DANTE V. LIBAN, REYNALDO M. BERNARDO, and SALVADOR M.

VIARI, Petitioners,
vs.
RICHARD J. GORDON, Respondent.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
This is a petition to declare Senator Richard J. Gordon (respondent) as having forfeited his seat in
the Senate.
The Facts
Petitioners Dante V. Liban, Reynaldo M. Bernardo, and Salvador M. Viari (petitioners) filed with this
Court a Petition to Declare Richard J. Gordon as Having Forfeited His Seat in the Senate.
Petitioners are officers of the Board of Directors of the Quezon City Red Cross Chapter while
respondent is Chairman of the Philippine National Red Cross (PNRC) Board of Governors.
During respondents incumbency as a member of the Senate of the Philippines, 1 he was elected
Chairman of the PNRC during the 23 February 2006 meeting of the PNRC Board of Governors.
Petitioners allege that by accepting the chairmanship of the PNRC Board of Governors, respondent
has ceased to be a member of the Senate as provided in Section 13, Article VI of the Constitution,
which reads:
SEC. 13. No Senator or Member of the House of Representatives may hold any other office or
employment in the Government, or any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof, including
government-owned or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries, during his term without forfeiting
his seat. Neither shall he be appointed to any office which may have been created or the
emoluments thereof increased during the term for which he was elected.
Petitioners cite Camporedondo v. NLRC,2 which held that the PNRC is a government-owned or
controlled corporation. Petitioners claim that in accepting and holding the position of Chairman of the
PNRC Board of Governors, respondent has automatically forfeited his seat in the Senate, pursuant
to Flores v. Drilon,3 which held that incumbent national legislators lose their elective posts upon their
appointment to another government office.
In his Comment, respondent asserts that petitioners have no standing to file this petition which
appears to be an action for quo warranto, since the petition alleges that respondent committed an
act which, by provision of law, constitutes a ground for forfeiture of his public office. Petitioners do
not claim to be entitled to the Senate office of respondent. Under Section 5, Rule 66 of the Rules of
Civil Procedure, only a person claiming to be entitled to a public office usurped or unlawfully held by
another may bring an action for quo warranto in his own name. If the petition is one for quo warranto,
it is already barred by prescription since under Section 11, Rule 66 of the Rules of Civil Procedure,
the action should be commenced within one year after the cause of the public officers forfeiture of
office. In this case, respondent has been working as a Red Cross volunteer for the past 40 years.
Respondent was already Chairman of the PNRC Board of Governors when he was elected Senator

in May 2004, having been elected Chairman in 2003 and re-elected in 2005.
Respondent contends that even if the present petition is treated as a taxpayers suit, petitioners
cannot be allowed to raise a constitutional question in the absence of any claim that they suffered
some actual damage or threatened injury as a result of the allegedly illegal act of respondent.
Furthermore, taxpayers are allowed to sue only when there is a claim of illegal disbursement of
public funds, or that public money is being diverted to any improper purpose, or where petitioners
seek to restrain respondent from enforcing an invalid law that results in wastage of public funds.
Respondent also maintains that if the petition is treated as one for declaratory relief, this Court would
have no jurisdiction since original jurisdiction for declaratory relief lies with the Regional Trial Court.
Respondent further insists that the PNRC is not a government-owned or controlled corporation and
that the prohibition under Section 13, Article VI of the Constitution does not apply in the present case
since volunteer service to the PNRC is neither an office nor an employment.
In their Reply, petitioners claim that their petition is neither an action for quo warranto nor an action
for declaratory relief. Petitioners maintain that the present petition is a taxpayers suit questioning the
unlawful disbursement of funds, considering that respondent has been drawing his salaries and
other compensation as a Senator even if he is no longer entitled to his office. Petitioners point out
that this Court has jurisdiction over this petition since it involves a legal or constitutional issue which
is of transcendental importance.
The Issues
Petitioners raise the following issues:
1. Whether the Philippine National Red Cross (PNRC) is a government- owned or
controlled corporation;
2. Whether Section 13, Article VI of the Philippine Constitution applies to the case of
respondent who is Chairman of the PNRC and at the same time a Member of the
Senate;
3. Whether respondent should be automatically removed as a Senator pursuant to
Section 13, Article VI of the Philippine Constitution; and
4. Whether petitioners may legally institute this petition against respondent. 4
The substantial issue boils down to whether the office of the PNRC Chairman is a government office
or an office in a government-owned or controlled corporation for purposes of the prohibition in
Section 13, Article VI of the Constitution.
The Courts Ruling
We find the petition without merit.
Petitioners Have No Standing to File this Petition
A careful reading of the petition reveals that it is an action for quo warranto. Section 1, Rule 66 of the

Rules of Court provides:

Section 1. Action by Government against individuals. An action for the usurpation of a public office,
position or franchise may be commenced by a verified petition brought in the name of the Republic
of the Philippines against:
(a) A person who usurps, intrudes into, or unlawfully holds or exercises a public
office, position or franchise;
(b) A public officer who does or suffers an act which by provision of law, constitutes a
ground for the forfeiture of his office; or
(c) An association which acts as a corporation within the Philippines without being
legally incorporated or without lawful authority so to act. (Emphasis supplied)
Petitioners allege in their petition that:
4. Respondent became the Chairman of the PNRC when he was elected as such
during the First Regular Luncheon-Meeting of the Board of Governors of the PNRC
held on February 23, 2006, the minutes of which is hereto attached and made
integral part hereof as Annex "A."
5. Respondent was elected as Chairman of the PNRC Board of Governors, during
his incumbency as a Member of the House of Senate of the Congress of the
Philippines, having been elected as such during the national elections last May 2004.
6. Since his election as Chairman of the PNRC Board of Governors, which position
he duly accepted, respondent has been exercising the powers and discharging the
functions and duties of said office, despite the fact that he is still a senator.
7. It is the respectful submission of the petitioner[s] that by accepting the
chairmanship of the Board of Governors of the PNRC, respondent has ceased to be
a Member of the House of Senate as provided in Section 13, Article VI of the
Philippine Constitution, x x x
xxxx
10. It is respectfully submitted that in accepting the position of Chairman of the Board
of Governors of the PNRC on February 23, 2006, respondent has automatically
forfeited his seat in the House of Senate and, therefore, has long ceased to be a
Senator, pursuant to the ruling of this Honorable Court in the case of FLORES, ET
AL. VS. DRILON AND GORDON, G.R. No. 104732, x x x
11. Despite the fact that he is no longer a senator, respondent continues to act as
such and still performs the powers, functions and duties of a senator, contrary to the
constitution, law and jurisprudence.
12. Unless restrained, therefore, respondent will continue to falsely act and represent
himself as a senator or member of the House of Senate, collecting the salaries,
emoluments and other compensations, benefits and privileges appertaining and due

only to the legitimate senators, to the damage, great and irreparable injury of the
Government and the Filipino people.5 (Emphasis supplied)
Thus, petitioners are alleging that by accepting the position of Chairman of the PNRC Board of
Governors, respondent has automatically forfeited his seat in the Senate. In short, petitioners filed
an action for usurpation of public office against respondent, a public officer who allegedly committed
an act which constitutes a ground for the forfeiture of his public office. Clearly, such an action is for
quo warranto, specifically under Section 1(b), Rule 66 of the Rules of Court.
Quo warranto is generally commenced by the Government as the proper party plaintiff. However,
under Section 5, Rule 66 of the Rules of Court, an individual may commence such an action if he
claims to be entitled to the public office allegedly usurped by another, in which case he can bring the
action in his own name. The person instituting quo warranto proceedings in his own behalf must
claim and be able to show that he is entitled to the office in dispute, otherwise the action may be
dismissed at any stage.6 In the present case, petitioners do not claim to be entitled to the Senate
office of respondent. Clearly, petitioners have no standing to file the present petition.
Even if the Court disregards the infirmities of the petition and treats it as a taxpayers suit, the
petition would still fail on the merits.
PNRC is a Private Organization Performing Public Functions
On 22 March 1947, President Manuel A. Roxas signed Republic Act No. 95, 7 otherwise known as the
PNRC Charter. The PNRC is a non-profit, donor-funded, voluntary, humanitarian organization,
whose mission is to bring timely, effective, and compassionate humanitarian assistance for the most
vulnerable without consideration of nationality, race, religion, gender, social status, or political
affiliation.8 The PNRC provides six major services: Blood Services, Disaster Management, Safety
Services, Community Health and Nursing, Social Services and Voluntary Service. 9
The Republic of the Philippines, adhering to the Geneva Conventions, established the PNRC as a
voluntary organization for the purpose contemplated in the Geneva Convention of 27 July 1929. 10
The Whereas clauses of the PNRC Charter read:
WHEREAS, there was developed at Geneva, Switzerland, on August 22, 1864, a convention by
which the nations of the world were invited to join together in diminishing, so far lies within their
power, the evils inherent in war;
WHEREAS, more than sixty nations of the world have ratified or adhered to the subsequent revision
of said convention, namely the "Convention of Geneva of July 29 [sic], 1929 for the Amelioration of
the Condition of the Wounded and Sick of Armies in the Field" (referred to in this Charter as the
Geneva Red Cross Convention);
WHEREAS, the Geneva Red Cross Convention envisages the establishment in each country of a
voluntary organization to assist in caring for the wounded and sick of the armed forces and to furnish
supplies for that purpose;
WHEREAS, the Republic of the Philippines became an independent nation on July 4, 1946 and
proclaimed its adherence to the Geneva Red Cross Convention on February 14, 1947, and by that
action indicated its desire to participate with the nations of the world in mitigating the suffering
caused by war and to establish in the Philippines a voluntary organization for that purpose as

contemplated by the Geneva Red Cross Convention;

WHEREAS, there existed in the Philippines since 1917 a Charter of the American National Red
Cross which must be terminated in view of the independence of the Philippines; and
WHEREAS, the volunteer organizations established in the other countries which have ratified or
adhered to the Geneva Red Cross Convention assist in promoting the health and welfare of their
people in peace and in war, and through their mutual assistance and cooperation directly and
through their international organizations promote better understanding and sympathy among the
peoples of the world. (Emphasis supplied)
The PNRC is a member National Society of the International Red Cross and Red Crescent
Movement (Movement), which is composed of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC),
the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (International Federation),
and the National Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (National Societies). The Movement is
united and guided by its seven Fundamental Principles:
1. HUMANITY The International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement, born of a
desire to bring assistance without discrimination to the wounded on the battlefield,
endeavors, in its international and national capacity, to prevent and alleviate human
suffering wherever it may be found. Its purpose is to protect life and health and to
ensure respect for the human being. It promotes mutual understanding, friendship,
cooperation and lasting peace amongst all peoples.
2. IMPARTIALITY It makes no discrimination as to nationality, race, religious
beliefs, class or political opinions. It endeavors to relieve the suffering of individuals,
being guided solely by their needs, and to give priority to the most urgent cases of
distress.
3. NEUTRALITY In order to continue to enjoy the confidence of all, the Movement
may not take sides in hostilities or engage at any time in controversies of a political,
racial, religious or ideological nature.
4. INDEPENDENCE The Movement is independent. The National Societies, while
auxiliaries in the humanitarian services of their governments and subject to the laws
of their respective countries, must always maintain their autonomy so that they may
be able at all times to act in accordance with the principles of the Movement.
5. VOLUNTARY SERVICE It is a voluntary relief movement not prompted in any
manner by desire for gain.
6. UNITY There can be only one Red Cross or one Red Crescent Society in any
one country. It must be open to all. It must carry on its humanitarian work throughout
its territory.
7. UNIVERSALITY The International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement, in
which all Societies have equal status and share equal responsibilities and duties in
helping each other, is worldwide. (Emphasis supplied)
The Fundamental Principles provide a universal standard of reference for all members of the

Movement. The PNRC, as a member National Society of the Movement, has the duty to uphold the
Fundamental Principles and ideals of the Movement. In order to be recognized as a National
Society, the PNRC has to be autonomous and must operate in conformity with the Fundamental
Principles of the Movement.11
The reason for this autonomy is fundamental. To be accepted by warring belligerents as neutral
workers during international or internal armed conflicts, the PNRC volunteers must not be seen as
belonging to any side of the armed conflict. In the Philippines where there is a communist insurgency
and a Muslim separatist rebellion, the PNRC cannot be seen as government-owned or controlled,
and neither can the PNRC volunteers be identified as government personnel or as instruments of
government policy. Otherwise, the insurgents or separatists will treat PNRC volunteers as enemies
when the volunteers tend to the wounded in the battlefield or the displaced civilians in conflict areas.
Thus, the PNRC must not only be, but must also be seen to be, autonomous, neutral and
independent in order to conduct its activities in accordance with the Fundamental Principles. The
PNRC must not appear to be an instrument or agency that implements government policy;
otherwise, it cannot merit the trust of all and cannot effectively carry out its mission as a National
Red Cross Society.12 It is imperative that the PNRC must be autonomous, neutral, and independent
in relation to the State.
To ensure and maintain its autonomy, neutrality, and independence, the PNRC cannot be owned or
controlled by the government. Indeed, the Philippine government does not own the PNRC. The
PNRC does not have government assets and does not receive any appropriation from the Philippine
Congress.13 The PNRC is financed primarily by contributions from private individuals and private
entities obtained through solicitation campaigns organized by its Board of Governors, as provided
under Section 11 of the PNRC Charter:
SECTION 11. As a national voluntary organization, the Philippine National Red Cross shall be
financed primarily by contributions obtained through solicitation campaigns throughout the year
which shall be organized by the Board of Governors and conducted by the Chapters in their
respective jurisdictions. These fund raising campaigns shall be conducted independently of other
fund drives by other organizations. (Emphasis supplied)
The government does not control the PNRC. Under the PNRC Charter, as amended, only six of the
thirty members of the PNRC Board of Governors are appointed by the President of the Philippines.
Thus, twenty-four members, or four-fifths (4/5), of the PNRC Board of Governors are not appointed
by the President. Section 6 of the PNRC Charter, as amended, provides:
SECTION 6. The governing powers and authority shall be vested in a Board of Governors composed
of thirty members, six of whom shall be appointed by the President of the Philippines, eighteen shall
be elected by chapter delegates in biennial conventions and the remaining six shall be selected by
the twenty-four members of the Board already chosen. x x x.
Thus, of the twenty-four members of the PNRC Board, eighteen are elected by the chapter
delegates of the PNRC, and six are elected by the twenty-four members already chosen a select
group where the private sector members have three-fourths majority. Clearly, an overwhelming
majority of four-fifths of the PNRC Board are elected or chosen by the private sector members of the
PNRC.
The PNRC Board of Governors, which exercises all corporate powers of the PNRC, elects the
PNRC Chairman and all other officers of the PNRC. The incumbent Chairman of PNRC, respondent

