Hypatia, Inc.

Feminism and Hermeneutics

Author(s): Georgia Warnke
Source: Hypatia, Vol. 8, No. 1 (Winter, 1993), pp. 81-98
Published by: Wiley on behalf of Hypatia, Inc.
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FeminismandHermeneutics
GEORGIA WARNKE

Feministsoftenlook to postmoderphilosophy
for a frameworkwithinwhichto
treatdifference.Wemightmoreproductively
lookto a hermeneutic
that
philosophy
dimensionsof differenceand allowsus to acknowledge
emphasizesthe interpretive
thepartialityof our understanding.
Hence, we mightalsorecognizetheimportance
of a hermeneuticconversationunconstrained
by relationsof poweror ideologyin
whichall nonexclusionary
voicescan be educatedby one another.
interpretive

A recent volume of essaysentitled Feminism/Postmodernism

and edited by
LindaJ. Nicholson (1990) suggeststwo sourcesfor feminist theory'sinterest
in postmodem philosophy. First, postmodern philosophy attacks the universalisticassumptionsof the Enlightenmentandof liberalhumanism,assumptions that feminists see as oppressivelygeneralizingthe social and political
concerns, epistemological perspectives,and historical experiences of white
men. Second, feministshave turnedto postmodernismfor a critiqueof feminism itself, since it may oppressivelygeneralizethe social and political concerns, epistemological perspectives, and historical experiences of white,
middle-classwomen. In both cases, the fear is of a false universalismthat
silences the voices of all those other than the dominant groupby presuming
that it can speak for all. In contrast,postmodernphilosophyseems to offera
frameworkwithin which to supportwhat feministscall difference,both differences in the experience, knowledge, and interests of men and women and
differencesin the experience, knowledge,and interestsof differentgroupsof
women. In this paper I want first to retrace the path some contemporary
feminists have taken towardspostmoder philosophy and then to consider
brieflysome of the problemsto which this path seems to lead for a feminist
politicalpractice.I will then tryto showhow what I call a hermeneuticpolitical
philosophymight be better able to supportfeministconcerns with difference.
vol. 8, no.'1 (Winter1993) byGeorgiaWamke
Hypatia

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PHILOSOPHY
I. THE PATHTOWARDPOSTMODERN

As Nancy Fraserand LindaNicholson (1990) reconstructthe development

of contemporaryfeminist theory, its startingpoint in the 1960s involves an
uncriticalreproductionof the universalisticand essentialisticformof the very
social theories it rejects. Thus, in her criticism of Marxist social theory,
Shulamith Firestonesimply substitutesgender conflict for class conflict and
replacescapitalismwith biology.The resultis a reductiveexplanationsimilar
to at least one form of Marxismin that it attributesall social phenomena to
one set of causes and one form of conflict. Froma postmoder perspective,
FraserandNicholson claim, these substitutionsare"essentialistinsofaras they
project onto all women and men qualitieswhich develop under historically
specific social conditions." Moreover,"they are monocausalinsofaras they
look to one set of characteristics,such as women'sphysiologyor men's hormones, to explain women'soppressionin all cultures"(Fraserand Nicholson
1990, 28).
In the 1970s,anthropologistssuch as Michelle Rosaldobegan to attackthis
reductiveness,citing differencesin both genderrelationsand the characterof
sexismwithin differentcultures.Accordingto FraserandNicholson, however,
these feminists themselves overgeneralizeda distinction between public and
privatespheres.The claim they madewas that all known societies distinguish
between a private domestic sphere and the public political sphere and that
most societiesrestrictwomen'slives to the domesticsphere.Such a distinction
might have seemed useful for feminism,Fraserand Nicholson admit, insofar
as it both demonstratesthe ubiquityof sexismand allowsforthe differentforms
it can take in different societies. Still, they argue that "the theory falsely
generalizedto all societies an historicallyspecific conjunction of properties:
women'sresponsibilityforearlychild rearing,women'stendencyto spendmore
time in the geographicalspace of the home, women'slesser participationin
the affairsof the community,a culturalascriptionof trivialitydue to domestic
work,and a culturalascriptionof inferiorityto women."Fraserand Nicholson
claim that "whileeach individualpropertymay be trueof many societies, the
conjunction is not true of most"(Fraserand Nicholson 1990, 29).
ForFraserand Nicholson, the problemwith a feminismthat focuseson the
distinction between public and privatespheres,as with a feminism basedon
biology,is that both continue to look for what the postmodernphilosopher
Jean-FrancoisLyotardcalls a metanarrative,an account that tries to provide
an overarchingsystemor philosophyof historywithin which all social causes
and social relations are meant to fit. Fraserand Nicholson claim that this
reductionis truenot only of Firestone'sandRosaldo'sworkbut also of feminist
theories that rely on psychoanalyticaccounts of gender identity. Feminists
relying on object-relations psychology, such as Nancy Chodorow, simply
assumethe similarityof identityformationacrossculturesand subsumediverse

