ARTURO M. TOLENTINO, petitioner, vs.

THE SECRETARY OF FINANCE and THE

COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, respondents. G.R. No. 115455
August 25, 1994
FACTS: Herein various petitioners seek to declare RA 7166 as unconstitutional as it
seeks to widen the tax base of the existing VAT system and enhance its
administration by amending the National Internal Revenue Code. The value-added
tax (VAT) is levied on the sale, barter or exchange of goods and properties as well as
on the sale or exchange of services. It is equivalent to 10% of the gross selling price
or gross value in money of goods or properties sold, bartered or exchanged or of the
gross receipts from the sale or exchange of services.
CREBA asserts that R.A. No. 7716 (1) impairs the obligations of contracts, (2)
classifies transactions as covered or exempt without reasonable basis and (3)
violates the rule that taxes should be uniform and equitable and that Congress shall
"evolve a progressive system of taxation."
With respect to the first contention, it is claimed that the application of the tax to
existing contracts of the sale of real property by installment or on deferred payment
basis would result in substantial increases in the monthly amortizations to be paid
because of the 10% VAT. The additional amount, it is pointed out, is something that
the buyer did not anticipate at the time he entered into the contract.
It is next pointed out that while Section 4 of R.A. No. 7716 exempts such
transactions as the sale of agricultural products, food items, petroleum, and medical
and veterinary services, it grants no exemption on the sale of real property which is
equally essential. The sale of real property for socialized and low-cost housing is
exempted from the tax, but CREBA claims that real estate transactions of "the less
poor," i.e., the middle class, who are equally homeless, should likewise be
exempted.
Finally, it is contended, for the reasons already noted, that R.A. No. 7716 also
violates Art. VI, Section 28(1) which provides that "The rule of taxation shall be
uniform and equitable. The Congress shall evolve a progressive system of taxation."
ISSUE: Whether or not RA 7166 violates the principle of progressive system of
taxation.
HELD: No, there is no justification for passing upon the claims that the law also
violates the rule that taxation must be progressive and that it denies petitioners'
right to due process and that equal protection of the laws. The reason for this
different treatment has been cogently stated by an eminent authority on
constitutional law thus: "When freedom of the mind is imperiled by law, it is freedom
that commands a momentum of respect; when property is imperiled it is the
lawmakers' judgment that commands respect. This dual standard may not precisely
reverse the presumption of constitutionality in civil liberties cases, but obviously it
does set up a hierarchy of values within the due process clause."
Petitioners contend that as a result of the uniform 10% VAT, the tax on consumption
goods of those who are in the higher-income bracket, which before were taxed at a

rate higher than 10%, has been reduced, while basic commodities, which before
were taxed at rates ranging from 3% to 5%, are now taxed at a higher rate.
Just as vigorously as it is asserted that the law is regressive, the opposite claim is
pressed by respondents that in fact it distributes the tax burden to as many goods
and services as possible particularly to those which are within the reach of higherincome groups, even as the law exempts basic goods and services. It is thus
equitable. The goods and properties subject to the VAT are those used or consumed
by higher-income groups. These include real properties held primarily for sale to
customers or held for lease in the ordinary course of business, the right or privilege
to use industrial, commercial or scientific equipment, hotels, restaurants and similar
places, tourist buses, and the like. On the other hand, small business
establishments, with annual gross sales of less than P500,000, are exempted. This,
according to respondents, removes from the coverage of the law some 30,000
business establishments. On the other hand, an occasional paper of the Center for
Research and Communication cities a NEDA study that the VAT has minimal impact
on inflation and income distribution and that while additional expenditure for the
lowest income class is only P301 or 1.49% a year, that for a family earning P500,000
a year or more is P8,340 or 2.2%.
Lacking empirical data on which to base any conclusion regarding these arguments,
any discussion whether the VAT is regressive in the sense that it will hit the "poor"
and middle-income group in society harder than it will the "rich," is largely an
academic exercise. On the other hand, the CUP's contention that Congress'
withdrawal of exemption of producers cooperatives, marketing cooperatives, and
service cooperatives, while maintaining that granted to electric cooperatives, not
only goes against the constitutional policy to promote cooperatives as instruments
of social justice (Art. XII, 15) but also denies such cooperatives the equal
protection of the law is actually a policy argument. The legislature is not required to
adhere to a policy of "all or none" in choosing the subject of taxation. 44
Nor is the contention of the Chamber of Real Estate and Builders Association
(CREBA), petitioner in G.R. 115754, that the VAT will reduce the mark up of its
members by as much as 85% to 90% any more concrete. It is a mere allegation. On
the other hand, the claim of the Philippine Press Institute, petitioner in G.R. No.
115544, that the VAT will drive some of its members out of circulation because their
profits from advertisements will not be enough to pay for their tax liability, while
purporting to be based on the financial statements of the newspapers in question,
still falls short of the establishment of facts by evidence so necessary for
adjudicating the question whether the tax is oppressive and confiscatory.
Indeed, regressivity is not a negative standard for courts to enforce. What Congress
is required by the Constitution to do is to "evolve a progressive system of taxation."
This is a directive to Congress, just like the directive to it to give priority to the
enactment of laws for the enhancement of human dignity and the reduction of
social, economic and political inequalities (Art. XIII, 1), or for the promotion of the
right to "quality education" (Art. XIV, 1). These provisions are put in the
Constitution as moral incentives to legislation, not as judicially enforceable rights.
The recent talks on reviving the plan to implement a national identification (ID)
system brings two cases back into the spotlight. In the first case, Ople vs. Torres, the
Supreme Court struck down Administrative Order 308 which seeks to implement the

National Computerized Identification Reference System. In the second

case, Kilusang Mayo Uno vs. Director-General of NEDA, the SC upheld the validity of
Executive Order 420 which adopts a unified multi-purpose ID system for government
agencies. Lets discuss each case, in the hope of giving our readers a brief overview
how the new proposals are different from these cases.
Ople vs. Torres (G.R. No. 127685, 23 July 1998, penned by Chief Justice Reynaldo
Puno)
In 1996, President Fidel Ramos issued Administrative Order No. 308, entitled
Adoption of a National Computerized Identification Reference System, the
pertinent portions of which reads:
ADOPTION OF A NATIONAL COMPUTERIZED IDENTIFICATION REFERENCE SYSTEM
WHEREAS, there is a need to provide Filipino citizens and foreign residents with the
facility to conveniently transact business with basic service and social security
providers and other government instrumentalities;
WHEREAS, this will require a computerized system to properly and efficiently
identify persons seeking basic services on social security and reduce, if not totally
eradicate, fraudulent transactions and misrepresentations;
WHEREAS, a concerted and collaborative effort among the various basic services
and social security providing agencies and other government instrumentalities is
required to achieve such a system;
NOW, THEREFORE, I, FIDEL V. RAMOS, President of the Republic of the Philippines,
by virtue of the powers vested in me by law, do hereby direct the following:
SECTION 1. Establishment of a National Computerized Identification Reference
System. A decentralized Identification Reference System among the key basic
services
and
social
security
providers
is
hereby
established.
xxx
SEC. 4. Linkage Among Agencies. The Population Reference Number (PRN)
generated by the NSO shall serve as the common reference number to establish a
linkage among concerned agencies. The IACC Secretariat shall coordinate with the
different Social Security and Services Agencies to establish the standards in the use
of Biometrics Technology and in computer application designs of their respective
systems.
A.O. 308 involves a subject that is not appropriate to be covered by an
administrative order and usurps the power of Congress to legislate
Congress is vested with the power to enact laws, while the President executes the
laws. The Presidents administrative power is concerned with the work of applying
policies and enforcing orders as determined by proper governmental organs. An
administrative order refers to [a]cts of the President which relate to particular
aspects of governmental operation in pursuance of his duties as administrative head
shall be promulgated in administrative orders. An administrative order is an
ordinance issued by the President which relates to specific aspects in the
administrative operation of government. It must be in harmony with the law and
should be for the sole purpose of implementing the law and carrying out the
legislative policy.

A.O. No. 308 establishes for the first time a National Computerized Identification
Reference System. It does not simply implement the Administrative Code of 1987.
This administrative order redefines the parameters of some basic rights of the
citizenry vis-a-vis the State, as well as the line that separates the administrative
power of the President to make rules and the legislative power of Congress. It deals
with a subject that should be covered by law.
A.O. violates the right to privacy
In striking down A.O. 308, the SC emphasized that the Court is not per se against the
use of computers to accumulate, store, process, retrieve and transmit data to
improve our bureaucracy. The SC also emphasized that the right to privacy does not
bar all incursions into the right to individual privacy. This right merely requires that
the law be narrowly focused and a compelling interest justify such intrusions.
Intrusions into the right must be accompanied by proper safeguards and welldefined standards to prevent unconstitutional invasions.
The right to privacy is a constitutional right, granted recognition independently of its
identification with liberty. It is recognized and enshrined in several provisions of our
Constitution, specifically in Sections 1, 2, 3 (1), 6, 8 and 17 of the Bill of Rights.
Zones of privacy are also recognized and protected in our laws, including certain
provisions of the Civil Code and the Revised Penal Code, as well as in special laws
(e.g., Anti-Wiretapping Law, the Secrecy of Bank Deposit Act and the Intellectual
Property Code).
The right to privacy is a fundamental right guaranteed by the Constitution. Thefore,
it is the burden of government to show that A.O. 308 is justified by some compelling
state interest and that it is narrowly drawn. The government failed to discharge this
burden.
A.O. 308 is predicated on two considerations: (1) the need to provide our citizens
and foreigners with the facility to conveniently transact business with basic service
and social security providers and other government instrumentalities and (2) the
need to reduce, if not totally eradicate, fraudulent transactions and
misrepresentations by persons seeking basic services. While it is debatable whether
these interests are compelling enough to warrant the issuance of A.O. 308, it is not
arguable that the broadness, the vagueness, the overbreadth of A.O. 308, if
implemented, will put our peoples right to privacy in clear and present danger.
The heart of A.O. 308 lies in its Section 4 which provides for a Population Reference
Number (PRN) as a common reference number to establish a linkage among
concerned agencies through the use of Biometrics Technology and computer
application designs. Biometry orbiometrics is the science of the application of
statistical methods to biological facts; a mathematical analysis of biological data.
The methods or forms of biological encoding include finger-scanning and retinal
scanning, as well as the method known as the artificial nose and the thermogram.
A.O. 308 does not state what specific biological characteristics and what particular
biometrics technology shall be used.
Moreover, A.O. 308 does not state whether encoding of data is limited to biological
information alone for identification purposes. The Solicitor Generals claim that the
adoption of the Identification Reference System will contribute to the generation of
population data for development planning is an admission that the PRN will not be
used solely for identification but for the generation of other data with remote
relation to the avowed purposes of A.O. 308. The computer linkage gives other

government agencies access to the information, but there are no controls to guard
against leakage of information. When the access code of the control programs of the
particular computer system is broken, an intruder, without fear of sanction or
penalty, can make use of the data for whatever purpose, or worse, manipulate the
data stored within the system.

trucks, buses and special purpose vehicles. They contend that E.O. No. 418 impliedly
repealed E.O. No. 156 which prohibits the importation of used motor vehicles. They
thus prayed that the Court's Decision dated February 20, 2006 be reconsidered by
clarifying that used motor vehicles may now be imported into the country, subject
only to the payment of the additional import duty.

A.O. 308 falls short of assuring that personal information which will be gathered
about our people will only be processed for unequivocally specified purposes. The
lack of proper safeguards in this regard of A.O. 308 may interfere with the
individuals liberty of abode andtravel by enabling authorities to track down his
movement; it may also enable unscrupulous persons to access confidential
information and circumvent the right against self-incrimination; it may pave the way
for fishing expeditions by government authorities and evade the right against
unreasonable searches and seizures. The possibilities of abuse and misuse of the
PRN, biometrics and computer technology are accentuated when we consider that
the individual lacks control over what can be read or placed on his ID, much less
verify the correctness of the data encoded. They threaten the very abuses that the
Bill of Rights seeks to prevent.

In its Motion for Partial Reconsideration, respondent ASSOCIATION claims that E.O.
No. 156 is void because it failed to satisfy the requisites of a valid delegation of
legislative power, hence, importation of used motor vehicles should be allowed
subject to the payment of additional duties as provided in E.O. No. 418.

[G.R. No. 164171. August 22, 2006]

HON. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, et al. v. SOUTHWING HEAVY INDUSTRIES,
INC., et al.
En Banc
Sirs/Mesdames:
Quoted hereunder, for your information, is a resolution of this Court dated AUG. 22,
2006
G.R. No. 164171 (Hon. Executive Secretary, et al. v. Southwing Heavy Industries,
Inc., et al.);
G.R. No. 164172 (Hon. Executive Secretary, et al. v. Subic Integrated Macro Ventures
Corp., etc.);
G.R. No. 168741 (Hon. Executive Secretary, et al. v. Motor Vehicle Importers
Association of Subic Bay Freeport, Inc., etc.)
This resolves the separate Motions for Clarification and Reconsideration filed by
respondents Southwing Heavy Industries, Inc., (SOUTHWING), United Auctioneers,
Inc. (UNITED AUCTIONEERS), and Microvan, Inc. (MICROVAN); Subic Integrated Macro
Ventures Corporation (MACRO VENTURES); and Motor Vehicle Importers Association
of Subic Bay Freeport, Inc. (ASSOCIATION). Respondents seek a definite ruling on
whether used motor vehicles may now be imported into the Philippines in view of
the issuance on April 4, 2005 by the Office of the President of Executive Order (E.O.)
No. 418, imposing an import duty of P500,000.00 on used motor vehicles, except

The motions are without merit.

In the February 20, 2006 Decision of the Court, we held that E.O. No. 156 which
imposes a ban on the importation of used motor vehicles is applicable only in the
Philippine territory outside the presently secured fenced-in former Subic Naval Base
area as stated in Section 1.1 of E.O. No. 97-A. Simply put, respondents may import
used motor vehicles into the presently secured fenced-in former Subic Naval Base
area, but since entry of said used motor vehicles is prohibited in other parts of the
Philippine territory, they may be stored, used or traded in the presently secured
fenced-in former Subic Naval Base area, or exported to other countries, but they
cannot be introduced in the other parts of the Philippine territory.
The subsequent issuance of E.O. No. 418 increasing the import duties on used motor
vehicles did not alter the policy of the executive department to prohibit the
importation of said vehicles. In his Comment, the Executive Secretary through the
Solicitor General stated a clear and unequivocal intention to ban the importation of
used motor vehicles into the country, notwithstanding the issuance of E.O. No. 418.
Moreover, there is nothing in the text of E.O. No. 418 which expressly repeals E.O.
No. 156. The Congress, or the Office of the President in this case, is presumed to
know the existing laws, such that whenever it intends to repeal a particular or
specific provision of law, it does so expressly. The failure to add a specific repealing
clause indicates that the intent was not to repeal previous administrative issuances.
[1]
cralaw In order to effect a repeal by implication, the later statute must be so
irreconcilably inconsistent and repugnant with the existing law that they cannot be
made to reconcile and stand together. The clearest case possible must be made
before the inference of implied repeal may be drawn, for inconsistency is never
presumed.[2]cralaw There must be showing of repugnance clear and convincing in
character. The language used in the later statute must be such as to render it
irreconcilable with what has been formerly enacted. An inconsistency that falls short
of that standard does not suffice. For it is a well settled rule in statutory construction
that repeal of statues by implication is not favored. [3]cralaw
In the instant case, E.O. No. 156 is very explicit in its prohibition on the importation
of used motor vehicles. On the other hand, E.O. No. 418 merely modifies the tariff
and nomenclature rates of import duty on used motor vehicles. Nothing therein
expressly revokes the importation ban. The full text thereof, reads:
EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 418

MODIFYING THE TARRIF NOMENCLATURE AND RATES OF IMPORT DUTY ON USED

MOTOR VEHICLES UNDER SECTION 104 OF THE TARIFF AND CUSTOMS CODE OF
1978 (PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO. 1464, AS AMENDED)
WHEREAS, it is the policy of the State to maintain a balance between development
and environmental protection, and hence, between motorization and air quality
management.
WHEREAS, it is the policy of the State to protect the public against unreasonable
risks to injury associated with consumer products;
WHEREAS, there is a need to mitigate the impact of used motor vehicle trading on
air quality and road safety;
WHEREAS, Article II:1 (b) of the 1994 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade allows
the unilateral imposition of other duties and charges on tariff items that were not
previously the subject of concession;

SEC. 4. The following motor vehicles shall be considered "used" and shall be subject
to the duties herein prescribed: (a) all motor vehicles that have been sold, registered
and operated in the roads/highways of any foreign state or country; or (b) all
imported motor vehicles that has a mileage of more than 200 kilometers regardless
of year model.
SEC. 5. Upon the effectivity of this Executive Order, the articles, specifically listed in
the aforesaid Annex, which are entered and withdrawn from warehouses in the
Philippines, shall be levied the rates of import and specific duties herein prescribed.
SEC. 6. All Presidential issuances, administrative rules and regulations, or parts
thereof, which are inconsistent with this Executive Order are hereby revoked or
modified accordingly.
SEC. 7. This Executive Order shall take effect thirty (30) days following its complete
publication in two (2) newspapers of general circulation in the Philippines.
XXXX

WHEREAS, motor vehicles were not covered by Schedule LXXV - Philippine Schedule
of Concessions and therefore, do not have tariff bindings;
WHEREAS, of Section 401 of the Tariff and Customs Code of 1978, as amended,
empowers the President of the Republic of the Philippines to increase, reduce, or
remove existing rates of import duty, as well as to modify the form of duty and the
tariff nomenclature under Section 104 of the Code;
NOW, THEREFORE, I, GLORIA MACAPAGAL ARROYO, President of the Republic of the
Philippines, by virtue of the powers vested in me by law, do hereby order[:]
SECTION 1. The articles specifically listed in Annex "A" hereof, as classified under
Section 104 of the Tariff and Customs Code of 1978, as amended, shall be subject to
the rates of import duty indicated opposite each article, except for trucks, buses and
special purpose vehicles.
SEC. 2. In addition to the regular rates of import duty, the articles specifically listed
in Annex "A" hereof, as classified under Section 104 of the Tariff and Customs Code
of 1978, as amended, shall be subject to additional specific duty of PhP500,000.00.
SEC. 3. The amount of specific duty will be indexed by the Secretary of Finance once
every two (2) years if the change in the exchange rate of the Philippine peso against
the United States (U.S.) dollar is more than ten percent (10%) from the date of the
effectivity of this Order, in the case of initial adjustment and from the last revision
date in the case of subsequent adjustments.
In case the change in the exchange rate of the Philippine peso against the US dollar
is more than twenty percent (20%) at any time within the two-year period referred
to above, the Secretary of Finance shall index the amount by the full rate of
depreciation or appreciation, as the case may be.

The positive and categorical language of the proscription on the importation of used
motor vehicles and the clear intent of the executive department to enforce the ban
can only be superseded by another issuance revoking the same in terms so certain
and unmistakable that needs no further interpretation or construction. Since no such
express repeal is stated in E.O. No. 418, the conclusion is that the said executive
issuance did not supersede E.O. No. 156.
Where it is possible to do so, it is the duty of courts, in the construction of statutes,
to harmonize and reconcile them, and to adopt a construction which reconciles them
with other statutory provisions. The fact that a later enactment may relate to the
same subject matter as that of an earlier statute is not of itself sufficient cause of an
implied repeal.[4]cralaw As asserted by petitioners, E.O. No. 418 is only a temporary
measure to address the influx of used motor vehicles in the country while E.O. No.
156 is under legal challenge. With the categorical intent of the Office of the
President to ban the importation of used motor vehicles, E.O. No. 418 should be
made operative only pending the finality of this decision upholding the power of the
President to ban the importation of used motor vehicles. This way, we can give
efficacy not only to the executive policy proscribing the importation of used motor
vehicles but also to the executive issuance increasing the applicable import duties
that would discourage the entry into the country of the same vehicles pending the
finality of this decision sustaining the power of the President to issue an importation
ban to protect the local automotive industry.
Likewise, the Motion for Partial Reconsideration of respondent ASSOCIATION must
fail. It argues that E.O. No. 156 is in effect extended to the Freeport because motor
vehicle importers can no longer continue their respective business if they cannot
bring the imported used motor vehicles into other parts of the Philippine territory.
Respondent, however, totally misses the point. While the presently secured fencedin former Subic Naval Base area enjoys the privilege of being considered as a
"foreign territory," and therefore, entry of used motor vehicles cannot be proscribed
by E.O. No. 156, such privilege should be construed as operative only within said
area. Any movement or entry of used motor vehicles to other parts of the Philippine

territory would logically subject said vehicles to the laws of the customs territory,
specifically the importation ban. To rule otherwise would be to put premium on the
interest of a few businessmen and to deprive the Congress or the President of the
power to issue measures protective of our domestic markets and air quality.

The case at bar involves a land in Aroroy, Masbate, inherited by respondents which
has been devoted exclusively to cow and calf breeding. On October 26, 1987,
pursuant to the then existing agrarian reform program of the government,
respondents made a voluntary offer to sell (VOS)[1] their landholdings to petitioner
DAR to avail of certain incentives under the law.

As exhaustively discussed in our February 20, 2006 Decision, the issuance of E.O.
No. 156 has constitutional and statutory bases and the issuance thereof was in
accordance with the prescribed procedure. We also held therein that issuance of the
ban to protect the domestic industry and the environment including its air sheds
against pollution from mobile sources is a reasonable exercise of police power.
Respondent ASSOCIATION's contention that petitioners failed to prove that the
importation of used motor vehicles caused the deterioration of the local automotive
industry lacks merit. Laws and other administrative issuance enjoy the presumption
of validity and the burden of proving its invalidity rests upon those who assert the
contrary.[5]cralaw It is therefore the obligation of respondents and not of petitioners
to show factual basis in support of their allegation that E.O. No. 156 is void.
However, respondents failed to do this because they moved for rendition of
summary judgment on the ground that there are no issues of facts necessary to be
resolved in the instant controversy.[6]cralaw Estoppel in presenting factual basis in
support of their argument operates against respondents. This Court is not a trier of
facts and the allegation of factual matters by the ASSOCIATION can no longer be
entertained.

On June 10, 1988, a new agrarian law, Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6657, also known as
the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL) of 1988, took effect. It included in
its coverage farms used for raising livestock, poultry and swine.

ACCORDINGLY, respondents' separate motions for clarification and reconsideration

are DENIED. Notwithstanding the issuance of E.O. No. 418, used motor vehicles
imported via the presently secured fenced-in former Subic Naval Base area cannot
further be imported into the other parts of the Philippine territory. Used motor
vehicles may be imported into, stored, used, and traded within the presently
secured fenced-in former Subic Naval Base area, or exported to other countries, but
entry thereof into the other parts of the Philippine territory is prohibited pursuant to
E.O. No. 156. (Corona, J., On leave)
Very truly yours,
(Sgd.) MA. LUISA D. VILLARAMA
Clerk of Court

DAR vs Sutton G.R No. 162070, Oct. 19, 2005

DECISION
PUNO, J.:
This is a petition for review filed by the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) of the
Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals, dated September 19, 2003 and
February 4, 2004, respectively, which declared DAR Administrative Order (A.O.) No.
9, series of 1993, null and void for being violative of the Constitution.

On December 4, 1990, in an en banc decision in the case of Luz Farms v. Secretary

of DAR,[2] this Court ruled that lands devoted to livestock and poultry-raising are not
included in the definition of agricultural land. Hence, we declared as unconstitutional
certain provisions of the CARL insofar as they included livestock farms in the
coverage of agrarian reform.
In view of the Luz Farms ruling, respondents filed with petitioner DAR a formal
request to withdraw their VOS as their landholding was devoted exclusively to cattleraising and thus exempted from the coverage of the CARL.[3]
On December 21, 1992, the Municipal Agrarian Reform Officer of Aroroy, Masbate,
inspected respondents land and found that it was devoted solely to cattle-raising
and breeding. He recommended to the DAR Secretary that it be exempted from the
coverage of the CARL.
On April 27, 1993, respondents reiterated to petitioner DAR the withdrawal of their
VOS and requested the return of the supporting papers they submitted in connection
therewith.[4] Petitioner ignored their request.
On December 27, 1993, DAR issued A.O. No. 9, series of 1993,[5] which provided that
only portions of private agricultural lands used for the raising of livestock, poultry
and swine as of June 15, 1988 shall be excluded from the coverage of the CARL. In
determining the area of land to be excluded, the A.O. fixed the following retention
limits, viz: 1:1 animal-land ratio (i.e., 1 hectare of land per 1 head of animal shall be
retained by the landowner), and a ratio of 1.7815 hectares for livestock
infrastructure for every 21 heads of cattle shall likewise be excluded from the
operations of the CARL.
On February 4, 1994, respondents wrote the DAR Secretary and advised him to
consider as final and irrevocable the withdrawal of their VOS as, under the Luz Farms
doctrine,their entire landholding is exempted from the CARL.[6]
On September 14, 1995, then DAR Secretary Ernesto D. Garilao issued an
Order[7] partially granting the application of respondents for exemption from the
coverage of CARL. Applying the retention limits outlined in the DAR A.O. No. 9,
petitioner exempted 1,209 hectares of respondents land for grazing purposes, and a
maximum of 102.5635 hectares for infrastructure. Petitioner ordered the rest of
respondents landholding to be segregated and placed under Compulsory Acquisition.
Respondents moved for reconsideration. They contend that their entire landholding
should be exempted as it is devoted exclusively to cattle-raising. Their motion was
denied.[8] They filed a notice of appeal[9] with the Office of the President assailing: (1)
the reasonableness and validity of DAR A.O. No. 9, s. 1993, which provided for a
ratio between land and livestock in determining the land area qualified for exclusion
from the CARL, and (2) the constitutionality of DAR A.O. No. 9, s. 1993, in view of
the Luz Farms case which declared cattle-raising lands excluded from the coverage
of agrarian reform.

On October 9, 2001, the Office of the President affirmed the impugned Order of
petitioner DAR.[10] It ruled that DAR A.O. No. 9, s. 1993, does not run counter to
the Luz Farms case as the A.O. provided the guidelines to determine whether a
certain parcel of land is being used for cattle-raising. However, the issue on the
constitutionality of the assailed A.O. was left for the determination of the courts as
the sole arbiters of such issue.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals ruled in favor of the respondents. It declared DAR
A.O. No. 9, s. 1993, void for being contrary to the intent of the 1987 Constitutional
Commission to exclude livestock farms from the land reform program of the
government. The dispositive portion reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, DAR Administrative Order No. 09, Series of 1993
is hereby DECLARED null and void. The assailed order of the Office of the President
dated 09 October 2001 in so far as it affirmed the Department of Agrarian Reforms
ruling that petitioners landholding is covered by the agrarian reform program of the
government is REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
SO ORDERED.[11]
Hence, this petition.
The main issue in the case at bar is the constitutionality of DAR A.O. No. 9, series of
1993, which prescribes a maximum retention limit for owners of lands devoted to
livestock raising.
Invoking its rule-making power under Section 49 of the CARL, petitioner submits that
it issued DAR A.O. No. 9 to limit the area of livestock farm that may be retained by a
landowner pursuant to its mandate to place all public and private agricultural lands
under the coverage of agrarian reform. Petitioner also contends that the A.O. seeks
to remedy reports that some unscrupulous landowners have converted their
agricultural farms to livestock farms in order to evade their coverage in the agrarian
reform program.
Petitioners arguments fail to impress.
Administrative agencies are endowed with powers legislative in nature, i.e., the
power to make rules and regulations. They have been granted by Congress with the
authority to issue rules to regulate the implementation of a law entrusted to them.
Delegated rule-making has become a practical necessity in modern governance due
to the increasing complexity and variety of public functions. However, while
administrative rules and regulations have the force and effect of law, they are not
immune from judicial review.[12] They may be properly challenged before the courts
to ensure that they do not violate the Constitution and no grave abuse of
administrative discretion is committed by the administrative body concerned.
The fundamental rule in administrative law is that, to be valid, administrative rules
and regulations must be issued by authority of a law and must not contravene the
provisions of the Constitution.[13] The rule-making power of an administrative agency
may not be used to abridge the authority given to it by Congress or by the
Constitution.Nor can it be used to enlarge the power of the administrative agency
beyond the scope intended. Constitutional and statutory provisions control with
respect to what rules and regulations may be promulgated by administrative
agencies and the scope of their regulations. [14]
In the case at bar, we find that the impugned A.O. is invalid as it contravenes the
Constitution. The A.O. sought to regulate livestock farms by including them in the
coverage of agrarian reform and prescribing a maximum retention limit for their
ownership. However, the deliberations of the 1987 Constitutional Commission show
a clear intent to exclude, inter alia, all lands exclusively devoted to livestock, swine
and poultry- raising. The Court clarified in the Luz Farms case that livestock, swine
and poultry-raising are industrial activities and do not fall within the definition of

agriculture or agricultural activity. The raising of livestock, swine and poultry is

different from crop or tree farming. It is an industrial, not an agricultural, activity. A
great portion of the investment in this enterprise is in the form of industrial fixed
assets, such as: animal housing structures and facilities, drainage, waterers and
blowers, feedmill with grinders, mixers, conveyors, exhausts and generators,
extensive warehousing facilities for feeds and other supplies, anti-pollution
equipment like bio-gas and digester plants augmented by lagoons and concrete
ponds, deepwells, elevated water tanks, pumphouses, sprayers, and other
technological appurtenances.[15]
Clearly, petitioner DAR has no power to regulate livestock farms which have been
exempted by the Constitution from the coverage of agrarian reform. It has exceeded
its power in issuing the assailed A.O.
The subsequent case of Natalia Realty, Inc. v. DAR[16] reiterated our ruling in the Luz
Farms case. In Natalia Realty, the Court held that industrial, commercial and
residential lands are not covered by the CARL. [17] We stressed anew that while
Section 4 of R.A. No. 6657 provides that the CARL shall cover all public and private
agricultural lands, the term agricultural land does not include lands classified as
mineral, forest, residential, commercial or industrial. Thus, in Natalia Realty, even
portions of the Antipolo Hills Subdivision, which are arable yet still
undeveloped, could not be considered as agricultural lands subject to agrarian
reform as these lots were already classified as residential lands.
A similar logical deduction should be followed in the case at bar. Lands devoted to
raising of livestock, poultry and swine have been classified as industrial, not
agricultural, lands and thus exempt from agrarian reform. Petitioner DAR argues
that, in issuing the impugned A.O., it was seeking to address the reports it has
received that some unscrupulous landowners have been converting their agricultural
lands to livestock farms to avoid their coverage by the agrarian reform. Again, we
find neither merit nor logic in this contention.The undesirable scenario which
petitioner seeks to prevent with the issuance of the A.O. clearly does not apply in
this case. Respondents family acquired their landholdings as early as 1948. They
have long been in the business of breeding cattle in Masbate which is popularly
known as the cattle-breeding capital of the Philippines.[18]Petitioner DAR does not
dispute this fact. Indeed, there is no evidence on record that respondents have just
recently engaged in or converted to the business of breeding cattle after the
enactment of the CARL that may lead one to suspect that respondents intended to
evade its coverage. It must be stressed that what the CARL prohibits is
the conversion of agricultural lands for non-agricultural purposes after the effectivity
of the CARL. There has been no change of business interest in the case of
respondents.
Moreover, it is a fundamental rule of statutory construction that the reenactment of
a statute by Congress without substantial change is an implied legislative approval
and adoption of the previous law. On the other hand, by making a new law, Congress
seeks to supersede an earlier one.[19] In the case at bar, after the passage of the
1988 CARL, Congress enacted R.A. No. 7881[20] which amended certain provisions of
the CARL. Specifically, the new law changed the definition of the terms agricultural
activity and commercial farming by dropping from its coverage lands that are
devoted to commercial livestock, poultry and swine-raising. [21] With this significant
modification, Congress clearly sought to align the provisions of our agrarian laws
with the intent of the 1987 Constitutional Commission to exclude livestock farms
from the coverage of agrarian reform.
In sum, it is doctrinal that rules of administrative bodies must be in harmony with
the provisions of the Constitution. They cannot amend or extend the Constitution. To

be valid, they must conform to and be consistent with the Constitution. In case of
conflict between an administrative order and the provisions of the Constitution, the
latter prevails.[22] The assailed A.O. of petitioner DAR was properly stricken down as
unconstitutional as it enlarges the coverage of agrarian reform beyond the scope
intended by the 1987 Constitution.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is DISMISSED. The assailed Decision and Resolution
of the Court of Appeals, dated September 19, 2003 and February 4, 2004,
respectively, are AFFIRMED. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.

[G.R. No. 130866. September 16, 1998]

ST. MARTIN FUNERAL HOME, petitioner, vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS
MARTINEZ, COMMISSION and BIENVENIDO ARICAYOS, respondents.
DECISION
REGALADO, J.:
The present petition for certiorari stemmed from a complaint for illegal
dismissal filed by herein private respondent before the National Labor Relations
Commission (NLRC), Regional Arbitration Branch No. III, in San Fernando,
Pampanga. Private respondent alleges that he started working as Operations
Manager of petitioner St. Martin Funeral Home on February 6, 1995. However, there
was no contract of employment executed between him and petitioner nor was his
name included in the semi-monthly payroll. On January 22, 1996, he was dismissed
from his employment for allegedly misappropriating P38,000.00 which was intended
for payment by petitioner of its value added tax (VAT) to the Bureau of Internal
Revenue (BIR).[1]

employee relationship existed between the parties and, therefore, his office had no
jurisdiction over the case.[3]
Not satisfied with the said decision, private respondent appealed to the NLRC
contending that the labor arbiter erred (1) in not giving credence to the evidence
submitted by him; (2) in holding that he worked as a volunteer and not as an
employee of St. Martin Funeral Home from February 6, 1995 to January 23, 1996, or
a period of about one year; and (3) in ruling that there was no employer-employee
relationship between him and petitioner.[4]
On June 13, 1997, the NLRC rendered a resolution setting aside the questioned
decision and remanding the case to the labor arbiter for immediate appropriate
proceedings.[5] Petitioner then filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied by
the NLRC in its resolution dated August 18, 1997 for lack of merit, [6] hence the
present petition alleging that the NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion. [7]
Before proceeding further into the merits of the case at bar, the Court feels
that it is now exigent and opportune to reexamine the functional validity and
systemic practicability of the mode of judicial review it has long adopted and still
follows with respect to decisions of the NLRC. The increasing number of labor
disputes that find their way to this Court and the legislative changes introduced over
the years into the provisions of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 442 (The Labor Code of
the Philippines and Batas Pambansa Blg. (B.P. No.) 129 (The Judiciary Reorganization
Act of 1980) now stridently call for and warrant a reassessment of that procedural
aspect.
We prefatorily delve into the legal history of the NLRC. It was first established
in the Department of Labor by P.D. No. 21 on October 14, 1972, and its decisions
were expressly declared to be appealable to the Secretary of Labor and, ultimately,
to the President of the Philippines.

Petitioner on the other hand claims that private respondent was not its
employee but only the uncle of Amelita Malabed, the owner of petitioner St. Martins
Funeral Home. Sometime in 1995, private respondent, who was formerly working as
an overseas contract worker, asked for financial assistance from the mother of
Amelita. Since then, as an indication of gratitude, private respondent voluntarily
helped the mother of Amelita in overseeing the business.

On May 1, 1974, P.D. No. 442 enacted the Labor Code of the Philippines, the
same to take effect six months after its promulgation. [8] Created and regulated
therein is the present NLRC which was attached to the Department of Labor and
Employment for program and policy coordination only. [9] Initially, Article 302 (now,
Article 223) thereof also granted an aggrieved party the remedy of appeal from the
decision of the NLRC to the Secretary of Labor, but P.D. No. 1391 subsequently
amended said provision and abolished such appeals. No appellate review has since
then been provided for.

In January 1996, the mother of Amelita passed away, so the latter she took
over the management of the business. She then discovered that there were arrears
in the payment of taxes and other government fees, although the records purported
to show that the same were already paid. Amelita then made some changes in the
business operation and private respondent and his wife were no longer allowed to
participate in the management thereof. As a consequence, the latter filed a
complaint charging that petitioner had illegally terminated his employment. [2]

Thus, to repeat, under the present state of the law, there is no provision for
appeals from the decision of the NLRC.[10] The present Section 223, as last amended
by Section 12 of R.A. No. 6715, instead merely provides that the Commission shall
decide all cases within twenty days from receipt of the answer of the appellee, and
that such decision shall be final and executory after ten calendar days from receipt
thereof by the parties.

Based on the position papers of the parties, the labor arbiter rendered a
decision in favor of petitioner on October 25, 1996 declaring that no employer-

When the issue was raised in an early case on the argument that this Court has
no jurisdiction to review the decisions of the NLRC, and formerly of the Secretary of
Labor, since there is no legal provision for appellate review thereof, the Court
nevertheless rejected that thesis. It held that there is an underlying power of the

courts to scrutinize the acts of such agencies on questions of law and jurisdiction
even though no right of review is given by statute; that the purpose of judicial
review is to keep the administrative agency within its jurisdiction and protect the
substantial rights of the parties; and that it is that part of the checks and balances
which restricts the separation of powers and forestalls arbitrary and unjust
adjudications.[11]
Pursuant to such ruling, and as sanctioned by subsequent decisions of this
Court, the remedy of the aggrieved party is to timely file a motion for
reconsideration as a precondition for any further or subsequent remedy, [12] and then
seasonably avail of the special civil action of certiorari under Rule 65, [13] for which
said Rule has now fixed the reglementary period of sixty days from notice of the
decision. Curiously, although the 10-day period for finality of the decision of the
NLRC may already have lapsed as contemplated in Section 223 of the Labor Code, it
has been held that this Court may still take cognizance of the petition for certiorari
on jurisdictional and due process considerations if filed within the reglementary
period under Rule 65.[14]
Turning now to the matter of judicial review of NLRC decisions, B.P. No. 129
originally provided as follows:
SEC. 9. Jurisdiction. - The Intermediate Appellate Court shall exercise:
(1) Original jurisdiction to issue writs of mandamus, prohibition, certiorari, habeas
corpus, and quo warranto, and auxiliary writs or processes, whether or not in aid of
its appellate jurisdiction;
(2) Exclusive original jurisdiction over actions for annulment of judgments of
Regional Trial Courts; and
(3) Exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all final judgments, decisions, resolutions,
orders, or awards of Regional Trial Courts and quasi-judicial agencies,
instrumentalities, boards, or commissions, except those falling within the appellate
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in accordance with the Constitution, the provisions
of this Act, and of subparagraph (1) of the third paragraph and subparagraph (4) of
the fourth paragraph of Section 17 of the Judiciary Act of 1948.
The Intermediate Appellate Court shall have the power to try cases and conduct
hearings, receive evidence and perform any and all acts necessary to resolve factual
issues raised in cases falling within its original and appellate jurisdiction, including
the power to grant and conduct new trials or further proceedings.
These provisions shall not apply to decisions and interlocutory orders issued under
the Labor Code of the Philippines and by the Central Board of Assessment Appeals.
[15]

Subsequently, and as it presently reads, this provision was amended by R.A.

No. 7902 effective March 18, 1995, to wit:

SEC. 9. Jurisdiction. - The Court of Appeals shall exercise:

(1) Original jurisdiction to issue writs of mandamus, prohibition, certiorari, habeas
corpus, and quo warranto, and auxiliary writs or processes, whether or not in aid of
its appellate jurisdiction;
(2) Exclusive original jurisdiction over actions for annulment of judgments of
Regional Trial Courts; and
(3) Exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all final judgments, decisions, resolutions,
orders or awards of Regional Trial Courts and quasi-judicial agencies,
instrumentalities, boards or commissions, including the Securities and Exchange
Commission, the Social Security Commission, the Employees Compensation
Commission and the Civil Service Commission, except those falling within the
appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in accordance with the Constitution, the
Labor Code of the Philippines under Presidential Decree No. 442, as amended, the
provisions of this Act, and of subparagraph (1) of the third paragraph and
subparagraph (4) of the fourth paragraph of Section 17 of the Judiciary Act of 1948.
The Court of Appeals shall have the power to try cases and conduct hearings,
receive evidence and perform any and all acts necessary to resolve factual issues
raised in cases falling within its original and appellate jurisdiction, including the
power to grant and conduct new trials or further proceedings. Trials or hearings in
the Court of Appeals must be continuous and must be completed within, three (3)
months, unless extended by the Chief Justice.
It will readily be observed that, aside from the change in the name of the lower
appellate court,[16] the following amendments of the original provisions of Section 9
of B.P. No. 129 were effected by R.A. No. 7902,viz.:
1. The last paragraph which excluded its application to the Labor Code of the
Philippines and the Central Board of Assessment Appeals was deleted and replaced
by a new paragraph granting the Court of Appeals limited powers to conduct trials
and hearings in cases within its jurisdiction.
2. The reference to the Labor Code in that last paragraph was transposed to
paragraph (3) of the section, such that the original exclusionary clause therein now
provides except those falling within the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court
in accordance with the Constitution, the Labor Code of the Philippines under
Presidential Decree No. 442, as amended, the provisions of this Act, and of
subparagraph (1) of the third paragraph and subparagraph (4) of the fourth
paragraph of Section 17 of the Judiciary Act of 1948. (Italics supplied)
3. Contrarily, however, specifically added to and included among the quasi-judicial
agencies over which the Court of Appeals shall have exclusive appellate jurisdiction
are the Securities and Exchange Commission, the Social Security Commission, the
Employees Compensation Commission and the Civil Service Commission.
This, then, brings us to a somewhat perplexing impass, both in point of
purpose and terminology. As earlier explained, our mode of judicial review over

decisions of the NLRC has for some time now been understood to be by a petition for
certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. This is, of course, a special original
action limited to the resolution of jurisdictional issues, that is, lack or excess of
jurisdiction and, in almost all cases that have been brought to us, grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction.
It will, however, be noted that paragraph (3), Section 9 of B.P. No. 129 now
grants exclusive appellate jurisdiction to the Court of Appeals over all final
adjudications of the Regional Trial Courts and the quasi-judicial agencies generally or
specifically referred to therein except, among others, those falling within
the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in accordance with x x x the Labor
Code of the Philippines under Presidential Decree No. 442, as amended, x x x. This
would necessarily contradict what has been ruled and said all along that appeal
does not lie from decisions of the NLRC. [17] Yet, under such excepting clause literally
construed, the appeal from the NLRC cannot be brought to the Court of Appeals, but
to this Court by necessary implication.
The same exceptive clause further confuses the situation by declaring that the
Court of Appeals has no appellate jurisdiction over decisions falling within the
appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in accordance with the Constitution, the
provisions of B.P. No. 129, and those specified cases in Section 17 of the Judiciary
Act of 1948. These cases can, of course, be properly excluded from the exclusive
appellate jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals. However, because of the
aforementioned amendment by transposition, also supposedly excluded are cases
falling within the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in accordance with the
Labor Code. This is illogical and impracticable, and Congress could not have
intended that procedural gaffe, since there are no cases in the Labor Code the
decisions, resolutions, orders or awards wherein are within the appellatejurisdiction
of the Supreme Court or of any other court for that matter.
A review of the legislative records on the antecedents of R.A. No. 7902
persuades us that there may have been an oversight in the course of the
deliberations on the said Act or an imprecision in the terminology used therein. In
fine, Congress did intend to provide for judicial review of the adjudications of the
NLRC in labor cases by the Supreme Court, but there was an inaccuracy in the term
used for the intended mode of review. This conclusion which we have reluctantly but
prudently arrived at has been drawn from the considerations extant in the records of
Congress, more particularly on Senate Bill No. 1495 and the Reference Committee
Report on S. No. 1495/H. No. 10452.[18]
In sponsoring Senate Bill No. 1495, Senator Raul S. Roco delivered his
sponsorship speech[19] from which we reproduce the following excerpts:
The Judiciary Reorganization Act, Mr. President, Batas Pambansa Blg. 129,
reorganized the Court of Appeals and at the same time expanded its
jurisdiction and powers. Among others, its appellate jurisdiction was
expanded to cover not only final judgment of Regional Trial Courts, but
also all final judgment(s), decisions, resolutions, orders or awards of quasijudicial agencies, instrumentalities, boards and commissions, except those
falling within the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in
accordance with the Constitution, the provisions of BP Blg. 129 and of

subparagraph 1 of the third paragraph and subparagraph 4 of Section 17

of the Judiciary Act of 1948.
Mr. President, the purpose of the law is to ease the workload of the
Supreme Court by the transfer of some of its burden of review of factual
issues to the Court of Appeals. However, whatever benefits that can be
derived from the expansion of the appellate jurisdiction of the Court of
Appeals was cut short by the last paragraph of Section 9 of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 129 which excludes from its coverage the decisions and
interlocutory orders issued under the Labor Code of the Philippines and by
the Central Board of Assessment Appeals.
Among the highest number of cases that are brought up to the Supreme
Court are labor cases. Hence, Senate Bill No. 1495 seeks to eliminate the
exceptions enumerated in Section 9 and, additionally, extends the
coverage of appellate review of the Court of Appeals in the decision(s) of
the Securities and Exchange Commission, the Social Security Commission,
and the Employees Compensation Commission to reduce the number of
cases elevated to the Supreme Court. (Emphases and corrections ours)
xxx
Senate Bill No. 1495 authored by our distinguished Colleague from Laguna
provides the ideal situation of drastically reducing the workload of the
Supreme Court without depriving the litigants of the privilege of review by
an appellate tribunal.
In closing, allow me to quote the observations of former Chief Justice
Teehankee in 1986 in the Annual Report of the Supreme Court:
x x x Amendatory legislation is suggested so as to relieve the
Supreme Court of the burden of reviewing these cases which
present no important issues involved beyond the particular fact
and the parties involved, so that the Supreme Court may
wholly devote its time to cases of public interest in the
discharge of its mandated task as the guardian of the
Constitution and the guarantor of the peoples basic rights and
additional task expressly vested on it now to determine
whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government.
We used to have 500,000 cases pending all over the land, Mr. President. It
has been cut down to 300,000 cases some five years ago. I understand we
are now back to 400,000 cases. Unless we distribute the work of the
appellate courts, we shall continue to mount and add to the number of
cases pending.

In view of the foregoing, Mr. President, and by virtue of all the reasons we
have submitted, the Committee on Justice and Human Rights requests the
support and collegial approval of our Chamber.
xxx
Surprisingly, however, in a subsequent session, the following Committee
Amendment was introduced by the said sponsor and the following proceedings
transpired:[20]
Senator Roco. On page 2, line 5, after the line Supreme Court in
accordance with the Constitution, add the phrase THE LABOR CODE OF
THE PHILIPPINES UNDER P.D. 442, AS AMENDED. So that it becomes clear,
Mr. President, that issues arising from the Labor Code will still be
appealable to the Supreme Court.
The President. Is there any objection? (Silence) Hearing none, the amendment is
approved.
Senator Roco. On the same page, we move that lines 25 to 30 be deleted. This
was also discussed with our Colleagues in the House of Representatives
and as we understand it, as approved in the House, this was also deleted,
Mr. President.
The President. Is there any objection? (Silence) Hearing none, the amendment is
approved.
Senator Roco. There are no further Committee amendments, Mr. President.
Senator Romulo. Mr. President, I move that we close the period of Committee
amendments.
The President. Is there any objection? (Silence) Hearing none, the amendment is
approved. (Italics supplied)
xxx
Thereafter, since there were no individual amendments, Senate Bill No. 1495
was passed on second reading and being a certified bill, its unanimous approval on
third reading followed.[21]; Record of the Senate, Vol. V, No. 63, pp. 180-181.21 The
Conference Committee Report on Senate Bill No. 1495 and House Bill No. 10452,
having theretofore been approved by the House of Representatives, the same was
likewise approved by the Senate on February 20, 1995, [22] inclusive of the dubious
formulation on appeals to the Supreme Court earlier discussed.
The Court is, therefore, of the considered opinion that ever since appeals from
the NLRC to the Supreme Court were eliminated, the legislative intendment was that
the special civil action of certiorari was and still is the proper vehicle for judicial
review of decisions of the NLRC. The use of the word appeal in relation thereto and

in the instances we have noted could have been a lapsus plumae because appeals
by certiorari and the original action for certiorari are both modes of judicial review
addressed to the appellate courts. The important distinction between them,
however, and with which the Court is particularly concerned here is that the special
civil action of certiorari is within the concurrent original jurisdiction of this Court and
the Court of Appeals;[23] whereas to indulge in the assumption that appeals by
certiorari to the Supreme Court are allowed would not subserve, but would subvert,
the intention of Congress as expressed in the sponsorship speech on Senate Bill No.
1495.
Incidentally, it was noted by the sponsor therein that some quarters were of
the opinion that recourse from the NLRC to the Court of Appeals as an initial step in
the process of judicial review would be circuitous and would prolong the
proceedings. On the contrary, as he commendably and realistically emphasized, that
procedure would be advantageous to the aggrieved party on this reasoning:
On the other hand, Mr. President, to allow these cases to be appealed to
the Court of Appeals would give litigants the advantage to have all the
evidence on record be reexamined and reweighed after which the findings
of facts and conclusions of said bodies are correspondingly affirmed,
modified or reversed.
Under such guarantee, the Supreme Court can then apply strictly the
axiom that factual findings of the Court of Appeals are final and may not
be reversed on appeal to the Supreme Court. A perusal of the records will
reveal appeals which are factual in nature and may, therefore, be
dismissed outright by minute resolutions.[24]
While we do not wish to intrude into the Congressional sphere on the matter of
the wisdom of a law, on this score we add the further observations that there is a
growing number of labor cases being elevated to this Court which, not being a trier
of fact, has at times been constrained to remand the case to the NLRC for resolution
of unclear or ambiguous factual findings; that the Court of Appeals is procedurally
equipped for that purpose, aside from the increased number of its component
divisions; and that there is undeniably an imperative need for expeditious action on
labor cases as a major aspect of constitutional protection to labor.
Therefore, all references in the amended Section 9 of B.P. No. 129 to supposed
appeals from the NLRC to the Supreme Court are interpreted and hereby declared to
mean and refer to petitions for certiorari under Rule 65. Consequently, all such
petitions should henceforth be initially filed in the Court of Appeals in strict
observance of the doctrine on the hierarchy of courts as the appropriate forum for
the relief desired.
Apropos to this directive that resort to the higher courts should be made in
accordance with their hierarchical order, this pronouncement in Santiago vs.
Vasquez, et al.[25] should be taken into account:
One final observation. We discern in the proceedings in this case a
propensity on the part of petitioner, and, for that matter, the same may
be said of a number of litigants who initiate recourses before us, to

disregard the hierarchy of courts in our judicial system by seeking relief

directly from this Court despite the fact that the same is available in the
lower courts in the exercise of their original or concurrent jurisdiction, or is
even mandated by law to be sought therein. This practice must be
stopped, not only because of the imposition upon the precious time of this
Court but also because of the inevitable and resultant delay, intended or
otherwise, in the adjudication of the case which often has to be remanded
or referred to the lower court as the proper forum under the rules of
procedure, or as better equipped to resolve the issues since this Court is
not a trier of facts. We, therefore, reiterate the judicial policy that this
Court will not entertain direct resort to it unless the redress desired cannot
be obtained in the appropriate courts or where exceptional and compelling

circumstances justify availment of a remedy within and calling for the

exercise of our primary jurisdiction.
WHEREFORE, under the foregoing premises, the instant petition for certiorari
is hereby REMANDED, and all pertinent records thereof ordered to be
FORWARDED, to the Court of Appeals for appropriate action and disposition
consistent with the views and ruling herein set forth, without pronouncement as to
costs.
SO ORDERED.