Senator Gordon, was elected, as all PNRC Chairmen are elected, by a private sector-controlled
PNRC Board four-fifths of whom are private sector members of the PNRC. The PNRC Chairman is
not appointed by the President or by any subordinate government official.
Under Section 16, Article VII of the Constitution,14 the President appoints all officials and employees
in the Executive branch whose appointments are vested in the President by the Constitution or by
law. The President also appoints those whose appointments are not otherwise provided by law.
Under this Section 16, the law may also authorize the "heads of departments, agencies,
commissions, or boards" to appoint officers lower in rank than such heads of departments, agencies,
commissions or boards.15 In Rufino v. Endriga,16 the Court explained appointments under Section 16
in this wise:
Under Section 16, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution, the President appoints three groups of
officers. The first group refers to the heads of the Executive departments, ambassadors, other public
ministers and consuls, officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain, and
other officers whose appointments are vested in the President by the Constitution. The second group
refers to those whom the President may be authorized by law to appoint. The third group refers to all
other officers of the Government whose appointments are not otherwise provided by law.
Under the same Section 16, there is a fourth group of lower-ranked officers whose appointments
Congress may by law vest in the heads of departments, agencies, commissions, or boards. x x x
xxx
In a department in the Executive branch, the head is the Secretary. The law may not authorize the
Undersecretary, acting as such Undersecretary, to appoint lower-ranked officers in the Executive
department. In an agency, the power is vested in the head of the agency for it would be
preposterous to vest it in the agency itself. In a commission, the head is the chairperson of the
commission. In a board, the head is also the chairperson of the board. In the last three situations,
the law may not also authorize officers other than the heads of the agency, commission, or board to
appoint lower-ranked officers.
xxx
The Constitution authorizes Congress to vest the power to appoint lower-ranked officers specifically
in the "heads" of the specified offices, and in no other person. The word "heads" refers to the
chairpersons of the commissions or boards and not to their members, for several reasons.
The President does not appoint the Chairman of the PNRC. Neither does the head of any
department, agency, commission or board appoint the PNRC Chairman. Thus, the PNRC Chairman
is not an official or employee of the Executive branch since his appointment does not fall under
Section 16, Article VII of the Constitution. Certainly, the PNRC Chairman is not an official or
employee of the Judiciary or Legislature. This leads us to the obvious conclusion that the PNRC
Chairman is not an official or employee of the Philippine Government. Not being a government
official or employee, the PNRC Chairman, as such, does not hold a government office or
employment.
Under Section 17, Article VII of the Constitution,17 the President exercises control over all
government offices in the Executive branch. If an office is legally not under the control of the
President, then such office is not part of the Executive branch. In Rufino v. Endriga,18 the Court

explained the Presidents power of control over all government offices as follows:
Every government office, entity, or agency must fall under the Executive, Legislative, or Judicial
branches, or must belong to one of the independent constitutional bodies, or must be a quasi-judicial
body or local government unit. Otherwise, such government office, entity, or agency has no legal and
constitutional basis for its existence.
The CCP does not fall under the Legislative or Judicial branches of government. The CCP is also not
one of the independent constitutional bodies. Neither is the CCP a quasi-judicial body nor a local
government unit. Thus, the CCP must fall under the Executive branch. Under the Revised
Administrative Code of 1987, any agency "not placed by law or order creating them under any
specific department" falls "under the Office of the President."
Since the President exercises control over "all the executive departments, bureaus, and offices," the
President necessarily exercises control over the CCP which is an office in the Executive branch. In
mandating that the President "shall have control of all executive . . . offices," Section 17, Article VII of
the 1987 Constitution does not exempt any executive office one performing executive functions
outside of the independent constitutional bodies from the Presidents power of control. There is no
dispute that the CCP performs executive, and not legislative, judicial, or quasi-judicial functions.
The Presidents power of control applies to the acts or decisions of all officers in the Executive
branch. This is true whether such officers are appointed by the President or by heads of
departments, agencies, commissions, or boards. The power of control means the power to revise or
reverse the acts or decisions of a subordinate officer involving the exercise of discretion.
In short, the President sits at the apex of the Executive branch, and exercises "control of all the
executive departments, bureaus, and offices." There can be no instance under the Constitution
where an officer of the Executive branch is outside the control of the President. The Executive
branch is unitary since there is only one President vested with executive power exercising control
over the entire Executive branch. Any office in the Executive branch that is not under the control of
the President is a lost command whose existence is without any legal or constitutional basis.
(Emphasis supplied)
An overwhelming four-fifths majority of the PNRC Board are private sector individuals elected to the
PNRC Board by the private sector members of the PNRC. The PNRC Board exercises all corporate
powers of the PNRC. The PNRC is controlled by private sector individuals. Decisions or actions of
the PNRC Board are not reviewable by the President. The President cannot reverse or modify the
decisions or actions of the PNRC Board. Neither can the President reverse or modify the decisions
or actions of the PNRC Chairman. It is the PNRC Board that can review, reverse or modify the
decisions or actions of the PNRC Chairman. This proves again that the office of the PNRC Chairman
is a private office, not a government office.
1avvphi1

Although the State is often represented in the governing bodies of a National Society, this can be
justified by the need for proper coordination with the public authorities, and the government
representatives may take part in decision-making within a National Society. However, the freelyelected representatives of a National Societys active members must remain in a large majority in a
National Societys governing bodies.19
The PNRC is not government-owned but privately owned. The vast majority of the thousands of
PNRC members are private individuals, including students. Under the PNRC Charter, those who
contribute to the annual fund campaign of the PNRC are entitled to membership in the PNRC for one

year. Thus, any one between 6 and 65 years of age can be a PNRC member for one year upon
contributing P35, P100, P300, P500 or P1,000 for the year.20 Even foreigners, whether residents or
not, can be members of the PNRC. Section 5 of the PNRC Charter, as amended by Presidential
Decree No. 1264,21 reads:
SEC. 5. Membership in the Philippine National Red Cross shall be open to the entire population in
the Philippines regardless of citizenship. Any contribution to the Philippine National Red Cross
Annual Fund Campaign shall entitle the contributor to membership for one year and said contribution
shall be deductible in full for taxation purposes.
Thus, the PNRC is a privately owned, privately funded, and privately run charitable organization. The
PNRC is not a government-owned or controlled corporation.
Petitioners anchor their petition on the 1999 case of Camporedondo v. NLRC, 22 which ruled that the
PNRC is a government-owned or controlled corporation. In ruling that the PNRC is a governmentowned or controlled corporation, the simple test used was whether the corporation was created by
its own special charter for the exercise of a public function or by incorporation under the general
corporation law. Since the PNRC was created under a special charter, the Court then ruled that it is
a government corporation. However, the Camporedondo ruling failed to consider the definition of a
government-owned or controlled corporation as provided under Section 2(13) of the Introductory
Provisions of the Administrative Code of 1987:
SEC. 2. General Terms Defined. x x x
(13) Government-owned or controlled corporation refers to any agency organized as a stock or nonstock corporation, vested with functions relating to public needs whether governmental or proprietary
in nature, and owned by the Government directly or through its instrumentalities either wholly, or
where applicable as in the case of stock corporations, to the extent of at least fifty-one (51) percent
of its capital stock: Provided, That government-owned or controlled corporations may be further
categorized by the Department of the Budget, the Civil Service Commission, and the Commission on
Audit for purposes of the exercise and discharge of their respective powers, functions and
responsibilities with respect to such corporations.(Boldfacing and underscoring supplied)
A government-owned or controlled corporation must be owned by the government, and in the case
of a stock corporation, at least a majority of its capital stock must be owned by the government. In
the case of a non-stock corporation, by analogy at least a majority of the members must be
government officials holding such membership by appointment or designation by the government.
Under this criterion, and as discussed earlier, the government does not own or control PNRC.
The PNRC Charter is Violative of the Constitutional Proscription against the Creation of Private
Corporations by Special Law
The 1935 Constitution, as amended, was in force when the PNRC was created by special charter on
22 March 1947. Section 7, Article XIV of the 1935 Constitution, as amended, reads:
SEC. 7. The Congress shall not, except by general law, provide for the formation, organization, or
regulation of private corporations, unless such corporations are owned or controlled by the
Government or any subdivision or instrumentality thereof.
The subsequent 1973 and 1987 Constitutions contain similar provisions prohibiting Congress from

creating private corporations except by general law. Section 1 of the PNRC Charter, as amended,
creates the PNRC as a "body corporate and politic," thus:
SECTION 1. There is hereby created in the Republic of the Philippines a body corporate and politic
to be the voluntary organization officially designated to assist the Republic of the Philippines in
discharging the obligations set forth in the Geneva Conventions and to perform such other duties as
are inherent upon a National Red Cross Society. The national headquarters of this Corporation shall
be located in Metropolitan Manila. (Emphasis supplied)
In Feliciano v. Commission on Audit,23 the Court explained the constitutional provision prohibiting
Congress from creating private corporations in this wise:
We begin by explaining the general framework under the fundamental law. The Constitution
recognizes two classes of corporations. The first refers to private corporations created under a
general law. The second refers to government-owned or controlled corporations created by special
charters. Section 16, Article XII of the Constitution provides:
Sec. 16. The Congress shall not, except by general law, provide for the formation, organization, or
regulation of private corporations. Government-owned or controlled corporations may be created or
established by special charters in the interest of the common good and subject to the test of
economic viability.
The Constitution emphatically prohibits the creation of private corporations except by general law
applicable to all citizens. The purpose of this constitutional provision is to ban private corporations
created by special charters, which historically gave certain individuals, families or groups special
privileges denied to other citizens.
In short, Congress cannot enact a law creating a private corporation with a special charter. Such
legislation would be unconstitutional. Private corporations may exist only under a general law. If the
corporation is private, it must necessarily exist under a general law. Stated differently, only
corporations created under a general law can qualify as private corporations. Under existing laws,
the general law is the Corporation Code, except that the Cooperative Code governs the
incorporation of cooperatives.
The Constitution authorizes Congress to create government-owned or controlled corporations
through special charters. Since private corporations cannot have special charters, it follows that
Congress can create corporations with special charters only if such corporations are governmentowned or controlled.24 (Emphasis supplied)
In Feliciano, the Court held that the Local Water Districts are government-owned or controlled
corporations since they exist by virtue of Presidential Decree No. 198, which constitutes their special
charter. The seed capital assets of the Local Water Districts, such as waterworks and sewerage
facilities, were public property which were managed, operated by or under the control of the city,
municipality or province before the assets were transferred to the Local Water Districts. The Local
Water Districts also receive subsidies and loans from the Local Water Utilities Administration
(LWUA). In fact, under the 2009 General Appropriations Act, 25 the LWUA has a budget amounting to
P400,000,000 for its subsidy requirements.26 There is no private capital invested in the Local
Water Districts. The capital assets and operating funds of the Local Water Districts all come from
the government, either through transfer of assets, loans, subsidies or the income from such assets

or funds.
The government also controls the Local Water Districts because the municipal or city mayor, or the
provincial governor, appoints all the board directors of the Local Water Districts. Furthermore, the
board directors and other personnel of the Local Water Districts are government employees subject
to civil service laws and anti-graft laws. Clearly, the Local Water Districts are considered
government-owned or controlled corporations not only because of their creation by special charter
but also because the government in fact owns and controls the Local Water Districts.
Just like the Local Water Districts, the PNRC was created through a special charter. However, unlike
the Local Water Districts, the elements of government ownership and control are clearly lacking in
the PNRC. Thus, although the PNRC is created by a special charter, it cannot be considered a
government-owned or controlled corporation in the absence of the essential elements of ownership
and control by the government. In creating the PNRC as a corporate entity, Congress was in fact
creating a private corporation. However, the constitutional prohibition against the creation of private
corporations by special charters provides no exception even for non-profit or charitable corporations.
Consequently, the PNRC Charter, insofar as it creates the PNRC as a private corporation and grants
it corporate powers,27 is void for being unconstitutional. Thus, Sections 1,28 2,29 3,30 4(a),31 5,32 6,33 7,34
8,35 9,36 10,37 11,38 12,39 and 1340 of the PNRC Charter, as amended, are void.
The other provisions41 of the PNRC Charter remain valid as they can be considered as a recognition
by the State that the unincorporated PNRC is the local National Society of the International Red
Cross and Red Crescent Movement, and thus entitled to the benefits, exemptions and privileges set
forth in the PNRC Charter. The other provisions of the PNRC Charter implement the Philippine
Governments treaty obligations under Article 4(5) of the Statutes of the International Red Cross and
Red Crescent Movement, which provides that to be recognized as a National Society, the Society
must be "duly recognized by the legal government of its country on the basis of the Geneva
Conventions and of the national legislation as a voluntary aid society, auxiliary to the public
authorities in the humanitarian field."
In sum, we hold that the office of the PNRC Chairman is not a government office or an office in a
government-owned or controlled corporation for purposes of the prohibition in Section 13, Article VI
of the 1987 Constitution. However, since the PNRC Charter is void insofar as it creates the PNRC as
a private corporation, the PNRC should incorporate under the Corporation Code and register with
the Securities and Exchange Commission if it wants to be a private corporation.
WHEREFORE, we declare that the office of the Chairman of the Philippine National Red Cross is not
a government office or an office in a government-owned or controlled corporation for purposes of the
prohibition in Section 13, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution. We also declare that Sections 1, 2, 3,
4(a), 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, and 13 of the Charter of the Philippine National Red Cross, or Republic
Act No. 95, as amended by Presidential Decree Nos. 1264 and 1643, are VOID because they create
the PNRC as a private corporation or grant it corporate powers.
SO ORDERED.
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:

REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice

CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice

RENATO C. CORONA
Associate Justice

CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES

Associate Justice

MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
Associate Justice

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

Associate Justice

ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA

Associate Justice

ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice

TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO

Associate Justice

DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice

LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
Associate Justice
C E R TI F I C ATI O N
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the conclusions in the above
Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion
of the Court.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice

Footnotes
1

Respondent was elected as a Senator during the May 2004 elections.

