PERSONS Family Code

Agapay vs Palang
G.R. No. 116668
July 28, 1997
Romero, J.
FACTS:
On July 16, 1949, Miguel Palang contracted his first marriage with private
respondent Carlina Vallesterol in Pangasinan. A few months after the wedding, in
October, he left to work in Hawaii. Their only child and respondent, Herminia Palang,
was born on May 12, 1950. The trial court found evidence that as early as 1957,
Miguel has attempted to divorce in Hawaii. When he returned for good in 1972, he
refused to live with the private respondents.
On July 15, 1973, the then 63 years old Miguel contracted his second marriage with
19 year-old Erlinda Agapay, herein petitioner. Two months earlier, Miguel and the
petitioner, as evidenced by the Deed of Sale, jointly purchased a parcel of
agricultural land located at Pangasinan. A house and lot in the same province was
likewise purchased allegedly by Erlinda as the sole vendee.
Miguel and petitioners cohabitation produced a son. In 1979, they were convicted
of Concubinage upon Carlinas complaint. Two years later, on February 15, 1981,
Miguel died.
On July 11, 1981, the private respondents instituted an action for recovery of
ownership and possession with damages against petitioner. Private respondents
sought to get back the Riceland and the house and lot both located at Pangasinan
allegedly purchased by Miguel during his cohabitation with petitioner. The lower
court dismissed the complaint. Said decision was reversed by the Court of Appeals.
The petitioner claims that the CA erred in, among others, not sustaining the validity
of two deeds of absolute sale covering the Riceland and the house and lot.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the award of properties, the riceland and house & lot, should be
granted in favor of the petitioner.
HELD:
NO.
RICELAND. While Miguel and Erlinda contracted marriage on July 15, 1973, said
union was patently void because the earlier marriage of Miguel and Carlina was still
subsisting and unaffected by the latters de facto separation. Under Article 148, only
the properties acquired by both of the parties through their actual joint contribution
of money, property or industry shall be owned by them in common in proportion to
her respective contributions. If the actual contribution of the party is not proved,
there will be no co-ownership and no presumption of equal shares. In the case at
bar, the petitioner tried to establish by her testimony that she is engaged in the

PERSONS Family Code

business of buy and sell and had a sari-sari store. The Court was not persuaded that
petitioner actually contributed money to buy the subject riceland. Worth-noting is
the fact that on the date of conveyance, May 17, 1973, petitioner was only around
20 years of age and Miguel Palang was already 64 years old and a petitioner of the
U.S. Government. Considering her youthfulness, it is unrealistic as her share in the
purchase price of subject property, there being no proof of the same.
HOUSE AND LOT. The notary public who prepared the deed of conveyance for the
property testified that Miguel Palang provided the money for the purchase price and
directed that petitioners name alone be placed as the vendee. The transaction was
properly a donation made by Miguel to the petitioner, but one which was clearly
void and inexistent by express provision of law because it was made between
persons guilty of adultery or concubinage at the time of donation (Art 739, NCC).
Moreover, Article 87 of the Family Code expressly provides that the prohibition
against donations between persons living together as husband and wife without a
valid marriage, for otherwise, the condition of those who incurred guilt would turn
out to be better that those in legal union.