Research Article

(wileyonlinelibrary.com) DOI: 10.1002/qre.1182

Published online 21 January 2011 in Wiley Online Library

Investigating the Reliability and Criticality

of the Maintenance Characteristics
of a Diving Support Vessel
O. Turan,a I. Lazakis,a S. Judahb and A. Incecika
Maintenance tasks and their application in the shipping industry have evolved significantly in the recent years.
Particularly in the offshore industry, safety onboard, environmental protection and intensive operational activities
necessitate the minimization of down-time and the preservation of an excellent performance ratio. The first step of
an innovative ship maintenance strategy, which is proposed by the authors and is based on criticality and reliability
assessment, is presented herein using the FTA tool with time-dependant dynamic gates so as to represent in an
accurate and comprehensive way the interrelation of the components of a system. The paper also presents a review
of the maintenance standards and procedures, such as the ALARP concept, the Key Programme 3-Asset Integrity
(KP3) initiative, the OREDA handbook as well as the RCM and RBI principles. As part of the reliability assessment,
the Birnbaum and Criticality reliability importance measures are utilized to validate the results of the analysis. A case
study of a diving support vessel (DSV) illustrates the application of this strategy. The main systems examined are: the
vessels power plant, propulsion, water system, lifting, hauling and anchoring, diving and finally the safety system.
The reliability of the main systems and subsystems as well as of their critical components is identified and suggestions
of how to improve the overall reliability of the various systems both at a component, system and managerial level
are also proposed. Copyright 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
Keywords: maintenance; reliability; criticality; diving support vessel; shipboard equipment

1. Introduction

aintenance tasks and applications in the shipping industry have evolved in the recent years in an effort to bridge the
gap with other industrial sectors by trying to adapt similar methods (although in a limited manner) already applied in
land-based industries. Closely related with the safety onboard the ship and the protection of the environment both being
fundamental to the successful application of the ISM Code as well as the high quality image of shipping worldwide, maintenance
has developed so as to include a more structured and scientific approach. In the Offshore Industry in particular, the above,
coupled with highly intensive operational activities has necessitated the minimization of down-time and the preservation of an
excellent performance ratio. However, ships face considerable challenges as they are, in most cases, isolated from any available
resources operating in the harsh sea environment and coping with traditional corrective and preventive maintenance measures
facing high criticalitylow profit margins. In addition, compared with land-based industries, where there is ample data recorded
on a daily basis, the maritime industry lacks the same procedures so as not only to collect data but also be able to comprehend
it and turn it into useful information. In this way, it is difficult to adapt similar methodologies, such as RCM and RBI, in the
shipping industry, which are already applied successfully in other industries, such as the chemical and manufacturing sectors.
In order to overcome these obstacles, the research study herein presents an innovative reliability and criticality-based maintenance and repair strategy; it also shows a detailed review of the above-mentioned maintenance standards and procedures, both
of which comply with ISM Code requirements. The first step of this strategy is presented here in detail and more specifically
the data collection as well as the evaluation of the system reliability. In comparison to previous research papers where FTA with
static gates is applied in land-based applications, the novelty of this approach lies in the usage of FTA with time-dependant
dynamic gates so as to represent the interrelation of the systems components in an accurate and comprehensive way. Moreover,
reliability importance measures (IMs), such as the Birnbaum and Criticality IMs, validate the results of the analysis. The innovative
case study of a diving support vessel (DSV) is used to show the application of the above-mentioned methodology. The main

a Department

Copyright 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

Qual. Reliab. Engng. Int. 2011, 27 931--946

931

of Naval Architecture and Marine Engineering, University of Strathclyde, Glasgow, U.K.

Renewables, Glasgow, U.K.
Correspondence to: O. Turan, Department of Naval Architecture and Marine Engineering, University of Strathclyde, Glasgow, U.K.
E-mail: o.turan@strath.ac.uk
b SSE

O. TURAN ET AL.
systems identified include the vessels power plant, the propulsion, water systems as well as the lifting, hauling and anchoring,
diving and safety units. The main outcomes are the identification of the reliability of the main systems and subsystems as well
as of their critical components. Suggestions of how to improve the overall reliability of the various systems both at a component
and managerial level are also proposed in line with any Continual Improvement expectations by ISO 9001 and ISM requirements.
The present research paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents the maintenance review in the offshore sector. In
Section 3 the suggested methodology is demonstrated and explained. Section 4 presents the case study application of the
above-mentioned methodology. The results of this analysis are shown in Section 5, which is followed by the discussion and
conclusions presented in Section 6.

2. Literature review/maintenance background

The offshore industry has pioneered concepts and methodologies in maintaining its assets in safe and environmental-friendly
conditions. In 1974, the UK HSWA initiated the efforts for implementing safety regulations regarding the UK Continental Shelf.
The Safety Case approach was introduced by the HSE in 1992, the last update of which was launched in 2006. In the Safety Case
approach, guidelines are given on what operators of each offshore installation need to do in order to reduce the risks from major
accident hazards to the health and safety of the workforce employed on offshore installations or in connected activities1 . In this case
the owner or operator of the installation needs to prepare a safety case report and submit it to the HSE for approval.
In order to strengthen this effort, the ALARP concept was also initiated in 1999 and updated in 2001 in an attempt to suggest
measures so as to reduce risk As Low As Reasonably Practicable2 . It is based on the ranking of risks from unaccepted to tolerable
and finally broadly accepted levels measured by individual and societal concerns. If there are any risks in the unaccepted level, the
related activity is abandoned and reconsidered so that the risk can be reduced to a satisfactory and controlled level. Moreover,
the HSE also published the Key Programme 3-Asset Integrity (KP3) handbook related to the offshore infrastructure of the UK
continental shelf3 . The aim of the KP3 project was to ensure that the risks associated with the offshore operations are managed
effectively and without causing accidents and fatalities.
In July 1998 and 2002 (dependent on the ship type) the ISM Code came into force and was applicable to all ships over
500 gross registered tonnes (grt). This code covered IMO expectations from ship operators and their vessels and includes among
others minimum requirements for the maintenance of ship and equipment. The regime required regular auditing of shipboard
and shore-based management systems and continues to provide a formal report based on objective evidence. Successful audits
provided continuation of the certificates issued to the Company and its ships. These certificates were in fact licenses to trade
and provide a very powerful means to the regulator to ensure that minimum standards are maintained.
Furthermore, the Norwegian petroleum industry developed the NORSOK standard Z-0084 which provides guidelines and
requirements for the implementation of maintenance programs for new and in-service facilities both offshore and onshore
regarding risks related to personnel, environment, production loss and direct economical cost. The OREDA handbook5 was another
effort originating from a few oil operators to enhance the maintenance and operation of offshore structures by collecting data
for the topside and subsea equipment.
In addition to the above, the RCM and RBI maintenance principles have been established in the offshore oil and gas industry.
Initially, Villemeur6 and Moubray7 described the benefits initiating from the RCM application in a general context. Conachey and
Montgomery8 described the applications of RCM in the marine industry in order to determine the functions and the failures
of a system as well as its equipment which is considered as the best strategy to manage any failures occurring and finally
the requirements for spares. Serratella et al.9 discussed in their paper about RCM applications for the machinery and rotating
equipment of ships. Mokashi et al.10 also presented the introduction of RCM on board ships and the way it can influence the
ship management and the work of seafarers.
RBI on the other hand is complementary to RCM in terms of dealing with the structural reliability of structures, either ships or
offshore vessels. In order to accomplish this task, Jaramillo and Cabos11 developed a computer hull condition monitoring system
which assists in the easier association of survey data with their location on board the ship. In Straub et al.12 the RBI application
is presented regarding fatigue deterioration for offshore fixed steel structures and floating, production, storage and offloading
vessels (FPSOs). Ku et al.13 discussed the implementation of risk-based inspection plans regarding the strength and fatigue
assessment of a floating production unit (FPU) located in offshore West Africa while Kalghatgi et al.14 presented a risk-based
decision making process for the hull condition of ships. Turan et al.15 also presented a methodology for examining the effects
of hull structure repairs on the life cycle cost of ships.
All the above show the various efforts of applying maintenance in the maritime industry and determining the reliability and
criticality of ship equipment in a fragmented way. This is overcome with the innovative integrated ship maintenance strategy
which is shown in the following section.

