RAMON RUFFY VS.

THE CHIEF OF STAFF, PHILIPPINE ARMY

(G.R. NO. L-533, AUGUST 20, 1946)
TUASON J.
FACTS:
It appears that at the outbreak of war in 1941, Ramon Ruffy was the
Provincial Commander, Prudente M. Francisco, a junior officer, and
Andres Fortus, a corporal, all of the Philippine Constabulary garrison
stationed in Mindoro. When the Japanese forces landed in Mindoro,
Major Ruffy retreated to the mountains instead of surrendering to the
enemy, disbanded his company, and organized and led a guerrilla
outfit known as Bolo Combat team of Bolo Area.
During the occupation of the Philippines by the Japanese forces, the
Bolo Area in Mindoro was a contingent of the 6th Military District,
which had been recognized by and placed under the operational
control of the US Army in the Southwest Pacific. A change in the
command in the Bolo Area was effected by Col. Jurado, the then
Commanding Officer of the Bolo Combat Team in Mindoro. Major
Ruffy was relieved of his assignment as Commanding Officer of the
Bolo Area. Col. Jurado was slain allegedly by the petitioners.
After the commission of this crime, it is alleged that the petitioners
seceded from the 6th Military District. It was this murder which gave
rise to petitioner's trial, the legality of which is now being contested.
A trial by the General Court Martial ensued and which resulted to the
acquittal of Ramon Ruffy and dismissal of the case as to Victoriano
Dinglasan and the conviction of Jose Garcia, Prudente
Francisco, Dominador Adeva and Andres Fortus.
The petitioners who were convicted filed suit before this Court,
assailing the constitutionality of 93rd Article of War. It ordains "that
any person subject to military law who commits murder in time of war
should suffer death or imprisonment for life, as the court martial may
direct" It is argued that since "no review is provided by that law to be
made by the Supreme Court, irrespective of whether the punishment
is for life imprisonment or death" it violated Art. VIII See 2 par 4 of
the Constitution.
It provides that "the National Assembly may not deprive the Supreme
Court of its original jurisdiction over all criminal cases in which the
penalty imposed is death or life imprisonment.

ISSUE: Whether or not the 93rd of Article of War unconstitutional?

HELD:
NO. The petitioners are in error. This error arose from failure to
perceive the nature of courts martial and the sources of the authority
for their creation. Court Martial are agencies of executive character
and one of the authorities for ordering of court martial has been held
to be attached to the constitutional functions of the President as
Commander in Chief, independently of legislation.
Unlike court of law, they are not a portion of judiciary. They are in fact
simply instrumentalities of the executive power, provided by Congress
for the President as Commander in chief to aid him in properly
commanding the army and navy and enforcing discipline therein and
utilized under his order Or those of his authorized military
representatives. The petition is therefore has no merit and that it
should be
dismissed with costs.

In its Declaration of Principles and state policies, the Constitution

adopts the generally accepted principles of international law as part
of the law of the land, and adheres to the policy of peace, equality,
justice, freedom, cooperation and amity , with all nations. By the
doctrine of incorporation, the country is bound by generally accepted
principles of international law, which are considered automatically
part of our own laws. Pacta sunt servanda international agreements
must be performed in good faith. A treaty is not a mere moral
obligation but creates a legally binding obligation on the parties.

TANADA v. ANGARA
272 SCRA 18, May 2, 1997
Facts :
This is a petition seeking to nullify the Philippine ratification of the
World Trade Organization (WTO) Agreement. Petitioners question the
concurrence of herein respondents acting in their capacities as
Senators via signing the said agreement.
The WTO opens access to foreign markets, especially its major trading
partners, through the reduction of tariffs on its exports, particularly
agricultural and industrial products. Thus, provides new opportunities
for the service sector cost and uncertainty associated with exporting
and more investment in the country. These are the predicted benefits
as reflected in the agreement and as viewed by the signatory
Senators, a free market espoused by WTO.
Petitioners on the other hand viewed the WTO agreement as one that
limits, restricts and impair Philippine economic sovereignty and
legislative power. That the Filipino First policy of the Constitution was
taken for granted as it gives foreign trading intervention.
Issue : Whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of the Senate in
giving its concurrence of the said WTO agreement.
Held:

Through WTO the sovereignty of the state cannot in fact and reality
be considered as absolute because it is a regulation of commercial
relations among nations. Such as when Philippines joined the United
Nations (UN) it consented to restrict its sovereignty right under the
concept of sovereignty as autolimitation. What Senate did was a
valid exercise of authority. As to determine whether such exercise is
wise, beneficial or viable is outside the realm of judicial inquiry and
review. The act of signing the said agreement is not a legislative
restriction as WTO allows withdrawal of membership should this be
the political desire of a member. Also, it should not be viewed as a
limitation of economic sovereignty. WTO remains as the only viable
structure for multilateral trading and the veritable forum for the
development of international trade law. Its alternative is isolation,
stagnation if not economic self-destruction. Thus, the people be
allowed, through their duly elected officers, make their free choice.
Petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit.

