PREFACE AND CHAPTER 1 OF VOL

1 (PP. 1-21)
MINORS OPOSA V FACTORAN
ISSUE: WoN petitioner-minors have a
cause of action in filing a class suit to
prevent the misappropriation or
impairment of Philippine rainforests
YES
HELD:
Petitioner-minors assert that they
represent their generation as well as
generations to come. The Supreme
Court ruled that they can, for
themselves, for others of their
generation, and for the succeeding
generation, file a class suit. Their
personality to sue in behalf of
succeeding generations is based
on
the
concept
of
intergenerational
responsibility
insofar as the right to a balanced
and
healthful
ecology
is
concerned. Such a right considers the
rhythm and harmony of nature
which indispensably include, inter alia,
the judicious disposition, utilization,
management,
renewal
and
conservation of the countrys forest,
mineral,
land,
waters,
fisheries,
wildlife, offshore areas and other
natural resources to the end that their
exploration,
development,
and
utilization be equitably accessible to
the present as well as the future
generations.
Needless to say, every generation has
a responsibility to the next to preserve
that rhythm and harmony for the full
enjoyment of a balanced and healthful
ecology. Put a little differently, the
minors assertion of their right to a
sound environment constitutes at the
same time, the performance of their
obligation to ensure the protection of
that right for the generations to come.
CONCERNED CITIZENS OF MANILA
BAY V MMDA, DEC 18, 2008

ISSUE: WON petitioners may be

compelled by mandamus to clean up
and rehabilitate the Manila Bay Yes
HELD: The Cleaning or Rehabilitation
of Manila Bay can be Compelled by
Mandamus. While the implementation
of the MMDA's
mandated tasks
may
entail
a
decision-making
process, the enforcement of the law
or the very act of doing what the
law exacts
to be done is
ministerial
in nature and may be
compelled by mandamus. Under
what
other
judicial
discipline
describes
as
continuing
mandamus , the Court
may,
under
extraordinary
circumstances, issue directives
with the end in view of ensuring
that its decision would not be
set to naught by administrative
inaction or indifference.
CARINO V INSULAR GOVERNMENT
212 US 499, 1909
ISSUE: WoN Carino has ownership and
is entitled to registration- Yes
HELD:
Land was not registered, and therefore
became, if it was not always, public
land.
Spanish Law: "Where such possessors
shall not be able to produce title
deeds, it shall be sufficient if they shall
show that ancient possession, as a
valid title by prescription."
For
cultivated
land,
20
years,
uninterrupted,
is
enough.
For
uncultivated, 30.
Applicant's
possession
was
not
unlawful, and no attempt at any such
proceedings against him or his father
ever was made.
Every native who had not a paper
title is not a trespasser.
There must be a presumption against
the government when a private
individual claims property as his or her
own. It went so far as to say that the
lands will be deemed private absent
contrary proof.

1 | Pa g e N AT R E S M I D T E R M S R E V I E W E R

CRUZ V NCIP, DEC 6, 2006

ISSUE: WoN the provisions of IPRA
contravene the Constitution?- NO
HELD:
The provisions of IPRA do not
contravene
the
Constitution.
Examining the IPRA, there is nothing in
the law that grants to the ICCs/IPs
ownership over the natural resources
within
their
ancestral
domain.
Ownership
over
the
natural
resources
in
the
ancestral
domains remains with the State
and the rights granted by the IPRA to
the ICCs/IPs over the natural resources
in their ancestral domains merely
gives them, as owners and occupants
of the land on which the resources are
found, the right to the small scale
utilization of these resources, and
at the same time, a priority in
their large scale development and
exploitation.
Additionally, ancestral lands and
ancestral domains are not part of
the lands of the public domain.
They are private lands and belong
to the ICCs/IPs by native title,
which is a concept of private land
title that existed irrespective of
any royal grant from the State.
However, the right of ownership and
possession by the ICCs/IPs of their
ancestral domains is a limited form of
ownership and does not include the
right to alienate the same.
RESIDENT MAMMALS OF TANON
STRAIT V REYES, APRIL 21, 2015
ISSUEs:
1. WoN marine mammals, through
their stewards, have legal standing to
pursue the case - NO
2. WoN the service contract (SC-46)
violated the Philippine Constitution or
other domestic laws YES
HELD:
1. The Court declined to extend the
principle of standing beyond natural