3. Methodology

932

In this section, the methodology that is followed within the novel reliability and criticality maintenance strategy is presented.
Figure 1 shows the details which are briefly described in the following paragraphs.
Copyright 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

Qual. Reliab. Engng. Int. 2011, 27 931--946

O. TURAN ET AL.

Figure 1. Reliability and Criticality based maintenance

Copyright 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

Qual. Reliab. Engng. Int. 2011, 27 931--946

933

As shown in the figure above, the middle section of the graph presents the current practice, which consists of the different
departments of a shipping company, such as technical, operations, chartering, crewing, safety and quality, and purchasing. The
technical department is tasked with the maintenance carried out onboard the ships. The integrated reliability and criticality
maintenance strategy lies in the expansion of the above structure to collect data including condition monitoring and inspection
tools (right-hand side of Figure 1). This is followed by processing the data collected or by using other sources such as published
databases for specific machinery equipment. A decision support system is then developed so as to facilitate the choice of the
best maintenance or repair sequence (corrective, preventive or predictive). In this way, the optimum maintenance work can be
performed leading to cost-effective inspection and repair work. The above are coupled with the training of the personnel on and
offshore, criticality-based assessment, a common working platform and an overall management decision strategy (left-hand side
of Figure 1). In any case that it might be necessary, the decisions taken can be communicated to equipment suppliers, shipyards
and original engine manufacturers so as to achieve a lean repair or maintenance sequence when needed.
In Figure 2, the description of the data collection and processing step of the above-mentioned strategy is described in more
detail as this is the main aim of the present research work.
As can be seen, it consists of the initial selection of the systems of the ship to be analysed, which can be the hull or machinery,
rotating equipment, etc. Further on, several well-established tools, such as the FMECA, FTA and Markov analysis or other analytical
reliability tools are incorporated in this module. FMECA is an expanded version of the classical FMEA tool. It differentiates in the
way that it makes use of severity and probability indices thus creating a risk and criticality matrix16, 17 . FMECA studies also vary
from one industrial sector to the other as each one has its own inherited characteristics and restrictions. Ideally, it should be
carried out by a team of experts which will have the knowledge and experience of the design features, operation and maintenance
of the system to be analysed18 . FTA is a well-known reliability tool used in various research studies for different applications
for a long time since its original introduction in reliability analysis in the 1960s and 1970s19, 20 . In some of the latest efforts to
apply FTA in research studies Lampis and Andrews21 combine the classical FTA with Bayesian Belief Networks (BBNs) in order
to illustrate the failure causes of a water tank system. Morello et al.22 also present another application of FTA on gearboxes of
commercial vehicles. In a paper by Gupta and Bhattacharya23 , the FTA is used in combination with Fuzzy Set theory in order to
investigate their application in a conveyor system while Zaphiropoulos and Dialynas24 also employ the FTA tool combined with
reliability block diagrams (RBDs) in order to evaluate the reliability of electronic devices in the light of cost constraints.
In all the above research studies, FTA consists of simple static gates (OR as well as AND gates) in order to describe the
relationship of the various events/gates with the top event/gate in all the levels of the FT structure. The novel approach of the
present research paper lies in the use of static gates (OR, AND, VOTING) together with dynamic gates (SEQUENCE ENFORCING-SEQ,
PRIORITY AND-PAND and SPARE gates) as a further step ahead in order to examine the reliability of a system and to describe and
solve the problems occurring on complex structures. Dynamic gates allow for a more precise representation of the structure of
the associating gates and basic events of the FT considering the specific sequential constraints imposed by the examined system.

O. TURAN ET AL.

Figure 2. Data collection and processing methodology

More specifically, the Priority AND (PAND) gate is used to show that the output condition (gate) occurs when all input events
occur in a particular order. The input events depend on the order they are placed in the FT structure, that is the left-most event
will occur first, then the one next to the right and so on. The SEQ dynamic gate denotes that events also occur in a particular
order (from left to right) as they are placed in the FT structure. This gate is used when the output occurs if and only if all input
events are constrained to occur in a specified order as shown in the FT structure otherwise the gate becomes inactive. This is the
difference with the PAND gate in terms of the output compared with the SEQ gate which may be true, false and not possible
to be executed as well. A SEQ gate usually denotes gradual degradation.
SPARE gates are used to represent cold, warm and hot spares in the FT system examined. This type of gate is active if and
only if all spare events/inputs occur. Spare events are a special event type used to model spare usage. Cold, hot and warm
spare events are distinguished according to the dormancy factor they have, that is the ratio of failure rate in the standby and
operational mode. Cold spares are the spare events which have a dormancy factor of zero. That means that the spare event has
zero failures in the standby mode. On the contrary, hot spare events have a dormancy factor of one, which means that the spare
event is always activated in the standby mode. A warm spare event has a dormancy factor value between 0 and 1 and is partially
powered in the standby mode until it is needed. In the maritime area, the application of DFT has so far been investigated on
the pod propulsion system of a Roll on-Roll off (Ro-Ro) vessel25 as well as in the diesel generator system of a cruise ship26 .
In order to perform the calculations in an FT, the exact as well as the cut-set method can be used. The exact method is
employed when the full set of calculations is performed in order to estimate the reliability of the top event. It may provide more
accurate results (when the FT is not widespread) but it is more time-consuming and requires extensive software capability for
certain systems under investigation. On the other hand, when approximation calculation methods are used, cut-sets and minimal
cut-sets are employed to estimate the reliability figures of the FT with higher accuracy27 . Minimal cut-sets describe the least
combination of basic events that will lead to the failure of the top event. In other words, they describe the occurrence of the
top event if and only if all the basic events that constitute a minimal cut-set occur at the same time. More specifically:


m

Ci
(1)
P{TE} = P{C1 C2 . . . Cm } = P
i=1

where P{TE} is the probability of the occurrence of the top event and (Ci. . .i = 1, 2,. . ., m), cumulative summation of the minimal cut-sets.
One of the calculation methods which uses cut-sets and which will be employed in the present paper is the Esary Proschan
(E-P) method. The main difference with the exact method of calculation is that the computing time is reduced and accurate
results are obtained especially when the FT consists of dynamic gates. In the E-P method upper and lower bounds are applied
for the gate probability, which is calculated as follows:
m(p)


934

i=1

P(Bi ) P {TE} 1

m(c)


[1P(Ci )]

(2)

i=1

where Bi is the minimal path sets, m(p) is the total number of minimal path sets and m(c) is the total number of minimal cut-sets.
Copyright 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

Qual. Reliab. Engng. Int. 2011, 27 931--946

O. TURAN ET AL.
In addition to the FT analysis described above, a further assessment using IMs, such as Birnbaum and Criticality, is conducted.
Birnbaum IM is the rate of change in the top gate probability with respect to the change in the unavailability of a basic
event28, 29 . Therefore, the ranking of events obtained using the Birnbaum IM is helpful when selecting which end-event needs
to be enhanced. It can be calculated as the difference in the probability of the top event of a system given that an event A
occurred, minus the probability of the top event given that event A did not occur, that is
IiB (A) = P{X|A}P{X| A}

(3)

where IB (A) is the Birnbaum IM for event A, A is the event whose importance is being measured, A, the event did not occur
and X is the top event.
On the other hand, while the Birnbaum IM considers only the conditional probability that event A is critical, the Criticality IM
also considers the overall probability of the top event occurrence due to event A30, 31 . Alternatively, the Criticality IM describes
the relative probability of basic event A of how likely the event is to occur. The Criticality IM is defined as
Iicr (A) = (P{X|A}P{X| A})P{A} / P{X}

(4)

where Iicr (A) is the Criticality IM for event A, A is the event whose importance is being measured, A, the event did not occur
and X is the top event.
Also, overall system reliability can be examined by using Markov analysis or other analytical reliability tools32, 33 . Markov
analysis is used to study the dynamic behaviour of systems. It is also known as a state transition diagram as it represents the
different states of the system and the transition from one state to the other with their interdependencies. The different states of
the system can be described as good or failed depending on the failure of their components at a given time.
As mentioned before, the FTA tool with static and dynamic gates is used to carry out the study for the vessel in the present
analysis while Birnbaum and Criticality IMs are also employed to validate the criticality of the system components. Data originating
from the operation of the power plant, propulsion, diving, lifting, safety and water systems of DSV A are used to carry out the
reliability and criticality analysis. The Markov tool is suggested for use in further research since calculating the overall reliability
of the ship in this specific case study is a multifaceted task to perform given its complicated operational profile. At this point it
should be mentioned that the data collection activity in the maritime industry is a cumbersome pursuit. Even in the cases that
a data collection software exists, it is difficult to perform the correct data population mostly because the onshore or offshore
personnel is not properly trained for this kind of activity with the result of accumulating gigabytes of data without being able to
further process it. Following the above, the following section shows the reliability and criticality analysis of the ships systems.

4. Case study
In this section, the application of the above-mentioned methodology will take place considering the case study of DSV A. In
Figure 3 the profile view of the vessel is shown. DSV A is a multipurpose vessel used not only for diving support services but also
for hyperbaric welding, flexible riser and umbilical lying, installation of heavyweight structures as well as providing support for
trenching and diverless subsea equipment. It is a certified Dynamic Positioning (DP) 3 vessel with its active and passive stabilizing
systems providing for a rolling motion of just 12 in an 8 Beaufort seastate condition. The vessel is also equipped with two light
duty cranes (max 10 tons lifting capacity) and two heavy duty cranes (max 65/130 tons lifting capacity) which are able to be
operated either independently or simultaneously. Through the centrally located working moonpool, Remotely Operated Vehicles
(ROVs) can be deployed assisting in the daily operational activities.

935

Figure 3. Profile view of DSV A

Copyright 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

Qual. Reliab. Engng. Int. 2011, 27 931--946

O. TURAN ET AL.
Water system

Power plant

Seawater

Fire

Fresh
water

Bilge

Potable
water
Sewage &
waste

Azimuth
thrusters

Lifting,
hauling,
anchoring

Light cranes
(10 tons)

DSV A
Tunnel
thrusters

Heavy cranes
(65-130 tons)

Propul
sion

Diving
Fire
fighting
Hatches
& doors

Handling

Chambers

Safety

Gas
system

Bell &
sphl

Elec comms
&
cut-outs

Figure 4. Breakdown of the systems under consideration

Figure 5. Part of the FT structure for the power plant system of DSV A

DSV A is powered by six 2100 kW engines driving three azimuth thrusters (port, centre and starboard) used for the main
propulsion located at the aft and three tunnel thrusters located at the bow. There are two engine rooms separated with watertight
fire-insulated bulkheads providing 100% redundancy. The vessel is also supplied with a helideck and accommodation spaces for
139 persons in 76 cabins. The diving support system consists of a saturation diving system currently rated to 380 metres of
seawater (msw). It is equipped with three 6-man deck decompression chambers (DDC) and two 3-man diving bells. Both are of the
conventional type (heave-compensated) although initially the second one was designed for mobile flying type (self-propelled)
allowing divers to work and decompress at various depths. A self-propelled hyperbaric lifeboat (SPHL) is also mounted on the
starboard side of the vessel capable of supporting 18 divers plus another three lifeboat crew members.
In order to start with the reliability and criticality analysis of the various systems of DSV A, it was decided to build independent
FTs and evaluate their reliability index separately regarding each one of the specific systems mentioned. In Figure 4 the breakdown
of the systems under consideration is shown.

936

Power plant. It consists of six engines (Engines no. 16), which are responsible for the entire power generation of the vessel
(Figure 5). Under each one of them, specific failure causes are used as inputs, such as improper maintenance, corrosion and
component defect, which are then populated with values from the Mean Time Between Failures (MTBF) table.
Propulsion. It consists of the subsystems of azimuth and tunnel thrusters. Furthermore, azimuth thrusters are broken down into
the thrusters located at the port, centre and starboard side of the aft part of the ship. On the other hand, tunnel thrusters are
divided into the bow thrusters and the power packs.
Lifting, hauling and anchoring. This system is broken down into two categories. The first concerns the light crane (duties less
than 10 tons) further subdivided into cranes A and B. The second includes the heavy cranes (65/130 tons) also subdivided
into main cranes A and B.
Copyright 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

Qual. Reliab. Engng. Int. 2011, 27 931--946

O. TURAN ET AL.

Table I. Part of the table for the MTBF used (29 out of 96 end events) for different
components of DSV A
##

System

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29

Power plant

Component
engine no1

engine no2

Propulsion

bow thruster fwd no1

bow thruster centre no2
bow thruster aft no3
azimuth thruster port no1

Water

main cooling pumps

seawater vvs & pipework

Lifting

light cranes A
main crane A

Diving

chambers

sdc structure

Safety

fire fighting equipment

Failure cause

MTBF (days)

comp
corr
imtc
comp
corr
imtc
fwt
fwt
fwt
fwt
comp
ilub
bloc
fwt
corr
crac
fwt
mecd
cont
corr
matf
cont
fwt
wrcm
comp
cont
corr
comp
corr

853
853
365
853
160
853
426
640
512
365
160
853
853
853
512
853
853
640
853
640
426
512
320
853
512
853
853
853
512

Table II. Explanation of abbreviations of failure causes

Abbr.
Comp
Cont
Conn
Corr
Crac
Fwt
Ilub
Imtc
Matf
Mecd
Wrcm

Meaning
Component defect
Contamination
Connection defective
Corrosion
Cracked
Fair wear and tear
Insufficient lubrication
Inappropriate maintenance
Material failure
Mechanical damage
Wrong component

Water system. Water system includes the seawater; bilge; fire; fresh water; potable water and sewage & waste subsystems.
Diving system. Diving system includes the Chambers; Bell & SPHL; handling; gas systems and electrical communications &
cut-outs.
Safety systems. This system includes the fire-fighting equipment and the hatches & doors subsystems.