370 Phil. 901 (1999).

G.R. No. 104732, 22 June 1993, 223 SCRA 568.

Rollo, p. 181.

Id. at 3-5.

The Secretary of Justice Cuevas v. Atty. Bacal, 400 Phil. 1115 (2000); Garcia v.
Perez, 188 Phil. 43 (1980).
6

An Act to Incorporate the Philippine National Red Cross, as amended by

Presidential Decree No. 1264.
7

PNRC Website,HYPERLINK
"http://www.redcross.org.ph/Site/PNRC/StrategicDirections.aspx" HYPERLINK
"http://www.redcross.org.ph/Site/PNRC/StrategicDirections.aspx"
http://www.redcross.org.ph/Site/PNRC/StrategicDirections.aspxHYPERLINK
"http://www.redcross.org.ph/Site/PNRC/StrategicDirections.aspx" (visited 25 March
2009).
8

PNRC Website,HYPERLINK
"http://www.redcross.org.ph/Site/PNRC/StrategicDirections.aspx" HYPERLINK
"http://www.redcross.org.ph/Site/PNRC/About.aspx"
http://www.redcross.org.ph/Site/PNRC/About.aspx (visited 25 March 2009).
9

Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armies
in the Field.
10

Article 4 of the Statutes of the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement
reads:
11

Article 4
Conditions for Recognition of National Societies
In order to be recognized in terms of Article 5, paragraph 2 b) as a National
Society, the Society shall meet the following conditions:
1. Be constituted on the territory of an independent State where the Geneva
Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in
Armed Forces in the Field is in force.
2. Be the only National Red Cross or Red Crescent Society of the said State
and be directed by a central body which shall alone be competent to
represent it in its dealings with other components of the Movement.
3. Be duly recognized by the legal government of its country on the basis of
the Geneva Conventions and of the national legislation as a voluntary aid
society, auxiliary to the public authorities in the humanitarian field.
4. Have an autonomous status which allows it to operation in conformity with
the Fundamental Principles of the Movement.
5. Use a name and distinctive emblem in conformity with the Geneva
Conventions and their Additional Protocols.
6. Be so organized as to be able to fulfill the tasks defined in its own statutes,
including the preparation in peace time for its statutory tasks in case of
armed conflicts.
7. Extend its activities to the entire territory of the State.
8. Recruit its voluntary members and its staff without consideration of race,

sex, class, religion or political opinions.

9. Adhere to the present Statutes, share in the fellowship which unites the
components of the Movement and cooperate with them.
10. Respect the Fundamental Principles of the Movement and be guided in
its work by the principles of international humanitarian law. (Emphasis
supplied)
The Fundamental Principles of the Red Cross and Red Crescent, ICRC
Publication, p. 17.
12

Although under Section 4(c) of the PNRC Charter, as amended, the PNRC is
allotted one lottery draw yearly by the Philippine Charity Sweepstakes for the support
of its disaster relief operations, in addition to its existing lottery draws for the Blood
Program, such allotments are donations given to most charitable organizations.
13

14

Section 16, Article VII of the Constitution provides:

The President shall nominate and, with the consent of the Commission on
Appointments, appoint the heads of the executive departments,
ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, or officers of the armed
forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain, and other officers whose
appointments are vested in him in this Constitution. He shall also appoint all
other officers of the Government whose appointments are not otherwise
provided for by law, and those whom he may be authorized by law to appoint.
The Congress may, by law, vest the appointment of other officers lower in
rank in the President alone, in the courts, or in the heads of departments,
agencies, commissions, or boards.
The President shall have the power to make appointments during the recess
of the Congress, whether voluntary or compulsory, but such appointments
shall be effective only until after disapproval by the Commission on
Appointments or until the next adjournment of the Congress.

15

Endriga v. Rufino, G.R. Nos. 139554 & 139565, 21 July 2006, 496 SCRA 13.

16

Id. at 50-57.

17

Section 17, Article VII of the Constitution provides:

The President shall have control of all the executive departments, bureaus,
and offices. He shall ensure that the laws be faithfully executed.

18

Supra note 15 at 63-65.

19

See note 12 at 20.

20

PNRC Website, http://202.57.124.158/Site/PNRC/membershipInfo.aspx#5 (visited

15 June 2009).
21

Issued on 15 December 1977.

22

Supra note 2.

23

464 Phil. 439 (2004).

24

Id. at 454-455.

25

Republic Act No. 9524.

DBM Website,HYPERLINK "http://www.dbm.gov.ph/GAA09/bsgc/C1.pdf"

HYPERLINK "http://www.dbm.gov.ph/GAA09/bsgc/C1.pdf"
http://www.dbm.gov.ph/GAA09/bsgc/C1.pdf (visited 25 June 2009).
26

Section 36 of the Corporation Code enumerates the general powers of a

corporation:
27

SEC. 36. Corporate powers and capacity. Every corporation incorporated

under this Code has the power and capacity:
1. To sue and be sued in its corporate name;
2. Of succession by its corporate name for the period of time stated in the
articles of incorporation and the certificate of incorporation;
3. To adopt and use a corporate seal;
4. To amend its articles of incorporation in accordance with the provisions of
this Code;
5. To adopt by-laws, not contrary to law, morals or public policy, and to
amend or repeal the same in accordance with this Code;
6. In case of stock corporations, to issue or sell stocks to subscribers and to
sell treasury stocks in accordance with the provisions of this Code; and to
admit members to the corporation if it be a non-stock corporation;
7. To purchase, receive, take or grant, hold, convey, sell, lease, pledge,
mortgage and otherwise deal with such real and personal property, including
securities and bonds of other corporations, as the transaction of the lawful
business of the corporation may reasonably and necessarily require, subject
to the limitations prescribed by law and the Constitution;
8. To adopt any plan of merger or consolidation as provided in this Code;
9. To make reasonable donations, including those for the public welfare or for
hospital, charitable, cultural, scientific, civic, or similar purposes: Provided,

That no corporation, domestic or foreign, shall give donations in aid of any

political party or candidate or for purposes of partisan political activity;
10. To establish pension, retirement and other plans for the benefit of its
directors, trustees, officers and employees; and
11. To exercise such other powers as may be essential or necessary to carry
out its purpose or purposes as stated in its articles of incorporation.
SECTION 1. There is hereby created in the Republic of the Philippines a body
corporate and politic to be the voluntary organization officially designated to assist
the Republic of the Philippines in discharging the obligations set forth in the Geneva
Conventions and to perform such other duties as are inherent upon a national Red
Cross Society. The national headquarters of this Corporation shall be located in
Metro Manila.
28

SEC. 2. The name of this corporation shall be "The Philippine National Red Cross"
and by that name shall have perpetual succession with the power to sue and be
sued; to own and hold such real and personal estate as shall be deemed advisable
and to accept bequests, donations and contributions of property of all classes for the
purpose of this Corporation hereinafter set forth; to adopt a seal and to alter and
destroy the same at pleasure; and to have the right to adopt and to use, in carrying
out its purposes hereinafter designated, as an emblem and badge, a red Greek cross
on a white ground, the same as has been described in the Geneva Conventions, and
adopted by the several nations ratifying or adhering thereto; to ordain and establish
by-laws and regulations not inconsistent with the laws of the Republic of the
Philippines, and generally to do all such acts and things as may be necessary to
carry into effect the provisions of this Act and promote the purposes of said
organization; and the corporation hereby created is designated as the organization
which is authorized to act in matters of relief under said Convention. In accordance
with the Geneva Conventions, the issuance of the distinctive Red Cross emblem to
medical units and establishments, personnel and materials neutralized in time of war
shall be left to the military authorities. The red Greek cross on a white ground, as has
been described by the Geneva Conventions is not, and shall not be construed as a
religious symbol, and shall have equal efficacy and applicability to persons of all
faiths, creeds and beliefs. The operational jurisdiction of the Philippine National Red
Cross shall be over the entire territory of the Philippines.
29

30

SEC. 3. That the purposes of this Corporation shall be as follows:

a. To provide volunteer aid to the sick and wounded of the armed forces in
time of war, in accordance with the spirit of and under the conditions
prescribed by the Geneva Conventions to which the Republic of the
Philippines proclaimed its adherence;
b. For the purposes mentioned in the preceding sub-section, to perform all
duties devolving upon the Corporation as a result of the adherence of the
Republic of the Philippines to the said Convention;
c. To act in matters of voluntary relief and in accordance with the authorities
of the armed forces as a medium of communication between the people of

the Republic of the Philippines and their Armed Forces, in time of peace and
in time of war, and to act in such matters between similar national societies of
other governments and the Government and people and the Armed Forces of
the Republic of the Philippines;
d. To establish and maintain a system of national and international relief in
time of peace and in time of war and apply the same in meeting the
emergency needs caused by typhoons, flood, fires, earthquakes, and other
natural disasters and to devise and carry on measures for minimizing the
suffering caused by such disasters;
e. To devise and promote such other services in time of peace and in time of
war as may be found desirable in improving the health, safety and welfare of
the Filipino people;
f. To devise such means as to make every citizen and/or resident of the
Philippines a member of the Red Cross.
SEC. 4. In furtherance of the purposes mentioned in the preceding sub-paragraphs,
the Philippine National Red Cross shall:
31

a. Be authorized to secure loans from any financial institution which shall not
exceed its budget of the previous year.
SEC. 5. Membership in the Philippine National Red Cross shall be open to the
entire population in the Philippines regardless of citizenship. Any contribution to the
Philippine National Red Cross Annual Fund Campaign shall entitle the contributor to
membership for one year and said contribution shall be deductible in full for taxation
purposes.
32

SEC. 6. The governing powers and authority shall be vested in the Board of
Governors composed of thirty members, six of whom shall be appointed by the
President of the Philippines, eighteen shall be elected by chapter delegates in
biennial conventions and the remaining six shall be selected by the twenty-four
members of the Board already chosen. At least one but not more than three of the
Presidential appointees shall be chosen from the Armed Forces of the Philippines.
33

a. The term of office of all members of the Board shall be four years,
including those appointed by the President of the Philippines, renewable at
the pleasure of the appointing power or elective bodies.
b. Vacancies in the Board of Governors caused by death or resignation shall
be filled by election by the Board of Governors at its next meeting, except
that vacancies among the Presidential appointees shall be filled by the
President.
SEC. 7. The President of the Philippines shall be the Honorary President of the
Philippine National Red Cross. The officers shall consist of a Chairman, a ViceChairman, a Secretary, a Treasurer, a Counselor, an Assistant Secretary and an
Assistant Treasurer, all of whom shall be elected by the Board of Governors from
34

among its membership for a term of two years and may be re-elected. The election of
officers shall take place within sixty days after all the members of the Board of
Governors have been chosen and have qualified.
SEC. 8. The Biennial meeting of chapter delegates shall be held on such date and
such place as may be specified by the Board of Governors to elect members of the
Board of Governors and advice the Board of Governors on the activities of the
Philippine National Red Cross; Provided, however, that during periods of great
emergency, the Board of Governors in its discretion may determine that the best
interest of the corporation shall be served by postponing such biennial meeting.
35

SEC. 9. The power to ordain, adopt and amend by-laws and regulations shall be
vested in the Board of Governors.
36

SEC. 10. The members of the Board of Governors, as well as the officers of the
corporation, shall serve without compensation. The compensation of the paid staff of
the corporation shall be determined by the Board of Governors upon the
recommendation of the Secretary General.
37

SEC. 11. As a national voluntary organization, the Philippine National Red Cross
shall be financed primarily by contributions obtained through solicitation campaigns
throughout the year which shall be organized by the Board of Governors and
conducted by the Chapters in their respective jurisdictions. These fund raising
campaigns shall be conducted independently of other fund drives by other
organizations.
38

SEC. 12. The Board of Governors shall promulgate rules and regulations for the
organization of local units of the Philippine National Red Cross to be known as
Chapters. Said rules and regulations shall fix the relationship of the Chapters to the
Corporation, define their territorial jurisdictions, and determine the number of
delegates for each chapter based on population, fund campaign potentials and
service needs.
39

SEC. 13. The Corporation shall, at the end of every calendar year submit to the
President of the Philippines an annual report containing the activities of the
Corporation showing its financial condition, the receipts and disbursements.
40

41

The valid provisions are Sections 4(b) and (c), 14, 15, 16, and 17:
SEC. 4. In furtherance of the purposes mentioned in the preceding subparagraphs, the Philippine National Red Cross shall:
xxx
b. Be exempt from payment of all duties, taxes, fees, and other charges of all
kinds on all importations and purchases for its exclusive use, on donations
for its disaster relief work and other Red Cross services, and in its benefits
and fund raising drives all provisions of law to the contrary notwithstanding.
c. Be allotted by the Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office one lottery draw

yearly for the support of its disaster relief operations in addition to its existing
lottery draws for the Blood Program.
SEC. 14. It shall be unlawful for any person to solicit, collect or receive
money, materials, or property of any kind by falsely representing or
pretending himself to be a member, agent or representative of the Philippine
National Red Cross.
SEC. 15. The use of the name Red Cross is reserved exclusively to the
Philippine National Red Cross and the use of the emblem of the red Greek
cross on a white ground is reserved exclusively to the Philippine National
Red Cross, medical services of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and such
other medical facilities or other institutions as may be authorized by the
Philippine National Red Cross as provided under Article 44 of the Geneva
Conventions. It shall be unlawful for any other person or entity to use the
words Red Cross or Geneva Cross or to use the emblem of the red Greek
cross on a white ground or any designation, sign, or insignia constituting an
imitation thereof for any purpose whatsoever.
SEC. 16. As used in this Decree, the term person shall include any legal
person, group, or legal entity whatsoever nature, and any person violating
any section of this Article shall, upon conviction therefore be liable to a fin[e]
of not less than one thousand pesos or imprisonment for a term not
exceeding one year, or both, at the discretion of the court, for each and every
offense. In case the violation is committed by a corporation or association,
the penalty shall devolve upon the president, director or any other officer
responsible for such violation.
SEC. 17. All acts or parts of acts which are inconsistent with the provisions of
this Decree are hereby repealed.

