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The
debate
about
military
intervention
and
the 'Responsibility
to
Turkey is a classic emerging power in many ways: similar to Brazil and India, it
seeks a greater representation in today's international institutions, and its foreign policy
over the past decade has been - just like Brazil's - extremely active. Nothing symbolizes
this better than Turkey's and Brazil's decision to jointly negotiate with Iran in May 2010
to solve the nuclear impasse. ("Have Lula and Erdogan tamed Ahmadinejad?")
Yet Brazil's and Turkey's position on how to deal with the crisis in Syria now
also differ considerably. After the massacre in Houla, which caused international
condemnation, Brazil refused to expel Syria's diplomats to "keep open all channels of
communication."
This has led to disappointment in Turkey. After all, Brazil had shown some
flexibility on the matter recently. As Matias Spektor argued in an op-ed in Folha de So
Paulo recently, Brazil's stance on R2P is "in flux", pointing out that Brazil's support for
the new idea of the "responsibility while protecting" indicated a growing flexibility and
pragmatism regarding military intervention, something "unthinkable only a few years
ago." In 2011, Brazil attempted to include the 'Responsibility while Protecting' (RwP)
into the final IBSA Summit Declaration. President Dilma's mention during her opening
speech that "while there has been been a lot of talk (...) on the right to protect, there is
little said about the responsibility while protecting" seemed insignificant to many, but in
essence meant that if carried out in a responsible manner, Brazil could, in principle,
support intervention in the future. India and South Africa are, in principle, not opposed
to that affirmation.
Russia and China, however, assured the idea would not appear in the final
declaration of the 4th BRICS Summit in New Delhi. Perhaps now feeling unsure about
RwP itself, Brazil felt aligning with Turkey on isolating Syria was a step too far.
Rising powers are unable - just like established powers in many cases- to find a
common position on Syria because their individual strategic interests at stake diverge
significantly. Turkey shares a long border with Syria and rightly believes the crisis
could not only affect Lebanon, but also political stability in Turkey itself.
Russia, for its part, is right to point out that Western powers have no credible
plan about who should rule in a post-Assad Syria. Just like China, it is concerned that
another military intervention will set a dangerous precedent. In principle, Brazil and
India share this concern, but they also have to deal with a public that is increasingly
pushing their respective governments to assume a more active stance against massive
human rights abuses committed by the Assad regime. In the Brazilian press, for
example, Brazil's decision not to expel Syria's diplomats was met with criticism.
Yet Russia's situation is indeed particular: Syria is also Russia's last client state
in the Middle East, and Assad is seen as a bastion against Islamist extremists who pose
a potent threat to Russia. In addition, Russia's reluctance to let go of Assad has allowed
it to be an important voice in the international debate about the matter, no small
achievement for the former superpower.
Syria has clearly shown that R2P has its limits, and RwP has not gained the
necessary traction to have any impact in the debate. The search for better concepts and
ideas continues, and emerging powers will no doubt be part of it.
Fonte:
STUENKEL,
Oliver.
http://www.postwesternworld.com/2012/07/08/why-