and juridical persons, even though it

recognized that the current trend in
Philippine
jurisprudence
moves
towards simplification of procedures
and facilitating court access in
environmental cases. Instead, the
Court explained, the need to give
the Resident Marine Mammals
legal
standing
has
been
eliminated by our Rules, which
allow any Filipino citizen, as a
steward of nature, to bring a suit
to enforce our environmental
laws.
2. While SC-46 was authorized
Presidential Decree No. 87 on oil
extraction, the contract did not fulfill
two
additional
constitutional
requirements. Section 2 Article XII
of the 1987 Constitution requires
a
service
contract
for
oil
exploration and extraction to be
signed by the president and
reported to Congress. Because the
JAPEX contract was executed solely by
the Energy Secretary, and not
reported to the Philippine congress,
the
Court
held
that
it
was
unconstitutional.
The contract violated the National
Integrated
Protected
Areas
System Act of 1992 (NIPAS Act),
which generally prohibits exploitation
of natural resources in protected
areas. In order to explore for
resources in a protected area, the
exploration must be performed in
accordance with an environmental
impact assessment (EIA). The Court
noted that JAPEX started the seismic
surveys
before
any
EIA
was
performed; therefore its activity was
unlawful. Id., pp. 33-34.
Furthermore, the Tanon Strait is a
NIPAS area, and exploration and
utilization of energy resources
can only be authorized through a
law passed by the Philippine
Congress. Because Congress had not

2 | Pa g e N AT R E S M I D T E R M S R E V I E W E R

specifically authorized the activity in

Taon Strait, the Court declared that
no energy exploration should be
permitted in that area
BORACAY FOUNDATION v
PROVINCE of AKLAN, June 26,
2012
Summary: Boracay Foundation, Inc.
filed a petition for an issuance of a writ
of
mandamus
suspending
the
implementation of a land reclamation
project along the foreshores of
Barangay Caticlan in the Province of
Aklan based on the ground that the
classification of the project was
incorrect leading to the failure to
perform a full EIA as required by law
and that there was a failure for proper,
timely
and
sufficient
public
consultation.
The Court determined that the valid
questions raised by the petitioners put
in question the sufficiency of the
evaluation of the project by the
Department of Environment and
Natural Resources Environmental
Management Bureau Regional Office
VI (DENR-EMB RVI). The Court further
found that there was a lack of prior
consultations and prior approval
required by law. The Court therefore
issued a writ of continuing mandamus
suspending the implementation of the
project and requiring, inter alia, the
DENR-EMB RVI to make a proper study
and the Province of Aklan to submit
the appropriate report and to secure
approvals from local government units
and hold proper consultations with
NGOs, other stakeholders and sectors
concerned.
FORESTS (Chapter 4, Volume I, pp.
208-264)
CALUB V CA, APRIL 27, 2000
Summary
Petitioner from DENR apprehended
two vehicles carrying illegally sourced
lumber and thereafter confiscated
them. The owners of the vehicles filed