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GeorgiaWarke

83

practicesunderlabelsextrapolatedfroma peculiarlymodem andWesternform

of the family. As Judith Butler points out, the same might be said of the
alternativedevelopmentalmodel put forwardby Lacanianpsychoanalysis.In
Butler'sview, it too relieson a "stabilizingmetanarrativeof infantile development,"one that, just as object-relationspsychologydoes, effects "a narrative
closure on gender experience and a false stabilization of the category of
woman"(Butler 1990, 329).
According to Fraserand Nicholson, however, since 1980 many feminists
have given up on the projectof "grandsocial theory"(Fraserand Nicholson
1990, 32) and have turnedto more concrete investigationsinto the varieties
of social identity and formsof sexism.Some of this workFraserand Nicholson
considerto be still overly essentialist.Carol Gilligan'sinquiryinto woman's
moralvoice (Gilligan, 1983) is their example here. But other feministshave
begun to worry about accounts that may be false extrapolationsfrom the
experiencesof white, middle-class,heterosexualwomen. They have begun to
examinedifferencesin the formsof sexismto which differentgroupsof women
may be subject and to investigatethe variousinterrelationsbetween gender,
race,classethnicity,age, andsexuality.Moreover,they have begunto question
the rigidityof the concept of a genderedidentity and thereforeto question
both the categoryof genderand the notion of a unified subjectitself. Gender
is now to be understoodas a social construction,one that a feminist politics
might insist upon for strategic reasons but one that feminists ought not,
themselves,conceive of in ontologicalterms.Similarly,the idea of the subject
is to be discardedinsofaras it ignores the conscious and unconscious forces
that undermineunity and makepsychiclife itself a processof change, or what
IrisYoungcalls a "playof differences"(Young1990a, 310).
Postmodernism'sappealforfeminism,then, is that it seemsable to elaborate
a theoretical frameworkfor these sorts of investigation and critique. As
Nicholson characterizesit in her introduction to Feminism/Postmodernism
(Nicholson 1990), postmodernisminvolvesthe criticismboth of philosophical
metanarrativeand, in fact, of all claimsto a "transcendent"reasonor objective
knowledge. Claims to knowledge are tied to what Foucaultconceives of as
discursiveregimesof power.They arenot trueor objectivebut ratherrepresent
the power of the procedures,practices,and sanctioned institutionsby which
they are produced.Hence, postmodernismdebunksthe distinction between
knowledgeand power,and,just as feminismis, it is waryof the oppressionthat
necessarilyaccompaniesall generalizedideals of truth,justice, or beauty.In a
similar vein, Jane Flax credits postmodernismwith discovering the social
constitutionof the mind,knowledge,andthe self andclaimsthat this discovery
leadsto a radicaldeconstructionof the Enlightenmentconceptionsof a unitary
and universallyvalid knowledge."Feministtheories,"she writes, "like other
formsof postmoderism, shouldencourageus to tolerateand interpretambivalence, ambiguityand multiplicityas well as to expose the roots of our needs

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Hypatia

for imposingorderand structureno matterhow arbitraryand oppressivethese

needs may be. If we do our workwell, realitywill appeareven more unstable,
complex and disorderlythan it does now" (Flax 1990, 56-57). And Fraserwith
Nicholson arguesthat an adequateand postmoder feminism would eschew
unitary notions of woman and gender identity for "pluraland complexly
constructedconceptions of social identity."It would give up the attempt to
ground its investigations on a single theoretical basis, instead tailoring "its
methodsand categoriesto the specific task at hand, using multiplecategories
whereappropriateand forswearingthe metaphysicalcomfortof a single feminist method or feminist epistemology"(Fraserand Nicholson 1990, 35).
The impetus for the present paper, however, is the thought that these
positions, or at least a version of these positions, might be more productively
worked out in terms of a hermeneutic political philosophy and that, as
formulatedby a postmoder philosophy,they remainproblematic.As manyof
the feministscollected in the Feminism/Postmodemism
anthology themselves
of
point out, the deconstruction the categoriesof genderand womanseems to
ridfeminismof both its objectof inquiryand the subjectof its politicalpractice.
There are no women to formthe locus of feminist interestsand concerns but
only blacks, whites, heterosexuals, lesbians and so on, and we might
deconstruct these categories as well to affirmdifferences in the concerns,
epistemologicalperspectives,and experiencesof the individualsthat compose
these groups.As Butlerputs this point, "Withouta unified concept of woman
or, minimally,a family resemblanceamong gender-relatedterms, it appears
that feministpolitics has lost the categoricalbasisof its own normativeclaims.
What constitutesthe "who,"the subjectfor whom feminismseeks emancipation? If there is no subject,who is left to emancipate?"(Butler 1990, 327).
By the same token, if any attempt to impose orderon the social world is
inherentlyoppressive,as Flax asserts,we might wonderhow to conceive of a
postmodernfeminism at all. If all forms of knowledge are simply discursive
regimesof power,will the social knowledgeto which feminismgives rise not
have the same status as that which it rejects:that of oppressionratherthan
truth?Flax tries to avoid this conclusion by arguingthat feminism'sconcern
with differencerequiresa tolerancefor the ambiguousand complex character
of social reality;but if feminismis meant simplyto articulatea lack of clarity,
whathappensto its perspectiveor to the validityof feministsocial andpolitical
critique?
Froma hermeneuticpoint of view, if feminismmust appreciateambiguity
and complexity,it is not clearthat it ought also to trysimplyto reflectdisorder.
Rather,what it might need is an interpretiveaccountof social realitythat can
be sensitive to its multipledimensions.Moreover,if feminismneeds to give up
on unitarynotions of womenandgender,the resultneed not be the deconstruction of the subject as opposed to a recognition of its social and historical
dimensions.In orderto indicate how such a hermeneuticstartingpoint might

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GeorgiaWarke

85

be better able to addressfeminism'sconcerns, not only with difference,but

with women andwith social-politicalemancipation,I want to begin bylooking
at some recent political philosophythat seems to me to make a hermeneutic
turn.
II. HERMENEUTIC
POLITICAL
THEORY