Copyright 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

Qual. Reliab. Engng. Int. 2011, 27 931--946

937

The FT structure was populated with data from the actual operation of the vessel for a period of six years. Originally, 171 data
points were chosen to be used, the number of which was furthermore reduced to 96 (Table I). This was an essential part of the
analysis in order to avoid the big size of the FTs built and consequently software breakdowns.
Moreover, the explanation of the abbreviations for all failure causes used is given in Table II.

O. TURAN ET AL.
After the final FT structure was completed, the quantitative analysis took place in order to estimate the reliability as well as
the cut-sets and the IMs of the top events/systems. In this case, Relex software was used to carry out the analysis34 . The time
boundary of the simulations was set to 30 months (which is similar to 2 12 years) in order to simulate the uninterrupted operation
of the vessel before it needed any dry-docking or major planned maintenance. Then, the progress of the reliability of the systems
was studied in time intervals of one month. The E-P approximation method was chosen to be used as it is the calculation method
which can provide the results in a timely manner. In the following section, the results of this calculation method are shown.

5. Results
In this section the results of the case study regarding the reliability and the IMs of the various systems and subsystems are
presented. For economy of space in the present paper a list of the 10 most important items/components will be shown. First of
all, the reliability curve for the power plant system is presented together with the results for all six engines of DSV A (Figure 6).
As is shown, the overall reliability of the power plant system retains its operational capability for a period of a few months
and then starts deteriorating quite fast reaching its lowest level after nine months of operation. Regarding the reliability analysis
of each one of the six engines of the vessel, they show better results but after some point they gradually reduce their reliability
index. It should be noted that the low reliability figures does not necessarily mean that the system remains out of operation
as the crew on board will always deal beforehand with any malfunctions that might be presented. Also, the excess in diesel
generation capacity means that work can be carried out on the engines without disruption to standard operations. Moreover,
in order to have a closer look at which end-events/components contribute more to the decrease of the reliability of the power
plant system, the results of Birnbaum and Criticality IM are shown in Table III. It is important to note that the Birnbaum IM is used
to identify which end-event/component needs improvement related to the rest of the components. In addition, the Criticality IM
denotes which end-event/component is more likely to occur and is at the same time critical to the top event/system.
As is shown, inappropriate maintenance (imtc) is the main factor affecting the reliability of engines 4, 1, 5 and 6, respectively,
followed by corrosion (corr) thus affecting the reliability of the entire power plant system. Imtc denotes the wrong maintenance
carried out by the maintenance crew (possibly a third party) or the crew on board the ship which led to failures and component
replacements. On the other hand, corr has to do with the corroded surfaces appearing in the cylinder heads or the pistons of
the engine from SOx gases. It is clear that, in both cases of Birnbaum and Criticality measures, the importance attributed to these
failures has similar ranking, meaning that the same components affect the engines in the same way. It should be mentioned that

1.0

1.0

0.9

0.9

0.8
0.6

Engine No3

0.5

Power plant

0.4

Engine No4

0.7

Engine No2

Reliability

Reliability

0.8

Engine No1

0.7

Engine No5

0.6

Engine No6

0.5
0.4

0.3

0.3

0.2

0.2

0.1

0.1
0.0

0.0
0

12 15 18
Time (months)

21

24

27

30

12

15

18

21

24

27

30

Time (months)

Figure 6. Reliability curves of power plant system and engines 16

Table III. Birnbaum and Criticality reliability IM for the power plant system
Birnbaum

Criticality

938

##

Components

##

Components

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10

corr eng no2

imtc eng no4
imtc eng no1
corr eng no3
imtc eng no5
corr eng no6
imtc eng no6
comp eng no5
imtc eng no3
corr eng no5

0.0696
0.0157
0.0157
0.0085
0.0044
0.0027
0.0017
0.0012
0.0009
0.0005

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10

corr eng no 2
imtc eng no4
imtc eng no1
corr eng no3
imtc eng no5
corr eng no6
imtc eng no6
comp eng no5
imtc eng no3
comp eng no6

0.0625
0.01
0.01
0.0077
0.0028
0.0018
0.0011
0.0006
0.0006
0.0003

Copyright 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

Qual. Reliab. Engng. Int. 2011, 27 931--946

O. TURAN ET AL.
1.0
0.9
0.8
0.6

Reliability

Reliability

0.7
Tunnel thrusters

0.5

Bow thrusters

0.4

Power packs

0.3

Propulsion system

0.2
0.1
0.0
0

12

15

18

21

24

27

1.0
0.9
0.8
0.7
0.6
0.5
0.4
0.3
0.2
0.1
0.0

30

Azimuth thrusters
Azimuth thr port
Azimuth thr ctr
Azimuth thr stbd

Time (months)

12

15

18

21

24

27

30

Time (months)

Figure 7. Reliability curves of propulsion system, tunnel thrusters, bow thrusters, power packs and azimuth thrusters (as a whole system and separate subsystems)

Table IV. Birnbaum and Criticality reliability IM for the propulsion system
Birnbaum

Criticality

##

Components

##

Components

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10

matf power packs

fwt power packs
fwt bow thruster 3
fwt bow thruster 1
comp power packs
fwt bow thruster 2
ilub azim thr port
ilub azim thr stbd
fwt azim thr stbd
fwt azim thr port

29.2933
24.9765
22.1246
0.5428
0.4292
0.2226
0.1656
0.1656
0.1656
0.1625

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10

comp azim thr stbd

comp azim thr port
fwt azim thr port
fwt azim thr stbd
ilub azim thr ctr
comp azim thr str
fwt azim thr ctr
ilub azim thr stbd
ilub azim thr port
fwt bow thruster 1

100
100
100
3.8275
3.0263
1.1894
0.807
0.4799
0.4527
0.4527

Copyright 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

Qual. Reliab. Engng. Int. 2011, 27 931--946

939

the IMs are used in a way so as to present the ranking of the failures of the components regardless of how big or small their
percentile might be.
The results of the propulsion system are shown in Figure 7. The reliability of the entire system maintains a high result of
90% after 11 months of operation and reaches 45% at the end of the 30 months period (2 12 years) of operation. Regarding the
tunnel thrusters, the overall reliability of the main system as well as the one of the bow thrusters have similar results with 90%
reliability index after 12 months (annual survey period) dropping to 45% after 30 months. Power packs on the contrary reach the
minimum of their operational capability after 17 months of operation. In the case of the azimuth thrusters, the overall azimuth
system shows good results for the first few months of its operation declining then to lower reliability levels. This is also the case
for the three thrusters (centre, port and starboard side) with the thruster located in the aft centre part showing better results
than the side thrusters. Again it should be noted that the crew on board the vessel carries out corrective maintenance so as
to preserve the good operational condition of the propulsion system. It must be appreciated, however, that at this stage the
low reliability or significant failure of components necessitating a vessel to dry-dock as opposed to fixing the problem without
dry-docking and such details have not been considered in detail.
In addition to the above, the results of the Birnbaum and Criticality IM for the propulsion system are shown in Table IV.
In the case of the Birnbaum IM, the power packs influence the propulsion system in terms of matf (29.29%) and fwt (almost
25%) as predominant failure causes. Matf includes the defective component breakdown that might occur during the operation
of the ship while fwt denotes the wear and tear of motors, valves or efficiency losses. The fwt is also considered as the main
failure cause for bow thrusters 3 (22.12%), 1 (0.54%) and 2 (0.22%). Regarding the Criticality IM, it is obvious that comp for
azimuth thrusters port (100%) and starboard (100%) is the prime affecting factor for this system followed by fwt of the azimuth
thruster port (100%). By component defect the failure of internal parts, bolts and nuts is indicated. It should be noted that
there is a big difference in the results between the Birnbaum and Criticality IM for this subsystem. This is due to the fact that
the Criticality IM estimates which component is more critical for the specific system as well as which is more likely to occur and
contribute to the failure of the system.The Birnbaum IM denotes that the system reliability improves when the reliability of the
specific component is improved too. Next, the results for the diving system and its subsystems including Chambers, Bell & SPHL,
handling, gas systems and electrical communications & cut-outs are presented (Figure 8).
As may be seen, the reliability of the lifting, hauling and anchoring system starts deteriorating after a few months of its
operation and reaches minimum figures after only 15 months of operation. For the light cranes subsystem, the reliability starts
getting worse after 12 months of operation (about 50% reliability index) while cranes A and B also follow a similar pattern with

O. TURAN ET AL.
1.0
0.9

Light cranes

0.8

Light crane A
Light crane B

0.6

Reliability

Reliability

0.7
Lifting & anchoring system

0.5
0.4
0.3
0.2
0.1
0.0
0

12

15

18

21

24

27

1.0
0.9
0.8
0.7
0.6
0.5
0.4
0.3
0.2
0.1
0.0

30

Heavy cranes
Main crane A
Main crane B

Time (months)

12

15

18

21

24

27

30

Time (months)

Figure 8. Reliability curves of overall lifting, hauling & anchoring system and light duty cranes (as one system and different subsystems) and heavy duty cranes
(as one system and as separate ones)

Table V. Birnbaum and Criticality reliability IM for the lifting, anchoring and hauling system
Birnbaum

Criticality

##

Components

##

Components

1
2
3
5
6
7
8
9
10

matf main crane A

matf main crane B
corr main crane A
corr main crane B
cont man crane B
cont main crane A
mecd light crane A
fwt light crane B
fwt light crane A

11.2943
10.7328
8.4688
7.483
7.483
7.1924
4.7161
4.5158
4.3102

1
2
3
5
6
7
8
9
10

matf main crane B

matf main crane A
corr main crane A
corr main crane B
cont man crane B
cont main crane A
fwt light crane B
mecd light crane A
fwt light crane A

7.11
6.8116
3.8576
3.4086
3.4086
2.624
2.4125
2.1482
1.5725

1.0
0.9

Sea water

0.8

Bilge system
Fire system

0.6

Reliability

Reliability

0.7

Water system

0.5
0.4
0.3
0.2
0.1
0.0
0

12

15

18

Time (months)

21

24

27

30

1.0
0.9
0.8
0.7
0.6
0.5
0.4
0.3
0.2
0.1
0.0

Fresh water
Potable water
Sewage & waste

12

15

18

21

24

27

30

Time (months)

Figure 9. Reliability curves of seawater, bilge, fire water, fresh water, potable water and sewage & waste systems

940

reliability of 4050%. As for the subsystem of heavy cranes and main cranes A and B, their reliability decreases below 50% after
6 months of operation and is minimized at month 18. The details of their deterioration are presented in the IM tables following
next (Table V).
As can be observed, the failures that need to be paid attention to for the lifting, anchoring and handling system according
to the Birnbaum IM are the matf for both heavy duty cranes A (11.2%) and B (10.7%) followed by corrosion and cont. In this
case matf concerns the wire rope, winch, hydraulics or material failures of safety devices while cont refers to oil contamination
with water or solid parts. In this case, removing of the existing oil is carried out and new oil is filled in. For the Criticality IM the
same order of failures is in effect with matf of main crane B being slightly more important than that of main crane A (7.1%
compared to 6.8%). In addition, corr of main crane A is more important than that of main crane B (3.8% compared to 3.4%).
This means that material failure is an issue to be urgently addressed as the lifting, hauling and anchoring system is one of the
most important systems for this type of vessel. The results for the different systems, the ones for the water system as well as for
its subsystems of seawater, bilge, fire, fresh water, potable water and sewage & waste are also presented (Figure 9).
Copyright 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

Qual. Reliab. Engng. Int. 2011, 27 931--946

O. TURAN ET AL.

Table VI. Birnbaum and Criticality reliability IM for the water system
Birnbaum

Criticality

##

Components

##

Components

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10

cont sewage tr
bloc sewage tr
bloc heat exch
corr sewage tr
corr tanks
fwt circ pp
fwt pump
fwt water treat
corr E/P
corr deck pp

2.4337
2.4337
2.4159
2.3868
2.3805
2.2385
2.0054
2.0054
1.95
1.95

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10

corr cath prot

crac sw valves
mecd bilge pp
mecd fw gen
cont fw gen
corr fw gen
fwt main cool pp
corr sw vv
conn valves
bloc main cool pp

1.3162
1.2432
1.1143
1.0808
1.0808
1.0729
0.8906
0.8906
0.866
0.866

1.0
0.9
0.8
Reliability

Electrical comms & cut outs

0.6

Diving systems

0.5
0.4
0.3
0.2
0.1
0.0
0

12

15

18

Time (months)

21

24

27

30

Reliability

Gas systems

0.7

1.0
0.9
0.8
0.7
0.6
0.5
0.4
0.3
0.2
0.1
0.0

Chambers
Bell & sphl
Handling

12

15

18

21

24

27

30

Time (months)

Figure 10. Reliability curves of gas, electrical comms & cut-outs, diving and Chambers, Bell & SPHL and handling system

Copyright 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

Qual. Reliab. Engng. Int. 2011, 27 931--946

941

As is observed, the reliability of water system tends to decrease below 90% after 3 months of operation while it gets to a
minimum at month 14. The seawater, bilge and fire subsystems follow the same trend and drop below 90% of reliability after
about 6 months while they reach 50% after operating for 15 months. For the fresh water and sewage & waste subsystems reliability
results are similar with a 90% figure at about after three months operating while the potable water subsystem presents slightly
better results with 90% reliability at about after seven months of operation. Next, the IM for the water system are presented
(Table VI).
According to the Birnbaum IM the item that needs more improvement is the sewage treatment (both cont and bloc at 2.4%
and corr at 2.3%) followed by the heat exchanger of the fresh water subsystem (bloc at 2.4%). The corrosion of the sewage tanks
is another issue to be addressed (2.3%) as well as the fwt of both the circulating (2.23%) and reciprocating (2.0%) pumps of the
fresh water system. For the Criticality IM, corrosion of the cathodic protection (1.31%) is more likely to occur followed by cracked
seawater valves (1.24%), mechanical damage of the bilge pump (1.11%) and the fresh water generator (1.08%). Accordingly, the
components mentioned above must be considered of high priority so as to improve the reliability of the whole water system.
Next, the results for the diving system and its subsystems including Chambers, Bell & SPHL, handling, gas systems and electrical
communications & cut-outs will be presented (Figure 10).
As is observed, the reliability of the diving system drops below 90% after 6 months of operational time and reaches its minimum
value after 12 months. In the case of the gas systems, the reduction of the reliability index follows a slower reduction curve (90%
after 2 months, 50% after 6 months and minimum value after 30 months) while for the electrical communications & cut-outs
the reliability reduction pattern is similar to the one of the chambers (90% after 1 month, minimum value after 15 months). The
reliability of the Bell & SPHL also decreases quite quickly and reaches its lowest value after 21 months of operation. The same
conditions apply for the Chambers and handling subsystems although the initial decrease is more rapid at the first months of
operation. Regarding the IM, they are presented in Table VII.
For the Birnbaum IM the electrical communications are more urgent to improve (comp at 2.96%) together with the Chambers
(fwt at 2.27%) and launch system (fwt at 2.01%). In this case component failure concerns the diving bell to surface communication
breakdowns while the fwt failures of the (decompression) Chambers mainly refer to sealing leaks, such as chamber door seals
and pressure loss due to wear of secondary seals. Other important items include the sdc structure (comp at 2.01%), SPHL
(fwt at 1.65%) and the compressors of the gas system (fwt at 1.55%). It is worth mentioning that fair, wear and tear are
amongst the top failure causes of the diving system as this is a most common defect observed in the ordinary operation of

O. TURAN ET AL.

Table VII. Birnbaum and Criticality reliability IM for the diving system
Birnbaum

Criticality

##

Components

##

Components

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10

comp elec comms

fwt chambers
fwt launch systems
comp sdc structure
fwt sphl
fwt compressors
comp sphl
cont chambers
comp launch systems
comp compressors

2.9648
2.2777
2.018
2.0109
1.6554
1.5503
1.114
1.0695
0.9955
0.9206

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10

comp elec comms

fwt chambers
fwt launch systems
comp sdc structure
fwt sphl
fwt compressors
cont chambers
comp sphl
comp launch systems
fwt elec comms

2.617
1.5515
1.1627
1.0263
0.8449
0.6746
0.5458
0.4848
0.4332
0.3778

1.0
0.9
0.8
Safety systems

Reliability

0.7

Fire fighting equipment

0.6

Hatches & doors

0.5
0.4
0.3
0.2
0.1
0.0
0

12

15

18

21

24

27

30

Time (months)
Figure 11. Reliability curve of safety, fire fighting equipment and hatches & doors systems

Table VIII. Birnbaum and Criticality reliability IM for the safety system
Birnbaum

Criticality

##

Components

##

Components

1
2
3
4
5

corr fire fight eq

comp fire fight eq
fwt wt doors
fwt wt hatches
fwt hydraulics

50.1098
39.4567
32.4938
32.4938
29.6972

1
2
3
4
5

corr fire fight eq

fwt wt doors
fwt wt hatches
comp fire fight eq
fwt hydraulics

37.3179
20.6328
20.6328
20.0665
15.1031

942

the vessel. Regarding the Criticality IM, component failure of the electrical communications (2.61%) is the event most likely to
occur which will influence the main system more together with fwt of the Chambers (1.55%), fwt of the launch systems (1.16%)
and component failure of the sdc structure. It is worthwhile observing that both categories of IM have the same ranking for
the components/events affecting the operation of the diving systems. Finally, the reliability curves for the safety system and its
subsystems of fire fighting equipment and hatches & doors are presented in Figure 11.
As is shown the reliability of the safety system decreases with time and falls below 90% after 3 months of operation while
it reaches its minimum value after 30 months. The fire fighting equipment as well as the hatches & doors subsystems follows
similar patterns reducing their reliability to 90% after 1 month and reach minimum values after about 30 months of operation.
Moreover, Table VIII demonstrates the IM for the safety system.
As is observed, for both the Birnbaum and Criticality IM the key components which affect the reliability of the safety system
are the fire fighting equipment, such as the fire hydrants, water piping, water mist systems (corrosion: 50.1 and 37.3%, component
failure: 39.4 and 20.06%) and the watertight doors (fear, wear and tear: 32.4 and 20.6%). Finally, the discussion and conclusions
of the present research work are shown in the last section of the paper.
Copyright 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

Qual. Reliab. Engng. Int. 2011, 27 931--946

O. TURAN ET AL.

6. Discussion/conclusions
In the present paper the maintenance standards and procedures followed in the maritime offshore sector are presented together
with an integrated maintenance and repair strategy which assesses the reliability and criticality of the asset under consideration.
In this case, the asset specified is a DSV with its main systems and subsystems including the power plant, propulsion, water
systems as well as the lifting, hauling & anchoring, diving and safety systems. At first, the FTA tool with static and dynamic gates
is used to represent the interrelations of the different components of each system. The different FTs are populated with field
data gathered from the actual operation of the vessel and the reliability curves of the systems over time are obtained. Birnbaum
and Criticality IMs are also employed in order to specify the reliability importance of the various components of the systems.
In this respect, it is observed that in almost all cases the reliability of the systems rapidly decreased after the first months
of simulated operation. However, this does not mean that the vessel is unavailable while operating in the 2.5-year simulation
time interval as corrective maintenance is available on-the-spot. The main aim of this research was to observe which system
components are more significant for the operation of the main system/ship, how much they influence the reliability of the
main system and which of them can be further improved. In this case, the failures recorded include all types of failures or
underperforming events (even minor ones). The crew carries out corrective maintenance wherever needed so as to rectify any
anomalies that may occur. On the other hand, the specific components and their failure causes identified in the reliability and
criticality analysis by using Birnbaum and Criticality IMs provide valuable feedback to the management team of the vessel so as to
know where to focus its maintenance efforts in order to achieve the desirable results, regarding safety, environmental protection,
minimization of downtime and cost effectiveness. In this case, the reliability of certain components can be increased by carrying
out opportunity maintenance, i.e. structured maintenance planning in conjunction with the vessel look-ahead plan.
For the power plant system, the key factors identified are inappropriate maintenance carried out by the maintenance crew as
well as ordinary corrosion affecting the engines. The first failure cause can be minimized by having a quality supervision team
during any planned repair sequence to ensure that the repair work is done according to the companys quality standards. For
the latter cause, further checks are needed regarding the fuel oil quality (use fuel oil additives to improve fuel oil dispersion),
the fuel pump (check pressure on fuel pump to see whether there are any gas leaks or improper sealing of the valves and rings)
or the fuel injectors (malfunctioning of the injector nozzle). For the propulsion system and the azimuth and tunnel thrusters,
material failure, usual fair wear and tear and component defect are the main contributors to component replacements. These can
be rectified by careful and frequent inspections based on a scheduled routine so as to prevent excessive breakdowns. For the
lifting, hauling and anchoring system the heavy duty cranes are more critical due to material failure and contamination. These
failures can be prevented by monitoring for items such as wire ropes, winches and load sensors on a daily basis as well as for
water and solid particles in the oil circuit of the cranes.
For the water system, the different tanks should be inspected carefully and regularly and any signs of coating damage or
localized corrosion should be treated immediately so as to avoid extended coating breakdowns and corrosion propagation taking
place. This should be the case for all tanks and especially for the seawater and sewage. As for the diving system, fair, wear and
tear of the sealing items can be dealt with continuous monitoring of the seals that provide for the pressure sealing within the
decompression Chambers, diving bells and other pressure sealing compartments. Also, the electrical communications may be
improved by additional redundant communication systems in place. In the case of the safety system, regular inspections of the
equipment in place, such as water piping, hydrants and watertight doors, will minimize the need for repairs and increase the
reliability of the overall system. All the above problems and suggested solutions are summarized in Figures 12 and 13.
Other measures taken at a higher/managerial level should include:
As was observed, there is plenty of information scattered around different documents, systems, software (Planned Maintenance
System). They all try to capture the detailed information needed in order to record the failures/underperforming events

