him that '(a)
lawyer should use his best efforts to restrain and to prevent his
clients from doing those things which the lawyer himself ought not to
do, particularly with reference to their conduct towards courts, judicial
officers, jurors, witnesses and suitors. If a client pursuits in such
wrongdoing the lawyer should terminate their relation.' " (In Re:
Contempt Proceedings in Surigao Mineral Reservation Board vs.
Cloribel, 31 SCRA 1, 23) Respondent Laureta manifestly failed to
discharge such responsibility. For all intents and purposes, he
appears to have encouraged and abetted his client in denigrating the
members of the First Division of this Court, by baselessly charging
them with rendering an "unjust" resolution with "deliberate bad faith,"
because of his stubborn insistence on his untenable arguments
which had been rejected as without merit by the Court's First
Division, whose Resolution was upheld by the Court en banc. Worse,
the dissemination in the print and broadcast media in bold captions
falsely depicting the Justices as "FAC(ING) GRAFT CHARGES"
instead of the baseless rantings of a disgruntled litigant appear to
have been timed to place them in a bad light at the height of the
Christmas season.
We come now to the specific accusations of respondents.
They charge Associate Justices Vicente Abad Santos (retired) then
Chairman of the First Division of the Supreme Court as of May
14,1986, Andres Narvasa, Ameurfina M. Herrera, and Pedro Yap for
knowingly and deliberately rendering their "unjust, extended

Resolution of May 14, 1986" dismissing their petition in this case with
manifest and evident bad faith to make the clients of Atty. Sedfrey A.
Ordonez (now the Solicitor General) the "illegal owners" of the
estates of Digna Maravilla, thereby causing the heirs of Ponciano
Maravilla (Digna's eldest brother) undue injury by depriving them of
their rights over the estates of Digna Maravilla (Charge No. Three
before the Tanodbayan). They further charge Justice Yap (and Atty.
Sedfrey Ordonez) of having 11 persuade(ed), inducted(ed) and
influence(ed) the members of the newly organized First Division into
promulgating their "unjust, extended minute Resolution of 14 May
1986" (Charge No. One before the Tanodbayan), which Resolution,
(the "Division Resolution, " for short) is herewith attached as Annex
"A ".
Preliminarily, respondents deny that respondent Ilustre lost three
times in this Court. It cannot be denied, however, that, as stated in
the Resolution of October 28, 1986 of the Court en banc, this is the
third time (in fact, the fourth, if we include Fernandez, et al. vs.
Maravilla, L-18799, 10 SCRA 589 [1964]) that a controversy
involving the estate of the late Digna Maravilla is elevated to this
Court. The first was in G.R. No. L-23225 (37 SCRA 672 [1971],
where this Court ruled:
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the decree of the
court below denying probate of the 1944 will of
Digna Maravilla (Exhibit "A") is reversed and the said
testament is hereby ordered probated. Let the
records be returned to the Court of origin for further
proceedings conformable to law. ...
As stated in the en banc Resolution of October 28, 1986 (hereto
attached as Annex " B ", and hereinafter referred to as the "Banc
Decision") while respondent Ilustre was not a party in that case, upon
remand of the case to the probate Court, she and other children of
the deceased brothers and sisters of the testatrix filed two Motions

13
for Intervention. Respondent Ilustre's participation in the state
involved, therefore, harks back to that first case.
The Court of Appeals resolved the issue of intervention in CA-G.R.
No. 05394, entitled "Heirs of Pastor Maravilla, et al. vs. Hon. Ernesto
S. Tengco, et al." in a Decision penned by Justice Venicio E scolin
(hereinafter referred to as the "Escolin Decision") wherein it was
categorically ruled that there was no point to allowing intervention on
the part of respondent Ilustre, et al., "for failure to show any right or
interest in the estate in question. " Thus:
(2) As heretofore stated, private respondents, in their
counter-petition for mandamus, seek this Court's
resolution on the petitioners' motion for intervention
in Sp. Proc. No. 4977. In their respective pleadings
and memoranda, the parties have lengthily
discussed the issue of whether or not petitioners
may be allowed to intervene; and the same may as
well be determined in the present case, if only 'to
avoid or, at least, minimize further protracted
controversy' between the parties (PCIB vs. Hon.
Escolin, 56 SCRA 266). A resolution of this issue
should render moot and academic the question
anent the disqualification of respondent Judge.
We agree with private respondents that petitioners'
motions for intervention are devoid of merit, for
failure on their part to show any right or interest in
the estate in question. There is no dispute that the
last will and testament of the late Digna Maravilla
had already been admitted to probate in a final
judgment which the Supreme Court promulgated on
March 2, 1971 (G.R. No. L-23225). In the said will
Digna instituted her husband Herminio Maravilla as