The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation

DISSENTING OPINION
NACHURA, J.:
I am constrained to register my dissent because the ponencia does not only endorse an
unmistakably flagrant transgression of the Constitution but also unwittingly espouses the destruction
of the Philippine National Red Cross (PNRC) as an institution. With all due respect, I disagree with
the principal arguments advanced in the ponencia to justify Senator Richard J. Gordons
unconstitutional holding of the chairmanship of the PNRC Board of Governors while concurrently
sitting as a member of the Senate of the Philippines.
Procedurally, I maintain that the petition is one for prohibition and that petitioners have standing to
file the same. On the merits, I remain earnestly convinced that PNRC is a government owned or
controlled corporation (GOCC), if not a government instrumentality; that its charter does not violate

the constitutional proscription against the creation of private corporations by special law; and that
Senator Gordons continuous occupancy of two incompatible positions is a clear violation of the
Constitution.
Allow me to elucidate.
I.
The petition should be treated
as one for prohibition; and
petitioners have locus standi
I submit that the present petition should be treated as one for prohibition rather than for quo
warranto. In the main, the petitioners seek from this Court the declaration that Senator Gordon has
forfeited his seat in the Senate, and the consequent proscription from further acting or representing
himself as a Senator and from receiving the salaries, emoluments, compensations, privileges and
benefits thereof.1 Hence, the remedy sought is preventive and restrictivean injunction against an
alleged continuing violation of the fundamental law. Furthermore, the petitioners raise a
constitutional issue, without claiming any entitlement to either the Senate seat or the chairmanship of
PNRC.
Considering that the issue involved is of fundamental constitutional significance and of paramount
importance, i.e., whether the Senator continues to commit an infringement of the Constitution by
holding two positions claimed to be incompatible, the Court has full authority, nay the bounden duty,
to treat the vaguely worded petition as one for prohibition and assume jurisdiction. 2
Petitioners, as citizens of the Republic and by being taxpayers, have locus standi to institute the
instant case. Garcillano v. the House of Representatives Committees on Public Information, Public
Order and Safety, National Defense and Security, Information and Communications Technology, and
Suffrage and Electoral Reforms3 echoes the current policy of the Court, as laid down in Chavez v.
Gonzales,4 to disallow procedural barriers to serve as impediments to addressing and resolving
serious legal questions that greatly impact on public interest. This is in keeping with the Courts
responsibility under the Constitution to determine whether or not other branches of government have
kept themselves within the limits of the Constitution and the laws, and that they have not abused the
discretion given them.5
Finally, as aforementioned, petitioners advance a constitutional issue which deserves the attention of
this Court in view of its seriousness, novelty and weight as precedent. 6 Considering that Senator
Gordon is charged with continuously violating the Constitution by holding incompatible offices, the
institution of the instant action by the petitioners is proper.
II.
A brief history of the PNRC
A historical account of the PNRCs creation is imperative in order to comprehend the nature of the
institution and to put things in their proper perspective.
Even before its incorporation in 1947, the Red Cross, as an organization, was already in existence in
the Philippines. Apolinario Mabini played an important role in the approval by the Malolos Republic,

on February 17, 1899, of the Constitution of the National Association of the Red Cross. Appointed to
serve as its president was Hilario del Rosario de Aguinaldo. On August 29, 1900, International
Delegate of Diplomacy Felipe Agoncillo met with International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC)
President Gustave Moynier to lobby for the recognition of the Filipino Red Cross Society and the
application of the 1864 Geneva Convention to the country during the Filipino-American war.7 The
Geneva Convention of August 22, 1864 dealt mainly on the relief to wounded soldiers without any
distinction as to nationality, on the neutrality and inviolability of medical personnel and medical
establishments and units; and on the adoption of the distinctive sign of the red cross on a white
ground by hospitals, ambulances and evacuation parties and personnel. 8
On August 30, 1905, a Philippine branch of the American National Red Cross (ANRC) was
organized. This was later officially recognized as an ANRC chapter on December 4, 1917. In 1934,
President Manuel L. Quezon initiated the establishment of an independent Philippine Red Cross, but
this did not materialize because the Commonwealth Government at that time could not ratify the
Geneva Convention. During the Japanese occupation, a Japanese-controlled Philippine Red Cross
was created to take care of internment camps in the country. After the liberation of Manila in 1945,
local Red Cross officials and the ANRC undertook to reconstitute the organization. 9 The Republic of
the Philippines became an independent nation on July 4, 1946, and proclaimed its adherence to the
Geneva Convention on February 14, 1947. On March 22 of that year, the PNRC was officially
created when President Manuel A. Roxas signed Republic Act (R.A.) No. 95. 10
PNRC is a GOCC
Section 16, Article XII, of the Philippine Constitution, provides the inflexible imperative for the
formation or organization of private corporations, as follows:
Sec. 16. The Congress shall not, except by general law, provide for the formation, organization or
regulation of private corporations. Government-owned or controlled corporations may be created or
established by special charters in the interest of the common good and subject to the test of
economic viability.
Delineating the nature of a GOCC, compared to a private corporation, Justice Carpio explains this
inviolable rule in Feliciano v. Commission on Audit11 in this wise:
We begin by explaining the general framework under the fundamental law. The Constitution
recognizes two classes of corporations. The first refers to private corporations created under a
general law. The second refers to government-owned or controlled corporations created by special
charters. Section 16, Article XII of the Constitution provides:
Section 16. The Congress shall not, except by general law, provide for the formation, organization,
or regulation of private corporations. Government-owned or controlled corporations may be created
or established by special charters in the interest of the common good and subject to the test of
economic viability.
The Constitution emphatically prohibits the creation of private corporations except by a general law
applicable to citizens. The purpose of this constitutional provision is to ban private corporations
created by special charters, which historically gave certain individuals, families or groups special
privileges denied to other citizens.
In short, Congress cannot enact a law creating a private corporation with a special charter. Such

legislation would be unconstitutional. Private corporations may exist only under a general law. If the
corporation is private, it must necessarily exist under a general law. Stated differently, only
corporations created under a general law can qualify as private corporations. Under existing laws,
that general law is the Corporation Code, except that the Cooperative Code governs the
incorporation of cooperatives.
The Constitution authorizes Congress to create government-owned or controlled corporations
through special charters. Since private corporations cannot have special charters, it follows that
Congress can create corporations with special charters only if such corporations are governmentowned or controlled.12
Reason dictates that since no private corporation can have a special charter, it follows that Congress
can create corporations with special charters only if such corporations are government-owned or
controlled.13 To hold otherwise would run directly against our fundamental law or, worse, authorize
implied amendment to it, which this Court cannot allow.
The PNRC was incorporated under R.A. No 95, a special law. Following the logic in Feliciano, it
cannot be anything but a GOCC.
R.A. No. 95 has undergone amendment through the years.14 Did the amendment of the PNRC
Charter have the effect of transforming it into a private corporation?
In Camporedondo v. National Labor Relations Commission, 15 we answered this in the negative. The
Courts ruling in that case, reiterated in Baluyot v. Holganza, 16 is direct, definite and clear, viz:
Resolving the issue set out in the opening paragraph of this opinion, we rule that the Philippine
National Red Cross (PNRC) is a government owned and controlled corporation, with an original
charter under Republic Act No. 95, as amended. The test to determine whether a corporation is
government owned or controlled, or private in nature is simple. Is it created by its own charter for the
exercise of a public function, or by incorporation under the general corporation law? Those with
special charters are government corporations subject to its provisions, and its employees are under
the jurisdiction of the Civil Service Commission, and are compulsory members of the Government
Service Insurance System. The PNRC was not "impliedly converted into a private corporation"
simply because its charter was amended to vest in it the authority to secure loans, be exempted
from payment of all duties, taxes, fees and other charges of all kinds on all importations and
purchases for its exclusive use, on donations for its disaster relief work and other services and in its
benefits and fund raising drives and be allotted one lottery draw a year by the Philippine Charity
Sweepstakes Office for the support of its disaster relief operation in addition to its existing lottery
draws for blood programs.17
In an effort to avoid the inescapable command of Camporendondo, the ponencia asserts that the
decision has failed to consider the definition of a GOCC under Section 2 (13) of the Introductory
Provisions of Executive Order No. 292 (Administrative Code of 1987), which provides:
SEC. 2. General Terms Defined. x x x
(13) Government-owned or controlled corporation refers to any agency organized as a stock or nonstock corporation, vested with functions relating to public needs whether governmental or proprietary
in nature, and owned by the Government directly or through its instrumentalities either wholly, or,
where applicable as in the case of stock corporations, to the extent of at least fifty-one (51) per cent

of its capital stock: Provided, That government-owned or controlled corporations may be further
categorized by the Department of the Budget, the Civil Service Commission, and the Commission on
Audit for purposes of the exercise and discharge of their respective powers, functions and
responsibilities with respect to such corporations.18
The ponencia then argues that, based on the criterion in the cited provision, PNRC is not owned or
controlled by the government and, thus, is not a GOCC.
I respectfully differ. The quoted Administrative Code provision does not pronounce a definition of a
GOCC that strays from Section 16, Article XII of the Constitution. As explained in Philippine National
Construction Corporation v. Pabion, et al.,19 it merely declares that a GOCC may either be a stock or
non-stock corporation, or that it "may be further categorized,"20 suggesting that the definition
provided in the Administrative Code is broad enough to admit of other distinctions as to the kinds of
GOCCs.21
Rather, crucial in this definition is the reference to the corporation being "vested with functions
relating to public needs whether governmental or proprietary." When we relate this to the PNRC
Charter, as amended, we note that Section 1 of the charter starts with the phrase, "(T)here is hereby
created in the Republic of the Philippines a body corporate and politic to be the voluntary
organization officially designated to assist the Republic of the Philippines in discharging the
obligations set forth in the Geneva Conventions x x x".22 It is beyond cavil that the obligations of the
Republic of the Philippines set forth in the Geneva Conventions are public or governmental in
character. If the PNRC is "officially designated to assist the Republic," then the PNRC is, perforce,
engaged in the performance of the governments public functions.
PNRC is, at the very least,
a government instrumentality
Further, applying the definition of terms used in the Administrative Code of 1987, as Justice Carpio
urges this Court to do, will lead to the inescapable conclusion that PNRC is an instrumentality of the
government. Section 2(10) of the said code defines a government instrumentality as:
(10) Instrumentality refers to any agency of the National Government not integrated within the
department framework, vested with special functions or jurisdiction by law, endowed with some if not
all corporate powers, administering special funds, and enjoying operational autonomy, usually
through a charter. This term includes regulatory agencies, chartered institutions and governmentowned or controlled corporations.23
The PNRC is vested with the special function of assisting the Republic of the Philippines in
discharging its obligations under the Geneva Conventions. It is endowed with corporate powers. It
administers special fundsthe contributions of its members, the aid given by the government, the
support extended to it by the Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office (PCSO) in terms of allotment of
lottery draws.24 It enjoys operational autonomy, as emphasized by Justice Carpio himself. And all
these attributes exist by virtue of its charter.
Significantly, in the United States, the ANRC, the precursor of the PNRC and likewise a member of
the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, 25 is considered as a federal
instrumentality. Addressing the issue of whether the ANRC was an entity exempt from paying
unemployment compensation tax, the US Supreme Court, in Department of Employment v. United
States,26 characterized the Red Cross as an instrumentality of the federal government not covered
by the enforcement of the tax statute and entitled to a refund of taxes paid

On the merits, we hold that the Red Cross is an instrumentality of the United States for purposes of
immunity from state taxation levied on its operations, and that this immunity has not been waived by
congressional enactment. Although there is no simple test for ascertaining whether an institution is
so closely related to governmental activity as to become a tax-immune instrumentality, the Red
Cross is clearly such an instrumentality. See generally, Sturges, The Legal Status of the Red Cross,
56 Mich.L.Rev. 1 (1957). Congress chartered the present Red Cross in 1905, subjecting it to
governmental supervision and to a regular financial audit by the Defense, then War, Department. 33
Stat. 599, as amended, 36 U.S.C. s 1 et seq. Its principal officer is appointed by the President, who
also appoints seven (all government officers) of the remaining 49 Governors. 33 Stat. 601, as
amended, 36 U.S.C. s 5. By statute and Executive Order there devolved upon the Red Cross the
right and the obligation to meet this Nation's commitments under various Geneva Conventions, to
perform a wide variety of functions indispensable to the workings of our Armed Forces around the
globe, and to assist the Federal Government in providing disaster assistance to the States in time of
need. Although its operations are financed primarily from voluntary private contributions, the Red
Cross does receive substantial material assistance from the Federal Government. And time and time
again, both the President and the Congress have recognized and acted in reliance upon the Red
Cross' status virtually as an arm of the Government. In those respects in which the Red Cross differs
from the usual government agency-e.g., in that its employees are not employees of the United
States, and that government officials do not direct its everyday affairs-the Red Cross is like other
institutions-e.g., national banks-whose status as tax-immune instrumentalities of the United States is
beyond dispute.27
The same conclusion was reached in R.A. Barton v. American Red Cross.28 In that case, a
transfusion recipient and her family brought action against American Red Cross and its state medical
director under Alabama Medical Liability Act as well as Alabama tort law for failing to properly test
blood sample and failing to timely notify recipient that donor had tested positive for human
immunodeficiency virus (HIV). The US District Court concluded that the Red Cross was a federal
instrumentality and was so intertwined with and was essential to the operation of the federal
government, both internationally and domestically;29 thus, its personnel were exempt from tort liability
if the conduct complained of were within the scope of official duties and were discretionary in
nature.30 The US Court of Appeals later affirmed the decision, and the US Supreme Court denied
certiorari and rehearing on the case.31
Interestingly, while the United States considers the ANRC as its arm and the US courts uphold its
status as a federal instrumentality, ANRC remains an independent, volunteer-led organization that
works closely with the ICRC on matters of international conflict and social, political, and military
unrest. There is, therefore, no sufficient basis for Justice Carpio to assume that if this Court will
consider PNRC as a GOCC, then "it cannot merit the trust of all and cannot effectively carry out its
mission as a National Red Cross Society."
Let it be stressed that, in much the same way as the ANRC, the PNRC has been chartered and
incorporated by the Philippine Government to aid it in the fulfillment of its obligations under the
Geneva Convention. The President of the Republic appoints six of the 36 PNRC governors. Though
it depends primarily on voluntary contributions for its funding, PNRC receives financial assistance
not only from the National Government and the PCSO but also through the local government units.
PNRC further submits to the President an annual report containing its activities and showing its
financial condition, as well as the receipts and disbursements. PNRC has further been recognized by
the Philippine Government to be an essential component in its international and domestic operation.
There is no doubt therefore that PNRC is a GOCC or, if not, at least a government instrumentality.
The fact that the Philippine or the American National Red Cross is a governmental instrumentality

