Report High Speed Network Final

Status for High-Speed
Networks in Northern Europe
About this report

After a tender procedure this job was commissioned to HTC - Hanseatic Transport Consultancy who have
entered into a partnership with data lab for this task. During the process there have been regular contacts
between the consultant and the STRING secretariat as well as two reviews/sessions with infrastructure
experts from the STRING partners.
STRING Secretariat
Allen 15
DK-4180 Sor
Tel: + 45 (0)2082 3459
The content, wording and conclusions in this report are solely the responsibility of the consultants.
ISBN number: 978-87-92026-31-6
The consultants
Multidimensional experience in the field of consultancy and practical expertise form the basis of our
independent and authoritative approach to consultancy, an approach geared to achieving all your
objectives. The range of expert advice on offer from HTC - Hanseatic Transport Consultancy - includes
not only classic strategy and management consultancy for businesses operating in the fields of transport
and logistics but also guidance on policies and institutions, notably in questions relating to competition
and industrial politics. The way of our approach considers the increasing requirements of our customers
with regard to economic and ecologic topics. HTC's consultancy advice is distinguished not at least by its
independence, high standards and flexibility, bringing together a tried and tested methodology with a
profound understanding of the transport sector. Innovative solutions trigger forward-looking perspectives
for companies, policy, economy and society.
As the competent assessment of high-speed networks in Northern Europe requires a multilateral
expertise regarding market and infrastructure development aspects in at least the three countries
(Germany, Denmark, Sweden), HTC has joined forces with the Danish company TDL.
Hanseatic Transport Consultancy

Dr. Ninnemann & Dr. Rssler GbR
Schopenstehl 15 (Miramar-Haus)
D-20095 Hamburg
TDL Transport Data Lab

Henrik Sylvan
Strandhjen 3
DK-4000 Roskilde
Dr. Jan Ninnemann, Dr. Thomas Rssler

Tel: +49 (0)40 1817 54-06/-08
info@htc-consultancy.de
Henrik Sylvan
Tel: +45 (0)2092 8040
henrik@sylvans.dk
Status: 22.03.12
Report Status for High-Speed Networks in Northern Europe
III
Executive Summary
National transport policies in Germany, Denmark and Sweden just generally follow the
same guideline with the aim of reducing congestion, accidents and environmental externalities. Specific high-speed strategies do not exist yet, but the overall objective to change
modal split by taking over passengers from motorised private transport and air transport
also covers the pursuit of high-speed activities.
Dedicated high-speed lines (>230 km/h) can only be found in Germany. Five high-speed
sections stand for a length of 1,100 km (3.3 % of the total German network) without
forming a coherent network. The investment volumes for current high-speed projects in
Germany indicate that (high-speed) infrastructure development in Germany seems to be
(too) cost-intensive due to disproportionate technical standards and track alignments.
In contrast to Germany the Danish time-model approach is mainly based on the idea of
setting a target of maximum travel time by increasing the velocity of trains; not for a
specific top-speed, but sufficient to fulfil a reasonable point-to-point travel time.
The existing network development plans in the three countries indicate that there are
different accentuations with regard to the high-speed network development strategies: a
more microeconomic approach in Germany influenced by corporate interests of German
DB AG and a more macroeconomic approach in Scandinavia.
As the TEN-T policy of the EU leaves the technical responsibility for the corridor
development to the member states, a high-speed target for the Fehmarnbelt corridor
requires a corridor-oriented mindset that recognizes the need for international mobility of
the peripheral region of Scandinavia.
The current high-speed vision for the Hamburg-resund corridor is mainly driven by
regional initiatives e.g. in various INTERREG programs, industry cooperation platforms,
political committees etc along the line.
The considerations of DB Netze for the German FBL hinterland section focus on a
conventional electrified double-track line with a maximum speed of 160 km/h between
Lbeck-Puttgarden. Current investigations of alignment alternatives do not cover technical
parameters for train operations faster than 160 km/h. Alternatives for a more capable
network design seizing the opportunities of a still ongoing planning procedure should be
initiated before further alignment decisions will be fixed.
Driven by the green transport policy approach Denmark has opted for a high-class
technical solution by deciding to introduce a nation-wide ERTMS system of the standards
of ETCS level II and the ambition of a velocity-performance increase. Maximum speeds of
200 km/h (between Ringsted and Rdby) and of 250 km/h (between Ringsted and Copenhagen) are projected. As the 200 km/h section has been criticized from many institutions
further upgrade initiatives are in consideration.
As the situation of the public infrastructure budgets is supposed to deteriorate over the
next years and the growing maintenance requirements of the existing railway network will
exhaust potential budgets for a potential high-speed corridor Hamburg-resund innovative
ways of financing as well as infrastructure development have to be considered.
IV
A general conclusion of the assessment of travel time, passenger volumes and

infrastructure investments for the Fehmarnbelt corridor is that competitive travel times of
2:00 h to 2:30 h can be achieved with reasonable additional investments. The favourable
network design generally follows the Danish time-model approach and is based on the
idea to establish an efficient semi high-speed network which contributes to an acceptable
increase of average travel times without requiring an overdesigned infrastructure project,
which is to a limited extent politically as well as economically sustainable. The intelligent
combination of upgrade and new-built projects play an important role for the provision of a
high-class technical solution for the corridor.
A corridor development following one of the (hereinafter illustrated) preferable scenarios

make an important contribution to provide additional passenger as well as freight transport
capacities, to increase the railway market share and to establish an innovative alternative
for political decision makers for a sustainable future cross-border infrastructure concept.
To support a corridor-driven new concept for a semi-high-speed line seizing the

opportunities of a still not fully detailed planning procedure for the FBL hinterland connections (especially on German side) the necessary postulations for additional considerations
have to be addressed soon.
Content
Page
1.
Initial situation
2.
General Requirements for High-Speed Networks
2.1
2.2
Technical constraints and standards

Socio-economic impacts and complementary measures to facilitate regional benefits
2
3
3.
National Frameworks for High-Speed Network Development
3.1
3.2
3.2.1
3.2.2
3.2.3
3.2.4
3.2.5
3.2.6
3.2.7
3.3
3.3.1
3.3.2
3.3.3
3.3.4
3.3.5
3.3.6
3.3.7
3.4
3.4.1
3.4.2
3.4.3
3.4.4
3.4.5
3.4.6
3.5
3.6
EU high-speed rail policy

High-speed rail in Germany
Transport policy and high-speed strategies of key stakeholders
National high-speed network
Network development strategy
Network development on Hamburg-Fehmarnbelt corridor
Demand and demand forecasting
Funding, financing and economic appraisal
First conclusions on high-speed activities in Germany
High-speed rail in Denmark
Network development on Fehmarnbelt-resund corridor
Main conclusions on the shape of a high-speed rail network
High-speed rail in Sweden
Transport policy and high-speed strategies of key stakeholder
Financing, funding and economic appraisal
Table of classification
Comments on national high-speed rail developments from corridor perspective
4.
Principle framework for (high-speed) network development on the Hamburg-resund

corridor
85
4.1
4.2
4.3
4.4
Assessment of HSR costs

Assessment of HSR benefits
Network discussion under consideration of cost-benefit aspects
Validation of the marginal investments and market potential
5
7
7
10
16
25
29
34
37
38
38
45
45
51
59
64
65
66
66
69
69
76
78
79
81
83
85
86
90
97
With the Fehmarnbelt Fixed Link and a high-speed rail link, Hamburg and Copenhagen will be brought
closer together. (Olaf Scholz, mayor of Hamburg, June 2011)
1.
INITIAL SITUATION
Triggered by the Fehmarnbelt project there is on some political level an intense discussion
on the future perspectives of a high-speed link between Hamburg and Copenhagen. This
vision is intended to make the mobility of people between the two metropolitan regions
more secure, more efficient and more environmentally friendly, with priority given to social
and territorial cohesion, as well as to economic dynamism. Several economic and cultural
centres in Europe can already be reached by trains travelling at speeds of 300 km/h and
sometimes more. This includes cities such as London, Paris, Brussels, Frankfurt, Amsterdam, Barcelona, Madrid, Rome and Milan. Until now there is no existing high-speed link
between the Central European network and Scandinavia. Today it takes almost five hours
to travel by passenger train from resund region to Hamburg. With a fixed link over the
Fehmarnbelt, the trip time will be reduced to three and a half hours.
Regardless the efforts for the establishment of a trans-European network for high-speed
trains, the current planning according to the bilateral treaty between Denmark and Germany on the Fehmarnbelt hinterland connection on the German side (only) considers an
electrified, double-track railway for a speed of at least 160 km/h for passenger trains and at
least 120 km/h for freight trains. An upgrading of the railway tracks for high-speed trains or
the construction of the second railway track before 2025 is not part of the agreement.
Some promising alternatives for a more capable network design at reasonable investment
levels seem to be possible but have to be initiated before further alignment decisions have
been fixed.
As one of the main objectives of the STRING cooperation is to find sustainable improvements in mobility i.e. having more transport of goods and people from fuel consuming to
energy saving transport modes, the future integration of Scandinavia in a trans-European
network for high-speed trains play an important role in todays (political) discussion. To
support a corridor-driven debate seizing the opportunities of a still not fully detailed planning procedure for the FBL hinterland connections (especially on German side) the following study gives an overview of the status for high-speed networks in Northern Europe. The
following analysis of framework conditions for a high-speed link between Hamburg and
Copenhagen/Malm generally covers the following aspects:
Objectives for high-speed rail and guiding principles for high-speed rail connections
between Central Europe and Scandinavia,
National strategies for high-speed networks in Germany, Denmark and Sweden including cost estimates and time tables for decisions as well as implementations,
Principle framework for (high-speed) network development on the HamburgCopenhagen (-Stockholm/Oslo) corridor under consideration of cost and travel time
aspects.
2.
GENERAL REQUIREMENTS FOR HIGH-SPEED NETWORKS

UIC (International Union of Railways) and EC Directive 96/58 define high-speed rail as
systems of infrastructure and rolling stock which regularly operate at or above 250 km/h
on new tracks, or 200 km/h on existing tracks. To develop some general requirements for
high-speed networks this chapter gives a brief review of the technical as well as (socio-)
economic framework of high-speed rail in Europe.
2.1
Technical constraints and standards

High-speed infrastructure:
Conventional lines, even with major upgrades, are basically unable to operate at more
than 200-220 km/h. The layout parameters, transverse sections, track quality, catenary
and power supply, and special environmental conditions must be able to sustain high operational speeds.
High-speed infrastructure is supposed to fulfil the following requirements:
High-speed rail infrastructure must be designed, inspected and maintained in optimum
conditions.
Layout requires large radius curves and limited gradients and track centre distances.
Track geometric parameters must meet exacting tolerances.
Slab track is in principle much more expensive than ballasted track, but it can be permanently operated with reduced maintenance frequency.
Though slab track can be recommended in certain cases for viaducts and tunnels, discussion of the ideal track system must proceed on a case-by-case basis.
Special catenary system and power supply system are required.
On-board signalling system is required.
According to UIC specifications1 the following parameters for new high-speed lines have to
be considered.
The maximum gradient depending on operating conditions allowed for 300 km/h train
speeds is set by the latest STI to 35 mm per metre (passenger traffic only with suitable
rolling stock). For mixed traffic the maximum gradient is up to 12/15 mm/m.
Design characteristics will allow trains to run at their maximum speeds. Minimum radius, associated with cant and cant deficiency, defines the maximum commercial
speed, providing a good level of comfort to passengers. According to TSI, the minimum
radius of curvature needs to ensure that the curve cant set does not exceed the minimum values. The figures below provide UIC standards for the minimum radius at different speeds.
Horizontal curve radius
200 km/h: 2,500 m (minimum), 3,500 m (ideal)
300 km/h: 5,500 m (minimum), 7,000 m (ideal)
Track centre distance
200 km/h: 4 m
300 km/h: 4.5/5 m
Maximum cant
150/170 mm
1
UIC report Design of new lines for speeds of 300-350 km/h, 2001.
Rolling stock and operating conditions:

High-speed operations require train sets instead of conventional trains (locomotive and
cars), because of the power-to-weight ratio and various other technical reasons, such as
aerodynamic conditions, reliability and safety.
Common basic characteristics of high-speed trains can be described as following:
Self propelled, fixed composition and bi-directional,
High level of technology,
Limited axle load (11 to 17 tons for 300 km/h) -> ICE 32,
High traction power (approx. 11 to 24 kW per ton),
Power electronic equipment: GTO, IGBT,
Control circuits. Computer network. Automatic diagnostic system,
Optimized aerodynamics shape,
In-cab signalling system/s,
Several braking systems,
High level of RAMS (Reliability, Availability, Maintainability and Safety),
Technical and safety requirements (compliance with standards),
Compatibility with infrastructure (track gauge, loading gauge, platforms, catenary, etc.).
One particular aspect of the operating conditions is the signalling system. Line side signals are no longer useable at more than 200 km/h because they may not always be observed in time. In-cab signalling is absolutely necessary for high-speed operation. (-> UIC)
Three systems exist on the different networks:
French TVM 430 that equips all the French high-speed lines (signalling boxes and
automatic headways), South Korean line, Benelux lines, and Eurostar service.
German LZB that equips the German high-speed lines and the Madrid-Sevilla Spanish line.
ERTMS (European Railway Traffic Management System) is the only normalized
system for European Interoperability that is recommended. ERTMS level 2 now
equips the Milan Bologna Italian line, the Madrid Barcelona Spanish line, and the
new Eastern European Line in France and Germany, but it currently duplicates another
system.
2.2
Socio-economic impacts and complementary measures to facilitate regional

benefits
High-speed rail is claimed to have a major impact on the (local) economy. For the assessment of these socio-economic impacts it is necessary to understand that, unlike motorways, high-speed networks will have a very limited number of stations. Therefore it will not
promote a growth corridor, but rather separate growth nodes based around the stations.
The theory is that economic activities located at or near these nodes derive economic
benefits as a result of improved business connectivity resulting from shorter journey
times, together with what is called the agglomeration effect. These are efficiencies resulting from geographical proximity of firms to each other, labour market effects, network
economies and environmental externalities. In general localisation effects of transport fall
off quite rapidly with distance, with little or no effect beyond 50 km or 80 minutes, and the
2
ICE 1 and ICE 2 with >20 t axle load.
most significant effects much closer than this. High-speed rail is most directly relevant to
particular high level services and higher tech manufacturing with a need for good longerdistance inter-city or international linkages.
The main benefits arise over distances where the higher speed delivers a significant time
saving relative to conventional rail. In France this seemed to be from about 2 hours upwards by TGV. Although intermediate stops cost about ten minutes of journey time and
also affect line capacity. As a significant reduction of travel time is a key success factor for
high-speed rail a strong trade-off between number of stops and the objective of short
travel times can be observed. Less stops is equivalent to a reduced number of potential
growth notes along the high-speed corridor. Stations must be in city centres or other locations where economic activity can be generated.
However, the economic benefit spillover effects from growth nodes into their wider hinterland is very significantly constrained by the quality of the local transport system. Significant economic benefit only occurs when high-speed rail (HSR) investment is accompanied
by major investments in local infrastructure. Furthermore integration with the existing rail
network is important to achieve a high connectivity without long transfer times. Through
running to destinations off the core network (where a new high-speed line cannot be justified) benefits can be increased. Similar benefits arise from improved access to airports
(long and short haul).
However, transport improvements due to high-speed network access tend not to have lasting effects. Rather, the benefits are taken in the form of a wider choice by households and
businesses of places to live, work and locate. From a long-term perspective it is therefore
necessary to develop governance and appraisal mechanisms (e.g. planning policy, regeneration, training) to deliver the complementary measures that would help to ensure that
the effects of high-speed rail investment include a beneficial impact on regional economies.
3.
NATIONAL FRAMEWORKS FOR HIGH-SPEED NETWORK DEVELOPMENT

The market for international high-speed services has increased sharply and is expected to
continue to grow with the further development of the trans-European high-speed network.
Therefore many national railways have started to develop or partly implemented their own
strategy for high-speed services.
This chapter gives an overview of European transport policy aspects as well as developments in the relevant countries Germany, Denmark and Sweden.
3.1
EU high-speed rail policy

With the White Paper 2011 the European Commission adopted a roadmap of 40 concrete
initiatives for the next decade to build a competitive transport system that will increase
mobility, remove major barriers in key areas and fuel growth and employment.3 The conceptual framework for a competitive and resource-efficient transport system covers the
following objectives for the extension of the existing high-speed network for rail transportation:
By 2050, complete a European high-speed rail network.
Triple the length of the existing high-speed rail network by 2030 and maintain a dense
railway network in all Member States.
By 2050 the majority of medium-distance passenger transport should go by rail.
The Europe-wide framework for the infrastructure development is set by the programme
for the trans-European transport network (TEN-T). The objective of the programme is to
establish the key links needed to facilitate transport, optimise the capacity of existing infrastructure, produce specifications for network interoperability and integrate the environmental dimension.
The current TEN-T Guidelines consist of a relatively dense comprehensive network and
the mentioned list of 30 priority projects, which at a great extent were determined bottomup, according to investment needs in member states and/or following previously defined
pan-european corridors. The priority projects do not reflect European needs in a systematic way; they do not form a coherent multimodal network. Equally, there is no sufficient
integration of EU transport or other policy fields in the existing TEN-T. The financing of the
projects is highly dependent on national investment plans and priorities. Therefore a continuous network development is finally not guaranteed. Due to a cut-back of EU funding for
rail projects, Poland for example just recently (Dec. 2011) decided to freeze all work on the
high-speed project for the Y-shaped line from Warszawa through Ldz to Poznan and
Wroclaw until 2030. As the public households in many European countries can be considered as critical, future reductions of investment volumes in railway infrastructure or at least
re-allocations of investment funds with a stronger focus on maintenance issues as well as
freight transportation network design can be expected. On the contrary the British Transport Secretary just recently (Jan. 2012) decided to proceed with plans to build a highspeed rail line between London and the West Midlands and on to Manchester and Leeds.
For a further support of the network development the European Commission in October
2011 presented 10 Core Network Corridors of the trans-European Transport Network
(TEN-T). The northsouth Corridor Helsinki-Valetta, based in part on a series of Priority
3
http://ec.europa.eu/transport/strategies/doc/2011_white_paper/white-paper-illustrated-brochure_en.pdf.
Projects (1, 11, 12 and 20), ERTMS corridor B and Rail freight corridor 3, is a crucial axis
for the European economy, linking the major urban centres in Germany and Italy to Scandinavia and the Mediterranean. The longest of the 10 TEN-T Core Network Corridors, it
has two centrepieces to be realised: the Fehmarn Belt crossing the Baltic Sea and the
Brenner Tunnel under the Alps.
Figure 1
Helsinki-Valetta Corridor
Source: EU Commission, Illustration: TDL.
For the pre-identified section Copenhagen-Hamburg via Fehmarn the corridor description
comprises Danish access routes to be completed by 2020, access routes Germany to be
completed in 2 steps (2020 - 2027). So far there are no indications for high-speed activities. Referring to a statement on the priority project no. 20 Railway axis Fehmarnbelt from
2008, the EU Commission foresees only a completed category II line for the HamburgPuttgarden as well as for the Copenhagen-Stockholm link in 2020.
3.2
High-speed rail in Germany
3.2.1
National transport policy and implications for (high-speed) rail strategy

The national transport policy is defined by the Federal Ministry of Transport, Building and
Urban Development (BMVBS) in accordance with the guidelines of the EU. Key target of
the German policy is to facilitate mobility and make it sustainable. The Federal Government has set itself objectives in its transport policy which cover the following aspects:4
Make optimum use of the existing transport infrastructure and foster efficient transport,
Reduce traffic level,
Shift significantly more traffic to the railways and waterways,
Take efforts to upgrade the transport infrastructure on a human scale and in an environmentally sound manner,
Reduce CO2 emissions and the specific energy and fuel consumption of transport.
The overall objective to shift significantly more traffic to railways in order to reduce CO2
emissions implicitly also covers the aspect of high-speed rail development in Germany.
Regarding the general accentuation, an ongoing change in German transport policy can be
observed over the last few years. As forecasts predict that traffic levels will continue to rise
drastically, especially freight traffic, an increasing orientation towards aspects facing freight
transport and logistics can be stated. Therefore efficient logistics systems and networks
are more and more considered as key elements of German transport policy.
(High-speed) Strategy of transport ministry
The Federal Ministry does not pursue a real HSR strategy. Merely the Federal Transport
Infrastructure Plan (FTIP) 20035 as a framework for investments and a planning instrument
in infrastructure for the Federal Government helps to develop a rough idea of the ministries
strategy with regard to high-speed rail. Around 66 billion euros (44 %) of a total of 149 billion euros are earmarked for the construction of new and the upgrading of existing federal
railway infrastructure, federal trunk roads and federal waterways. The priorities for the inclusion of evaluated projects in the FTIP 2003 are basically a result of the benefit-cost ratio, network design considerations, the status of planning and the level of investment that
is likely to be available over the lifetime of the plan. Amongst the 28 first priority rail projects (investment volume 15,993.3 million euros) 6 projects with a sum of 9,358.1 million
euros (59 % of total) are wholly or partly designated for speed levels of 230 km/h or more.
With this programme of upgrading and new construction work, the Federal Government
pretends to make a major contribution to the development of the trans-European highspeed rail network.6 In fact experts criticize that there is no evidence for a coherent highspeed network, but rather single, isolated high-speed sections within the German network.7
4
5
6
7
Source: http://www.bmvbs.de/EN/TransportAndMobility/TransportPolicy/transport-policy_node.html.
At its meeting on 2 July 2003, the Federal Cabinet adopted the Federal Transport Infrastructure Plan 2003
valid for the period until 2015.
FTIP 2003, p. 60.
Andersen, S. (2010), Ein Zielbedienungskonzept fr den Hochgeschwindigkeitsverkehr in Deutschland.
(High-speed) Strategy of DB Netze