xxx xxx xxx

The above testamentary provision for the universal
heirship of Herminio Maravilla over the residue of the
decedent's present and future property legally and
completely excluded the petitioners, as collateral
relatives of the testatrix, from inheriting any part of
the latter's estate through intestate succession or
mixed succession. Having no forced or compulsory
heirs, except her husband, the testatrix had the
absolute freedom to institute the latter as her sole,
universal heir, and such freedom is recognized by
Article 842 of the Civil Code which provides:
ART. 842. One who has no
compulsory heirs may dispose by
will of all his estate or any part of it
in favor of any person having
capacity to succeed.
One who has compulsory heirs may
dispose of his estate provided he
does not contravene the provisions
of this Code with regard to the
legitimate of said heirs.
There is therefore no point in allowing the
petitioners, who clearly appear to have no interest in
the estate, to intervene in the proceedings involving
the settlement thereof.
xxx xxx xxx
The aforesaid Decision was affirmed by this Court in G.R. No. L46155 on November 9, 1977 and has become final. That was the
second case involving the estate filed before this Court.

14
Respondents' contention, therefore, that the statement in the Banc
Resolution "that the Court of Appeals had denied intervention" is an
"unadulterated distortion of the facts" is obviously erroneous and
intended to mislead.
The "Escolin Decision" (in CA-G.R. No. 05394-R), which had
become final, also finally foreclosed any claim that respondent
Ilustre, and those who sought to intervene with her, may have had on
the estate of Digna Maravilla. In unmistakable terms, what the Court
of Appeals held in that Decision, affirmed by this Court, bears
repeating:
The above testamentary provision for the universal
heirship of Herminio Maravilla over the residue of the
decedent's present and future property legally and
completely excluded the petitioners, as collateral
relatives of the testatrix, from inheriting any part of
the latter's estate through intestate succession or
mixed succession. ...
To circumvent that judgment, however, two years later, or on
February 29, 1979, respondent Ilustre, with respondent Laureta as
counsel, filed a complaint for partition of Digna Maravilla's estate and
for damages against the heirs of Digna Maravilla's husband, who had
then passed away (docketed as Civil Case No. X-404), before the
Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental, San Carlos City, Branch
X, presided over by Judge Antonia Corpuz Macandog. That Court,
after declaring defendants therein (private respondents in the petition
under review) in default, ordered "all properties of Digna Maravilla
mentioned in this case to go back to their trunk of origin, the plaintiffs
herein who are represented by Eva Maravilla Ilustre and Eva
Maravilla Ilustre herself" (hereinafter referred to as the "Macandog
Decision"). In addition, the judgment awarded damages to the
respondent Ilustre, et al., (the plaintiffs therein), and the sum of
P100,000.00 to their counsel, respondent Laureta.

A special civil action for certiorari was filed by the defeated parties
(private respondents in the petition under review) before this Court,
docketed as G.R. No. L-58014, praying that the lower Court's
declaration of default in Civil Case No. X-404 and all other actions or
decisions taken thereafter be declared null and void and that the
dismissal of the complaint be ordered. On January 21, 1982, this
Court resolved to refer the case to the Court of Appeals in aid of its
appellate jurisdiction, questions of fact being involved.
In a Decision dated January 14, 1983, the Court of Appeals (Fourth
Division)', 1 in AC-G.R. SP No. 13680 (hereafter called the Busran
Decision"), dismissed the petition and denied certiorari stating in one
breath that "the judgment subject of assail had long become final" (at
p. 13), and in another "for all we know, the judgment below had
already attained finality long ago." The reason relied upon was that
petitioners therein had the remedy of appeal but instead availed of
Certiorari, which is not a substitute therefor.
On motion for reconsideration, however, filed by petitioners (private
respondents in the petition under review), in that appealed case ACGR SP No. 13680), the same Court of Appeals (Fourth Special
Cases Division) 2 in its Resolution of January 20, 1984 (the
"Javellana Resolution"), reconsidered and set aside the BusRan
Decision" and entered another one:
1. Annulling the order of default of the Hon.
respondent Court dated 29 April 1980 and its
decision dated 11 August 1981; and
2. Dismissing private respondents' complaint in Civil
Case No. X-404 and ordering the Hon. respondent
Court not to take further action therein.
Respondent Ilustre challenged that reversal in the present Petition
for Review filed on October 22, 1984. This is the third case brought
before this Court involving the same estate. Review was denied in an