an action for replevin to recover the

vehicles. They won in the trial court on
the ground that petitioner did not act
in accordance with the law. So
petitioner appeals on the ground that
the replevin in this case is a suit
against the State and is therefore
valid.
ISSUE: Whether or not a replevin may
be instituted for recovery of property
under custodia legis -NO
HELD: Replevin cannot be issued
to recover a property lawfully
taken by virtue of legal process
and considered in the custody of
the law. A replevin case against
the State, without its consent,
cannot prosper.
VILLARIN V PEOPLE, AUG 31, 2011
Summary:
Petitioner Aniano Latayada (Latayada)
and three others namely, Barangay
Captain Sudaria of Tagpangi, CDO,
Baillo and Boyatac, were charged with
violation of Section 68, P.D.No. 705 as
amended by Executive Order No. 277.
City Prosecutor recommended to
chargeVillarin as well.
The Version of the Defense:
In response to the clamor of the
residents of Barangays Tampangan,
Pigsag-an,Tuburan and Taglinao, all in
Cagayan De Oro City, Villarin, decided
to repair the impassable Batinay
bridge. The project was allegedly with
the concurrence of the Barangay
Council. However, the timber flitches
were seized by the DENR Strike Force
Team and taken to its office where
they were received by Vera Cruz, the
security guard on duty. RTC found
them guilty. CA affirmed.
Issue: WON mere possession
timber without criminal intent
punishabl e- YES
Held:

3 | Pa g e N AT R E S M I D T E R M S R E V I E W E R

of
is

possession of timber without the

legal documents required under
forest laws and regulations makes
one
automatically
liable
of
violation
of
Section
68,
Presidential Decree(P.D.) No. 705,
as amended. Lack of criminal
intent is not a valid defense, the
nature of offense being malum
prohibitum.
"There are two distinct and separate
offenses punished under Section 68 of
P.D.No. 705, to wit:(1) Cutting,
gathering, collecting and removing
timber or other forest products from
any forest land, or timber from
alienable or disposable public land, or
fromprivate
land
without
any
authorization; and(2) Possession of
timber or other forest products without
the legal documents required under
existing forest laws and regulations. "
The Information charged petitioners
with the second offense which is
consummated by the mere possession
of forest products without the proper
documents. As a special law, the
nature of the offense is malum
prohibitum and as such, criminal
intent is not an essential element.
"However, the prosecution must prove
that petitioners had the intent to
possess (animus possidendi)" the
timber. "Possession, under the law,
includes
not
only
actual
possession, but also constructive
possession.
Actual
possession
exists when the[object of the crime] is
in the immediate physical control of
the accused. On the other hand,
constructive
possession
exists
when the [object of the crime] is under
the dominion and control of the
accused or when he has the right to
exercise dominion and control over the
place where it is found. "
There is no dispute that petitioners
were in constructive possession of the

timber without the requisite legal

document s. Villarin and Latayada
were
personally
involved
in
itsprocurement, delivery and storage
without any license or permit issued
by any competent authority. Given
these and considering that the offense
is malum prohibitum, petitioners
contention that the possession of the
illegally cut timber was not for
personal gain but for the repair of said
bridge is, therefore, inconsequential.
RUZOL V SANDIGANBAYAN, APRIL
17, 2013
ISSUE: WoN the authority to monitor
and regulate the transportation of
salvaged forest product is solely with
the DENR, and no one else NO
HELD: The LGU also has, under
the LGC of 1991, ample authority
to promulgate rules, regulations
and ordinances to monitor and
regulate salvaged forest products,
provided that the parameters set
forth by law for their enactment
have been faithfully complied
with.
While the DENR is, indeed, the primary
government instrumentality charged
with the mandate of promulgating
rules
and
regulations
for
the
protection of the environment and
conservation of natural resources, it is
not
the
only
government
instrumentality clothed with such
authority.
Pursuant to the General welfare
clause of the LGC of 1991,
municipal
governments
are
clothed with authority to enact
such ordinances and issue such
regulations as may be necessary
to carry out and discharge the
responsibilities conferred upon
them by law, and such as shall be