Since the end of 2007 DB Netze has been responsible for infrastructure and operations,
taking over from DB Netz AG. Its business areas include DB Netze Fahrweg, DB Netze
Energie, DB Netze Personenbahnhfe, DB ProjektBau and DB Station&Service. DB Netze
does not embark on an own strategy for the development of a high-speed network. As
stated in the previous section the FTIP sets the mandatory framework for the infrastructure
development in Germany. The annually revised requirement plans define the specific projects realized by DB Netze as national infrastructure provider. The preparation of the plan
is carried out after consultation of policy, ministries and DB Netze.
In fact the national network development is highly affected by the corporate strategy of
Deutsche Bahn AG (DB). As stated on DB webpage8, Deutsche Bahn sees itself as an
integrated group whose business units cooperate sensibly and efficiently. Only the close
integration of infrastructure, passenger services, transportation and logistics, as well as
engineering and procurement, enables DB to develop the innovations that optimize the
potential of rail transport and strengthen its competitiveness in comparison to road and
air. The comparison of segment profits/loss (EBIT) identifies DB Bahn Long Distance as
economically one of the most important transport divisions of DB Holding. Therefore the
corporate strategy (and therewith the infrastructure development) of DB shows a strong
orientation towards the (monopolistic) long distance segment. For further details on the
strategy of DB long distance see next chapter.
Figure 2
profit/loss (EBIT)
DB segment reporting by business segments (million euros)
DB Bahn
Long Distance
2010
2009
160
80
DB Bahn
Regional
2010
2009
656
678
DB Bahn
Urban
2010 2009
23
71
DB Schenker
Rail
2010
2009
-71
-291
Source: DB annual report 2010.
(High-speed) Strategy of DB Bahn

DB Bahn is the group that manages passenger travel within Germany. The segment reporting of the DB AG (see extract in the table above) underlines the significant importance
of passenger transportation. In the commercially independent (no public subsidies like in
regional transportation) and economically attractive long distance segment DB sees itself
in a quasi monopolistic position (market share >98 %). ICE long distance trains are - compared to freight transportation - of public interest for a wide part of the population and positioned as DB flagships. Thats why (high-speed) long distance transportation can be considered as key element in DBs corporate strategy.
Deutsche Bahns first ICE made its debut in 1991 and today there are 5 ranges: ICE 1, 2,
3, T and TD. The ICE family, with its 252 trains, is the newest part of the DB fleet and has
an average age of just nine years.
http://www.deutschebahn.com/site/nachhaltigkeitsbericht__2009/en/our__company/strategy/corporate__
strategy/corporate__strategy.html
Figure 3
Deutsche Bahn ICE fleet
Name
Number of
Trainsets
Operating
Speed
Design
Speed
Service
ICE 1
59
280 km/h
280 km/h
1991
ICE 2
44
280 km/h
280 km/h
1996
ICE 3
63
320 km/h
330 km/h
2000
ICE T
67
230 km/h
230 km/h
2005
ICE TD
(Diesel)
19
200 km/h
200 km/h
2001
Source: Deutsche Bahn AG.
In April 2011 Deutsche Bahn has reached agreement with Siemens to order up to 300 ICx
trainsets. The new ICx will from 2016 on form the backbone of DB long-distance transport
services. Described by DB as the largest single investment in the company's history and
by the manufacturer as the largest individual order yet in Siemens history, the multibillion euro framework agreement will allow replacement of DB's ageing fleet of locomotive-hauled InterCity and EuroCity coaches. Later ICx vehicles are intended to replace the
ICE1 fleet as well as the ICE2 trainsets.
The initial order will cover two main variants. The first is a seven-car formation with three
powered vehicles, giving a seating capacity of 499 passengers and a maximum speed of
10
230 km/h. These will be used to operate the bulk of DBs IC network, replacing locomotivehauled trainsets. The second variant is a 10-car train with five power cars and 724 seats.
These will have a top speed of 249 km/h. These will replace the existing ICE1 and ICE2
trainsets, which currently operate at up to 250 km/h. DB says it will continue to use its
ICE3 trainsets on those few routes which have maximum speeds greater than 250 km/h.
With this new vehicle concept DB reaches a significant increase of travelling comfort which
might contribute to attract additional passengers. Further impacts on the cost side can be
expected due to less energy consumption and more efficient operations. Another conclusion is that DB withdraws from a further extension of the high-speed fleet with maximum
speeds of more than 230-250 km/h. Trainsets with a maximum speed of 300 km/h are
considered as barely cost-efficient.
Figure 4
ICx trainset operative from 2016
Source: Siemens.
3.2.2

The high-speed part of the network accounts for 3.3 % of the total length of 33,723 km of
tracks operated by DB Netze. The high-speed lines (defined as those where the maximum
permitted speed is in the range of 230-300 km/h) now total approximately 1,100 km. The
other conventional lines served by high-speed trains have been upgraded to a greater or
lesser extent, and the maximum train speeds there are in the range of 160-200 km/h.
The first German high-speed rail lines were planned in the 1980s, when the Iron Curtain
dividing the country was still in place. Today there are five high-speed lines respectively
sections:
Hanover-Wrzburg (327 km): the first and longest newly built line in Germany. With the
later Nuremberg-Munich upgrades, this creates a largely high-speed route for Hamburg-Munich services.
11
Stuttgart-Mannheim (100 km): Mannheims approaches and a terminus layout at Stuttgart restrict acceleration of end-to-end timings for through services.
Hannover-Berlin: 185 km of new build, via Wolfsburg rather than the 'classic' route
through Magdeburg. A symbolic piece of engineering following Berlin's restoration as
national capital, this and the earlier Hanover-Wrzburg newly built line enable accelerated services to the south, albeit at much greater route length.
Cologne-Frankfurt (177 km): Severe gradients assume ICE3 capability or better.
Shorter than the sinuous Rhine route via Koblenz that it partly replaces, this newly built
line also links Kln/Bonn and Frankfurt Main's airports.
Nuremberg-Ingolstadt (89 km): Almost entirely built with slab track, this is a shorter
route than existing lines and offers reduced timings in conjunction with the 200 km/h
upgrade of Ingolstadt-Munich. From December 2006 the line featured the first Regional
Express services (operated by DB Regio) operating at up to 200 km/h. Using Class
101 former IC coaches, it cuts 48 minutes off the previous fastest Nrnberg-Mnchen
RE timings.
Cologne-Aachen (70 km): This high-speed line is the German part of the TransEuropean transport networks project high-speed line ParisBrusselsCologne. It is not
a newly built railway line, but a project to upgrade the existing railway line which was
opened in 1841 by the Rhenish Railway Company.
Karlsruhe-Basel (incomplete): In March 1993 the first section, between Bhl and
Achern (9 km) was put into service. The continued development of the line as the
Neu- und Ausbaustrecke Karlsruhe-Basel (i.e. a mixture of new high-speed line and
upgraded line). This line forms the most important northern access route to the Swiss
AlpTransit project and is therefore part of a bilateral convention for an increase in the
efficiency in rail transport between Switzerland and Germany.
Speeds on the newly built lines vary, some 250 km/h with 280 km/h allowed for later running. Later lines are passed for service speeds of 300 km/h. The following map shows the
maximum speed as well as the number of (high-speed) trains per hour.
Figure 5
12
Maximum speed and trains per hour on German high-speed lines
Source: DB Netz AG 2009.
Only the Cologne-Frankfurt line is exclusively dedicated to high-speed trains (due to severe gradients). All other lines are used for mixed traffic as the following map shows.
Figure 6
13
Mixed traffic on high-speed lines in Germany
Source: DB Netz AG.
All lines are 1,435 mm gauge and electrified at 15 kV ac 16.7 Hz. The following table
shows the further technical parameters of the mentioned high-speed lines in comparison to
the UIC standards.
Line
UIC
standard
Centre
distance
4-5 m
Hannover
Wrzburg
Stuttgart
Mannheim
4.7 m
Hannover
Berlin
4.7 m
Cologne
Frankfurt
4.5 m
Nuremberg
Ingolstadt
Track
superstructure
Gradient
35
mm/m
Curve radius
(reg/min)
7,000/
5,500 m
(300 km/h)
7,000/5,100 m
Design
speed
7,000/5,100 m
300
km/h
ballasted
track,
UIC-60 track,
B-70 concrete
sleeper
12.5
mm/m
300
km/h
red.
250
km/h
ballasted
track,
UIC-60 track,
B-70 concrete
sleeper
predominantly
slab track.
UIC-60 track
slab track,
UIC-60 track
12.5
mm/m
40
mm/m
3,348 (min)
300
km/h
slab track,
UIC-60 track
20
mm/m
4,085 (min)
300
km/h
Train
control
on-board
signalling
system
continuous
automatic
trainrunning
control
(LZB)
LZB
LZB
LZB add.
CIRELKE 2
LZB L72
CE II add.
CIR-ELKE
2
Cologne
Aachen
Karlsruhe
Basel
14
ballasted
track,
UIC-60 track,
B-70 concrete
sleeper
slab track,
UIC-60 track
250
km/h
250
km/h
LZB add.
CIR-ELKE
2
future:
ETCS L2
The following three maps show the future perspective of the German high-speed network,
based on the current plan of DB Netze.
Figure 7
Todays network with a minimum speed of 230 km/h
Existing lines min. 230 km/h
Source: DB Netz AG.
Based on the existing network there are future plans for the extension of the German highspeed network. The following map and project overview considers the period until
2020/2025 and is based on the publications of DB Netze. The assessment especially with
regard to the feasibility and the realisation timeline will be discussed later in this study (see
section 3.2.6).
From 2002-2004 the Hamburg-Berlin line was upgraded for a maximum speed of 200-230 km/h
Figure 8
Network 2020/2025 with a minimum speed of 230 km/h
Existing lines min. 230 km/h

New high-speed lines until 2020/2025
Source: DB Netz AG.
Speed extension on existing high-speed lines:

1. Hannover Wrzburg, extension to 280 km/h (planned)
2. Mannheim Stuttgart, extension to 280 km/h (planned)
3. Wolfsburg Berlin, extension to auf 280 km/h (under examination)
New high-speed lines until 2020/2025 (planned beginning of operation, Vmax):
10. ABS Augsburg Mnchen (2011, 230 km/h)
11. Erfurt Halle/Leipzig (2016, 300 km/h)
12. NBS Ebensfeld Erfurt (2018, 300 km/h)
13. Stuttgart Ulm (2020, 250 km/h)
14. Karlsruhe Basel (complete line until 2020, 250 km/h)
15. Rhein/Main Rhein/Neckar (ca. 2020, 300 km/h)
16. Y-Trasse Langwedel/Lauenbrck-Isernhagen (ca. 2020, 300 km/h)
15
Figure 9
16
Network extension in neighbouring countries and perspective for Germany
New high-speed lines in neighbouring countries

Upgrades in Germany after 2020/2025
Source: DB Netz AG.
New highs-peed lines/extensions and projects in neighbouring countries:

17. Fehmarnbelt link (2018)
18. Hammerbrcke Brussels (2009)
19. Straburg Paris (eastern section 2014)
20. Mulhouse Lyon (first section 2011)
21. Basel Mailand (new tunnel after 2016)
22. Kufstein Verona (first HSR section 2011, Brennerbasistunnel after 2020)
23. Salzburg Vienna (first sections open, complete line until 2015)
24. Frankfurt/Oder Warszawa (160 km/h, planned)
25. Hanau Fulda
26. Niederaula Blankenheim
27. Seelze Haste
3.2.3

Overall criteria of route selection are the reduction of journey times between German metropolitan regions with additional impacts on the trans-European rail network: Hamburg
Frankfurt (16), Berlin Munich (11, 12), Frankfurt Stuttgart (15), Stuttgart Munich (10,
13). Furthermore there are still obligations from Federal Government decision in 1991 for
the achievement of coherent living conditions in eastern and western Germany by the establishment of a cross-national transport network (German unity transport projects, VDE
8).
17
As already indicated in section 3.2.1 the network development until 2020/2025 underlines
the very slowly proceeding orientation from a network with isolated high-speed sections
towards a nation-wide high-speed network linking the main metropolitan regions within
Germany and Europe.
The most relevant projects covering the new construction of high-speed lines as well as
the upgrade of existing lines for high-speed purposes will be described in detail in the following.
11. Erfurt Halle/Leipzig, 12. Ebensfeld Erfurt
VDE 8 was approved as a Germany Unity transport project by the Federal Government.
The upgraded Nuremberg-Ebensfeld line is the southernmost section of the Germany
Unity Transport Project No. 8. The German government added the project to the Federal
Transport Infrastructure Plan in 1992. It is regarded as one of the most vital rail projects
not only for Germany, but also for the trans-European rail network. The line is part of the
Line 1 of Trans-European Transport Networks (TEN-T).
Designed for maximum speeds of up to 300 km/h, the new line will reduce journey times
between Munich and Berlin from 6 to 4 hours. It consists of five sub-projects:
VDE 8.1 Upgraded line: Nuremberg to Ebensfeld (83 km), including S-Bahn (rapid
transit) tracks from Nuremberg to Forchheim, planned opening date: 2017,
VDE 8.1 New line: Ebensfeld to Erfurt (107 km), planned opening date: 2017
Erfurt junction (5 km),
VDE 8.2 New line: Erfurt to Leipzig/Halle (123 km), planned opening date: 2015, 23 km
opened in June 2003,
VDE 8.3 Upgraded line: Leipzig/Halle to Berlin (187 km), opened in May 2006.
Figure 10
18
VDE8 Development of corridor Berlin - Munich
Source: DB Netz AG, www.vde8.de.
The legislative framework comprises the following steps:

Federal Transport Infrastructure Plan (1992) -> Verkehrsprojekte Deutsche Einheit,
Federal Railway Infrastructure Development Act (BSchwAG),
Regional planning procedure (1994),
Plan approval procedure (1995/ 1996/2009 ff),
EU legislation.
The project planning and realization is conducted by DB ProjektBau GmbH as a 100 %
subsidiary of Deutsche Bahn AG. On the project web-page www.vde8.de interested persons can find a detailed documentation of the time table and progress of the construction
work. According to the progress report German unity transport projects10 from May 2011
the budgetary funds for the continuation of the project VDE Nr. 8 are guaranteed. The investments in the sub-projects 8.1 (Nuremberg Erfurt) and Nr. 8.2 (Erfurt Leipzig/Halle)
have been strengthened to achieve a completion of the new Erfurt Leipzig link until the
end of 2015 and the new line Ebensfeld Erfurt line until the end of 2017. Due to financial
restrictions (until now no mandatory financing agreement) the Ebensfeld Nuremberg upgrade will not be completed before the end of 2018. Therefore the full achievement potential on the way from Berlin to Munich will prospectively not be reached before 2019.
The total cost of the project is currently estimated to be 9.6 billion Euro. The widely discussed section Nuremberg Erfurt stands for 5.2 billion Euros. In the 1990s it was estimated to be 3.75 billion Euros. Costs have increased due to inflation and because addi10
http://www.bmvbs.de/cae/servlet/contentblob/68032/publicationFile/40375/sachstandsberichtverkehrsprojekte-deutsche-einheit-stand-mai-2011.pdf.
19
tional infrastructure is now required. Total expenditure on this particular line until the end of
2010 was 1.7 billion Euros.
Figure 11
Project
VDE 8.1: Nuremberg Erfurt
VDE 8.2: Erfurt Halle/Leipzig
VDE 8.3: Berlin Halle/Leipzig
Investment volume VDE8
Total Investment
(Million Euro/km)
5.201
(27.4)
2.738
(22.3)
1.653
(8.8)
Investment
until end of 2010
Open Investment
1.654
3.547
1.652
1.086
1.648
Source: Progress report VDE, p. 16.
The financing of the project is tied to specific laws/funding bodies:

Central government (Federal Railway Infrastructure Development Act, economic stimulus plan),
European Union (TEN program, EFRD, EU economic stimulus plan)
Federal states (Local Transport Financing Act GVFG)
Local authorities (EkrG)
Capital resources DB Netz AG, DB Station & Service AG, DB Energie GmbH
The estimated journey time reduction from 6 to 4 hours from Berlin to Munich differs considerably from the total investment volume of approximately 10 billion Euro. The forecast
for the number of ICE trains on the line has been reduced from 32 trains per day and direction in 1994 to 16 in 2010. The new line mainly serves the axis between Munich and Berlin.
The vision of a shorter journey time of 3 hours between both cities was given in favour of a
(political motivated) stop in Erfurt instead of creating a direct Leipzig Nuremberg link (90
km shorter distance). For the execution of the project a (cost-intensive) solution with 64 km
tunnel constructions has been chosen in order to allow freight trains on the line to increase
the cost-benefit-ratio up to 1.8. De facto there are 4 sections with gradients up to 20 mm/m
in order to avoid higher building costs which make the line more or less useless for efficient freight transportation.
(10. Augsburg Mnchen), 13. Stuttgart Ulm, 15. Rhein/Main Rhein/Neckar
The DB concept Netz 21 (network 21)11 envisages a reduction of the travel time between
Frankfurt and Munich from over three and a half today to only two and a half hours in the
future. Basis for this timing form the following upgrading and new construction projects:
Upgraded line: Augsburg to Munich (62 km), opened on 10 December 2011 with a new
speed limit of 230 km/h after 13 years of building,
New line: Stuttgart to Ulm (59 km), planned opening date: end of 2019,
New line: Frankfurt to Mannheim (85 km), planned opening date: 2017.
The Deutsche Bahn AG Stuttgart Ulm rail project breaks down into two project segments: refurbishment of the Stuttgart 21 rail node and the Wendlingen Ulm new-build
line. The two projects are first priority projects in the Federal Transport Infrastructure Plan
(FTIP) 2003 and also part of the federal railway infrastructure requirement plan. Before
11
The network 21 concept was developed in 1995 and has not been realized.
20
construction begins, the rail project has to receive the required planning permission by
undergoing the project approval procedures pursuant to Section 18 of the German General
Railway Act (AEG). The planning approval procedure started in October 2001; first resolutions have been achieved in 2005 and 2006 (building law). With the results of the Stuttgart
21 referendum in November 2011 the continuation of the construction of the new Stuttgart
main station is politically legitimated which strongly affects the progress of the approval
procedure for the remaining sections of the (Stuttgart -) Wendlingen Ulm high-speed line.
The following illustration shows the two projects.
Figure 12
Planning approval sections Stuttgart 21
Source: www.bahnprojekt-stuttgart-ulm.de.
In Stuttgart the terminal is to be rebuilt to a through-station, and the high-speed line Mannheim-Stuttgart is to be extended to Ulm via the airport located at a higher altitude. Its longitudinal slope is 25 mm/m (2.5 %) and more, heavy trains would have to continue to travel
on the existing lines. The reduction of journey time between Stuttgart and Ulm by the new
high-speed line is estimated to 26 minutes (from 54 to 28 minutes), if a stop at Stuttgart
Airport is omitted. The new-build line forms part of the Magistrale for Europe and therefore
of priority Trans-European Project No. 17.
Federal Transport Infrastructure Plan (2003),
Regional planning procedure (1996),
Plan approval procedure (open resolutions for PFA 1.3, 1.6b, 2.1a/b, 2.2),
EU legislation.
21
The project planning and realization is conducted by DB ProjektBau GmbH. The applicable
time table schedules the trial operations for beginning of 2019 - the start of operations is
planned for December 2019. Shortly after the Stuttgart 21 referendum there is another
building freeze due to a court ruling (Verwaltungsgerichtshof Baden-Wrttemberg) from 16.
December 2012. Further delays of the building progress can be expected due to an ongoing financial discussion and resistance of BUND (Friends of the Earth Germany) and other
initiatives.
The financing framework for restructuring the Stuttgart rail node amounts to a total of EUR
4.526 billion. Other opinions consider this cost estimation as too low. Most of that sum will
be provided by the Federal government, Deutsche Bahn and the Federal Land of BadenWrttemberg.
Deutsche Bahn AG: 1,747 million Euros
Federal government: 1,229.4 million Euros
Federal Land of Baden-Wrttemberg: 930.6 million Euros
Regional capital Stuttgart: 291.8 million Euros
Airport Stuttgart: 227.2 million Euros
Verband Region Stuttgart: 100 million Euros
The new-build line between Wendlingen and Ulm is expected to cost EUR 2.89 billion, a
sum which will be split between the Federal government (2/3) and the Land of BadenWrttemberg (1/3).
The estimated benefits from the project are in contrast to a 7.4 billion Euro investment.
Due to the ambitious alignment with numerous tunnels, expected operational instabilities
and the (still) ongoing resistance of project opponents further cost increases and delays
are likely. The gradient of 25 mm/m (2.5 %) and more on the Wendlingen Ulm line
makes heavy trains to continue to travel on the existing lines. Considering this constraint
the cost-benefit-ratio of the project drops to 1.2 (including 17 lightweight freight trains per
day) which makes the project economically limited useful. The broadly based resistance
underlines the enormous mistakes in the project communication.
The planned new Rhine-Main/Rhine-Neckar (Frankfurt Mannheim) intercity express
(ICE) line closes the gap on the high-speed corridor between Cologne and Stuttgart (via
Frankfurt). Furthermore it is intended to consolidate the backbone of the key north-south
connections in the European railway system network (corridor 24 of TEN-T). The new ICE
line is one of the "urgently required" measures in the FTIP 2003 that are intended to be
realised by 2015. Designed for a maximum speed of 300 km/h, the new line will help to
reduce the journey time from Frankfurt to Stuttgart from 70 to 53 minutes.
Deutsche Bahn AG is currently determining the exact route. The original plans proposed
by Deutsche Bahn contained a bypass route which would have skirted Mannheim. This
would have resulted in considerable conflicts of usage on the lines in the high-density core
area of the Rhine-Neckar metropolitan region and a severe downgrading of the Mannheim
ICE hub. Due to intense discussions the original time-line of a completion until 2007 had to
be given up, currenty there is no mandatory time line; experts expect an opening not before 2021.
Figure 13
22
NBS Rhine-Main/Rhine-Neckar
Source: Deutsche Bahn AG (http://www.deutschebahn.com/site/bahn/de/konzern/db__hintergruende/

bauen__bahn/laufende__projekte/rheinmain__rheinneckar/rheinmain__rheinneckar.html).

Regional planning procedure (1999-2004),
Plan approval procedure (start for the first section Frankfurt (M) Stadion Kreisgrenze
Landkreis Gro-Gerau/Darmstadt-Dieburg in 2008),
EU legislation.
A time table for the construction of the new line can currently not be given. Following the
in December 2011 published framework for infrastructure investments 2011-2015 in Germany (Investitionsrahmenplan fr die Verkehrsinfrastruktur des Bundes) the Frankfurt -
23
Mannheim project is amongst numerous project which will generally not be started before
2015.
The cost estimates including the Mannheim junction amount to 1,771.4 Euro. A future increase due to the project delay is likely. The financing of the project is tied to the followingg funding bodies:
Central government (Federal Railway Infrastructure Development Act)
Capital resources Deutsche Bahn AG,
Third party resources.
The new line contributes to eliminating one of Germany's greatest capacity bottleneck,
which is to be found in this area. The gap closing of the high-speed line Cologne Frankfurt Stuttgart is another important issue. With regard to the predicted traffic volumes on
the Rhine axis especially in freight transportation it has to be asked, if the amount of 1.8
billion Euro can be invested more efficiently in order to avoid bottlenecks. The controversial Darmstadt and Mannheim junction and financial situation of the public households
might cause a further delay of the project beyond 2021.
16. Y-Trasse Langwedel/Lauenbrck-Isernhagen
The Y-Trasse is from Fehmarnbelt perspective the most important high-speed project in
Germany as it ensures the connection of Hamburg to the high-speed link Hannover
Wrzburg. The main objective of the project is not only to reduce journey times between
Hamburg/Bremen and Hannover (reduction 13/8 minutes), it is also to create additional
capacity for hinterland transportation of the seaport of Hamburg. The Y-Trasse is part of
the high priority corridor 5 (TEN-T) from Helsinki to Valetta on Malta via the Fehmarnbelt.
The building comprises two sub-projects:
New line (1): Hannover to Lauenbrck (92 km), start of construction not before 2015,
planned opening not before 2020,
Upgrade line (2): Visselhvede to Langwedel (22 km), start of construction not before
2015, planned opening not before 2020.
To achieve the full potential of the line additional upgrades (e.g. Lauenbrck Buchholz
(3), access to Hannover-Lehrte) which are not part of the project Y-Trasse are necessary.
After the review of the requirement plan in September 2011 new parameters for the project
design have been fixed. Due to the strong growth perspectives of freight transportation on
the Hamburg hinterland corridor the transport ministry has revoked plans for a 300 km/h
designed high-speed link in favour of a 250 km/h line dedicated for passenger as well as
freight transportation. Impacts on future journey times have not been calculated yet.
Figure 14
24
NBS/ABS Hamburg/Bremen Hannover (Y-Trasse)

Source: Deutsche Bahn AG, Ulrich Bischoping, 04.11.2011.

Regional planning procedure (1990s),
Plan approval procedure (not started),
EU legislation.
A memorandum of understanding between Deutsche Bahn AG and Federal government
(19 million Euros) respectively Federal land of Lower-Saxony (10 million Euro) has been
signed, Hamburg and Bremen have also indicated to participate in the memorandum. As
the new investment master plan (draft from 14.12.2011) has put the project Y-Trasse on
hold (classification in lowest category D), the existing time table for the project is currently
highly doubtful. A realization until 2020 is not likely; experts expect a completion 2025 or
25
later. On 30th January 2012 DB AG CEO Rdiger Grube announced to freeze all work on
the project and to assess alternatives first. Even if the transport ministry has announced
that there is no stop for the planning procedure the final realization of the project is therefore more unlikely than ever. Other alternatives are supposed to give a major contribution
to solve the infrastructure capacity problems between Hamburg and Hannover, mixed operations with maximum speed for passenger trains of <230 km/h are likely from todays
perspective.
According to FTIP 2003 the investment volume counts for 1.3 billion euros (only projected
ABS/NBS). Experts estimate the total cost of the project to be 5 billion Euros including the
necessary upgrades of the feeding lines. For beginning of 2012 new cost estimations have
been announced by DB. Issues regarding the financing of the project are currently not
predictable.
The railway infrastructure in the hinterland of Hamburg sees itself confronted with various
challenges derived from the dynamic growth especially of container volumes in the port of
Hamburg. The contribution of the Y-Trasse to gain significantly more capacity for freight
transportation must be doubted. The line as originally projected fails to significantly release
the bottlenecks in the railway nodes of Hamburg, Bremen and Hannover, new capacities
will be available too late (financing, protests), other chances for separation of freight and
passenger trains e.g. by upgrading regional infrastructure have not been considered in
detail. The journey time decreases of <13 minutes contrasts with a 5 billion Euro investment in a dedicated high-speed line.
3.2.4
Network development on Hamburg-Fehmarnbelt corridor

The German part of the Hamburg-resund corridor has to be divided into two sections.
With the introduction of the new timetable on December 13, 2008, the electrification (Type
Re200) of the Hamburg-Lbeck (-Travemnde) railway line was successfully accomplished. The modernization of the 85-kilometre double-track line section (maximum speed
160 km/h) was carried out over a period of two and a half years while maintaining full traffic
on the line.
Figure 15
26
ABS Hamburg-Lbeck
Source: BMVBS.
According to the specifications of the state treaty between Danmark and Germany the
planning of DB Netze for the section Lbeck-Puttgarden focuses on an electrified railway
line and - with the exception of the Fehmarn Sound Bridge, where the train path remains a
single-track line - feature a double-track line. The overall economic analysis of a Fehmarnbelt Fixed Link was based on a conventional electrified double-track line (maximum speed
160 km/h).12
In May 2010, Schleswig-Holstein decided to carry out a regional planning procedure for the
rail connection of the Fehmarnbelt Fixed Link. The following map shows the different
alignment alternatives. The alternatives A, 1A and E were proposed by DB AG, the X alternative is based on regional initiatives. As all alternatives more or less follow the current
alignment, a future high-speed upgrade is most unlikely due to technical parameters as
well as noise exposure.
12
Source: Rail Connection for the Fehmarnbelt Link, DB AG, 2011 (www.deutschebahn.com/site/shared
/de/dateianhaenge/infomaterial/bauprojekte/fehmarnbelt__feste__fahrbahn__englisch.pdf).
Figure 16
27
Alignment alternatives for Lbeck-Puttgarden section
Source: DB AG, Kreis Ostholstein, Illustration by Lrmkontor/HTC.
As the regional planning procedure has not been finished yet there are only provisional
estimations for the investment. Following the most recent cost estimate the total invest-
28
ment volume counts for 817 million Euros.13 Aspects of node extension in Hamburg and
Lbeck as well further lines upgrades e.g. between Hamburg and Ahrensburg (S 4) are not
included in this estimation.
Detached from the specifications of the state treaty and the current planning of DB there
are visions for a high-speed link between (Berlin -) Hamburg and Copenhagen (- Oslo) (e.
g. COINCO approach fur a future high-speed link Berlin - Oslo14). In spring 2011 the mayors of Hamburg and Copenhagen met to discuss an extended partnership between the two
cities. Both had also infrastructure and high-speed trains on the agenda.15
For further comments on the high-speed vision see section 0 of this study. At this point one
thing can already be stated: a high-speed link Hamburg Copenhagen will most likely not
work without a wholly or at least partly dedicated high-speed line as indicated on the following map.16 A maximum speed of 250 km/h between Lbeck and Fehmarn supposably
requires a track alignment without touching the seaside resorts of Timmendorfer Strand,
Scharbeutz etc. Currently the DB seems to prefer an upgrade of the existing line.
13
14
15
16
According to an assessment of the German Federal Court of Auditors from April 2009 a potential cost increase of up to 60 % has to be considered. A published figure of 1.7 billion Euro for the total investment
also comprises an upgrade of the Bad Oldesloe-Hamburg-Wandsbek link.
High-speed train Oslo-Berlin, P. H. Jespersen, 2007.
Femern AS Newsletter, June 2011.
A maximum speed of 250 km/h between Lbeck and Puttgarden will most likely require a track alignment
without crossing the seaside resorts of Timmendorfer Strand, Scharbeutz etc.
Figure 17
29
Visions for high-speed line Hamburg-Copenhagen
Source: TDL.
3.2.5

The total German passenger transport market recorded a slight gain in volume sold in
2010 thereby connecting to the robust development noted in 2009. While the rise in demand noted in the rail passenger and in domestic air transport sectors was driven by favourable overall economic conditions in Germany coupled with gains in both employment
figures and disposable real income levels, the public road passenger transport segment
continued its downward trend. Rail was the only mode of transport to expand its intermodal
share of market in 2010. In total, the rail passenger transport sector was able to regain the
share of market it lost in 2010 and currently has a market share of just over 10 %.
Figure 18
30
German passenger transport market
Rail passenger transport

DB Group
Non-Group railways
Public road passenger transport
DB Group
Motorized individual transport
Air transport (domestic)
Total Market
Growth rates
2010
2009
+ 2.4
- 1.5
+ 2.2
- 1.6
+ 5.0
+ 0.3
- 0.5
- 1.0
- 0.5
+ 0.7
0.0
0.0
+ 2.2
- 3.6
+ 0.2
- 0.3
Market share
2010
2009
10.1
9.8
9.4
9.2
0.7
0.7
9.5
9.6
1.1
1.1
79.1
79.3
1.3
1.3
100.0
100.0
Source: DB Annual Report 2010.
The rail passenger transport segment in Germany was able to post substantial gains in
volume sold over the previous years figure. Driven by a favourable market environment,
demand noted by DB Group companies rose by 2.2 % over the same year-ago period. DB
estimates that the performance of non-Group railways rose by about 5 % due to their taking over additional lines in the regional transport segment. Their share of the rail passenger transport market in Germany rose slightly. In the long-distance rail segment, competitors still account for only a low market share of less than one per cent in terms of traffic
performance. Once again, DBs principal competitor was Interconnex, a member of the
French Veolia Group.
Evaluating the development of the overall transport volumes in the (long-distance) rail passenger segment between 2005 and 2010 only a moderate increase of passenger volumes
(5.9 %) as well as passenger kilometres (2.7 %) can be observed.
Figure 19
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
Development of long-distance transportation (rail) 2005-2010
million passengers
119
120
119
124
123
126
million pkm
33,600
34,500
34,100
35,500
33,100
34,500
Source: Destatis, Deutsche Bahn AG.
Considering the impacts of new high-speed lines an increase in number trains going together with an increase of travellers has to be stated.
Figure 20
31
Impact of high-speed lines in Germany
Source: Deutsche Bahn AG, 2011.
With regard to the development of the total passenger volumes, the beginning of highspeed operations (new lines as well new train sets) seem to have a minor impact as the
following illustration shows.
Figure 21
Impact of high-speed development on passenger km
Source: HTC Illustration.
32
Examples from France show that there seem to be stronger impacts of new high-speed
operations on passenger volumes in other countries compared to Germany.
Figure 22
Passenger impacts of Paris-Lyon TGV-line
Source: IBU.
Over the last decade ICE trains can be considered as the backbone of long-distance
transportation in Germany. In 2010 nearly 78 million long-distance passengers travelled by
ICE (1992: 10 million passengers). This stands for 60 % of all passengers of DB Fernverkehr. In fact the number of ICE passengers does not mirror the impacts of high-speed
lines as ICE trainsets are used on various long-distance relations within Germany. Travelling by ICE has gained popularity as IC trainsets are most of the time old-fashioned and in
a bad shape.
For the future there seem to be no significant growth expectations for long-distance passenger transportation by rail. The study Prognose der deutschlandweiten Verkehrsverflechtungen 2025 on behalf of the Federal Ministry of Transport, Building and Urban Development (BMVBS) predicts an annual passenger increase of 0.3 % until 2025. Forecasts
considering aspects of a significant extension of the high-speed activities do not exist in
Germany. But: demographic changes as well as ongoing changes regarding the housing
activities might lead to a stronger population concentration in metropolitan areas which
might also lead to an increased demand of (high-speed) passenger transportation between
these agglomerations. The following map taken from the acatech-study Mobilitt 202017
17
http://www.acatech.de/fileadmin/user_upload/Baumstruktur_nach_Website/Acatech/root/de/
Publikationen/Projektberichte/Mobilitaet_2020_web.pdf.pdf.
33
shows the expected demand for long-distance/ICE-transportation and underlines the ongoing concentration on core-regions and a core-network.
Figure 23
Transportation demand 2020 (passengers per day and direction) and

changes to 2002 per day and direction
Source: Acatech-study Mobilitt 2020.
Current projections of Deutsche Bahn AG from 2011 show an expected increase of operating performance between 2010 and 2030 of 5.2 % for long distance transportation (+ 7
million train-km), the average net speed is supposed to increase by 9.2 % up to 118 km/h.
The following map shows the projected service level (expected trains per day) until 2030
(green: expansion of services, red: reduction of services). The most significant shifts in
supply occur on the following lines:
Supply duplication on the axis Cologne-Frankfurt-Stuttgart-Munich due to new line,
Significant supply extension Frankfurt-Karlsruhe-Basel,
Significant journey time reductions Berlin-Munich,
Supply thinning peripheral net.
Figure 24
34
Projected service level (trains per day) DB long-distance 2010 vs. 2030
Source: Fahrplan 2026, Deutsche Bahn AG.
3.2.6

Section 7 of the Federal Railway Infrastructure Upgrading Act states that BMVBS shall
submit a report to the German Bundestag each year on the progress made in upgrading
the railway infrastructure network (Verkehrsinvestitionsbericht). In 2009 (latest published
report 2010 for the year 2009) investment totalling 3,839 million Euros was made for the
funding of railway infrastructure (BSWAG/DBGrg). Total expenditure on the rail projects
under the current demand plan (only upgrade and new-built) was 1,592 million Euros,
around 1,142 million Euros of which was financed from federal funds. The investment focused on the following new high-speed lines/upgraded lines: KarlsruheBasle, NurembergErfurtHalle/Leipzig, AugsburgMunich, BerlinFrankfurt (Oder) and Hamburg
Lbeck. The following illustration shows the principle of the financing agreement between
German government and Deutsche Bahn AG.
Figure 25
35
Financing agreements between German government and DB AG
Source: Deutsche Bahn AG.
In December 2012 the German ministry (BMVBS) presented the latest draft of the new
investment master plan (Investitionsrahmenplan) for the period from 2011 to 2015 for all
modes of transport. The traffic forecasts and the in part critical condition of the infrastructure underline the necessity of large investments in the maintenance and upgrade of the
existing road and rail infrastructure as well as the inland waterways. Therefore the in November 2011 approved Federal government budget comprises an extended infrastructure
investment budget of 10.5 billion Euros for 2012 (including a 1 billion infrastructure acceleration program). For the period from 2013 to 2015 an overall budget of 10.1 billion Euros
per year has been approved. Regardless of these large investments not all economically
relevant projects can be realized. Due to increasing budget restrictions the existing list of
upgrade and new building projects (FTIP 2003 based on the economic appraisal by costbenefit ratio) has been substantiated. The priority has been set to maintenance and replacement projects to support the performance of the existing infrastructure.
For the preservation and upgrade/new-built of German railway infrastructure the investment master plan sets the following framework for the period from 2011 to 2015. The
budget for the preservation of the existing network is double the budget for upgrade and
new lines.
Figure 26
Investment master plan for 2011-2015
Total investment
Misc. investment
Infrastructure acceleration program
Investment in existing infrastructure
and new projects
Maintenance
Upgrade and new lines
Source: Investitionsrahmenplan 2011-2015.
2011
3,883
182
3,701
2012
4,063
256
40
3,767
2013
4,206
300
60
3,846
2014
4,242
360
3,882
2015
4,237
370
3,867
sum
20,631
1,468
100
19,063
2,590
1,111
2,540
1,227
2,510
1,336
2,500
1,382
2,500
1,367
12,640
6,423
36
Compared to the sum of the trusted investment budget for the upgrade and the construction of new network sections (6.4 billion Euros), the investment needs amount to 7.5 to 8
billion Euros until 2015 (12.7 billion Euros until final project realization).
Figure 27
25,0
Framework for German infrastructure investments

total demand
20-20.5 billion
add. demand
1-1.5 billion
billion euro
20,0
demand for
preservation
12.6 billion
demand for
upgrades/new lines
7.5-8 billion
15,0
10,0
add. demand
1-1.5 billion
5,0
available
19.1 billion
available
12.6 billion
available
6.4 billion
0,0
Therefore a ranking of all projects is necessary. For efficiency reasons projects which are
already underway are of highest priority. Only remaining budgets can be used for the upgrade and extension of the existing network. According to annex 1 of the master plan, all
projects are ranked in four categories:
Category A: accumulative projects,
Category B: current projects,
Category C: priority projects,
Category D: other important projects.
In the priority list in annex 1 the following projects with relevance to high-speed rail can be
found. For further details see Investitionsrahmenplan 2011-201518.
Figure 28
Five-year plan for infrastructure upgrades
Cat.
Project
ABS/NBS Stuttgart-Ulm-Augsburg
(NBS Stuttgart-Ulm incl. Stuttgart
junction)
ABS/NBS Karlsruhe-Basel
B
18
Investment needs from

2011 (million euros)
2,418.3
Project status
under construction
506.4
under construction
http://www.bmvbs.de/cae/servlet/contentblob/76848/publicationFile/49522/investitionsrahmenplan-2011bis-2015-irp.pdf.
B
B
C
C
D
D
D
D
D
(Schliengen-Basel)
VDE 8.1 Nuremberg-Erfurt (NBS
Ebensfeld-Erfurt)
VDE 8.2 Erfurt-Halle (ErfurtGrbers)
ABS/NBS Karlsruhe-Basel (tunnel
Rastatt)
VDE 8.1 Nuremberg-Erfurt (upgrade Eltersdorf-Erlangen)
ABS/NBS Karlsruhe-Basel (further
sections)
Hinterlandaccess Fehmarnbelt
VDE 8.1 ABS NurembergEbensfeld
NBS/ABS Hamburg/BremenHannover (Y-Trasse)
NBS/ABS Rhein-Main/RheinNeckar
37
1,921.6
under construction
1,134.4
under construction
957.2
in planning stage
156.9
in planning stage
3.2.7
Main conclusions on high-speed activities in Germany
Key target of the German (transport) policy is to facilitate mobility and make it sustainable. This can be considered as a door-opener also for high-speed concepts.
The national network development in Germany is highly affected by the corporate

strategy of Deutsche Bahn AG (DB). Due to the economic success of passenger transportation the DB corporate strategy shows a strong orientation towards the (monopolistic) long distance/ICE-segment.
DB Bahn strategy of new vehicle concept (ICx from 2016) is supposed to increase
travelling comfort and contribute to attract additional passengers. Further impacts on
the cost side can be expected due to less energy consumption and more efficient operations. With maximum speeds of more than 230-250 km/h of the new ICx fleet DB
withdraws from a further extension of the fleet with maximum speeds of >250 km/h.
The planning of DB Netze for the section Lbeck-Puttgarden focuses on a conventional electrified double-track line with a maximum speed of 160 km/h. Currently different alignment alternatives are under investigation. All alternatives do not cover a highspeed scenario. Detached from the current planning the mayors of Hamburg and Copenhagen have exchanged ideas on the vision for a high-speed link between (Berlin -)
Hamburg and Copenhagen (- Oslo).
The development of a coherent high-speed network in Germany will not be finished

before 2025/2030. As investments priorities are shifting towards the preservation of the
existing network it is likely that new building projects as well as necessary infrastructure upgrades to fill gaps in the existing high-speed will further be postponed. The realization of the Y-Trasse as gateway to the German high-speed network seems to be
uncertain as DB AG decided in January 2012 to freeze all work on the project and to
assess alternatives first. Other alternatives are supposed to give a major contribution to
38
solve the infrastructure capacity problems between Hamburg and Hannover, mixed
operations with maximum speed for passenger trains of <230 km/h are likely from todays perspective.
The investment volumes for current high-speed projects indicate that (high-speed) infrastructure development in Germany are too costly due to disproportionate technical
standards and track alignments.
Over the last decade ICE trains can be considered as the backbone of long-distance
transportation in Germany. Compared to other European countries the number of passengers does not mirror the impacts of high-speed lines as ICE trainsets are used on
various long-distance relations within Germany.
The situation of the public infrastructure budgets is supposed to deteriorate over the
next years and the growing preservation needs and upgrade of the existing network
will eat up potential budgets for new high-speed lines.
3.3
High-speed rail in Denmark
3.3.1

National transport policy and implications for high-speed rail strategy
In January 2009, all parliamentary parties, except from one very small, decided on a wide
consensus regarding the national transport policy: the Green Transport Policy. Since
January 2009, the national transport program has been concluded in and backed up by 10
political agreements on new investments in railways, roads, bicycle paths, bus systems,
stations, ports, terminals, ITS, etc.
National investments are financed through a dedicated infrastructure fund and through
special public owned DBO-companies e.g. building and operating the fixed links or metro
expansions in Copenhagen. The financial constraints require a very strict priority in the
coming years as the means in the Infrastructure Fund are almost fully activated until 2020.
More than hundred projects have been launched on the platform of the national transport
policy, all with the aim to improve mobility and enhance the opportunities for a more green
transport policy. Execution of the projects will be a priority up to 2020, but a strategic preparation for the next investment period 2020-2030 is in progress.
In principle the new Danish government continues the Green Transport Policy:
Transport CO2 emissions to be reduced further,
Implementation of a green conversion scheme of car taxation,
Public transport needs to lift most of the future growth in traffic,
The railway sector must be reliable, safe and modern,
Road capacity must be expanded where it causes congestion problems, but also in
corridors where the future traffic growth resulting from economic and social development will require an expansion of infrastructure,
Cycling should be promoted as preferable where it is a realistic possibility,
Denmark should be a laboratory for green transport technology,
Bridges, roads and railways must not destroy irreplaceable nature,
Noise and air pollution in towns and cities must be reduced.
39
However, in terms of pricing policy for public transport, the new Government will see to a
more social balance (lower fares), and will execute the former Governments decision on
introduction of road pricing, in first place with a toll ring around Copenhagen. An extended
road pricing as well as monetary impacts from a further CO2 reduction are expected to
catalyze modal shifts from road to (high-speed) rail.
On the basis of the Green Transport Policy a historic revitalisation program with special
focus on the rail sector has been decided. This action took many years to agree. In 1997
the Ministry of Transport published a high-speed railway plan (Baneplan modernization
of the main railway network in Denmark) and it was followed up by specific planning acts
for the first sections of a new fast Danish railway network.
But more than 10 years of political debate on whether to prioritize upgraded solutions
(ABS) for 200 km/h instead of building new lines for 250 km/h postponed the start of construction until 2009. Finally it was agreed to work accordingly to a strategic concept called
the time-model setting a target of maximum travel time by increasing the velocity of trains;
not for a specific top-speed but sufficient to fulfil a point-to-point travel time of max one
hour reaching central terminals in the network. The implication of this time-model concept
means that the top-speed of the trains has to be increased from the present 180 km/h to
250 km/h on certain sections of the railway network, but on other parts 200 km/h could be
sufficient on upgraded lines.
The by far largest part of railway traffic is coming to and from Copenhagen, but the potential for an increase in traffic can be seen in the main corridor Copenhagen-Aalborg.
Figure 29
40
Passenger transport flows on the Danish railway lines (BaneDK)
Source: DK National Railway Authority, 2011.
Objectives for the railway investment program according to the Green Transport Policy has
been set and agreed:
The railway must be able to take most of the future growth in the transport sector,
The railway must provide a more attractive and customer focused product,
The railway must be reliable, safe and modern,
The railway must be more efficient, and competition in the market should be strengthened,
The railway vision is based on a doubling the rail passenger transport before 2030,
The railway vision is based on a tripling the rail freight transport before 2030.
For Denmark the geo-spatial conditions are special due to the many islands of which the
nation consists. Before making a long term viable high-speed strategy it has been more
relevant to finance and construct the major fixed link in a priority order: first the Great Belt,
secondly the resund and then the Fehmarnbelt fixed link all very large investments in
the same league as major European high-speed projects. As a consequence of the necessary massive investments in the fixed links the Danish railway sector was given less financial means during many years compared with other countries. Today Danish trains are
running at only semi-high-speed (max 180 km/h on the InterCity lines), and modern signaling systems and electrification is lacking.
The strategic planning of the national transport policy points at a number of development
corridors which should be decided upon in 2014-2015 in order to continue modernization
41
and upgrading of the Danish main infrastructure in the period after 2020. These corridors
consist of both railway or/and highway prioritized investments and as well major fixed links
(tunnels or bridges):
Jutland: new north-south highways and partly new railway lines,
East-West: New fixed links to merge the two parts of Denmark, and here is the highspeed railway perspective important in all the alternatives analyzed,
Zealand: here is a new transport corridor (Ring 5) north of Copenhagen on the list. It
is a combined railway and highway corridor connected to a possible fixed link across
resund between Helsingborg and Helsingr.
Figure 30
Strategic perspective map for infrastructure development in Denmark in

the period after 2020
Source: Green transport policy status of strategic investigations, Ministry of Transport, 2011.
It will always be very difficult to choose between these projects which count for more than
30 billion Euros in the investment program for 2020-2030. The East-West alternatives
crossing either Little Belt or the direct Zealand-Jutland fixed link across the Kattegat are
themselves a challenge for decision making. If the Kattegat-project should be preferred it
would take more than half the budget.
42
Of more importance for a Scandinavian high-speed rail system would be the improvement
of the corridors in East-Denmark. The two cities Copenhagen and Malm are going to investigate another alternative for a new fixed link across resund as a sort of supplement
to the HH-link. This is also for discussion in the coming years.
However, the political constellations on national and regional and local level are already in
the process of finding some common understanding for the development. As a matter of
fact there is a very clear back-up for investments in the Fehmarnbelt-corridor.
Regional stakeholder positions
Copenhagen and Hamburg are now getting closer as the Fehmarn-project is going to be
realized. A declaration from the two Lord Mayors emphasizes the need to cooperate in
different areas where the metropolitan centers have mutual advantages of a stronger regional economic development.
Among the statements from the present declaration concerns the field of more effective
infrastructure. If a budget of 6 billion Euros is spent on the fixed link giving one hour of improvement in travelling time also a parallel and reasonable improvement of the hinterland
infrastructure should be prioritized in order to raise standards and fulfill the aims of the
Trans-European Transport Network. A further reduction in travelling time of one hour
therefore is set as a minimum demand.
Figure 31
The Copenhagen-Hamburg declaration announcing a max travelling time

between the two cities
Source: Declaration of cooperation, Infrastructure vision, Mayors of Copenhagen and Hamburg, 2011
43
Its a new position taken to favoring high-speed rail investments, and the new policy can be
identified also at the regional level. Earlier there was a fear that new roads and railways
only would damage environment, but an understanding that investments can be done in a
way where socio economic benefits could be obtained at the same time as the new infrastructure is build according to best practice, i.e. with the lowest possible negative impact
on the local environment.
Figure 32
The local and regional political institutions agree to favouring a future

high-speed link across Fehmarnbelt
Source: Political positions and statements from all municipalities in East Denmark and the Region Zealand and
the Capital Region, 2011.
These two transport policy framework papers identify the direction of future investments as
a respond to national policy programs where there always has been a fight between the
Western part and the Eastern part of Denmark with regard to obtain the best possible
share of the national investment budget.
The positions fully back up of strengthening the South Zealand Corridor from Fehmarn and
construct a new transport corridor in the North up to a future HH-link to be build between
the two harbor cities. This corridor will give priority to German-Swedish freight transit, but
should also accommodate direct high-speed trains bound for Copenhagen Airport and linking to the resund Bridge further into the Swedish network.
(High-speed) Strategy of DSB
The main train operating company DSB do not make transport policies and strategies for
high-speed projects. In the Scandinavian countries there has been made a complete and
genuine separation of the railway infrastructure and the operating companies, both in the
passenger and the freight business. This policy is a consequence of EU-legislation and in
order to prepare for more competition and development within the railway sector.
44
DSB currently has a fleet of semi-fast comfortable InterCity trains. But train speed is restricted to 180 km/h on all main lines.
Figure 33
DSB train fleet
Number of
Trainsets
Operating
Speed
Design
Speed
Service
IC3/ER4
140
180 km/h
180 km/h
1991-93
IC4
83
180 km/h
200 km/h
2007-12
ICE TD
(Danish
modified)
10
180 km/h
200 km/h
2007
Name
Source: DSB
In the Danish long distance traffic a fleet of 140 trainsets have been operating since 1991
at the main network. 60 % of the fleet is powered by diesel engines, due to the lack of
electrification of the lines especially in Jutland. The electrical version runs in multiple units
with the diesel version across the Great Belt bridge in the domestic InterCity traffic.
The transport policy in Denmark has been very much focussing on highway investments,
metro, lightrail projects, cycle initiatives, etc. This has lead to the absence of a dedicated
high-speed railway strategy and an electrification investment process. As probably the last
purchase of diesel trains the IC4-series were decided as a way to find a necessary way of
relieving the IC3/ER4 series in the short term. However, the supplier Ansaldo-Breda failed
to deliver in the agreed quality. Even though 50 % of the payment was refunded the present situation is not optimal: all trainsets are under a technical re-make for at least the next
two years.
The IC3 trains are licensed and capable of running in both Sweden and Germany. The
need of more rolling stock on Danish lines have lead to that all IC3s are deployed in domestic services. The border crossing Danish-German traffic is now dominated by a fleet of
10 ICE-TDs being leased from DB.
Regarding rolling stock development in Denmark it could be expected to find an electric
inter-regional train unit, but with an operating speed of max 200 km/h. DSB is still reluctant
45
to go into serious considerations about the fast travel market. A simple replacement of the
ICE-TD with the upcoming new ICE version capable of running on multi-current systems is
very likely when the Fehmarn Belt link opens. For the Danish main lines there are not currently a high-speed rolling stock strategy available: it has not been decided whether DSB
should prefer leasing of European standard equipment or going into self-development of a
special Danish fleet of a semi-high speed train for 200-250 km/h. However, experience
with the IC4-delivery certainly does not encourage the latter.
3.3.2

A dedicated high-speed network is non-existing at the moment, but the era will come due
to the political agreement in 2009 (see previous section). An important part of the decision
and the technical standards chosen is influenced by the parallel decision to realize the
Fehmarnbelt fixed link. The projected new semi high-speed railway corridor from Copenhagen to Rdby is one important part of the future Danish high-speed network which will
be described in the following section.
3.3.3

National perspective
As described in section 3.3.1 the revitalisation program for the national railway was
launched in 2009. The phase one of the time-model forms the new platform for constructing a comprehensive network of high-speed rail services covering the major Danish conurbations in which 75 % of the GDP is produced.
The ambitious high-speed strategy has been decided for the national network to ensure
significant faster travel times by train between major cities. The time-model includes the
following initiatives:
Fixing the maximum travel time between Aalborg and Copenhagen to 3 hours, resulting in a reduction of approx. 1 hours,
As first step introduce a 200-250 km/h service between Odense and Copenhagen in
2020. It must not take any longer than one hour between the two cities,
As second step upgrade the Aalborg-Aarhus section. This has been initiated, in order
for this part to introduce the first improvements 2018-2020,
During 2013-14 it should be decided in which way the last section between Odense
and Aarhus could be upgraded,
Finally the strategy should fulfil the target of doubling railway traffic giving a passenger
benefit in saving 3.5 million travel hours annually, reduce CO2 emissions in the transport sector and reduce congestion on major highways.
The time-model is a cornerstone of the strategy to develop the railway network between
the provinces and tying Denmark better together. The faster journey times on main routes
between parts of the country will attract travellers to public transport and enhance rail role
in provincial traffic further. It is expected this ultimately would lead to a significant share of
the travel market to using the public transport. Simultaneously, investments in the timemodel release capacity to develop the local and regional train services.
Figure 34
46
The national railway development scheme
Source: Green transport policy status of strategic investigations, Ministry of Transport, 2011.
The ongoing strategic planning activities for the period 2020-2030 point at three ambition
levels of the railway investment:
As shown in the above figure the basic alternative A gives a journey time of two hours
for the Copenhagen-Aarhus connection (the two largest cities in Denmark) corresponding to a mean travel speed at 160 km/h. This is comparable to ICE-services like the
Hamburg-Hanover. Investments will be 2-3 billion Euros, which among other major infrastructure upgrading include a bridge crossing the Vejle Fjord (also with a road section). However, the Danish politicians want to investigate other options.
In the alternative B the Copenhagen-Aarhus travel time could climb down to approximatly 1 hours which would really lead to new domestic high-speed railway services.
The preliminary cost estimate for this alternative is 6-7 billion Euros and involves a new
fixed link of 16 km in the northern Little Belt.
Most visionary is alternative C. Reducing the Copenhagen-Aarhus journey time to 1
hour changes the time-space map completely, but it implies the construction of new
mega-infrastructure. The study includes a bridge of 50 km across the Kattegat plus
new hinterland investment, which result in the total cost of 15-18 billion Euros. The
fixed link solutions of model B and C also enable cars to use these new connections.
For all alternatives it is of general interest that high-speed trains not only serve end-to-end
markets of the biggest conurbations. The system is composed in a way where faster interregional trains should benefit of the new tracks. More capacity in the network is a pivotal
focus for a better operation of commuter traffic and the medium-distance passenger traffic
as well. A prerequisite for the plans seems to be the freight transport. Goods can be
moved off the road onto the track if more capacity is offered the railway operators.
Late 2013 the investigations will draw conclusions and become subject of a probably
longer political discussion and positioning. It can be registered that sustainable mobility
and effective transport solutions for the future are topics placed high on the political
agenda for the national transport development strategies.
Of course the problems of the global economy and the actual constraints in the state fiscal
budgets could add some more years to how fast the visions can be realized. On the other
hand there is a growing recognition of the fact that public works in the infrastructure field in
itself generates the frames for future socio economic growth. In this context several sug-
47
gestions of a more international investment profile have been brought into the debate by
different stakeholders.
International perspective
This first of all deals with the Swedish-Danish-German main transport corridor, i.e. the
resund-Fehmarn line. Today the border-crossing transport between Jutland and Schleswig plays a major role. The picture will change when the fixed Fehmarn link opens. Freight
transit on railway will be re-directed from the Jutland route to the Fehmarn link reducing
the distance of the rail route Sweden-Denmark-Germany by 160 km.
Due to the time distance generated by the rather slow ferry lines crossing the Baltic Sea
approximately half the passenger volume from Scandinavia to Germany and vice versa is
not executed via land transport modes. It is transported by air. The fixed Fehmarnbelt link
and a substantial improvement of the hinterland infrastructure is expected to produce a
new flow chart for both passenger and freight transport.
The strategic master plan issued by the Capital Region presents a number of actions
e.g. introduction of a Scandinavian high-speed rail system linked to the Trans-European
network via Fehmarnbelt. It also suggests a new fixed link across resund and a new rail
(and road) transport corridor north-west of Copenhagen.
Figure 35
48
The international north-south corridors incorporate a new fixed link between Denmark and Sweden
Source: Investments in the Future, the Capital Region Denmark, 2011.
The Danish and Swedish Government have agreed to consider further perspectives of a
new fixed links across resund. The HH-link and the supporting transport corridor is part
of the investigations of the Ministry of Transport although it is emphasized that the idea of
the HH-link originates from a Swedish initiative.
Figure 36
49
The next fixed link: proposal for a tunnel project
Source: IBU Infrastructure and Regional Development, 2010.
In 2008-2010 the IBU-project published a number of updated technical analyses of the HHlink pointing at the obvious advantages for further integration and development the resund region.
In 2011 the Swedish National Transport Administration presents a report with clear recommendations. It is subsequently acknowledged that the challenges of the capacity of the
transport system across resund will intensify, the resund traffic must be seen in a
longer perspective of the Fehmarnbelt link, and the potential benefits of building a link in
the northern resund is worth investigating further.
The IBU-analysis is probably the most detailed at the moment regarding a new resund
crossing. The HH-fixed link is composed as a package of three tunnel sections:
In the north a separate system of twin-tunnels for passenger trains running from centre-to-centre linking the two cities of Helsingborg and Helsingr. The inter-regional
passenger service gives direct connection between many cities at the one side to the
other, and it creates a virtual circular line around resund.
A twin-tunnel system for cars south of the two harbour cities connects direct to the
highway system instead of the present situation with intense road traffic e.g. a lot of international lorries in and out the cities. Replacement of the ferry lines with a 15 km tunnel results in a non-stop direct connection between the E4/E6/E47 motorways.
A rail freight tunnel which connects direct to the existing Scania-railway line on the
Swedish side, but will have to be connected to a completely new railway line in the
Western transport corridor (originally decided to be placed in Ring 5).
In the beginning of the study process the HH-link was seen closely integrated with a future
high-speed rail system. At a later stage this position was changed in favour of having interregional and freight trains concentrated at the HH-route in the north of resund and the
high-speed trains calling at Copenhagen Airport station via the resund Bridge in the
south.
Figure 37
50
Investment in the new Zealand transport corridor (Ring 5) and the

Helsingr-Helsingborg Link
Kge-Helsingr highway
Kge-Helsingr railway line
Helsingr-Helsingborg passenger trains
Helsingr-Helsingborg freight trains
Helsingr-Helsingborg road connection
Total corridor package
Railway part
billion Euros
1.2
1.3
1.2
1.1
2.0
6.8
3.6
Source: IBU Infrastructure and Regional Development, 2010.
In order to utilize the capacity in the best possible way, a choice in the IBU-management
group was made for the future route for the main freight transport flows as a very important
step for giving priority for faster passenger trains. By moving the freight transport today
operated via the resund Bridge up to a future northern link this will give better access for
passenger traffic to/from the airport.
Figure 38
Freight and interregional train services in the Helsingborg-Kge corridor
Source: IBU Infrastructure and Regional Development, 2010 www.ibu-oresund.se
As stated the ongoing national strategic considerations for infrastructure investments in the
period 2020-2030 includes this corridor perspective (see Figure 37). However, at the moment the process of the analytical work is not running in a very fast tempo even though the
general picture on the regional and local level seems to cover a major interest for the pro-
51
jects. The HH-link could turn out being a less complex topic of planning compared with the
challenges that the construction of the highway/railway transport corridor in the Danish
hinterland might induce. The parties suggest the Danish government that more in-depth
studies (than the present strategy analysis) should be initiated in order to find a solution for
placing the exact alignment (Investment in the future. Capital Region, 2011).
Further aspects regarding the South-Zealand corridor will be dealt with in the next chapter.
3.3.4
Network development on Fehmarnbelt-resund corridor

According to the state treaty between Denmark and Germany on the Fehmarnbelt fixed
link, the Kingdom of Denmark should have the sole responsibility for upgrading and financing the hinterland connection to the fixed link across the Fehmarnbelt in the Kingdom of
Denmark. The upgrading of the hinterland infrastructure in the Kingdom of Denmark
should be completed no later than at the opening of the fixed link across the Fehmarnbelt.
This includes the electrification of the existing railway line between Ringsted and Rdbyhavn as well as the upgrading of the railway lines from Vordingborg to the Storstrm
Bridge and from Orehoved to Rdbyhavn to a double-track, electrified railway line.
The planning process has not been based on one single and integrated decision for the
whole railway corridor between resund and Fehmarnbelt. Separate decisions and financial funds is part of the process.
In the original EU-initiative for a Trans-European Transport Network headed by former EUcommissioner Henning Christophersen the Fehmarnbelt link was incorporated in a highspeed railway net. The parallel guidelines for determination of the technical specifications
for the new rail infrastructure recommended a dedicated high-speed standard. The classification of the future railway line across Fehmarnbelt was later on downgraded by the National Railway Authorities in fear of the high cost which an inter-operable ERTMS traffic
management system eventually could induce. Therefore the technical specifications were
adopted from the standards of the conventional rail network for semi high-speed resulting
in more flexibility in the planning process.
However, the green transport policy showed surprisingly to favoring a high-class technical
solution for the Danish railway modernization program by the fundamental decision to introduce a nation-wide ERTMS system of the standards of ETCS level II. And the ambition
of velocity-performance was also increased to 200-250 km/h.
Section Copenhagen-Ringsted
Quickly after the decision to go on with the fixed Fehmarnbelt link it followed the decision
for the first new railway section, the new alignment between Ringsted and Copenhagen.
Figure 39
52
The emergence of a high-speed railway through East-Denmark with connection to Fehmarnbelt
Source: TDL illustration.
The new Copenhagen-Ringsted line is financed through the ordinary state budget. The
main section of 55 km at a cost of 1.4 billion Euros does not include running in and out of
Copenhagen and Ringsted station. These small sections of 5 km which cannot be
avoided and finally will enable a platform to platform connection are under construction
for the cost 0.1 billion Euros (the KR programme) giving a total construction budget of 1.5
billion Euros.
Figure 40
General technical standard for the new line
Max speed (for conventional rolling stock)

Electrification
Traffic management
Operation
Profile and max axle load
250 km/h
25.000 kV 50 Hz
ETCS-level II
Mixed passenger and freight
GC + 25 ton
The line will open in 2018 equipped with existing traffic management systems in order to
have the present train fleet running at the new line at an allowed max speed of 200 km/h,
but after test trial of the new ETCS-II the line will be commissioned for 250 km/h operation
expected in 2020.
Figure 41
53
The new Copenhagen-Ringsted high-speed railway line parallel to the

existing motorways E55-E47
Source: Banedanmark, Danish National Railway Authority, 2011.
The Ringsted-Rdby section

From Ringsted to the Fehmarnbelt tunnel (Rdby) the railway line will be upgraded, electrified and fully equipped with ETCS-II and rebuild to double track except for the passage
of the Storstrmmen Bridge which is undergoing separate investigations. The railway line
is according to the ongoing planning act intended to be decided in details in order for the
section to be in full operation in 2020.
The decision base for this project consists of 3 alternatives: a 160 km/h, a 200 km/h and a
250 km/h alternative. The Danish National Railway Administration has made a position and
points at the 200 km/h solution as the best investment for society. Total cost is estimated
at 1.2 billion Euros. The price increase for raising standard from 160 km/h to 200 km/h is
13 %. The 200 km/h alternative is criticized from many institutions e.g. the Industrial
Chamber of Denmark, research and university institutions and public organisations like
municipalities. They point at the need to have a long term perspective and to raise the
level of ambition regarding the max speed at least at some parts of the hinterland infrastructure. However, the 200 km/h alternative is most likely to be included in the national
decision making. Later on further railway upgrade initiatives might be prepared and executed.
Figure 42
54
The upgraded Ringsted-Fehmarn railwayline
It has been expected that the Minister for Transport would take the decision in spring 2012
and ask the parliament to approve the Act of construction. However, late 2011 it has been
agreed among the political stakeholders to make a decision for construction of a new Storstrmmen Bridge (or tunnel). A fast process of planning and analyses has been initiated. A
decision base should be presented for the political parties before summer 2012.
At this point the decision makers should draw up their final position which will include the
proposal from the Danish National Railway Authority. It has been thoroughly analysed
whether a 1 billion DKK (13 %) more expensive 200 km/h alignment should be build instead of the 160 km/h alignment which has a total cost of 8 billion DKK.
A positive net present value of 260 million DKK can be the result if a 200 km/h is going to
be the preferred solution. And this is without the benefit of a new Storstrmmen Bridge. It
is assumed 120 km/h on the Storstrmmen stretch (but this could be change, see below).
Figure 43
Ringsted-Rdby Socio economic analysis 200 km/h
Extra construction costs

Time savings and increased revenue
Net operating and maintenance costs
Tax consequence and distortion factor
Total
Internal rate
NPV 2010 mill DKK

-999
1,278
160
-124
+260
5.9 %
55
The value of the travel time reduction is worth enough for paying for the extra construction
cost. The National Railway Authority Banedanmark finds an internal rate of return of 5.9 %
in their socio economic calculations.
The Storstmmen Bridge
As a consequence of budget constraints and as a part of the treaty between Germany and
Denmark regarding the Fehmarnbelt link it was decided in first place to avoid construction
of a new Storstrmmen bridge. But like the speed-commitment only was settled at a minimum speed of 160 km/h according to the treaty, history has developed differently. Final
decisions on the hinterland infrastructure from the German-Danish border to Copenhagen
might indicate that the main line standard will be significantly improved, i.e. with a line
speed of 200-250 km/h and with new ETCS-II traffic management system.
One of the remaining weak points in the Danish rail corridor resund-Fehmarn is the
single-tracked Storstrmmen Bridge. Transport scientists e.g. TU-Denmark and a number
of research institutions have pointed at the need to enhance capacity by building a new
link across Storstrmmen. Inspections of the bridge have now revealed severe wear, and
the life time of the bridge will be dramatically affected and reduced when the operation of
the Fehmarnbelt traffic begins. Therefore it has top-priority to find a solution as soon as
possible.
Due to a political agreement at national level investigations of 5 technical alternatives for a
new crossing are underway. Estimated cost is 0.4 billion , but is very much depending on
the specific alternative.
Figure 44
Investigation program for a new Storstrmmen bridge
56
The studies include the following alternatives:

1. A major renewal of the existing bridge, i.e. the existing single-track and 2 lane road
2. A major renewal, but only railway modernized and the road section closed
3. New railway bridge, the existing bridge is kept for car traffic
4. New railway bridge, the existing bridge ends its days for traffic
5. New combined railway and road bridge, the existing bridge ends its days for traffic.
The schedule is to finalize technical and environmental investigations, as well as the planning and decision process in order to re-build the Storstrmmen Bridge or to open a new
link in 2019. The traffic across the Fehmarnbelt will from that time be able to flow unhindered.
There is no specification at the moment which level the railway part will be designed for.
But as is the case for other rail upgrade projects the extra investment for a 200 km/h standard is probably in the area of 5-15 % compared with an only 160 km/h stretch. The initial
drawings suggest curve radii for a 200 km/h solution.
Capacity resund
As part of the law package for the Fehmarn Belt hinterland infrastructure it has been decided to start a plan approval process for expanding capacity on the resund line through
the station at Copenhagen Airport. Background for this is the bottleneck situation caused
by too little station capacity for passenger trains and difficulties due to an increase in operations of German-Swedish freight transit trains in the future.
Figure 45
Investigation program for capacity improvement on the resund line as

part of the Fehmarnbelt hinterland infrastructure investments
Source: Danish Railway Authority, Banedanmark 2011 (Environmental Impact Assessment, technical part)
There are different alternatives in discussion, but a total investment of 0.1 billion should
be expected. A fly-over solution is representing the most costly solution, but does not give
optimal capacity improvement. It would be wise to direct freight trains from Denmark to
Sweden through the existing station. In the other direction it is not necessary. Looking at a
longer perspective a new fixed HH-link across resund, or another long lasting solution,
could relieve the resund Bridge for most of the freight trains enabling the station to accommodate for a possible introduction of high-speed trains Sweden-Denmark-Germany
57
Investment budget 2011-2020 for the resund-Fehmarn corridor

All in all the infrastructure investment in the new semi high-speed railway corridor is totaling approximately 8 billion with expected commercial start of services in 2020 on the
Danish side.
Figure 46
Investments in the resund-Fehmarn corridor 2010-2020
Source: TDL Illustration.
Further high-speed considerations

A new high-speed railway line through the southern part of Zealand has been dealt with in
several phases. And the interest for this has been growing slowly, although it turned out to
be rejected as part of the existing planning for the Fehmarnbelt link in the period 20102020.
In the mid-90s the Ministry of Transport decided to conduct a study of a high-speed railway
line from Copenhagen to Rdby (Rambll-Systra, 1997). The results from this were reported in the national Baneplan. However, it appeared to show more relevance a decade
later when the decision of the Fehmarnbelt link was taken, and when the IBU-program
started more thorough analyses.
Figure 47
58
Study of high-speed line between Rdby (Fehmarn tunnel) and Kge with
different alignment alternatives
Source: IBU traffic model, Prof. Otto Anker Nielsen 2009 (left). Ministry of Transport, Baneplan 1997 (right).
A new railway line parallel to the motorway E47 combined with a new bridge or tunnel
across the Storstrmmen and a tunnel under the strait of Guldborgsund can give substantial more capacity in the network and much faster passenger trains. The consulting firm
COWI assisted IBU/Professor Otto Anker Nielsen in his studies, and they came to an
alignment with a price tag of 2.3 billion Euros.
The National Railway Authority has also done recent studies during the stages of the environmental impact assessment of the Fehmarnbelt hinterland infrastructure. The cost is
estimated to 3.1 billion Euros for a complete new alignment of 120 km new track incl. the
two passages of Storstrmmen and Guldborgsund.
Figure 48
59
Alternative for a high-speed rail line for 250 km/h from Kge to Rdby
The alternative of a new high-speed alignment can be built in stages after the upgrading
project for the existing railway line although this strategy in the long run will be more expensive.
3.3.5

Today railway traffic in Denmark is on its highest level ever seen. Measured in absolute
volume the public transport by train shows a historic high level of attraction, in recent years
the driver' being medium-long or long distance journeys. Although new metro lines in Copenhagen contributed to the growth it was especially opening of the fixed links which accelerated the competitiveness of the railway sector.
Figure 49
Railway passenger transport development in Denmark
Source: Danish Ministry of Transport, A railway in progress, 2009.
It is expected that the Danish long term strategic plans will favour investments in further
railway renewal and upgrading projects. The Time model and the plans for building new
fixed links will strongly support the national goal of doubling the railway transport. Investments in the Fehmarn Belt corridor will of course also contribute to this forecast, even
though the ambition level of the expenditure and thereby the precise market reaction
60
cannot be settled at this moment, primarily due to the fact that the German specifications
of the corridor has not yet been determined.
Figure 50
Forecast Danish land transport volume until 2030
Source: Danish Ministry of Transport, A railway in progress, 2009.
A rather large proportion of the growth in the demand for railway transport can be seen in
long distance journeys of >150 km. In Denmark these journeys occur especially in the
East-West direction across the Great Belt.
Figure 51
Danish market segments for rail transport
Source: Tetraplan 2007, Railway traffic forecast 2030 (Infrastructure Commission).
Even though regional lines in West- and East-Denmark count for 61 % including commuter
traffic on the suburban network around Copenhagen, the InterCity and long distance lines
have a strong position within the railway system by 39 %.
More or less half the international activity is bound for primarily German destinations (including night trains) and the other half consists of longer journeys from Sweden to/from
Copenhagen Central or Copenhagen Airport (excl regional resund traffic). In economic
terms the long-distance rail market plays an even bigger role; earnings are approx 50 %
61
higher in the long distance division of the railways compared with regional/ local transport
divisions which need substantial grants from public funds.
Figure 52
Market share in long distance travel (across the Great Belt)
Source: Sund & Blt 2008. Demand effects of the Great Belt link.
Long distance rail transport has been growing the most.

(Great Belt) corridor it can be concluded that the induced
significant after opening of the fixed link in 1997 and
services. Here we see the largest ramp-up effect, but
slowed down following more normal growth patterns.
Looking closer at the East-West

traffic in the first time period was
after introduction of faster IC3the growth continued and then
In the period 1995-2005 the long distance travellers grew from 4.5 to 7.8 million equal to
an increase of 66 %. This corresponds to a growth of 900 million pkm based on an average journey length of 220-235 km by long distance trains across the Great Belt. Thereby
more than half of the growth of 1.7 billion pkm came from the long distance trains. New
regional resund trips can explain the other part of this growth story.
Figure 53
Danish long distance railway traffic
Long distance (across Great Belt)

mill pass
Long distance (across Great Belt)
billion pkm *)
Rail total in DK
billion pkm
1995
2000
2005
2010
1995-2010
4.5
6.7
7.8
8.4
+87 %
1.0
1.6
1.9
2.0
+101 %
4.9
5.4
6.2
6.6
+35 %
Source: DSB annual reports, DS Danmarks Statistik and estimation *)
The average time reduction after launch of the new train services in 1997 was 30 %. Between the most important end-to-end destinations, Copenhagen and Aarhus, the travel
time shrank 1 hour 5 minutes from 3:55 to 2:50 for the fastest train (Lyntog) giving a reduction of 32 %. A rough estimation of the time elasticity gives approximately -2.0 as a result
of the market effect stemming from the speed increase on main lines and the fixed link
across the Great Belt. While the average length of the long distance journeys increased by
9 % we could argue that the elasticity even proved to be higher.
Figure 54
62
The long distance railway traffic across Great Belt
As can be seen from the diagram it appeared a little back-drop in 1998-99. This is due to
the opening of the parallel road connection across the Great Belt which created severe
competition between the modes. Despite the car traffic obtained 1 hour travel time reduction continued public transport to grow.
When we more specific are looking at analyses of infrastructure development in the resund-Fehmarn corridor we will find at least 3 different views on demand forecasting. The
old Femern A/S model predicts 3.800 train passengers in the border-crossing trains depending on a travel time Copenhagen-Hamburg of between 3 and 3 hours. A high-speed
option was not a main focus in these forecasts.
The National Railway Authority Banedanmark analysed the effects of various upgrading
alternatives of the hinterland line Rdby-Ringsted. Using an internal model Banedanmark
also evaluated the effects of building a 250 km/h section from Kge to Holeby (Rdby)
including a new passage across Storstrmmen. This was however not based on an international transport demand forecasting model, and did not incorporate a system dynamic
approach where the line was seen in a perspective of an integrated coherent system Copenhagen-Hamburg.
The IBU strategic infrastructure program (Interreg project) produced in 2008-2010 a rather
large study of a Scandinavian high-speed railway system, and effects of different highspeed corridors were examined. The Coinco-corridor from Oslo towards Gothenburg, the
63
Stockholm-resund corridor and the resund-Hamburg corridor were examined in different variations and alignments.
The IBU investigations resulted in several analysis reports. One of these concerned traffic
modelling based upon EUs Trans-Tools model which gave input to a qualified assessment of potentials for a high-speed system to be implemented in Northern Europe. The
background for the modelling was DG-Moves evaluations of the Trans-European Network
and the so-called TEN-Connect studies.
Figure 55
Results from the Trans-Tools model regarding a North-European highspeed railway system
Source: IBU Bahnstrategie technical report, Prof. Otto Anker Nielsen, 2009
The Trans-Tools model showed some initial problems of explanation when making forecasting scenarios, but as the first model describing an international transport market in the
North-European corridor it produced interesting data. The TU-Denmark validated the
methods and the technical calculation routines.
Based on the intensive modelling work a number of effects can be found. The IBU railway
strategy focused on five alternatives, and the passenger effects of these were reported as
follows:
Figure 56
Results from the IBU alternatives for a high speed rail corridor
The railway connection Hamburg-Copenhagen

Alt 0 Present services
Alt 1 Including the effect of the Fehmarnbelt fixed link
Alt 2 Danish and German hinterland basic program
Alt 3 Further railway upgrade ABS + NBS in DK and DE
Alt 4 New lines NBS in DK and DE
Alt 5 Dedicated high-speed NBS investments
Travel time
4:45
3:30
2:40
2:15
1:50
1:30
Source: IBU Bahnstrategie summary report, prof. Otto Anker Nielsen, 2009
ICE pax/day
1.000
3.500
5.000
6.000
7.000
8.000
64
The studies described an increase in long-distance passengers as a more or less linear

function of the travel time reduction. High-speed trains are found very competitive and they
are gaining a relatively large market share especially in the travel time interval less than 3
hours. As local and regional effects are not considered directly in the Trans-Tools model
(in the Fehmarnbelt corridor) and as the effect of the time reduction seems a little pessimistic it could be explained, that the increase in passenger numbers eventually will show a
tendency to be higher than the IBU results depending on how the high speed line could be
used for improving both international and local/regional services.
Figure 57
Passenger effect at reduced journey times for long distance railway journeys across Fehmarnbelt
Source: IBU Bahnstrategie Technical Report, Otto Anker Nielsen, 2009.
Even though the results are not showing an exponentially growing function it can be extracted from the analysis that a travel time saving of half an hour is equal to an increase in
demand of approximately 1.000 long distance passengers.
Later in this report we test these data stemming from the Trans-Tools in 4 infrastructure
development scenarios.
3.3.6

For the investment period 2010-2020 the Danish Government has found sufficient financial
means to continue their ambitions to implement a semi-high speed railway corridor resund-Fehmarn connecting Scandinavia to Germany.
As can be seen from the table below public transport and railway investments play a significant role:
Figure 58
65
Danish basis program for new infrastructure investments
State infrastructure investments in billion uros, Period 2010-2020

Fehmarn Belt link and hinterland DK
6.7
Metro Copenhagen
2.7
New railway lines
2.0
Reinvestment revitalisering program railways
2.0
ITS rail ERTMS
3.0
New motorways and state highways
4.8
Public transport program, busses etc.
0.4
Bicycle investment program
0.1
Port investment program I and II
0.1
Total
21.5
The green transport policy has been supplemented by a kick-start package in 2012, and a
decision to continue electrification of main lines in Jutland and to establish a Northern
metro line as a supplement to the on-going construction of 17 new metro stations in Copenhagen. Planning for congestion charging as a toll ring around Copenhagen has been
cancelled and road pricing will be considered. Revenues from a national lorry charging
system will from next year be allocated for funding of public transport.
3.3.7

Denmark has taken the decision to introduce a semi-high-speed rail system called 'Time
model'. From 2020, trains run up to 250 km/h in order to meet the political objectives set
for the mean speed of min. 165 km/h to be able to contribute to certain travel times. Between 2020 and 2030 the number of stations that meet the criterion will be gradually
enlarged.
To achieve the goal of doubling the rail transport by 2030 it will be necessary to establish
additional capacity for freight and as part of this to expand the resund line. A long
term improvement of the capacity for the freight on rails influences carefully the potentials
and the outcome of a further high speed strategy.
Denmark is on track to restore its rail network after many years of neglect in innovation
and investment, resulting in a lacking behind other European countries. More capacity will
be build to cope with the transport goal.
Looking however at the decision-making and planning process for the corridor resundFehmarn it is striking that this is sliced into 6 partial final decisions at this stage. And the
projects do not show a heading of high speed but capacity improvement or upgrading.
The 6 partial decisions are typically followed by construction acts:

Decision process re. the fixed Fehmarn Belt link

Decision process re. upgrading Rdby-Ringsted
Decision process re. new line Ringsted-Ny Ellebjerg
Decision process re. Ny Ellebjerg-Copenhagen Central
Decision process re. new capacity on the resund line (Cph Airport)
Decision process re. new Storstrmmen Bridge.
Assessment: If decisions on railway infrastructure investment are sliced into many pieces
and the transport system in the end should be fully integrated there will be a high risk for
66
cost increase due to interoperability problems and loss of benefits due to disintegrated
services and generally a lower level of quality (where optimal travel times cannot be meet).
3.4
High-speed rail in Sweden
3.4.1
Transport policy and high-speed strategies of key stakeholder