15
extended Resolution by the First Division of this Court in the
challenged Resolution of May 14, 1986, for the following reasons:
The appealed Decision stands on firm legal grounds.
(1) The Order of Default of the Trial Court was
issued in grave abuse of discretion. The Answer was
only one day late besides the fact that when so filed,
the Order of default had not yet been issued by the
Trial Court.
(2) While appeal is, indeed, the remedy from a
judgment by default, certiorari may be resorted to
when a party has been illegally declared in 4 default
Omico Mining & Industrial Corporation vs. Vallejos
63 SCRA 300-301 [19751), or where it is necessary
to restore order to proceedings in the Court below
(Lim Tanhu vs. Ramolete, 66 SCRA 462-463
[19751).

the complaint below in Civil Case X-404 is barred by

the principle of res adjudicata, and whatever
transpired therein are nun and void ab initio and
without any legal effect.
To rule otherwise would upset the fundamental issue
on which res judicata rests that parties ought not to
be permitted to litigate the same issue more than
once, that when a right or fact has been judicially
determined, the judgment of the Court, so long as it
remains unreversed, should be conclusive upon the
parties and those in privity with them in law or estate
(Sarabia vs. Sec. of Agriculture and Natural
Resources, 2 SCRA 54 [1961]).
ACCORDINGLY, the review sought for is denied and
respondent Court's judgment in CA-G.R. SP No.
13080 is hereby affirmed.
SO ORDERED.

(3) More importantly, the judgment of the Trial Court,

in Civil Case No. X-404 declaring that the Testatrix's
collateral relatives have a rightful claim to her estate
to the exclusion of the husband who was designated
her sole and universal heir, nullifies the Will already
probated by final judgment and overturns the
pronouncements of both the Appellate Court and this
Court on the case.
There being former judgments on the issues which
have become final rendered by Courts having
jurisdiction of the subject matter and the parties, the
said judgments having been rendered on the merits,
and there being between the prior and subsequent
action Identity of parties, subject matter and
substantial Identity of cause of action, it is clear that

Respondents decry the fact that the First Division set aside the due
course Order and denied review in an extended Minute Resolution
instead of in a signed Decision. They allege that said Resolution was
"railroaded with such hurry/promptitude unequalled in the entire
history of the Supreme Court under circumstances that have gone
beyond the limits of legal and judicial ethics," unduly "persuaded,
induced and influenced" by Solicitor General Ordonez and Justice
Pedro Yap.
Nothing is farthest from the truth. As explained in the "Banc
Resolution"
The petition for review was assigned to the then First
Division of seven Justices, which initially gave it due
course because the resolution of the Intermediate

16
Appellate Court had reversed a decision originally
rendered by the then Court of Appeals, and in order
to have more time for further study.
Pleadings were submitted, the last being on May 3,
1985, which can be considered as the date when
this case was submitted for resolution.
The First Division of seven (7) was not able to act on
the case up to the February, 1986 political upheaval
The last incident in the case was a motion for the
early release of decision filed by petitioner on
November 19, 1985.
When this Court was reorganized in April of 1986,
the membership of the First Division was reduced to
five (5) Justices. Taking account of the motion of
petitioner for early release of decision, the new First
Division, then chairmanned by Justice Abad Santos,
realizing that the doctrine of res judicata was clearly
applicable not only as to the probate of the will but
also as to the heirship of petitioner, among others,
and their right to intervene and participate in the
proceedings resolved, on May 14, 1986 to
dismiss the petition through an extended resolution
which at the same time recalled the due course
order. The new Division of 5 acted unanimously.
The recall of a due course Order after a review of the records of the
case is a common occurrence in the Court. Respondents speak as if
it were only their petition which has been subjected to such recall.
They have lost all objectivity in this regard. They are hardly qualified,
and cannot presume to speak of the I entire history" of the Supreme
Court.

As to the participation of Justice Yap in the ease, the "Banc

Resolution" stated:
Justice Yap clarified that he was an official mission
to Switzerland for the Presidential Conunission on
Good Government after his appointment to the
Supreme Court an April 11, 1986 and did not
assume his position in the Supreme Court his return
on May 2, 1986. When the resolution of dismissal on
May 14, 1986 was issued, Justice Yap was unaware
that Atty. Sedfrey Ordonez was private respondent's
counsel.
On June 11, 1986, petitioner filed a motion for
reconsideration, which was taken up by the First
Division on July 9, 1986 with Justice Abad Santos
still the Chairman. This time, Justice Yap, realizing
that his former partner, Atty. Ordonez, had submitted
the pleadings for petitioner, inhibited himself and
Justice Edgardo L. Paras was designated under
Special Order No. 21, dated July 9, 1986, to sit in
the Division in his place. The motion for
reconsideration was denied with finality on July 9,
1986.
Justice Yap was designated Chairman of the First
Division on July 14, 1986.
On August 7, 1986, petitioner asked leave to file a
second motion for reconsideration, which was
denied on September 3, 1986, entry of judgment of
the May 14, 1986 resolution having been made on
July 28, 1986. Justice Yap again took no part in the
deliberation of the case.

17
But respondents continue to claim derisively that Justice Yap could
not have been "unaware" of the appearance of Atty. Sedfrey
Ordonez. They reacted by saying "ten it to the marines" (Letters of
November 3, 1986 to Justices Narvasa, Herrera, and Cruz, at p. 8,
respectively). But that was the true and untarnished fact. With so
many cases being handled by the Court, the appearances of lawyers
during deliberative sessions very often escape attention,
concentration being centered on the issues to be resolved.

The aforesaid resolutions were by no means

'railroaded.' The pleadings filed by the parties, as in
any other case, were included in the Agenda of the
First Division as soon as feasible. The Division acts
promptly on all Agenda items, and the minutes of its
deliberations are released as soon as possible after
Agenda day.
xxx xxx xxx

Respondents also fault the Court for "still recogniz(ing) Atty. Ordonez
as counsel" for their opponents in the case. In the same " Banc
Resolution," it was clarified:
A copy of the resolution, dated May 14, 1986, was
sent by the Releasing Clerks to Atty. Sedfrey A.
Ordonez as his name still appears on the cover page
of the Rollo. It was not necessarily because the
Supreme Court still recognizes him as counsel for
respondents (at p. 4)
The fact of the matter is that even Atty. Laureta continued to
recognize Atty. Ordonez as counsel as shown by his pleadings filed
before the Court, which inevitably contained the notation "copy
furnished Atty. Sedfrey Ordonez." No withdrawal of appearance
having been presented by Atty. Ordonez in the main petition, his
name continues to be in the Rollo of the case and the personnel
concerned continue to furnish him with copies of Resolutions of this
Court.
In respect of the charge that the Resolutions of the First Division of
May 14, 1986, July 9, 1986 denying the Motion for Reconsideration
with finality, and September 3, 1986 denying leave to file a second
motion for reconsideration since entry of judgment of the May 14,
1986 Resolution had been made on July 28, 1986, were "unjust" and
were "railroaded," the Banc Resolution, adopting the Division
Resolution, explained:

The dispositions in this case were arrived at after

careful study. Because a case is resolved against
the interests of a party, does not mean that it is an
'unjust decision;' or that it has been "railroaded."
This Division declares without hesitation that it has
consistently rendered justice without fear or favor. (at
p. 4)
Respondents insist that the doctrine of "res judicata" is inapplicable.
In their own words "the ordered probate of the 1944 Will of Digna
Maravilla by judgment of the Supreme Court in G.R. No. L-23225 is
conclusive only as to the genuineness and due execution of said will
but not upon the validity of testamentary provision, particularly with
the invalid designation of Herminio Maravilla as sole and universal
heir of Digna Maravilla."
On this point, the "Javellana Resolution," in reversing the Busran
Decision" AC-GR SP No. 13680), aptly held:
The then Court of Appeals held that the questioned
decision does not run counter to the decision of the
Hon. Supreme Court in G.R. No. L-23225 admitting
the will of Digna Maravilla to probate because the
latter refers to the extrinsic validity of the will while
the former concerns its intrinsic validity. We cannot

18
agree with this observation because it is quite clear
from the questioned decision that the will was in
effect declared not to have been freely and
voluntarily executed by the deceased Digna
Maravilla but was the result of the evil and fraudulent
machinations of her husband, Herminio Maravilla,
and sets aside said will The declaration that private
respondents, as collateral relatives of the deceased
Digna Maravilla, are entitled to her estate, is an
indication that the Hon. respondent Court has
nullified the will. Private respondents are not
compulsory heirs and, in the absence of their being
named legatees or devisees in the will, they could
only lay claim to the estate of Digna Maravilla if the
latter died without a will, pursuant to Art. 1003 of the
New Civil Code, to wit:
Art. 1003. If there are no
descendants
ascendants,
illegitimate children or a surviving
spouse, the collateral relatives shall
succeed to the entire estate of the
deceased in accordance with the
following articles.'
However, assuming arguendo, that the matter
complain d of by private respondents referred only to
the intrinsic validity of the will, still, it was improper
for them to have instituted a separate action in a
court other than that in which the probate proceeding
was pending.
xxx xxx xxx
It seems clear from these provisions
of the law that while the estate is

being settled in the Court of First

Instance in a special proceeding, no
ordinary action can be maintained in
that court or in any other court by a
person claiming to be the heir,
against the executor or against
other persons claiming to be heirs,
for the purpose of having the rights
of the plaintiffs in the estate
determined The very purpose of the
trial or hearing provided for in
section 753 is to settle and
determine those questions, and until
they are settled and determined in
that proceeding and under that
section no action such as the
present one can be maintained.
Considering that the "Escolin Decision, " as affirmed by this Court on
November 9, 1977 in G.R. No. L-46155, had become final, the
"Javellana Resolution" aptly observed:
3. The questioned decision of the Hon. respondent
Court dated 12 August 1981 (referring to the
"Macandog Decision") unsettles and reviews issues
which had long been laid to rest by the Hon.
Supreme Court and the then Court of Appeals.
But respondents ask: if res judicata were applicable, why did this
Court, in G.R. No. L-50814, refer the case to the Court of Appeals?
The answer is simple. The issue of whether the remedy of
petitioners' in that case was appeal and not certiorari had to be
resolved. If certiorari were proper, then the "Macandog Decision" had
not become final. If appeal, its finality would be the consequence.
The "Javellana Resolution," which -reversed the Busran Decision,"
held that certiorari was proper when a party has been illegally

19
declared in default. It follows that the "Macandog Decision" had not
attained finality.
Still undaunted, respondents claim that the Court of Appeals
"deliberately evaded divaricated" two important issues: (1) that the
judgment of the Trial Court (in CC No. X-404) had attained finality as
in fact the Court of Appeals had held that the "judgment of assail had
long become final," and (2) that Digna Maravilla's husband could not
be instituted as the sole and universal heir of the wife on
indestructible ground of moral impossibility and could not inherit
wife's vast estate on the ground of utter unworthiness.
The penchant of respondents for making misleading statements is
again obvious. It was not in the "Javellana Resolution" that the Court
of Appeals held that "the judgment of assail (referring to the
'Macandog Decision') had long become final." That was in the
BurRan Decision," which was precisely reversed by the " Javellana
Resolution."
As to the alleged unworthiness of the husband to inherit from his
wife, the "Javellana Resolution" pointedly observed:
The last will and testament of Digna Maravilla which
instituted her husband, Herminio Maravilla, as her
sole and universal heir, was admitted to probate,
pursuant to a final judgment of the Hon. Supreme
Court in G.R. No. L-23225, 27 February 1971. This
probate foreclosed all questions as to the age and
mental capacity of the testator, the signing of the
document by the testator, or by someone in his
behalf, and the acknowledgment of the instrument
by him in the presence of the required member of
witnesses who affix their signatures to the will to
attest the act. In re Estate of Johnson, 39 Phil. 156,
168). Yet, more than ten years later, the Hon.
respondent Court would nullify the effects of the

probate by declaring that Digna Maravilla did not

voluntarily and sanely execute the probated last will
and testament, unifying the institution of Herminio
Maravilla as her sole and universal heir, and
ordering the return of the properties of Digna
Maravilla to the trunk of origin.
The soundness of the legal conclusions arrived at in the "Escolin
Decision" and "Javellana Resolution" commends itself. Only a
disgruntled litigant and a defeated lawyer would claim that those
judgments were accepted "hook, line and sinker" by this Court. The
doctrine of res judicata is inescapably applicable. Thus it was that the
First Division, in its challenged Resolution of May 14, 1986, found it
unnecessary, after further study, to have a signed Decision and,
instead, recalled the due course Order, which it had previously
issued to give it "more time for further study" (p. 2, Banc Resolution,
October 28, 1986). Contrary to respondents' claim, the Court is not
"duty bound" to render signed Decisions all the time. It has ample
discretion to formulate Decisions and/or minute Resolutions,
provided a legal basis is given, depending on its evaluation of a
case.
But obdurately enough, respondents have seen fit to take their case
to the Tanodbayan charging the members of the First Division of this
Court collectively with having knowingly and deliberately rendered an
"unjust extended minute Resolution" with deliberate bad faith in
violation of Article 204 of the Revised Penal Code 3 and for
deliberately causing "undue injury" to respondent Ilustre and her coheirs because of the 11 unjust Resolution" promulgated, in violation
of the AntiGraft and Corrupt Practices Act. 4
Respondents' action is brazenly unjustifiable. Nor can they plead
ignorance. As aptly declared in the Chief Justice's Statement of
December 24, 1986, which the Court hereby adopts in toto, "(I)t is
elementary that the Supreme Court is supreme the third great
department of government entrusted exclusively with the judicial

20
power to adjudicate with finality all justiciable disputes, public and
private. No other department or agency may pass upon its
judgments or declare them "unjust." " It is elementary that "(A)s has
ever been stressed since the early case of Arnedo vs. Llorente (18
Phil. 257, 263 [1911]) "controlling and irresistible reasons of public
policy and of sound practice in the courts demand that at the risk of
occasional error, judgments of courts determining controversies
submitted to them should become final at some definite time fixed by
law, or by a rule of practice recognized by law, so as to be thereafter
beyond the control even of the court which rendered them for the
purpose of correcting errors of fact or of law, into which, in the
opinion of the court it may have fallen. The very purpose for which
the courts are organized is to put an end to controversy, to decide
the questions submitted to the litigants, and to determine the
respective rights of the parties." (Luzon Brokerage Co., Inc. vs.
Maritime Bldg., Co., Inc., 86 SCRA 305, 316-317)

balances under a republican form of government such as ours, viz.

that the three co-equal branches of government, the executive,
legislative and judicial, are each supreme and independent within the
limits of its own sphere Neither one can interfere with the
performance of the duties of the other. (Forbes vs. Chuoco 16 Phil.
534 [1910]). As restated by the late Justice Jose P. Laurel in the
1936 landmark case of Angara vs. Electoral Commission (63 Phil.
134), our Constitution "as a definition of the powers of
government"placed upon the judiciary the great burden of
"determining the nature, scope and extent of such powers" and
'when the judiciary mediates to allocate constitutional boundaries, it
does not assert any superiority over the other departments . . . but
only asserts the solemn and sacred obligation entrusted to it by the
Constitution to determine conflicting claims of authority under the
Constitution and to establish for the parties in an actual controversy
the rights which the instrument secures and guarantees to them.' "

Respondents should know that the provisions of Article 204 of the

Revised Penal Code as to "rendering knowingly unjust judgment"
refer to an individual judge who does so "in any case submitted to
him for decision" and even then, it is not the prosecutor who would
pass judgment on the "unjustness" of the decision rendered by him
but the proper appellate court with jurisdiction to review the same,
either the Court of Appeals and/or the Supreme Court. Respondents
should likewise know that said penal article has no application to the
members of a collegiate court such as this Court or its Divisions who
reach their conclusions in consultation and accordingly render their
collective judgment after due deliberation. It also follows,
consequently, that a charge of violation of the AntiGraft and Corrupt
Practices Act on the ground that such a collective decision is "unjust"
cannot prosper.

As an officer of the Court, respondent Laureta, should realize that the

cardinal principle he would grossly impair and violate is that of the
independence of the judiciary, which the members of the bar are
called upon to defend and preserve. The independence of the
judiciary is the indispensable means for enforcing the supremacy of
the Constitution and the rule of law.

The Chief Justice's Statement of the supremacy of the Supreme

Court's judicial power is by no means a "display of arrogance" as per
respondents' puerile contention, but a restatement of the
fundamental principle of separation of powers and checks and

To subject to the threat and ordeal of investigation and prosecution, a

judge, more so a member of the Supreme Court for official acts done
by him in good faith and in the regular exercise of official duty and
judicial functions is to subvert and undermine that very
independence of the judiciary, and subordinate the judiciary to the
executive. "For it is a general principle of the highest importance to
the proper administration of justice that a judicial officer in exercising
the authority vested in him, shall be free to act upon his own
convictions, without apprehension of personal consequences to
himself. Liability to answer to everyone who might feel himself
aggrieved by the action of the judge would be inconsistent with the
possession of this freedom, and would destroy that independence

21
without which no judiciary can be either respectable or useful."
(Bradley vs. Fisher, 80 U.S. 335).
Indeed, resolutions of the Supreme Court as a collegiate court,
whether en banc or division, speak for themselves and are entitled to
full faith and credence and are beyond investigation or inquiry under
the same principle of conclusiveness of enrolled bills of the
legislature. (U.S. vs. Pons 34 Phil 729; Gardiner, et al. vs. Parades,
et al., 61 Phil. 118; Mabanag vs. Lopez Vito, 78 Phil. 1) The Supreme
Court's pronouncement of the doctrine that "(I)t is well settled that
the enrolled bill . . . is conclusive upon the courts as regards the
tenor of the measure passed by Congress and approved by the
President. If there has been any mistake in the printing of the bill
before it was certified by the officers of Congress and approved by
the Executive [as claimed by petitioner-importer who unsuccessfully
sought refund of margin fees] on which we cannot speculate,
without jeopardizing the principle of separation of powers and
undermining one of the cornerstones of our democratic system
the remedy is by amendment or curative legislation, not by judicial
decree" is fully and reciprocally applicable to Supreme Court orders,
resolutions and decisions, mutatis mutandis (Casco Phil. Chemical
Co., Inc. vs. Gimenez, 7 SCRA 347, 350. (Citing Primicias vs.
Paredes, 61 Phil. 118, 120; Mabanag vs. Lopez Vito, 78 Phil. 1;
Macias vs. Comelec, 3 SCRA 1)
The Court has consistently stressed that "the doctrine of separation
of powers calls for the executive, legislative and judicial departments
being left alone to discharge their duties as they see fit (Tan vs.
Macapagal, 43 SCRA 677). It has thus maintained in the same way
that the judiciary has a right to expect that neither the President nor
Congress would cast doubt on the mainspring of its orders or
decisions, it should refrain from speculating as to alleged hidden
forces at work that could have impelled either coordinate branch into
acting the way it did. The concept of separation of powers
presupposes mutual respect by and between the three departments
of the government. (Tecson vs. Salas, 34 SCRA 275, 286-287)

To allow litigants to go beyond the Court's resolution and claim that

the members acted "with deliberate bad faith" and rendered and
"unjust resolution" in disregard or violation of the duty of their high
office to act upon their own independent consideration and judgment
of the matter at hand would be to destroy the authenticity, integrity
and conclusiveness of such collegiate acts and resolutions and to
disregard utterly the presumption of regular performance of official
duty. To allow such collateral attack would destroy the separation of
powers and undermine the role of the Supreme Court as the final
arbiter of all justiciable disputes.
Dissatisfied litigants and/or their counsels cannot without violating
the separation of powers mandated by the Constitution relitigate in
another forum the final judgment of this Court on legal issues
submitted by them and their adversaries for final determination to
and by the Supreme Court and which fall within the judicial power to
determine and adjudicate exclusively vested by the Constitution in
the Supreme Court and in such inferior courts as may be established
by law.
In resume, we find that respondent Ilustre has transcended the
permissible bounds of fair comment and criticism to the detriment of
the orderly administration of justice in her letters addressed to the
individual Justices quoted in the show-cause Resolution of this Court
en banc, particularly the underlined portions thereof; in the language
of the charges she filed before the Tanodbayan quoted and
underscored in the same Resolution; in her statements, conduct,
acts and charges against the Supreme Court and/or the official
actions of the Justices concerned and her ascription of improper
motives to them; and in her unjustified outburst that she can no
longer expect justice from this Court. The fact that said letters are not
technically considered pleadings, nor the fact that they were
submitted after the main petition had been finally resolved does not
detract from the gravity of the contempt committed. The
constitutional right of freedom of speech or right to privacy cannot be
used as a shield for contemptuous acts against the Court.

22
We likewise find that Atty. Laureta has committed acts unbecoming
an officer of the Court for his stance of dangling threats of bringing
the matter to the "proper forum" to effect a change of the Court's
adverse Resolution; for his lack of respect for and exposing to public
ridicule, the two highest Courts of the land by challenging in bad faith
their integrity and claiming that they knowingly rendered unjust
judgments (Montecillo vs. Gica 60 SCRA 234 [1974]); for authoring,
or at the very least, assisting and/or abetting and/or not preventing
the contemptuous statements, conduct, acts and malicious charges
of his client, respondent Ilustre, notwithstanding his disclaimer that
he had absolutely nothing to do with them, which we find disputed by
the facts and circumstances of record as above stated; for totally
disregarding the facts and circumstances and legal considerations
set forth in this Court's Resolutions of the First Division and en banc,
as the Tribunal of last resort; for making it appear that the Justices of
this Court and other respondents before the Tanodbayan are
charged with "graft and corruption" when the complaint before the
Tanodbayan, in essence, is a tirade from a disgruntled litigant and a
defeated counsel in a case that has been brought thrice before this
Court, and who would readily accept anything but the soundness of
the judgments of the Courts concerned, all with the manifest intent to
bring the Justices of this Court and of the Court of Appeals into
disrepute and to subvert public confidence in the Courts.
Atty. Laureta should be reminded that his first duty is not to his client
but to the administration of justice; to that end, his chent's success is
wholly subordinate; and his conduct ought to and must always be
scrupulously observant of law and ethics. For like the Court itself, "a
lawyer is an instrument or agency to advance the ends of justice."
(Surigao Mineral Conservation Board vs. Cloribel, 31 SCRA 1 [1970];
Castaneda vs. Ago, 65 SCRA 505 [1975[).
In assessing the penalty on respondent Laureta, the Court notes that
"disciplinary proceedings against lawyers are suit generis. Neither
purely civil nor purely criminal, they do not involve a trial of an action
or a suit, but are rather investigations by the Court into the conduct

of one of its officers. Not being intended to inflict punishment, it is in

no sense a criminal prosecution. Accordingly, there is neither a plaint
nor a prosecutor therein. It may be initiated by the Court motu
proprio. Public interest is its primary objective, and the real question
for determination is whether or not the attorney is still a fit person to
be allowed the privileges as such. Hence, in the exercise of its
disciplinary powers, the Court merely calls upon a member of the Bar
to account for his actions as an officer of the Court with the end in
view of preserving the purity of the legal profession and the proper
and honest administration of justice by purging the profession of
members who by their misconduct have proved themselves no
longer worthy to be entrusted with the duties and responsibilities
pertaining to the office of an attorney." Viewed in the light of the
demonstrated persistence of grave misconduct and undermining
public confidence in the honor and integrity of the Court and its
members (at a time when the Court is exerting every effort to regain
public confidence in our courts after the trauma and debacle
undergone by them in the past regime), the Court shall impose upon
him an indefinite suspension, leaving it to him to prove at some
future and opportune time, that he shag have once again regained
the fitness to be allowed to resume the practice of law as an officer of
the Courts. (In re: Almacen, 31 SCRA 562)
ACCORDINGLY, (1) respondent Eva Maravilla Ilustre is hereby held
in contempt, and is hereby fined in the amount of P1,000.00 only,
mindful that the power of contempt should be exercised on the
preservative and not on the vindictive principle of punishment; and
(2) Atty. Wenceslao Laureta is found guilty of grave professional
misconduct, rendering him unfit to continue to be entrusted with the
duties and responsibilities belonging to the office of an attorney, and
is hereby suspended from the practice of law until further Orders, the
suspension to take effect immediately.

23
Let copies of this Resolution be circulated to all Courts of the country
for their information and guidance, and spread in the personal record
of Atty. Wenceslao Laureta.

Teehankee, C.J., Fernan, Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Alampay,

Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Paras, Feliciano, Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin,
Sarmiento and Cortes, JJ., concur.

SO ORDERED.

Yap, J., took no part.