does not affect its autonomy and operation in conformity with the Fundamental Principles of the
International Red Cross. The PNRC, like the ANRC, remains autonomous, neutral and independent
from the Government, and vice versa, consonant with the principles laid down in the Geneva
Convention.
A similar standing obtains in the case of the Commission on Human Rights (CHR). While it is a
governmental office, it is independent. Separatists and insurgents do not consider the CHR, or the
PNRC in this case, as the enemy, but rather as the entity to turn to in the event of injury to their
constitutional rights, for the CHR, or to their physical being, for the PNRC.
The PNRC Charter does not violate
the constitutional proscription
against the creation of private
corporations by special law
Considering that the PNRC is not a private corporation, but a GOCC or a government
instrumentality, then its charter does not violate the constitutional provision that Congress cannot,
except by a general law, provide for the formation, organization or regulation of private corporations,
unless such corporations are owned or controlled by the Government. 32 We have already settled this
issue in Camporedondo and in Baluyot. Let it be emphasized that, in those cases, this Court has
found nothing wrong with the PNRC Charter. We have simply applied the Constitution, and in
Feliciano, this Court has explained the meaning of the constitutional provision.
I respectfully submit that we are not prepared to reverse the ruling of this Court in the said cases. To
rule otherwise will create an unsettling ripple effect in numerous decisions of this Court, including
those dealing with the jurisdiction of the Civil Service Commission (CSC) and the authority of the
Commission on Audit (COA), among others.
Furthermore, to subscribe to the proposition that Section 1 of the PNRC Charter, which deals with
the creation and incorporation of the organization, is invalid for being violative of the aforesaid
constitutional proscription, but the rest of the provisions in the PNRC Charter remains valid, is to
reach an absurd situation in which obligations are imposed on and a framework for its operation is
laid down for a legally non-existing entity. If Section 1 of the PNRC Charter were impulsively
invalidated, what will remain are the following provisions, which will have no specific frame of
reference
SECTION 2. The name of this corporation shall be "The Philippine National Red Cross" and by that
name shall have perpetual succession with the power to sue and be sued; to own and hold such real
and personal estate as shall be deemed advisable and to accept bequests, donations and
contributions of property of all classes for the purpose of this Corporation hereinafter set forth; to
adopt a seal and to alter and destroy the same at pleasure; and to have the right to adopt and to
use, in carrying out its purposes hereinafter designated, as an emblem and badge, a red Greek
cross on a white ground, the same as has been described in the Geneva Conventions, and adopted
by the several nations ratifying or adhering thereto; to ordain and establish by-laws and regulations
not inconsistent with the laws of the Republic of the Philippines, and generally to do all such acts
and things as may be necessary to carry into effect the provisions of this Act and promote the
purposes of said organization; and the corporation hereby created is designated as the organization
which is authorized to act in matters of relief under said Convention. In accordance with the Geneva
Conventions, the issuance of the distinctive Red Cross emblem to medical units and establishments,
personnel and materials neutralized in time of war shall be left to the military authorities. The red
Greek cross on a white ground, as has been described by the Geneva Conventions is not, and shall

not be construed as a religious symbol, and shall have equal efficacy and applicability to persons of
all faiths, creeds and beliefs. The operational jurisdiction of the Philippine National Red Cross shall
be over the entire territory of the Philippines.
SECTION 3. That the purposes of this Corporation shall be as follows:
a. To provide volunteer aid to the sick and wounded of armed forces in time of war, in
accordance with the spirit of and under the conditions prescribed by the Geneva
Conventions to which the Republic of the Philippines proclaimed its adherence;
b. For the purposes mentioned in the preceding sub-section, to perform all duties
devolving upon the Corporation as a result of the adherence of the Republic of the
Philippines to the said Convention;
c. To act in matters of voluntary relief and in accordance with the authorities of the
armed forces as a medium of communication between people of the Republic of the
Philippines and their Armed Forces, in time of peace and in time of war, and to act in
such matters between similar national societies of other governments and the
Governments and people and the Armed Forces of the Republic of the Philippines;
d. To establish and maintain a system of national and international relief in time of
peace and in time of war and apply the same in meeting and emergency needs
caused by typhoons, flood, fires, earthquakes, and other natural disasters and to
devise and carry on measures for minimizing the suffering caused by such disasters;
e. To devise and promote such other services in time of peace and in time of war as
may be found desirable in improving the health, safety and welfare of the Filipino
people;
f. To devise such means as to make every citizen and/or resident of the Philippines a
member of the Red Cross.
SECTION 4. In furtherance of the purposes mentioned in the preceding sub-paragraphs, the
Philippine National Red Cross shall:
a. Be authorized to secure loans from any financial institution which shall not exceed
its budget of the previous year.
b. Be exempt from payment of all duties, taxes, fees, and other charges of all kinds
on all importations and purchases for its exclusive use, on donations for its disaster
relief work and other Red Cross services, and in its benefits and fund raising drives
all provisions of law to the contrary notwithstanding.
c. Be allotted by the Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office one lottery draw yearly
for the support of its disaster relief operations in addition to its existing lottery draws
for the Blood Program.
SECTION 5. Membership in the Philippine National Red Cross shall be open to entire population in
the Philippines regardless of citizenship. Any contribution to the Philippine National Red Cross
Annual Fund Campaign shall entitle the contributor to membership for one year and said contribution

shall be deductible in full for taxation purposes.

SECTION 6. The governing powers and authority shall be vested in a Board of Governors composed
of thirty members, six of whom shall be appointed by the President of the Philippines, eighteen shall
be elected by chapter delegates in biennial conventions and the remaining six shall be elected by
the twenty-four members of the Board already chosen. At least one but not more than three of the
Presidential appointees shall be chosen from the Armed Forces of the Philippines.
a. The term of office of all members of the board of Governors shall be four years.
Any member of the Board of Governor who has served two consecutive full terms of
four years each shall be ineligible for membership on the Board for at least two
years; any term served to cover unexpired terms of office of any governor will not be
considered in this prohibition in serving two consecutive full terms, and provided,
however, that terms served for more than two years shall be considered a full term.
b. Vacancies in the Board of Governors caused by death or resignation shall be filled
by election by the Board of Governors at its next meeting, except that vacancies
among the Presidential appointees shall be filled by the President.
SECTION 7. The President of the Philippines shall be the Honorary President of the Philippine
National Red Cross. The officers shall consist of a Chairman, a Vice-Chairman, a Secretary, a
Treasurer, a Counselor, an Assistant Secretary and an Assistant Treasurer, all of whom shall be
elected by the Board of Governors from among its membership for a term of two years and may be
re-elected. The election of officers shall take place within sixty days after all the members of the
Board of Governors have been chosen and have qualified.
SECTION 8. The Biennial meeting of chapter delegates shall be held on such date and such place
as may be specified by the Board of Governors to elect members of the Board of Governors and
advice the Board of Governors on the activities of the Philippine National Red Cross; Provided,
however that during periods of great emergency, the Board of Governors in its discretion may
determine that the best interest of the corporation shall be served by postponing such biennial
meeting.
SECTION 9. The power to ordain, adopt and amend by-laws and regulations shall be vested in the
Board of Governors.
SECTION 10. The members of the Board of Governors, as well as the officers of the corporation,
shall serve without compensation. The compensation of the paid staff of the corporation shall be
determined by the Board of Governors upon the recommendation of the Secretary General.
SECTION 11. As a national voluntary organization, the Philippine National Red Cross shall be
financed primarily by contributions obtained through solicitation campaigns throughout the year
which shall be organized by the Board of Governors and conducted by the Chapters in their
respective jurisdictions. These fund raising campaigns shall be conducted independently of other
fund drives and service needs.
SECTION 12. The Board of Governors shall promulgate rules and regulations for the organization of
local units of the Philippine National Red Cross to be known as Chapters. Said rules and regulations
shall fix the relationship of the Chapters to the Corporation, define their territorial jurisdictions, and
determine the number of delegates for each chapter based on population, fund campaign potentials

and service needs.

SECTION 13. The Corporation shall, at the end of every calendar year submit to the President of the
Philippines an annual report containing the activities of the Corporation showing its financial
condition, the receipts and disbursements.
SECTION 14. It shall be unlawful for any person to solicit, collect or receive money, materials, or
property of any kind by falsely representing or pretending himself to be a member, agent or
representative of the Philippine National Red Cross.
SECTION 15. The use of the name Red Cross is reserved exclusively to the Philippine National Red
Cross and the use of the emblem of the red Greek cross on a white ground is reserved exclusively to
the Philippine National Red Cross, medical services of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and such
other medical facilities or other institutions as may be authorized by the Philippine National Red
Cross as provided under Article 44 of the Geneva Conventions. It shall be unlawful for any other
person or entity to use the words Red Cross or Geneva Cross or to use the emblem of the red Greek
cross on a white ground or any designation, sign, or insignia constituting an imitation thereof for any
purpose whatsoever.
SECTION 16. As used in this Decree, the term person shall include any legal person, group, or legal
entity whatsoever nature, and any person violating any section of this Article shall, upon conviction
therefore be liable to a find of not less than one thousand pesos or imprisonment for a term not
exceeding one year, or both, at the discretion of the court, for each and every offense. In case the
violation is committed by a corporation or association, the penalty shall devolve upon the president,
director or any other officer responsible for such violation.
SECTION 17. All acts or parts of acts which are inconsistent with the provisions of this Decree are
hereby repealed.
Sections 2 to 17 of R.A. No. 95, as amended, are not separable from Section 1, the provision
creating and incorporating the PNRC, and cannot, by themselves, stand independently as law. The
PNRC Charter obviously does not contain a separability clause.
The constitutionality of
a law is presumed
Two other important points militate against the declaration of Section 1 of the PNRC Charter as
invalid and unconstitutional, namely: (1) respondent does not question the constitutionality of the
said provision; and (2) every law enjoys the presumption of constitutionality.
Settled is the doctrine that all reasonable doubts should be resolved in favor of the constitutionality
of a statute. 33 The presumption is that the legislature intended to enact a valid, sensible and just law
and one which operates no further than may be necessary to effectuate the specific purpose
thereof.34 Justice Carpio, in Kapisanan ng mga Kawani ng Energy Regulatory Board v. Barin, 35 even
echoes the principle that "to justify the nullification of a law, there must be a clear and unequivocal
breach of the Constitution."
Here, as in Camporedondo and Baluyot, there is no clear showing that the PNRC Charter runs
counter to the Constitution. And, again in the same tone as in Montesclaros v. Commission on
Elections, "[the parties] are not even assailing the constitutionality of [the PNRC Charter]." A

becoming courtesy to a co-equal branch should thus impel this Court to refrain from
unceremoniously invalidating a legislative act.
Deleterious effects will result
if PNRC is declared a private
corporation, among which are
its consequent destruction as
an institution and the Republics
shirking its obligation under
the Geneva Convention
The hypothesis that PNRC is a private corporation has far-reaching implications. As mentioned
earlier, it will be a reversal of the doctrines laid down in Camporedondo and Baluyot, and it will have
an unsettling ripple effect on other numerous decisions of the Court, including those dealing with the
jurisdiction of the CSC and the authority of the COA.
Not only that. If PNRC is considered as a private corporation, then, this will lead to its ultimate
demise as an institution. Its employees will no longer be covered by the Government Service
Insurance System. It can no longer be extended tax exemptions and official immunity and it cannot
anymore be given support, financial or otherwise, by the National Government, the local government
units and the PCSO; because these will violate not only the equal protection clause in the
Constitution, but also penal statutes.
And if PNRC is consequently obliterated, the Republic will be shirking its responsibilities and
obligations under the Geneva Convention.
This Court then has to be very careful in the resolution of this case and in making a declaration that
will have unintended yet deleterious consequences. The Court must not arbitrarily declare a law
unconstitutional just to save a single individual from the unavoidable consequences of his
transgression of the Constitution, even if it be unintentional and done in good faith.
The respondent holds two
incompatible offices
in violation of the Constitution
Section 13, Article VI of the Constitution explicitly provides that "no Senator or Member of the House
of Representatives may hold any other office or employment in the government, or any subdivision,
agency or instrumentality thereof, including [GOCCs] or their subsidiaries, during his term without
forfeiting his seat."36 In Adaza v. Pacana, Jr.,37 the Court, construing a parallel provision in the 1973
Constitution, has ruled that
The language used in the above-cited section is plain, certain and free from ambiguity. The only
exceptions mentioned therein are the offices of prime minister and cabinet member. The wisdom or
expediency of the said provision is a matter which is not within the province of the Court to
determine.
A public office is a public trust. It is created for the interest and the benefit of the people. As such, a
holder thereof "is subject to such regulations and conditions as the law may impose" and "he cannot
complain of any restrictions which public policy may dictate on his holding of more than one office." It
is therefore of no avail to petitioner that the system of government in other states allows a local