The defendant moved for the dismissal of the complaint on two

grounds: 1) lack of cause of action against him and 2) the issue raised
was a political question which properly pertains to the legislative or
executive branches. The trial court dismissed the complaint based on
the aforementioned grounds. Thus, the petitioners filed a special civil
action for certiorari seeking to rescind and set aside.
ISSUE: Whether or not the said petitioners have a cause of action to
prevent the misappropriation or impairment of the Philippine
rainforests and have the defendant stop form receiving, processing
and approving timber license agreements.
HELD:
Yes. The petitioners have a cause of action. The complaint focuses on
one specific fundamental legal right-the right to a balanced and
healthful ecology which, for the first time in our constitutional history,
is solemnly incorporated in the fundamental law. Section 16, Article II
of the 1987 Constitution explicitly provides that the State shall protect
and advance the right of the people to a balanced and healthful
ecology in accord with the rhythm and harmony of nature.This right
unites with the right to health which is provided for in SEC. 15 of
Article 2.

OPOSA VS. FACTORAN

224 SCRA 792, 1993
FACTS:
The petitioner, all minors and alleges that the plaintiffs "are all
citizens of the Republic of the Philippines, taxpayers, and entitled to
the full benefit, use and enjoyment of the natural resource treasure
that is the country's virgin tropical rainforests, duly joined and
represented by their parents instituted a complained as a taxpayers
class suit and prayed for the rendering of judgment ordering
defendant Factoran, then Secretary of the DENR, his agents,
representatives and other persons acting in his behalf to cancel all
existing timber license agreements in the country and to cease and
desist form receiving, accepting, processing, renewing or approving
new timber license agreements.

While the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is to be found

under the Declaration of Principles and State Policies and not under
the Bill of Rights, it does not follow that it is less important than any
of the civil and political rights enumerated in the latter. Such a right
belongs to a different category of rights altogether for it concerns
nothing less than selfpreservation and self-perpetuation -- aptly and
fittingly stressed by the petitioners -- the advancement of which may
even be said to predate all governments and constitutions. As a
matter of fact, these basic rights need not even be written in the
Constitution for they are assumed to exist from the inception of
humankind. If they are now explicitly mentioned in the fundamental
charter, it is because of the well-founded fear of its framers that
unless the rights to a balanced and healthful ecology and to health are
mandated as state policies by the Constitution itself, thereby
highlighting their continuing importance and imposing upon the state
a solemn obligation to preserve the first and protect and advance the
second, the day would not be too far when all else would be lost not
only for the present generation, but also for those to come

generations which stand to inherit nothing but parched earth

incapable of sustaining life.
The right to a balanced and healthful ecology carries with it the
correlative duty to refrain from impairing the environment. The said
right implies, among many other things, the judicious management
and conservation of the country's forests.
E.O. No.192 and the Administrative Code of 1987 have set the
objectives which serve as the bases for policy formulation and have
defined the powers and functions of the DENR, the primary
government agency for the proper use and development of the
countries natural resources. The right of the petitioners and all they
represent to a balanced and healthful ecology is as clear as the
DENRs duty to protect and advance the said right.
A denial or violation of that right by the owner who has the correlative
duty or obligation to respect or protect the same gives rise to a cause
of action.

PAMATONG VS. COMELEC

G.R. No. 161872, April 13, 2004
FACTS:
Petitioner Rev. Elly Velez Pamatong filed his Certificate of Candidacy
for President. Respondent Commission on Elections (COMELEC)
refused to give due course to petitioners Certificate of Candidacy in
its Resolution No. 6558 dated January 17, 2004. The decision,
however, was not unanimous since Commissioners Luzviminda G.
Tancangco and Mehol K. Sadain voted to include petitioner as they
believed he had parties or movements to back up his candidacy.
On January 15, 2004, petitioner moved for reconsideration of
Resolution No. 6558. Petitioners Motion for Reconsideration was
docketed as SPP (MP) No. 04-001. The COMELEC, acting on
petitioners Motion for Reconsideration and on similar motions filed
by other aspirants for national elective positions, denied the same
under the aegis of Omnibus Resolution No. 6604 dated February 11,
2004.
The COMELEC declared petitioner and thirty-five (35) others
nuisance candidates who could not wage a nationwide campaign
and/or are not nominated by a political party or are not supported by
a registered political party with a national constituency. Commissioner
Sadain maintained his vote for petitioner. By then, Commissioner
Tancangco had retired.
In this Petition For Writ of Certiorari, petitioner seeks to reverse the
resolutions which were allegedly rendered in violation of his right to
equal access to opportunities for public service under Section 26,
Article II of the 1987 Constitution,[by limiting the number of qualified
candidates only to those who can afford to wage a nationwide
campaign and/or are nominated by political parties. In so doing,
petitioner argues that the COMELEC indirectly amended the
constitutional provisions on the electoral process and limited the
power of the sovereign people to choose their leaders. The COMELEC
supposedly erred in disqualifying him since he is the most qualified