National transport policy and implications for high-speed rail strategy
The national policy has a strong focus on regional effects, but it also encompasses a global perspective. This becomes evident when looking at the large volumes of goods transported over long distances, and the importance of the global outlook, where Swedish exports have an eye for accessibility to international markets. Rail freight has traditionally
been given high priority on the Swedish network with an impressive market share of 30 %.
Sweden was among the first to implement the EU policy concerning the complete separation of the commercial operation from the physical infrastructure. The Swedish transport
policy works through its sector institutions which have been re-organized recently e.g. by
forming the new Trafikverket. The Ministry has merged the former Railway and Road authority into one administration, thereby making a stronger incentive for intermodal transport
solutions. When looking back at the Swedish transport policy it seems to have kept railway's role as an important part of the transport system. With a very strong focus on sustainability and climate-friendly solutions the railway has managed to double traffic as the
following overview indicates.
Figure 59
Railway passenger transport development in Sweden
Source: Railway statistics, SCB.
Today, major parts of the rail lines suffer from capacity constraints as a direct consequence of the increasing demand and the high utilization of the existing network. This has
therefore become the main topic in the national transport policy, which allocates substantial financial resources to ensure a better performance quality, by double-tracking existing
lines, improving the technical installations, etc. Some new line projects have been given
priority e.g. the new City-tunnel line in Malm or the City-tunnel lines in Stockholm and
Gothenburg, but also the opening of the 150 km long Botnia line for 250 km/h operation in
67
the Northern Sweden should be mentioned, and not at least the extension of this project
further North in the coming years.
The national Swedish policy favors
A gradually adaptive expansion of the transport infrastructure in line with the increase
in transport demand,
A substantial increase in capacity mainly in existing transport corridors,
An adjustment of the transport system in order to reach the goal for a climate friendly
transport sector.
(High-speed) Strategy of SJ
SJ can be found as the main carrier on most lines. The Swedish company covers a little
more than half of the railway transport in Sweden in terms of passenger km, and SJ offer a
regular service at semi-high speed to many destinations. Though top-speed is only 200
km/h the key performance measured in average speed is very high. Including stop times
the X2000 trains are running at 150-160 km/h, which places X2000 at a little lower level
compared with the ICE services. The X2000 is capable of running through Denmark.
Several regional transport authorities in Sweden are managing their own fleet of semi fast
inter-regional trains. These trains derive from the X5 series. The newest batch is the X55
which is a long distance, high comfort version for SJ. This fleet can be upgraded for 250
km/h operations. The following table shows an overview of the Swedish fleet of fast interregional trains.
Figure 60
Swedish fleet of fast inter-regional trains
Series
Number of
Trainsets
Operating
Speed
Design
Speed
X2000
43
200 km/h
275 km/h 1990-91
X3
Arlanda
200 km/h
210 km/h
1989
X40 DD
43
200 km/h
200 km/h
2007
Service
X50-55
93
200 km/h
68
250 km/h 2001-12
Source: SJ etc.
It is expected that the increase in speed will be supported by implementation of the ETCSII which means that 250 km/h gradually will be introduced in Sweden during the next 10
years.
If dedicated high-speed investments is not decided as the favored solution then could the
ongoing modernization of the present railway network probably be a variant of the US0
development strategy. Renewal of the rolling stock might take advantage of the full-scale
Green Train experiment where research and development institutions and the supplier
Bombardier etc. have prepared a next generation of rolling stock, X5G, which is very suitable for the Swedish market.
Figure 61
Next generation for 250 km/h: the Green Train
Source: Royal Technical University, Stockholm, Research program Grna Tget, www.gronataget.se.
Its configuration is based on rather small units of 2-3-4 cars per train in a wide-body design
utilizing the broad Swedish profile which allows for an approx 50 cm broader cabin compared with the continental UIC-profile. As the economy-class is designed with 3+2 seating
this gives approx 15 % lower running costs for the operator which enables lower fares to
be introduced for the market giving the operator a competitive advantage.
The energy consumption is as low as 50 Wh per passenger-km for 250-280 km/h operations (65 % load factor). Under Swedish conditions the X5G is capable of running with tilting mechanism and in rather low temperatures of -40 C. The train has been tested at a
driving speed of 300 km/h on tracks built for 160-200 km/h operations.
69
Even though the base line alternative for the railway infrastructure forms a default scenario
and the very useful Green train concept seems as a just down the alley development
strategy the Swedish Government will have to decide whether the railway investments
should take a more European continental direction.
3.4.2

A dedicated high-speed network does not exist in Sweden even though various transport
development strategies and national planning has dealt with this question for 20 years.
The 1,370 km long lines of the triangle network Stockholm-Gothenburg-Malm have been
upgraded for 200 km/h, which is also the case for some other lines north of Stockholm and
Gothenburg. Parts of the network are prepared for a technical upgrade for 250 km/h, but
there are no train services yet running at this max speed.
Figure 62
Main railway network in Sweden and the selected lines for speeds higher
than 200 km/h
Source: National Infrastructure Plan Perspective 2004-2015, Banverket.
3.4.3

Like many other countries Sweden conducted major innovations to upgrade the railway
main lines in the 1990s. Due to the large physical distances was a modernization strategy
with new-built lines not considered realistic before than the existing main lines had under-
70
gone an upgrade through the renewal program. Therefore the development strategy firstly
comprises an upgrade process called the base line alternative US0.
This US0 should:
Improve capacity in order to meet a rather large growth in the demand,
Improve reliability of the railway services,
Increase top speed to 250 km/h.
The US0 could very likely become a first choice upgrade program:
The program has a fairly high cost level of 10 billion Euro,
A dedicated high-speed investment would instead cost 15 billion Euro,
There are no new stations outside the present network,
The only partially new tracks will result in capacity constraints at certain points.
Figure 63
The base alternative US0 for upgrading the main lines
Source: Swedish transport capacity plan, presentation, Trafikverket 2012.
The base line alternative US0 relates to an expansion and upgrading of existing main
lines for 250 km/h on major parts of the stretches. The alternative includes a number of
new double track stretches for 250 km/h parallel to the existing tracks. These are e.g. the
Eastern Link Jrna-Linghem, Mantorp-Gripenberg, and Hr-Lund. In addition to this will
be some longer third track sections paralleling to the existing tracks and a number of new
bypass track for freight. The stretches like the Nssj-Hr section will undergo adjustment that implies that the existing track will be moved within the existing railway fences. If
the trains are assumed to run with tilting bodies >200 km/h would the travel time for non-
71
stop trains between Stockholm and Malmo be 3 hours and 13 minutes equal to an average
speed of 190 km/h. Without tilting the travel time will be extended by about 15-20 minutes.
The Swedish national authority Trafikverket concludes, that the US0 alternative will substantially improve the current travel market, but it does not radically improve accessibility
for conurbations that today are placed outside the present railway network. The US0 involves capacity improvement, but this will hardly be enough and satisfy the increase in
demand in 2050.
The ongoing national planning process for creation of a dedicated high-speed network in
Sweden consists of 4 alternatives:
US1: integrated lines and direct services (320 km/h),
US2: a modified version of US1 composed of a more separate system (320 km/h),
US3. priority of end-destination market, external stations (320 km/h),
US4: integrated system with focus on regional markets (280 km/h).
US1 has an emphasis on national transportation needs, with close attention to regional
needs where the strategy is an integrated system. US1 is based on the national highspeed investigation report with an alignment through West Scania and a target speed of
320 km/h. Travel time for non-stop trains between Stockholm and Malm are assumed to
be 2 hours and 30 minutes.
The system is reminiscent of today's German and Italian systems, but a major difference
with Germany is that US1 results in both more comprehensive traffic and shorter travel
times.
Figure 64
High speed alternative 1 and 2
US2 also has an emphasis on national transport needs and with great attention to regional
needs. This alternative is composed of a more stand-alone solution, where it is assumed
that a larger separation from the rest of the network can be executed, but then it has fewer
trains. This means that the transfer points must be efficient.
The new line is assumed to go a shorter way to Lund-Malm, enabling travel times to be
shorter than in the US1. The system is similar to the current Spanish system and to some
extent the Japanese system, transfer points are highly prioritized.
Figure 65
72
High speed alternative 3 and 4
US3 has an emphasis on national transportation needs, with a less focus for regional
needs. The strategy is a separated TGV-like 320 km/h system with priority to short travel
times. US3 strongly promote end-point connections, which means that the high-speed
network is more separate and largely drawn outside urban areas.
This option is reminiscent of the French high-speed network although it also demonstrates
inspiration from the Spanish and Japanese networks.
US4 has an emphasis on regional transportation needs, taking into account national
needs. It is assumed that this alternative can be connected to the existing West Coast line
just north of Helsingborg. The system can be more generic and built in stages. The top
speed is assumed to be 280 km/h and the travel times longer than in the US1-US3. To
some extend this implies a continuation of fast train services on the existing main lines.
The system is similar in some parts of the current German system, but with more emphasis on regional expansion.
Modifications of these alternatives are possible. More iteration can be done during the next
phase of planning in order to optimize the costs and benefits of the final proposal for a new
Swedish high-speed network. Integration with the international network across resund
and Fehmarn Belt in 2020 and in a longer horizon would be advisable to include in the
further study program.
Figure 66
Swedish high speed rail investments and outcome
US1
US2
US3
US4
15,3
14,1
n.a.
12,5
2:30
2:25
2:25
3:00
Average speed
236 km/h
240 km/h
240 km/h
197 km/h
StockholmCph Airport
2:45
2:40
2:40
3:15
Total investment
cost, billion EUR
Travel time
Stkholm-Malm
73
From an resund perspective there is remarkable little focus on the West coast corridor
Oslo-Gothenburg-resund. The West coast main line Gothenburg-Lund is still in the
upgrading program after a 20 year old decision to establish double track on the whole
stretch. The tunnel through Hallandss just North of Helsingborg has been delayed for
many years due to difficult geological challenges, technical problems with the TBMs, etc.
The project is now in the final stage and in 2015 opens a new railway section for 200 km/h.
However, there are still unsolved problems and decisions not made yet regarding the single track section North of Helsingborg station, Knutpunkten, towards Maria-ngelholm.
This creates a major bottleneck in the corridor.
Figure 67
West coast main line upgrading Gothenburg-Lund-Malm
Source: Swedish Railway Authority, 2010
Status for the corridor development is as follows:

The upgrading program for the West coast main line was decided in many stages.
There are still works to be finished in the coming years, but most of the line is now
technically in much better shape than 20 years ago. The long process may have
caused some budget lifts as investments have been growing to 7 billion even though
the Hallandss tunnel problems were not foreseeable.
In the Southern part of the corridor there are still construction works to do on the remaining single track section Helsingborg-ngelholm.
An upgrade of larger parts of the Gothenburg-Helsingborg section for 230-250 km/h
operation is possible (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm).
Based on the technical specification of the X5G could the travel times be reduced to
1:55 on the 305 km long stretch Malm-Gothenburg incl. 3 stops, and for a direct service 1:45 (KTH model).
74
Construction of 75 km double track for 250 km/h on the Gothenburg-Trollhttan line

should be opened completely this year, and a further 10 km section from Trollhttan
north to xnered is also underway.
Figure 68
Gothenburg-Trollhttan upgrade prepared for 250 km/h
Source: Coinco North II presentation 2012
The Coinco Interreg project which deals with infrastructure development and cooperation
in the corridor Copenhagen-Oslo is now looking at proposals for a more ambitious upgrading of the north-south corridor. The project originates as a Norwegian initiative and has set
up a goal of a travel time of 2 hours between Oslo and Copenhagen. Compared with the
existing 675 km long journey lasting 8 hours it would indeed represent a tremendous
change.
The line between xnered and Oslo is causing real challenges due to its low standard in
terms of speed and capacity. The Norwegian Railway Authority has just published investigations of how to rebuild the cross-border stretch as a modern transport system giving new
benefits for travelers.
Oslo-Ski will be the first section on the Southern line. After discussions during many years
is a decision now taken in favor of doubling the capacity from 2 to 4 tracks involving 19 km
new tunnel on the stretch to be completed in 2019.
Between Ski and xnered there are two main alternatives in focus involving tunnel works
for a length of 40-50 km. The alignment of A1 follows the existing line and A2 shortens the
stretch by 30 km with a new line from Ski to Sarpsborg and a bypass at Halden.
Figure 69
The South
Section
Ski-xnered
75
The Norwegian-Swedish cross-border high-speed rail project
Investment
Total length
New line
Tunnel %
Travel time
OsloGothenburg
Alt 1
(250 km/h)
8.8 bill. EUR
327 km
184 km
25 %
2:18
Alt 2
(250-330
km/)
9.2 bill. EUR
297 km
195 km
30 %
1:40
Source: Norwegian Railway Authority, High-Speed Rail Investigation, 2012.
Detailed studies show a significant difference between A1 and A2 regarding the travel time
between the two major cities. While the first alternative reaches a speed in the area of 200250 km/h the second more ambitious alternative suggest a top speed of 330 km/h on certain parts of the stretch. Investments are estimated to 8,8 respectively 9,2 billion EUR. The
extra cost for exceeding the 250 km/h limit seems relatively low.
Figure 70
Upgrading the international railway line Oslo-Ski-xnered
Source: Norwegian high-speed rail investigations, Norconsult presentation 2012.
3.4.4
76

The updated forecasts for the transport development in Sweden indicates a fairly large
increase in transport, freight transport even at a more escalating level. This forecast includes various socio-economic growth parameters, but not specific actions like extraordinary investments in a dedicated high-speed rail system, a new fixed link across resund
etc.
Figure 71
Long term development for land transport in Sweden
Person km (billions)
2006
2050
2006-2050
Road
89.2
149.2
67 %
Railway
14.5
26.0
80 %
PT (bus)
10.4
11.9
15 %
Source: Swedish transport capacity plan, Trafikverket 2012.
With a passenger transport increase of 80 % the railways in Sweden seem to get into huge
capacity problems. Despite this growth it is only predicted that rail will enhance its market
share by 1 percentage. Compared with the tendency for the demand development regarding bus transport the future market for new train services seems much more promising.
There are several examples of successes within rail (of course also some failures). The
well-known introduction of X2000 in the Stockholm-Gothenburg corridor could be mentioned. These services cutting travel time from 4 to 3 hours raised the market share for rail
significantly in good correlation with other international examples.
Figure 72
Development in market share for rail by shorter travel time
Source: Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, High Speed railway investigations 2010.
Another example is the traffic across the fixed resund link when we look at the train connections. There are normally 4 trains per hour per direction across resund, and max 1
train is an X2000. However, interregional resund-trains also run over distances of 200-
77
300 km which attract passengers from both the shorter commuting trips but also longer
trips because of the Copenhagen airport. This terminal plays not only an important role for
the resund region, it is actually the most important Swedish air hub next after Stockholm
Arlanda.
The fixed resund link has created a large synergy effect for the international relations and
co-operations in general and for air, road and rail traffic. As one of the most successful
cross-border infrastructure projects in Europe it is wise to learn from what kind of market
reaction that can be achieved through a new and fast railway service.
Figure 73
Passengers on regional/long distance trains across resund after the

opening in 2000
Source: Statistics resund Brokonsortiet.
A rough estimate points at a time-elasticity of -6.0 if we are only measuring the effects of
passenger increase and time reduction. During 10 years the passenger market (excl. car
traffic which experienced the same effects of time reduction) has grown from 3.6 to 11 million passengers per year. But elasticity of frequency must also be taken into consideration
as well as an elasticity of expansion of direct services between many towns on both sides.
Before the bridge there was practically only one direct service with fast ferries between the
city of Copenhagen and Malm
78
Of course was the financial crisis not possible to avoid for the international traffic across
resund. The market will have to be rebooted by new initiatives. In this context a survey of
the viability of a new Express Metro tunnel line of 27 km across resund is under preparation.
The demand effect for a high-speed rail system has been examined. The results show an
increase ceteris paribus of 19-21 % of total long distance traffic, but there is not much difference between the alternatives to see. The fastest alternative seems to have the highest
output. Effects of an improved West coast main line in the corridor resund-GothenburgOslo have not been taken into consideration. Measured in passenger kilometers the effect
for the railway as such is significant.
Figure 74
Mio passengers,
Long distance
Diff. 2030-US
Passenger demand effect of a Swedish high-speed rail system
2030
base
34.5
US1
(320 km/h)
41.7
US2
(320 km/h)
42.1
US4
(280 km/h)
40.9
21 %
22 %
19 %
Source: Swedish transport capacity plan, Trafikverket 2012 (US3 not available).
3.4.5
Financing, funding and economic appraisal

The Swedish state budget for railway investment is rather tight for the ongoing period. A
large proportion of the budget is earmarked for maintenance and re-investment purpose.
Figure 75
National railway investment budget for the period until 2021
For investment in new infrastructure and for upgrading the existing railway assets is it
within the frame budget possible to spend 0.75 to 1.25 billion EUR annually on the national
initiatives.
79
This indicates that a high-speed rail system representing a capital investment of approx 14
billion Euro has to supplement with external funding. If the whole system is built in 10
years time it equals to 2 billion Euro per year.
A minor part of the necessary capital can be found in the regions, but probably between 10
and 20% could be found as EU financial support, if the high-speed system is defined as a
cross-border project e.g. linked to the ongoing investments in the Fehmarn Belt hinterland
infrastructure. As the project especially the more dedicated high-speed alternatives is
suitable for accelerating competition between operators in the railway market, and as the
marginal earnings are lucrative would operators be able to contribute to part of the investments. The direct revenues and costs stemming from the daily transport business show a
substantial surplus.
Figure 76
Total benefits and cost, net present value
billion EUR
US1
(320km/h)
US2
(320 km/h)
US4
(280 km/h)
US0
(250 km/h)
US0
(+200 km/h)
9.4
9.8
8.3
6.6
5.6
-12.8
-11.8
-10.6
-9.5
-9.5
-0.3
-0.2
-0.2
-0.3
-0.5
Benefits
(consumers
surplus +
scrap value)
Investment
cost (+ tax
distort)
B/C
npv ratio
Looking at the socio-economic assessment for the whole project is it not a surprise that the
results reveal a deficit at the bottomline. The traditional assessment methods for transport
projects could certainly misjudge effects of that kind of dimensions which are here in question. Large scale investment can be extremely difficult to justify by utilising the present
model competence.
The most advantageous alternative giving a benefit/cost ratio of -0.2 is also the most capital intensive. The less ambitious alternatives with lower efficient travel time is revealing a
more negative benefit/cost result. Especially if it should happen that is impossible to run
long distance trains at 250 km/h in the base line alternative US0 (+200 km/h). If the train
speed would have to be limited to 200-220 km/h then could the costs be too high and the
benefits too low.
3.4.6

The policy of mainly rebuilding the existing infrastructure represents a dilemma. Never has
the train traffic been larger, but the expected increase in freight and passenger transport
demand could be difficult to realize while reconstructing the existing track facilities. Heavily
utilized lines and expectations of more attractive (shorter) travel time of passenger trains,
more departures, and also transport of larger goods volumes favor a strategy of building
new line sections.
80
Of course there will be discussions at the local level of which kind of high-speed model is
the most feasible as well as pros- and cons regarding the specific alignment proposal, but
the greatest challenges in this context seem to be
to choose between a separated system with higher reliability instead of a more integrated system which could turn to be more sensitive to train delays etc. in the existing
system,
to select the market orientation of the system, i.e. whether the train connections for the
large cities should have a little more priority by utilizing their strength to drive fast on
longer distances, or the system should give more priority to stop trains that serve conurbations of a small and medium size.
Figure 77
Design characteristics for high-speed rail systems
Source: Swedish transport capacity plan, workshop presentation, 2012.
Another challenge seems to be the financial and organizational issues. A transport system
of this size has been dealt with in other countries, and the experiences are both positive
and less positive. A company structure with public ownership like the Fehmarn Belt consortium could be a model.
Finally could market-dimensions as well as network dynamics be seen in a more appropriate international perspective than the present investigations suggest. It is of great interest
to include the inter-modal connectivity e.g. the Copenhagen Airport hub function. But an
emerging high-speed railway is underway in Denmark even though it is more like a semi
high-speed system to start with. This and the fixed Fehmarnbelt link will add positive synergy effects into a potential new Swedish (and Norwegian) high speed network.
3.5
81
Table of classification
Based on the fact finding in the previous sections the following overview can be generated
comparing the specific framework in Germany, Denmark and Sweden.
National transport
policy
High-speed strategy of
transport ministry
High-speed strategy of
national railway
Rolling stock policy of

national railway
Germany
Facilitate mobility and
make it sustainable (->
shift significantly more
traffic to rail)
No real HSR strategy,
development of 6 projects for speed levels
of > 230 km/h
DB with significant
influence on highspeed network development
Fleet of 166 trainset
with operating speed
of 280 km/h or more.
New vehicle concept
from 2016 to replace
ICE1/2 and IC with
maximum speed of
230-250 km/h
National high-speed
network
Five high-speed sections > 230 km/h total

for appr. 1,100 km (3.3
% of total network).
Today no coherent
high-speed network.
Network development
strategy
The network development until 2020/2025

underlines the very
slowly proceeding
orientation from a network with isolated
high-speed sections
towards a nation-wide
Denmark
Consensus on a green
transport policy (->
new investments in
railways)
Time-model: setting
of max. travel time
instead of specific topspeed (-> top-speed
has to be increased
from 180 km/h to 250
km/h on certain sections)
DSB not engaged in
transport policies and
strategies for highspeed projects
Fleet of semi-fast comfortable InterCity trains
(speed restricted to
180 km/h). Future: not
decided whether DSB
should prefer leasing
of European standard
equipment or going
into self-development
of a special Danish
fleet of a semi-high
speed train for 200250 km/h
No existing dedicated
high-speed network so
far.
The ongoing strategic

planning activities for
the period 2020-2030
follow the objective to
ensure significant
faster travel times by
train between major
cities (time-model).
Sweden
Strong focus on regional effects due to
long physical distances
Substantial upgrade
process called the
base line alternative
US0 (-> Increase top
speed to 250 km/h)
No real HSR policy of

SJ can be observed
Fleet of 93 trainsets
from X5 series as
newest batch. Long
distance, high comfort
version for SJ, which
can be upgraded for
250 km/h operations,
Green Train experiment
No dedicated highspeed network, triangle StockholmGothenburg-Malm

upgraded for 200
km/h, parts of the network are prepared for
250 km/h upgrade
Consideration of 4
alternatives:
US1: integrated lines
and direct services
(320 km/h), US2:
modified version of
US1 composed of a
more separate system
high-speed network
linking the main metropolitan regions within
Germany and Europe.
Cost extensive alignments as well as other
obstacles (financing,
protests) might cause
significant delays.
Fehmarnbelt hinterland access
Demand and demand

forecast
Financing, funding and

economic appraisal
Electrification of Hamburg-Lbeck doubletrack line section

(maximum speed 160
km/h) accomplished in
2008. Planning for
Lbeck-Puttgarden
section focuses on
conventional electrified
double-track line
(maximum speed 160
km/h). Alignment alternatives are currently
under investigation,
but do not cover a
high-speed scenario.
2010 almost 78 million
passengers (>60 % of
long-distance pass.)
travelled by ICE (not
only high-speed).
Compared to other
countries the beginning of high-speed
operations seems to
have a minor impact
on the total passenger
volume. For the future
there are no significant
growth expectations
for long-distance passenger transportation
by rail (+ 0.3 % p.a.
until 2025).
Total expenditure on
rail projects (upgrade
82
The strategic master

plan of the Region
presents a number of
actions e.g. introduction of a Scandinavian
high-speed rail system
linked to the TransEuropean network via
Fehmarnbelt. It also
suggests a new transport corridor northwest of Copenhagen
to link with a new resund tunnel to Sweden.
Favoring of a highclass technical solution
(ETCS level II) and
increased ambition of
velocity-performance
(200-250 km/h) ->
Copenhagen-Ringsted
250 km/h from 2020,
Ringsted-Rdby 200
km/h (further upgrade
in discussion). Mixed
operations, but studies
on a high-speed line
for 250 km/h from
Kge to Rdby.
(320 km/h), US3. priority of end-destination

market, external stations (320 km/h), US4:
integrated system with
focus on regional markets (280 km/h)
2010 8.4 million long

distance passengers.
General forecasts for
the railway sector envisage a growth potential of 6,5 billion person
km until 2030 corresponding to 3.4 % p.a.;
of this increase are
36% new trips >150
km and 32 % is new
medium-long trips of a
length of 50-150 km.
Updated forecasts for

the transport development in Sweden
indicate a fairly large
increase in railway
passenger transport
(+80 % until 2050).
Demand effect for a
HSR system has been
examined. The results
show an additional
increase ceteris paribus of 19-21 % of total
long distance traffic
State infrastructure
investments for the
Swedish state budget

for railway investment
Remarkable little focus

on the West coast
corridor OsloGothenburg-resund,
Coinco project is now
looking at proposals
for a more ambitious
upgrading of the northsouth corridor.
and new-built) in 2009

was 1,592 million
Euro. Investment master plan 2011-15:
trusted investment
budget for upgrade
and new-built (6.4
billion Euros), investment needs (7.5 to 8
billion Euros). Budget
for the preservation of
the existing network is
double the budget for
upgrade and new
lines.
3.6
83
period 2010-2020
comprise 21.5 billion
Euros, thereof 13.7 for
rail (excl. Metro Copenhagen). Share for
upgrade/new-build of
>80 %. National investments are financed through a
dedicated infrastructure fund and through
special public owned
DBO-companies. The
means in the infrastructure fund are almost fully activated
until 2020.
is rather tight for the

ongoing period. A
large proportion of the
budget is earmarked
for maintenance and
re-investment purpose. HSR investments of approx 14
billion EUR have to
supplement with external funding.
Comments on national high-speed rail developments from corridor perspective

The previous evaluation of the national high-speed rail developments forms the base for
the following comments from the Hamburg-resund corridor perspective. Obviously the
key objective of the national transport policies in the three investigated countries is to
change modal split in passenger transport with the aim of reducing congestion, accidents
and environmental externalities. With an expansion of high-speed lines travel times will
become very short both on the high-speed network and on lines connecting with that network. Following this general policy an expansion of the high-speed network is supposed to
have great effects on the passenger traffic market. Rail travel is expected to increase, and
rail is estimated to take over passengers from internal flights.
The different network structures indicate that there seem to be various impacts on the
high-speed network development strategies in the three countries. As more microeconomic objectives based on corporate interests of German DB AG contrast with more macroeconomic objectives of the Scandinavian countries a common high-speed strategy for
the Hamburg-resund corridor seems to be challenging. The TEN-T policy of the EU
which leaves the technical responsibility for the corridor development to the member
states can in the best sense build the guideline for a high-speed vision. The example of the
joint approach of the mayors of Hamburg and Copenhagen to work on a joint vision for a
high-speed link between (Berlin-) Hamburg and Copenhagen (-Stockholm/Oslo) seems to
be a promising kick-off for the future sphere of activities. These activities should be based
on a corridor-orientated lobbying in Berlin, Copenhagen, Stockholm, Oslo and Brussels.
As described the considerations of DB Netze for the section Lbeck-Puttgarden focus on a
conventional electrified double-track line with a maximum speed of 160 km/h. Even if the
current investigation of alignment alternatives does not cover a high-speed scenario the
technical parameters (curve radius etc.) of a (potential) new alignment should at least consider future speeds of more than 160 km/h. The Danish flexibility in the planning process
before and after the green transport policy approach has finally led to favoring a high-class
84
technical solution by the fundamental decision to introduce a nation-wide ERTMS system

of the standards of ETCS level II and the ambition of a velocity-performance increase.
The investment volumes for current high-speed projects in Germany indicate that (highspeed) infrastructure development in Germany seems to be (too) cost-intensive due to
disproportionate technical standards and track alignments. Especially for the relatively flat
Hamburg-resund link a slim infrastructure development should be the objective. As the
situation of the public infrastructure budgets is supposed to deteriorate over the next years
and the growing preservation needs and upgrade of the existing network will eat up potential budgets for new high-speed lines innovative ways of financing high-speed corridor
Hamburg-resund have to be considered.
Judging the rolling stock policy of DB AG and DSB there seem to be future opportunities
for a joint corridor approach. The new DB vehicle concept (ICx from 2016) is supposed to
increase travelling comfort and contribute to attract additional passengers. Further impacts
on the cost side can be expected due to less energy consumption and more efficient operations. With maximum speeds of more than 230-250 km/h of the new ICx fleet DB withdraws from a further extension of the fleet with maximum speeds of >250 km/h but opens
up the chance for an efficient semi high-speed solution. For real cross-border high-speed
operations international co-operations and fleet strategies together with Swedish SJ have
to be thought (see Thalys example).
4.
85
PRINCIPLE FRAMEWORK FOR (HIGH-SPEED) NETWORK DEVELOPMENT ON THE

HAMBURG-RESUND CORRIDOR
Based on the previous comments from the corridor perspective and the overall objective of
significant journey time achievements through high-speed activities the benefits arising
from the development of a new high-speed infrastructure (sections) will be compared with
cost aspects to come to an overall HSR-assessment for the Hamburg-resund corridor.
4.1
Assessment of HSR costs

Total social costs of building and operating a high-speed line comprise the producer and
the external costs. Producer costs involve two major types of costs: infrastructure and
operating costs. External costs are associated to construction (e.g. barrier effect and
visual intrusion) and operation (e.g. noise, pollution and contribution to global warming). In
the following the focus will be on infrastructure costs.
The construction costs for high-speed infrastructure have to deal with the challenge to
overcome the technical problems which avoid reaching speeds above 300 km/h (e.g.
roadway level crossings, sharp curves, new signalling mechanisms, more powerful electrification systems). According to UIC, building new HSR infrastructure involves three major
types of costs: planning and land costs, infrastructure building costs and superstructure
costs.
Planning and land costs: Feasibility studies, technical design, land acquisition, legal
and administrative fees, licenses, permits, etc. Planning and land costs can reach up to
10 % of total infrastructure costs in new railway lines requiring costly land expropriations.
Infrastructure building costs: Terrain preparation and platform building. Depending on
the characteristics of the terrain, the need of viaducts, bridges and tunnels, these costs
can range from 15 to 50 % of total investment.
Superstructure costs: Rail specific elements such as tracks, sidings along the line, signalling systems, catenary, communication and safety equipment, installations, etc.
From the actual building costs (planning and land costs, and main stations excluded) of 45
HSR lines in service, or under construction, the average cost per km of a HSR line ranges
from 9 to 40 million of Euros with an average of 18 million Euros.19 The upper values arise
from difficult terrain conditions and crossing of high density urban areas. According to UIC
studies the average costs for the construction of 1 km of new high-speed line in Europe
count for 12 to 30 million Euros.20 The following table presents an overview of building
costs for selected infrastructure projects in Germany as well as references from other
countries.
19
20
Figures taken from OECD Discussion Paper No. 2008-16 The economic effects of HSR investment, October 2008.
http://www.uic.org/IMG/pdf/20101124_uic_brochure_high_speed.pdf.
Figure 78
86
Building costs for selected infrastructure projects in Europe
Project
Length
NBS Stuttgart - Ulm

NBS Nuremberg - Ingolstadt
NBS Frankfurt - Cologne
NBS Stuttgart - Mannheim
LGV Rhin-Rhone
Gotthard Basistunnel
Fehmarnbelt railway section*
Copenhagen-Ringsted*
Helsingborg-Kvlinge (200 km/h)
60 km
77 km
177 km
99 km
140 km
57 km
19 km
60 km
40 km
Total costs
(mill. Euros)
2,890
4,011
7,070
3,420
2,312
8,900
2,750
1,490
399
Tunnels
(%)
50 %
35 %
18 %
31 %
2%
100 %
100 %
3%
0%
Costs per km
(mill. Euros)
48.2
53.4
40.0
34.5
16.5
157.0
145.0
24.9
10.0
Source: HTC/TDL research (* = budget).
4.2
Assessment of HSR benefits

Investing in high-speed infrastructure is associated with a noticeable reduction of journey
times, higher comfort, reduction in the probability of accidents, and in some cases the release of extra capacity which helps to alleviate congestion in other modes of transport.
Furthermore extended high-speed services help to downsize the net environmental impact
of transport and boosts regional development.
The observation of existing high-speed lines shows that user benefits deserve a closer
examination. The main focus will be on journey time reductions. The user time invested in
a round trip includes access and egress time, waiting time and in vehicle time. The total
user time savings will depend on the transport mode where the passengers come from.
Evidence from the assessment of high-speed rail development in selected European countries shows the following journey time reductions after the introduction of HSR services in
comparison to a conventional rail connection:
Operating speed of
100 km/h: potential time savings of one hour or more,
130 km/h: 45-50 minutes savings for distances in the range of 350-400 km,
160 km/h: time saving is around half an hour over a distance of 450 km.21
Access, egress and waiting time are practically the same.
For road transport and line lengths around 500 km, passengers benefit from travel time
savings but they lose with respect to access, egress and waiting time. Benefits increase
when travel distance is long enough as HSR runs on average twice as fast as the average
car. Nevertheless, as the travel distance gets shorter the advantage of the HSR diminishes
as in vehicle time lost weight with respect to access, egress and waiting time.
Air transport is in some way the opposite case to road transport. Increasing the distance
reduces the HSR market share. For a 2,000 km trip (and shorter distances) the competitive
advantage of HSR vanishes. On the other hand HSR has extended market shares in the
medium distance range. Considering a standard high-speed line of 500-600 km air transport has lower in vehicle time. The advantage of HSR rests on access, egress and waiting time, plus differences in comfort. The net user benefit of deviating a passenger from air
21
Steer Davies Gleave, 2004: High-speed rail: international comparisons.
87
to HSR could even be positive in the case of a longer total travel after the shift. This would
be the case if the values of time of access egress and waiting time are high enough to
compensate the longer in vehicle time. The relative advantage of HSR with respect to air
transport is significantly affected by the existing differences in the values of time, and these
values are no unconnected with the actual experience of waiting, queuing and passing
through security control points in airports. The generalized cost of air transport is seriously
penalized by security controls at airports, and this translates in more attractiveness of the
HSR option.
Within this discussion it has also be considered that an efficient high-speed network access plays an important role for the growth potential and the catchment areas of Hamburg
as well as Copenhagen Airport. If Copenhagen Airport is to retain its status as the traffic
hub of Scandinavia, it is important that the number of potential passengers is increased
substantially in the years to come. Therefore the attraction of additional passengers outside the current catchment area of four million people is of high importance. The vision for
the next 10 to 15 years must therefore be to double the catchment area to 8 million people
with less than two hours transport to the airport.
Figure 79
Catchment Area of Copenhagen Airport
Source: Copenhagen Airport.
This will be possible through expansion of infrastructure as well as the elimination of bottlenecks. Various studies emphasize that there is a clear correlation between the size of
the catchment area and the number of passengers and routes. Today almost 90 % of the
traffic is international, while many of Nordic competitors have around 40-50 % domestic
traffic. The decision by Finnish-based Blue1 to use Copenhagen Airport as a hub beginning in March of this year, the coming SAS and Air China routes to Shanghai and Beijing
88
as well as the existing inter-continental routes e.g. to Bangkok, Singapore, Chicago, Tokyo, New York and Colombo may help to attract further passengers. As the following map
indicates Copenhagen is generally the airport which most citizens can reach in less than
half an hour, 1 hour, 1.5 hours and 2 hours respectively. The catchment area covers most
of Denmark and all of Southern Sweden which accommodates 40 % of the entire Swedish
population. With an improved infrastructure connection via FBL further passengers from
Germany could also be attracted. Further impacts on the air cargo volumes can also be
expected.
Amongst the largest unserved inter-continental destinations from Hamburg several CPH
destinations can be found:
Bangkok: Annual market size HAM-BKK: 65,500. Largest unserved market from HAM
catchment area
Singapore: Annual market size HAM-SIN: 36,200. Reason for travel: 72.1% business
(Hamburg Airport Passenger Survey)
Chicago: Annual market size HAM-CHI: 33,700. 39.5% of traffic to Chicago is business
(Hamburg Airport Passenger Survey)
Shanghai: Annual market size HAM-PVG: 29,100. Reason for travel: 55% business
(Hamburg Airport Passenger Survey).
On the other hand there are also new opportunities for Danish passengers due to an easier access to Hamburg airport. Currently 3.7 million people can reach Hamburg Airport
within one hour, 4.9 million in 1.5 hours and 7.5 million in two hours. This catchment area
is supposed to be further extended by a Fehmarnbelt fixed link. Hamburg Airports timetable covers 115 domestic and international direct routes. On the following map showing the
embarking passengers at HAM by region the importance of the Danish market Jutland for
the airport can be observed, the Copenhagen region is currently untouched.
Figure 80
Embarking Passengers at HAM by Region
Source: Hamburg Airport.
Due to the ongoing passenger loss the airport of Lbeck plays a minor role in this discussion. Being the only Ryanair base along the corridor Lbeck might be able to attract additional Danish passengers due to cheap rates, but the total volume is expected to be negligible compared to HAM or CPH.
89
Benefits also come from generated traffic. The conventional approach for the measurement of the benefit of new traffic is to consider that the benefit of the infra-marginal user is
equal to the difference in the generalized cost of travel without and with HSR. The last user
with the project is indifferent between both alternatives, so the user benefit is zero. Assuming a linear demand function the total user benefit of generated demand is equal to one
half of the difference in the generalized cost of travel.
According to estimations from CER, UIC and UNIFE passenger growth on high-speed
lines is mainly affected by modal shifts: modal shift from air transportation 27 %, modal
shift from road (car) 37 %, modal shift from road (coach) 2 %. 34 % of the new passengers
are induced.22
Figure 81
Reasons for HSR passenger growth
road (car)
37%
induced
34%
modal shift
66%
road (coach)
2%
air
27%
Source: CER, UIC, UNIFE.
Assessments of the impacts of price level and journey times on demand also emphasize
the strong importance of ticket pricing.
The fixed link will in conjunction with a semi high-speed rail service induce a market for
regular commuting. The labour market effects and local business activities in the immediate hinterland of the link will of course be influenced of the 12 minutes ride for a car ride
crossing the link, thereby creating new business opportunities for the region. However,
long distance commuting by a fast and high-frequent train service will also arise from a
level almost non-existing today. In this context, a short traveling time to be decisive, but
affordable prizes and favorable travel conditions will also be essential to expand the market in the long run.
22
CER, UIC, UNIFE, 1994: Hochgeschwindigkeitszge in Europa. Brssel/Paris.
Figure 82
90
Impact of pricing and journey times on traffic demand (example weekly

23
passengers commuting between Copenhagen and Hamburg in 2020)
180 minutes, 60 Euros
500
1000
1500
2000
2500
3000
3500
# of passengers (both directions)
Source: C. W. Matthiessen et al., 2011: The Fehmarnbelt Fixed Link - Regional development perspectives.
4.3
Network discussion under consideration of cost-benefit aspects

Based on the assessment of HSR costs and benefits in the previous sections a simplified
cost-benefit comparison can be developed. With regard to HSR costs there are sound arguments to focus on the construction costs for high-speed infrastructure. Average costs in
the range from 9 to 40 million Euros per km high-speed line overwhelm operating costs by
far and can therefore be considered as key criteria.
To simplify the very complex discussion of HSR benefits, the focus will be on the aspect of
travel time reductions. According to the findings from previous sections the following impacts on journey times can be reached by increasing the operating speed.
Figure 83
Impacts on journey times from speed changes
from
100 km/h
130 km/h
to
high-speed level
high-speed level
160 km/h
high-speed level
journey time reduction

potential time savings of 60 minutes or more
45-50 minutes savings for distances in the
range of 350-400 km
time saving is around 30 minutes over
a distance of 450 km
Source: OECD, Steer Davies Gleave.
As journey time reductions separately do not create a measurable pecuniary benefit, the
impacts of reduced journey times on the demand side have to be considered. Therefore
the further assessment will be further reduced to the analysis of the relation between journey times and the demand for high-speed passenger transportation.
23
see also: Madrid-Barcelona: market share rail/air 50:50, price ratio rail/air 1.9, Paris-Brussels: market share
rail/air 95:5, price ratio rail/air 0.28 (Source: OECD).
91
To evaluate this relation, aspects of travel time elasticity have to be considered. Travel
time elasticity can be described by the following formula:
p
p
e=
t
t
with
p
p
t
t
change in demand for passenger transportation

demand for passenger transportation
changes in journey times
journey time
A study on travel time elasticity for the long distance segment conducted by TH-Aachen24
in 1992 shows the following results for different travel motivations:
business trip: -0.82
vacation trip: -0.44
private trip:
-0.71
A verification of these 20 year old data with updated figures from the review of the requirement plan 2011 allows for the example NBS Hamburg-Hannover (Y-Trasse) the following derivation of travel time elasticity:
Expected travel time reduction Hamburg-Hannover from 69 to 52 minutes (-25 %),
Expected passenger increase Hamburg-Hannover from 8.8 to 10.5 million passenger
trips (+19 %),
Travel time elasticity of -0.76.
HTC has also evaluated travel-time elasticities for other high-speed or upgraded lines:
Cologne-Frankfurt -0.82,
Berlin-Hamburg (upgrade): -1.11,
Madrid-Barcelona -2.48,
Paris-London -0.82,
Brussels-Paris -0.52,
Brussels-London -1.61.
The inauguration of the Paris-Lyon TGV-line stands as a European paradigm of high
speed when the old loco-hauled InterCity-trains (the Corail-fleet running 200 km/h) were
supplemented by the new TGV-services. During the first 10 year period a tremendous development could be seen in the transport corridor. The InterCity trains carried 12.5 million
passengers before the opening of the parallel TGV line in September 1981. After 10 years
the old trains had only 4 million passengers left, while the TGV-trains were carrying 18.2
millions. Although it is not possible to establish a total overview of all demand and supply
parameters influencing the South/South Eastern transport corridor a general time elasticity
of -1.65 can be registered.
The previous overview of travel time elasticities shows a wide range of results. Furthermore it has to be stated that the comparability of the single results is difficult due to different sample periods and the lack of transparency regarding the passenger increases in
detail. Therefore the figures above can only used for a rough validation of results.
The further discussion with focus on the Hamburg-resund corridor is based on the results
from Figure 56. A travel time elasticity matrix based on the estimated passenger increases
24
Krmer, Th., 1992: Der Modal-Split im Personenfernverkehr, TH-Aachen.
92
caused by reduced journey times between Hamburg and Copenhagen describes a wide
range of values for the travel time elasticity e.
Figure 84
Travel time elasticities for different journey time reductions between Hamburg and Copenhagen
former travel time
03:30
-9.50
04:45
03:30
02:40
02:15
01:50
new travel time

02:40
02:15
-9.12
-9.50
-1.80
-2.00
-1.28
01:50
-9.77
-2.10
-1.28
-0.90
01:30
-10.23
-2.25
-1.37
-1.00
-0.79
Source: HTC calculations.
Compared to the findings from other (high-speed) projects the travel time elasticities for
the Hamburg-Copenhagen axis seem to be unusually high. A closer look at the results
underlines the strong impact of an improved connectivity due to the Fehmarnbelt fixed link
(first row with travel time elasticities of < -9). A nonstop service without ferry transfer
seems to be the strongest argument for a significant increase of passenger acceptance.
Assessing the impacts of further travel time reductions e.g. from 3:30 h to 2:40 h the elasticities reach a range which is comparable to other successful projects (e.g. MadridBarcelona). Furthermore it has to be stated that the positive impact of travel time
reductions loses importance the shorter the travel time is. The principle of marginal benefit
uses leads to the question, which investments need to be made to reach certain travel time
reductions. For the implementation of high-speed services on the Fehmarnbelt corridor
different upgrade scenarios were evaluated.
Figure 85
Impacts of different upgrade scenarios (excluding Fehmarnbelt tunnel)

Extra pax/
Pax
Investment (milTravel
t
time
lion Euro)
day ( p )
Scenario 0
No fixed link
Scenario A (basis)
200 km/h standard to be
constructed in DK
Scenario B
Investment for raising
speed from 160 to 200
km/h in DE
Scenario C
Investments for a 200250 km/h upgrade in DK
and DE
Scenario D
Investments in dedicated
high-speed section in DK
and DE
0
4,000
4:45
25
1,000
3:00
2,800
(+280 %)
3,800
-1:45
(-36.8 %)
-7.61
DE: +100-170
2:30
1,000
(+26.3 %)
4,800
-0:30
(-16.7 %)
-1.58
DE: +600-800
DK: +800
2:00
2,000
(+20.8 %)
5,800
-0:30
(-20.0 %)
-1.04
DE: +2,000
DK: +400
1:35
3,000
(+17.2 %)
6,800
-0:25
(-20.8 %)
-0.83
Source: Banedanmark, Femern A/S, DB AG.
25
Including the following upgrades (see page 56): Bad Schwartau-Puttgarden (817 million EUR), RingstedRdby (1.2 billion EUR), Storstrmmen (0.4 billion EUR), Ringsted-Copenhagen (1.5 billion EUR), capacity
resund line (0.1 billion EUR).
93
In the following the four scenarios will be described in detail. To achieve (more or less)
significant travel time reductions necessary investments related to the scenarios A to D
have to be considered. The infrastructure pre-conditions for the scenario A regarding the
Danish investment projects have already been described in section 3.3.4.
Figure 86
The high-speed development scenario A
Source: TDL.
Scenario A serves as a form of basic scenario. It does not take the effects of the German
hinterland investments into account, but it includes the most likely Danish decisions on the
network development. The total travel time reduction on the Copenhagen-Puttgarden
stretch will be 1 hour 40 minutes, the fixed link itself giving 1 hour of reduction.
The 200-250 km/h standard of the hinterland railway line has been found the socio economically best solution, and this view plays an important role in the Danish decision making when the Danish parliament is supposed to pass the construction act. The decision on
alignment alternative for the hinterland infrastructure between Puttgarden and Lbeck is
pending.
This minimum alternative represents a significant change in accessibility across the new
link. Travel time improvement can be compared with the largest changes that have occurred in comparison to other mega projects in Europe. Travel time between Copenhagen
and the German border is reduced to 1 hour 20 minutes, corresponding to an average
speed of 150 km/h. Between the border and Hamburg are here provided a travel time
equal to the current of 1 hour 40 minutes (from the ferry dock to the train arrives in Hamburg Hbf). Average ICE speed is as low as 95 km/h. The scenario can be realized if the
Puttgarden-Lbeck line could not be completed before the opening of the fixed Fehmarn
link.
Regarding the rolling stock investments of the railway undertakings it has to be considered
that the trainsets have to be adapted to the maximum speed level of 250 km/h (underutilisation of equipement on the lower speed sections).
Figure 87
94
The high-speed development scenario B
Source: TDL.
Scenario B suggests a +160 km/h alternative to be decided instead of a lower ambition

level just focussing on the need to expand capacity for freight trains. If it is assumed that
the present max speed of 160 km/h on shorter parts of the existing railway line can be
raised to a more regular 160 to 200 km/h speed, then it should be possible to cut off half
an hour of the journey time. Without much difficulty the fastest trains can run the Puttgarden-Hamburg line in 70 minutes equal to an average speed of 129 km/h for an ICEservice.
The marginal investment for the semi high-speed scenario B seems relatively low compared with the travel time gain. An estimate for the additional costs to raise the line speed
to approximately 200 km/h is between 100 and 170 million Euros (13 % surcharge on base
investment26). The fastest trains between Copenhagen and Hamburg will in this future
scenario offer a journey time of 2 hours.
It must be recognized that in Scenario B are some less coherent elements of the upgrade
of rail infrastructure in the Danish-German corridor. It is indeed doubtful whether this can
be done if the conversion of a single track must be done after the opening of the fixed
Fehmarnbelt link. A current example from South Jutland shows that if the train operators
should be respected, construction works will only be done at nights and the extra track
shall be placed with a longer distance to the existing one, which increases costs by 19 %.
In this case where DB Schenker made complaints, the Danish parliament decided for an
extra financial bill due to increase in construction costs by 8 %. The conversion can be
made cheaper if the transport authority simply close some of the local train traffic. For
example by only running freight trains on the single track and temporary rebuild the line. In
this context a completely new double track would be much more preferable.
26
According to the Danish Railway Administrations department Fehmarn Belt hinterland infrastructure:
Miljredegrelsen Hringsudgave, hfte 1 report 1 additional costs for the 200 km/h alternative
(Grundlsning 1) compared with the 160 km/h alternative (Grundlsning 2) is 13 %.
Figure 88
95
The high-speed development scenario C
Source: TDL.
Scenario C constitutes a high-speed connection in line with other major high-speed projects in Europe. It is assumed that the existing line across Zealand can be shortened by 20
km by building a 55 km long new line from Kge to Vordingborg (see section 3.3.4), and
the upgrading standard will be raised to 230 km/h on the new double track on Lolland and
in the tunnel. The marginal investment volume is 0.8 billion Euros. The 55 km double track
Kge N-Vordingborg N can be estimated to a total of 1.3 billion Euros. This alternative will
replace another possible upgrade of the 40 km long Lille Syd line Kge-Nstved estimated to 0.5 billion Euros which enable more capacity for transit freight. It is assumed that
the need for capacity for the railway freight transport brings in an important background
parameter for future railway investments. As such a new line between Kge and Vordingborg replaces a less ambitious upgrading project for the line Kge-Nstved (Lille Syd).
This project concerns electrification and double tracking the line as well as enhancing the
speed limit, but only for 160 km/h. In order to relieve the capacity constraints on the new
high-speed line Copenhagen-Ringsted due to the inappropriate mix of slow and fast trains,
the freight trains could effectively be deviated in Kge on to the Kge-Vordingborg line.
This also improves runtimes for the national high-speed service Copenhagen-Odense.
Furthermore the line between Puttgarden and Lbeck is assumed to be equipped for fully
200 km/h operation (the single-track Fehmarnsund Brcke to be reconstructed with a double track; the motorway then need a tunnel crossing and the line between Bad Oldesloe
and Hamburg-Wandsbek is upgraded.27 The further upgrade between Hamburg and
Lbeck mainly comprises the construction of an additional line to shift regional transportation from RE-trains to an enhanced S-Bahn concept (S4). A significant reduction of regional trains helps to provide additional capacity for long-distance as well as freight transportation. According to German Federal Court of Auditors the estimated investment just for
the construction of an additional line between Bad Oldesloe and Wandsbek count for 560
million Euro incl. a 60 % increase of construction costs. It has to be discussed if the highspeed scenario has to take the full cost here as the separation of the S4 has been on the
27
A further extension of the railway node Lbeck is not considered.
96
agenda all the time. Including the further Puttgarden-Lbeck upgrade a net investment on
the German side of 0.6-0.8 billion Euros can be estimated.
The direct trains between Hamburg and Copenhagen will now target a 2 hour travelling
time by achieving an average speed of 165 km/h on the German side 150 km/h and on
the Danish side 194 km/h.
Figure 89
The high-speed development scenario D
Source: TDL.
Scenario D represents the best-case for a high-speed link between Hamburg and Copenhagen by reaching the shortest possible travel time of 1 hour 35 minutes giving an average
speed of 203 km/h. A service like this requires further investments of 0.428 billion Euros on
the Danish side comprising a new 3 km shorter by-pass line for 250 km/h paralleling the
motorway across Falster and Lolland as well as a new tunnel under Guldborgsund. On the
German side a nearly 50 km new alignment from Bad Schwartau along the highway to a
point northwest of Hamburg-Rahlstedt can fulfil the aim to reduce the travel time by achieving a higher speed on a line that is shortened by 7 km. The estimated costs for this ambitious project count for approximately 2.0 billion Euros.29 For the Lbeck-Puttgarden section
a further upgrade for a maximum speed of +200 km/h is assumed.30
The scenario D is as investment profile composed like the Karlsruhe-Basel combined
ABS/NBS project. A target of high average speeds could be met for a railway with a mix of
traffic, but the technical standard of the line has to be raised significantly. When all the
proposed infrastructure elements are implemented the fastest train service will be 1 hour
35 minutes. A less fast service with a couple of stops under way runs just under 2 hours.
28
29
30
According to the Danish Railway Administrations department Fehmarn Belt hinterland infrastructure:
Miljredegrelsen Hringsudgave, hfte 1 report 1. The extra costs for a by-pass solution has been estimated to 0.2 to 0.6 billion DKK. There are 3 possible alignments investigated. It is assumed the middle alternative to cost 0.4 billion Euros.
Source: IHK Lbeck, Entwicklung der Verkehrsinfrastruktur auf der Achse Hamburg - Puttgarden im Zuge
einer festen Fehmarn-Beltquerung.
A dedicated high-speed line would require a new alignment (NBS) as well as an upgrade of the existing line
to ensure the connectivity of the seaside resorts causing tremendous additional costs.
97
Although the Bruxelles-Paris high-speed line will have exactly the same length of 320 km
after the rebuilt of the whole Hamburg-Copenhagen stretch it will not be possible to reach
the 234 km/h TGV-speed as a performance of the normal time table which sets a run time
of 1 hour 22 minutes between the two cities. However, it should be borne in mind that
freight traffic in the Franco-Belgian corridor has a separate track. Freight trains and TGVs
are not mixed together in daytime operation. In the Danish-German corridor freight train
partially run on the same track 24-7.
4.4
Validation of the marginal investments and market potential

The estimate for extra passengers due to the travel time reduction leads to a potential for
making extra revenue in the interest of the train operating companies. A part of the
additional user benefits has to remunerate the marginal investment cost for enhancing the
quality of infrastructure (speed and capacity). If it is assumed that extra 1.000 passengers
in 2020 would be carried in the 24 ICE departures (both directions per day) then trains on
average would increase their load factor by 42 passengers.
In general the marginal cost per passenger will fall, but transport of some of the additional
passengers will always cause extra costs, and on some departures extra seats would have
to be supplied. In this sense it will cost extra to gain extra passengers, but if yield
management ticket pricing and some more differentiation of prices could be integrated into
the commercial business compared with the present marketing performance, probably a lot
more earning would be possible.
Today the 2nd class ticket Hamburg-Copenhagen is 81.00 Euro (normal tariff) and 1st
class is 130.00 Euro. Average price per ticket is 30-50 % lower. If a share of between
20.00 and 28.00 EUR per passenger could be allocated for an extra upgrading of the
infrastructure, then there will be in the area of 140-190 million Euro for the extra
investment. This estimate is based on 1.000 extra long distance passengers across
Fehmarnbelt, but not revenues derived from extra regional passengers on both sides.
If it is assumed that the railway investments (both speed improvement and more capacity)
also would benefit freight transport and this corresponds to 50 % of the marginal
passenger revenue, then will the investment potential increase. Further, if we include an
EU-subsidy of 15-20 % for the infrastructure investment then could 240-330 million Euro in
total be allocated for the project paid by the extra traffic generated and paid fully on normal
market conditions.
Figure 90
98
Investment potential due to marginal earnings
Source: TDL.
A train service Hamburg-Copenhagen lasting 2 to 2 hours will be attractive to more time

sensitive as well as comfort-quality focussed travellers.
Today a high willingness to pay can be observed on the SAS flight route. The standard
economy class is 440 Euro and a business is 560 Euro both of them one way. Probably
this price reveals the lack of competition on this 350 km long route, but it also shows that
the market will pay a relatively high price for short travelling time. Therefore it could be
reasonable to assume that the business travel segment could pay a marginal higher price
for fast and frequent train journeys. After all the Hamburg and the resund regions belongs to the richest regions in Northern Europe. GDP per employed in the Zealand region
and in the Hamburg region is 85,000 respectively 78,000 EUR (2007). Against this background, it might as hypothesis noted that there is an unexplored market for fast and frequent train connections Hamburg-Copenhagen, and that a modern concept will actually
attract long distance travelers.
If looking at competitive strength of trains, it clearly appears that it is precisely the long and
medium-long journeys which the train shows its largest market share relative to other
modes.
Figure 91
The market strength of the long distance train operation
Source: Data from Model Center, TU-Denmark, and Incentive Partners, Rail potential analysis, DK 2010.
99
In Denmark, 16% of all transport regarding trips over 150 km is done by train. This number
may of course vary a little from country to country, but what seems important in this respect is that the train has just its strength on the long distance travel and here is far above
its average market performance. When therefore making a potential growth chart of new
market initiatives it is estimated that for every new 100 person km on the railway will 32
person km be generated by trips of more than 150 km because of the train's competitive
advantage in long distance travel.
Many metropolitan areas invest in new metro lines, which relieve congestion in the city
road network, but the dominating short trips to be made here affect only marginally positive
rail traffic market share in total. Compared to city traffic, the growth of railway traffic across
the Fehmarnbelt might not be very dense calculated in number of trips, but here we will
look more closely at the potential to generate new traffic. As previously stated, the standard time elasticity explains a large part of growth. The probability of a forecast turns out in
reality depends on more factors than time gains, including whether an integration process
actually takes place.
In this context it may be useful to derive a travel frequency for trips between two points.
That does not take into account whether it is business or leisure trips. We will look into this
general citizens travel activity level by assuming that a process of integration and bringing
two major cities together similar to that found between Bruxelles and Paris may also occur
elsewhere e.g. between Hamburg and Copenhagen, which covers roughly the same distance as between Paris and Bruxelles. With the introduction of Thalys trains have been
created a stronger integration. Before the French railways suggested a high-speed connection between the two cities had air traffic a more dominating role, but high-speed trains
now offer an intense and affordable service. The travel frequency by Thalys is 0.9 trip per
inhabitant per year in this corridor. It means that citizens of the two conurbations take almost one trip (one-way) every year.
Figure 92
Travel frequency as a function of travel time reduction
Source: IBU-Bahnstrategie data and demographic data from the cities.
Encouragement to travel depends on the right quality and the right amount of services offered. Between Hamburg and Copenhagen's train frequency per capita day 0.11. With a
fast train service on the 2 hour (Scenario B) can be calculated that trip frequency increases to 0.52. For our very fast Scenario D, which comes closest to our Paris-Brussels
100
reference, trip frequency will be increased to 0.73. And thus still well below the reference
case.
Two observations must be done. First, it would be reasonable to include Malm catchment
area for Copenhagen. In consequence, it makes a fall of 0.05 in trip frequency, making it
more robust in comparison with the reference case. Secondly, from a Scandinavian point
of view seem most other cases, however, difficult to use as a reference, since most cities
are built up with several international corridors. This is not the case here, since the corridor
is surrounded by the waters, and the most efficient southbound connection will be via the
Fehmarn tunnel in the future.
This underscores the likelihood of a significant effect on trip frequency. At the same time it
must be emphasized that a substantial reduction in travel time of 2 to 2 hours will change
the current travel patterns quite extensively.
Drawing a conclusion the previous scenario consideration has shown that competitive
travel times of 2:00 h to 2:30 h can be achieved with reasonable additional investments.
The network design generally follows the Danish time-model approach and is based on the
idea to establish an efficient semi high-speed network which contributes to an acceptable
increase of average travel times without requiring overdesigned infrastructure projects like
Stuttgart 21 which are to a limited extent politically as well as economically sustainable.
The intelligent combination of upgrade and new-built projects provides a high-class technical solution for the Hamburg-resund corridor comprising the following advantages:
Provision of additional passenger as well as freight transport capacities,
Considerable travel time reductions as incentive for a future increase of railway market
share,
Lower investment volumes supporting faster decisions and shorter realization periods,
Flexible infrastructure design as base for future upgrades or technical advancements,
Match with Danish transport policy and (necessary) innovative alternative for political
decision makers on German side,
Concept as pilot for a sustainable future cross-border infrastructure development.
Besides the numerous advantages there are also risks of this concept. If decisions on infrastructure investment are sliced into many pieces and the transport system in the end
should be fully integrated there will be a high risk for cost increase due to interoperability
problems and loss of benefits due to disintegrated services and generally a lower level of
quality (where optimal travel times cannot be meet).
Despite the hesitant actions of DB AG regarding the infrastructure development on the
German side the current planning process opens up the chance to postulate additional
upgrades. Collective agreements on further actions after the completion of the current upgrade project seem to cause significantly more efforts. With the decision to favoring a highclass technical solution by implementing a nation-wide ERTMS system of the standards of
ETCS level II, the ambition of velocity-performance increases as well as the actions for
infrastructure projects the Danish transport policy has set some promising guidelines for
the corridor development on the Hamburg-resund axis.

Report High Speed Network Final

Загружено:

Сведения о документе

Авторское право

Доступные форматы

Поделиться этим документом

Поделиться или встроить документ

Параметры публикации

Этот документ был вам полезен?

Это неприемлемый материал?

Авторское право:

Доступные форматы

Report High Speed Network Final

Загружено:

Авторское право:

Доступные форматы

Status for High-Speed

Networks in Northern Europe

About this report

Hanseatic Transport Consultancy

TDL Transport Data Lab

Dr. Jan Ninnemann, Dr. Thomas Rssler

Report Status for High-Speed Networks in Northern Europe

Report Status for High-Speed Networks in Northern Europe

A general conclusion of the assessment of travel time, passenger volumes and

A corridor development following one of the (hereinafter illustrated) preferable scenarios

To support a corridor-driven new concept for a semi-high-speed line seizing the

Report Status for High-Speed Networks in Northern Europe

General Requirements for High-Speed Networks

Technical constraints and standards

National Frameworks for High-Speed Network Development

EU high-speed rail policy

Principle framework for (high-speed) network development on the Hamburg-resund

Assessment of HSR costs

Report Status for High-Speed Networks in Northern Europe

Report Status for High-Speed Networks in Northern Europe

GENERAL REQUIREMENTS FOR HIGH-SPEED NETWORKS

Technical constraints and standards

Report Status for High-Speed Networks in Northern Europe

Rolling stock and operating conditions:

Socio-economic impacts and complementary measures to facilitate regional

ICE 1 and ICE 2 with >20 t axle load.

Report Status for High-Speed Networks in Northern Europe

Report Status for High-Speed Networks in Northern Europe

NATIONAL FRAMEWORKS FOR HIGH-SPEED NETWORK DEVELOPMENT

EU high-speed rail policy

Report Status for High-Speed Networks in Northern Europe

Source: EU Commission, Illustration: TDL.

Report Status for High-Speed Networks in Northern Europe

High-speed rail in Germany

Transport policy and high-speed strategies of key stakeholders

National transport policy and implications for (high-speed) rail strategy

Report Status for High-Speed Networks in Northern Europe

(High-speed) Strategy of DB Netze

DB segment reporting by business segments (million euros)

Source: DB annual report 2010.

(High-speed) Strategy of DB Bahn

Report Status for High-Speed Networks in Northern Europe

Deutsche Bahn ICE fleet

Source: Deutsche Bahn AG.

Report Status for High-Speed Networks in Northern Europe

ICx trainset operative from 2016

National high-speed network

Report Status for High-Speed Networks in Northern Europe

Report Status for High-Speed Networks in Northern Europe

Maximum speed and trains per hour on German high-speed lines

Source: DB Netz AG 2009.

Report Status for High-Speed Networks in Northern Europe

Mixed traffic on high-speed lines in Germany

Source: DB Netz AG.

Report Status for High-Speed Networks in Northern Europe

Todays network with a minimum speed of 230 km/h

Existing lines min. 230 km/h

Source: DB Netz AG.

Report Status for High-Speed Networks in Northern Europe

Network 2020/2025 with a minimum speed of 230 km/h

Existing lines min. 230 km/h

Source: DB Netz AG.

Speed extension on existing high-speed lines:

Report Status for High-Speed Networks in Northern Europe