elective official to act as an elected member of the parliament at the same time. The dictate of the
people in whom legal sovereignty lies is explicit. It provides no exceptions save the two offices
specifically cited in the above-quoted constitutional provision. Thus, while it may be said that within
the purely parliamentary system of government no incompatibility exists in the nature of the two
offices under consideration, as incompatibility is understood in common law, the incompatibility
herein present is one created by no less than the constitution itself. In the case at bar, there is no
question that petitioner has taken his oath of office as an elected Mambabatas Pambansa and has
been discharging his duties as such. In the light of the oft-mentioned constitutional provision, this
fact operated to vacate his former post and he cannot now continue to occupy the same, nor attempt
to discharge its functions.38
There is no doubt that the language in Section 13, Article VI is unambiguous; it requires no in-depth
construction. However, as the constitutional provision is worded at present, the then recognized
exception adverted to in Adaza, i.e., offices of prime minister and cabinet member, no longer holds
true given the reversion to the presidential system and a bicameral Congress in the 1987
Constitution. There remains, however, a single exception to the rule. Civil Liberties Union v.
Executive Secretary,39 reiterated in the fairly recent Public Interest Center, Inc. v. Elma, 40 recognizes
that a position held in an ex officio capacity does not violate the constitutional proscription on the
holding of multiple offices. Interpreting the equivalent section in Article VII on the Executive
Department,41 the Court has decreed in Civil Liberties that
The prohibition against holding dual or multiple offices or employment under Section 13, Article VII of
the Constitution must not, however, be construed as applying to posts occupied by the Executive
officials specified therein without additional compensation in an ex officio capacity as provided by law
and as required by the primary functions of said officials office. The reason is that these posts do not
comprise "any other office" within the contemplation of the constitutional prohibition but are properly
an imposition of additional duties and functions on said officials. x x x
xxxx
x x x x The term ex officio means "from office; by virtue of office." It refers to an
"authority derived from official character merely, not expressly conferred upon the
individual character, but rather annexed to the official position." Ex officio likewise
denotes an "act done in an official character, or as a consequence of office, and
without any other appointment or authority other than that conferred by the office." An
ex officio member of a board is one who is a member by virtue of his title to a certain
office, and without further warrant or appointment. x x x
xxxx
The ex officio position being actually and in legal contemplation part of the principal office, it follows
that the official concerned has no right to receive additional compensation for his services in the said
position. The reason is that these services are already paid for and covered by the compensation
attached to his principal office. x x x42
In the instant case, therefore, we must decide whether the respondent holds the chairmanship of
PNRC in an ex officio capacity. Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1264, amending R.A. No. 95, provides
for the composition of the governing authority of the PNRC and the manner of their appointment or
election, thus:
Section 6. The governing powers and authority shall be vested in a Board of Governors composed of

thirty members, six of whom shall be appointed by the President of the Philippines, eighteen shall be
elected by chapter delegates in biennial conventions and the remaining six shall be elected by the
twenty-four members of the Board already chosen. At least one but not more than three of the
Presidential appointees shall be chosen from the Armed Forces of the Philippines.
a. The term of office of all members of the board of Governors shall be four years.
Any member of the Board of Governor who has served two consecutive full terms of
four years each shall be ineligible for membership on the Board for at least two
years; any term served to cover unexpired terms of office of any governor will not be
considered in this prohibition in serving two consecutive full terms, and provided,
however, that terms served for more than two years shall be considered a full term.
b. Vacancies in the Board of Governors caused by death or resignation shall be filled
by election by the Board of Governors at its next meeting, except that vacancies
among the Presidential appointees shall be filled by the President.
Section 7. The President of the Philippines shall be the Honorary President of the Philippine National
Red Cross. The officers shall consist of a Chairman, a Vice-Chairman, a Secretary, a Treasurer, a
Counselor, an Assistant Secretary and an Assistant Treasurer, all of whom shall be elected by the
Board of Governors from among its membership for a term of two years and may be re-elected. The
election of officers shall take place within sixty days after all the members of the Board of Governors
have been chosen and have qualified.
Nowhere does it say in the law that a member of the Senate can sit in an ex officio capacity as
chairman of the PNRC Board of Governors. Chairmanship of the PNRC Board is neither an
extension of the legislative position nor is it in aid of legislative duties. 43 Likewise, the position is
neither derived from one being a member of the Senate nor is it annexed to the Senatorial position.
Stated differently, the PNRC chairmanship does not flow from ones election as Senator of the
Republic. Applying Civil Liberties, we can then conclude that the chairmanship of the PNRC Board is
not held in an ex officio capacity by a member of Congress.
The fact that the PNRC Chairman of the Board is not appointed by the President 44 and the fact that
the former does not receive any compensation45 do not at all give the said position an ex officio
character such that the occupant thereof becomes exempt from the constitutional proscription on the
holding of multiple offices. As held in Public Interest Center, the absence of additional compensation
being received by virtue of the second post is not enough, what matters is that the second post is
held by virtue of the functions of the first office and is exercised in an ex officio capacity.46 Hence,
Senator Gordon, in assuming the chairmanship of the PNRC Board of Governors while being a
member of the Senate, is clearly violating Section 13, Article VI of the Constitution. While we can
only hypothesize on the extent of the incompatibility between the two officesas stated in
petitioners memorandum, Senator Gordons holding of both offices may result in a divided focus of
his legislative functions, and in a conflict of interest as when a possible amendment of the PNRC
Charter is lobbied in Congress or when the PNRC and its officials become subjects of legislative
inquiries.47 Let it be stressed that, as in Adaza, the incompatibility herein present is one created by
no less than the Constitution itself.48
I hasten to add that Senator Gordons chairmanship of the PNRC Board cannot be likened to the
membership of several legislators in the Legislative-Executive Development Advisory Council, in the
Council of State, in the Board of Regents of state universities, and in the Judiciary, Executive and
Legislative Advisory and Consultative Council, because, in these bodies, the membership of the

legislators is held in an ex officio capacity or as an extension of their legislative functions. 49

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, I vote to GRANT the petition.
ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA

G.R. No. 170165

August 15, 2006

B/GEN. (RET.) FRANCISCO V. GUDANI AND LT. COL. ALEXANDER F. BALUTAN Petitioners,
vs.
LT./GEN. GENEROSO S. SENGA CORONA, AS CHIEF OF STAFF OF THE CARPIO-MORALES,
ARMED FORCES OF THE CALLEJO, SR., PHILIPPINES, COL. GILBERTO AZCUNA, JOSE C.
ROA AS THE PRE-TRIAL TINGA, INVESTIGATING OFFICER, THE CHICO-NAZARIO, PROVOST
MARSHALL GENERAL GARCIA, and OF THE ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES AND
THE GENERAL COURT-MARTIAL, Respondents.
DECISION
TINGA, J.:
A most dangerous general proposition is foisted on the Court that soldiers who defy orders of their
superior officers are exempt
from the strictures of military law and discipline if such defiance is predicated on an act otherwise
valid under civilian law. Obedience and deference to the military chain of command and the
President as commander-in-chief are the cornerstones of a professional military in the firm cusp of
civilian control. These values of obedience and deference expected of military officers are contentneutral, beyond the sway of the officers own sense of what is prudent or rash, or more elementally,
of right or wrong. A self-righteous military invites itself as the scoundrels activist solution to the "ills"
of participatory democracy.
Petitioners seek the annulment of a directive from President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo 1 enjoining
them and other military officers from testifying before Congress without the Presidents consent.
Petitioners also pray for injunctive relief against a pending preliminary investigation against them, in
preparation for possible court-martial proceedings, initiated within the military justice system in
connection with petitioners violation of the aforementioned directive.
The Court is cognizant that petitioners, in their defense, invoke weighty constitutional principles that
center on fundamental freedoms enshrined in the Bill of Rights. Although these concerns will not be
addressed to the satisfaction of petitioners, the Court recognizes these values as of paramount
importance to our civil society, even if not determinative of the resolution of this petition. Had the
relevant issue before us been the right of the Senate to compel the testimony of petitioners, the
constitutional questions raised by them would have come to fore. Such a scenario could have very

well been presented to the Court in such manner, without the petitioners having had to violate a
direct order from their commanding officer. Instead, the Court has to resolve whether petitioners may
be subjected to military discipline on account of their defiance of a direct order of the AFP Chief of
Staff.
The solicited writs of certiorari and prohibition do not avail; the petition must be denied.
I.
The petitioners are high-ranking officers of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP). Both
petitioners, Brigadier General Francisco Gudani (Gen. Gudani) and Lieutenant Colonel Alexander
Balutan (Col. Balutan), belonged to the Philippine Marines. At the time of the subject incidents, both
Gen. Gudani and Col. Balutan were assigned to the Philippine Military Academy (PMA) in Baguio
City, the former as the PMA Assistant Superintendent, and the latter as the Assistant Commandant of
Cadets.2
On 22 September 2005, Senator Rodolfo Biazon (Sen. Biazon) invited several senior officers of the
AFP to appear at a public hearing before the Senate Committee on National Defense and Security
(Senate Committee) scheduled on 28 September 2005. The hearing was scheduled after topics
concerning the conduct of the 2004 elections emerged in the public eye, particularly allegations of
massive cheating and the surfacing of copies of an audio excerpt purportedly of a phone
conversation between President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo and an official of the Commission on
Elections (COMELEC) widely reputed as then COMELEC Commissioner Virgilio Garcillano. At the
time of the 2004 elections, Gen. Gudani had been designated as commander, and Col. Balutan a
member, of "Joint Task Force Ranao" by the AFP Southern Command. "Joint Task Force Ranao"
was tasked with the maintenance of peace and order during the 2004 elections in the provinces of
Lanao del Norte and Lanao del Sur.3 `
Gen. Gudani, Col. Balutan, and AFP Chief of Staff Lieutenant General Generoso Senga (Gen.
Senga) were among the several AFP officers who received a letter invitation from Sen. Biazon to
attend the 28 September 2005 hearing. On 23 September 2005, Gen. Senga replied through a letter
to Sen. Biazon that he would be unable to attend the hearing due to a previous commitment in
Brunei, but he nonetheless "directed other officers from the AFP who were invited to attend the
hearing."4
On 26 September 2005, the Office of the Chief of Staff of the AFP issued a Memorandum addressed
to the Superintendent of the PMA Gen. Cristolito P. Baloing (Gen. Baloing). It was signed by Lt. Col.
Hernando DCA Iriberri in behalf of Gen. Senga.5 Noting that Gen. Gudani and Col. Balutan had been
invited to attend the Senate Committee hearing on 28 September 2005, the Memorandum directed
the two officers to attend the hearing.6 Conformably, Gen. Gudani and Col. Balutan filed their
respective requests for travel authority addressed to the PMA Superintendent.
On 27 September 2005, Gen. Senga wrote a letter to Sen. Biazon, requesting the postponement of
the hearing scheduled for the following day, since the AFP Chief of Staff was himself unable to
attend said hearing, and that some of the invited officers also could not attend as they were
"attending to other urgent operational matters." By this time, both Gen. Gudani and Col. Balutan had
already departed Baguio for Manila to attend the hearing.
Then on the evening of 27 September 2005, at around 10:10 p.m., a message was transmitted to
the PMA Superintendent from the office of Gen. Senga, stating as follows:

PER INSTRUCTION OF HER EXCELLENCY PGMA, NO AFP PERSONNEL SHALL

APPEAR BEFORE ANY CONGRESSIONAL OR SENATE HEARING WITHOUT
HER APPROVAL. INFORM BGEN FRANCISCO F GUDANI AFP AND LTC
ALEXANDER BALUTAN PA (GSC) ACCORDINGLY.7
The following day, Gen. Senga sent another letter to Sen. Biazon, this time informing the senator
that "no approval has been granted by the President to any AFP officer to appear" before the hearing
scheduled on that day. Nonetheless, both Gen. Gudani and Col. Balutan were present as the
hearing started, and they both testified as to the conduct of the 2004 elections.
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), representing the respondents before this Court, has
offered additional information surrounding the testimony of Gen. Gudani and Col. Balutan. The OSG
manifests that the couriers of the AFP Command Center had attempted to deliver the radio message
to Gen. Gudanis residence in a subdivision in Paraaque City late in the night of 27 September
2005, but they were not permitted entry by the subdivision guards. The next day, 28 September
2005, shortly before the start of the hearing, a copy of Gen. Sengas letter to Sen. Biazon sent
earlier that day was handed at the Senate by Commodore Amable B. Tolentino of the AFP Office for
Legislative Affairs to Gen. Gudani, who replied that he already had a copy. Further, Gen. Senga
called Commodore Tolentino on the latters cell phone and asked to talk to Gen. Gudani, but Gen.
Gudani refused. In response, Gen. Senga instructed Commodore Tolentino to inform Gen. Gudani
that "it was an order," yet Gen. Gudani still refused to take Gen. Sengas call. 8
A few hours after Gen. Gudani and Col. Balutan had concluded their testimony, the office of Gen.
Senga issued a statement which noted that the two had appeared before the Senate Committee "in
spite of the fact that a guidance has been given that a Presidential approval should be sought prior
to such an appearance;" that such directive was "in keeping with the time[-]honored principle of the
Chain of Command;" and that the two officers "disobeyed a legal order, in violation of A[rticles of]
W[ar] 65 (Willfully Disobeying Superior Officer), hence they will be subjected to General Court
Martial proceedings x x x" Both Gen. Gudani and Col. Balutan were likewise relieved of their
assignments then.9
On the very day of the hearing, 28 September 2005, President Gloria-Macapagal-Arroyo issued
Executive Order No. 464 (E.O. 464). The OSG notes that the E.O. "enjoined officials of the executive
department including the military establishment from appearing in any legislative inquiry without her
approval."10 This Court subsequently ruled on the constitutionality of the said executive order in
Senate v. Ermita.11 The relevance of E.O. 464 and Senate to the present petition shall be discussed
forthwith.
In the meantime, on 30 September 2005, petitioners were directed by General Senga, through Col.
Henry A. Galarpe of the AFP Provost Marshal General, to appear before the Office of the Provost
Marshal General (OPMG) on 3 October 2005 for investigation. During their appearance before Col.
Galarpe, both petitioners invoked their right to remain silent.12 The following day, Gen. Gudani was
compulsorily retired from military service, having reached the age of 56. 13
In an Investigation Report dated 6 October 2005, the OPMG recommended that petitioners be
charged with violation of Article of War 65, on willfully disobeying a superior officer, in relation to
Article of War 97, on conduct prejudicial to the good order and military discipline. 14 As recommended,
the case was referred to a Pre-Trial Investigation Officer (PTIO) preparatory to trial by the General
Court Martial (GCM).15 Consequently, on 24 October 2005, petitioners were separately served with
Orders respectively addressed to them and signed by respondent Col. Gilbert Jose C. Roa, the PreTrial Investigating Officer of the PTIO. The Orders directed petitioners to appear in person before
Col. Roa at the Pre-Trial Investigation of the Charges for violation of Articles 65 16 and 9717 of