Power plant
Corr eng no2
Imtc eng no4
Imtc eng no1
Water
cont sewage treat
bloc sewage treat
bloc heat exchange

Propulsion

Lift, haul & anchor

matf power packs

fwt power packs
fwt bow thruster 3

matf main crane A

matf main crane B
corr main crane A

Diving

Safety

comp elec comms

fwt chambers
fwt launch system

corr fire fight eq

comp fire fight eq
fwt wt doors

943

Figure 12. Ship systems of DSV A and problems identified in the present paper

Copyright 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

Qual. Reliab. Engng. Int. 2011, 27 931--946

O. TURAN ET AL.

Power plant
Check fuel oil,
pump & injectors
Supervision of
maintenance &
repairs
Water
Inspect tanks
regularly
Check bloc of heat
exchanger

Propulsion
Scheduled &
effective insp,
preventive
maintenance
Diving
Redundant comm
system, prev maint
Cont monitoring of
seals, chambers

Lift, haul & anchor

Condition
monitoring of
wires, winches
Monitor oil
circuit
Safety
Inspection of
water piping,
hydrants, wt
doors

Figure 13. Ship systems of DSV A and suggested solutions in the present paper

occurring in different systems on board the vessel (i.e. diving, propulsion, power, water, lifting, etc.). They all need to be
combined into one easily comprehended process/tool like FMECA looking down from vessel to equipment level.
A severity and probability index/matrix needs to be established in order to create a criticality matrix at various areas (i.e.
safety, environment, asset, operation) having in mind similar studies performed by IMO, MoD, etc.16, 35
Key Performance Indicators (KPIs) for internal and/or external use can also be derived from the previous process based on
similar efforts in other fields (i.e. TMSA element 4)36 . In addition, a following step can be the implementation of KPIs for the
various departments of the company, such as technical, crewing, operations, diving, training and HSQE. KPIs can be set all
across the fleet operated as well as on a ship to ship basis37 .
Class notations like Condition Monitoring should be looked at more carefully including the investment on condition monitoring
systems, such as thermal imaging of engines/control panels/circuits, lubrication oil monitoring of engines, vibration monitoring
of thrusters and diving equipment.
Provide the equipment and training to the ships crew to operate condition monitoring appliances correctly so as to act
within the companys proactive policy. Engage them in the as part of the solution strategy before any serious problems
occur on board.
As similar procedures, systems and equipment are used onboard different ships, it will be helpful to share/transfer the
knowledge from one ship to the other. On the other hand, as each offshore vessel is engaged in different operational
activities (i.e. diving support, pipe laying, subsea equipment) with different crew this might be better looked at on a case by
case approach.
All the above must be carried out having in mind that top management commitment and support is a prerequisite.

Nomenclature

944

ALARP
FMEA
FMECA
FTA
HSE
HSWA
IACS
IMO
ISM code
ISO
MoD
NORSOK
NPD
OREDA
RBI
RCM
TMSA

As Low as Reasonably Practicable

Failure Modes and Effects Analysis
Failure Modes, Effects and Criticality Analysis
Fault Tree Analysis
The UK Health and Safety Executive
UK Health & Safety at Work Act
International Association of Classification Societies
International Maritime Organisation
International Safety Management code
International Standards Organisation
Ministry of Defence
Norsk Sokkels Konkuranseposisjon (Norwegian Offshore Sector)
Norwegian Petroleum Directorate
Offshore Reliability Database
Risk-based Inspection
Reliability Centred Maintenance
Tanker Management Self Assessment

Copyright 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

Qual. Reliab. Engng. Int. 2011, 27 931--946

O. TURAN ET AL.

Acknowledgements
The present research paper would not have been completed without the invaluable help and feedback from the managing
company of vessel A. More particularly, our appreciation goes to Alain Erdody and Freya King for their continuous support.

References
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.

