1

1.SOLIVEN VS MAKASIAR

Yes. The rationale for the grant to the

President of the privilege of

Facts:
Pres. Cory Aquino filed a criminal
complaint for libel against Beltran
Petitioner Beltran argues
reasons which necessitate

that

"the

presidential immunity from suit impose a

correlative disability to file suit". He
contends that if criminal proceedings
ensue by virtue of the President's filing of
her
complaint-affidavit,
she
may
subsequently have to be a witness for
the
prosecution, bringing her under the trial
court's jurisdiction. This, continues
Beltran, would in an indirect way defeat
her privilege of immunity from suit, as by
testifying on the witness stand, she would
be exposing herself to possible
contempt of court or perjury.
Issues:
1.
Whether or not the President of the
Philippines, under the
Constitution,
may
initiate
criminal
proceedings against the petitioners
through the filing of a complaint-affidavit.
If she may initiate, what are
the repercussions of such initiation to her
executive immunity?
2.
Can Beltran invoke the executive
immunity of the president as a
defense?
Held:
First Issue:

immunity from suit is to assure the

exercise of Presidential duties and
functions free from any hindrance or
distraction, considering that being the
Chief Executive of the Government is a
job that, aside from requiring all of the
office-holder's
time,
also
demands
undivided attention.

2. NERI VS. SENATE COMMITTEE

ROMULO L. NERI, petitioner vs. SENATE
COMMITTEE ON ACCOUNTABILITY OF PUBLIC
OFFICERS AND INVESTIGATIONS, SENATE
COMMITTEE ON TRADE AND COMMERCE, AND
SENATE COMMITTEE ON NATIONAL DEFENSE
AND
SECURITY
G.R. No. 180643, March 25, 2008
FACTS: On April 21, 2007, the Department

of Transportation and Communication

(DOTC) entered into a contract with
Zhong
Xing
Telecommunications
Equipment (ZTE) for the supply of
equipment and services for the National
Broadband Network (NBN) Project in the
amount
of
U.S.
$
329,481,290
(approximately P16 Billion Pesos). The
Project was to be financed by the Peoples
Republic
of
China.
The Senate passed various resolutions
relative to the NBN deal. In the
September 18, 2007 hearing Jose de
Venecia III testified that several high
executive officials and power brokers
were using their influence to push the
approval of the NBN Project by the NEDA.
Neri, the head of NEDA, was then invited
to testify before the Senate Blue Ribbon.
He appeared in one hearing wherein he
was interrogated for 11 hrs and during
which he admitted that Abalos of
COMELEC tried to bribe him with P200M
in exchange for his approval of the NBN
project. He further narrated that he
informed President Arroyo about the
bribery attempt and that she instructed
him not to accept the bribe.
However, when probed further on what
they discussed about the NBN Project,

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petitioner refused to answer, invoking
executive privilege. In particular, he
refused to answer the questions on:
(a) whether or not President Arroyo
followed
up
the
NBN
Project,
(b) whether or not she directed him to
prioritize
it,
and
(c) whether or not she directed him to
approve.
He later refused to attend the other
hearings and Ermita sent a letter to the
senate averring that the communications
between GMA and Neri are privileged and
that the jurisprudence laid down in
Senate vs Ermita be applied. He was cited
in contempt of respondent committees
and an order for his arrest and detention
until such time that he would appear and
give his testimony.
ISSUE:

Are the communications elicited by the

subject three (3) questions covered by
executive privilege?
HELD:

The communications
executive privilege

are

covered

by

The revocation of EO 464 (advised

executive officials and employees to
follow and abide by the Constitution,
existing
laws
and
jurisprudence,
including, among others, the case of
Senate v. Ermita when they are invited to
legislative inquiries in aid of legislation.),
does not in any way diminish the concept
of executive privilege. This is because this
concept has Constitutional underpinnings.
The claim of executive privilege is highly
recognized in cases where the subject of
inquiry relates to a power textually
committed by the Constitution to the
President, such as the area of military and
foreign relations. Under our Constitution,
the President is the repository of the
commander-in-chief,
appointing,
pardoning,
and
diplomatic
powers.
Consistent with the doctrine of separation
of powers, the information relating to
these
powers
may
enjoy
greater
confidentiality
than
others.
Several jurisprudence cited provide the

elements of presidential communications

privilege:
1) The protected communication must
relate to a quintessential and nondelegable
presidential
power.
2) The communication must be authored
or solicited and received by a close
advisor of the President or the President
himself. The judicial test is that an advisor
must be in operational proximity with
the President.
3) The presidential communications
privilege remains a qualified privilege that
may be overcome by a showing of
adequate need, such that the information
sought
likely
contains
important
evidence and by the unavailability of the
information elsewhere by an appropriate
investigating authority.
In the case at bar, Executive Secretary
Ermita premised his claim of executive
privilege on the ground that the
communications elicited by the three (3)
questions fall under conversation and
correspondence between the President
and public officials necessary in her
executive and policy decision-making
process and, that the information
sought to be disclosed might impair our
diplomatic as well as economic relations
with the Peoples Republic of China.
Simply put, the bases are presidential
communications privilege and executive
privilege on matters relating to diplomacy
or foreign relations.
Using the above elements, we are
convinced
that,
indeed,
the
communications elicited by the three (3)
questions are covered by the presidential
communications privilege. First, the
communications
relate
to
a
quintessential and non-delegable power
of the President, i.e. the power to enter
into an executive agreement with other
countries. This authority of the President
to enter into executive agreements
without
the
concurrence
of
the
Legislature
has
traditionally
been
recognized in Philippine jurisprudence.
Second,
the
communications
are
received by a close advisor of the