among all the presidential candidates, i.e., he possesses all the

constitutional and legal qualifications for the office of the president,
he is capable of waging a national campaign since he has numerous
national organizations under his leadership, he also has the capacity
to wage an international campaign since he has practiced law in other
countries, and he has a platform of government. Petitioner likewise
attacks the validity of the form for the Certificate of Candidacy
prepared by the COMELEC. Petitioner claims that the form does not
provide clear and reasonable guidelines for determining the
qualifications of candidates since it does not ask for the candidates
bio-data and his program of government.
ISSUE:
Whether the constitutional provision ensuring equal access to
opportunities for public office creates a constitutional right to run for
or hold public office and, particularly in his case, to seek the
presidency?
HELD:
NO. Implicit in the petitioners invocation of the constitutional
provision ensuring equal access to opportunities for public office is
the claim that there is a constitutional right to run for or hold public
office and particularly in his case, to seek the presidency. There is
none. What is recognized is merely a privilege subject to limitations
imposed by law. Section 26, Article II of the Constitution neither
bestows such a right nor elevates the privilege to the level of an
enforceable right.
There is nothing in the plain language of the provision which suggests
such a thrust or justifies an interpretation of the sort.
The equal access provision is a subsumed part of Article II of the
Constitution, entitled Declaration of Principles and State Policies.
The provisions under the Article are generally considered not selfexecuting, and there is no plausible reason for according a different
treatment to the equal access provision. Like the rest of the policies
enumerated in Article II, the provision does not contain any judicially
enforceable constitutional right but merely specifies a guideline for
legislative or executive action.[3] The disregard of the provision does
not give rise to any cause of action before the courts.

An inquiry into the intent of the framers produces the same

determination that the provision is not self-executory. The original
wording of the present Section 26, Article II had read, The State
shall broaden opportunities to public office and prohibit public
dynasties. Commissioner (now Chief Justice) Hilario Davide, Jr.
successfully brought forth an amendment that changed the word
broaden to the phrase ensure equal access, and the substitution of
the word office to service. He explained his proposal in this wise: I
changed the word broaden to ENSURE EQUAL ACCESS TO
because what is important would be equal access to the opportunity. If
you broaden, it would necessarily mean that the government would be
mandated to create as many offices as are possible to accommodate
as many people as are also possible.
That is the meaning of broadening opportunities to public service. So,
in order that we should not mandate the State to make the
government the number one
employer and to limit offices only to what may be necessary and
expedient yet offering equal opportunities to access to it, I change the
word
broaden. [7] mphasis supplied) Obviously, the provision is not
intended to compel the State to enact positive measures that would
accommodate as many people as possible into public office. The
approval of the Davide amendment indicates the design of the
framers to cast the provision as simply enunciatory of a desired policy
objective and not reflective of the imposition of a clear State burden.
Moreover, the provision as written leaves much to be desired if it is to
be regarded as the source of positive rights. It is difficult to interpret
the clause as operative in the absence of legislation since its effective
means and reach are not properly defined. Broadly written, the
myriad of claims that can be subsumed under this rubric appear to be
entirely open-ended. [8] Words and phrases such as equal access,
opportunities, and public service are susceptible to countless
interpretations owing to their inherent impreciseness. Certainly, it
was not the intention of the framers to inflict on the people an
operative but amorphous foundation from which innately
unenforceable rights may be sourced.
As earlier noted, the privilege of equal access to opportunities to
public office may be subjected to limitations. Some valid limitations
specifically on the privilege to seek elective office are found in the
provisions[9] of the Omnibus Election Code on Nuisance Candidates

and COMELEC Resolution No. 6452[10] dated December 10, 2002

outlining the instances wherein the COMELEC may motu proprio
refuse to give due course to or cancel a Certificate of Candidacy.
As long as the limitations apply to everybody equally without
discrimination, however, the equal access clause is not violated.

Equality is not sacrificed as long as the burdens engendered by the

limitations are meant to be borne by any one who is minded to file a
certificate of candidacy. In the case at bar, there is no showing that
any person is exempt from the limitations or the burdens which they
create.