Commonwealth Act No. 408,18 and to submit their counter-affidavits and affidavits of witnesses at the
Office of the Judge Advocate General.19 The Orders were accompanied by respective charge sheets
against petitioners, accusing them of violating Articles of War 65 and 97.
It was from these premises that the present petition for certiorari and prohibition was filed,
particularly seeking that (1) the order of President Arroyo coursed through Gen. Senga preventing
petitioners from testifying before Congress without her prior approval be declared unconstitutional;
(2) the charges stated in the charge sheets against petitioners be quashed; and (3) Gen. Senga,
Col. Galarpe, Col. Roa, and their successors-in-interest or persons acting for and on their behalf or
orders, be permanently enjoined from proceeding against petitioners, as a consequence of their
having testified before the Senate on 28 September 2005.20
Petitioners characterize the directive from President Arroyo requiring her prior approval before any
AFP personnel appear before Congress as a "gag order," which violates the principle of separation
of powers in government as it interferes with the investigation of the Senate Committee conducted in
aid of legislation. They also equate the "gag order" with culpable violation of the Constitution,
particularly in relation to the publics constitutional right to information and transparency in matters of
public concern. Plaintively, petitioners claim that "the Filipino people have every right to hear the
[petitioners] testimonies," and even if the "gag order" were unconstitutional, it still was tantamount to
"the crime of obstruction of justice." Petitioners further argue that there was no law prohibiting them
from testifying before the Senate, and in fact, they were appearing in obeisance to the authority of
Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation.
Finally, it is stressed in the petition that Gen. Gudani was no longer subject to military jurisdiction on
account of his compulsory retirement on 4 October 2005. It is pointed out that Article 2, Title I of the
Articles of War defines persons subject to military law as "all officers and soldiers in the active
service" of the AFP.
II.
We first proceed to define the proper litigable issues. Notably, the guilt or innocence of petitioners in
violating Articles 65 and 97 of the Articles of War is not an issue before this Court, especially
considering that per records, petitioners have not yet been subjected to court martial proceedings.
Owing to the absence of such proceedings, the correct inquiry should be limited to whether
respondents could properly initiate such proceedings preparatory to a formal court-martial, such as
the aforementioned preliminary investigation, on the basis of petitioners acts surrounding their
testimony before the Senate on 28 September 2005. Yet this Court, consistent with the principle that
it is not a trier of facts at first instance,21 is averse to making any authoritative findings of fact, for that
function is first for the court-martial court to fulfill.
Thus, we limit ourselves to those facts that are not controverted before the Court, having been
commonly alleged by petitioners and the OSG (for respondents). Petitioners were called by the
Senate Committee to testify in its 28 September 2005 hearing. Petitioners attended such hearing
and testified before the Committee, despite the fact that the day before, there was an order from
Gen. Senga (which in turn was sourced "per instruction" from President Arroyo) prohibiting them
from testifying without the prior approval of the President. Petitioners do not precisely admit before
this Court that they had learned of such order prior to their testimony, although the OSG asserts that
at the very least, Gen. Gudani already knew of such order before he testified. 22 Yet while this fact
may be ultimately material in the court-martial proceedings, it is not determinative of this petition,
which as stated earlier, does not proffer as an issue whether petitioners are guilty of violating the
Articles of War.

What the Court has to consider though is whether the violation of the aforementioned order of Gen.
Senga, which emanated from the President, could lead to any investigation for court-martial of
petitioners. It has to be acknowledged as a general principle23 that AFP personnel of whatever rank
are liable under military law for violating a direct order of an officer superior in rank. Whether
petitioners did violate such an order is not for the Court to decide, but it will be necessary to assume,
for the purposes of this petition, that petitioners did so.
III.
Preliminarily, we must discuss the effect of E.O. 464 and the Courts ruling in Senate on the present
petition. Notably, it is not alleged that petitioners were in any way called to task for violating
E.O. 464, but instead, they were charged for violating the direct order of Gen. Senga not to
appear before the Senate Committee, an order that stands independent of the executive
order. Distinctions are called for, since Section 2(b) of E.O. 464 listed "generals and flag officers of
the Armed Forces of the Philippines and such other officers who in the judgment of the Chief of Staff
are covered by the executive privilege," as among those public officials required in Section 3 of E.O.
464 "to secure prior consent of the President prior to appearing before either House of Congress."
The Court in Senate declared both Section 2(b) and Section 3 void,24 and the impression may have
been left following Senate that it settled as doctrine, that the President is prohibited from requiring
military personnel from attending congressional hearings without having first secured prior
presidential consent. That impression is wrong.
Senate turned on the nature of executive privilege, a presidential prerogative which is encumbered
by significant limitations. Insofar as E.O. 464 compelled officials of the executive branch to seek prior
presidential approval before appearing before Congress, the notion of executive control also comes
into consideration.25 However, the ability of the President to require a military official to secure prior
consent before appearing before Congress pertains to a wholly different and independent specie of
presidential authoritythe commander-in-chief powers of the President. By tradition and
jurisprudence, the commander-in-chief powers of the President are not encumbered by the same
degree of restriction as that which may attach to executive privilege or executive control.
During the deliberations in Senate, the Court was very well aware of the pendency of this petition as
well as the issues raised herein. The decision in Senate was rendered with the comfort that the
nullification of portions of E.O. 464 would bear no impact on the present petition since petitioners
herein were not called to task for violating the executive order. Moreover, the Court was then
cognizant that Senate and this case would ultimately hinge on disparate legal issues. Relevantly,
Senate purposely did not touch upon or rule on the faculty of the President, under the aegis of the
commander-in-chief powers26 to require military officials from securing prior consent before
appearing before Congress. The pertinent factors in considering that question are markedly outside
of those which did become relevant in adjudicating the issues raised in Senate. It is in this petition
that those factors come into play.
At this point, we wish to dispose of another peripheral issue before we strike at the heart of the
matter. General Gudani argues that he can no longer fall within the jurisdiction of the court-martial,
considering his retirement last 4 October 2005. He cites Article 2, Title I of Commonwealth Act No.
408, which defines persons subject to military law as, among others, "all officers and soldiers in the
active service of the [AFP]," and points out that he is no longer in the active service.
This point was settled against Gen. Gudanis position in Abadilla v. Ramos,27 where the Court
declared that an officer whose name was dropped from the roll of officers cannot be considered to
be outside the jurisdiction of military authorities when military justice proceedings were initiated

against him before the termination of his service. Once jurisdiction has been acquired over the
officer, it continues until his case is terminated. Thus, the Court held:
The military authorities had jurisdiction over the person of Colonel Abadilla at the time of the alleged
offenses. This jurisdiction having been vested in the military authorities, it is retained up to the end of
the proceedings against Colonel Abadilla. Well-settled is the rule that jurisdiction once acquired is
not lost upon the instance of the parties but continues until the case is terminated. 28
Citing Colonel Winthrops treatise on Military Law, the Court further stated:
We have gone through the treatise of Colonel Winthrop and We find the following passage which
goes against the contention of the petitioners, viz
3. Offenders in general Attaching of jurisdiction. It has further been held, and is now settled law, in
regard to military offenders in general, that if the military jurisdiction has once duly attached to them
previous to the date of the termination of their legal period of service, they may be brought to trial by
court-martial after that date, their discharge being meanwhile withheld. This principle has mostly
been applied to cases where the offense was committed just prior to the end of the term. In such
cases the interests of discipline clearly forbid that the offender should go unpunished. It is held
therefore that if before the day on which his service legally terminates and his right to a
discharge is complete, proceedings with a view to trial are commenced against him as by
arrest or the service of charges, the military jurisdiction will fully attach and once attached
may be continued by a trial by court-martial ordered and held after the end of the term of the
enlistment of the accused x x x 29
Thus, military jurisdiction has fully attached to Gen. Gudani inasmuch as both the acts complained of
and the initiation of the proceedings against him occurred before he compulsorily retired on 4
October 2005. We see no reason to unsettle the Abadilla doctrine. The OSG also points out that
under Section 28 of Presidential Decree No. 1638, as amended, "[a]n officer or enlisted man carried
in the retired list [of the Armed Forces of the Philippines] shall be subject to the Articles of War x x
x"30 To this citation, petitioners do not offer any response, and in fact have excluded the matter of
Gen. Gudanis retirement as an issue in their subsequent memorandum.
IV.
We now turn to the central issues.
Petitioners wish to see annulled the "gag order" that required them to secure presidential consent
prior to their appearance before the Senate, claiming that it violates the constitutional right to
information and transparency in matters of public concern; or if not, is tantamount at least to the
criminal acts of obstruction of justice and grave coercion. However, the proper perspective from
which to consider this issue entails the examination of the basis and authority of the President to
issue such an order in the first place to members of the AFP and the determination of whether such
an order is subject to any limitations.
The vitality of the tenet that the President is the commander-in-chief of the Armed Forces is most
crucial to the democratic way of life, to civilian supremacy over the military, and to the general
stability of our representative system of government. The Constitution reposes final authority, control
and supervision of the AFP to the President, a civilian who is not a member of the armed forces, and
whose duties as commander-in-chief represent only a part of the organic duties imposed upon the
office, the other functions being clearly civil in nature. 31 Civilian supremacy over the military also

countermands the notion that the military may bypass civilian authorities, such as civil courts, on
matters such as conducting warrantless searches and seizures.32
Pursuant to the maintenance of civilian supremacy over the military, the Constitution has allocated
specific roles to the legislative and executive branches of government in relation to military affairs.
Military appropriations, as with all other appropriations, are determined by Congress, as is the power
to declare the existence of a state of war.33 Congress is also empowered to revoke a proclamation of
martial law or the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus.34 The approval of the Commission on
Appointments is also required before the President can promote military officers from the rank of
colonel or naval captain.35 Otherwise, on the particulars of civilian dominance and administration
over the military, the Constitution is silent, except for the commander-in-chief clause which is fertile
in meaning and
implication as to whatever inherent martial authority the President may possess. 36
The commander-in-chief provision in the Constitution is denominated as Section 18, Article VII,
which begins with the simple declaration that "[t]he President shall be the Commander-in-Chief of all
armed forces of the Philippines x x x"37 Outside explicit constitutional limitations, such as those found
in Section 5, Article XVI, the commander-in-chief clause vests on the President, as commander-inchief, absolute authority over the persons and actions of the members of the armed forces. Such
authority includes the ability of the President to restrict the travel, movement and speech of military
officers, activities which may otherwise be sanctioned under civilian law.
Reference to Kapunan, Jr. v. De Villa38 is useful in this regard. Lt. Col. Kapunan was ordered
confined under "house arrest" by then Chief of Staff (later President) Gen. Fidel Ramos. Kapunan
was also ordered, as a condition for his house arrest, that he may not issue any press statements or
give any press conference during his period of detention. The Court unanimously upheld such
restrictions, noting:
[T]he Court is of the view that such is justified by the requirements of military discipline. It cannot be
gainsaid that certain liberties of persons in the military service, including the freedom of
speech, may be circumscribed by rules of military discipline. Thus, to a certain degree,
individual rights may be curtailed, because the effectiveness of the military in fulfilling its
duties under the law depends to a large extent on the maintenance of discipline within its
ranks. Hence, lawful orders must be followed without question and rules must be faithfully
complied with, irrespective of a soldier's personal views on the matter. It is from this viewpoint
that the restrictions imposed on petitioner Kapunan, an officer in the AFP, have to be considered. 39
Any good soldier, or indeed any ROTC cadet, can attest to the fact that the military way of life
circumscribes several of the cherished freedoms of civilian life. It is part and parcel of the military
package. Those who cannot abide by these limitations normally do not pursue a military career and
instead find satisfaction in other fields; and in fact many of those discharged from the service are
inspired in their later careers precisely by their rebellion against the regimentation of military life.
Inability or unwillingness to cope with military discipline is not a stain on character, for the military
mode is a highly idiosyncratic path which persons are not generally conscripted into, but volunteer
themselves to be part of. But for those who do make the choice to be a soldier, significant
concessions to personal freedoms are expected. After all, if need be, the men and women of the
armed forces may be commanded upon to die for country, even against their personal inclinations.
It may be so that military culture is a remnant of a less democratic era, yet it has been fully
integrated into the democratic system of governance. The constitutional role of the armed forces is
as protector of the people and of the State.40 Towards this end, the military must insist upon a respect

for duty and a discipline without counterpart in civilian life.41 The laws and traditions governing that
discipline have a long history; but they are founded on unique military exigencies as powerful now as
in the past.42 In the end, it must be borne in mind that the armed forces has a distinct subculture with
unique needs, a specialized society separate from civilian society. 43 In the elegant prose of the
eminent British military historian, John Keegan:
[Warriors who fight wars have] values and skills [which] are not those of politicians and diplomats.
They are those of a world apart, a very ancient world, which exists in parallel with the everyday world
but does not belong to it. Both worlds change over time, and the warrior world adopts in step to the
civilian. It follows it, however, at a distance. The distance can never be closed, for the culture of the
warrior can never be that of civilization itself.44
Critical to military discipline is obeisance to the military chain of command. Willful disobedience of a
superior officer is punishable by court-martial under Article 65 of the Articles of War.45 "An individual
soldier is not free to ignore the lawful orders or duties assigned by his immediate superiors. For
there would be an end of all discipline if the seaman and marines on board a ship of war [or soldiers
deployed in the field], on a distant service, were permitted to act upon their own opinion of their
rights [or their opinion of the
Presidents intent], and to throw off the authority of the commander whenever they supposed it to
be unlawfully exercised."46
Further traditional restrictions on members of the armed forces are those imposed on free speech
and mobility. Kapunan is ample precedent in justifying that a soldier may be restrained by a superior
officer from speaking out on certain matters. As a general rule, the discretion of a military officer to
restrain the speech of a soldier under his/her command will be accorded deference, with minimal
regard if at all to the reason for such restraint. It is integral to military discipline that the soldiers
speech be with the consent and approval of the military commander.
1wphi1