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President.
Under
the
operational
proximity test, petitioner can be
considered a close advisor, being a
member of President Arroyos cabinet.
And third, there is no adequate showing
of a compelling need that would justify
the limitation of the privilege and of the
unavailability
of
the
information
elsewhere by an appropriate investigating
authority.
Respondent Committees further contend
that the grant of petitioners claim of
executive
privilege
violates
the
constitutional provisions on the right of
the people to information on matters of
public concern.50 We might have agreed
with such contention if petitioner did not
appear before them at all. But petitioner
made himself available to them during
the September 26 hearing, where he was
questioned for eleven (11) hours. Not only
that, he expressly manifested his
willingness to answer more questions
from the Senators, with the exception
only of those covered by his claim of
executive privilege.
The right to public information, like any
other right, is subject to limitation.
Section 7 of Article III provides:
The right of the people to information on
matters of public concern shall be
recognized. Access to official records, and
to documents, and papers pertaining to
official acts, transactions, or decisions, as
well as to government research data used
as basis for policy development, shall be
afforded the citizen, subject to such
limitations as may be provided by law.

3. Legarda vs. De Castro

Castro filed a motion for its outright

dismissal but the PET confirmed its
jurisdiction over the protest. De Castro
filed a motion for reconsideration
assailing the PET resolution. He argues
that where the correctness of the number
of votes is the issue, the best evidence
are the ballots; that the process of
correcting the manifest errors in the
certificates of canvass or election returns
is a function of the canvassing bodies;
that once the canvassing bodies had done
their functions, no alteration or correction
of manifest errors can be made; that
since the authority of the Tribunal
involves an exercise of judicial power to
determine the facts based on the
evidence presented and to apply the law
based on the established facts, it cannot
perform the ministerial function of
canvassing election returns; that the
averments contained in the protest are
mere conclusions of law which are
inadequate to form a valid cause of
action; and that the allegations are not
supported by facts. He also contends that
the Tribunal cannot correct the manifest
errors on the statements of votes (SOV)
and certificates of canvass (COC).

Issues:

1. Can the PET correct the manifest errors

in the SOV and COC?

2. Is there a need to resort to revision of

ballots?

3. Was the election protest sufficient in

form and substance?

Facts:
Held:
Loren B. Legarda filed an election protest
against Noli L. de Castro before the
Presidential Electoral Tribunal (PET). De

1. The constitutional function as well as

the power and the duty to be the sole

4
judge of all contests relating to the
election, returns and qualification of the
President and Vice-President is expressly
vested in the PET, in Section 4, Article VII
of the Constitution. Included therein is the
duty to correct manifest errors in the
SOVs and COCs.

revision of ballots, nothing herein

prevents the Tribunal from allowing or
including the correction of manifest
errors, pursuant to the Tribunals rulemaking power under Section 4, Article VII
of the Constitution. (Legarda vs De
Castro, P.E.T. Case 0003, March 31, 2005)

2. We agree that the ballots are the best

and most conclusive evidence in an
election contest where the correctness of
the number of votes of each candidate is
involved. However, we do not find any
reason to resort to revision in the first
part of the protest, considering that the
protestant concedes the correctness of
the ballot results, concerning the number
of votes obtained by both protestant and
protestee, and reflected in the election
returns. Protestant merely seeks the
correction of manifest errors, that is,
errors in the process of different levels of
transposition and addition of votes.
Revision of ballots in case of manifest
errors, in these circumstances, might only
cause
unwarranted
delay
in
the
proceedings.

4. Bitonio vs Commission on Audit

3. In the instant protest, protestant

enumerated
all
the
provinces,
municipalities and cities where she
questions all the results in all the
precincts therein. The protest here is
sufficient in form and substantively,
serious enough on its face to pose a
challenge to protestee's title to his office.
The instant protest consists of alleged
ultimate facts, not mere conclusions of
law, that need to be proven in due time.

Arguments of COA:

Considering that we find the protest

sufficient in form and substance, we must
again stress that nothing as yet has been
proved as to the veracity of the
allegations. The protest is only sufficient
for the Tribunal to proceed and give the
protestant the opportunity to prove her
case pursuant to Rule 61 of the PET Rules.
Although said rule only pertains to

GR No. 14732
March 12, 2004
Instant petition filed under Rule 64 of the
Revised Rules of Court seeks the
annulment of the decision of COA denying
the
petitioners
motion
for
reconsideration of the COA Notices of
Disallowance.
Benedicto Ernesto R. Bitonio, Jr was
appointed Director IV of the Bureau of
Labor Relations in the DOLE. Acting
Secretary Jose S. Brillantes of DOLE
designated Bitonio to be the DOLE
representative to the Boiard directors of
PEZA. After post audit of PEZAs
disbursement
transactions,
COA
disallowed the per diem of Bitonio.

1. Cabinet members, their deputies and

assistants holding other offices in addition
to primary office are not allowed to
receive compensation to subsequent
office
Argument of Bitonio:
1.
Rank equivalent to a Secretary,
Undersecretary or Assistant Secretary
and other appointive officials below the
rank of Assistant secretary are not
covered by the prohibition
2. Section 11 RA No. 7916 was enacted
four years after Civil Liberties Union
become final thus Congress is presumed
to be aware of the parameters.
3.

RA No. 7916 is presumed to be valid.

5
4.
RA No. 7916 is more superior than
COA Memorandum No. 97-038. (Statute
vs Administrative directive)
Ruling of the Court:
1.
Article VII
Constitution

Section

13

of

1987

2. Dela Cruz v Commission on Audit if

a secretary of Finance attends a monetary
board meeting as an ex officio member,
he is actually and in legal compensation
performing the primary function of his
principal office
3. Whatever prohibitions or restrictions
the
member
is
subjected,
the
representative is likewise, not exempted.
4. Constitution is more superior than a
statute
RA No. 7916 was later amended by RA
No. 8748 to cure the defect

V. Bermudez vs. Torres G.R. No. 131429,

August 4, 1999
Facts: Petitioner Oscar Bermudez, the
First Assistant Provincial Prosecutor of
Tarlac and Officer-in-Charge of the Office
of
Provincial
Prosecutor,
was
a
recommendee of then Sec. of Justice
Guingona for the position of Provincial
Prosecutor. Private respondent Atty.
Conrado Quiaoit had the support of then
Representative Yap of the Second District
of Tarlac. Quiaoit was appointed by Pres.
Ramos to the office. Quiaoit took his oath
and assumed office. Bermudez refused to
vacate the Office of the Provincial
Prosecutor.
Nonetheless,
Quiaoit,
performed the duties and functions of the
Office of Provincial Prosecutor. Petitioner

Bermudez challenged the appointment of

Quiaoit primarily on the ground that the
appointment lacks the recommendation
of the Sec. Of Justice prescribed under the
Revised Administrative Code of 1987.
Section 9, Chap. II, Title III, Book IV of the
Revised Administrative Code provides
that all provincial and city prosecutors
and their assistants shall be appointed by
the Pres. upon the recommendation of the
Secretary.

Issue: Whether or not the absence of a

recommendation of the Secretary of
Justice to the President can be held fatal
to
the
appointment
of
Quiaoit

Held: An appointment to a public office is

the unequivocal act of designating or
selecting by one having the authority
therefor of an individual to discharge and
perform the duties and functions of an
office or trust. The appointment is
deemed complete once the last act
required of the appointing authority has
been complied with and its acceptance
thereafter by the appointee in order to
render
it
effective.
The power to appoint is, in essence,
discretionary. The appointing authority
has the right of choice which he may
exercise freely according to his judgment,
deciding for himself who is best qualified
among those who have the necessary
qualifications
and
eligibilities.
When the Constitution or the law clothes
the Pres. with the power to appoint a
subordinate officer, such conferment
must be understood as necessarily
carrying with it an ample discretion of
whom to appoint. The Pres. is the head of
government whose authority includes the
power of control over all executive
departments, bureaus and
offices.
Control means the authority of an
empowered officer to alter or modify, or
even nullify or set aside, what a
subordinate officer has done in the
performance of his duties, as well as to
substitute the judgment of the latter, as

6
and when the former deems it to be
appropriate. The Pres. has the power to
assume directly the functions of an
executive department, bureau and office.
It can therefore be inferred that the Pres.
can interfere in the exercise of discretion
of officials under him or altogether ignore
their
recommendations.
The phrase upon recommendation of the
Secretary found in Sec. 9, Chap. II, Title
III, Book IV of the Revised Administrative
Code should be interpreted to be a mere
advice, exhortation or indorsement, which
is essentially persuasive in character and
not binding or obligatory upon the party
to whom it is made. The recommendation
is here nothing really more than advisory
in nature. The Pres., being the head of the
Executive Department, could very well
disregard or do away with the action of
the departments, bureaus or offices even
in the exercise of discretionary authority,
and in so opting, he cannot be said as
having acted beyond the scope of his
authority.

On 5 October 1972, or soon after the

declaration of Martial Law, President
Marcos issued PD 15, the CCPs charter,
which converted the CCP under EO 30
into a non-municipal public corporation
free from the pressure or influence of
politics. PD 15 increased the members of
CCPs Board from seven to nine
trustees. Later, Executive Order No.
1058, issued on 10 October 1985,
increased further the trustees to 11.

After the People Power Revolution in

1986, then President Corazon C. Aquino
asked for the courtesy resignations of the
then incumbent CCP trustees and
appointed
new
trustees
to
the
Board. Eventually, during the term of
President Fidel V. Ramos, the CCP Board
included
Endriga,
Lagdameo,
Sison, Potenciano, Fernandez, Lenora A.
Cabili (Cabili), and Manuel T. Maosa
(Maosa).

On 22 December 1998, then

President Joseph E. Estrada appointed
seven new trustees to the CCP Board for a
term of four years to replace the Endriga
group as well as two other incumbent
trustees. The seven new trustees were:
6. Rufino vs Endriga

Rufino vs Endriga

1. Armita B. Rufino
vice Baltazar

President,

N. Endriga

G.R. No. 139554

July 21, 2006

2. Zenaida R. Tantoco
vice Doreen Fernandez

Member,

FACTS:
On 25 June 1966, then President
Ferdinand E. Marcos issued Executive
Order No. 30 (EO 30) creating the Cultural
Center of the Philippines as a trust
governed by a Board of Trustees of seven
members to preserve and promote
Philippine culture.

3. Federico Pascual
vice Lenora A. Cabili

4. Rafael Buenaventura
vice Manuel T. Maosa

Member,

Member,

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5. Lorenzo Calma
Ma. Paz D. Lagdameo

Member, vice

6. Rafael Simpao, Jr.

Patricia C. Sison

Member, vice

7.
Freddie Garcia
Irma Ponce-Enrile

Member, vice

Potenciano

Except
for
Tantoco, the
Rufino
group took their respective
oaths of
office and assumed the performance of
their duties in early January 1999.

On 6 January 1999, the Endriga group

filed a petition for quo warranto before
this Court questioning President Estradas
appointment of seven new members to
the CCP Board. The Endriga group
alleged that under Section 6(b) of PD 15,
vacancies in the CCP Board shall be filled
by election by a vote of a majority of the
trustees held at the next regular meeting
x x x. In case only one trustee
survive[s], the vacancies shall be filled by
the
surviving
trustee
acting
in
consultation with the ranking officers of
the [CCP]. The Endriga group claimed
that it is only when the CCP Board is
entirely vacant may the President of the
Philippines fill such vacancies, acting in
consultation with the ranking officers of
the CCP.

The Endriga group asserted that when

former President Estrada appointed the
Rufino group, only one seat was vacant
due to the expiration of Maosas
term. The CCP Board then had 10
incumbent trustees.
The Endriga group refused to accept that
the CCP was under the supervision and
control of the President. The Endriga

group cited Section 3 of PD 15, which

states that the CCP shall enjoy
autonomy of policy and operation x x x.

On 14 May 1999, the Court of Appeals

granted the quo warranto petition. The
Court of Appeals declared the Endriga
group lawfully entitled to hold office as
CCP trustees. On the other hand, the
appellate courts Decision ousted the
Rufino group from the CCP Board.

In their motion for reconsideration, the

Rufino group asserted that the law could
only delegate to the CCP Board the power
to appoint officers lower in rank than the
trustees of the Board. The law may not
validly confer on the CCP trustees the
authority to appoint or elect their fellow
trustees, for the latter would be officers of
equal
rank
and
not
of
lower
rank. Section 6(b) of PD 15 authorizing
the CCP trustees to elect their fellow
trustees
should
be
declared
unconstitutional being repugnant to
Section 16, Article VII of the 1987
Constitution allowing the appointment
only of officers lower in rank than the
appointing power.

On 3 August 1999, the Court of Appeals

denied the Rufino groups motion for
reconsideration. The Court of Appeals
also denied the Endriga groups motion
for immediate execution of the 14 May
1999 Decision.

Hence,
the
petitions.

instant

consolidated

ISSUE:

Whether or not Sec. 6 (b) of PD 15 is

constitutional and CCP trustees have the

8
authority to appoint and elect their fellow
trustees when there is vacancy.

President not only to influence but even

to control all offices in the Executive
branch, including the CCP. Control is far
greater than, and subsumes, influence.

RULING:

7. Drilon vs Lim
GR No. 112497

NO. The SC ruled that Sec. 6 (b) and (c) of

PD 15 as amended which authorizes the
remaining trustees to fill by election
vacancies in the Board of Trustees of CCP
is unconstitutional.
Section 6(b) and (c) of PD 15, which
authorizes the trustees of the CCP Board
to fill vacancies in the Board, runs afoul
with the Presidents power of control
under Section 17, Article VII of the 1987
Constitution. The intent of Section 6(b)
and (c) of PD 15 is to insulate the CCP
from political influence and pressure,
specifically from the President. Section
6(b) and (c) of PD 15 makes the CCP a
self-perpetuating entity, virtually outside
the control of the President. Such a
public office or board cannot legally exist
under the 1987 Constitution.

Section 3 of PD 15, as amended, states

that the CCP shall enjoy autonomy of
policy and operation x x x. This
provision does not free the CCP from the
Presidents control, for if it does, then it
would be unconstitutional. This provision
may give the CCP Board a free hand in
initiating and formulating policies and
undertaking activities, but ultimately
these policies and activities are all subject
to the Presidents power of control.

The CCP is part of the Executive branch.

No law can cut off the Presidents control
over the CCP in the guise of insulating the
CCP from the Presidents influence. By
stating that the President shall have
control of all the executive x x x offices,
the 1987 Constitution empowers the

August 4, 1994
The principal issue in this case is the
constitutionality of Section 187 of the
Local Government Code. The Secretary of
Justice (on appeal to him of four oil
companies and a taxpayer) declared
Ordinance No. 7794 (Manila Revenue
Code) null and void for non-compliance
with the procedure in the enactment of
tax ordinances and for containing certain
provisions contrary to law and public
policy.

RTCs Ruling:

1.
The RTC revoked the Secretarys
resolution and sustained the ordinance. It
declared Sec 187 of the LGC as
unconstitutional because it vests on the
Secretary the power of control over
LGUs in violation of the policy of local
autonomy mandated in the Constitution.

Petitioners Argument:

1.
The annulled Section 187 is
constitutional and that the procedural
requirements for the enactment of tax
ordinances as specified in the Local
Government Code had indeed not been
observed. (Petition originally dismissed by
the Court due to failure to submit certified
true copy of the decision, but reinstated it
anyway.)

9
2.
Grounds
procedure

of

non-compliance

of

a. No written notices as required by Art

276 of Rules of Local Government Code
b.

Not published

c.

Not translated to tagalog

Supreme Courts Argument:

1. Section 187 authorizes the petitioner
to review only the constitutionality or
legality of tax ordinance. What he found
only was that it was illegal. That act is not
control but supervision.
2.
Control lays down the rules in the
doing of act and if not followed order the
act undone or re-done. Supervision sees
to it that the rules are followed.
3.
Two grounds of declaring Manila
Revenue Code null and void (1) inclusion
of certain ultra vires provisions (2) noncompliance with prescribed procedure in
its enactment but were followed.
The requirements are upon approval of
local development plans and public
investment programs of LGU not to tax
ordinances.
8. Phillips Seafood (Philippines) Corp. v.
The Board of Investment, G.R. No.
175787, 04 February 2009
FACTS
Phillips Seafood is a domestic corporation
engaged in the export of processed
crabmeat
and
seafood
products.
Respondent BOI informed petitioner that
the ITH previously granted would be
applicable only to the period from 13
August 1999 to 21 October 1999 or
before petitioners transfer to a not lessdeveloped
area.
Petitioner
wrote
respondent
BOI
requesting
for
a
reconsideration of its decision but was
denied.petitioner filed a petition for
review before the Court of Appeals,
questioning the dismissal of its appeal
before the Office of the President. The
appellate court dismissed the petition for
review for having been filed out of time as

petitioner opted to appeal to the Office of

the President instead of filing a Rule 43
petition to the Court of Appeals within the
reglementary period.

ISSUE
Is the decision of the BOI denying the ITH
appealable to the Office of the President
or to the Court of Appeals?

HELD
It is to the latter.
[P]etitioner should have immediately
elevated to the Court of Appeals the
denial by respondent BOI of its
application for an ITH. From the letter
dated 09 October 2003 of respondent
BOI, which informed petitioner that its ITH
would be extended only from 13 August
1999 to 21 October 1999, petitioner
appealed to the Office of the President, a
recourse that is not sanctioned by either
the Rules of Civil Procedure or by the
Omnibus Investments Code of 1987

9. ABERCA v. VER
FACTS

Task Force Makabansa (TFM) was ordered

by General Fabian Ver to conduct preemptive strikes against CommunistTerrorist underground houses. TFM raided
several houses, employing in most cases
defectively judicial search warrants,
arrested people without warrant of arrest,
denied visitation rights, and interrogated
them with the use of threats and tortures.
A motion to dismiss was filed by
defendants, stating that 1) plaintiffs may
not cause a judicial inquiry about their
detention because the writ of habeas
corpus was suspended; 2) defendants are
immune from liability for acts done in
their official duties; 3) there was no cause
of action. On Nov 8, 1983, Judge Fortun
granted the motion to dismiss, which
prompted plaintiffs to file a MR on Nov 18,

10
1983. He later inhibited himself and was
replaced Judge Lising, who denied the MR
for being filed out of time. Another MR
was filed, and was only modified to
include Maj. Aguinaldo and MSgt. Balaba
for officers accountable in the said
complaint.
ISSUES

1. Whether or not immunity from suit may

be invoked?
2. Whether petitioners have the right to
question the alleged violation of their
rights in the constitution?
3. Whether the superior officers who gave
the orders are liable?
HELD
NO, Article 32 of the Civil Code provides a

sanction to rights and freedom enshrined

in the constitution. These rights cannot be
violated just because of an order given by
a superior. The rule of law must prevail, or
else liberty will perish. Even though they
just followed the orders of their superior,
these do not authorize them to disregard
the rights of the petitioners, and therefore
cannot be considered acts done in their
official duties. Article 32 speaks of any
public officer or private individual, and
violation of these constitutional rights
does not exempt them from responsibility.
2. YES, the suspension of the writ of
habeas
corpus
does
not
prevent
petitioners from claiming damages for the
illegal arrest and detention in violation of
their constitutional rights by seeking
judicial authority. What the writ suspends
is merely the right of an individual to seek
release from detention as a speedy
means of obtaining liberty. It cannot
suspend their rights and cause of action
for injuries suffered due to violation of
their
rights.
3. YES, Article 32 speaks of the liabilities
of people who are in direct violation of the
rights stated, as well as people who are
indirectly responsible for such acts. In the
case at hand, the superior officers are the
ones who gave the order, and can be
considered indirectly responsible. It was
also stated in the complaint who were the

ones
who
directly
and
indirectly
participated in those acts. By filing a
motion to dismiss, they admitted all the
facts stated in the complaint.

10. ISABELITA C. VINUYA, VICTORIA C. DELA

PEA, HERMINIHILDA, MANIMBO, LEONOR H.
SUMAWANG, CANDELARIA L. SOLIMAN, MARIA
L. QUILANTANG, MARIA L. MAGISA, NATALIA M.
ALONZO, LOURDES M. NAVARO, FRANCISCA M.
ATENCIO, ERLINDA MANALASTAS, TARCILA M.
SAMPANG, ESTER M. PALACIO MAXIMA R.
DELA CRUZ, BELEN A. SAGUM, FELICIDAD
TURLA, FLORENCIA M. DELA PEA, FRANCIA
A. BUCO, PASTORA C. GUEVARRA, VICTORIA
M. DELA CRUZ, PETRONILA O. DELA CRUZ,
ZENAIDA P. DELA CRUZ, CORAZON M. SUBA,
EMERINCIANA A. VINUYA, LYDIA A. SANCHEZ,
ROSALINA M.BUCO, PATRICIA A. ERNARDO,
LUCILA H. PAYAWAL, MAGDALENA LIWAG,
ESTER C. BALINGIT, JOVITA A. DAVID, EMILIA C.
MANGILIT, VERGINIA M. BANGIT, GUILLERMA S.
BALINGIT, TERECITA PANGILINAN, MAMERTA C.
PUNO, CRISENCIANA C. GULAPA, SEFERINA S.
TURLA, MAXIMA B. TURLA, LEONICIA G.
GUEVARRA, ROSALINA M. CULALA, CATALINA
Y. MANIO, MAMERTA T. SAGUM, CARIDAD L.
TURLA,
et
al.
In their capacity and as members of the Malaya
Lolas Organization,

versus
THE HONORABLE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
ALBERTO G. ROMULO, THE HONORABLE
SECRETARY OF FOREIGNAFFAIRS DELIA
DOMINGO-ALBERT,
THE
HONORABLE
SECRETARY OF JUSTICE MERCEDITAS N.
GUTIERREZ,
and
THE
HONORABLE
SOLICITOR
GENERAL
ALFREDO
L.
BENIPAYO
G.R. No. 162230, April 28, 2010
FACTS:

This is an original Petition for Certiorari

under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court with
an application for the issuance of a writ of
preliminary mandatory injunction against
the Office of the Executive Secretary, the
Secretary of the DFA, the Secretary of the
DOJ, and the OSG.
Petitioners are all members of the
MALAYA LOLAS, a non-stock, non-profit
organization registered with the SEC,

11
established for the purpose of providing
aid to the victims of rape by Japanese
military forces in the Philippines during
the Second World War.

official apology and other

reparations against Japan.

Petitioners claim that since 1998, they

have
approached
the
Executive
Department through the DOJ, DFA, and
OSG, requesting assistance in filing a
claim against the Japanese officials and
military
officers
who
ordered
the
establishment of the comfort women
stations in the Philippines. But officials of
the Executive Department declined to
assist the petitioners, and took the
position that the individual claims of the
comfort women for compensation had
already been fully satisfied by Japans
compliance with the Peace Treaty
between the Philippines and Japan.

Petition lacks merit. From a Domestic Law

Perspective, the Executive Department
has
the
exclusive
prerogative
to
determine
whether
to
espouse
petitioners claims against Japan.

Hence, this petition where petitioners

pray for this court to (a) declare that
respondents committed grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of
discretion in refusing to espouse their
claims for the crimes against humanity
and war crimes committed against them;
and (b) compel the respondents to
espouse their claims for official apology
and other forms of reparations against
Japan before the International Court of
Justice (ICJ) and other international
tribunals.
Respondents maintain that all claims of
the Philippines and its nationals relative
to the war were dealt with in the San
Francisco Peace Treaty of 1951 and the
bilateral Reparations Agreement of 1956.
On January 15, 1997, the Asian Womens
Fund and the Philippine government
signed a Memorandum of Understanding
for medical and welfare support programs
for former comfort women. Over the next
five years, these were implemented by
the Department of Social Welfare and
Development.
ISSUE:

WON
the
Executive
Department
committed grave abuse of discretion in
not espousing petitioners claims for

forms

of

RULING:

Political questions refer to those

questions which, under the Constitution,
are to be decided by the people in their
sovereign capacity, or in regard to which
full discretionary authority has been
delegated to the legislative or executive
branch of the government. It is concerned
with issues dependent upon the wisdom,
not legality of a particular measure.
One type of case of political questions
involves questions of foreign relations. It
is well-established that the conduct of
the foreign relations of our government is
committed by the Constitution to the
executive and legislativethe political
departments of the government, and the
propriety of what may be done in the
exercise of this political power is not
subject to judicial inquiry or decision. are
delicate, complex, and involve large
elements of prophecy. They are and
should be undertaken only by those
directly responsible to the people whose
welfare they advance or imperil.
But not all cases implicating foreign
relations present political questions, and
courts certainly possess the authority to
construe or invalidate treaties and
executive agreements. However, the
question
whether
the
Philippine
government should espouse claims of its
nationals against a foreign government is
a foreign relations matter, the authority
for which is demonstrably committed by
our Constitution not to the courts but to
the political branches. In this case, the
Executive
Department
has
already
decided that it is to the best interest of
the country to waive all claims of its
nationals for reparations against Japan in
the Treaty of Peace of 1951. The wisdom

12
of such decision is not for the courts to
question.
The President, not Congress, has the
better opportunity of knowing the
conditions which prevail in foreign
countries, and especially is this true in
time of war. He has his confidential
sources of information. He has his agents
in the form of diplomatic, consular and
other officials.
The
Executive
Department
has
determined that taking up petitioners
cause would be inimical to our countrys
foreign policy interests, and could disrupt
our relations with Japan, thereby creating
serious implications for stability in this
region. For the to overturn the Executive
Departments determination would mean
an assessment of the foreign policy
judgments by a coordinate political
branch to which authority to make that
judgment
has
been
constitutionally
committed.
From a municipal law perspective,
certiorari will not lie. As a general
principle, where such an extraordinary
length of time has lapsed between the
treatys conclusion and our consideration
the Executive must be given ample
discretion to assess the foreign policy
considerations of espousing a claim
against Japan, from the standpoint of both
the interests of the petitioners and those
of the Republic, and decide on that basis
if apologies are sufficient, and whether
further
steps
are
appropriate
or
necessary.
In the international sphere, traditionally,
the only means available for individuals
to bring a claim within the international
legal system has been when the
individual is able to persuade a
government to bring a claim on the
individuals behalf. By taking up the case
of one of its subjects and by resorting to
diplomatic action or international judicial
proceedings on his behalf, a State is in
reality asserting its own right to ensure, in
the person of its subjects, respect for the
rules of international law.

Within
the
limits
prescribed
by
international law, a State may exercise
diplomatic protection by whatever means
and to whatever extent it thinks fit, for it
is its own right that the State is asserting.
Should the natural or legal person on
whose behalf it is acting consider that
their rights are not adequately protected,
they have no remedy in international law.
All they can do is resort to national law, if
means are available, with a view to
furthering their cause or obtaining
redress. All these questions remain within
the province of municipal law and do not
affect the position internationally.
Even the invocation of jus cogens norms
and erga omnes obligations will not alter
this analysis. Petitioners have not shown
that the crimes committed by the
Japanese army violated jus cogens
prohibitions at the time the Treaty of
Peace was signed, or that the duty to
prosecute perpetrators of international
crimes is an erga omnes obligation or has
attained the status of jus cogens.
The term erga omnes (Latin: in relation to
everyone) in international law has been
used as a legal term describing
obligations owed by States towards the
community of states as a whole. Essential
distinction should be drawn between the
obligations of a State towards the
international community as a whole, and
those arising vis--vis another State in the
field of diplomatic protection. By their
very nature, the former are the concern of
all States. In view of the importance of
the rights involved, all States can be held
to have a legal interest in their protection;
they are obligations erga omnes.
The
term
jus
cogens
(literally,
compelling law) refers to norms that
command
peremptory
authority,
superseding conflicting treaties and
custom. Jus cogens norms are considered
peremptory in the sense that they are
mandatory, do not admit derogation, and
can be modified only by general
international
norms
of
equivalent
authority

13
WHEREFORE,
DISMISSED.

the

Petition

is

hereby

11. People vs. Salle

Where the judgment of conviction is still

pending appeal and has not yet therefore
attained finality, as in the instant case,
executive clemency may not yet be
granted to the appellant.

The acceptance of the pardon shall not

operate as an abandonment or waiver of
the appeal.

Facts:

On November 1991, Francisco Salle, Jr.

and Ricky Mengote were convicted of the
compound
crime
of
murder
and
destructive arson before the RTC of
Quezon City. Salle and Mengote filed their
Notice of Appeal which was accepted by
the Supreme Court on March 24, 1993.

In 1994, Salle filed an Urgent Motion to

Withdraw Appeal. The Court required
Salle's counsel, Atty. Ida May La'o of the
Free Legal Assistance Group (FLAG) to
verify the voluntariness of the motion.

Atty. La'o manifested that Salle signed the

motion without the assistance of counsel
on his misimpression that the motion was
necessary for his early release from the
New Bilibid Prison following the grant of a
conditional pardon by the President on
December 9, 1993. She also stated that
Mengote was also granted conditional
pardon and that he immediately left for
his province without consulting her. She

prayed that the Court grant Salle's motion

to withdraw his appeal.

On March 23, 1994, the Court granted

Salle's motion.

After taking into consideration Section 19,

Article VII of the Constitution which
provides that the President may, except
in cases of impeachment or as otherwise
provided in the Constitution, grant
pardon after conviction by final judgment,
the Court required (1) the Solicitor
General and the counsel for accusedappellants to submit their memoranda on
the issue of the enforceability of the
conditional
pardon
and
(2) the Presidential Committee for the
Grant of Bail, Release or Pardon to inform
the Court why it recommended to the
President the grant of the conditional
pardon despite the pendency of the
appeal.

In its Memorandum, the Office of the

Solicitor General maintains that the
conditional pardon granted to appellant
Mengote is unenforceable because the
judgment of conviction is not yet final in
view of the pendency in this Court of his
appeal.

On the other hand, the FLAG, through

Atty. La'o, submits that the conditional
pardon extended to Mengote is valid and
enforceable.
Citing Monsanto
vs.
Factoran, Jr., it argues that although
Mengote did not file a motion to withdraw
the appeal, he was deemed to have
abandoned the appeal by his acceptance
of the conditional pardon which resulted
in the finality of his conviction.

Issue:

14
Whether or not a pardon granted to an
accused during the pendency of his
appeal from a judgment of conviction by
the trial court is enforceable.

probation, thereby waiving his right to

appeal. Where the judgment of conviction
is still pending appeal and has not yet
therefore attained finality, as in the
instant case, executive clemency may not
yet be granted to the appellant.

Held:

Section 19, Article VII thereof reads as

follows:

Except in cases of impeachment, or as

otherwise provided in this Constitution,
the President may grant reprieves,
commutations, and pardons, and remit
fines and forfeitures, after conviction by
final judgment.

He shall also have the power to grant

amnesty with the concurrence of a
majority of all the Members of the
Congress.

Where the pardoning power is subject to

the limitation of conviction, it may be
exercised at
any
time
after
conviction even if the judgment is on
appeal. It is, of course, entirely different
where
the
requirement
is
" final
conviction, " as was mandated in the
original provision of Section 14, Article IX
of the 1973 Constitution, or "conviction
by
final
judgment,"
as
presently
prescribed in Section 19, Article VII of the
1987 Constitution. In such a case, no
pardon may be extended before a
judgment of conviction becomes final.

A judgment of conviction becomes

final (a) when no appeal is seasonably
perfected, (b)
when
the
accused
commences to serve the sentence, (c)
when the right to appeal is expressly
waived in writing, except where the death
penalty was imposed by the trial court,
and (d) when the accused applies for

The "conviction by final judgment"

limitation under Section 19, Article VII of
the present Constitution prohibits the
grant of pardon, whether full or
conditional, to an accused during the
pendency of his appeal from his
conviction
by
the
trial
court. Any
application therefor, if one is made,
should not be acted upon or the process
toward its grant should not be begun
unless
the
appeal
is
withdrawn.
Accordingly,
the
agencies
or
instrumentalities of the Government
concerned must require proof from the
accused that he has not appealed from
his conviction or that he has withdrawn
his appeal. Such proof may be in the form
of a certification issued by the trial court
or the appellate court, as the case may
be.

The acceptance of the pardon shall not

operate as an abandonment or waiver of
the appeal, and the release of an accused
by virtue of a pardon, commutation of
sentence, or parole before the withdrawal
of an appeal shall render those
responsible
therefor
administratively
liable. Accordingly, those in custody of
the accused must not solely rely on the
pardon as a basis for the release of the
accused from confinement.

WHEREFORE, counsel
for
accusedappellant Ricky Mengote y Cuntado is
hereby given thirty (30) days from notice
hereof within which to secure from the
latter the withdrawal of his appeal and to
submit it to this Court. The conditional
pardon granted the said appellant shall
be deemed to take effect only upon the
grant of such withdrawal. In case of non-

15
compliance with this Resolution, the
Director of the Bureau of Corrections
must exert every possible effort to take
back into his custody the said appellant,
for which purpose he may seek the
assistance of the Philippine National
Police or the National Bureau of
Investigation. (People vs. Francisco Salle,
Jr. and Ricky Mengote, G.R. No. 103567,
December 4, 1995)

No. The President, being the head of the

Sate, is regarded as the sole organ and
authority in external relations with foreign
nations. In the realm of treaty-making,
the President has the sole authority to
negotiate with other states.

FACTS:

Although
it
is
correct
that
the
Constitution, in Article VII, Section 21,
provides for the concurrence of 2/3 of all
members of the Senate for validating a
treaty and is deemed essential to provide
check on the executives foreign relations,
it is not absolute. The power to ratify does
not belong to the Senate.

On 28 December 2000, the Philippines

signed the Rome Statute through Charge
d Affairs Enrique A. Manalo of the
Philippine Mission to the United Nations
(PMUN). The Rome Statue establsihed the
International
Criminal
Court
which
provides shall have the power to
exercise its jurisdiction over persons for
the most serious crimes of international
concerns.
However,
the
treatys
provisions require that it be subject to
ratification, acceptance, or approval of
the signatory states.

The
process
of
treaty
making:
negotiation, signature, ratification, and
exchance of th instruments of ratification.
Petitioners arguments equate the signing
of the treaty by the Phil. representative
with ratification. However, it should be
noted that signature and ratification is
two separate steps. Signature is for
authentication, on the other hand,
ratification
is
the
formal
act
of
acceptance. the latter is generally an
executive act undertaken by the head of
the state.

Petitioner/s filed an instant petitione

compelling respondents to transmit the
signed text of the treaty to the Senate for
ratification. It is on the theory that
ratification of a treaty is a function of the
Senate. Hence, the duty of the executive
it to sign the same and transmit it
thereafter
to
to
the
Senate
for
concurrence.

Moreover, under E.O. 459, issued by Pres.

Ramos, provides for guidelines in the
negotiation of international agreements
and its ratification. The said Order
provides that a treaty, after it was signed
by the representative of the State, shall
be subject to ratification by the President.
before the Senate can concur it, the
President must ratify it first.

The OSG, representing respondents,

contends that the executive department
has no duty to transmit the said treaty to
the Senate for concurrence.

It should be emphasized that under the

Constitution, the power to ratify is vested
in the President, subject to the
concurrence of the Senate. The role of the
latter is limited only to giving consent to
the ratification. Hence, the President has
the authority to refuse to submit a treaty
to the Senate, and/or refuse to ratify it.

12. PIMENTEL vs EXEC SEC

ISSUE: WON Respondents have the

ministerial duty to transmit the copy of
the subject treaty to the Senate signed by
a member of the PMUN even without the
signature
of
the
President
for
concurrence?
RULING:

12. PIMENTEL VS. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

462
SCRA
622
G.R.
No.
158088
July
06,
2005

16

Facts:
On December 28, 2000, the Philippines
through the Charge d Affairs Enrique A.
Manalo of the Philippine Mission to the
United Nations, signed the Rome Statute
which
established
the
International
Criminal Court. Thus, herein petitioners
filed the instant petition to compel the
respondents the Office of the Executive
Secretary and the Department of Foreign
Affairs to transmit the signed text of
the treaty to the Senate of the Philippines
for
ratification.
Issue: Whether or not the Executive
Secretary and the Department of Foreign
Affairs have a ministerial duty to transmit
to the Senate for ratification the copy of
the Rome Statute signed by a member of
the Philippine Mission to the United
Nations even without the signature of the
President.
Held:
The Supreme Court rule in the negative.
The President, being the head of state, is
regarded as the sole organ and authority
in external relations and is the countrys
sole representative with foreign nations.
As the chief architect of foreign policy,
the President acts as the countrys
mouthpiece with respect to international
affairs. Hence, the President is vested
with the authority to deal with foreign
states and governments, extend or
withhold recognition, maintain diplomatic
relations,
enter into
treaties,
and
otherwise transact the business of foreign
relations. In the realm of treaty-making,
the President has the sole authority to
negotiate
with
other
states.
It should be emphasized that under the
Constitution, the power to ratify is vested
in the President, subject to the
concurrence of the Senate. The role of the
Senate, however, is limited only to giving
or
withholding
its
consent,
or
concurrence, to the ratification. Hence, it
is within the authority of the President to

refuse to submit a treaty to the Senate or,

having secured its consent for its
ratification, refuse to ratify it.

Pimentel v. Executive Secretary Digest

G.R. No. 158088 July 6, 2005

Facts:

1. The petitioners filed a petition for

mandamus to compel the Office of the
Executive Secretary and the Department
of Foreign Affairs to transmit the signed
copy of the Rome Statute of the
International Criminal Court
to the
Senate
of
the
Philippinesfor
its
concurrence pursuant to Sec. 21, Art VII
of the 1987 Constitution.

2. The Rome Statute established the Int'l

Criminal Court which will have jurisdiction
over the most serious crimes as genocide,
crimes against humanity, war crimes and
crimes of aggression as defined by the
Statute. The Philippines through the
Chargie du Affairs in UN. The provisions of
the Statute however require that it be
subject to ratification, acceptance or
approval of the signatory state.

3. Petitioners contend that ratification of a

treaty,
under
both
domestic
and
international law, is a function of the
Senate, hence it is the duty of the
Executive Department to transmit the
signed copy to the senate to allow it to
exercise its discretion.

Issue: Whether or not the Exec. Secretary

and the DFA have the ministerial duty to
transmit to the Senate the copy of the
Rome Statute signed by a member of the
Philippine mission to the U.N. even
without the signature of the President.

17

The Supreme Court held NO.

1. The President as the head of state is

the sole organ and authorized in the
external relations and he is also the
country's sole representative with foreign
nations, He is the mouthpiece with
respect to the country's foreign affairs.

2. In treaty-making, the President has the

sole authority to negotiate with other
states and enter into treaties but this
power is limited by the Constitution with
the 2/3 required vote of all the members

of the Senate for the treaty to be valid.

(Sec. 21, Art VII).

3. The legislative branch part is essential

to provide a check on the executive in the
field of foreign relations, to ensure the
nation's pursuit of political maturity and
growth.