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RESOLUTION
PER CURIAM:
2
these three minute- resolutions in question. For the
members thereof cannot claim immunity when their
action runs afoul with penal sanctions, even in the
performance of official functions; like others, none of
the division members are above the law.
In our quest for justice, we wish to avoid doing
injustice to anyone, particularly the members of the
First Division, providing that they had no hand in the
promulgation of the resolution in question. That is
why we are requesting you to inform us your
participation in the promulgation of these resolutions
in question. Even we who are poor are also capable
of playing fair even to those who take advantage of
our poverty by sheer power and influence. We shall
then wait for your reply. If, however, we do not hear
from you after a week, then we will consider your
silence that you supported the dismissal of our
petition. We will then be guided accordingly.
(Emphasis supplied).
The letter also attacked the participation in the case of Justice Pedro
L. Yap, Chairman of the First Division in this wise:
As Division Chairman, Associate Justice Pedro Yap,
as a copy of Resolution dated 14 May 1986 we
received indicate, did not even have the elementary
courtesy of putting on record that he voluntarily
inhibited himself from participating in the
promulgation of this minute-resolution, although an
extended one, which he should have done
consistent with judicial decorum and the Canons of
Judicial Ethics. After he is the law partner of Atty.
Sedfrey A. Ordonez counsel for respondents, now
the distinguished Solicitor General ... indicative that
even at this stage of the proceeding in point of time,
3
without merit and since the
members the new ones knew
nothing about the case, readily
agreed to the dismissal of the
petition by a minute. resolution
an extended one. After all, this was
the case of the Solicitor General. If
this is what happened, then we are
sorry to say that you were
deliberately "had"
After ala the 14 May 1986 untenable
minute resolution although an
extended one, does not bear the
signatures of the Division members.
The members should have signed
the resolution, after ala the Supreme
Court had given the petition due
course, indicating whether they
concur, dissent or otherwise abstain
from voting.
The letter to Justice Herrera went on to state:
We assume, of course, that you had studied the
case thoroughly since you were with the original
First Division under the chairmanship of then Justice
Claudio Teehankee. We assure you that we will
bring this case before another forum to hold
responsible the members of the Division who
participated in the dismissal of the case by the
unjust minute-resolutions, knowingly rendered for
intended objective that your conscience you are
aware.
xxx xxx xxx
4
Justice Yap was unaware that Atty. Ordonez was private
respondents' counsel; that upon realization thereof, Justice Yap
inhibited himself from further participation in the case; and that
Justice Yap was designated Chairman of the First Division only on 14
July 1986, after the compulsory retirement of Justice Vicente Abad
Santos on 12 July 1986. The Resolution of the First Division
(incorporated herein by reference) concluded thus:
The dispositions in this case were arrived at after
careful study. Because a case is resolved against
the interests of a party, does not mean that it is an
"unjust decision" or that it has been "railroaded".
This Division declares without hesitation that it has
consistently rendered justice without fear or favor.
YAP, J., took no part.
On 3 November 1986, petitioner again addressed similar letters to
Justices Narvasa, Herrera, and Cruz, (incorporated herein by
reference), excerpts from which follow:
It is rather amazing that when we wrote you our
previous letter, we never dreamed that you would
rush, as you did rush for assistance en consults with
the Honorable Court en banc. The unfortunate part
of it all is the fact that the Court en banc had to
promulgate its resolution dated 28 October 1986
which to us when considered in its entirety, is just as
untenable as the First Division extended and
unsigned minute-resolution of 14 May 1986.
Evidently you misunderstood our point of inquiry, to
wit: 'Did you or did you not approve the dismissal of
our petition under
1) The l4 May l986 minute resolution? Yes or No.
5
Anyhow, whether you referred our letter to the Court
en banc consults) or not, the situation remains the
same. At the proper time, as we said, we will bring
this case before another forum of justice where the
members of the First Division, in fact the Honorable
Court en banc may no longer deny our action by
mere untenable and unjust minute resolutions.
Better believe it that we intend to hold responsible
members of the First Division who took part in the
promulgation of the untenable and unjust extended
minute-resolution that is not even signed by any of
those who promulgated it; therefore, to us, is clearly
bereft of judicial integrity from its very inception on
14 May 1986.
6
the fight, just forget it. Ignoramus that we are, better
believe it when we say we are prepared to carry the
fight before another forum of justice. When we do,
we shall call for a press conference with TV and
radio coverage, so that we can present to the entire
nation our quest for justice against the steam-roller
of power and influence and, at the same time, to call
the attention of the people to the manner in which
the members of the highest tribunal of the land
perform their respective individual and collective
functions in the domain of this most sensitive area of
decision making.
Allow us to restate our previous and now, our
present inquiry, to wit:
Did you or did you not approve the dismissal of our
petition under
a) The l4 May l986 minute resolution? Yes or No.
b) The 9 July l986 minute resolution? Yes or No.
c) The 3 Sept. 1986 minute resolution? Yes or No.
(Emphasis supplied).
True to her threats, after having lost her case before this Court,
petitioner filed on 16 December 1986 an Affidavit-Complaint before
the Tanodbayan, totally disregarding the facts and circumstances
and legal considerations set forth in this Court's aforecited
Resolutions of the First Division and en banc. Some Members of this
Court were maliciously charged with having knowingly and
deliberately rendered, with bad faith, an unjust, extended Minute
Resolution "making" her opponents the "illegal owners" of vast
estates. Some Justices of the Court of Appeals were similarly
maliciously charged with knowingly rendering their "unjust resolution"
7
violation of Section 3, sub-letter (a) of Republic Act
No. 3019, as amended, ... ; and
8
the Complaint was actually filed by a disgruntled litigant and her
counsel after having lost her case thrice in this Court.
9
case before the Supreme Court not because of lack of merit or of its
own merits, assisted by attorneys who offered their services in the
prosecution of my case;" (5) the newspaper publicity of this case
"was no fault of mine; neither is it the fault of my former counsel
Dean Wenceslao Laureta, " who prevailed upon her to call off the
press conference with TV and radio coverage; that she is not a
"disgruntled litigant" who thrice lost before the Court, rather, she has
challenged the validity of the resolutions of the Court "containing
distortion of facts, conjectures and mistaken inferences" particularly,
in that (a) there is no res judicata, (b) the Court of Appeals in its
decision declared that the judgment of the trial Court had long
attained finality, so that it can no longer be set aside, (c) her 11
opponents," clients of Atty. Ordonez, are not entitled to own her
aunt's "vast properties" whether under the law of testate or intestate
succession or mixed succession," (d) that the statement in this
Court's Resolution that the Court of Appeals had denied intervention
is an "unadulterated distortion of the facts;" (b) the statement in the
en banc Resolution that some Justices of the Court of Appeals were
similarly maliciously charged with knowingly rendering their "unjust
resolution" of 20 January 1984 is a bit "premature, a pre-judgment
over a case over which this Court does not have jurisdiction;" (7)
Atty. Laureta is not her counsel in the case before the Tanodbayan;
(8) before the latter body, she has "established not only probable
cause but has also proved the collective culpability (of the Justices
concerned) as charged;" (9) and that her 53 page Motion for
Reconsideration before the Tanodbayan is made an integral part of
her Answer.
(2)
In his own Answer, Atty. Laureta maintains substantially that: (1) he is
not respondent Ilustre's counsel before the Tanodbayan and that she
has consulted and/or engaged the services of other attorneys in the
course of the prosecution of her case, fike Atty. Edgardo M.
Salandanan and Atty. Vedastro B. Gesmundo; that he just learned
from other sources that respondent llustre was planning to bring her
10
record of this case. Justice Yap had "never voluntarily entered on the
record his inhibition" when he should have done so when respondent
Ilustre's petition was taken up; Justice Yap's partner, Atty. Ordonez,
continued to be recognized by this Court as counsel for private
respondents even as he was the Solicitor General; (b) finally,
"appearances to the contrary notwithstanding, he has not colted acts
unworthy of his profession. The truth of the matter is, he should at
least be credited in whatever small way for his acts and efforts taken
by him to protect and uphold the honor and dignity of the Honorable
Court.
We find the explanations of both Ms. Ilustre and Atty. Laureta
unsatisfactory. Their claims that they had done nothing that could
constitute an affront to the honor and dignity of this Court dissipate in
the face of attendant facts and circumstances and "defy every
vestige of human understanding," to use their own language. Indeed,
they should not "think that they will win a hearing by the sheer
multiplication of words." (Mathew 6:7).
Respondents' reliance on the "privacy of communication" is
misplaced. Letters addressed to individual Justices, in connection
with the performance of their judicial functions become part of the
judicial record and are a matter of concern for the entire Court. The
contumacious character of those letters constrained the First Division
to refer the same to the Court en banc, en consults and so that the
Court en banc could pass upon the judicial acts of the Division. It
was only in the exercise of forbearance by the Court that it refrained
from issuing immediately a show cause order in the expectancy that
after having read the Resolution of the Court en banc of October 28,
1986, respondents would realize the unjustness and unfairness of
their accusations.
11
Those same terms are reproduced verbatim in the letters ostensibly
authored by respondent Ilustre addressed to the individual Justices
whom respondents have charged. Thus:
We consider the three minute resolutions ...
railroaded with such hurry/promptitude unequalled in
the entire history of the Supreme Court under
circumstances that have gone beyond the limits of
legal and judicial ethics" ltr., to Justice Narvasa, p. 2;
Itr., to Justice Herrera, p. 2; Itr., to Justice Cruz, p.
2).
xxx xxx xxx
with such unusual hurry/promptitude unequalled in
the entire history of the Supreme Court (Ltr., to
Justice Narvasa, p. 5; Itr., to Justice Herrera, p. 5;
Itr., to Justice Cruz, p. 5).
The same terminologies are reiterated in the Complaint and in the
Motion for Reconsideration filed before the Tanodbayan (p. 2).
Further, in his Manifestation & Motion, dated June 25, 1986, Atty.
Laureta stated:
counsel for petitioner personally inquired from
Division Clerk of Court Corazon Served the
following:
(1) When was the above-entitled case deliberated by
the First Division?
(2) Are there recorded minutes of such deliberation?
12
envelopes bearing the name of respondent Laureta, who was heard
over the radio speaking on the same complaint, and that he was
following up the complaint and the motion for reconsideration of the
order of dismissal of the Tanodbayan.
Furthermore, respondent Laureta as his co-respondent Ilustre's
lawyer had control of the proceedings. As stressed by this Court in
an early case, as such lawyer, "Whatever steps his client takes
should be within his knowledge and responsibility. Indeed, Canon 16
of the Canons of Legal E times should be reminded him that '(a)
lawyer should use his best efforts to restrain and to prevent his
clients from doing those things which the lawyer himself ought not to
do, particularly with reference to their conduct towards courts, judicial
officers, jurors, witnesses and suitors. If a client pursuits in such
wrongdoing the lawyer should terminate their relation.' " (In Re:
Contempt Proceedings in Surigao Mineral Reservation Board vs.
Cloribel, 31 SCRA 1, 23) Respondent Laureta manifestly failed to
discharge such responsibility. For all intents and purposes, he
appears to have encouraged and abetted his client in denigrating the
members of the First Division of this Court, by baselessly charging
them with rendering an "unjust" resolution with "deliberate bad faith,"
because of his stubborn insistence on his untenable arguments
which had been rejected as without merit by the Court's First
Division, whose Resolution was upheld by the Court en banc. Worse,
the dissemination in the print and broadcast media in bold captions
falsely depicting the Justices as "FAC(ING) GRAFT CHARGES"
instead of the baseless rantings of a disgruntled litigant appear to
have been timed to place them in a bad light at the height of the
Christmas season.
We come now to the specific accusations of respondents.
They charge Associate Justices Vicente Abad Santos (retired) then
Chairman of the First Division of the Supreme Court as of May
14,1986, Andres Narvasa, Ameurfina M. Herrera, and Pedro Yap for
knowingly and deliberately rendering their "unjust, extended
Resolution of May 14, 1986" dismissing their petition in this case with
manifest and evident bad faith to make the clients of Atty. Sedfrey A.
Ordonez (now the Solicitor General) the "illegal owners" of the
estates of Digna Maravilla, thereby causing the heirs of Ponciano
Maravilla (Digna's eldest brother) undue injury by depriving them of
their rights over the estates of Digna Maravilla (Charge No. Three
before the Tanodbayan). They further charge Justice Yap (and Atty.
Sedfrey Ordonez) of having 11 persuade(ed), inducted(ed) and
influence(ed) the members of the newly organized First Division into
promulgating their "unjust, extended minute Resolution of 14 May
1986" (Charge No. One before the Tanodbayan), which Resolution,
(the "Division Resolution, " for short) is herewith attached as Annex
"A ".
Preliminarily, respondents deny that respondent Ilustre lost three
times in this Court. It cannot be denied, however, that, as stated in
the Resolution of October 28, 1986 of the Court en banc, this is the
third time (in fact, the fourth, if we include Fernandez, et al. vs.
Maravilla, L-18799, 10 SCRA 589 [1964]) that a controversy
involving the estate of the late Digna Maravilla is elevated to this
Court. The first was in G.R. No. L-23225 (37 SCRA 672 [1971],
where this Court ruled:
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the decree of the
court below denying probate of the 1944 will of
Digna Maravilla (Exhibit "A") is reversed and the said
testament is hereby ordered probated. Let the
records be returned to the Court of origin for further
proceedings conformable to law. ...
As stated in the en banc Resolution of October 28, 1986 (hereto
attached as Annex " B ", and hereinafter referred to as the "Banc
Decision") while respondent Ilustre was not a party in that case, upon
remand of the case to the probate Court, she and other children of
the deceased brothers and sisters of the testatrix filed two Motions
13
for Intervention. Respondent Ilustre's participation in the state
involved, therefore, harks back to that first case.
The Court of Appeals resolved the issue of intervention in CA-G.R.
No. 05394, entitled "Heirs of Pastor Maravilla, et al. vs. Hon. Ernesto
S. Tengco, et al." in a Decision penned by Justice Venicio E scolin
(hereinafter referred to as the "Escolin Decision") wherein it was
categorically ruled that there was no point to allowing intervention on
the part of respondent Ilustre, et al., "for failure to show any right or
interest in the estate in question. " Thus:
(2) As heretofore stated, private respondents, in their
counter-petition for mandamus, seek this Court's
resolution on the petitioners' motion for intervention
in Sp. Proc. No. 4977. In their respective pleadings
and memoranda, the parties have lengthily
discussed the issue of whether or not petitioners
may be allowed to intervene; and the same may as
well be determined in the present case, if only 'to
avoid or, at least, minimize further protracted
controversy' between the parties (PCIB vs. Hon.
Escolin, 56 SCRA 266). A resolution of this issue
should render moot and academic the question
anent the disqualification of respondent Judge.
We agree with private respondents that petitioners'
motions for intervention are devoid of merit, for
failure on their part to show any right or interest in
the estate in question. There is no dispute that the
last will and testament of the late Digna Maravilla
had already been admitted to probate in a final
judgment which the Supreme Court promulgated on
March 2, 1971 (G.R. No. L-23225). In the said will
Digna instituted her husband Herminio Maravilla as
14
Respondents' contention, therefore, that the statement in the Banc
Resolution "that the Court of Appeals had denied intervention" is an
"unadulterated distortion of the facts" is obviously erroneous and
intended to mislead.
The "Escolin Decision" (in CA-G.R. No. 05394-R), which had
become final, also finally foreclosed any claim that respondent
Ilustre, and those who sought to intervene with her, may have had on
the estate of Digna Maravilla. In unmistakable terms, what the Court
of Appeals held in that Decision, affirmed by this Court, bears
repeating:
The above testamentary provision for the universal
heirship of Herminio Maravilla over the residue of the
decedent's present and future property legally and
completely excluded the petitioners, as collateral
relatives of the testatrix, from inheriting any part of
the latter's estate through intestate succession or
mixed succession. ...
To circumvent that judgment, however, two years later, or on
February 29, 1979, respondent Ilustre, with respondent Laureta as
counsel, filed a complaint for partition of Digna Maravilla's estate and
for damages against the heirs of Digna Maravilla's husband, who had
then passed away (docketed as Civil Case No. X-404), before the
Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental, San Carlos City, Branch
X, presided over by Judge Antonia Corpuz Macandog. That Court,
after declaring defendants therein (private respondents in the petition
under review) in default, ordered "all properties of Digna Maravilla
mentioned in this case to go back to their trunk of origin, the plaintiffs
herein who are represented by Eva Maravilla Ilustre and Eva
Maravilla Ilustre herself" (hereinafter referred to as the "Macandog
Decision"). In addition, the judgment awarded damages to the
respondent Ilustre, et al., (the plaintiffs therein), and the sum of
P100,000.00 to their counsel, respondent Laureta.
A special civil action for certiorari was filed by the defeated parties
(private respondents in the petition under review) before this Court,
docketed as G.R. No. L-58014, praying that the lower Court's
declaration of default in Civil Case No. X-404 and all other actions or
decisions taken thereafter be declared null and void and that the
dismissal of the complaint be ordered. On January 21, 1982, this
Court resolved to refer the case to the Court of Appeals in aid of its
appellate jurisdiction, questions of fact being involved.
In a Decision dated January 14, 1983, the Court of Appeals (Fourth
Division)', 1 in AC-G.R. SP No. 13680 (hereafter called the Busran
Decision"), dismissed the petition and denied certiorari stating in one
breath that "the judgment subject of assail had long become final" (at
p. 13), and in another "for all we know, the judgment below had
already attained finality long ago." The reason relied upon was that
petitioners therein had the remedy of appeal but instead availed of
Certiorari, which is not a substitute therefor.
On motion for reconsideration, however, filed by petitioners (private
respondents in the petition under review), in that appealed case ACGR SP No. 13680), the same Court of Appeals (Fourth Special
Cases Division) 2 in its Resolution of January 20, 1984 (the
"Javellana Resolution"), reconsidered and set aside the BusRan
Decision" and entered another one:
1. Annulling the order of default of the Hon.
respondent Court dated 29 April 1980 and its
decision dated 11 August 1981; and
2. Dismissing private respondents' complaint in Civil
Case No. X-404 and ordering the Hon. respondent
Court not to take further action therein.
Respondent Ilustre challenged that reversal in the present Petition
for Review filed on October 22, 1984. This is the third case brought
before this Court involving the same estate. Review was denied in an
15
extended Resolution by the First Division of this Court in the
challenged Resolution of May 14, 1986, for the following reasons:
The appealed Decision stands on firm legal grounds.
(1) The Order of Default of the Trial Court was
issued in grave abuse of discretion. The Answer was
only one day late besides the fact that when so filed,
the Order of default had not yet been issued by the
Trial Court.
(2) While appeal is, indeed, the remedy from a
judgment by default, certiorari may be resorted to
when a party has been illegally declared in 4 default
Omico Mining & Industrial Corporation vs. Vallejos
63 SCRA 300-301 [19751), or where it is necessary
to restore order to proceedings in the Court below
(Lim Tanhu vs. Ramolete, 66 SCRA 462-463
[19751).
Respondents decry the fact that the First Division set aside the due
course Order and denied review in an extended Minute Resolution
instead of in a signed Decision. They allege that said Resolution was
"railroaded with such hurry/promptitude unequalled in the entire
history of the Supreme Court under circumstances that have gone
beyond the limits of legal and judicial ethics," unduly "persuaded,
induced and influenced" by Solicitor General Ordonez and Justice
Pedro Yap.
Nothing is farthest from the truth. As explained in the "Banc
Resolution"
The petition for review was assigned to the then First
Division of seven Justices, which initially gave it due
course because the resolution of the Intermediate
16
Appellate Court had reversed a decision originally
rendered by the then Court of Appeals, and in order
to have more time for further study.
Pleadings were submitted, the last being on May 3,
1985, which can be considered as the date when
this case was submitted for resolution.
The First Division of seven (7) was not able to act on
the case up to the February, 1986 political upheaval
The last incident in the case was a motion for the
early release of decision filed by petitioner on
November 19, 1985.
When this Court was reorganized in April of 1986,
the membership of the First Division was reduced to
five (5) Justices. Taking account of the motion of
petitioner for early release of decision, the new First
Division, then chairmanned by Justice Abad Santos,
realizing that the doctrine of res judicata was clearly
applicable not only as to the probate of the will but
also as to the heirship of petitioner, among others,
and their right to intervene and participate in the
proceedings resolved, on May 14, 1986 to
dismiss the petition through an extended resolution
which at the same time recalled the due course
order. The new Division of 5 acted unanimously.
The recall of a due course Order after a review of the records of the
case is a common occurrence in the Court. Respondents speak as if
it were only their petition which has been subjected to such recall.
They have lost all objectivity in this regard. They are hardly qualified,
and cannot presume to speak of the I entire history" of the Supreme
Court.
17
But respondents continue to claim derisively that Justice Yap could
not have been "unaware" of the appearance of Atty. Sedfrey
Ordonez. They reacted by saying "ten it to the marines" (Letters of
November 3, 1986 to Justices Narvasa, Herrera, and Cruz, at p. 8,
respectively). But that was the true and untarnished fact. With so
many cases being handled by the Court, the appearances of lawyers
during deliberative sessions very often escape attention,
concentration being centered on the issues to be resolved.
Respondents also fault the Court for "still recogniz(ing) Atty. Ordonez
as counsel" for their opponents in the case. In the same " Banc
Resolution," it was clarified:
A copy of the resolution, dated May 14, 1986, was
sent by the Releasing Clerks to Atty. Sedfrey A.
Ordonez as his name still appears on the cover page
of the Rollo. It was not necessarily because the
Supreme Court still recognizes him as counsel for
respondents (at p. 4)
The fact of the matter is that even Atty. Laureta continued to
recognize Atty. Ordonez as counsel as shown by his pleadings filed
before the Court, which inevitably contained the notation "copy
furnished Atty. Sedfrey Ordonez." No withdrawal of appearance
having been presented by Atty. Ordonez in the main petition, his
name continues to be in the Rollo of the case and the personnel
concerned continue to furnish him with copies of Resolutions of this
Court.
In respect of the charge that the Resolutions of the First Division of
May 14, 1986, July 9, 1986 denying the Motion for Reconsideration
with finality, and September 3, 1986 denying leave to file a second
motion for reconsideration since entry of judgment of the May 14,
1986 Resolution had been made on July 28, 1986, were "unjust" and
were "railroaded," the Banc Resolution, adopting the Division
Resolution, explained:
18
agree with this observation because it is quite clear
from the questioned decision that the will was in
effect declared not to have been freely and
voluntarily executed by the deceased Digna
Maravilla but was the result of the evil and fraudulent
machinations of her husband, Herminio Maravilla,
and sets aside said will The declaration that private
respondents, as collateral relatives of the deceased
Digna Maravilla, are entitled to her estate, is an
indication that the Hon. respondent Court has
nullified the will. Private respondents are not
compulsory heirs and, in the absence of their being
named legatees or devisees in the will, they could
only lay claim to the estate of Digna Maravilla if the
latter died without a will, pursuant to Art. 1003 of the
New Civil Code, to wit:
Art. 1003. If there are no
descendants
ascendants,
illegitimate children or a surviving
spouse, the collateral relatives shall
succeed to the entire estate of the
deceased in accordance with the
following articles.'
However, assuming arguendo, that the matter
complain d of by private respondents referred only to
the intrinsic validity of the will, still, it was improper
for them to have instituted a separate action in a
court other than that in which the probate proceeding
was pending.
xxx xxx xxx
It seems clear from these provisions
of the law that while the estate is
19
declared in default. It follows that the "Macandog Decision" had not
attained finality.
Still undaunted, respondents claim that the Court of Appeals
"deliberately evaded divaricated" two important issues: (1) that the
judgment of the Trial Court (in CC No. X-404) had attained finality as
in fact the Court of Appeals had held that the "judgment of assail had
long become final," and (2) that Digna Maravilla's husband could not
be instituted as the sole and universal heir of the wife on
indestructible ground of moral impossibility and could not inherit
wife's vast estate on the ground of utter unworthiness.
The penchant of respondents for making misleading statements is
again obvious. It was not in the "Javellana Resolution" that the Court
of Appeals held that "the judgment of assail (referring to the
'Macandog Decision') had long become final." That was in the
BurRan Decision," which was precisely reversed by the " Javellana
Resolution."
As to the alleged unworthiness of the husband to inherit from his
wife, the "Javellana Resolution" pointedly observed:
The last will and testament of Digna Maravilla which
instituted her husband, Herminio Maravilla, as her
sole and universal heir, was admitted to probate,
pursuant to a final judgment of the Hon. Supreme
Court in G.R. No. L-23225, 27 February 1971. This
probate foreclosed all questions as to the age and
mental capacity of the testator, the signing of the
document by the testator, or by someone in his
behalf, and the acknowledgment of the instrument
by him in the presence of the required member of
witnesses who affix their signatures to the will to
attest the act. In re Estate of Johnson, 39 Phil. 156,
168). Yet, more than ten years later, the Hon.
respondent Court would nullify the effects of the
20
power to adjudicate with finality all justiciable disputes, public and
private. No other department or agency may pass upon its
judgments or declare them "unjust." " It is elementary that "(A)s has
ever been stressed since the early case of Arnedo vs. Llorente (18
Phil. 257, 263 [1911]) "controlling and irresistible reasons of public
policy and of sound practice in the courts demand that at the risk of
occasional error, judgments of courts determining controversies
submitted to them should become final at some definite time fixed by
law, or by a rule of practice recognized by law, so as to be thereafter
beyond the control even of the court which rendered them for the
purpose of correcting errors of fact or of law, into which, in the
opinion of the court it may have fallen. The very purpose for which
the courts are organized is to put an end to controversy, to decide
the questions submitted to the litigants, and to determine the
respective rights of the parties." (Luzon Brokerage Co., Inc. vs.
Maritime Bldg., Co., Inc., 86 SCRA 305, 316-317)
21
without which no judiciary can be either respectable or useful."
(Bradley vs. Fisher, 80 U.S. 335).
Indeed, resolutions of the Supreme Court as a collegiate court,
whether en banc or division, speak for themselves and are entitled to
full faith and credence and are beyond investigation or inquiry under
the same principle of conclusiveness of enrolled bills of the
legislature. (U.S. vs. Pons 34 Phil 729; Gardiner, et al. vs. Parades,
et al., 61 Phil. 118; Mabanag vs. Lopez Vito, 78 Phil. 1) The Supreme
Court's pronouncement of the doctrine that "(I)t is well settled that
the enrolled bill . . . is conclusive upon the courts as regards the
tenor of the measure passed by Congress and approved by the
President. If there has been any mistake in the printing of the bill
before it was certified by the officers of Congress and approved by
the Executive [as claimed by petitioner-importer who unsuccessfully
sought refund of margin fees] on which we cannot speculate,
without jeopardizing the principle of separation of powers and
undermining one of the cornerstones of our democratic system
the remedy is by amendment or curative legislation, not by judicial
decree" is fully and reciprocally applicable to Supreme Court orders,
resolutions and decisions, mutatis mutandis (Casco Phil. Chemical
Co., Inc. vs. Gimenez, 7 SCRA 347, 350. (Citing Primicias vs.
Paredes, 61 Phil. 118, 120; Mabanag vs. Lopez Vito, 78 Phil. 1;
Macias vs. Comelec, 3 SCRA 1)
The Court has consistently stressed that "the doctrine of separation
of powers calls for the executive, legislative and judicial departments
being left alone to discharge their duties as they see fit (Tan vs.
Macapagal, 43 SCRA 677). It has thus maintained in the same way
that the judiciary has a right to expect that neither the President nor
Congress would cast doubt on the mainspring of its orders or
decisions, it should refrain from speculating as to alleged hidden
forces at work that could have impelled either coordinate branch into
acting the way it did. The concept of separation of powers
presupposes mutual respect by and between the three departments
of the government. (Tecson vs. Salas, 34 SCRA 275, 286-287)
22
We likewise find that Atty. Laureta has committed acts unbecoming
an officer of the Court for his stance of dangling threats of bringing
the matter to the "proper forum" to effect a change of the Court's
adverse Resolution; for his lack of respect for and exposing to public
ridicule, the two highest Courts of the land by challenging in bad faith
their integrity and claiming that they knowingly rendered unjust
judgments (Montecillo vs. Gica 60 SCRA 234 [1974]); for authoring,
or at the very least, assisting and/or abetting and/or not preventing
the contemptuous statements, conduct, acts and malicious charges
of his client, respondent Ilustre, notwithstanding his disclaimer that
he had absolutely nothing to do with them, which we find disputed by
the facts and circumstances of record as above stated; for totally
disregarding the facts and circumstances and legal considerations
set forth in this Court's Resolutions of the First Division and en banc,
as the Tribunal of last resort; for making it appear that the Justices of
this Court and other respondents before the Tanodbayan are
charged with "graft and corruption" when the complaint before the
Tanodbayan, in essence, is a tirade from a disgruntled litigant and a
defeated counsel in a case that has been brought thrice before this
Court, and who would readily accept anything but the soundness of
the judgments of the Courts concerned, all with the manifest intent to
bring the Justices of this Court and of the Court of Appeals into
disrepute and to subvert public confidence in the Courts.
Atty. Laureta should be reminded that his first duty is not to his client
but to the administration of justice; to that end, his chent's success is
wholly subordinate; and his conduct ought to and must always be
scrupulously observant of law and ethics. For like the Court itself, "a
lawyer is an instrument or agency to advance the ends of justice."
(Surigao Mineral Conservation Board vs. Cloribel, 31 SCRA 1 [1970];
Castaneda vs. Ago, 65 SCRA 505 [1975[).
In assessing the penalty on respondent Laureta, the Court notes that
"disciplinary proceedings against lawyers are suit generis. Neither
purely civil nor purely criminal, they do not involve a trial of an action
or a suit, but are rather investigations by the Court into the conduct
23
Let copies of this Resolution be circulated to all Courts of the country
for their information and guidance, and spread in the personal record
of Atty. Wenceslao Laureta.
SO ORDERED.