HSE. A Guide to the Offshore Installations (Safety Case) Regulations 2005 (3rd edn). Health & Safety Commission: London, 2006.
HSE. Reducing Risk, Protecting People: HSEs Decision-making Process. Health & Safety Commission: London, 2001.
HSE. Key Programme 3-Asset Integrity Programme Handbook. Hazardous Installations Directorate, Offshore Division, London, 2007.
NTS. Criticality Analysis for Maintenance Purposes. Norsok standard Z-008, Norwegian Technology Centre, Rev. 2, 2001.
OREDA, Offshore Reliability Database Handbook, (4th edn). DNV: Norway, 2002.
Villemeur A. Reliability, Availability, Maintainability and Safety Assessment 2. Wiley: Chichester, U.K., 1992.
Moubray J. Reliability-Centered Maintenance (2nd edn). Industrial Press: NY, 1997.
Conachey RM, Montgomery RL. Application of reliability-centered maintenance techniques to the marine industry. SNAME Meeting Houston,
TX, 2003.
Serratella CM, Wang G, Conachey R. Risk-based strategies for the next generation of maintenance and inspection programs. International
Symposium on Maritime, Safety, Security and Environmental Protection (SSE), Athens, Greece, 2021 September 2007.
Mokashi AJ, Wang J, Vermar AK. A study of reliability-centred maintenance in maritime operations. Marine Policy 2002; 26:325--335.
Jaramillo D, Cabos C. Computer support for hull condition monitoring with Pegasus. Sixth International Conference on Computer and IT
Applications in the Maritime Industries (COMPIT), Oegstgeest, the Netherlands, 810 May 2006; 228--236.
Straub D, Goyet J, Sorensen JD, Faber MH. Benefits of risk based inspection planning for offshore structures. Proceedings of the 25th
International Conference of Offshore Mechanics and Arctic Engineering (OMAE), Hamburg, Germany, 49 June 2006.
Ku AP, Serratella C, Spong R, Basu R, Wang G, Angevine D. Structural reliability applications in developing risk-based inspection plans for a
floating production installation. 23rd International Conference of Offshore Mechanics and Arctic Engineering (OMAE), Vancouver, Canada, 2025
June 2004.
Kalghatgi SG, Serratella C, Hagan JB. Hull inspection and maintenance systems. American Bureau of Shipping Technical Papers, 2009.
Turan O, ler A, Lazakis I, Rigo P, Caprace JD. Maintenance/repair and production-oriented life cycle cost/earning model for ship structural
optimisation during conceptual design stage. Journal of Ships and Offshore Structures 2009; 4(2):107--125. DOI: 10.1080/17445300802564220.
IMO. Guidelines for formal safety assessment (FSA) for use in the IMO rule-making process. MSC 81/Circ.1023, London, 2002.
Turan O, Olcer A, Martin PL. Risk assessment of loss of life for fishing vessels in fuzzy environment. Safety and Reliability 2003; 23(2):19--39.
Kontovas CA, Psaraftis HN. Formal Safety Assessment. A critical review and ways to strengthen it and make it more transparent. Working
Paper NTUA-MT-06-102b, 2006.
Dhillon BS. Maintainability, Maintenance and Reliability for Engineers. CRC Press: Boca Raton, FL, 2002.
Kumamoto H, Henley EJ. Probabilistic Risk Assessment and Management for Scientists and Engineers (2nd edn). The Institution of Electrical
and Electronic Engineers Inc: NY, 1996.
Lampis M, Andrews JD. Bayesian belief networks for system fault diagnostics. Quality and Reliability Engineering International 2009; 25:409--426.
DOI: 10.1002/qre.978.
Morello MG, Cavalca KL, Silveira Z. Development and reduction of a fault tree for gearboxes of heavy commercial vehicles based on
identification of critical components. Quality Reliability Engineering International 2008; 24:183--198. DOI: 10.1002/qre.879.
Gupta S, Bhattacharya J. Reliability analysis of a conveyor system using hybrid data. Quality Reliability Engineering International 2007;
23:867--882. DOI: 10.1002/qre.843.
Zaphiropoulos EP, Dialynas EN. Methodology for the optimal component selection of electronic devices under reliability and cost constraints.
Quality Reliability Engineering International 2007; 23:885--897. DOI: 10.1002/qre.850.
Aksu S, Aksu S, Turan O. Reliability and availability of pod propulsion systems. Quality and Reliability Engineering International 2006; 22:41--58.
DOI: 10.1002/qre.747.
Lazakis I, Turan O, Aksu S. Increasing ship operational reliability through the implementation of a holistic maintenance management strategy.
Journal of Ships and Offshore Structures 2010; 5(4):337--357.
Tang Z, Dugan JB. Minimal cut set/sequence generation for dynamic fault trees. Reliability and Maintainability Symposium, Washington, U.S.A.,
2004; 207--213.
Beeson S, Andrews JD. Birnbaums measure of component importance for non-coherent systems. IEEE Transactions on Reliability 2003;
52(2):213--219.
Levitin G, Podofillini L, Zio E. Generalised importance measures for multi-state elements based on performance level restrictions. Reliability
Engineering and System Safety 2003; 82:287--298.
Andrews JD. Birnbaum and criticality measures of component contribution to the failure of phased missions. Reliability Engineering and
System Safety 2008; 93:1861--1866.
Borgonovo E. Differential, criticality and Birnbaum importance measures: an application to basic event, groups and SSCs in event trees and
binary decision diagrams. Reliability Engineering and System Safety 2007; 92:1458--1467.
Pil CK, Rausand M, Vatn J. Reliability assessment of reliquefaction systems on LNG carriers. Reliability Engineering and System Safety 2008;
93:1345--1353.
Trucco P, Cagno E, Ruggeri F, Grande O. A Bayesian belief network modelling of organisational factors in risk analysis: A case study in
maritime transportation. Reliability Engineering and System Safety 2008; 93:823--834.
Relex, Reliability Excellence Studio, edition 2008, version 10.
MoD. Using reliability centred maintenance to manage engineering failures. Part 3: Guidance on the application of reliability centred
maintenance. Defence Standard 00-45, 2006.
OCIMF. Tanker Management and Self Assessment (TMSA) 2: A Best-Practice Guide for Ship Operators (2nd edn). Oil Companies International
Marine Forum, June 2008.
Grabowski MR, Ayyalasomayajula P, Wang H et al. Accident precursors and safety nets: Initial results from the leading indicators of safety
project. ABS Technical Papers, 2007.

Authors biographies

Copyright 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

Qual. Reliab. Engng. Int. 2011, 27 931--946

945

Dr Osman Turan is a Reader at the Department of Naval Architecture & Marine Engineering at Strathclyde University and leading
the Marine Design, Operations and Human Factor Group. He has been teaching at the same department since 1995 and he was

O. TURAN ET AL.
the partner of Safety at Sea Ltd, engineering consultancy firm, between 1999 and 2006. He is one of leading experts on safety,
design for safety covering, human factors and ship operations. He has been involved in many international research and industrial
projects dealing with design, operations and safety related areas.
Iraklis Lazakis is a Researcher and a PhD candidate at the Department of Naval Architecture & Marine Engineering at Strathclyde
University. He got his MSc in Marine Technology from the same department. He has several years experience in the marine
industry, specializing in the fields of maintenance, repairs and corrosion-related issues regarding ships structure. Among others,
he has attended a number of dry-dockings/repairs of different vessels worldwide supervising the repair works carried out. He
has also participated and contributed in EU funded research projects.
Sol Judah is currently Head of Marine Division with the Scottish and Southern Energy Renewables working with Offshore Wind,
Wave and Tidal Power technologies. For a number of years, he has been a Senior Manager with Technip UK in Aberdeen. His
key responsibilities included developing the company strategy and providing direction and support in key areas of Asset Risk &
Integrity, Maintenance, Installation Engineering, Naval architecture and R&D. Prior to this he was a Senior Marine and Offshore
surveyor and Asst station Manager with Det Norske Veritas Classification (DNV) for 15 years with international assignments.
During his time with DNV he has been exposed to design reviews, new-building surveys and ships in operation surveys and had
early involvement in management systems (ISM, ISO, ISPS). He spent nine years in the merchant navy and two years as a naval
architect. He studied Naval Architecture and Offshore Engineering at Strathclyde University in Glasgow in 1988. He is currently
the Chairman of The Institute of Marine Engineering Science and Technology (IMarEST) Scottish Branch and a visiting lecturer at
Strathclyde University.
Atilla Incecik is the Professor of Offshore Engineering and Head of Department of Naval Architecture and Marine Engineering,
Universities of Glasgow and Strathclyde, U.K. Professor Incecik obtained his BSc in Naval Architecture and Marine Engineering in
1975 from the Technical University of Istanbul and his PhD in Ocean Engineering in 1982 from the University of Glasgow. He has
been involved with teaching and research concerning the theoretical and experimental hydrodynamics and hydromechanics of
ships and floating offshore structures over the last 30 years. He was Lloyds Register Professor of Offshore Engineering and Head
of School of Marine Science and Technology at the University of Newcastle upon Tyne. He is Editor-in-Chief of Ocean Engineering.

946
Copyright 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

Qual. Reliab. Engng. Int. 2011, 27 931--946