By a "hermeneuticpolitical theory"I mean to characterizethe recent work

of such theoristsas Michael Walzer,AlasdairMaclntyreand John Rawls.On
theirface, the worksof these theoristsmove in quite differentdirections.They
are, respectively,social democratic,neo-Aristotelian, and liberal.Nevertheless, if one concentrateson Rawls'smorecurrentwork,as opposedto A Theory
of Justice,all might be said to share a postmodernfeminism'ssuspicion of
philosophicalmetanarrative.All explicitlyor implicitlyrejectattemptsto find
the common substructureto differentformsof life or to order all of history
within a lineardevelopment.All alsorejectEnlightenmentattemptsto ground
principles of justice or norms of action in what is supposedto be universal
human nature, the universalrequirementsof human action, or the general
categoriesof rationalchoice. Instead,they begin with the particularistclaim
that if we are to act on justifiednormsor principles,we mustfind those norms
and principlesthat are justifiedfor us because they issue from our culturally
specificneeds, interests,and aspirationsand fromourparticularsharedunderstandingsand traditions.
The basisforthis approachis the idea that we arealwayspartof a historically
developed, moral and intellectual culture and that this culture is entwined
with what Berard Williamshas called a "thick"vocabulary(Williams 1985,
129). In other words,the termsin which we justifyourpractices,reflectupon
our norms,and considernew possibilitiesfor acting are mutuallyinterdependent. They are terms such as human dignity or respect for others that carry
with them the traces of particularhistoricalstrugglesand developmentsand
that resonate with the meaning of particularkinds of historical experiences
and practices,with particularsortsof social and legal norms,and with particularnotions of human association.Attempts to abstractfromthese particular
historicaltracesand resonancesto formulatenormsof action and principlesof
justice that are meant to be universallyvalid miss an importantpoint. It may
be that the thick vocabularyof a cultureis too burdenedwith its specificsets
of interrelationsand the assumptionsthese involve to allow for universal
application.Still, the vocabularymayremainthe most relevantfor the culture
preciselybecauseof the experiences,struggles,and formsof resolutionthat are
reflectedin it. Conversely,simplyto assumethat our thick vocabularycan be
made universallyapplicable is to ignore its dependence on the conceptual
interrelationships, institutional arrangementsand historical applications
throughwhich it has developed.

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Hypatia

The taskof political theoryfor hermeneuticpolitical philosophers,then, is

neither to universalizeour thick vocabularynor to dispensewith it for a fresh,
somehowhistoricallyunconditionedone. Rather,it is to ask what the moral
and political vocabularywe alreadypossess implies about the principlesof
justice or norms of action that are appropriatefor us. As Walzerputs it, the
taskis one neither of discoverynor of invention but of interpretation(Walzer
1987). We need to try to understandthe meaningsthat arealreadyembedded
in the moral,political, and intellectualtraditionswe shareand considerwhat
these meaningsindicatewith regardto suitableprinciplesforus.This approach
can be called hermeneuticor interpretivebecauseit takesa society'smoraland
political traditionsas well as its practicesand institutionsas the analogueof a
text. The taskis to conceive of this complexof actions,beliefsand socialgoods,
assumptionsandaspirationsasa whole andto articulatethe principlesof justice
that emerge from it. Thus Rawls insists that "we are not trying to find a
conception of justicesuitableforall societiesregardlessof theirparticularsocial
or historical circumstances.. .. We look to ourselvesand to our future,and
reflectupon our disputes.... How farthe conclusionswe reach areof interest
in a wider context is a separatequestion" (Rawls 1980, 518). And Walzer
concludes with Hegel: "Philosophyis a second coming (lower case), which
bringsus not millennial understandingbut the wisdom of the owl at dusk."
(Walzer1987, 8)
At first glance, of course, this form of political theory may seem not only
not to providea frameworkfor feminismbut to be entirely antithetical to its
concerns.Forwhat is strikingabouta hermeneutictheoryas thusfarelucidated
is that it does not seem either to recognizethe issueof differenceor to consider
the relationsof powerthat might be involved in both historicaltraditionsand
their interpretation.The theoristswho take a hermeneuticapproachto issues
of justice arguefor the faithfulnessand "congruence"(Rawls 1980, 519) of
certainprinciplesto the sharedsocial meaningsof the democraticsocieties to
which they belong. But they do not seem to considerpossible differencesin
the experiences and social circumstancesof different groups within these
societies or the different ways such groupsmight therefore understandthe
social meanings at issue. In other words, they do not seem to explore the
problem that appearsto be posed by the circumstancethat the historical
experiences of differentgroupsin these societies may not be the same and
hence that the same traditions,institutions,disputes,and practicesmight be
understoodin very differentways.Do women not understandthe moraland
political traditionsof the West,for example,verydifferentlyfrommen insofar
as they are,by and large,traditionsthat have excludedwomen?Alternatively,
to the extent that men and women do share an understandingof these
traditions,might we not say that such commonalityis the result more of the
pervasivenessof a sexist ideologythan of any "real"common accord?

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GeorgiaWarnke

87

In Justice,Genderand theFamilySusan MollerOkin exempts Rawls and at

least aspectsof Walzer'sworkfromthe chargethis sortof questionimplies,but
she does criticize Maclntyrefor failing to recognizeeither that the traditions
to which he is committed exclude women or that the meanings he tries to
articulateneglect women'sconcerns(Okin 1989,41-73). I want to look at this
criticismin some detail for, in my view, it is a powerfulstatement of the kind
of chargethat might be leveled at a hermeneuticpolitical philosophy.It also
overlooks the contributionboth Maclntyreand a hermeneutic approachin
general might make to feminist theory, precisely in regardto the issue of
difference.
III. OKINVS. MACINTYRE

ForOkin, Maclntyreis simplyrepresentativeof a "tradition-basedthinking

about social justice" to be found in the work of ChristopherLasch, Edward
Shils and Allan Bloomaswell (Okin 1989,44). Muchof her attackis therefore
focused on the misogynist characterof the Aristotelian, Augustinian, and
Thomist traditionsto which Maclntyreappeals.She arguesthat women are
excluded from Aristotle'sattempt to specify the good life for man as well as
from both Augustine'sand Aquinas'sconceptions of higher reason. Women
are not simply arbitrarilyexcluded, however.According to Okin, Aristotle's
conceptionof the good life, aswell asAugustine'sconception of religiousvirtue
andAquinas'saccountof the City of Man,dependson the exclusionof women.
Hence, she rejects Maclntyre'shermeneuticpremise that insight into these
traditionsmight indicate the moraland political principlesappropriateforus.
She writes:"althoughthe Aristoteliantradition,as presentedby Maclntyre,is
supposedlyaimed at the humangood, only those whose productive,reproductive, and daily service needs are fully taken care of by others, and who are
thereforefree to engage in the highest goods-political activity and intellectual life-are regardedas fullyhuman.This would seem to be a philosophyin
need of some considerable adaptation if it is to be relevant to the later
twentieth century!"(Okin 1989, 54).
Still, with this quickreferenceto adaptation,Okin mayglossover the most
importantpartsof Maclntyre's"tradition-based
thinking"fora feministtheory.
Two points are worth makingin this regard.First,it is significant that Okin
fails to acknowledge the groundsfor what she refersto as "tradition-based
thinking."For Maclntyre,as for other hermeneuticallyoriented theorists,we
are alwayspart of a tradition or set of traditions.The questions we ask, the
vocabularywe use, and the standardswe applyarehistoricallydevelopedones,
and our attempts to understandthe traditionsin which we participateare
thereforeneither arbitrarynor perverse.Instead,they are attemptsto find out
who we are and what principlesof justice are rational or make sense for us
because of our standardsof rationalityand our moral ideals and aspirations.

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Hypatia

Indeed,in responseto the questionOkin asksas to why we should "expectto

find rationalityand justice embodied in traditions"(Okin 1989, 45-46), we
might ask whereelse we shouldexpect to find them even if they are,we think,
not yet fully realizedin the moralor political practiceof those traditions.The
startingpoint for a tradition-basedpolitical theory is that we are traditionbound and that even attempts to begin afresh, with principles of justice
constructedon neutral,allegedlyunconditionedgrounds,owe morethan they
admit to the assumptions,categories,and criteriaembeddedin the moraland
political vocabularythey employand in the traditionsof which, like it or not,
they remaina part.
Indeed, part of the motive for a hermeneuticapproachto political theory
involves the dangerin attemptsto separateourselvesfromour traditions.The
assumptions,categoriesand criteriaover which we have least reflected and
that thereforemay be the most pernicious,will also be the ones that we take
most easily with us, preciselybecausewe remainunawareof them. Still, Okin
seemsto assumethat we can leave ourhistorybehind us to inhabit an original
position that is cleansed of all referencesto the past. For this reason, she
contrastsRawls'stheory of justice to Maclntyre'sand claims that "the significance of Rawls'scentral, brilliant idea, the originalposition, is that it forces
one to question and consider traditions,customs and institutions from all
points of view and ensuresthat the principlesof justice will be acceptableto
everyone"(Okin 1989,101). ButhereOkin appearsto relyon Rawls'sA Theory
of Justicewithout acknowledgingeither his more recent clarificationsof the
idea of the original position or his insistence on its own "tradition-bound"
character.But he now insists that the originalposition is simply supposedto
reflectoursharedpolitical traditionsand, in particular,oursharedunderstanding of the freedomand equalityof moralpersons.It is a model conception that
connects a particularconception of the personto a particularconception of
the well-orderedsociety in a way that is meant to representand synthesize
Lockeanand Rousseauiantraditionsin ourpolitical thought (see Rawls1980).
To this extent, the "brilliantidea"of the originalposition allowsus to consider
"traditions,customsand institutions"less "fromall points of view" than from
a tradition-boundpoint of view that is meant,nonetheless,to be an appropriate
one for us. Okin does recognizethat her liberalfeminism belongs itself to a
liberaltradition.It is odd, then, that she thinks Rawls'sliberalismis somehow
not tradition-bound.It is alsoodd that she generalizesfromwhat she considers
the bankruptcharacterof Aristotelian traditionsfor feminist thought to the
bankruptcharacterof tradition-basedthinkingin general,even as she depends
on it.

The second point worth making with regard to Okin's critique of

Maclntyre'swork is that she seems largelynot to recognizethe centrality to
his account of an analysisof the way in which traditionsmaybe characterized
by adaptation.Forneither Maclntyrenor hermeneuticpolitical philosophers

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89

as a whole does attention to the meaningsembeddedin traditionmean that

traditionscannot change. In fact, Macintyrebegins by defining a traditionas
a "traditionof enquiry"or as "an argumentextended throughtime in which
certainfundamentalagreementsaredefinedand redefined"(Maclntyre 1988,
12). Traditionsare not static or monolithic structures.Rather,they are contexts of investigationin which the ideasand assumptionsthat comprisethem
can, at differenttimes, be put in question,confirmed,or reassessedin relation
to other ideasand assumptionsthat remain,for the time being, unquestioned.
Membersof a traditioncan begin to raisequestionsabouttheir traditioneither
becausethey encounteranothertraditionthat revealsthe biasesin their own,
becausethey startto interpretcertainauthoritativetexts within the tradition
differentlywith differentissuesand concernsin mind, becauseinternalinconsistencies between some of the tradition'sown beliefs and practicesbecome
clear,or becausethe situationin which they find themselvesseems to require
new responses to old beliefs. But the point here is simply that to claim
allegianceto a traditionor to see a traditionas worth takingup and reflecting
upon can be to involve oneself, not in dogma,but in a context for interpretation, reinterpretation,and inquiry.
Fora feminist political theory,this conception would seem to suggestthat,
instead of simply dismissingour traditionsas misogynist,we might confront
them on just this point. It suggests,in other words,that feministconcernsare
one of the challengesour moraland political traditionsmustface and in terms
of which they need to be understood,criticized,assessed,and advanced.Okin
concludes her critique of Maclnytreby claiming, "It is by now obvious that
many of 'our'traditions,and certainlythose evaluatedmost highly by MacIntyre,areso permeatedby the patriarchalpowerstructurewithin which they
evolved as to requirenothing less than radicaland intensive challenge if they
are to meet trulyhumanistconceptions of the virtues"(Okin 1989, 58). But,
to refer to humanist conceptions of the virtues is already to refer to an
Aristotelian moral and political tradition.Moreover,to challenge Aristotle's
own equation of humanity with the male sex seems to be close to what
Maclntyreenvisions as the path of political thought and action. The Aristotelian conception of the good life as a life of well-integratedvirtues,in which
the meaningof one'slife is not exhaustedby the instrumentalpursuitof wealth,
in which the virtues of friendship,community,and political engagementare
not neglected, and in which political engagement has the robust sense of
debate and deliberationamongequals-this life would seem to be not only a
plausiblegoal of feministpoliticaltheorybut alsoone that manyfeministshave
alreadyraisedagainstthe traditionof liberalismto which Okin adheres.
Of course, it might be contended that Aristotle'svision of the good life is
simplyinseparablefroma practicethat dividedpublic and privatespheresand
relegatedwomen andslavesto a domesticdomainofnonpersons.This is Okin's
premise, but it is, at least, not self-evident. That is, aspects of Aristotle's

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Hypatia

philosophymay be inextricablytied to the social and political arrangements

of his time. But it is not clear that one cannot subtracthis particularviews of
women and slaves fromhis conception of the good life in a way that, in fact,
strengthensthat conception. In other words,there seems to be nothing about
a life of well-integratedvirtues, friendship,community,and robustpolitical
engagementthat requiresthe delegation of houseworkand child care to the
province of one group.Perhapsmore importantly,it would seem to be one of
the virtues of Okin's own book to have shown that there is nothing about a
robustpolitical engagement which suggeststhat issues of housework,child
care,and domesticjustice in generalshouldnot be partof it. In any case, if we
do take up the Aristoteliantraditionin ethics and politics, as Maclntyredoes,
we need not do so in an uncriticalway. Rather,we can do so in a way that
seems to be the very model of what Maclntyre means by engaging in the
movement of a traditionand what Okin means by challenging it in a radical
and intensive way.
We were led to Okin's criticismof Maclntyre'sworkby the objection that
we thoughtmight be raisedto a hermeneuticpolitical philosophythat it could
not accommodate feminism's concerns with difference. In exploring
Maclntyre'swork, however, I have tried to suggest the opposite: that a
hermeneuticpolitical philosophy is in fact characterizedby difference,if by
differencewe mean a recognitionof the challengesthat membersof a tradition
can raiseto it. Indeed,if we expandMaclntyre'sconception, we mightsay that
the differenceswith which postmodernismis concerned are differencesthat
compose a tradition, that the different positions different membersof the
traditionhave in it and the differentperspectivesand historicalexperiences
they bringto it are just those differencesthat allow a traditionto advance.A
feminist standpoint, then, is not one that opposes tradition-boundthinking
with a neutral, unconditioned point of view. Rather, it is one that engages
reflectivelyin the traditionswith which it is involved, points up the inconsistencies in their idealsand practices,and requiresthem to justifytheir conceptions of justice in the face of the historical experience and historically
conditioned interestsof women.
Butfeminismis not only a point of differencewithin traditions.The contrast
I noted above, between Okin'sliberalfeminismand a feminismmorecommitted to an Aristotelian tradition,suggeststhat feminism contains differences
within itself. Such differencesare only multipliedif we add to them a recognition of Marxist,existentialist, and psychoanalyticdirections in feminism.
But even if we concentrate on liberaland neo-Aristotelianfeminismwe can
locate differencesin their views of women (as equallyconcerned as men with
independence and individual achievement or as other-directed and relational); in their conceptions of an ethics of justice, as opposedto an ethics of
care; in their understandingsof the value of motherhood and surrogacy
contracts; and so on. To this extent, however, it becomes unclear how a

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hermeneuticfeminismavoids the problemsof the postmoder feminismwith

which we began. I followedcertainpostmodernfeministsin suggestingthat by
deconstructingthe categoryof woman and equatingknowledgewith power,
postmodernfeminismmayhave lost both the subjectit was to emancipateand
the legitimacy of its social and political critique. But differenceswithin a
hermeneuticallyconceived feminismseem to lead in the samedirection.They
seem to mean that differentfeminismscan possess no unity and hence no
unitarycriticalthrust.Marxist,Lacanian,Aristotelian,liberaland object-relations feministswill take up very differenttraditionsand thereforeunderstand
the issuesof justice, equality,and emancipationin very differentways.Moreover,white, black,poor,middle-class,heterosexual,and lesbianwomen within
these diverse traditions will have very different positions and experiences
within them and thereforeunderstandthem in very differentways.
In the remainderof this paper I want, nonetheless, to try to indicate the
resourcesthat a hermeneuticallyconceived feminismmight have in confronting such differences,and I will suggestthat it has them preciselybecauseof the
role that the interpretationof traditionshas within it. Indeed,partof the merit
of a hermeneuticapproachfor feminismlies in the conception of interpretive
conversation it requires.I will begin by looking at the characteristicsof the
sortof interpretiveconversationwe pursuein the domainof artand literature,
since this seems to me to contain importantclues for both a hermeneutic
feminismand the advantagesit might have over postmodernism.
IV. HERMENEUTIC
CONVERSATION

For our purposes,discussionsof texts or worksof art have three important

features.First,we do not supposethat the validity of one interpretationof a
text or workof art necessarilyprecludesthe validityof another.We recognize
the interpretivecharacterof our own understandingof a workof art. But this
meansthat we also acknowledgeits partialityand concede that the workmay
admit of interpretationsother than our own. We admit that differentinterpretersmight come to the work with differentconcerns, interests, and purposes,that interpretersin the futurewill have a differentperspectiveon it than
we do and will be able to relate it to differentworksand experiencesthan we
can, that interpretersin the pasthave broughtdifferentissuesto bearon it and
appliedit to differentconcernsand so on. Indeed,in the humanities,the idea
that one interpretationof a text or workof art could be canonical makesno
sense. The idea is ratherthat a given work admitsof diverse interpretations
and that these can all be adequatein the sense that each makessense out of
the whole of the text or work and shows how its variouspartscontributeto
that whole. They differbecauseof the interpretiveperspectives,interestsand
purposesof their interpreters;but althoughdifferentinterpretationsof a text

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orworkof artmight competewith one another,they do not necessarilyexclude

one another.
Not only does a given workadmitof diverseinterpretations;in the humanities, the assumptionis alsothat the competitionbetweenthese interpretations
can be a fruitful, invigorating,and even educational one. This idea is the
second importantcharacteristicof hermeneuticdiscussionsof texts and works
of art. Because we acknowledgethe interpretive,noncanonical characterof
our own understandingof the meaning of a text or work of art, we can also
acknowledgenot only the possibleexistence of other interpretationsbut also
the importanceof consideringthem and even of tryingto learnfromthem. We
try to see what a differentinterpretationof a work illuminatesthat we may
have missed, how it illuminatesit, and what it reveals about both the work
and our own interpretationof it. Both interpretationsmaybe trueto the work
in their own fashions.In takingseriouslythe interpretiveinsightsof the other,
however, we can begin to develop our own. Our own understandingcan
become richerand moredifferentiatedto the extent that we tryto understand
the point of other interpretations,come to understandour own in relation to
them, try to accommodatewithin our own interpretationsthe insights we
think these other interpretationsmay possess,and work to preserveour own
interpretationsfromthe lacunaewe find in others.
A thirdcharacteristicof interpretiveand evaluativediscussionsof texts and
worksof art concerns the role of reasonsin this processof mutualeducation.
If we fail to convince other interpretersto take certain relationshipswithin a
workof art as seriouslyas we do or to understanda text the way we do, we do
not usually consider this failure to indicate their irrationality.Rather, the
differencesbetween us can be ones of purpose,interest,aesthetic orientation,
context, or the concerns we each have in considering the text, and these
differencescan be enriching. Certainlywe might question an interpretation
of King Learthat reversedthe allocation of good and evil between Learand
Cordelia,on the one hand, and Goneril and Regan, on the other (see Smiley,
1991). Butsuch an interpretationmight also turnout to be coherent and quite
interesting. Indeed, it might offer us a way of rethinking both our own
understandingof the text and our assumptionsof good and evil. We need not
adopt the interpretationin the end. But the point here is that neither it nor
ourown interpretationis necessarilyirrationaljust becausethey differ.Rather,
each providesa spurto the other to deepenanddevelop its own understanding.
How might this account of the characteristicsof hermeneuticdiscussionsof
art and literature be relevant to a hermeneutic feminism and to feminist
concernswith differencein general?First,it suggeststhe possibilityof a similar
kind of pluralismwith regardto the wayswe understandourmoralandpolitical
traditionsand, indeed, with regardto the traditionswe decide to take up and
advance.We acknowledgethat ourmoralandpoliticalunderstandinginvolves
interpretationsof meaning-interpretations of the meaning of traditions;

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93

interpretationsof the norms and principles we consider these to involve;

interpretationsof the meaning of the actions that norms and principlesare
meantto regulate;and,indeed,interpretationsof the goalsof sociallife. Hence,
we acknowledgethat our own understandingcannot be canonical. Justas we
possessmany different,legitimateinterpretationsof King Lear,we can possess
many different,legitimate interpretationsof the meaning and importanceof
our diversetraditionsand of the conceptions of justice they involve.
Second, the characteristicsof hermeneuticdiscussionsin art and literature
suggest that we might look for the same kind of mutual education in the
moral-practicaldomain.Weneed not concentrateon eradicatingthe influence
of one traditionor another.Instead,we can try to understandand articulate
the differentwaysin which our traditionsmight be understood;we can try to
uncover new ways of understandingthe social practicesand human circumstancesto which those traditionsaremeant to apply,and we can use different
traditionsor differentaspectsof the same traditionto challenge some of the
assumptionsand expectations a traditionis thought to contain. In this way,
we conceive of the task of any political theory,includingfeminism,as that of
testing interpretivepossibilitiesagainst others both within and without our
own traditionsandof encouragingthe kind of discussionin which ourdifferent
interpretationsof meaning can help to develop and revise one another.The
conversationbetween liberaland Aristotelianfeminismmight thus be understood as a case in point, as a conversationin which each side learnsto rethink
its conceptions of women, the goals of equality,and the meaning of emancipation. In a conversationof this kind each interpretationcan become more
educatedand sophisticatedthroughits encounter with the other.
Third, then, the characteristicsof hermeneutic discussions in art and
literature might lead us to the recognition that our moral and political
differencesmaynot alwaysbe ones of rationality.Rather,just as we admitthat
interpreterscan differin their readingsof KingLearwithout necessarilybeing
irrational,we might admit that we can differ on the question of surrogacy
contractsorpornography,forinstance,justbecausewe differin ourinterpretive
orientations and in our understandingof the meaning of the norms and
principleswe take seriouslyand not becauseone or the other of us is insane,
manipulative,or ideologicallyduped.We can no longerappealto an objective
truth about surrogatemotherhoodor to a justice in itself. Instead,we possess
only our understandingof our traditions,ourpractices,and our aspirationsas
a community,and once we recognizethe interpretivestatusof this understanding, we must also recognizethe need to reassessit in the face of the differing
understandingsof others. If, for an Aristotelianfeminism,surrogacycontracts
violate the meaning of parenthoodand underminethe female virtuesof care
and concern for others, it might learn from a more liberal (or libertarian)
emphasison the freedomof contractand the equalityof men and women with
regardto selling their reproductivecapacities(see Shalev 1989). By the same

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token, the more liberalor libertarianorientationmight learnfroman Aristotelian or Marxistfeminismto rethink the commodificationof both male and
female bodies and to take more seriouslythe possibilitythat contract pregnancy involves the exploitationof poorwomen by the rich (see Young1990b,
Pateman 1988). Neither our traditionsnor our interpretationsof them will
necessarilyconverge.Still, we can all come to recognizethe potential fruitfulnessof ourdialoguewith one anotherandincorporateinto ourmoreconsidered
views those insights into meaning that we have gleaned from others. Hence
each side might develop a notion of contract pregnancythat tries to take
account of the concernsraisedby the other (or others) and is thereforemore
developed,differentiatedand multidimensional.
This conclusion is problematicin the moraland political sphere,however,
in a way that it may not be in the domain of art and literature.As thus far
delineated, a hermeneutic conception of discourse and mutual education
seems to have left completely behind it one of the questions with which we
began-namely, that of power.Okin maydismissan Aristotelian interpretive
traditiontoo quickly.Still, is she not correct to assumethat some traditions
may be interpretivelybankruptin the sense that to engage in hermeneutic
conversationwith representativesof them is to degraderatherthan educate
ourown understandingof meaning?Even if we do not accept a given tradition
of interpretationuncritically,if we as much as take it seriouslyas a perspective
that interestinglychallengesourown or as a traditionwe might challengefrom
within as participants,might it not coarsenand confusethe termsin which we
think about ourneeds, interests,or historicalexperiences?What, for instance
is the statusof an interpretationof the meaningof women'sequalityaccording
to which it is satisfiedby the achievementof certainformalrightssuch as the
right to vote? What if this understandingsimply replicates the dominant
understandingof the society or is conditioned by certain relations of power
and domination?What if other interpretationsof the meaning of equality,
interpretationsthat go beyondthe rightto vote or the rightto choose between
a family and a careercannot be articulatedbecauseof certain sorts of social
constraint or even self-censorship?In general, are there not discussionsof
meaningin which powerrelationsamongthe partieseitherprecludethe raising
of certain questionsor slant the termsin which they are answered?
The transmissionof traditionswill alwaysinvolve a form of power insofar
as individualsmaturewithin families and culturesin which the relations of
influence between generationsare not symmetrical.But the questionsasked
abovesuggestthat if we beginwith the ideaofhermeneuticdebateasthe means
throughwhich we can challenge and develop ourinterpretivetraditions,then
we also need to attend to two circumstances.First,the hermeneuticdiscussion
of meaning throughwhich traditionsadvance may be not only conditioned,
but also systematicallydistorted, by social and economic conditions and
relationsofpower.Second, these conditionsandrelationsmaymean that there

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are interpretivevoices that have been repressedor excludedfromour hermeneutic debatesand fromwhich we have thereforebeen unable to lear. Okin
cites a New Yorkercartoon in which three male justicessurveytheir pregnant
bellies while one says "Perhapswe'd better reconsiderthat decision" (Okin
1989, 102). She uses the cartoon to insist on a neutralstandpointfor formulating nonsexist principlesof justice. SupremeCourtjusticesmust decide the
casesthat come beforethem as if they sat behind a veil of ignorance,as if they
were deprivedof all knowledge of their sex, socioeconomic situation, class,
race, and the like. But the cartoon might also be used to illustratethe point I
want to make:namely, that one of the chief deficiencies of recent Supreme
Court decisions about abortionis that they exclude so many women'svoices
and all interpretiveorientationsrootedin experiencesand situationsdifferent
fromthe justices'own.
The conclusion here is that the only interpretivediscussionsthat can be
assumedto be undistortedand mutuallyeducationalare those that are, as far
as possible,open and inclusive. In contrast,we can question the conclusions
of any interpretivediscussionamongadultsin which one partyhas morepower
than another,in which the externalconstraintsof money and social domination impedethe freeexchangeof interpretiveassessments,or,indeed,in which
widespreadand dominantideasof race or gendersilence alternativeinterpretations of a group'sneeds and interests.Obviously,these conclusions apply
both to the challenge feministsraiseto the sexist dimensionsof our traditions
andpracticesand to the challengesthe diversestrandsof feminismraisewithin
feminismitself. If we are to learnfromour hermeneuticefforts,then no voice
can retain a monopoly on interpretationand no voice can try to limit in
advance what we might lear from others. But the possibilityof expanding
one'sinterpretivehorizonsneed not dependonly on the impossiblepossession
of an Archimedean point outside of historical tradition, as Okin assumes.
Rather,it can be fosteredby an inclusiveand, as faras possible,unconstrained
hermeneuticdiscussionin which all sides recognizethe interpretivestatusof
their own understandingof our moral, political, and, indeed, constitutional
traditionsand arethereforeopen to learningfromthe interpretiveunderstandings of others.
The conditions of this kind of free and equal discoursefollow from the
educationalaspectof hermeneuticconversation.If we acknowledgethe tradition-bound dimensions of our interpretiveorientations and commitments,
then we must also recognize their inevitable partialityand, moreover,the
necessityof tryingto lear fromothers.Moreover,if we recognizethe necessity
of learningfrom interpretationsother than our own, we must also recognize
the necessity of being able to listen to them; and if we are to be able to listen
to them, they must be fosteredand encouragedin the communitiesof which
we are a part. Such encouragement,however, is possible only as long as we
worktowardsthe open and unconstrainedcharacterof the conversation-as

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long, therefore, as we question those interpretive voices that entail the

exclusion of others and criticize those hermeneuticdiscussionsthat are not
open to all concerned.
One additionalobjection might be broughtagainsta hermeneuticfeminism
insofaras its stresson conversationmayseem to precludeaction. The continuing adequacyand vitality of our interpretivetraditionsis now seen to reston
the openness and unconstrainedcharacterof the conversationsin which we
discuss their meaning. But certainly we need to do more than exchange
interpretations.We need to move in some directionin ourpractices,to adopt
some policy with regardto surrogatemotherhood,for example. But if we are
simplyto recognizeand even learnfromthe diversityof possibleunderstandings of the norms and practicessurroundingsuch issues,how can we decide
what to do with regardto them? What shall we do if, for example, unconand
strainedhermeneuticdebatesustainsthe plausibilityof both pro-surrogacy
the
of
of
of
our
norms
and
interpretations
meaning
anti-surrogacy
parenthood
contract?What if we must acknowledge both a commitment to women's
freedomof contractand a rejectionof the commodificationof familyrelations
and the exploitation of poor women by rich or middle-classwomen?
It seems to me that a hermeneuticfeminismcan make at least two requests
with regardto such differences.First,as long as the hermeneuticdiscussionof
them remainsunconstrainedand inclusive, we can ask that our practices,as
faras possible,reflect the diversityof legitimate,nonexclusionaryinterpretive
perspectivesboth within and without feminism. Thus, we might look for a
differentiatedsolution to the controversyover surrogatemotherhoodrather
than holding out the hope that eventually one side will somehow be proved
"correct."We might affirmthe idea that women should have the same rights
as men to enter into contractsof sale, even those that include reproductive
capacities. At the same time, we might insist on the difference between
surrogacycontracts and other contracts and work to assurethe conditions
underwhich they might satisfya respectfor the specificityof the relationship
between mother and child. These might include the opportunitiesfor women
to enter into custodialrelationshipsratherthan surrenderingall theirparental
rights;and perhapsmore importantly,they might shift the focusto the sortsof
generaleconomic conditions that could prevent exploitation.
But we may not alwaysbe able to guaranteeeither that a differentiated
solution will alwaysbe possible or that all interpretivevoices will alwaysbe
adequatelyrepresentedin our policies and practices.The second request a
hermeneuticfeminismcan make,then, is that where a differentiatedsolution
is not possibleor forthcoming,we acknowledgethe legitimate,nonexclusionary interpretationsthat have been excluded in our practicesand continue to
searchfor waysto accommodatethose interpretations.In this way,we can try
to providefor a continuing developmentof our interpretiveresourcesas well
as for a continuing assessmentof our feminismsand ourselves.

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In its interpretiveguiseand in its recognitionof the diversityof interpretive

perspectives, a hermeneutic feminism not only confirms postmodern
feminism'sconcern with differencebut also arguesfor its importancefor all
formsof critical social and political thought. A hermeneuticfeminismrecognizes the interpretive status of our understandingof our norms and social
practices,and it thereforeencouragesthe open conversationin which we can
develop ourselves and our traditions through our differences. In order to
acknowledgeand learn fromdiversity,however,we need not deconstructthe
categoryof womanas some postmodernfeminismseemsto do. Instead,we can
recognize the social and historical dimensionsof the categoryand begin to
articulatethe pluralityof feminismsto which it givesrise.Nor need we conflate
truth and power. A hermeneutic feminism does not equate all forms of
understandingwith repressivediscursiveregimes. Rather, it recognizesthe
partial and perspectival character of understandingand, hence, works to
eliminate the constraints of repressionand exclusion from the domain of
interpretivedebate.

NOTE
I would like to thank the Institutefor AdvancedStudy in Princetonfor its support
duringthe writingof "Feminismand Hermeneutics."

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