4 | Pa g e N AT R E S M I D T E R M S R E V I E W E R

necessary and proper to provide

for the health, safety, comfort and
convenience, maintain peace and
order, improve public morals,
promote
the
prosperity
and
general
welfare
of
the
municipality and its inhabitants,
and ensure the protection of
property in the municipality.
CHAINSAW ACT, PD 705, DENR
DAO 97-32
PEOPLE V DATOR, PASTOR TELEN
(PAGE 223) OCT 24, 2000
Summary:
Telen, a utility worker, was charged
with violation of Sec 68, PD 705, as
amended. In his defense, he testified
that he needed lumber to be used in
renovating
the
house
of
his
grandparents. Telen secured verbal
permission from CENRO OIC Leonor.
Leonor did not approve of his plan to
cut teak or hard lumber but allowed
him to cut aging DITA trees (which he
considers as soft lumber) only from
the private land of his mother. Telen
submits that under DAO 78, no permit
is required in cutting of planted trees
within titled lands except Benguet Pine
and premium species namely : narra,
molave, dao, kamagong, ipil, acacia,
akle, apanit, banuyo, batikuling, betis,
bolong-eta,
kalantas,
lanete,
lumbayao, sangilo, supa, teak, tindalo
and manggis.
ISSUE: WoN Telen is liable for failing
to secure permit for the cutting of Dita
Trees- Yes
HELD:
YES. DAO 78, S. 0f 1987 states that
No permit is required in the cutting of
planted trees within the titled lands or
tax declared A and D lands with
corresponding application for patent or
acquired through court proceedings,
except BENGUET PINE and premium
species
listed
under
DENR

Administrative Order No 78, Series of

1987, provided, that a certification of
the CENRO concerned to the effect
that the forest products came from a
titled land or tax declared alienable
and
disposable
land
is
issued
accompanying the shipment.
While it is true that no permit is
required for the cutting of dita trees in
titled lands, still under the same DAO,
a certification from the CENRO
concerned to the effect that the forest
products came from a titled land or
tax declared alienable and disposable
land must still be secured to
accompany the shipment.
This the appellant failed to do, thus,
he is criminally liable under Section 68
of Presidential Decree No. 705
PAAT V CA, PAGE 232
JAN 10, 1997
ISSUE: Petitioners insist that only the
court is authorized to confiscate and
forfeit conveyances in transporting
illegal forest products.
HELD: WoN DENR employees are
empowered to confiscate conveyances
used in transporting illegal forest
products YES
Under Sec 68-A of DAO 78, s.
1997, the Secretary and his duly
authorized representatives are
given the authority to confiscate
and forfeit any
conveyances
utilized in violating the Code or
other forest
laws,
rules
and
regulations. The phrase to dispose
of the same is broad enough to
cover the
act
of
forfeiting
conveyances
in
favor
of
the
government. The only limitation is that
it should be made in accordance with
pertinent laws, regulations or policies
on the matter.
It is interesting to note that Section
68-A is a new provision authorizing the
DENR
to
confiscate,
not
only

5 | Pa g e N AT R E S M I D T E R M S R E V I E W E R

conveyances,' but forest products as

well. On the other hand, confiscation
of forest products by the court' in a
criminal action has long been provided
for in Section 68. If as private
respondents insist, the power on
confiscation cannot be exercised
except only through the court under
Section 68, then Section 68-A would
have no purpose at all.
MUSTANG LUMBER V CA, PAGE 238
JUNE 18, 1996
STATUTE: Sec. 68 PD 705 - penalizes
the cutting, gathering & or collecting
timber or other forest products without
a license.
Petitioners claim that the truck was
not carrying contraband articles since
there is no law punishing the
possession of kumberm and that
lumber is not timber
ISSUE: WoN lumber is included in
timber - YES
HELD: Reversing first ruling, SC says
lumber is included in timber.
The Revised Forestry Code contains
no definition of timber or lumber.
Timber is included in definition
of forestry
products par
(q) Sec.3.
Lumber
same
definitions
as
processing plants
Processing plant is any mechanical
set-up, machine or combination of
machine used for processing of logs &
other
forest
raw
materials
into lumber veneer, plywood etc p.
183.
Simply means, lumber is a processed
log or forest raw material. The Code
uses lumber in ordinary common
usage. In 1993 ed. of Websters
International
Dictionary, lumber is
defined as timber or logs after being
prepared for the market. Therefore,
lumber is a processed log or
timber. Sec 68 of PD 705 makes
no distinction between raw &
processed timber.

MERIDA V PEOPLE
Petitioner was charged with violation
of Sec 68 of PD 705 for cutting the
lone narra tree in a private land.
ISSUE: WoN the lone narra tree
constitutes timber under sec 86 of PD
705 YES
HELD: Petitioner is guilty of the
second paragraph of section 68, which
is the cutting, gathering, collecting,or
removing of timber
from alienable or disposable public
land, or from private land without
any authority.
The court also said that the lumber
or processed log is covered by
the forest products term in PD
705, as the law does not
distinguish between a raw and
processed timber.
It is settled that in the absence of
legislative intent to the contrary,
words and phrases used in a statute
should be given their plain, ordinary,
and common usage meaning. And in
so
far
as
possession
of timber without the required
legal documents is concerned,
Section 68 of PD No. 705, as
amended, makes no distinction
between
raw
and
processed
timber. Neither should we.
We see no reason why, as in Mustang,
the term "timber" under Section 68
cannot be taken in its common
acceptation as referring to "wood used
for or suitable for building or for
carpentry or joinery."37 Indeed, tree
saplings or tiny tree stems that are too
small for use as posts, panelling,
beams, tables, or chairs cannot be
considered timber.38
Undoubtedly, the narra tree petitioner
felled and converted to lumber was
"timber" fit "for building or for
carpentry or joinery" and thus falls

6 | Pa g e N AT R E S M I D T E R M S R E V I E W E R

under the ambit of Section 68 of PD

705, as amended.
PROTECTED AREAS, WILDLIFE,
AND BIODIVERSITY
CHAPTERS 5-6 OF VOLUME I (PP,
273-332); CHAPTER 3, VOLUME II
FISHERIES, COASTAL AND MARINE
(CHAPTER 5, VOL I, PP. 273-322)
TANO V SOCRATES, AUG 21, 1997
ISSUES:
1. WoN the resolution banning the live
shipment of tilapia for 5 years is valid YES
2. WoN the ordinance violates Sec 2,
Art XII of the Constitution NO
HELD:
1. Both Ordinances have two principal
objectives or purposes:
(1) to establish a closed season for
the species of fish or aquatic animals
covered therein for a period of five
years, and
(2) to protect the corals of the marine
waters of the City of Puerto Princesa
and the Province of Palawan from
further destruction due to illegal
fishing activities.
The accomplishment of the first
objective is well within the devolved
power to enforce fishery laws in
municipal waters.
The realization of the second objective
clearly falls within both the general
welfare clause of the LGC and the
express mandate to cities and
provinces to protect the environment
and impose appropriate penalties for
acts which endanger the government.
One of the devolved powers of the
LGC
on
devolution
is
the
enforcement of fishery laws in
municipal waters including the
conservation of mangroves. This
necessarily
includes
the
enactment
of
ordinances
to

effectively carry out such fishery

laws within the municipal waters.
In light of the principles of
decentralization and devolution
enshrined in the LGC and the
powers granted therein to LGUs
which unquestionably involve the
exercise of police power, the
validity
of
the
questioned
ordinances cannot be doubted.
2. There is absolutely no showing that
any of the petitioners qualifies as a
subsistence or marginal fisherman.
Besides, Section 2 of Article XII
aims primarily not to bestow any
right to subsistence fishermen,
but to lay stress on the duty of
the State to protect the nations
marine wealth. The so-called
preferential
right
of
subsistence
or
marginal
fishermen to the use of marine
resources is not at all absolute.
In accordance with the Regalian
Doctrine, marine resources belong to
the state and pursuant to the first
paragraph of Section 2, Article XII of
the Constitution, their exploration,
development and utilization...shall be
under the full control and supervision
of the State.
HIZON V CA, DEC 13, 1996
The information charged petitioners
with illegal fishing with the use of
obnoxious or poisonous substance.
ISSUE: WoN petitioners are guilty of
illegal fishing NO
HELD: The offense of illegal fishing is
committed when a person catches,
takes or gathers or causes to be
caught, taken or gathered fish, fishery
or aquatic products in Philippine
waters with the use of explosives,
electricity, obnoxious or poisonous
substances. The
law
creates
a
presumption that illegal fishing has
been committed when: (a) explosives,
obnoxious or poisonous substances or

7 | Pa g e N AT R E S M I D T E R M S R E V I E W E R

equipment or device for electric

fishing are found in a fishing boat or in
the possession of a fisherman; or
(b) when fish caught or killed with the
use of explosives, obnoxious or
poisonous substances or by electricity
are found in a fishing boat. Under
these instances, the boat owner,
operator or fishermen are presumed to
have engaged in illegal fishing. The
last paragraph of Section 33,
creates a presumption that illegal
fishing has been committed when
fish caught or killed with the use
of
explosives,
obnoxious
or
poisonous
substances
or
by
electricity are found in a fishing
boat. In this case, it cannot be
denied that the fishes found in
petitioners banca were caught or
killed by the use of explosives.
However, the prosecution failed to
explain the inconsistency of the
contradictory findings on the fish
samples and this omission raises a
reasonable doubt that the one ton of
the fishes in the cage were caught
with the use of sodium cyanide. The
absence of cyanide in the second set
of fish specimens supports petitioners
claim that they did not use the poison
in fishing.
SB OF GUINDULMAN BOHOL V
JUDGE CASTRO
A.M. No. MTJ-03-1487. December
1, 2003
FACTS:
Lawmen
apprehended
the
boat
captain and eight crew members of
the fishing boat B/B Junida-J who were
fishing within the vicinity of the
municipal waters and fish sanctuary of
Basdio, Guindulman, Bohol with a ring
net. Charges for violation of
Sections 86, 90 and 96 of Republic
Act No. 8550 were immediately filed
with the MCTC, Guindulman-Duero,
Bohol, presided over in an acting
capacity by Judge Manuel A. de Castro.

In the morning of the very next day, a

Saturday, two of the accused, namely:
Narciso J. Jusay, Jr. (boat owner) and
Rolando T. Amistoso (boat captain)
were released from detention upon
order of respondent.
Before summons could be served,
accused Narciso J. Jusay, Jr. (Owner),
Rolando T. Amistoso (Boat Captain), of
B-B Junida-J, requested the court for
an immediate arraignment because
they will plead guilty and pay the
penalty of fine as first offenders of the
above-mentioned charged for Violation
of Section 86, 90 and 96, RA 8550.
Accordingly, the Court conducted
immediate arraignment of the said
accused, and after they plead guilty,
the Court sentences them to pay a
fine in the total sum of Five Thousand
Pesos (P5,000.00), which is the fine
imposable on first offenders of the
above-mentioned charge.
Respondent Judge failed to send a
written notice to the offended party.
The Chief of Police was not informed
and his supposed representative was
not authorized and the prosecution
witnesses were not called to attend.
An administrative complaint was filed
against Judge Manuel A. de Castro, for
violations of Administrative Circular
No. 3-99, Section 1(f), Rule 116 of the
Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure
and Rule 2.01 of the Code of Judicial
Conduct; for arbitrary release of the
accused in Criminal Case No. G-1912
and for not imposing the proper
penalty provided for in Sec. 90, R.A.
No. 8550, otherwise known as The
Philippine Fisheries Code of 1998.
ISSUE: WoN Judge is guilty of gross
ignorance of the law and procedure YES
HELD:
Verily, respondent judge committed
serious irregularities in the procedures
laid down by the Supreme Court,

8 | Pa g e N AT R E S M I D T E R M S R E V I E W E R

thereby giving the impression that he

is favoring the accused to the
detriment of the interests of the State.

penalties that should have been

imposed on the guilty offenders.`
NOTE:

Considering that the offended party is

the State, its representative, in this
case, are the deputized Municipal Fish
Wardens. Respondent
had
no
justifiable reason why he failed to
notify
them.
Their
names
are
mentioned at the bottom portion of
the
complaint.
By
setting
the
arraignment on a Saturday and failing
to notify them, respondent eroded
public confidence in the integrity and
impartiality of the Judiciary.
The penalty of only a fine of P5,000.00
imposed by respondent on both
accused in the subject criminal case
reflects his gross ignorance or
absolute disregard of the provisions of
Republic Act No. 8550.
Section 90 of said law, as earlier
reproduced in the early part of herein
Resolution, clearly enumerates the
penalties that should be imposed on
violators
thereof.
It
specifically
imposes a penalty of imprisonment
from two years to six years on the
boat captain and master fisherman of
the
vessel,
a
fine
ranging
from P2,000.00 to P20,000.00 on the
boat owner/operator; and, confiscation
and forfeiture of the catch. Clearly
therefrom, the trial court may only
exercise its discretion as to the
amount of fine to be meted out on the
boat owner, in this case, accused
Jusay, Jr., but it is not within the
discretion of the court whether or not
to impose the penalty of imprisonment
on boat captain Amistoso. Upon a
finding of guilt, it is mandatory for the
court to impose the penalty of
imprisonment on the accused boat
captain Amistoso. Respondent, in
imposing only a fine of P5,000.00 for
both the boat owner and boat captain,
has not been able to justify why he
disregarded with impunity the proper

Sec. 86- Unauthorized Fishing or

Engaging in Other Unauthorized
Fisheries Activities. - No person
shall exploit, occupy, produce, breed,
culture, capture or gather fish, fry or
fingerlings of any fishery species or
fishery products, or engage in any
fishery activity in Philippine waters
without a license, lease or permit.
Discovery of any person in an area
where he has no permit or registration
papers for a fishing vessel shall
constitute a prima facie presumption
that the person and/or vessel is
engaged in unauthorized fishing:
Provided, That fishing for daily food
sustenance or for leisure which is not
for
commercial,
occupation
or
livelihood purposes may be allowed.
It shall be unlawful for any commercial
fishing vessel to fish in bays and in
such other fishery management areas
which may hereinafter be declared as
over-exploited.
Section 90. Use of Active Gear in
the Municipal Waters and Bays
and Other Fishery Management
Areas. - It shall be unlawful to engage
in fishing in municipal waters and in all
bays as well as other fishery
management areas using active
fishing gears as defined in this Code.
Violators of the above prohibitions
shall suffer the following penalties:
(1) The boat captain and master
fisherman of the vessels who
participated in the violation
shall suffer the penalty of
imprisonment from two (2)
years to six (6) years;

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(2) The owner/operator of the

vessel shall be fined from Two
thousand pesos (P2,000.00) to
Twenty
thousand
pesos
(20,000.00) upon the discretion
of the court.
If the owner/operator is a
corporation, the penalty shall be
imposed on the chief executive
officer of the Corporation.
If the owner/operator is a
partnership the penalty shall be
imposed on the managing
partner.
(3)
The
catch
shall
confiscated and forfeited.

be

Section 96. Fishing in Fishery

Reserves,
Refuge
and
Sanctuaries. - It shall be unlawful to
fish in fishery areas declared by the
Department as fishery reserves,
refuge and sanctuaries.
Violation of the provision of this
section
shall
be
punished
by
imprisonment of two (2) years to six
(6) years and/or fine of Two thousand
pesos (P2,000.00) to Twenty thousand
pesos (P20,000.00) and by forfeiture
of the catch and the cancellation of
fishing permit or license.
SENSON V PANGILINAN
AM NO. MTJ- 02-1430, SEPT 8,
2003
FACTS:
On 14 March 2000, several persons
were apprehended for violation of
Section 86 of Republic Act No. 8550,
also known as "The Philippine Fisheries
Code of 1998" by members of the
Philippine National Police. The items
seized from those arrested included
(a) 1 unit fish net, (b) 36 units lights
(300 watts), (c) 1 unit light (500
watts), (d) 1 unit buoy, (e) 7

containers, (f) 7 plastic container

boxes, (g) 4 styropore boxes, and (h)
10 boxes of fish. On the same day,
Criminal Case No.15019 against them
was filed. Three days later, Danilo
Alayon and Norma Villarosa, asserting
to be the co-owners of the M/B King
Fisher that was used in the illegal
fishing activity, filed an "Urgent Motion
for Custody of Fishing Net," alleging
that the fish net which costs "no less
than
P600,000.00"
was
left
unattended at the beach exposed to
the elements and movements of the
sea which could cause its early
deterioration
and
ultimate
loss.
Respondent
Judge,
despite
the
vigorous objection of the public
prosecutor, granted the motion in his
order of 22 March 2000. The public
prosecutor filed, on 24 March 2000, a
motion for reconsideration. Instead of
deciding
the
pending
motion,
respondent
Judge
deferred
its
resolution until after the arraignment
of the accused and the pretrial of the
case.
Special Prosecutor Romeo B. Senson
filed an administrative complaint
against respondent Judge for "Gross
Misconduct with Prayer for Preventive
Suspension". Respondent contended
that Republic Act No. 8550, the law
under which the accused were
charged with having transgressed, did
not provide for the seizure of the
fishing paraphernalia pending trial and
that the prosecution still could prove
the guilt of the accused beyond
reasonable doubt even without the
evidence being presented since it had
sufficient witnesses for the purpose.
ISSUE:
WON RA 8550 does not provide for the
seizure of the fishing paraphernalia
pending trial -NO
HELD:

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Nowhere in the statute would it appear

that the seizure of the items, alleged
to have been used in the illegal fishing
activity,
is
proscribed
by
it.
Evidently, the seizure of the
fishing paraphernalia has been
made as being an incident to a
lawful arrest. Rule 127, Section 12,
of the Rules of Court provides:
"SEC. 12. Search incident to lawful
arrest.- A person lawfully arrested may
be searched for dangerous weapons or
anything which may be used as proof
of the commission of an offense,
without a search warrant."
All criminal actions commenced by a
complaint
or
information
are
prosecuted under the direction and
control of the prosecutor. The seized
items ordered released by respondent
Judge have not yet been offered in
evidence; hence, the prosecution, not
the court, could still be deemed to be
in the legal custody and to have the
responsibility over such items.
Note:
SECTION
86.
Unauthorized
Fishing or Engaging in Other
Unauthorized Fisheries Activities.
- No person shall exploit, occupy,
produce, breed, culture, capture or
gather fish, fry or fingerlings of any
fishery species or fishery products, or
engage in any fishery activity in
Philippine waters without a license,
lease or permit.

Discovery of any person in an area

where he has no permit or registration
papers for a fishing vessel shall
constitute a prima facie presumption
that the person and/or vessel is
engaged in unauthorized fishing:
Provided, That fishing for daily food
sustenance or for leisure which is not
for
commercial,
occupation
or
livelihood purposes may be allowed.
It shall be unlawful for any commercial
fishing vessel to fish in bays and in
such other fishery management areas
which may hereinafter be declared as
over-exploited.
Any commercial fishing boat captain
or the three (3) highest officers of the
boat who commit any of the above
prohibited acts upon conviction shall
be punished by a fine equivalent to
the value of catch or Ten thousand
pesos (P10,000.00) whichever is
higher, and imprisonment of six (6)
months, confiscation of catch and
fishing
gears,
and
automatic
revocation of license.
It shall be unlawful for any person not
listed in the registry of municipal
fisherfolk to engage in any commercial
fishing activity in municipal waters.
Any municipal fisherfolk who commits
such violation shall be punished by
confiscation of catch and a fine of Five
Hundred Pesos (P500.00).

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LARAYA v PE