The necessity of upholding the ability to restrain speech becomes even more imperative if the soldier
desires to speak freely on political matters. The Constitution requires that "[t]he armed forces shall
be insulated from partisan politics," and that [n]o member of the military shall engage directly or
indirectly in any partisan political activity, except to vote."47 Certainly, no constitutional provision or
military indoctrination will eliminate a soldiers ability to form a personal political opinion, yet it is vital
that such opinions be kept out of the public eye. For one, political belief is a potential source of
discord among people, and a military torn by political strife is incapable of fulfilling its constitutional
function as protectors of the people and of the State. For another, it is ruinous to military discipline to
foment an atmosphere that promotes an active dislike of or dissent against the President, the
commander-in-chief of the armed forces. Soldiers are constitutionally obliged to obey a President
they may dislike or distrust. This fundamental principle averts the country from going the way of
banana republics.
Parenthetically, it must be said that the Court is well aware that our countrys recent past is marked
by regime changes wherein active military dissent from the chain of command formed a key, though
not exclusive, element. The Court is not blind to history, yet it is a judge not of history but of the
Constitution. The Constitution, and indeed our modern democratic order, frown in no uncertain terms
on a politicized military, informed as they are on the trauma of absolute martial rule. Our history
might imply that a political military is part of the natural order, but this view cannot be affirmed by the
legal order. The evolutionary path of our young democracy necessitates a reorientation from this
view, reliant as our socio-political culture has become on it. At the same time, evolution mandates a
similar demand that our system of governance be more responsive to the needs and aspirations of

the citizenry, so as to avoid an environment vulnerable to a military apparatus able at will to exert an
undue influence in our polity.
Of possibly less gravitas, but of equal importance, is the principle that mobility of travel is another
necessary restriction on members of the military. A soldier cannot leave his/her post without the
consent of the commanding officer. The reasons are self-evident. The commanding officer has to be
aware at all times of the location of the troops under command, so as to be able to appropriately
respond to any exigencies. For the same reason, commanding officers have to be able to restrict the
movement or travel of their soldiers, if in their judgment, their presence at place of call of duty is
necessary. At times, this may lead to unsentimental, painful consequences, such as a soldier being
denied permission to witness the birth of his first-born, or to attend the funeral of a parent. Yet again,
military life calls for considerable personal sacrifices during the period of conscription, wherein the
higher duty is not to self but to country.
Indeed, the military practice is to require a soldier to obtain permission from the commanding officer
before he/she may leave his destination. A soldier who goes from the properly appointed place of
duty or absents from his/her command, guard, quarters, station, or camp without proper leave is
subject to punishment by court-martial.48 It is even clear from the record that petitioners had actually
requested for travel authority from the PMA in Baguio City to Manila, to attend the Senate Hearing. 49
Even petitioners are well aware that it was necessary for them to obtain permission from their
superiors before they could travel to Manila to attend the Senate Hearing.
It is clear that the basic position of petitioners impinges on these fundamental principles we have
discussed. They seek to be exempted from military justice for having traveled to the Senate to testify
before the Senate Committee against the express orders of Gen. Senga, the AFP Chief of Staff. If
petitioners position is affirmed, a considerable exception would be carved from the unimpeachable
right of military officers to restrict the speech and movement of their juniors. The ruinous
consequences to the chain of command and military discipline simply cannot warrant the Courts
imprimatur on petitioners position.
V.
Still, it would be highly myopic on our part to resolve the issue solely on generalities surrounding
military discipline. After all, petitioners seek to impress on us that their acts are justified as they were
responding to an invitation from the Philippine Senate, a component of the legislative branch of
government. At the same time, the order for them not to testify ultimately came from the President,
the head of the executive branch of government and the commander-in-chief of the armed forces.
Thus, we have to consider the question: may the President prevent a member of the armed forces
from testifying before a legislative inquiry? We hold that the President has constitutional authority to
do so, by virtue of her power as commander-in-chief, and that as a consequence a military officer
who defies such injunction is liable under military justice. At the same time, we also hold that any
chamber of Congress which seeks the appearance before it of a military officer against the consent
of the President has adequate remedies under law to compel such attendance. Any military official
whom Congress summons to testify before it may be compelled to do so by the President. If the
President is not so inclined, the President may be commanded by judicial order to compel the
attendance of the military officer. Final judicial orders have the force of the law of the land which the
President has the duty to faithfully execute.50
Explication of these principles is in order.

As earlier noted, we ruled in Senate that the President may not issue a blanket requirement of prior
consent on executive officials summoned by the legislature to attend a congressional hearing. In
doing so, the Court recognized the considerable limitations on executive privilege, and affirmed that
the privilege must be formally invoked on specified grounds. However, the ability of the President
to prevent military officers from testifying before Congress does not turn on executive
privilege, but on the Chief Executives power as commander-in-chief to control the actions
and speech of members of the armed forces. The Presidents prerogatives as commander-inchief are not hampered by the same limitations as in executive privilege.
Our ruling that the President could, as a general rule, require military officers to seek presidential
approval before appearing before Congress is based foremost on the notion that a contrary rule
unduly diminishes the prerogatives of the President as commander-in-chief. Congress holds
significant control over the armed forces in matters such as budget appropriations and the approval
of higher-rank promotions,51 yet it is on the President that the Constitution vests the title as
commander-in-chief and all the prerogatives and functions appertaining to the position. Again, the
exigencies of military discipline and the chain of command mandate that the Presidents ability to
control the individual members of the armed forces be accorded the utmost respect. Where a military
officer is torn between obeying the President and obeying the Senate, the Court will without
hesitation affirm that the officer has to choose the President. After all, the Constitution prescribes that
it is the President, and not the Senate, who is the commander-in-chief of the armed forces. 52
At the same time, the refusal of the President to allow members of the military to appear before
Congress is still subject to judicial relief. The Constitution itself recognizes as one of the legislatures
functions is the conduct of inquiries in aid of legislation.53 Inasmuch as it is ill-advised for Congress to
interfere with the Presidents power as commander-in-chief, it is similarly detrimental for the
President to unduly interfere with Congresss right to conduct legislative inquiries. The impasse did
not come to pass in this petition, since petitioners testified anyway despite the presidential
prohibition. Yet the Court is aware that with its pronouncement today that the President has the right
to require prior consent from members of the armed forces, the clash may soon loom or actualize.
We believe and hold that our constitutional and legal order sanctions a modality by which members
of the military may be compelled to attend legislative inquiries even if the President desires
otherwise, a modality which does not offend the Chief Executives prerogatives as commander-inchief. The remedy lies with the courts.
The fact that the executive branch is an equal, coordinate branch of government to the legislative
creates a wrinkle to any basic rule that persons summoned to testify before Congress must do so.
There is considerable interplay between the legislative and executive branches, informed by due
deference and respect as to their various constitutional functions. Reciprocal courtesy idealizes this
relationship; hence, it is only as a last resort that one branch seeks to compel the other to a
particular mode of behavior. The judiciary, the third coordinate branch of government, does not enjoy
a similar dynamic with either the legislative or executive branches. Whatever weakness inheres on
judicial power due to its inability to originate national policies and legislation, such is balanced by the
fact that it is the branch empowered by the Constitution to compel obeisance to its rulings by the
other branches of government.
As evidenced by Arnault v. Nazareno54 and Bengzon v. Senate Blue Ribbon Committee,55 among
others, the Court has not shirked from reviewing the exercise by Congress of its power of legislative
inquiry.56 Arnault recognized that the legislative power of inquiry and the process to enforce it, "is an
essential and appropriate auxiliary to the legislative function." 57 On the other hand, Bengzon
acknowledged that the power of both houses of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation is
not "absolute or unlimited", and its exercise is circumscribed by Section 21, Article VI of the

Constitution.58 From these premises, the Court enjoined the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee from
requiring the petitioners in Bengzon from testifying and producing evidence before the committee,
holding that the inquiry in question did not involve any intended legislation.
Senate affirmed both the Arnault and Bengzon rulings. It elucidated on the constitutional scope and
limitations on the constitutional power of congressional inquiry. Thus:
As discussed in Arnault, the power of inquiry, "with process to enforce it," is grounded on the
necessity of information in the legislative process. If the information possessed by executive officials
on the operation of their offices is necessary for wise legislation on that subject, by parity of
reasoning, Congress has the right to that information and the power to compel the disclosure
thereof.
As evidenced by the American experience during the so-called "McCarthy era", however, the right of
Congress to conduct inquirites in aid of legislation is, in theory, no less susceptible to abuse than
executive or judicial power. It may thus be subjected to judicial review pursuant to the Courts
certiorari powers under Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution.
For one, as noted in Bengzon v. Senate Blue Ribbon Committee, the inquiry itself might not properly
be in aid of legislation, and thus beyond the constitutional power of Congress. Such inquiry could not
usurp judicial functions. Parenthetically, one possible way for Congress to avoid such result as
occurred in Bengzon is to indicate in its invitations to the public officials concerned, or to any person
for that matter, the possible needed statute which prompted the need for the inquiry. Given such
statement in its invitations, along with the usual indication of the subject of inquiry and the questions
relative to and in furtherance thereof, there would be less room for speculation on the part of the
person invited on whether the inquiry is in aid of legislation.
Section 21, Article VI likewise establishes critical safeguards that proscribe the legislative power of
inquiry. The provision requires that the inquiry be done in accordance with the Senate or Houses
duly published rules of procedure, necessarily implying the constitutional infirmity of an inquiry
conducted without duly published rules of procedure. Section 21 also mandates that the rights of
persons appearing in or affected by such inquiries be respected, an imposition that obligates
Congress to adhere to the guarantees in the Bill of Rights.
These abuses are, of course, remediable before the courts, upon the proper suit filed by the persons
affected, even if they belong to the executive branch. Nonetheless, there may be exceptional
circumstances wherein a clear pattern of abuse of the legislative power of inquiry might be
established, resulting in palpable violations of the rights guaranteed to members of the executive
department under the Bill of Rights. In such instances, depending on the particulars of each case,
attempts by the Executive Branch to forestall these abuses may be accorded judicial sanction 59 .
In Senate, the Court ruled that the President could not impose a blanket prohibition barring executive
officials from testifying before Congress without the Presidents consent notwithstanding the
invocation of executive privilege to justify such prohibition. The Court did not rule that the power to
conduct legislative inquiry ipso facto superseded the claim of executive privilege, acknowledging
instead that the viability of executive privilege stood on a case to case basis. Should neither branch
yield to the other branchs assertion, the constitutional recourse is to the courts, as the final arbiter if
the dispute. It is only the courts that can compel, with conclusiveness, attendance or non-attendance
in legislative inquiries.
Following these principles, it is clear that if the President or the Chief of Staff refuses to allow a
member of the AFP to appear before Congress, the legislative body seeking such testimony may

seek judicial relief to compel the attendance. Such judicial action should be directed at the heads of
the executive branch or the armed forces, the persons who wield authority and control over the
actions of the officers concerned. The legislative purpose of such testimony, as well as any defenses
against the same whether grounded on executive privilege, national security or similar concerns
would be accorded due judicial evaluation. All the constitutional considerations pertinent to either
branch of government may be raised, assessed, and ultimately weighed against each other. And
once the courts speak with finality, both branches of government have no option but to comply with
the decision of the courts, whether the effect of the decision is to their liking or disfavor.
Courts are empowered, under the constitutional principle of judicial review, to arbitrate disputes
between the legislative and executive branches of government on the proper constitutional
parameters of power.60 This is the fair and workable solution implicit in the constitutional allocation of
powers among the three branches of government. The judicial filter helps assure that the
particularities of each case would ultimately govern, rather than any overarching principle unduly
inclined towards one branch of government at the expense of the other. The procedure may not
move as expeditiously as some may desire, yet it ensures thorough deliberation of all relevant and
cognizable issues before one branch is compelled to yield to the other. Moreover, judicial review
does not preclude the legislative and executive branches from negotiating a mutually acceptable
solution to the impasse. After all, the two branches, exercising as they do functions and
responsibilities that are political in nature, are free to smooth over the thorns in their relationship with
a salve of their own choosing.
And if emphasis be needed, if the courts so rule, the duty falls on the shoulders of the
President, as commander-in-chief, to authorize the appearance of the military officers before
Congress. Even if the President has earlier disagreed with the notion of officers appearing
before the legislature to testify, the Chief Executive is nonetheless obliged to comply with the
final orders of the courts.
Petitioners have presented several issues relating to the tenability or wisdom of the Presidents order
on them and other military officers not to testify before Congress without the Presidents consent. Yet
these issues ultimately detract from the main point that they testified before the Senate despite an
order from their commanding officer and their commander-in-chief for them not to do so, 61 in
contravention of the traditions of military discipline which we affirm today. The issues raised by
petitioners could have very well been raised and properly adjudicated if the proper procedure was
observed. Petitioners could have been appropriately allowed to testify before the Senate without
having to countermand their Commander-in-chief and superior officer under the setup we have
prescribed.
1wphi1

We consider the other issues raised by petitioners unnecessary to the resolution of this petition.
Petitioners may have been of the honest belief that they were defying a direct order of their
Commander-in-Chief and Commanding General in obeisance to a paramount idea formed within
their consciences, which could not be lightly ignored. Still, the Court, in turn, is guided by the
superlative principle that is the Constitution, the embodiment of the national conscience. The
Constitution simply does not permit the infraction which petitioners have allegedly committed, and
moreover, provides for an orderly manner by which the same result could have been achieved
without offending constitutional principles.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.

DANTE O. TINGA
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR: