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Ty vs CA
GR No. 127406, November 27, 2000

P15,000 is ratified and maintained as monthly support to their 2

children for as long as they are of minor age or otherwise legally
entitled thereto.

Private respondent, Edgardo Reyes, was married with Anna
Villanueva in a civil ceremony in March 1977 in Manila and
subsequently had a church wedding in August 1977. Both
weddings were declared null and void ab initio for lack of
marriage license and consent of the parties. Even before the
decree nullifying the marriage was issued, Reyes wed Ofelia Ty
herein petitioner on April 1979 and had their church wedding in
Makati on April 1982. The decree was only issued in August
1980. In January 1991, Reyes filed with RTC a complaint to have
his marriage with petitioner be declared null and void. AC ruled
that a judicial declaration of nullity of the prior marriage with
Anna must first be secured before a subsequent marriage could
be validly contracted. However, SC found that the provisions of
the Family Code cannot be retroactively applied to the present
case for doing so would prejudice the vested rights of the
petitioner and of her children.
ISSUE: Whether or not damages should be awarded to Ofelia Ty.
SC is in the opinion of the lower courts that no damages should
be awarded to the wife who sought damages against the husband
for filing a baseless complaint causing her mental anguish,
anxiety, besmirched reputation, social humiliation and alienation
from her parents. Aside from the fact, that petitioner wants her
marriage to private respondent held valid and subsisting. She is
likewise suing to maintain her status as legitimate wife. To grant
her petition for damages would result to a situation where the
husband pays the wife damages from conjugal or common funds.
To do so, would make the application of the law absurd.
Moreover, Philippine laws do not comprehend an action for
damages between husband and wife merely because of breach of
a marital obligation.

2. Arcaba vs. Tabancura Vda. De Batocael Case Digest

Arcaba vs. Tabancura Vda. De Batocael
G.R. No. 146683 November 22, 2001
Facts: Francisco Comille and his wife Zosima Montallana became
the registered owners of two lots in Zamboanga del Norte. After
the death of Zosima, Francisco and his mother-in-law executed a
deed of extrajudicial partition with waiver of rights, in which the
latter waived her share of the property. Thereafter, Francisco
registered the lot in his name. Having no children to take care of
him after his retirement, Francisco asked his niece Leticia, the
latters cousin Luzviminda and petitioner Cirila Arcaba, to take
care of his house and store.
Conflicting testimonies were offered as to the nature of the
relationship between Cirila and Francisco. Leticia said that the
previous party was lovers since they slept in the same room while
Erlinda claimed that Francisco told her that Cirila was his
mistress. On the other hand, Cirila said she was mere helper and
that Francisco was too old for her.
A few months before Franciscos death, he executed an
instrument denominated Deed of Donation Inter Vivos in which
he ceded a portion of the lot together with is house to Cirila, who
accepted the donation in the same instrument. The deed stated
that the donation was being made in consideration of the faithful
services she had rendered over the past ten years. Thereafter,
Francisco died and the respondents filed a complaint against
Cirila for declaration of nullity of a deed of donation inter vivos,
recovery of possession and damages. Respondents, who are
nieces, nephews and heirs by intestate succession of Francisco,
alleged that Cirila was the common-law wife of Francisco and the
donation inert vivos is void under Article 87 of the Family Code.

Hence, the petition was granted. Marriage between Ty and Reyes

is declared valid and subsisting and the award of the amount of

Issue: Whether or not the deed of donation inter vivos executed

by the late Francisco Comille be declared void under Article 87 of
the Family Code.

RATIO: The loan obtained by the husband from AIDC was for the
benefit of PBM and not for the benefit of the conjugal partnership
of Ching.

Ruling: Where it has been established by preponderance of

evidence that two persons lived together as husband and wife
without a valid marriage, the inescapable conclusion is that the
donation made by one in favor of the other is void under Article
87 of the Family Code.

PBM has a personality which is distinct from that of Chings family

despite their being stockholders of the said company. The debt
incurred by Ching is a corporate debt and the right of recourse to
respondent as surety is only to the extent of his corporate stocks.

Therefore, respondents having proven by preponderance of

evidence that Cirila and Francisco lived together as husband and
wife without a valid marriage, the donation inter vivos is
considered null and void.
3. Ayala Investment v. CA, G.R. No. 118305, February 12,
FACTS: Philippine Blooming Mills (PBM) obtained a P50,300,000
loan from petitioner Ayala Investment and Development
Corporation (AIDC). Respondent Alfredo Ching made himself
jointly answerable to the debt as added security. Upon PBMs
failure to pay the loan, AIDC filed a case for sum of money
against PBM and respondent Ching in the CFI of Pasig.
After trial, the court rendered decision in favor of AIDC ordering
PBM and Alfredo Ching to jointly and severally pay AIDC the
principal amount of the loan with interests. Pending the appeal of
the judgment, RTC issued a writ of execution and thereafter, the
deputy sheriff caused the issuance and service upon respondent
spouses of the notice of sheriff sale on three of their conjugal
Respondent spouses then filed an injunction contending that
subject loan did not redound to the benefit of the conjugal
partnership. Nevertheless, a certificate of sale was issued to
AIDC, being the only bidder for the property.
ISSUE: WON the debts and obligations contracted by the husband
alone is considered for the benefit of the conjugal partnership.
HELD: No. Petition is DENIED.

If the money or services are given to another person or entity,

and the husband acted only as a surety or guarantor, that
contract cannot, by itself, alone be categorized as falling within
the context of obligations for the benefit of the conjugal
The contract of loan or services is clearly for the benefit of the
principal debtor and not for the surety or his family. No
presumption can be inferred that, when a husband enters into a
contract of surety or accommodation agreement, it is for the
benefit of the conjugal partnership. Proof must be presented to
establish benefit redounding to the conjugal partnership.

4. Go vs CA
Family Code Article 73 Exercise of Profession of Either Spouse
In 1981, Hermogenes Ong and Jane Ong contracted with Nancy
Go for the latter to film their wedding. After the wedding, the
newlywed inquired about their wedding video but Nancy Go said
its not yet ready. She advised them to return for the wedding
video after their honeymoon. The newlywed did so but only to
find out that Nancy Go can no longer produce the said wedding
video because the copy has been erased.
The Ongs then sued Nancy Go for damages. Nancys husband,
Alex Go, was impleaded. The trial court ruled in favor of the
spouses Ong and awarded in their favor, among others, P75k in
moral damages. In her defense on appeal, Nancy Go said: that
they erased the video tape because as per the terms of their
agreement, the spouses are supposed to claim their wedding tape

within 30 days after the wedding, however, the spouses

neglected to get said wedding tape because they only made their
claim after two months; that her husband should not be
impleaded in this suit.

G.R. No. L-28589, February 29, 1972

ISSUE: Whether or not Nancy Go is liable for moral damages.

Spouses Rafael Zulueta and Telly Albert Zulueta, with their

daughter boarded a PANAM plane from Honolulu to Manila, the
first leg of which was Wake Island. While on stopover, Mr. Zulueta
found the need to relieve himself and after finding the terminals
comfort rooms full, he walked down the beach to do his business.
Meanwhile, the flight was called and Mr. Zuluetas absence was
noticed. Heading towards the ram, plaintiff remarked, You people
almost made me miss your flight. You have a defective
announcing system and I was not paged.

HELD: Yes. Her contention is bereft of merit. It is shown that the

spouses Ong made their claim after the wedding but were
advised to return after their honeymoon. The spouses advised Go
that their honeymoon is to be done abroad and wont be able to
return for two months. It is contrary to human nature for any
newlywed couple to neglect to claim the video coverage of their
wedding; the fact that the Ongs filed a case against Nancy Go
belies such assertion. Considering the sentimental value of the
tapes and the fact that the event therein recorded a wedding
which in our culture is a significant milestone to be cherished and
remembered could no longer be reenacted and was lost
forever, the trial court was correct in awarding the Ongs moral
damages in compensation for the mental anguish, tortured
feelings, sleepless nights and humiliation that the Ongs suffered
and which under the circumstances could be awarded as allowed
under Articles 2217 and 2218 of the Civil Code.
Anent the issue that Nancy Gos husband should not be included
in the suit, this argument is valid. Under Article 73 of the Family
Code, the wife may exercise any profession, occupation or
engage in business without the consent of the husband. In this
case, it was shown that it was only Nancy Go who entered into a
contract with the spouses Ong hence only she (Nancy) is liable to
pay the damages awarded in favor of the Ongs.

5. Zulueta v. Pan American World Airways, Inc.

Concepcion, C.J.

Instead of allowing plaintiff to board the plane, however, the

airport manager stopped plaintiff and asked him to surrender his
baggages for inspection. Refusing to comply with the order,
plaintiff was not allowed to board the plane. His wife and
daughter were able to proceed but were instructed to leave their
baggages behind.
Plaintiff instituted present petition for recovery of damages
against respondents for breach of contract. The defendants,
however, maintain that plaintiffs reason for going to the beach
was not to relieve himself but because he had a quarrel with his
Whether or not plaintiff is entitled to damages for breach of
YES, plaintiff is entitled to damages. Firstly, plaintiffs testimony
about what he did upon reaching the beach is uncontradicted.
Furthermore, there is absolutely no direct evidence about said
alleged quarrel. If such was true, surely, plaintiff would not have
walked back from the beach to the terminal before the plane had
resumed its flight to Manila, thereby exposing his presence to the
full view of those who were looking for him.

Anent the request of the common carrier to inspect the bags of

plaintiff, it appears that Captain Zentner received information
that one of the passengers expressed a fear of a bomb on board
the plane. As a result, he asked for the plaintiffs bags to verify
the bomb. Nevertheless, this claim is unfounded. The Captain
failed to explain why he seemingly assumed that the alleged
apprehension of his information was justified. Plaintiff himself
intimated to them that he was well known to the US State
Department and that the Captain was not even aware of the
informants name or any circumstances which may substantiate
the latters fear of a certain bomb.
Defendants further argue that plaintiff was also guilty of
contributory negligence for failure to reboard the plane within the
30 minutes announced before the passengers debarked
therefrom. This may have justified a reduction of the damages
had plaintiff been unwittingly left by the plane, owing to the
negligence of PANAM personnel, or even, wittingly, if he could not
be found before the planes departure. It does not, and cannot
have such justification in the case at bar, plaintiff having shown
up before the plane had taken off and he having been off-loaded
intentionally and with malice.
With all the foregoing, it is clear that plaintiff is entitled to
damages from respondent company.

6. Wong vs. IAC

GR No. 70082, August 19, 1991
Romario Henson married Katrina on January 1964. They had 3
children however, even during the early years of their marriage,
the spouses had been most of the time living separately. During
the marriage or on about January 1971, the husband bought a
parcel of land in Angeles from his father using the money
borrowed from an officemate. Sometime in June 1972, Katrina
entered an agreement with Anita Chan where the latter consigned
the former pieces of jewelry valued at P321,830.95. Katrina
failed to return the same within the 20 day period thus Anita

demanded payment of their value. Katrina issued in September

1972, check of P55,000 which was dishonored due to lack of
funds. The spouses Anita Chan and Ricky Wong filed action for
collection of the sum of money against Katrina and her husband
Romarico. The reply with counterclaim filed was only in behalf of
Katrina. Trial court ruled in favor of the Wongs then a writ of
execution was thereafter issued upon the 4 lots in Angeles City all
in the name of Romarico Henson married to Katrina Henson. 2 of
the lots were sold at public auction to Juanito Santos and the
other two with Leonardo Joson. A month before such redemption,
Romarico filed an action for annulment of the decision including
the writ and levy of execution.
ISSUE: WON debt of the wife without the knowledge of the
husband can be satisfied through the conjugal property.
The spouses had in fact been separated when the wife entered
into the business deal with Anita. The husband had nothing to do
with the business transactions of Katrina nor authorized her to
enter into such. The properties in Angeles were acquired during
the marriage with unclear proof where the husband obtained the
money to repay the loan. Hence, it is presumed to belong in the
conjugal partnership in the absence of proof that they are
exclusive property of the husband and even though they had
been living separately. A wife may bind the conjugal partnership
only when she purchases things necessary for support of the
family. The writ of execution cannot be issued against Romarico
and the execution of judgments extends only over properties
belonging to the judgment debtor. The conjugal properties
cannot answer for Katrinas obligations as she exclusively
incurred the latter without the consent of her husband nor they
did redound to the benefit of the family. There was also no
evidence submitted that the administration of the partnership
had been transferred to Katrina by Romarico before said
obligations were incurred. In as much as the decision was void
only in so far as Romarico and the conjugal properties concerned,
Spouses Wong may still execute the debt against Katrina,
personally and exclusively.

Gaviola and Protacio, Jr. entered into a contract ofsale of a parcel
of land. 23 years later, Protacio, Jr executed an Affidavit of
Renunciation and Waiver affirming under oath that it was his
father Protacio Go, Sr.(Married to Marta Go) who purchased the
said property. Subsequently, Protacio Go together with his son
Rito Go sold a portion of the property to herein respondent Ester
Servacio. On March 2, 2001, the petitioners demanded the return
of the property, but Servacio refused to heed their demand;
hence this case for the annulment of sale of the property. The
contention of the petitioner was that following Protacio, Jr.s
renunciation, the property became conjugal property; and that
the sale of the property to Servacio without the prior liquidation
of the community property between Protacio, Sr. and Marta was
null and void pursuant to Article 130 of the Family Code. Servacio
and Rito countered thatArticle 130 of the Family Code was
inapplicable; that the want of the liquidation prior to the sale did
not render the sale invalid, because the sale was valid to the
extent of the portion that was finally allotted to the vendors as his
share; and that the sale did not also prejudice any rights of the
petitioners as heirs, considering that what the sale disposed of
was within the aliquot portion of the property that the vendors
were entitled to as heirs.
The RTC declared that the property was the conjugal property of
Protacio, Sr. and Marta, not the exclusive property of Protacio, Sr.
Nonetheless, the RTC affirmed the validity of the sale of the
property. Aggrieved, the petitioners went all the way up to the
Supreme Court.
Whether Article 130 of the Family Code was applicable.

Under Article 130 in relation to Article 105 of the Family Code,any

disposition of the conjugal property after the dissolution of the
conjugal partnership must be made only after the liquidation;
otherwise, the disposition is void. Upon Martas death in 1987, the
conjugal partnership was dissolved, pursuant to Article 175 (1) of
the Civil Code, and an implied ordinary co-ownership ensued
among Protacio, Sr. and the other heirs of Marta with respect to
her share in the assets of the conjugal partnership pending a
liquidation following its liquidation.
Protacio, Sr., although becoming a co-owner with his children in
respect of Martas share in the conjugal partnership, could not yet
assert or claim title to any specific portion of Martas share
without an actual partition of the property being first done either
by agreement or by judicial decree. Until then, all that he had was
an ideal orabstract quota in Martas share. Nonetheless, a coowner could sell his undivided share; hence, Protacio, Sr. had the
right to freely sell and dispose of his undivided interest, but not
the interest of his co-owners. Consequently, the sale by Protacio,
Sr. and Rito as co-owners without the consent of the other coowners was not necessarily void, for the rights of the selling coowners were thereby effectively transferred, making the buyer
(Servacio) a co-owner of Martas share. Article 105 of the Family
Code, supra, expressly provides that the applicability of the rules
on dissolution of the conjugal partnership is without prejudice
to vested rights already acquired in accordance with the
Civil Code or other laws.
The proper action in cases like this is not for the nullification of
the sale or for the recovery of possession of the thing owned in
common from the third person who substituted the co-owner or
co-owners who alienated their shares, but the DIVISION of the
common property as if it continued to remain in the possession of
the co-owners who possessed and administered it [Mainit v.
Bandoy, supra] In the meanwhile, Servacio would be a trustee for
the benefit of the co-heirs of her vendors in respect of any portion
that might not be validly sold to her.

The appeal lacks merit.

Posted by kaye lee on 10:00 PM

G.R. No. 132529 February 2 2001

[Article 147 Family Code-Property Regime of Union Without
Marriage; Article 148 - Rules on Co-ownership regarding
polygamous/bigamous marriages, adulterous or concubinage
relationships; Article 40 - Judicial Declaration of Nullity of
SPO4 Santiago Cario married Susan Nicdao in 1969 without
marriage license. They had two children. He then married Susan
Yee on November 10 1992, with whom he had no children in their
almost 10 year cohabitation starting way back in 1982.
He passed away on November 23 1992. The two Susans filed with
the RTC of Quezon City the claims for monetary benefits and
financial assistance pertaining to the deceased from various
government agencies. Nicdao collected a total of P146,000 while
Yee received a total of P21,000.
Yee filed an instant case for collection of half the money acquired
by Nicdao, collectively denominated as "death benefits." Yee
admitted that her marriage with the SPO4 took place during the
subsistence of, and without first obtaining a judicial declaration of
nullity, the marriage between Nicdao and the SPO4. She however
claimed that she became aware of the previous marriage at the
funeral of the deceased.
In 1995, the trial court ruled in favor of Yee. Nicdao appealed to
the CA, which the CA affirmed the decision of the trial court.
Whether or not Yee can claim half the amount acquired by

No. SC held that the marriage between Yee and Cario falls under
the Article 148 of the Family Code, which refers to the property
regime of bigamous or polygamous marriages, adulterous or
concubinage relationships.

Yee cannot claim the benefits earned by the SPO4 as a police

officer as her marriage to the deceased is void due to bigamy.
She is only entitled to the properties acquired with the deceased
through their actual joint contribution. Wages and salaries
earned by each party belong to him or her exclusively. Hence,
they are not owned in common by Yee and the deceased, but
belong to the deceased alone and Yee has no right whatsoever to
claim the same. By intestate succession, the said death
benefits of the deceased shall pass to his legal heirs. And, Yee,
not being the legal wife, is not one of them.
As regards to the first marriage, the marriage between Nicdao
and SPO4 is null and void due to absence of a valid marriage
license. Nicdao can claim the death benefits by the deceased
even if she did not contribute thereto. Article 147 creates a coownership in respect thereto, entitling Nicdao to share one-half of
the benefits. As there is no allegation of bad faith in the first
marriage, she can claim one-half of the disputed death benefits
and the other half to the deceased' to his legal heirs, by intestate
The marriage between Yee and SPO4 is likewise null and void for
the same has been solemnized without the judicial declaration of
the nullity of the marriage between Nicdao and SPO4. Under
Article 40, if a party who is previously married wishes to contract
a second marriage, he or she has to obtain first a judicial decree
declaring the first marriage void, before he or she could contract
said second marriage, otherwise the second marriage would be
void. However, for purposes other than to remarry, no prior and
separate judicial declaration of nullity is necessary.
G.R. No. L-39587
March 24, 1934

FACTS: Lilius was driving with his wife and daughter for


sightseeing in Pagsanjan Laguna. It was his first time in the area

and he was entirely unacquainted with the conditions of the road
and had no knowledge of the existence of a railroad crossing.
Before reaching the crossing in question, there was nothing to
indicate its existence and, it was impossible to see an
approaching train. At about seven or eight meters from the
crossing the plaintiff saw an autotruck parked on the left side of
the road. Several people, who seemed to have alighted from the
said truck, were walking on the opposite side. He slowed down
and sounded his horn for the people to get out of the way. With


WON Manila Railroad Company is liable for damages


WON the sums of money fixed by the court a quo as

indemnities for damages proper
1. Injuries sustained by Lilius
2. for injuries sustained by wife and child
3. for loss of domestic service of wife to husband

HELD: The judgment appealed from is affirmed in toto, with the

sole modification on interest to be added on the indemnity in
favor of Lilius.

his attention thus occupied, he did not see the crossing but he
heard two short whistles. Immediately afterwards, he saw a huge

1. YES

black mass fling itself upon him, which turned out to be

locomotive No. 713 of the MRCs train. The locomotive struck the
plaintiffs car right in the center. The 3 victims were injured and
were hospitalized.

Upon examination of the oral as well as of the documentary

evidence, this court is of the opinion that the accident was due to
negligence on the part of the defendant-appellant company
alone, for not having had on that occasion any semaphore at the

Lilus filed a case against MRC in the CFI. Answering the

crossing to serve as a warning to passers-by of its existence in

complaint, it denies each and every allegation thereof and, by

order that they might take the necessary precautions before

way of special defense, alleges that the Lilius, with the

crossing the railroad; and, on the part of its employees the

cooperation of his wife and coplaintiff, negligently and recklessly

flagman and switchman, for not having remained at his post at

drove his car, and prays that it be absolved from the complaint.

the crossing in question to warn passers-by of the approaching


The CFI decided in favor of Lilius. The 2 parties appealed said

decision, each assigning errors on said judgement.

Although it is probable that the defendant-appellant entity

by the lacerated wound received by her from the accident,

employed the diligence of a good father of a family in selecting its

disfigures her face and that the fracture of her left leg has caused

aforesaid employees, however, it did not employ such diligence in

a permanent deformity which renders it very difficult for her to

supervising their work and the discharge of their duties. The

walk, and taking into further consideration her social standing,

diligence of a good father of a family, which the law requires in

neither is the sum adjudicated to her for patrimonial and moral

order to avoid damage, is not confined to the careful and prudent

damages, excessive.

selection of subordinates or employees but includes inspection of

their work and supervision of the discharge of their duties.

As to the indemnity in favor of the child neither is the same

excessive, taking into consideration the fact that the lacerations

2. a. With respect to the plaintiffs appeal, the first question to be

received by her have left deep scars that permanently disfigure

decided is that raised by Lilius relative to the insufficiency of the

her face and that the fractures of both her legs permanently

sum of P5,000 which the trial court adjudicated to him by way of

render it difficult for her to walk freely, continuous extreme care

indemnity for damages consisting in the loss of his income as

being necessary in order to keep her balance in addition to the

journalist and author as a result of his illness. As to the amount of

fact that all of this unfavorably and to a great extent affect her

P10,000 claimed by Lilius as damages for the loss of his wifes

matrimonial future.

services in his business, which services consisted in going over

his writings, translating them into foreign languages and acting
as his secretary, in addition to the fact that such services formed
part of the work whereby he realized a net monthly income of
P1,500, there is no sufficient evidence of the true value of said
services nor to the effect that he needed them during her illness
and had to employ a translator to act in her stead.
b. Taking into consideration the fact that the wife in the
language of the court, which saw her at the trial young and
beautiful and the big scar, which she has on her forehead caused

c. Lilius also seeks to recover the sum of P2,500 for the loss of
what is called Anglo-Saxon common law consortium of his wife,
that is, her services, society and conjugal companionship, as a
result of personal injuries which she had received from the
accident now under consideration.
Under the law and the doctrine of this court, one of the husbands
rights is to count on his wifes assistance. This assistance
comprises the management of the home and the performance of
household duties. However, nowadays when women, in their

desire to be more useful to society and to the nation, are

However, in order that a victim of an accident may recover

demanding greater civil rights and are aspiring to become mans

indemnity for damages from the person liable therefor, it is not

equal in all the activities of life, marriage has ceased to create the

enough that the latter has been guilty of negligence, but it is also

presumption that a woman complies with the duties to her

necessary that the said victim has not, through his own

husband and children, which the law imposes upon her, and he

negligence, , contributed to the accident.

who seeks to collect indemnity for damages resulting from

deprivation of her domestic services must prove such services. In
the case under consideration, apart from the services of his wife
as translator and secretary, the value of which has not been
proven, Lilius has not presented any evidence showing the
existence of domestic services and their nature, rendered by her
prior to the accident, in order that it may serve as a basis in
estimating their value.

It appears that Lilius took all precautions which his skill and the
presence of his wife and child, driving his car at a speed which
prudence demanded according to the circumstances and
conditions of the road, slackening his speed in the face of an
obstacle and blowing his horn upon seeing persons on the road. If
he failed to stop, look and listen before going over the crossing, in
spite of the fact that he was driving at 12 miles per hour after
having been free from obstacles, it was because, his attention

Furthermore, inasmuch as a wifes domestic assistance and

having been occupied in attempting to go ahead, he did not see

conjugal companionship are purely personal and voluntary acts

the crossing in question, nor anything, nor anybody indicating its

which neither of the spouses may be compelled to render, it is

existence, as he knew nothing about it beforehand. The first and

necessary for the party claiming indemnity for the loss of such

only warning, which he received of the impending danger, was

services to prove that the person obliged to render them had

two short blows from the whistle of the locomotive immediately

done so before he was injured and that he would be willing to

preceding the collision and when the accident had already

continue rendering them had he not been prevented from so

become inevitable.


10. GO vs YAMANE

Lot in Baguio City is registered in the name of Muriel Yamane,

wife of Leonardo Yamane. Atty. De Guzman who handled a case
for wife and her sisters levied the said property to satisfy the lien
for attorneys fees.
The RTC of Baguio City held that the subject parcel of land was
the paraphernal property of Muriel Yamane and not the conjugal
property of the spouses. Leonardo Yamane, husband filed a
motion for reconsideration, which was denied. The case was
brought to the Court of Appeals.
The Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the RTC. The
appellate court contends that, property acquired during
marriage is presumed to be conjugal, unless the exclusive funds
of one spouse are shown to have been used for the purpose.
Husbands name appeared on the Transfer Certificate of Title
(TCT) and the Deed of Absolute Sale. Both documents indicate
that Muriel was married to Leonardo Yamane.
Whether the nature of the property is conjugal or paraphernal

February 27, 1967, or specifically during the marriage. We then

follow the rule that proof of the acquisition of the subject property
during a marriage suffices to render the statutory presumption
operative. It is clear enough that the presently disputed piece of
land pertains to the conjugal partnership.
The contract or transaction between Atty. De Guzman and the
Pucay sisters appears to have been incurred for the exclusive
interest of the latter. Muriel was acting privately for her exclusive
interest when she joined her two sisters in hiring the services of
Atty. De Guzman to handle a case for them. Accordingly,
whatever expenses were incurred by Muriel in the litigation for
her and her sisters' private and exclusive interests, are her
exclusive responsibility and certainly cannot be charged against
the contested conjugal property. This piece of land may not be
used to pay for her indebtedness, because her obligation has not
been shown to be one of the charges against the conjugal
The power of the court in executing judgments extends only to
properties unquestionably belonging to the judgment debtor
alone. In this case, therefore, the property -- being conjugal in
nature -- cannot be levied upon. Petition is DENIED.

Property purchased by spouses during the existence of their
marriage is presumed to be conjugal in nature, unless it be
proved that it pertains exclusively to the husband or to the wife.
(Article 160)
The nature of a property, whether conjugal or paraphernal, is
determined by law and not by the will of one of the spouses.
The mere registration of a property in the name of one spouse
does not destroy its conjugal nature. Conjugal property cannot be
held liable for the personal obligation contracted by one spouse,
unless some advantage of benefit is shown to have accrued to
the conjugal partnership.

11. Pana v. Heirs of Juanite, G.R. No. 164201, Dec. 10,

FACTS: Petitioner EfrenPana (Efren), his wife Melecia, and others
were accused of murder. Efren was acquitted but Melecia and
another person was found guilty and was sentenced to the
penalty of death and to pay each of the heirs of the victims,
jointly and severally for civil indemnity and damages.
Upon motion for execution by the heirs of the deceased, the RTC
ordered the issuance of the writ, resulting in the levy of real
properties registered in the names of Efren and Melecia.
Subsequently, a notice of levy and a notice of sale on execution
were issued.

The CA committed no error in declaring that the parcel of land

belonged to the conjugal partnership of Spouses Muriel and
Leonardo Yamane. They acquired it from Eugene Pucay on


Efren and his wife Melecia filed a motion to quash the writ of
execution, claiming that the levied properties were conjugal
assets, not paraphernal assets of Melecia.
ISSUE: WON the conjugal properties of spouses Efren and Melecia
can be levied and executed upon for the satisfaction of Melecias
civil liability in the murder case.
HELD: Art. 122. The payment of personal debts contracted by the
husband or the wife before or during the marriage shall not be
charged to the conjugal properties partnership except insofar as
they redounded to the benefit of the family.
Neither shall the fines and pecuniary indemnities imposed upon
them be charged to the partnership.
The payment of fines and indemnities imposed upon the spouses
may be enforced against the partnership assets if the spouse who
is bound should have no exclusive property or if it should be
Since Efren does not dispute the RTCs finding that Melecia has no
exclusive property of her own, the above applies. The civil
indemnity that the decision in the murder case imposed on her
may be enforced against their conjugal assets after the
responsibilities enumerated in Article 121 of the Family Code
have been covered.

12. Carlos vs. Abelardo

GR No. 146504, April 4, 2002

violent resistance to the extent of making various death threats

against petitioner. In 1994, petitioner made a formal demand but
the spouses failed to comply with the obligation. The spouses
were separated in fact for more than a year prior the filing of the
complaint hence spouses filed separate answers.
contended that the amount was never intended as a loan but his
share of income on contracts obtained by him in the construction
firm and that the petitoner could have easily deducted the debt
from his share in the profits. RTC decision was in favor of the
petitioner, however CA reversed and set aside trial courts
decision for insufficiency of evidence. Evidently, there was a
check issued worth $25,000 paid to the owner of the Paranaque
property which became the conjugal dwelling of the spouses. The
wife executed an instrument acknowledging the loan but
Abelardo did not sign.
ISSUE: WON a loan obtained to purchase the conjugal dwelling
can be charged against the conjugal partnership.
Yes, as it has redounded to the benefit of the family. They did not
deny that the same served as their conjugal home thus benefiting
the family. Hence, the spouses are jointly and severally liable in
the payment of the loan. Abelardos contention that it is not a
loan rather a profit share in the construction firm is untenable
since there was no proof that he was part of the stockholders that
will entitle him to the profits and income of the company.
Hence, the petition was granted and Abelardo is ordered to pay
the petitioner in the amount of $25,000 plus legal interest
including moral and exemplary damages and attorneys fees.

Honorio Carlos filed a petition against Manuel Abelardo, his sonin-law for recovery of the $25,000 loan used to purchase a house
and lot located at Paranaque. It was in October 1989 when the
petitioner issued a check worth as such to assist the spouses in
conducting their married life independently. The seller of the
property acknowledged receipt of the full payment. In July 1991,
the petitioner inquired from spouses status of the amount loaned
from him, the spouses pleaded that they were not yet in position
to make a definite settlement. Thereafter, respondent expressed

13. Guiang v. CA
Over the objection of private respondent Gilda Corpuz and while
she was in Manila seeking employment, her husband sold to the
petitioners-spouses Antonio and Luzviminda Guiang one half of
their conjugal peoperty, consisting of their residence and the lot
on which it stood. Upon her return to Cotabato, respondent


gathered her children and went back to the subject property.

Petitioners filed a complaint for trespassing. Later, there was an
amicable settlement between the parties. Feeling that she had
the shorer end of the bargain, respondent filed an Amended
Complaint against her husband and petitioners. The said
Complaint sought the declaration of a certain deed of sale, which
involved the conjugal property of private respondent and her
husband, null and void.
Whether the sale was void or merely voidable and was ratified by
the amicable settlement
Respondent's consent to the contract of sale of their conjugal
property was totally inexistent or absent. The nullity of the
contract of sale is premised on the absence of private
respondent's consent. To constitute a valid contract, the Civil
Code requires the concurrence of the following elements: (1)
cause, (2) object, and (3) consent, the last element being
indubitably absent in the case at bar.

Neither can the "amicable settlement" be considered a continuing

offer that was accepted and perfected by the parties, following
the last sentence of Article 124. The order of the pertinent events
is clear: after the sale, petitioners filed a complaint for
trespassing against private respondent, after which the barangay
authorities secured an "amicable settlement" and petitioners filed
before the MTC a motion for its execution. The settlement,
however, does not mention a continuing offer to sell the property
or an acceptance of such a continuing offer. Its tenor was to the
effect that private respondent would vacate the property. By no
stretch of the imagination, can the Court interpret this document
as the acceptance mentioned in Article 124.


G.R. No. 147978. January 23, 2002.

Petitioner, Thelma A. Jader-Manalo made an offer to buy the
properties of the respondents from the husband of Norma
Fernandez C. Camaisa, respondent Edilberto Camaisa. After some
bargaining, petitioner and Edilberto agreed upon the purchase
price and terms of payment. The agreement handwritten by the
petitioner was signed by Edilberto, with assurance from him that
he would secure his wifes consent. Petitioner was later on
surprised when she was informed that respondent spouses were
backing out of the agreement. Hence, she filed a complaint for
specific performance and damages.
Whether or not the husband may validly dispose of a conjugal
property without the wife's written consent.

Under Art. 124 of the Family Code: In the event that one spouse
is incapacitated or otherwise unable to participate in the
administration of the conjugal properties, the other spouse may
assume sole powers of administration. These powers do not
include the powers of disposition or encumbrance which must
have the authority of the court or the written consent of the other
spouse. In the absence of such authority or consent the
disposition or encumbrance shall be void.
The properties subject to the contract in this case were conjugal;
hence, for the contracts to sell to be effective, the consent of both
husband and wife must be obtained. Respondent Norma Camaisa
did not give her written consent to the sale. Even granting that
respondent Norma actively participated in negotiating for the sale
of the subject properties, which she denied, her written consent
to the sale is required by law for its validity. She may have been
aware of the negotiations for the sale of their conjugal properties,
however that is not sufficient to demonstrate consent.




G.R. No. 153802

Certificate of Sale was issued in favor of petitioner as the highest

bidder. After the lapse of one year without the property being

March 11, 2005

FACTS: Miguela Dailo and Marcelino Dailo, Jr were married on
August 8, 1967. During their marriage the spouses purchased a
house and lot situated at San Pablo City from a certain Dalida.
The subject property was declared for tax assessment purposes
The Deed of Absolute Sale, however, was executed only in favor
of the late Marcelino Dailo, Jr. as vendee thereof to the
exclusion of his wife.
Marcelino Dailo, Jr. executed a Special Power of Attorney (SPA) in
favor of one Gesmundo, authorizing the latter to obtain a loan
from petitioner Homeowners Savings and Loan Bank to be
secured by the spouses Dailos house and lot in San Pablo City.
Pursuant to the SPA, Gesmundo obtained a loan from petitioner.
As security therefor, Gesmundo executed on the same day a Real
Estate Mortgage constituted on the subject property in favor of
petitioner. The abovementioned transactions, including the
execution of the SPA in favor of Gesmundo, took

redeemed, petitioner consolidated the ownership thereof by

executing an Affidavit of Consolidation of Ownership and a Deed
of Absolute Sale.
In the meantime, Marcelino Dailo, Jr. died. In one of her visits to
the subject property, Miguela learned that petitioner had already
employed a certain Brion to clean its premises and that her car, a
Ford sedan, was razed because Brion allowed a boy to play with
fire within the premises.
Claiming that she had no knowledge of the mortgage constituted
on the subject property, which was conjugal in nature, respondent
instituted with the RTC San Pablo City a Civil Case for Nullity of
Real Estate Mortgage and Certificate of Sale, Affidavit of
Consolidation of Ownership, Deed of Sale, Reconveyance with
Prayer for Preliminary Injunction and Damages against petitioner.
In the latters Answer with Counterclaim, petitioner prayed for the
dismissal of the complaint on the ground that the property in
question was the exclusive property of the late Marcelino Dailo, Jr.

place without the knowledge and consent of respondent.[

After trial on the merits, the trial court rendered
Upon maturity, the loan remained outstanding. As a result,
petitioner instituted extrajudicial foreclosure proceedings on the
mortgaged property. After the extrajudicial sale thereof, a

a Decision declaring the said documents null and void and further
ordered the defendant is ordered to reconvey the property
subject of this complaint to the plaintiff, to pay the plaintiff the


sum representing the value of the car which was burned, the

other spouse may assume sole powers of administration. These

attorneys fees, moral and exemplary damages.

powers do not include the powers of disposition or encumbrance

which must have the authority of the court or the written consent

The appellate court affirmed the trial courts Decision, but deleted
the award for damages and attorneys fees for lack of basis.

of the other spouse. In the absence of such authority or consent,

the disposition or encumbrance shall be void. . . .

Hence, this petition

In applying Article 124 of the Family Code, this Court declared

that the absence of the consent of one renders the entire sale null
and void, including the portion of the conjugal property pertaining
to the husband who contracted the sale.
Respondent and the late Marcelino. were married on August 8,
1967. In the absence of a marriage settlement, the system of
relative community or conjugal partnership of gains
governed the property relations between respondent and her
late husband. With the effectivity of the Family Code on August 3,
1988, Chapter 4 on Conjugal Partnership of Gains in the Family

HELD: the petition is denied.

Code was made applicable to conjugal partnership of

gains already established before its effectivity unless vested

1. NO. Article 124 of the Family Code provides in part:

ART. 124. The administration and enjoyment of the conjugal
partnership property shall belong to both spouses jointly. . . .
In the event that one spouse is incapacitated or otherwise unable
to participate in the administration of the conjugal properties, the

rights have already been acquired under the Civil Code or other
The rules on co-ownership do not even apply to the property
relations of respondent and the late Marcelino even in a
suppletory manner. The regime of conjugal partnership of
gains is a special type of partnership, where the husband


and wife place in a common fund the proceeds, products, fruits

the same manner that the rule on co-ownership under Article 493

and income from their separate properties and those acquired by

of the Civil Code does. Where the law does not distinguish, courts

either or both spouses through their efforts or by chance. Unlike

should not distinguish. Thus, both the trial court and the appellate

the absolute community of property wherein the rules on co-

court are correct in declaring the nullity of the real estate

ownership apply in a suppletory manner, the conjugal partnership

mortgage on the subject property for lack of respondents

shall be governed by the rules on contract of partnership in all


that is not in conflict with what is expressly determined in the

chapter (on conjugal partnership of gains) or by the spouses in
their marriage settlements. Thus, the property relations of
respondent and her late husband shall be governed, foremost, by
Chapter 4 on Conjugal Partnership of Gains of the Family Code
and, suppletorily, by the rules on partnership under the Civil

2. NO. Under Article 121 of the Family Code, [T]he conjugal

partnership shall be liable for: . . .

Debts and obligations contracted by either spouse without

the consent of the other to the extent that the family may have
been benefited; . . . .

Code. In case of conflict, the former prevails because the Civil

Code provisions on partnership apply only when the Family Code

Certainly, to make a conjugal partnership respond for a liability

is silent on the matter.

that should appertain to the husband alone is to defeat and

frustrate the avowed objective of the new Civil Code to show the

The basic and established fact is that during his lifetime, without
the knowledge and consent of his wife, Marcelino constituted a

utmost concern for the solidarity and well-being of the family as a


real estate mortgage on the subject property, which formed part

of their conjugal partnership. By express provision of Article 124

The burden of proof that the debt was contracted for the benefit

of the Family Code, in the absence of (court) authority or written

of the conjugal partnership of gains lies with the creditor-party

consent of the other spouse, any disposition or encumbrance of

litigant claiming as such. Ei incumbit probatio qui dicit, non qui

the conjugal property shall be void.

negat (he who asserts, not he who denies, must prove).

Petitioners sweeping conclusion that the loan obtained by the

The aforequoted provision does not qualify with respect to the

late Marcelino to finance the construction of housing units without

share of the spouse who makes the disposition or encumbrance in


a doubt redounded to the benefit of his family, without adducing

adequate proof, does not persuade this Court. Consequently, the
conjugal partnership cannot be held liable for the payment of the
principal obligation.
In addition, a perusal of the records of the case reveals that
during the trial, petitioner vigorously asserted that the subject
property was the exclusive property of the late Marcelino Dailo, Jr.
Nowhere in the answer filed with the trial court was it alleged that
the proceeds of the loan redounded to the benefit of the family.
Even on appeal, petitioner never claimed that the family
benefited from the proceeds of the loan. When a party adopts a

a Conditional Contract to Sell for the purchase on installment of a

lot situated in Quezon City. On April 24, 1968, Bonifacio married
Anita de Leon. They had two children, Danilo and Vilma. On June
22, 1970, PHHC executed a Final Deed of Sale in favor of
Bonifacio upon full payment of the price of the lot. TCT was issued
on February 24, 1972 in the name of Bonifacio, single. On
January 12, 1974, Bonifacio sold the lot to his sister, Lita, and her
husband, Felix Tarrosa. The Deed of Sale did not bear the written
consent and signature of Anita. On February 29, 1996, Bonifacio
Three months later, Tarrosa spouses registered the Deed of Sale.
Anita, Danilo, and Vilma filed a reconveyance suit allegeing that
Bonifacio was still the owner of the lands. Tarrosa spouses averred
that the lot Bonifacio sold to them was his exclusive property
because he was still single when he acquired it from PHHC. They
further alleged that they were not aware of the marriage between
Bonifacio and Anita at the time of the execution of the Deed of
The RTC ruled in favor of Anita De Leon et al stating that the lot in
question was the conjugal property of Bonifacio and Anita. The CA
affirmed the decision of the RTC. Hence, this petition.

certain theory in the court below, he will not be permitted to

change his theory on appeal, for to permit him to do so would not
only be unfair to the other party but it would also be offensive to
the basic rules of fair play, justice and due process. A party may
change his legal theory on appeal only when the factual bases
thereof would not require presentation of any further
evidence by the adverse party in order to enable it to properly
meet the issue raised in the new theory.

16. Tarrosa v. De Leon, G.R. No. 185063, July 23, 2009

ISSUE: W/N the property that Bonifacio has purchased on

installment before the marriage although some installments were
paid during the marriage would be considered conjugal property

HELD: Yes. The subject lot which was once owned by PHHC and
covered by the Conditional Contract to Sell was only transferred
during the marriage of Bonifacio and Anita. The title to the
property was only passed to Bonifacio after he had fully paid the
purchase price on June 22, 1970. This full payment was made
more than 2 years after his marriage to Anita on April 24, 1968.
In effect, the property was acquired during the existence of the
marriage. Hence, ownership to the property is presumed to
belong to the conjugal partnership.

FACTS: On July 20, 1965, Bonifacio De Leon, then single, and the
Peoples Homesite and Housing Corporation (PHHC) entered into



January 1998 petitioner and respondent got married. On May
2001, petitioner filed an action for Declaration of Niullity of
Marriagw against respondent citing psychological incapacity
under article 36. Petitioner alleged that respondent failed in her
marital obligation to give love and support to him, and had
abandoned her responsibility to the family, choosing instead to go
on shopping sprees and gallivanting with her friends that
depleted the family assets. Petitioner further alleged that
respondent was not faithful, and would at times become violent
and hurt him. The trial court declared their marriage void ab
MARRIAGE shall only be issued upon compliance with Article[s] 50
and 51 of the Family Code. It later altered it to A DECREE OF
ABSOLUTE NULLITY OF MARRIAGE shall be issued after liquidation,
partition and distribution of the parties properties under Article
147 of the Family Code
ISSUE: WON the trial court erred when it ordered that a decree of
absolute nullity of marriage shall only be issued after liquidation,
partition, and distribution of the parties properties under Article
147 of the Family Code
The court erred. The Court has ruled in Valdes v. RTC, Branch 102,
Quezon City that in a void marriage, regardless of its cause, the
property relations of the parties during the period of cohabitation
is governed either by Article 147 or Article 148 of the Family
Code.7 Article 147 of the Family Code applies to union of parties
who are legally capacitated and not barred by any impediment to
contract marriage, but whose marriage is nonetheless void, such
as petitioner and respondent in the case before the Court.
For Article 147 of the Family Code to apply, the following
elements must be present:
1. The man and the woman must be capacitated to marry each
2. They live exclusively with each other as husband and wife; and

3. Their union is without the benefit of marriage, or their marriage

is void
All these elements are present in this case and there is no
question that Article 147 of the Family Code applies to the
property relations between petitioner and respondent.
It is clear from Article 50 of the Family Code that Section 19(1) of
the Rule applies only to marriages which are declared void ab
initio or annulled by final judgment under Articles 40 and 45 of
the Family Code. In short, Article 50 of the Family Code does not
apply to marriages which are declared void ab initio under Article
36 of the Family Code, which should be declared void without
waiting for the liquidation of the properties of the parties.
Since the property relations of the parties in art 40 and 45 are
governed by absolute community of property or conjugal
partnership of gains, there is a need to liquidate, partition and
distribute the properties before a decree of annulment could be
issued. That is not the case for annulment of marriage under
Article 36 of the Family Code because the marriage is governed
by the ordinary rules on co-ownership.
In this case, petitioners marriage to respondent was declared
void under Article 3615 of the Family Code and not under Article
40 or 45. Thus, what governs the liquidation of properties owned
in common by petitioner and respondent are the rules on coownership. In Valdes, the Court ruled that the property relations
of parties in a void marriage during the period of cohabitation is
governed either by Article 147 or Article 148 of the Family Code.
The rules on co-ownership apply and the properties of the
spouses should be liquidated in accordance with the Civil Code
provisions on co-ownership. Under Article 496 of the Civil Code,
[p]artition may be made by agreement between the parties or
by judicial proceedings. x x x. It is not necessary to liquidate the
properties of the spouses in the same proceeding for declaration
of nullity of marriage.


18. Valdes vs Regional Trial Court, G.R. No. 122749. July

31, 1996
In a void marriage, regardless of the cause thereof, the
property relations of the parties during the period of cohabitation
is governed by the provisions of Article 147 or Article 148, such as
the case may be, of the Family Code.
Facts: Antonio Valdez and Consuelo Gomez were married in
1971. They begot 5 children. In 1992, Valdez filed a petition for
declaration of nullity of their marriage on the ground of
psychological incapacity. The trial court granted the petition,
thereby declaring their marriage null and void. It also directed the
parties to start proceedings on the liquidation of their common
properties as defined by Article 147 of the Family Code, and to
comply with the provisions of Articles 50, 51 and 52 of the same
Gomez sought a clarification of that portion in the decision. She
asserted that the Family Code contained no provisions on the
procedure for the liquidation of common property in "unions
In an Order, the trial court made the following clarification:
"Consequently, considering that Article 147 of the Family Code
explicitly provides that the property acquired by both parties
during their union, in the absence of proof to the contrary, are
presumed to have been obtained through the joint efforts of the
parties and will be owned by them in equal shares, plaintiff and
defendant will own their 'family home' and all their other
properties for that matter in equal shares. In the liquidation and
partition of the properties owned in common by the plaintiff and
defendant, the provisions on co-ownership found in the Civil Code
Valdes moved for reconsideration of the Order which was denied.
Valdes appealed, arguing that: (1) Article 147 of the Family Code
does not apply to cases where the parties are psychological
incapacitated; (2) Articles 50, 51 and 52 in relation to Articles 102
and 129 of the Family Code govern the disposition of the family
dwelling in cases where a marriage is declared void ab initio,
including a marriage declared void by reason of the psychological

incapacity of the spouses; (3) Assuming arguendo that Article 147

applies to marriages declared void ab initio on the ground of the
psychological incapacity of a spouse, the same may be read
consistently with Article 129.
Whether Art 147 FC is the correct law governing the disposition of
property in the case at bar.
Yes. In a void marriage, regardless of the cause thereof, the
property relations of the parties during the period of cohabitation
is governed by the provisions of Article 147 or Article 148, such as
Article 147 applies when a man and a woman, suffering no illegal
impediment to marry each other, so exclusively live together as
husband and wife under a void marriage or without the benefit of
marriage. Under this property regime, property acquired by both
spouses through their work and industry shall be governed by the
rules on equal co-ownership. Any property acquired during the
union is prima facie presumed to have been obtained through
their joint efforts. A party who did not participate in the
acquisition of the property shall be considered as having
contributed thereto jointly if said party's "efforts consisted in the
care and maintenance of the family household." Unlike the
conjugal partnership of gains, the fruits of the couple's separate
When the common-law spouses suffer from a legal impediment to
marry or when they do not live exclusively with each other (as
husband and wife), only the property acquired by both of them
through their actual joint contribution of money, property or
industry shall be owned in common and in proportion to their
respective contributions. Such contributions and corresponding
shares, however, are prima facie presumed to be equal. The
share of any party who is married to another shall accrue to the
absolute community or conjugal partnership, as the case may be,
if so existing under a valid marriage. If the party who has acted in
bad faith is not validly married to another, his or her share shall


be forfeited in the manner already heretofore expressed.

In deciding to take further cognizance of the issue on the
settlement of the parties' common property, the trial court acted
neither imprudently nor precipitately; a court which has
jurisdiction to declare the marriage a nullity must be deemed
likewise clothed in authority to resolve incidental and
consequential matters. Nor did it commit a reversible error in
ruling that petitioner and private respondent own the "family
home" and all their common property in equal shares, as well as
in concluding that, in the liquidation and partition of the property
owned in common by them, the provisions on co-ownership under
the Civil Code, not Articles 50, 51 and 52, in relation to Articles
102 and 129, 12 of the Family Code, should aptly prevail. The
rules set up to govern the liquidation of either the absolute
community or the conjugal partnership of gains, the property
regimes recognized for valid and voidable marriages (in the latter
case until the contract is annulled), are irrelevant to the
liquidation of the co-ownership that exists between common-law
The first paragraph of Articles 50 of the Family Code, applying
paragraphs (2), (3), (4) and 95) of Article 43, 13 relates only, by
its explicit terms, to voidable marriages and, exceptionally, to
void marriages under Article 40 14 of the Code, i.e., the
declaration of nullity of a subsequent marriage contracted by a
spouse of a prior void marriage before the latter is judicially
declared void.
G.R. No. 151967 :: 16 February 2005 :: Callejo, Sr., J.
Josefina Castillo, married to Eduardo Francisco, bought two
parcels of residential land and a house thereon. The Register of
Deeds issued TCTs in the name of Josefina Castillo Francisco
married to Eduardo G. Francisco. Eduardo had written an
Affidavit of Waiver stating that before his marriage to Josefina, the
latter purchased two parcels of land, including the house
constructed thereon, with her own savings and that he was

waiving whatever claims he had over the property. The property

was mortgaged to Leonila Cando with marital conformity of
When Eduardo failed to pay for the 7,500 bags of cement worth
P768,750.00 from Master Iron Works, the court issued a writ of
execution levying the two parcels of land owned by Josefina.
Before Josefina could commence presenting her evidence against
MIWCC, Josefina filed a petition to annul her marriage to Eduardo
on the ground that the latter had a subsisting marriage to one
Carmelita Carpio when the two were married. Said annulment
was granted by the RTC.
Whether or not the subject properties were paraphernal property
of Josefina and can not be held liable for the Eduardos personal

Although it is true that the properties cannot be held as conjugal
for the cohabitation between Eduardo and Josefina are bigamous,
the latter failed to adduce preponderance of evidence that she
contributed money, property or industry in the acquisition of the
subject property and hence, is not a co-owner of such. Also, the
Court doubted that when she acquired the property at 23 years of
age, she had enough funds to pay for it. Her claim that the funds
for the property were provided by her mother and sister, the
Court believed, was just an afterthought.
20. ABRENICA VS ABRENICA GR 180572 06.18.12
P and R were law firm partners. R filed a case against P d to
return partnership funds representing profits from the sale of a
parcel of land and sought to recover from petitioner retainer fees


that he received from two clients of the firm and the balance of
the cash advance that he obtained.
P filed an Urgent Omnibus Motion alleging that the sheriff had
levied on properties belonging to his children and petitioner
Joena. Joena filed an Affidavit of Third Party alleging that she and
her stepchildren owned a number of the personal properties
sought to be levied and that it was under their ACP.
A Sheriffs Certificate of Sale was issued on 3 January 2008 in
favor of the law firm for the Ps properties.
*P has been previously married to another woman but their
marriage has already been dissolved.

FACTS: Brigido Quiao (petitioner) and Rita Quiao (respondent)

contracted marriage in 1977. They had no separate properties
prior to their marriage. During the course of said marriage, they
produced four children. In 2000, Rita filed a complaint against
Brigido for legal separation for cohabiting with another woman.
Subsequently, the RTC rendered a decision in 2005 declaring the
legal separation of the parties pursuant to Article 55. Save for one
child (already of legal age), the three minor children remains in
the custody of Rita, who is the innocent spouse.
The properties accrued by the spouses shall be divided equally
between them subject to the respective legitimes of their
children; however, Brigidos share of the net profits earned by the
conjugal partnership shall be forfeited in favor of their children in
accordance to par. 9 of Article 129 of the FC.


A few months thereafter, Rita filed a motion for execution, which

was granted by the trial court. By 2006, Brigido paid Rita with
regards to the earlier decision; the writ was partially executed.

NO. Two of these stepchildren were already of legal age when

Joena filed her Affidavit. As to one of the children, parental
authority over him belongs to his parents. Absent any special
power of attorney authorizing Joena to represent Erlandos
children, her claim cannot be sustained.

After more than 9 months later, Brigido filed a motion for

clarification asking the RTC to define Nets Profits Earned. In
answer, the court held that the phrase denotes the remainder of
the properties of the parties after deducting the separate
properties of each of the spouses and debts.

Art. 92, par. (3) of the Family Code excludes from the
community property the property acquired before the marriage of
a spouse who has legitimate descendants by a former marriage;
and the fruits and the income, if any, of that property. Thus,
neither these two vehicles nor the house and lot belong to the
second marriage.

Upon a motion for reconsideration, it initially set aside its

previous decision stating that NET PROFIT EARNED shall be
computed in accordance with par. 4 of Article 102 of the FC.
However, it later reverted to its original Order, setting aside the
last ruling.

WON Joena had the right to the claim?

Petition denied.

21. Quiao v. Quiao, G.R. No. 183622, July 4, 2012

ISSUE: Whether or not the regime of conjugal partnership of gains

governs the couples property relations.

HELD: Yes. Brigido and Rita tied the knot on January 6, 1977.
Since at the time of exchange of martial vows, the operative law
was the NCC and since they did not agree on a marriage
settlement, the property relations between them is the system of
relative community or the conjugal partnership of gains. Under


this property relation, the husband and wife place in a common

fund the fruits of their separate property and the income from
their work and industry. The husband and wife also own in
common all the property of the conjugal partnership of gains.

Tarciano offered to sell the lot to the petitioners Fuentes spouses

through the help of Atty. Plagata who would prepare the

and requirements to






agreement between Tarciano and Fuentes spouses there will be a


Php 60,000 down payment and Php 140,000 will be paid upon the

G.R. 195670 December 3, 2012

removal of Tarciano of certain structures on the land and after the

Ponente: Perlas-Bernabe, J

consent of the estranged wife of Tarciano, Rosario, would be


attained. Atty. Plagata thus went about to complete such tasks

Petitioner. a Dutch national, assails the decision of CA which

affirmed the decision of RTC Negros Oriental. Petitioner and
Filipina respondents marriage was nullified by basis of the
formers psychological incapacity. Petitioner thus filed for
Dissolution of Conjugal Partnership praying for distribution of the
properties acquired during their marriage which include 4 lots of
land acquired through purchase and 2 lots by inheritance. RTC
ruled that all parcels of land be given to the respondent, tools and
equipment in favour of the petitioner and the two houses on Lots
1 and 2142 as co-owned by the parties.

and claimed that he went to Manila to get the signature of Rosario


was not attained and that Rosarios signature was a mere forgery.

Is the petitioner entitled to assail the decision of the RTC and CA?

The Fuentes spouses claim that the action has prescribed since


an action to annul a sale on the ground of fraud is 4 years from

The petition lacks merit. Firstly, foreigners may not own lands in
the Philippines. However, there are no restrictions to the
ownership of buildings or structures on lands of foreigners. As
such, the two houses on Lots 1 and 2142 are considered coowned by the parties.


but notarized the document at Zamboanga . The deed of sale was

executed January 11, 1989. As time passed, Tarciano and Rosario
died while the Fuentes spouses and possession and control over
the lot. Eight years later in 1997, the children of Tarciano and
Rosario filed a case to annul the sale and reconvey the property
on the ground that the sale was void since the consent of Rosario

The RTC ruled in favor of the Fuentes spouses ruling that there
was no forgery, that the testimony of Atty. Plagata who witnessed
the signing of Rosario must be given weight, and that the action

23. Fuentes v. Conrado Roca, G.R. 178902, April 2010

FACTS: On, Oct 11, 1982, Tarciano Roca bought a 358-square
meter lot in Zambales from his mother. Six years later in 1988,




On the other hand, the CA reversed the ruling of the CA stating

that the action has not prescribed since the applicable law is the


1950 Civil Code which provided that the sale of Conjugal Property

already established at the enactment of the Family Code. The sale

without the consent of the other spouse is voidable and the

of conjugal property done by Tarciano without the consent of



Rosario is completely void under Art 124 of the family code. With

transaction was in 1989 and the action was brought in 1997

that, it is a given fact that assailing a void contract never


prescribes. On the argument that the action has already







within 10








prescribed based on the discovery of the fraud, that prescriptive


period applied to the Fuentes spouses since it was them who

1. Whether or not Rosarios signature on the document of consent

should have assailed such contract due to the fraud but they

to her husband Tarcianos sale of their conjugal land to the

failed to do so. On the other hand, the action to assail a sale


based on no consent given by the other spouse does not




2. Whether or not the Rocas action for the declaration of nullity
















3. Whether or not only Rosario, the wife whose consent was not

3. It is argued by the Spouses Fuentes that it is only the spouse,


Rosario, who can file such a case to assail the validity of the sale









but given that Rosario was already dead no one could bring the

action anymore. The SC ruled that such position is wrong since as

1. The SC ruled that there was forgery due to the difference in the


signatures of Rosario in the document giving consent and another

Consequently, the land remained the property of Tarciano and

document executed at the same time period. The SC noted that

Rosario despite that sale. When the two died, they passed on the

the CA was correct in ruling that the heavy handwriting in the

ownership of the property to their heirs, namely, the Rocas. As

document which stated consent was completely different from

lawful owners, the Rocas had the right, under Article 429 of the

the sample signature. There was no evidence provided to explain

Civil Code, to exclude any person from its enjoyment and










2. Although Tarciano and Rosario was married during the 1950

civil code, the sale was done in 1989, after the effectivity of the









24. Ravina vs Abrille


Family Code. The Family Code applies to Conjugal Partnerships


Mary Ann and Pedro Villa-Abrille were husband and wife. They
had four children (herein respondents). The properties involved
in this case are: (1982) Lot 7 acquired by the spouses during
their marriage; Lot 8 acquired by Pedro when he was still single;
House built on lot 7 and 8 built from their joint efforts and the
proceeds of a loan from DBP.
(1991) Pedro got a mistress. Pedro offered to sell the house and
two lots to petitioners Ravina. Mary Ann objected. Pedro still sold
the properties without her consent. Pedro, with the connivance
Ravina and some Civilian Armed Forces (CAFGU) transferred all
the belongings from the house to an apartment and prevented
Mary Ann and the kids from entering the house.
Thus, Mary Ann and the children filed a complaint for Annulment
of Sale, Specific Performance and Damages before RTC Davao.
During the trial, Pedro declared that the house was built with his
own money. Petitioner Ravina testified that they bought the house
and lot from Pedro upon examination of the title.
RTC The sale of: Lot 7 void as to representing share of Mary
Ann; Lot 8 void as to representing share of Mary Ann who did
not consent; house void as to ; pay Mary Ann the value of
belongings that were lost; pay moral and exemplary damages and
the cost of suit.
CA sale of Lot 8 valid; sale of Lot 7 null and void; ordered
Pedro to return the value of the consideration to Ravina; ordered
Ravina to reconvey the house and Lot to spouses Pedro and Mary
Ann; ordered Pedro and Ravina to pay Mary Ann moral and
exemplary damages.
(1) Whether Lot 7 is an exclusive property of Pedro or conjugal
(2) Whether sale of Lot 7 by Pedro was valid considering the
absence of Mary Anns consent.


(1) Presumed to be Conjugal property of spouses Pedro and Mary

(2) Annullable with five years
(1) Petitioner Ravina asserts that Lot 7 was exclusive property of
Pedro, it being acquired by Pedro thru barter or exchange with his
another exclusive property.
The Court is not persuaded. No evidence was adduced to show
that the subject property was acquired through exchange or
barter. The presumption of the conjugal nature of the property
subsists in the absence of clear, satisfactory and convincing
evidence to overcome said presumption or to prove that the
subject property is exclusively owned by Pedro. The fact is, Lot 7
was acquired in 1982 during the marriage of Pedro and Mary Ann.
Likewise, the house built thereon is conjugal property, having
been constructed through the joint efforts of the spouses, who
had even obtained a loan from DBP to construct the house.
Article 160 of the New Civil Code provides, "All property of the
marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership,
unless it be proved that it pertains exclusively to the husband or
to the wife."
(2) Significantly, a sale or encumbrance of conjugal property
concluded after the effectivity of the Family Code on August 3,
1988, is governed by Article 124 of the same Code that now
treats such a disposition to be void if done (a) without the
consent of both the husband and the wife, or (b) in case of one
spouses inability, the authority of the court. Article 124 of the
Family Code, the governing law at the time the assailed sale was
contracted, is explicit:

ART. 124. The administration and enjoyment of the conjugal

partnership property shall belong to both spouses jointly. In case
of disagreement, the husbands decision shall prevail, subject to
recourse to the court by the wife for proper remedy which must
be availed of within five years from the date of the contract
implementing such decision.


In the event that one spouse is incapacitated or otherwise unable

to participate in the administration of the conjugal properties, the
other spouse may assume sole powers of administration. These
powers do not include the powers of disposition or encumbrance
which must have the authority of the court or the written consent
of the other spouse. In the absence of such authority or consent,
the disposition or encumbrance shall be void. However, the
transaction shall be construed as a continuing offer on the part of
the consenting spouse and the third person, and may be
perfected as a binding contract upon the acceptance by the other
spouse or authorization by the court before the offer is withdrawn
by either or both offerors.
The particular provision in the New Civil Code giving the wife ten
(10) years to annul the alienation or encumbrance was not
carried over to the Family Code. It is thus clear that alienation or
encumbrance of the conjugal partnership property by the
husband without the consent of the wife is null and void.
Hence, just like the rule in absolute community of property, if the
husband, without knowledge and consent of the wife, sells
conjugal property, such sale is void. If the sale was with the
knowledge but without the approval of the wife, thereby resulting
in a disagreement, such sale is annullable at the instance of the
wife who is given five (5) years from the date the contract
implementing the decision of the husband to institute the case.
Here, respondent Mary Ann timely filed the action for annulment
of sale within five (5) years from the date of sale and execution of
the deed. However, her action to annul the sale pertains only to
the conjugal house and lot and does not include the lot covered
by TCT No. T-26471, a property exclusively belonging to Pedro
and which he can dispose of freely without Mary Anns consent.
DISPOSITIVE: WHEREFORE, we deny the instant petition for lack
of merit. The Decision dated February 21, 2002 and the
Resolution dated October 7, 2003 of the Court of Appeals in CAG.R. CV No. 54560 are AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners. SO
DOCTRINE: Sale of one spouse of conjugal property with the
knowledge of the spouse sale is null and void; Sale of one

spouse of conjugal property with knowledge but without consent

of the other spouse sale is annullable, within five years, by the
non-consenting spouse.


DESCALLAR, respondent.
Wilhelm Jambrich, an Austrian, met respondent Antonietta OpallaDescallar. They fell in love and live together. They bought a house
and lot and an Absolute Deed of Sale was issued in their names.
However, when the Deed of Absolute Sale was presented for
registration, it was refused on the ground that Jambrich was an
alien and could not acquire alienable lands of the public domain.
Consequently, his name was erased but his signature remained
and the property was issued on the name of the Respondent
alone. However their relationship did not last long and they found
new love.
Jambrich met the petitioner who was engaged in business.
Jambrich indebted the petitioner for a sum of money and to pay
his debt, he sold some of his properties to the petitioner and a
Deed of Absolute Sale/Assignment was issued in his favor.
However, when the Petitioner sought to register the deed of
assignment it found out that said land was registered in the name
of Respondent. Petitioner filed a complaint against respondent for
recovery of real property.
1. Whether or not Jambrich has no title to the properties in
question and may not transfer and assign any rights and interest
in favor of the petitioner?
2. Whether or not the registration of the properties in the name of
respondents make his the owner thereof.



1. The evidence clearly shows that as between respondent and

Jambrich, it was Jambrich who possesses the financial capacity to
acquire the properties in dispute. At the time of the acquisition of
the properties, Jamrich was the source of funds used to purchase
the three parcels of land, and to construct the house. Jambrich
was the owner of the properties in question, but his name was
deleted in the Deed of Absolute Sale because of legal constraints.
Nevertheless, his signature remained in the deed of sale where he
signed as a buyer. Thus, Jambrich has all authority to transfer all
his rights, interest and participation over the subject properties to
petitioner by virtue of Deed of Assignment. Furthermore, the fact
that the disputed properties were acquired during the couples
cohabitation does not help the respondent. The rule of coownership applies to a man and a woman living exclusively with
each other as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage,
but otherwise capacitated to marry each other does not apply. At
the case at bar, respondent was still legally married to another
when she and Jambrich lived together. In such an adulterous
relationship and no co-ownership exists between the parties. It is
necessary for each of the partners to prove his or her actual
contribution to the acquisition of property in order to able to lay
claim to any portion of it.

2. It is settled rule that registration is not a mode of acquiring

ownership. It is only a means of confirming the existence with
notice to the world at large. The mere possession of a title does
not make one the true owner of the property. Thus, the mere fact
that respondent has the titles of the disputed properties in her
name does not necessarily, conclusively and absolutely make her
the owner.

26. Villanueva vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 143286 April

14, 2004
FACTS: On 13 October 1988, Eusebia Retuya filed a complaint
before the trial court against her husband Nicolas Retuya, Pacita
Villanueva and Nicolas son with Pacita, Procopio Villanueva.
Eusebia sought the reconveyance from Nicolas and Pacita of
several properties (subject properties), claiming that such are her

conjugal properties with Nicolas. Plaintiff Eusebia, is the legal wife

of defendant Nicolas, having been married on October 7, 1926.
Out of the lawful wedlock, they begot five (5) children. Spouses
Retuya resided at Mandaue City. During their marriage, they
acquired real properties and all improvements situated in
Mandaue City, and Consolacion, Cebu. Nicolas is the co-owner of
a parcel of land situated in Mandaue City which he inherited from
his parents Esteban Retuya and Balbina Solon as well as the
purchasers of hereditary shares of approximately eight (8) parcels
of land in Mandaue City. Some of the properties earn income from
coconuts leased to corporations
In 1945, Nicolas no longer lived with his legitimate family and
cohabited with defendant, Pacita Villanueva, wherein Procopio
Villanueva, is their illegitimate son. Nicolas, then, was the only
person who received the income of the properties. Pacita, from
the time she started living in concubinage with Nicolas, has no
occupation. She had no properties of her own from which she
could derive income. From the time Nicolas suffered stroke until
the present, his illegitimate son is already the one who has been
receiving the income of his properties
Settlement between parties was asked but not met. Trial court in
favor of Eusebia Natuya. Petitioners appealed. Eusebia died, and
was then substituted by her heirs. CA upheld trial courts decision

ISSUE: Whether or not the subject properties acquired during the

marriage between Eusebia and Procopio are conjugal

HELD: YES, they are conjugal. Petition denied; decision of CA

RATIO: The Family Code provisions on conjugal partnerships
govern the property relations between Nicolas and Eusebia even
if they were married before the effectivity of Family Code.

Article 105 of the Family Code explicitly mandates that the Family
Code shall apply to conjugal partnerships established before the


Family Code without prejudice to vested rights already acquired

under the Civil Code or other laws. Thus, under the Family Code, if
the properties are acquired during the marriage, the presumption
is that they are conjugal. The burden of proof is on the party
claiming that they are not conjugal. This is counter-balanced by
the requirement that the properties must first be proven to have
been acquired during the marriage before they are presumed

filed a motion for execution; Luis asked for suspension of the

motion stating that he still has a pending loan with a banking
institution; request for suspension denied. Levy was accordingly
made by the City Sheriff of QC on certain personal properties of
the spouses at their residence in Quezon City. Auction sale was
held, and G-Tractors was awarded with the sale of such. Luis then
offered to redeem such properties for the same amount;
accepted; a Deed of Reconveyance was executed by G-Tractors.

Nicolas and Eusebia were married on 7 October 1926. Nicolas and

Pacita started cohabiting in 1936. Eusebia died on 23 November
1996. Pacita and Nicolas were married on 16 December 1996.
Petitioners themselves admit that Lot No. 152 was purchased on
4 October 1957. The date of acquisition of Lot No. 152 is clearly
during the marriage of Nicolas and Eusebia.

On February 12, 1975, the Sheriff of Quezon City made a levy on

"all rights, interest, title, participation which the defendant Luis R.
Narciso" may have over a parcel of residential land of the Registry
of Deeds of QC which parcel of land is allegedly the conjugal
property of the spouses Luis and Josefina. Sheriff sold at public
auction to the highest bidder for cash. Certificate of Sale was then
issued to G-Tractors as the highest bidder for P180,000.

Since the subject properties, including Lot No. 152, were acquired
during the marriage of Nicolas and Eusebia, the presumption
under Article 116 of the Family Code is that all these are conjugal
properties of Nicolas and Eusebia.

29. G-Tractors, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-57402,

February 28, 1985
FACTS: Luis R. Narciso, legally married to Josefina Narciso, is a
businessman engaged in business as a producer and exporter of
Philippine mahogany logs and operates a logging concession at
del Gallego, Camarines Sur. G-Tractors, Inc. is a domestic
corporation engaged primarily in the business of leasing heavy
equipments such as tractors, bulldozers, and the like.
Luis entered into a Contract of Hire of Heavy Equipment with GTractors under the terms of which the latter leased to the former
tractors for the purpose of constructing switchroads and hauling
felled trees at the jobsite of Narciso's logging concession at del
Gallego, Camarines Sur. The contract provided for payment of
rental for the use of said tractors. Luis Narciso failed to pay; GTractors instituted an action urging Luis to pay a certain amount
(P155,410.25), representing the unpaid rentals. G-Tractors
accepted his offer for a compromise agreement, stating the mode
of payment (installment plan); Luis failed to comply; G-Tractors

On March 31, 1976, Josefina and Luis filed a complaint in CFI of

Quezon City for "declaration of nullity of levy on execution and
auction sale of plaintiff's conjugal property with damages and
injunction", claiming that the conjugal property of the plaintiffsspouses could not be made liable considering that the subject
matter was never used for the benefit of the conjugal partnership
or of the family

ISSUE: Whether or not the conjugal property of the spouses can

be held answerable for the debt of the husband
HELD: YES, the conjugal property of the spouses can be held
answerable for the debt of the husband. CAs decision reversed
and set aside
Article 161 of the New Civil Code provides that the conjugal
partnership shall be liable for:
(1) All the debts and obligations contracted by the husband for
the benefit of the conjugal partnership, and those contracted by
the wife, also for the same purpose, in the cases where she may
legally bind the partnership


His account with petitioner G-Tractors, Inc. represents rentals for

the use of petitioner's tractors which he leased for the purpose of
constructing switchroads and hauling felled trees at the jobsite of
the logging concession at del Gallego, Camarines Sur which is not
his exclusive property but that of his family. There is no doubt
then that his account with the petitioner was brought about in
order to enhance the productivity of said logging business, a
commercial enterprise for gain which he had the right to embark
the conjugal partnership.
It is very clear, therefore, that the obligations were contracted in
connection with his legitimate business as a producer and
exporter in mahogany logs and certainly benefited the conjugal

The husband is the administrator of the conjugal partnership and

as long as he believes he is doing right to his family, he should
not be made to suffer and answer alone. So that, if he incurs an
indebtedness in the legitimate pursuit of his career or profession
or suffers losses in a legitimate business, the conjugal partnership
must equally bear the indebtedness and the losses, unless he
deliberately acted to the prejudice of his family.
The sale at public auction belonging to the conjugal partnership
of gains of the Narcisos in order to satisfy the judgment debt of
the private respondent Luis R. Narciso was validly and legally
made in accordance with law.