CIVIL

LAW
The Law on Persons and Family
Relations Course Outline
I.
Preliminary Title; Human Relations;
Personality; Domicile;
Art. 2 NCC; Art.5 Labor Code; Sec. 3(1) & 4, Ch. 2,
Book VII, Administrative Code of 1987; BSP Circular
799
Effects and application of law
Tanada vs Tuvera, 136 SCRA 27 (1985)
Article 2 of the NCC does not preclude the requirement of
publication in the Official Gazette even if the law itself provides
for the date of its effectivity.
Tanada vs Tuvera,146 SCRA 446 (1986)
If the law provides for its own effectivity date, then it takes
effect
on
the said date, subject to the requirement of
publication. The clause unless otherwise provided refers to the
date of effectivity and not the to the requirement of publication
itself, which cannot in any event be omitted.
Basa vs Mercado, 61 Phil 632
To be a newspaper of general circulation, it is enough that it is
published for the dissemination of local news and general
information, that it has bona fide subscription list of paying
subscribers, and that it is published at regular intervals.
PASEI vs. Torres, G.R. NO. 101279,Aug. 06, 1992 212
SCRA 298
Although the questioned circulars are a valid exercise of the
police
power as delegated to the executive branch of
Government, they are
legally
invalid, defective and
unenforceable for lack of proper publication and filing in the
Office of the National Administrative Register as required in
Article 2 of the Civil Code, Article 5 of the Labor Code and
1

Sections 3(1) and 4, Chapter 2, Book VII of the Administrative

Code of 1987
Rep. vs. Extelcom, G.R. NO. 147096,Jan. 15, 2002
373 SCRA 316
Thus, publication in the Official Gazette or a newspaper of
general circulation is a condition sine qua non before statutes,
rules or regulations can take effect. There is nothing in the
Administrative Code

of 1987 which implies that the filing of the rules with the UP
Law Center is the operative act that gives the rules force and
effect.
Cojuangco, Jr. vs. Rep., G.R. NO. 180705, Nov.
27,2012 686 SCRA 472
In this case, while it incorporated the PCA-Cojuangco
AG.R.eement by reference, Section 1 of P.D. 755 did not in
any way reproduce the exact terms of the contract in the
decree. Neither was acopy thereof attached to the decree
when published. We cannot, therefore, extend to the said
AG.R.eement the status of a law.
NMSMI vs. DND,G.R. NO. 187587,June 5, 2013 697
SCRA 359
The Court cannot rely on a handwritten note that was not part of
Proclamation No. 2476 as published. Without publication, the
note never had any legal force and effect.
Roy vs CA, G.R. NO 80718 Jan. 29, 1988
The term laws do not include decisions of the Supreme
Court because lawyers in the active practice must keep
abreast of decisions, particularly where issues have been
clarified, consistently reiterated and published in advanced
reports and the SCRA.

Arts.3, 4, 5, 6, 7 NCC; Arts. 105, 256 Family Code;

Vested Rights; Substantive & Procedural Laws;
Retroactive Application; Express and Implied Repeal;
Effect of declaration of Unconstitutionality
Marcella-Bobis vs Bobis, 336 SCRA 747

(2000)

The accused is prosecuted for the crime of bigamy for not

obtaining a judicial declaration of nullity of his first marriage
before entering into another marriage. Ignorance of the
existence of article 40 of the Family Code canno enve be
successfully invoked as an excuse.
Bernabe v. Alejo G.R. NO. 140500, Jan. 21, 2002 374
SCRA 180
An illegitimate
to article

child filed an

action for recognition pursuant

285 of the NCC during the effectivity of the Family Code.

illegitimate children who were still minors at the time the
Family Code took effect and whose putative parent died during
their minority are thus given the right to seek recognition
(under Article 285 of the Civil Code) for a period of up to four
years from attaining majority age and this vested right was
not impaired or taken away by the passage of the Family
Code.
Rep. v. Miller G.R. NO. 125932, Apr. 21, 1999 306
SCRA 183

Whether or not, an alien, who is qualified to adopt at the

time of filing the petition, can be disqualified by the new
provisions of the family code. An alien qualified to adopt under
the Child and Youth Welfare Code, which was in force at the
time of the filing of the petition, acquired a vested right
which could not be affected by the subsequent enactment
of a new law disqualifying him. Vested rights include not only
legal or equitable title to the enforcement of a demand, but
also an exemption from new obligations created after the
right has vested.

Atienza vs. Brillantes, AM

243 SCRA 32

MTJ 92-706, Mar. 29,1995

Article 40 is applicable to remarriages entered into after the

effectivity of the Family Code on August 3, 1988 regardless of
the date of the first marriage. The fact that procedural statutes
may somehow affect the litigants' rights may not preclude their
retroactive application to pending actions.
Ty v. Cam G.R. NO. 127406, Nov. 27, 2000
The two marriages involved in this case was entered during
the effectivity of the New Civil Code. The Family Code has
retroactive effect unless there be impairment of vested rights.
Compare the case of TY vs CA and Atienza vs
Brillantes Systems Factors Corp vs NLRC, 346
SCRA 149

(2000)

The retroactive application of procedural laws is not violative of

any
right
of a person who may feel that he is adversely affected. The
reason is that as a general rule, no vested right may attach nor
arise from procedural laws.
Agujetas vs CA, 261 SCRA 17 (1996)
Implied repeals are not to be favored because they rest only on
the presumption that because the old and the new laws are
incompatible with each other, there is an intention to repeal the
old. There must be a plain, unavoidable and irreconcilable
repugnancy between the two.

Laguna Lake Development Authority vs CA, 251 SCRA 42

(1995)
When there is a conflict between a general law and a special
statute, the special statute should prevail since it evinces the
legislative intent more clearly than the general statute. The
special law is to be taken as an exception to the general law
in the absence of special circumstances forcing a contrary
conclusion.
De Agbayani vs PNB, 38 SCRA 429

The
Supreme
Court
declared
the
moratorium
law
unconstitutional but it did not allow to toll the prescriptive
period of the right to foreclose the mortgage. The court
adopted the view that before
an act is declared
unconstitutional it is an operative fact which can be the source
of rights and duties.

Article 8. Stare Decisis; Case Law; See also Article

36, FC; article 9, 10, 11, 12 , 13, 14 NCC

Ting v. Velez-Ting, G.R. NO. 166562, Mar. 31, 2009

582 SCRA 694
The rule of stare decisis is not inflexible, whether it shall be
followed or departed from, is a question entirely within the
discretion of the court, which is again called upon to consider a
question once decided. It is only when a prior ruling of this Court
is overruled, and a different view is adopted, that the new
doctrine may have to be applied prospectively in favor of
parties who have relied on the old doctrine and have acted
in good faith, in accordance therewith under the familiar rule of
"lex prospicit, non respicit

Floresca vs Philex Mining Corp.,G.R. 30642, April 30,

1985
The application or interpretation placed by the Supreme
Court upon a law is part of the law as of the date of its
enactment since the courts application or interpretation merely
establishes the contemporaneous legislative
intent that the
construed law purports to carry into effect.

Mendiola vs CA, 258 SCRA

492

Equity, which has been described as justice outside legality

is applied only in the absence of, and never against statutory
law or judicial rules of procedure.

Articles 15, 16, 17, 50, 51 (New Civil Code); Article

26, Family Code DAVID A. NOVERAS vs. LETICIA T.
NOVERAS, G.R. No. 188289,
August 20, 2014
David and Leticia are US citizens who own properties in the USA and
in the Philippines. Leticia obtained a decree of divorce from the
Superior Court of California in June 2005 wherein the court awarded
all the properties in the USA to Leticia. The trial court erred in
recognizing the divorce decree The foreign

judgment and its authenticity must be proven as facts under our rules
on evidence, together with the aliens applicable national law to show
the effect of the judgment on the alien himself or herself. The
recognition may be made in an action instituted specifically for the
purpose or in another action where a party invokes the foreign decree
as an integral aspect of his claim or defense. With respect to their
properties in the Philippines, Leticia filed a petition for judicial
separation of conjugal properties. The Court ruled that the Philippine
courts did not acquire jurisdiction over the California properties of
David and Leticia. Indeed, Article 16 of the Civil Code clearly states
that real property as well as personal property is subject to the law of
the country where it is situated. Thus, liquidation shall only be limited
to the Philippine properties.
NORMA A. DEL SOCORRO, for and in behalf of her minor child
RODERIGO NORJO VAN WILSEM, vs. ERNST JOHAN BRINKMAN
VAN WILSEM, G.R. No.
193707 , December 10, 2014
A foreigner was sued for support. The Supreme Court ruled that Article
195 of the New Civil Code cannot apply to him, since Article 15 of the
New Civil Code stresses the principle of nationality. Philippine laws,
specifically the provisions of the Family Code relating to support, only
apply to Filipino citizens. By analogy, the same principle applies to
foreigners such that they are governed by their national law with
respect to family rights and duties. Be that as it may, the accused,
who is residing in the Philippines, was held liable under under Section
5(e) and (i) of R.A. No. 9262 for unjustly refusing or failing to give
support to petitioners son on since respondent is currently living in
the Philippines, on the basis of the Territoriality Principle in criminal
law, in relation to Article 14 of the New Civil Code, applies to the
instant case, which provides that: "[p]enal laws and those of public
security and safety shall be obligatory upon all who live and sojourn in
Philippine territory, subject to the principle of public international law
and to treaty stipulations."
NORMA A. DEL SOCORRO for and in behalf of her Minor
Child RODERIGO NORJO VAN WILSEM vs. ERNST JOHAN
BRINKMAN VAN WILSEM, G.R. No.
193707, December 10, 2014

SAUDI ARABIAN AIRLINES (SAUDIA) AND BRENDA VS. MA.

JOPETTE M. REBESENCIO MONTASSAH B. SACAR-ADIONG ET.
AL. G.R. NO. 198587. January 14, 2015
Under the doctrine of processual presumption, if the foreign law
involved is not properly pleaded and proved, our courts will presume
that the foreign law is the same as our local or domestic or internal
law. Hence, pleading a foreign law without proving the same will bar its
application in the Philippines

All told, the considerations for assumption of jurisdiction by Philippine

tribunals as outlined in Bank of America, NT&SA have been satisfied.
First, all the parties are based in the Philippines and all the material
incidents transpired in this jurisdiction. Thus, the parties may
conveniently seek relief from Philippine tribunals. Second, Philippine
tribunals are in a position to make an intelligent decision as to the law
and the facts. Third, Philippine tribunals are in a position to enforce
their decisions. There is no compelling basis for ceding jurisdiction to a
foreign tribunal. Quite the contrary, the immense public policy
considerations attendant to this case behoove Philippine tribunals to
not shy away from their duty to rule on the case.

Van Dorn vs. Romillo G.R. NO.L-68470 October 8,

1985 139 SCRA
139
It is true that owing to the nationality principle embodied in
Article 15 of the Civil Code, only Philippine nationals are covered
by the policy against absolute divorces the same being
considered contrary to our concept of public policy and morality.
Howe ver, aliens may obtain divor ces abroad, which may be
recognized in the Philippines, provided they are valid according
to their national law.
Pilapil vs. Ibay-Somera, G.R.
1989 174 SCRA
652

NO. 80116

June 30,

Whether or not, the complainant, a foreigner, qualify as an

offended spouse having obtained a final divorce decree under
his national law prior to his filing the criminal complaint. The
person who initiates the adultery case must be an offended
spouse, and by this is meant that he is still married to the
accused spouse, at the time of the filing of the complaint.
Recio vs. Recio G.R. NO. 138322. October 2, 2001 366
SCRA 437
Whether or not the divorce must be proved before it is to be
recognized in the Philippines. Before a foreign divorce decree
can be recognized by our courts, the party pleading it must
prove the divorce as a fact and demonstrate its conformity to the
foreign law allowing it. Presentation solely of the divorce
decree is insufficient.

Roehr v. Rodriguez,G.R. NO. 142820 ,Jun. 30, 2003

404 SCRA 495
As a general rule, divorce decrees obtained by foreigners in
other countries are recognizable in our jurisdiction, but the
legal effects thereof, e.g. on custody, care and support of the
children, must still be determined by our courts.
Morigo v. People, G.R. NO. 145226 , Feb. 6, 2004 422
SCRA 376

The mere private act of signing a marriage contract bears no

semblance to a valid marriage and thus, needs no judicial
declaration of nullity. Such act alone, without more, cannot be
deemed to constitute an ostensibly valid marriage for which
petitioner might be held
liable for bigamy unless he first
secures a judicial declaration of nullity before he contracts a
subsequent marriage. (Pro hac vice case)
Rep. v. Orbecido, G.R. NO. 154380, Oct. 05, 2005 472
SCRA 114

Whether or not, a Filipino Spouse can remarry under ARTICLE

26 OF THE FAMILY CODE where his,her spouse is later
naturalized as a foreign citizen and obtains a valid divorce
decree capacitating him or her to remarry. The reckoning
point is not the citizenship of the parties at the time of the
celebration of the marriage, but their citizenship at the time a
valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating
the latter to remarry.
Corpuz v. Sto. Tomas, G.R.NO. 186571, Aug. 11, 2010
628 SCRA
266
In Gerberts case, since both the foreign divorce decree and
the national law of the alien, recognizing his or her capacity
to obtain a divorce, purport to be official acts of a sovereign
authority, Section 24, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court comes
into play. This Section requires proof, either by (1) official
publications or (2) copies attested by the officer having legal
custody of the documents. If the copies of official records are
not kept in the Philippines, these must be (a) accompanied by
a certificate issued by the proper diplomatic or consular
officer in the Philippine foreign service stationed in the foreign
country in which the record is kept and (b) authenticated by
the seal of his office.
Human Relations; Abuse of Rights, Unjust Enrichment;
Malicious Prosecution;
Independent
Civil
Action;
Arts. 1724; 2142;
2154;

2164; 2176, NCC

SPOUSES ALEJANDRO MANZANILLA AND REMEDIOS VELASCO v
WATERFIELDS
INDUSTRIES CORPORATION, represented by its President,
ALIZA MA. G.R No. 177484, July 18, 2014. J. DEL CASTILLO
Waterfields Corp. and the spouses Manzanilla entered into a contract
of lease. When Waterfields breached the contract by failing to pay
rent, the lessors brought an ejectment suit. Waterfields claims that if it
was ejected prior to the expiration of the lease, it would be
tantamount to unjust enrichment as Waterfields already introduced
substantial improvements on the property.

The principle of unjust enrichment requires two conditions: (1) that a

person is benefited without a valid basis or justification, and (2) that
such benefit is derived at the expense of another.
It does not, however, apply in this case since any benefit that the
spouses Manzanilla may obtain from the subject premises cannot be
said to be without any valid basis or justification. It is well to remind
Waterfields that they violated the contract of lease and that they
failed to vacate the premises upon demand. Hence, the spouses
Manzanilla are justified in recovering the physical possession thereof
and consequently, in making use of the property. Besides, in violating
the lease by failing to pay the rent, Waterfields took the risk of losing
the improvements it introduced thereon in favor of the spouses
Manzanilla.
RAUL SESBRENOVS. COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. No. 160689 March
26, 2014, J. BERSAMIN
This case concerns the claim for damages of petitioner Raul H. Sesbreo
founded on abuse of rights. Sesbreo accused the violation of contract
(VOC) inspection team dispatched by the Visayan Electric Company (VECO)
to check his electric meter with conducting an unreasonable search in his
residential premises. It is worth noting that the VOC inspectors decided to
enter the main premises only after finding the meter of Sesbreo turned
upside down, hanging and its disc not rotating. Their doing so would enable
them to determine the unbilled electricity consumed by his household. The
circumstances justified their decision, and their inspection of the main
premises was a continuation of the authorized entry.

Although the act is not illegal, liability for damages may arise should
there be an abuse of rights. The concept of abuse of rights prescribes
that a person should not use his right unjustly or in bad faith;
otherwise, he may be liable to another who suffers injury. There is an
abuse of rights if when the act is performed without prudence or in bad
faith. In order that liability may attach under the concept of abuse of
rights, the following elements must be present, to wit: (a) the existence
of a legal right or duty, (b) which is exercised in bad faith, and (c) for
the sole intent of prejudicing or injuring another. There is no hard and
fast rule that can be applied to ascertain whether or not the principle of
abuse of rights is to be invoked. The resolution of the issue depends on
the circumstances of each case.
However, Sesbreo did not persuasively demonstrate that there was an
intervention of malice or bad faith on the part of (VOC) inspection team

during the inspection of the main premises, or any excessiveness

committed by them in the course of the inspection. But Sesbreo did
not. On the other hand, the CA correctly observed that the inspection
did not zero in on Sesbreos residence because the other houses
within the area were similarly subjected to the routine inspection. The
court eliminated any notion of malice or bad faith.

WILLAWARE PRODUCTS CORPORATION vs. JESICHRIS

MANUFACTURING CORPORATION, G.R. No. 195549,
September 3, 2014, J. Peralta

The issue for resolution is: whether or not petitioner committed acts
amounting to unfair competition under Article 28 of the Civil Code.The
instant case falls under Article 28 of the Civil Code on human
relations, and not unfair competition under Republic Act No. 8293, as
the present suit is a damage suit and the products are not covered by
patent registration. A fortiori, the existence of patent registration is
immaterial in the present case.
The concept of "unfair competition"under Article 28 is very much
broader than that covered by intellectual property laws. Under the
present article, which follows the extended concept of "unfair
competition" in American jurisdictions, the term covers even cases of
discovery of trade secrets of a competitor, bribery of his employees,
misrepresentation of all kinds, interference with the fulfillment of a
competitors contracts, or any malicious interference with the latters
business.
Article 28 of the Civil Code provides that unfair competition in
agricultural, commercial or industrial enterprises or in labor through
the use of force, intimidation, deceit, machination or any other unjust,
oppressive or high-handed method shall give rise to a right of action by
the person who thereby suffers damage. What is being sought to be
prevented is not competition per se but the use of unjust, oppressive or
highhanded methods which may deprive others of a fair chance to
engage in business or to earn a living. Thus, when a manufacturer of
plastic kitchenware products employed the former employees of a
neighboring partnership engaged in the manufacture of plastic
automotive parts; deliberately copied the latters products and even
went to the extent of selling these products to the latters customers,
there is unfair competition.

CARLOS A. LORIA vs. LUDOLFO P. MUOZ, G.R. No. 187240,

October 15, 2014, J.
Leonen
The principle of unjust enrichment has two conditions. First, a person
must have been benefited without a real or valid basis or justification.
Second, the benefit was derived at another persons expense or
damage. In this case, Loria received P2,000,000.00 from Muoz for a
subcontract of a government project to dredge the Masarawag and
San Francisco Rivers in Guinobatan, Albay. However, contrary to the
parties agreement, Muoz was not subcontracted for the project.

Nevertheless, Loria retained the P2,000,000.00. Thus, Loria was

unjustly enriched. He retained Muozs money without valid basis or
justification. Under Article 22 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, Loria
must return the P2,000,000.00 to Muoz.
DOMINGO GONZALO VS.JOHN TARNATE JR., G.R. NO. 160600,
JANUARY 15,
2014, J. Bersamin

Gonzalo, who was the sole contractor of the project in question,

subcontracted the implementation of the project to Tarnate in violation
of the statutory prohibition. Their subcontract was illegal because it
did not bear the approval of the DPWH Secretary. Necessarily, the
deed of assignment was also illegal, because it sprung from the
subcontract. Thus, Tarnate and Gonzalo entered into an illegal
contract.
While it is true that under Article 1412 (1) of the Civil Code, the guilty
parties to an illegal contract cannot recover from one another and are
not entitled to an affirmative relief because they are in pari delicto or
in equal fault, the doctrine of in pari delicto is not always rigid.
An accepted exception arises when its application contravenes wellestablished public policy. In this jurisdiction, public policy has been
defined as "that principle of the law which holds that no subject or
citizen can lawfully do that which has a tendency to be injurious to the
public or against the public good."
Under the principle of unjust enrichment exists then, Gonzalo would be
unjustly enriched at the expense of Tarnate, who provided the
materials, if the latter was to be barred from recovering because of the
rigid application of the doctrine of in pari delicto. The prevention of
unjust enrichment called for the exception to apply in Tarnates favor.
Amonoy vs Gutierrez, 351 SCRA 731 (2001)
One who merely exercises ones rights does no actionable
injury and cannot be held liable for damages.
Albenson Enterprises Corp. vs CA,217 SCRA
18 (1993)
The elements of an abuse of right under article 19are the
following: 1. There is a legal right or duty; 2. Which is
exercised in bad faith; 3. For the sole intent of prejudicing or
injuring another.
RCPI vs CA, 143 SCRA 657 (1986)
Dionela filed a complaint for damages against RCPI alleging
that the defamatory words on the telegram sent to him not
only wounded his feelings but also caused him undue
embarrassment and affected his business as well as because
other people have come to know of said defamatory words.
There is a clear case of breach of contract by the petitioner in
1
0

adding extraneous and libelous matters in the message sent

to Dionela.
Constantino vs Mendez 209 SCRA 18 (1992)
Mere sexual intercourse is not by itself a basis for recovery.
Damages could only be awarded if sexual intercourse is
not a product of voluntariness and mutual desire.

1
0

Gashme Shookat Baksh vs CA,219 SCRA115 (1993)

Where a mans promise to marry is in fact the proximate cause of
the acceptance of his love by a woman and his representation to
fulfill that promise thereafter becomes the proximate cause of
the giving of herself unto him a sexual congress, proof that he
had, in reality, no intention of marrying her and that the promise
was only a subtle scheme or deceptive device to entice or
inveigle her to accept him and to obtain her consent to the
sexual act, could justify the award of damages pursuant to
article 21 of the new civil code not because of such promise
to marry but because of the fraud and deceit behind it and the
wilful injury to her honor and reputation
which
followed
thereafter.
Figueroa vs. Barranco, SBC Case NO. 519. July 31,
1997 276 5CRA 445 - His engaging in premarital sexual
relations with complainant and promises to marry suggests a
doubtful moral character on his part but the same does not
constitute grossly immoral conduct.
University of the East vs Jader, G.R. NO. 132344, Feb.
7, 2000
325
SCRA 805
A law student was allowed to graduate by his school with a
failing grade but was later on prohibited by the said school to
take the bar exams. The negligent act of a professor who fails
to observe the rules of the school, for instance by not
promptly submitting a student's grade, is not only imputable
to the professor but is an act of the school, being his
employer.

UP v. Philab, G.R. NO. 152411, Sept. 29, 2004 439

SCRA 467
Whether or not UP is liable to pay PHILAB considering that it is
only a donee of FEMF, FEMF being the one which funded the
project, and despite being a donee, unjust enrichment still
applies to UP. In order that accion in rem verso may prosper,
the essential elements must be present: (1) that the
defendant has been enriched, (2) that the plaintiff has
suffered a loss, (3) that the enrichment of the defendant is
without just or legal ground, and (4) that the plaintiff has
no other action based on contract, quasi-contract,
crime or quasi-delict.
11

Beumer vs. Amores, G.R. NO. 195670, Dec. 03, 2012

686 SCRA 770
An action for recovery of what has been paid without just
cause has been designated as an accion in rem verso. This
provision does not apply if, as

12

in this case, the action is proscribed by the Constitution or by

the application of the pari delicto doctrine.

Padalhin vs. Lavia, G.R. NO. 183026,Nov. 14, 2012

685 SCRA 549
Nestor himself admitted that he caused the taking of the
pictures of Lavina's residence without the latter's knowledge
and consent. Nestor violated the New Civil Code prescriptions
concerning the privacy of one's residence and he cannot hide
behind the cloak of his supposed benevolent intentions to
justify the invasion.

Civil Personality; Birth; Death; Arts 37, 38, 39 40, 41,

42; 390, 391,
712, 777 NCC; Art. 41, 96 &124, 99 & 126, 142 FC

Geluz vs CA, July 20, 1961

It is unquestionable that the appellants act in provoking the
abortion of appellees wife, without medical necessity to
warrant it, was a criminal and morally reprehensible act, that
cannot be to severely condemned; and the consent of the
woman or that of her husband does not excuse it. But the
immorality or illegality of the act does not justify an award of
damage that, under the circumstances on record, have no
factual or legal basis.
Quimiguing vs ICAO, 34 SCRA 132 (1970
A conceived child, although as yet unborn, is given by law a
provisional personality of its own for all purposes favorable to
it, as explicitly provided under article 40 of the civil code.
Continental Steel v. Montao, G.R. NO. 182836 ,
Oct.13, 2009 603 SCRA 621
Whether or
dependent
personality
the womb

not, a death of a fetus is considered a death of a

of the parent. One need not acquire civil
first before he/she could die. Even a child inside
already has life. No less than the Constitution

recognizes the life of the unborn from conception, that the

State must protect equally with the life of the mother. If the
unborn already has life, then the cessation thereof even prior
to the child being delivered, qualifies as death.

Domicile; Arts 50 & 51 NCC; Arts. 68 & 69, FC;

Residence
v. Domicile; Annulment or Nullity of
Marriages AM 02-11-10 SC; Settlement of Estate
Marriage
Definition, Marriage as contract and social institution,
Presumption of Marriage, Proof of Marriage,Offer of
Marriage

Tuazon vs CA, 256 SCRA 158

Our Family Law is based on the policy that marriage is not a
mere contract, but a social institution in which the State is
vitally interested.
Perido vs Perido, 63 SCRA 97
It is the union (and inviolable social institution) of one man
with one woman for the reciprocal blessings of a domestic
home life, and for the birth, rearing, and education of
children. In one case, the Supreme Court ruled that marriage
is also a new relation in the maintenance of which
the
general public is interested.
People v. Casao, 220 SCRA 362
The offer of the accused to marry the victim establishes his
guilt. As a rule in rape cases, an offer of marriage is an
admission of guilt
People vs. Borromeo,133 SCRA 106, 109 (1984)
Persons living together in apparent matrimony are presumed,
in the absence of any counter-presumption or evidence
special to the case, to be in fact married. The reason is that
such is the common order of society, and if the parties were
not what they thus hold themselves out as being, they would
be living in the constant violation of decency and of law.
People v. Ignacio, 81 SCAD 138

(1997)

Appellants own admission that she was married to the victim

was a confirmation of the semper praesumitur matrimonio and the
presumption that a man and a woman so deporting themselves
as husband and wife had verily acted into a lawful contract of
marriage.

Proof of Marriage; Marriage Certificate v. Presumption

of Marriage; Torrens Title Entry Single, Civil Status;
Villanueva vs. CA, 198 SCRA 472 (1991)
The best documentary evidence of a marriage is the
marriage contract. A marriage contract renders unnecessary
the presumption that a man and a woman deporting
themselves as husband and wife have entered into a lawful
contract of marriage.
Balogbog vs. CA, 269 SCRA 259, 266 (1997)
Although a marriage contract is considered primary evidence of
marriage, the failure to present it is not, however, proof that
no marriage took place,
as other evidence may be
presented to prove marriage.
People vs. Borromeo, 133 SCRA 106, 110 (1984)
The mere fact that no record of the marriage exists in the
registry of marriage does not invalidate said marriage, as long
as in the celebration thereof, all requisites for its validity are
present. The forwarding of a copy of the marriage certificate
to the registry is not one of said requisites.
Pugeda vs. Trias, 4 SCRA 849, 855 (1962)
The defendants questioned the marriage of plaintiff by
presenting the records of the municipality of Rosario, Cavite to
show that there is no record of the alleged marriage. The court
admitted evidence consisting of the testimonies of witnesses.
Trinidad vs. Court of Appeals, et. al., 289 SCRA 188
(1998)
The Supreme Court held that the following may be presented
as proof of marriage: (a) testimony of a witness to the
matrimony; (b) the couples public and open cohabitation as
husband and wife after the alleged wedlock; (c) the birth and
baptismal certificate of children born during such union; and
(d) the mention of such nuptial in subsequent documents.

Hernandez vs. CA, 320 SCRA 76.

The law favors the validity of marriage because the State is
interested in the preservation of the family and sanctity of the
family is a matter of constitutional concern. The burden of
proof to show the nullity of the marriage rests upon the party
seeking its nullity

Aonuevo v. Estate of Jalandoni G.R. NO. 178221,

Dec. 1, 2010 636
SCRA 420
The birth certificate of Sylvia was presented to prove the
marriage between Isabel and John despite the absence of the
marriage certificate. The court held that the birth certificate
may serve as evidence to prove the marriage between Isabel
and John , as it contains the following notable entries: (a) that
Isabel and John Desantis were "married" and (b) that Sylvia is
their "legitimate" child.
Villatuya v. Tabalingcos, A.C. NO. 6622 676 SCRA 37
A lawyer was married three times, while the first marriage was
still subsisting, his marriage contracts as certified by the NSO
was presented in the disbarment proceeding to prove his
subsequent
marriages.
For
purposes
of
disbarment
proceeding, these marriage contracts bearing the name of
respondent are competent and convincing evidence proving
that he committed bigamy.
Compare the case of Aonuevo v. Estate of Jalandoni
and Villatuya
v. Tabalingcos A.C. NO. 6622 676 SCRA 37
Cario v. Cario, G.R. NO. 132529 , Feb. 02, 2001 351
SCRA 127
Whether or not the certification by the registrar of the nonexistence of marriage license is enough to prove nonissuance thereof. The records reveal that the marriage
contract of petitioner and the deceased bears no marriage
license number and, as certified by the Local Civil Registrar
of San Juan, Metro Manila, their office has no record of such
marriage license.
Requirements of
Marriage Essential
requisite
Legal Capacity and
Consent Formal
Requisite

Marriage License
Certificate of
Civil Registrar;

; Civil W edding v. Church W edding;

Alcantara v. Alcantara,
28,2007 531 SCRA 446

G.R.

NO.

167746

Aug.

Whether or not, a marriage license issued by a municipality or

city to a non-resident invalidates the license. Issuance of a
marriage license in a

city or municipality, not the residence of either of the

contracting parties, and issuance of a marriage license despite
the absence of publication or prior to the completion of the 10day period for publication are considered mere irregularities
that do not affect the validity of the marriage
Abbas v. Abbas, G.R. NO. 183896 , Jan. 30, 2013 689
SCRA 636
The Municipal Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite, where the
marriage license of Gloria and Syed was allegedly issued,
issued a certification to the effect that no such marriage
license for Gloria and Syed was issued, and that the serial
number of the marriage license pertained to another couple,
Arlindo Getalado and Myra Mabilangan. The fact that the
names in said license do not correspond to those of Gloria and
Syed does not overturn the presumption that the registrar
conducted a diligent search of the records of her office.

Compare the case of Abbas v. Abbas and Alcantara

v. Alcantara Sy v. CA, G.R. NO. 127263 , Apr. 12,
2000 330 SCRA 550
In
this
case
the
marriage
license
was
issued
on
September 17,1974,
almost one year after the ceremony took place on November
15, 1973. The ineluctable conclusion is that the marriage was
indeed contracted without a marriage license.

Marriages Exempted from the License Requirement

Art. 27 34 FC Cruz v. Catandes, C.A., 39 O.G. NO.
18, p. 324
In a marriage in articulo mortis, while it is advisable that a
witness to the
marriage should sign the dying partys signature if the latter
be physically unable to do so, still if upon order of the
solemnizing official, another person should so sign,
the
marriage is still valid. The law as much as possible intends to
give legal effect to a marriage. As a matter of fact, no
particular form for a marriage celebration is prescribed.

Soriano v. Felix, L-9005, June 20, 1958

The affidavit is for the purpose of proving the basis for
exemption from the marriage license. Even if there is failure
on the part of the solemnizing officer to execute the
necessary affidavit, such irregularity will not invalidate the
marriage for the affidavit is not being required of the parties.
People v. Dumpo, 62 Phil. 246

No judicial notice can be taken of Mohammedan rites and

customs for marriage. They must be alleged and proved in
court.
Borja-Manzano vs. Sanchez, 354 SCRA 1, 5 (2001)
The solemnizing officer must execute a sworn statement that
he had ascertained the qualifications of the parties and that
he had found no legal impediment to their marriage.
Nial vs. Bayadog 328 SCRA 122, March 14, 2000
In this case, at the time of Pepito and respondents marriage, it
cannot be said that they have lived with each other as husband
and wife for at least five years prior to their wedding day
because their cohabitation is not exclusive. The Court ruled that
the cohabitation contemplated under said provisions must be in
the nature of a perfect union that is valid under the law but
rendered imperfect only by the absence of the
marriage
contract and characterized by exclusivity meaning nothird
party was involved at
anytime
within
the
5 years
andcontinuity that is unbroken.

Marriage Ceremony
Morigo vs People, 422 SCRA 376 (2004)
Petitioner and Lucia Barrette merely signed
the
marriage
contract on their own. The mere act of signing a marriage
contract by the contracting parties without the presence of the
solemnizing officer will not result to marriage.
Infante vs Arenas, June 29, 1951
The failure of the solemnizing officer to ask the parties whether
they take each other as husband and wife cannot be regarded
as a fatal
omission
if the parties nonetheless signed the
marriage contract in the presence of the solemnizing officer.
A declaration of word of mouth of what the parties and
already stated in writing would be a mere repetition, so that
its omission should not be regarded as fatal.
People v. Opea, L-34954, Feb. 20, 1981

If a man and a woman deport themselves as if

husband and wife, they are presumed to be validly
married to each other and this presumption is not
a mere denial by the man (or woman) of the fact of

they were
and legally
rebutted by
marriage.

Persons who may solemnize Marriages

Araes v. Occiano, A.M. 02-1390 , April 11, 2002 380
SCRA 402
The respondent Judge solemnized marriage without the
requisite marriage license. Where a
judge
solemnizes
a
marriage outside his courts jurisdiction, there is a resultant
irregularity in the formal requisite laid down in article 3,
which while it may not affect the validity of marriage, may
subject the officiating official to administrative liability.
OCA vs. J. Necessario et al, A.M. NO. 07-1691,April
2, 2013 695 SCRA
The court does not accept the arguments of the respondent
judges that the ascertainment of the validity of the marriage
license is beyond the scope of the duty of a solemnizing
officer especially when there are glaring pieces of evidence
that point to the contrary. As correctly observed by the OCA,
the presumption of regularity accorded to a marriage license
disappears the moment the marriage documents do not
appear regular on its face.
Compare the ruling of the court in the case of Cario v.
Cario and OCA vs. J. Necessario et al as to the duty
of the solemnizing officer to examine the validity of
marriage license.
Marriage in good faith
Effect of Absence of Essential and Formal requisite
Arts. 15-17,50-5, NCC; Art.26, FC; Divorce [Filipino;
Foreigner;
Parenting;
Children,
Property
Rights;
Succession rights]; Declaratory Relief; Rule 108;; Art.
412 NCC
SOLEDAD L. LAVADIA vs. HEIRS OF JUAN LUCES LUNA,
represented by GREGORIO Z. LUNA and EUGENIA ZABALLEROLUNA, G.R. No. 171914, July 23,
2014, J. Lucas P. Bersamin

Divorce between Filipinos is void and ineffectual under the nationality

rule adopted by Philippine law. Hence, any settlement of property
between the parties of the first marriage involving Filipinos submitted
as an incident of a divorce obtained in a foreign country lacks
competent judicial approval, and cannot be enforceable against the
assets of the husband who contracts a subsequent marriage.

Atty. Lunas subsequent marriage to Soledad was void for being

bigamous, on the ground that the marriage between Atty. Luna and
Eugenia had not been dissolved by the Divorce Decree rendered by
the CFI of Sto. Domingo in the Dominican Republic but had subsisted
until the death of Atty. Luna
Given the subsistence of the first marriage between Atty. Luna and
Eugenia, the presumption that Atty. Luna acquired the properties out of
his own personal funds and effort remained. It should then be justly
concluded that the properties in litis legally pertained to their conjugal
partnership of gains as of the time of his death. Consequently, the sole
ownership of the 25/100 pro indiviso share of Atty. Luna in the
condominium unit, and of the law books pertained to the respondents
as the lawful heirs of Atty. Luna.
EDELINA T. ANDO vs. DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, G.R. No.
195432, August 27, 2014, CJ. Sereno
Petitioner questions the decision of the RTC, dismissing her petition for
the recognition of her second marriage as valid, for failing to comply
with the requirements set forth in Art. 13 of the Family Code that is
obtaining a judicial recognition of the foreign decree of absolute
divorce in our country. The SC however ruled that a divorce obtained
abroad by an alien may be recognized in our jurisdiction, provided the
decree is valid according to the national law of the foreigner. The
presentation solely of the divorce decree is insufficient; both the
divorce decree and the governing personal law of the alien spouse who
obtained the divorce must be proven. Because our courts do not take
judicial notice of foreign laws and judgment, our law on evidence
requires that both the divorce decree and the national law of the alien
must be alleged and proven and like any other fact.
Hence, instead of filing a petition for the recognition of her second
marriage as valid, petitioner should have filed a petition for the judicial
recognition of her foreign divorce from her first husband.
EDELINA T. ANDO v DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, G.R
No. 195432 August 27, 2014. J. SERENO
Edelina Tungol married a Japanese man, Yuichiro Kobayashi, in 2001.
In 2004, Kobayashi obtained a divorce valid under Japanese law.
Believing the divorce capacitated her to marry, Edelina married
Masatomi Ando in 2005. When Edelina applied for a renewal of her

passport using Andos last name, the DFA told her that she needed to
prove by a competent court decision that her second marriage to
Ando is valid until otherwise declared.
There appears to be insufficient proof or evidence presented on
record of both the national law of her first husband, Kobayashi, and
of the validity of the divorce decree under that national law. Hence,
any declaration as to the validity of the divorce can only be made
upon her complete submission of evidence proving the

divorce decree and the national law of her alien spouse, in an action
instituted in the proper forum.
Rep. v. Orbecido, G.R. NO. 154380, Oct. 05, 2005 472
SCRA 114
Whether or not, a Filipino spouse of an alien, who is a Filipino
at the time of marriage, remarry after the latter acquires a
foreign divorce that allows her to remarry. The reckoning point is
not the citizenship of the parties at the time of the celebration
of the marriage, but their citizenship at the time a valid divorce
is obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating the latter to
remarry.

Corpuz v. Sto. Tomas, G.R. NO.

2010 628 SCRA
266

186571, Aug. 11,

A judgment of divorce is a judicial decree, although a foreign

one, affecting a persons legal capacity and status that must
be recorded. But while the law requires the entry of the
divorce decree in the civil registry, the law and the submission
of the decree by themselves do not ipso facto authorize the
decrees registration.
Classification of
Marriages,
Parties
In
NCC;FC;AM 02-11-10 SC

Relationships.
Interest;

Valid
Voidable
Void
Terminable
Others Classifications
Legal Separation
Separation in Fact
Common Law
Relationship
Void Marriages vs Voidable Marriages
2
0

Suntay
(1998)

vs.

Conjuangco-Suntay,

300

SCRA

760,

770

The fundamental distinction between void and voidable

marriages is that a void marriage is deemed never to have
taken place at all and cannot be the source of rights. On
the other hand, a voidable marriage, is considered valid and
produces all its civil effects, until it is set aside by final
judgment of a competent court in an action for annulment

2
0

Declaration of Nullity; NCC v. FC, AM 02-11-10 SC; Civil

Code and Muslim Code [PD 1083]
Proper party to petition for nullity of marriage; AM
02-11-10 SC Ablaza v. Republic, G.R. NO. 158298 ,
Aug. 11, 2010 628 SCRA 27
Indeed, a brother like the petitioner, albeit not a compulsory
heir under
the laws of succession, has the right to succeed to the estate
of a deceased brother under the conditions stated in Article
1001 and Article 1003 of the Civil Code Necessarily, therefore,
the right of the petitioner to bring the action hinges upon a
prior
determination
of
whether Cresenciano had any
descendants, ascendants, or children (legitimate or illegitimate),
and of whether the petitioner was the late Cresencianos
surviving heir. Such prior determination must be made by the
trial court, for the inquiry thereon involves questions of fact.
Juliano-Llave v. Republic, G.R. NO. 169766 , Mar.
30, 2011 646
SCRA 637
The marriage between the late Sen. Tamano and Zorayda was
celebrated in 1958, solemnized under civil and Muslim rites.
The only law in force governing marriage relationships
between Muslims and non-Muslims alike was the Civil Code of
1950, under the provisions of which only one marriage can
exist at any given time.
Procedure in declaration of nullity of

marriage

Carlos v. Sandoval G.R. NO. 179922 , Dec. 16, 2008

574 SCRA 116
Whether a marriage may be declared void ab initio through
a judgment on the pleadings or a summary judgment and
without the benefit of a trial. The grounds for declaration of
absolute nullity of marriage must be proved. Neither
judgment on the pleadings nor summary judgment is allowed.
So is confession of judgment disallowed.
Bolos v. Bolos, G.R. NO. 186400 , Oct. 20, 2010 634
SCRA 429

21

Whether
or
not
A.M.
NO.
02-11-10-SC
RULE
ON
DECLARATION OF
ABSOLUTE
NULLITY
OF
VOID
MARRIAGES AND ANNULMENT OF
VOIDABLE
MARRIAGES
is
applicable
to
marriages
solemnized before the effectivity of Family Code. NO. The Rule
on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and
Annulment of Voidable Marriages as contained in A.M. NO. 0211-10-SC which the Court promulgated on March 15, 2003

22

Article 36, FC; AM 02-11-10 SC; See also Articles 48,

68-71, 220-221
& 225 FC
Psychological Incapacity
Definition Salita vs Hon.
Magtolis ,June 13,

1994

The Committee did not give any examples of psychological

incapacity for fear that the giving of examples would limit the
applicability of the provision under the principle of ejusdem
generis. Rather, the Committee would like the judge to interpret
the provision on a case-to-case basis, guided by experience, the
findings of experts and researchers in psychological disciplines,
and by decisions of church tribunals which, although not binding
on the civil courts, may be given persuasive effect since the
provision was taken from Canon Law.
Characteristics of Psychological Incapacity
Santos v. Court of Appeals, 240 SCRA 20
(1995)
The Supreme Court enumerated the three basic requirements of
psychological incapacity as a ground for declaration of nullity
of the marriage: (a) gravity; (b) juridical antecedence; and (c)
incurability.
Guidelines in the interpretation and application of
Article 36; AM 02-11-10 SC
VALERIO E. KALAW vs. MA. ELENA FERNANDEZ, G.R. No.
166357, January 14,
2015, J. Del Castillo
On reconsideration, the Supreme Court reversed its previous ruling
and reinstated the trial courts ruling granting the petition for nullity
on the basis of Art. 36.
Psychological incapacity is the downright incapacity or inability to take
cognizance of and to assume the basic marital obligations. The burden
of proving psychological incapacity is on the plaintiff. The plaintiff must
prove that the incapacitated party, based on his or her actions or
behavior, suffers a serious psychological disorder that completely

disables him or her from understanding and discharging the essential

obligations of the marital state. The psychological problem must be
grave, must have existed at the time of marriage, and must be
incurable.
The courts are justified in declaring a marriage null and void under
Article 36 o f the Family Code regardless of whether it is the petitioner
or the respondent who imputes the psychological incapacity to the
other as long as the imputation is fully substantiated with proof.
Indeed, psychological incapacity may exist in one party alone or in
both of them, and if psychological incapacity of either or both is
established, the marriage has to be deemed null and void.

ROBERT F. MALLILIN vs. LUZ G. JAMESOLAMIN AND THE

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 192718, February
18, 2015, J. Mendoza
The alleged failure of Luz to assume her duties as a wife and as a
mother, as well as her emotional immaturity, irresponsibility and
infidelity, cannot rise to the level of psychological incapacity that
justifies the nullification of the parties' marriage. Psychological
incapacity as required by Article 36 must be characterized by (a)
gravity, (b) juridical antecedence and (c) incurability. The
interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of
the Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive,
should be given great respect by our courts. The decision of the NAMT,
however, was based on the second paragraph of Canon 1095 which
refers to those who suffer from a grave lack of discretion of judgment
concerning essential matrimonial rights and obligations to be mutually
given and accepted --- a cause not of psychological nature under
Article 36 of the Family Code. A cause of psychological nature similar to
Article 36 is covered by the third paragraph of Canon 1095 of the Code
of Canon Law.

Republic of the Philippines vs. Court of

Molina, 268 SCRA 198, 212 (1997)

Appeals

and

The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage

belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in favor
of the existence and continuation of the marriage and against
its dissolution and nullity.
Republic vs. Quintero-Hamano, 428 SCRA 735 (2004).
According to the appellate court, the requirements in Molina
and Santos do not apply here because the present case
involves a mixed marriage, the husband being a Japanese
national. The court held that in proving psychological
incapacity, we find no distinction between an alien spouse
and a Filipino spouse.

Failure to comply with the Essential Marital

Obligations Chi Ming Tsoi vs CA, 266 SCRA
324 (1997)
In this case, there was no sexual contact between the parties
since their marriage on May 22, 1988 up to Mar. 15, 1989 or for
almost a year. The senseless and protracted refusal of one of
the
parties
of
sexual cooperation for the procreation of
children is equivalent to psychological incapacity.

Marable v. Marable G.R. NO. 178741, Jan. 17, 2011

639 SCRA 557

The appellate court correctly ruled that the report of Dr. Tayag
failed to explain the root cause of petitioners alleged
psychological incapacity. The evaluation of Dr. Tayag merely
made a general conclusion that petitioner is suffering from an
Anti-social Personality Disorder but there was no factual basis
stated for the finding that petitioner is a socially deviant
person, rebellious, impulsive, self-centered and deceitful.

Ochosa v. Alano, G.R. NO. 167459 , Jan. 26, 2011 640

SCRA 517
In this case the court proved that respondent was the sex
partner of many military officials. In view of the foregoing, the
badges of Bona s alleged psychological incapacity, i.e., her
sexual infidelity and abandonment, can only be convincingly
traced to the period of time after her marriage to Jose and
not to the inception of the said marriage.
Yambao v. REP., G.R. NO. 184063 , Jan. 24, 2011 640
SCRA 355
Article 36 contemplates incapacity or inability to take
cognizance of and to assume basic marital obligations and
not merely difficulty, refusal, or neglect in the performance of
marital obligations or ill will.
Rep. v. Galang G.R. NO. 168335 , Jun. 6, 2011 650
SCRA 524
In like manner, Juvys acts of falsifying the respondents
signature to encash a check, of stealing the respondents
ATM, and of squandering a huge portion of the P15,000.00
that the respondent entrusted to her, while no doubt
reprehensible, cannot automatically be equated with a
psychological disorder, especially when the evidence shows
that these were mere isolated incidents and not
recurring acts.

Aurelio v. Aurelio, G.R. NO. 175367 , Jun. 6, 2011 650

SCRA 561
Whether or not a petition for nullity of marriage on the ground of
psychological incapacity may be dismiss for failure to comply
with the guidelines set forth in the Molina Ruling. Let it be
remembered that each case involving the application of Article
36 must be treated distinctly and judged not on the basis of a
priori assumptions, predilections or generalizations but
according to its own attendant facts.
Kalaw v. Fernandez, G.R. NO. 166357 , Sept 19, 2011
657 SCRA 822

He presented the testimonies of two supposed expert witnesses

who concluded that respondent is psychologically incapacitated,
but the conclusions of these witnesses were premised on the
alleged acts or behavior of respondent which had not been
sufficiently proven. Sexual infidelity per se is a G.R.ound for legal
separation, but it
does
not necessarily
constitute
psychological incapacity.
Toring v. Toring, G.R. NO. 165321 , Aug. 03, 2010 626
SCRA 389
We are in no way convinced that a mere narration of the
statements of Ricardo and Richardson, coupled with the results
of
the
psychological
tests administered only on Ricardo,
without more, already constitutes sufficient basis for the
conclusion that Teresita suffered from Narcissistic Personality
Disorder. This Court has long been negatively critical in
considering psychological evaluations, presented in evidence,
derived solely from one-sided sources, particularly from the
spouse seeking the nullity of the marriage.
Baccay v. Baccay, G.R. No 173138 , Dec, 1, 2010 636
SCRA 350
In this case, the totality of evidence presented by Noel was
not
sufficient to sustain
a
finding
that Maribel
was
psychologically
incapacitated.
Noels evidence merely
established that Maribel refused to have sexual intercourse with
him after their marriage, and that she left him after their
quarrel
when he
confronted her about
her
alleged
miscarriage.

Agraviador v. Agraviador G.R.NO.170729 , Dec. 08,

2010 637 SCRA 519
In the present case, the petitioners testimony failed to establish
that the respondents condition is a manifestation of a
disordered
personality
rooted on some incapacitating or
debilitating psychological condition that makes her completely
unable to discharge the essential marital obligations. If at all,
the petitioner merely showed that the respondent had some
personality defects that showed their manifestation during the
marriage; his testimony sorely lacked details necessary to
establish that the respondents defects existed at the inception
of the marriage.

Mendoza v. Republic, G.R. NO. 157649,Nov 12, 2012

685 SCRA 16
Here, the experts testimony on Dominics psychological profile
did not identify, much less prove, the root cause of his
psychological incapacity because said expert did not examine
Dominic in person before completing her report but simply
relied on other peoples recollection and

opinion for that purpose. Expert evidence submitted here

did not establish the precise cause of the supposed
psychological incapacity of Dominic, much less show that the
psychological incapacity existed at the inception of the
marriage.
Republic v. Encelan, G.R. NO. 170022 , Jan. 9, 2013
688 SCRA 215
In any event, sexual infidelity and abandonment of the
conjugal dwelling, even if true, do not necessarily constitute
psychological incapacity; these are simply grounds for legal
separation. To constitute psychological incapacity, it must be
shown that the unfaithfulness and abandonment
are
manifestations of a disordered personality that completely
prevented the erring spouse from discharging the essential
marital obligations.
Evidentiary requirement
GLENN VIAS vs. MARY
208790, January 21,
2015, J. Reyes

GRACE

PAREL-VIAS,

G.R.

No.

The lack of personal examination or assessment by a psychologist or

psychiatrist is not necessarily fatal in a petition for the declaration of
nullity of marriage. If the totality of evidence presented is enough to
sustain a finding of psychological incapacity, then actual medical
examination of the person concerned need not be resorted to. In the
case at bar, the assessment of the psychological incapacity of the wife
was based solely on the information provided by the husband whose
bias in favor of his cause cannot be doubted. While this circumstance
alone does not disqualify the psychologist for reasons of bias, her
report, testimony and conclusions deserve the application of a more
rigid and stringent set of standards. Hence, if the totality of the
evidence presented provides inadequate basis to warrant the
conclusion that a psychological incapacity existed that prevented her
from complying with the essential obligations of marriage, the
declaration of the nullity of the marriage cannot be obtained. It has
been settled that irreconcilable differences, sexual infidelity or
perversion, emotional immaturity and irresponsibility, and the like, do
not by themselves warrant a finding of psychological incapacity under
Article 36, as the same may only be due to a persons refusal or
unwillingness to assume the essential obligations of marriage and not
due to some psychological illness that is contemplated by said rule.

Marcos vs Marcos, 343 SCRA 755 (2000)

If the totality of evidence presented is enough to sustain a
finding of psychological incapacity, then actual medical
examination of the person concerned need not be resorted to.
Award of Moral Damages

Buenaventura vs CA, 454 SCRA 261 (2005)

By declaring the petitioner as psychologically incapacitated,
the possibility of awarding moral damages on the same set of
facts was negated.
The award of moral damages should be predicated, not on
the mere act of entering into the marriage, but on specific
evidence that it was done deliberately and with malice by a
party who had knowledge of his or her disability and yet
willfully concealed the same.

Prescription
Nial v. Bayadog G.R. NO. 133778=, Mar. 14, 2000
328 SCRA 122
The action or defense for nullity is imprescriptible, unlike
voidable marriages where the action prescribes. Only the
parties to a voidable marriage can assail it but any proper
interested party may attack a void marriage.
Declaration of Nullity; Art.40; Prejudicial QuestionSection 7, Rule 117, 2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure;
Arts.35 (4) & 41, FC; Art.349 RPC; Civil & Criminal
Bigamy; Art. 83, NCC
Judicial Declaration of nullity of marriages

Ablaza v. Republic, G.R. NO. 158298 , Aug. 11, 2010

628 SCRA 27
Other than for purposes of remarriage, no judicial action is
necessary to declare a marriage an absolute nullity. For other
purposes, such as but not limited to determination of heirship,
legitimacy or illegitimacy of a child, settlement of estate,
dissolution of property regime, or a criminal case for that
matter, the court may pass upon the validity of marriage
even in a suit not directly instituted to question the same so long
as it is essential to the determination of the case.
Atienza vs. Brillantes, Jr., 243 SCRA 32,35 (1995)

Article 40 is applicable to remarriages entered into after the

effectivity of the Family Code on August 3, 1988 regardless of
the date of the first marriage.
Mercado vs. Tan, 337 SCRA 122 (2000)

A judicial declaration of nullity of a previous marriage is

necessary before a subsequent one can be legally contracted
and that one who enters into a subsequent marriage without
first obtaining such judicial declaration is guilty of bigamy.

Morigo v. People, G.R. NO. 145226, Feb. 06, 2004 422

SCRA 376
The existence and the validity of the first marriage being an
essential element of the crime of bigamy, it is but logical that a
conviction for said offense cannot be sustained where there is
no first marriage to speak of.
Jarillo v.People, G.R. NO.164435 , Sept. 29, 2009 601
SCRA 236
Whether or not the declaration of the first marriage as void
ab initio on the ground of psychological incapacity is a
defense
for
the crime
of bigamy. In this case, even if
petitioner eventually obtained a declaration that his first
marriage was void ab initio, the point is, both the first and
the second marriage were subsisting before the first marriage
was annulled.
Tenebro v. CA, G.R. NO. 150758 , Feb. 18, 2004 423
SCRA 272
Whether or not, the nullity of the second marriage on the
G.R.ound of PI is a valid defense for the crime of bigamy. The
declaration of the nullity of the second marriage on the ground
of psychological incapacity is not an indicator that petitioners
marriage to Ancajas lacks the essential requisites for validity.
Antone v. Beronilla, G.R. NO.183824, Dec. 08, 2010
637 SCRA 615
To conclude, the issue on the declaration of nullity of the
marriage between petitioner and respondent only after the latter
contracted the subsequent marriage is, therefore, immaterial for
the
purpose
of establishing that the facts alleged in the
information for Bigamy does not constitute an offense. Following
the same rationale, neither may such defense be interposed by
the respondent in his motion to quash by way of exception
to the established rule that facts contrary to the allegations
in the information are matters of defense which may be
raised only during the presentation of evidence.

Teves v. People, G.R. NO. 188775 , Aug 24, 2011 656

SCRA 307
The crime of bigamy was committed by petitioner on 10
December 2001 when he contracted a second marriage with
Edita. The
finality
on
27 June 2006 of the judicial
declaration of the nullity of his previous marriage to Thelma
cannot be made to retroact to the date of the bigamous
marriage.

Nollora v. People, G.R. NO.191425 , Sept. 7, 2011 657

SCRA 330
Indeed, Article 13(2) of the Code of Muslim Personal Laws
states that "[i]n case of a marriage between a Muslim and a
non-Muslim, solemnized not in accordance with Muslim law or
this Code, the [Family Code of the Philippines, or Executive Order
NO. 209, in lieu of the Civil Code of the Philippines] shall apply."
Thus, regardless of his professed religion, Nollora cannot
claim exemption from liability for the crime of bigamy.
Villatuya v. Tabalingcos, A.C. NO. 6622 , July 10,
2012 676 SCRA 37
Respondent exhibited a deplorable lack of that deG.R.ee of
morality required of him as a member of the bar. He made a
mockery of marriage, a sacred institution demanding respect
and dignity.

Subsequent Bigamous Marriage

under art. 41 Arts. 41- 44, 49 FC;
Art.83 (2) NCC;
Judicial Declaration of Presumptive Death
Armas v. Calisterio, G.R. NO.136467, Apr. 06, 2000
330 SCRA 201
Whether or not, the rule under the FC, that a judicial declaration
of presumptive death of the absent spouse is necessary before
the present spouse can remarry, has a retroactive effect. A
judicial declaration of absence of the absentee spouse is not
necessary as long as the prescribed period of absence is met.
It is equally noteworthy that the marriage in these exceptional
cases are, by the explicit mandate of Article 83, to be deemed
valid "until declared null and void by a competent court."
Requisites for declaration of presumptive Death
Rep. v. Nolasco, G.R. NO. 94053 , Mar. 17, 1993 220
SCRA 20
In the case at bar, the Court considers that the investigation
allegedly conducted by respondent in his attempt to
ascertain Janet Monica Parker's whereabouts is too sketchy
to form the basis of a reasonable or well-founded belief that

she was already dead. When he arrived in San Jose, Antique

after learning of Janet Monica's departure, instead of seeking
the help of local authorities or of the British Embassy, he
secured another seaman's contract and went to London, a
vast city of many millions of inhabitants, to look for her there.
Retroactive application of Art. 41
Valdez v. Republic, G.R. NO.180863 , Sept. 08, 2009
598 SCRA 646

Since death is presumed to have taken place by the seventh

year of absence, Sofio is to be presumed dead starting October
1982. To retroactively apply the provisions of the Family Code
requiring petitioner
to exhibit "well-founded
belief"
will,
ultimately, result in the invalidation of her second marriage,
which was valid at the time it was celebrated.
Effects of Declaration of Presumptive
Death Effects of Recording of Affidavit
of Reapperance
Procedural rules of declaration of Presumptive Death
The proper remedy for a judicial declaration of presumptive death
obtained by extrinsic fraud is an action to annul the judgment. An
affidavit of reappearance is not the proper remedy when the person
declared presumptively dead has never been absent. CELERINA J.
SANTOS vs. RICARDO T. SANTOS, G.R. No. 187061,
October 08, 2014, J. Leonen

Rep. v. Tango, G.R. NO.161062 , Jul. 31, 2009 594

SCRA 560
By express provision of law, the judgment of the court in a
summary proceeding shall be immediately final and executory.
As a matter of course, it follows that no appeal can be had
of the trial courts judgment in a summary proceeding for the
declaration of presumptive death of an absent spouse under
Article 41 of the Family Code
Navarro v. Domogtoy, A.M. NO.M TJ-96-1088, Jul. 19,
1996 259 SCRA 129
Even if the spouse present has a well-founded belief that the
absent spouse was already dead, a summary proceeding for the
declaration of presumptive death is necessary in order to
contract a subsequent marriage, a mandatory requirement
which has been precisely incorporated into the Family Code to
discourage subsequent marriages where it is not proven that the
previous marriage has been dissolved or a missing spouse is
factually or presumptively dead, in accordance with pertinent
provisions of law.
Rep. v. Bermudez-Lorino, G.R. NO. 160258 , Jan. 19,
2005
449
SCRA 57
3
0

Although the result of the Court of Appeals denial of the appeal

would apparently be the same, there is a big difference between
having the supposed appeal dismissed for lack of jurisdiction by
virtue of the fact that the RTC decision sought to be appealed
is immediately final and executory, and the denial of the appeal
for lack of merit. In the former, the supposed appellee can
immediately ask for the issuance of an Entry

3
0

of Judgment in the RTC, whereas, in the latter, the appellant

can still raise the matter to this Court on petition for review
and the RTC judgment cannot be executed until this Court
makes the final pronouncement.
Rep. v. Granada, G.R. NO. 187512, June 13, 2012 672
SCRA 432
As a matter of course, it follows that no appeal can be had of
the trial court's judgment in a summary proceeding for the
declaration of presumptive death of an absent spouse under
Article 41 of the Family Code. It goes without saying,
however, that an aggrieved party may file a petition for certiorari
to question abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction.
Terminable Marriage; Art. 43 44 FC
Effects of termination of subsequent
marriage Effects of Bad Faith
Armas v. Calisterio, G.R. NO.136467, Apr. 06, 2000
330 SCRA 201
Bad faith imports a dishonest purpose or some moral
obliquity and conscious doing of wrong it partakes of the
nature of fraud, a breach of a known duty through some
motive of interest or ill-will.
Voidable Marriages; Art.
45- 49 FC Definition
Suntay
(1998)

vs.

Cojuangco-Suntay,

300

SCRA

760,

771

A voidable marriage is considered valid and produces all its

civil effects until it is set aside by final
judgment of a
competent court in an action for annulment. The terms
annul and null and void have different legal connotations
and implications. Annul means to reduce to nothing; to nullify;
to abolish; to do away with; whereas, null and void is
something that does not exist from the beginning.

Characteristics of Voidable Marriages

31

Proper party to file annulment of

Marriage G.R.ounds
Ratification and prescription
Procedural rules of
declaration of nullity

annulment

of

marriage

and

32

Tuazon vs. Court of Appeals, 256 SCRA 158 (1996)

The prosecuting attorney or fiscal may oppose the application for
legal separation or annulment (or declaration of nullity
of
marriages) through the presentation of his own evidence, if in
his opinion, the proof adduced is dubious and fabricated.

Effects of judicial declaration of nullity of Marriage ;

Art. 50-54 Title II. LEGAL SEPARATION (Articles 55-67)
Concept
Distinction of annulment and
absolute divorce Grounds
Ong v. Ong, G.R. NO. 153206 , Oct. 23, 2006 505
SCRA 76
Also without merit is the argument of William that since Lucita
has abandoned the family, a decree of legal separation should
not be granted, following Art. 56, par. (4) of the Family Code
which provides that legal separation shall be denied when
both parties have given ground for legal separation. The
abandonment
referred
to
by
the Family
Code is
abandonment without justifiable cause for more than one
year.
De facto Separation vs. Legal Separation,Article 63
Manzano vs. Sanchez,
2001 354 SCRA 1

A.M.

NO.00-1329,

Mar.

08,

The fact that Manzano and Payao had been living apart from
their respective spouses for a long time already is immaterial.
Article 63(1) of the Family Code allows spouses who have
obtained a decree of legal separation to live separately from
each other, but in such a case the marriage bonds are not
severed.
SSS v. Aguas, G.R. NO. 165546 , Feb. 27, 2006 483
SCRA 383
On the claims of Rosanna, it bears stressing that for her to
qualify as a primary beneficiary, she must prove that she was
"the legitimate spouse dependent for support from the
employee, whether one is actually dependent for support

upon the other is something that has to be shown; it cannot

be presumed from the fact of marriage alone. The obvious
conclusion then is that a wife who is already separated de
facto from her husband cannot be said to be "dependent for
support" upon the husband, absent any showing to the
contrary.
Defenses in Legal Separation Art. 56- 57

Cooling off period; Art. 58 59

Pacete vs. Carriaga, Jr., G.R. NO. L-53880, March 17,
1994.
In this interim, the court should take steps toward getting the
parties to reconcile.
Somosa-Ramos vs. Vamenta, Jr., G.R. NO. L-34132,
July 29,1972
During this period, the court where the action is pending shall
remain passive and is precluded from hearing the suit.
Rule of Procedure on Legal Separation (A.M. NO. 0211-11 SC); Rule on Provisional Orders (AM 02-11-12
SC);
Baez vs. Baez, G.R. NO. 132592 , Jan. 23, 2002 374
SCRA 340
The effects of legal separation, such as entitlement to live
separately, dissolution and liquidation of the absolute
community or conjugal partnership, and custody of the minor
children, follow from the decree of legal separation. They are not
separate or distinct matters that may be resolved by the court
and become final prior to or apart from the decree of legal
separation.

Pacete vs. Carriaga, G.R. NO. 53880, Mar. 17, 1994

231 SCRA 321
Whether or not, the order declaring in default a respondent in a
legal separation case amounts to grave abuse of discretion. In
case of non- appearance of the defendant, the court shall
order the prosecuting attorney to inquire whether or not a
collusion between the parties exists. If there is no collusion,
the prosecuting attorney shall intervene for the State in order
to take care that the evidence for the plaintiff is not fabricated.
Quiao vs. Quiao, G.R. NO.176556 , July 4, 2012 675
SCRA 642

When the trial court issued its order dated November 8,

2006, it held that although the Decision dated October 10,
2005 has become final and executory, it may still consider
the Motion for Clarification because the petitioner simply
wanted to clarify the meaning of "net profit earned."

Title
III.
RIGHTS
AND
OBLIGATIONS
HUSBAND & W IFE (Arts 68-73)

BETWEEN

Ilusorio v. Bildner, G.R. NO. 139789 , May 12, 200 332

SCRA 169

Marital rights including coverture and living in conjugal dwelling

may
not be enforced by the extra-ordinary writ of habeas
corpus. With his full mental capacity coupled with the right of
choice, Potenciano Ilusorio may not be the subject of visitation
rights against his free choice. Otherwise, we will deprive him
of his right to privacy.
Go vs. CA G.R. NO.114791, May 29, 1997 272 SCRA
752
Under Article 117 of the Civil Code (now Article 73 of the
Family Code), the wife may exercise any profession,
occupation or engage in business without the consent of the
husband. In the instant case, we are convinced that it was
only petitioner Nancy Go who entered into the contract with
private respondent.
Family expenses and management of the household
TITLE IV. PROPERTY RELATIONS BET. HUSBAND & W
IFE (Articles 74- 148)
CHAPTER 1. GENERAL PROVISIONS;
Prenuptial
Agreement; (Articles 74-81, FC; Art. 119,
NCC)
Concept
Property regime by default
Marriage settlement
Parties to Marriage
settlement Laws governing
Property Relations
CHAPTER 2. DONATIONS
(Articles 82 87)

BY

REASON

OF MARRIAGE

Donation Propter Nuptias

Serrano vs. Solomon, G.R. NO. L-12093, June 29,
1959
The following donations are not donations propter nuptias: (1)
those made in favor of the spouses after the celebration of
marriage; (2) those executed in favor of the future spouses but

not in consideration of the marriage; and (3) those Ggranted to

persons other than the spouses even though they may be
founded on the marriage

Rules governing Donation propter nuptias

Heirs of Segunda Maningding vs. CA, 276 SCRA 601
(1997)

Even if the donation proper nuptias is void for failure to comply

with formal requisites, it could still constitute as legal basis
for adverse possession.
Valencia v. Locquiao, G.R. NO. 122134, Oct. 3, 200
412 SCRA 600
Under the Old Civil Code, donations propter nuptias must be
made in a public instrument in which the property donated
must be specifically described. However, Article 1330 of the
same Code provides that "acceptance is not necessary
to
the
validity
of
such
gifts". In other words, the
celebration of the marriage between the beneficiary couple, in
tandem with compliance with the prescribed form, was
enough to effectuate the donation propter nuptias under the
Old Civil Code.
Donation between the
parties Donation of future
properties
Revocation of Donation Propter
Nuptias Donation between Spouses
Agapay vs. Palang, G.R. NO. 116668 , Jul. 28, 1997
276 SCRA 340
Article 87 of the Family Code expressly provides that the
prohibition against donations between spouses now applies to
donations between persons living together as husband and wife
without a valid marriage, for otherwise, the condition of those
who incurred guilt would turn out to be better than those in
legal union.
Arcaba vs. Batocael, G.R. NO.146683 , Nov.22, 2001
370 SCRA 414
Respondents having proven by a preponderance of evidence
that Cirila and Francisco lived together as husband and wife
without a valid marriage, the inescapable conclusion is that the
donation made by Francisco in favor of Cirila is void under
Art. 87 of the Family Code.

CHAPTER 3. SYSTEM
(Articles 88-104);
R.A. 8369

OF

ABSOLUTE

COMMUNITY

Section 1. General Provisions (Articles 88-90)

Section 2. W hat
(Articles 91-93)

constitutes

Community

Property

Section 3. Charges Upon & Obligations of the Absolute

Community (Articles 94-95)

Section 4. Ownership, Administration, Enjoyment &

Disposition of the Community Property (Articles 9698)
Section 5. Dissolution of Absolute Community Regime
(Arts 99-101)
Section6. Liquidation
of the
Absolute
Community
Assets & Liabilities (Arts 102104); Succession; Probate;
Sec. 3, Rule 87
Rules governing
ACP
Commencement of the ACP
Prohibition on waiver of Rights, Interest, Shares
and Effects Abalos vs Macatangay Jr., 439 SCRA
649, 662-663 (2004).
Prior to the liquidation of the conjugal partnership, the interest of
each spouse in the conjugal assets is inchoate, a mere
expectancy, which constitutes neither a legal nor an equitable
estate, and does not ripen into title until it appears that there
are assets in the community as a result of the liquidation
and settlement. The interest of each spouse is limited to the net
remainder or remanente liquido (haber ganancial) resulting from
the liquidation of the affairs of the partnership after its
dissolution.
CHAPTER 3. SYSTEM
(Articles 88-104);
R.A. 8369

OF

ABSOLUTE

COMMUNITY

Section 1. General Provisions (Articles 88-90)

Section 2. W hat
(Articles 91-93)

constitutes

Community

Property

Section 3. Charges Upon & Obligations of the

Absolute Community (Articles 94-95)
Section 4. Ownership, Administration, Enjoyment &
Disposition of the Community Property (Articles 9698)
Section 5. Dissolution of Absolute Community Regime
(Arts 99 -101)
Section6. Liquidation
of the
Absolute
Community
Assets & Liabilities (Arts 102104); Succession; Probate;
Sec. 3, Rule 87

Concept
Homeowners Savings & Loan Bank vs. Dailo, 453 SCRA
283, 290 (2005)
The regime of conjugal partnership of gains is a special
type of partnership, where the husband and wife place in a
common fund the proceeds, products, fruits and income from
their separate properties and those acquired by either or both
spouses through their efforts or by chance.
Rules governing CPG
Commencement of CPG
Prohibition on waiver of Rights, Interest, Shares
and Effects Quiao vs. Quiao G.R. NO. 176556 , July
4, 2012 675 SCRA 642
In this provision, net profits "shall be the increase in value
between the market value of the community property at the time
of the celebration of the marriage and the market value at
the time of its dissolution."

General Provisions
FRANCISCO LIM vs. EQUITABLE PCI BANK, now known as the
BANCO DE ORO
UNIBANK INC., January 15, 2014, J. del Castillo
All property of the marriage is presumed to be conjugal, unless it is
shown that it is owned exclusively by the husband or the wife; that
this presumption is not overcome by the fact that the property is
registered in the name of the husband or the wife alone 2and that the
consent of both spouses is required before a conjugal property may
be mortgaged. However, we find it iniquitous to apply the foregoing
presumption especially since the nature of the mortgaged property
was never raised as an issue before the RTC, the CA, and even before
this Court. In fact, petitioner never alleged in his Complaint that the
said property was conjugal in nature.

PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK v JOSE GARCIA and CHILDREN

NORA GARCIA, JOSE GARCIA, JR., BOBBY GARCIA and JIMMY
GARCIA and HEIRS OF ROGELIO GARCIA NAMELY: CELEDONIO
GARCIA, DANILO GARCIA, ELSA GARCIA, FERMIN GARCIA,
HEHERSON GARCIA, GREGORIO GARCIA, IMELDA GARCIA and
JANE GARCIA, G.R No. 182839, June 2, 2014 J. BRION

Registration of a property alone in the name of one spouse does not

destroy its conjugal nature. What is material is the time when the
property was acquired. The registration of the property is not
conclusive evidence of the exclusive ownership of the husband or the
wife. Although the property appears to be registered in the name of
the husband, it has the inherent character of conjugal property if it was
acquired for valuable consideration during marriage. In order to rebut
the presumptive conjugal nature of the property, the petitioner must
present strong, clear and convincing evidence of exclusive ownership
of one of the spouses. The burden of proving that the property belongs
exclusively to the wife or to the husband rests upon the party asserting
it.
Dewara v. Lamela G.R. NO. 179010, Apr. 11, 2011 647
SCRA 483
All property of the marriage is presumed to belong to the
conjugal partnership, unless it be proved that
it
pertains
exclusively to the husband or to the wife. Registration in the
name of the husband or the wife alone does not destroy
this presumption.
De Leon v. De Leon G.R. NO. 185063 , Jul. 23, 2009
593 SCRA 768
In the case at bar, ownership over what was once a PHHC lot
and covered by the PHHC-Bonifacio Conditional Contract to
Sell was only transferred during the marriage of Bonifacio and
Anita. Evidently, title to the property in question only passed
to Bonifacio after he had fully paid the purchase price on June
22, 1970.
Section
(Articles

2.

Exclusive

109

-115)

Property

Villegas

v.

of

Each

Lingan

Spouse

G.R.

NO.

153839 , Jun. 29, 2007 526 SCRA 63

Consequently, as correctly held by the CA, Marilou acquired
ownership
of the subject property. All rights and title of the judgment
obligor are transferred upon the expiration of the right of
redemption. And where the redemption is made under a property
regime governed by the conjugal partnership of gains, Article
109 of the Family Code provides that property acquired by
right of redemption is the exclusive property of the spouses
redeeming the property.

Section 3. Conjugal Partnership Property (Articles 116120); Article 160 NCC

Presumption in Favor of
Conjugality Tan vs. CA, 273
SCRA 229, 236 (1997)

For the presumption to apply, it is not even necessary to prove

that the property was acquired with funds of the partnership. In
fact, even when the manner in which the property was acquired
does not appear, the presumption
applies and it will be
considered conjugal property.
Imani v. MBTC, G.R. NO.187023,Nov. 17, 2010 635
SCRA 357
The party who invokes it must first prove that the property was
acquired during the marriage. Proof of acquisition during the
coverture is a condition sine qua non to the operation of the
presumption in favor of the conjugal partnership.
Pisuea vs. Heirs of Petra Unating, G.R. NO. 132803
, Aug. 31, 1999 313 SCRA 384
The words "married to" were merely descriptive of Petra
Unating's status at the time the lot was awarded and registered
in her name. Since Petra Unating did not leave any other
property, will or debt upon her demise in 1948, the property in
question was thus inherited by her children, Felix and
Catalina Villar; and her husband, Aquilino Villar.

Improvement on Separate
Property Determination of
Ownership
Ferrer v. Ferrer, G.R. NO.166496 , Nov. 29, 2006 508
SCRA 570
The obligation to reimburse rests on the spouse upon whom
ownership
of the entire property is vested. There is no
obligation on the part of the purchaser of the property, in case
the property is sold by the owner- spouse.
Section 4.Charges Upon &
Partnership (Articles 121-123)

Oblig.of

the

Conjugal

Alipio vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. NO. 134100, Sept.

29, 2000.

A creditor cannot sue the surviving spouse of a decedent in an

ordinary proceeding for the collection of a sum of money
chargeable against the conjugal partnership and that the proper
remedy is for him to file a claim in the settlement of estate of
the decedent.
Homeowners Savings & Loan Bank
283
(2005)

vs.

Dailo, 453 SCRA

The burden of proof that the debt was contracted for the benefit
of the conjugal partnership of gains lies with the creditor-party
litigant claiming as such.
Ayala Investment & Development Corp. vs. Court of
Appeals, 286 SCRA 272 (1998)
Where the husband contracts obligations on behalf of the
family business, the law presumes, and rightly so, that such
obligation will redound to the benefit of the conjugal
partnership.
Ching vs. CA, G.R. NO. 124642 , Feb. 23, 2004 423
SCRA 356

The barefaced fact that the shares of stocks were registered

in the corporate books of Citycorp Investment Philippines
solely in the name of the petitioner-husband does not
constitute proof that the petitioner- husband, not the conjugal
partnership, owned the same.
Carlos vs. Abelardo, G.R. NO. 146504 , Apr. 09, 2002
380 SCRA 361
On the same principle, acknowledgment of the loan made
by the defendant-wife binds the conjugal partnership since
its proceeds redounded to the benefit of the family. Hence,
defendant-husband and defendant-wife are jointly and
severally liable in the payment of the loan.

SBTC v. Mar Tierra Corp., G.R. NO. 143382 , Nov. 29,

2006 508 SCRA 419
To hold the conjugal partnership liable for an obligation
pertaining to the husband alone defeats the objective of the Civil
Code to protect the solidarity and well being of the family as
a unit. The underlying concern of the law is the conservation of
the conjugal partnership. Hence, it limits the liability of the
conjugal partnership only to debts and obligations contracted by
the husband for the benefit of the conjugal
partnership.

4
0

Ros v. PNB Laoag Br., G.R. NO.170166, Apr. 06, 2011

647 SCRA 334
It is enough that the benefit to the family is apparent at the
signing of the contract. From the very nature of the contract of
loan or services, the family stands to benefit from the loan
facility or services to be rendered to the business or
profession of the husband.

4
0

Pana v. Heirs of Jose Juanite G.R. NO. 164201,Dec.

10, 2012 687 SCRA 414
Contrary to Efrens contention, Article 121 above allows payment
of the criminal indemnities imposed on his wife, Melecia, out of
the partnership assets even before these are liquidated. Indeed,
it states that such indemnities "may be enforced against the
partnership assets after the responsibilities enumerated in the
preceding article have been covered." No prior liquidation of
those assets is required.

Section 5. Administration of the Conjugal

Partnership Property (Articles 124-125)
Joint Administration of CPG
Disposition or Encumbrance
of CPG Rules under the Civil
Code
SERCONSISION R. MENDOZA v AURORA MENDOZA FERMIN,
G.R No. 177235,
July 7, 2014. J. Peralta
As Leonardo and Serconsision were married sometime in 1985, the
applicable provision governing the property relations of the spouses is
Article 172 of the Civil Code of the Philippines which states that the
wife cannot bind the conjugal partnership without the husbands
consent. The disposal by the wife of their conjugal property without
the husbands consent is voidable under Article 173, which states that
contracts entered by the husband without the consent of the wife
when such consent is required are annullable at her instance during
the marriage and within ten years from the transaction questioned.
In the present case, the fictitious Deed of Absolute Sale was executed
on September 22, 1986, one month after Leonardo died. Auroraas one
of the heirs and the duly appointed administratrix of Leonardos
estate, had the right therefore to seek for the annulment of the Deed
of Sale as it deprived her and the other legal heirs of Leonardo of their
hereditary rights.
SOLEDAD L. LAVADIA v HEIRS OF JUAN LUCES LUNA,
represented by GREGORIO Z. LUNA and EUGENIA ZABALLEROLUNA, G.R No. 171914, July 23, 2014. J. BERSAMIN
41

Due to the second marriage between Atty. Luna and the petitioner
being void ab initio by virtue of its being bigamous, the properties
acquired during the bigamous marriage were governed by the rules
on co-ownership, conformably with Article 144 of the Civil Code.

42

In such a situation, whoever alleges co-ownership carried the burden of

proof to confirm such fact. To establish co-ownership, therefore, it
became imperative for the Lavadia to offer proof of her actual
contributions in the acquisition of property. Her mere allegation of coownership, without sufficient and competent evidence, would warrant
no relief in her favor.

Tinitigan vs. Tinitigan, Sr., NO. L- 45418, October 30,

1980,
100
SCRA 619.
A husband may sell property belonging to the conjugal
partnership even without the consent of the wife if the sale is
necessary to answer for a big conjugal liability which might
endanger the familys economic standing. This is one
instance where the wifes consent is not required and,
impliedly, no judicial intervention is necessary.
Spouses Guiang vs. Court
125172. June 26, 1998,

of

Appeals,

G.R.

No.

Under the Civil Code, the encumbrance or alienation of a

conjugal real property by the husband absent the wifes
consent, is voidable and not void.
Roxas vs. CA G.R. NO. 92245, Jun. 26, 1991 198 SCRA
541
The joinder of the wife, although unnecessary for an oral
lease of conjugal realty which does not exceed one year in
duration, is required in a lease of conjugal realty for a period of
more than one year, such a lease being considered a
conveyance and encumbrance within the provisions of the
Civil Code requiring the joinder of the wife in the instrument by
which real property is conveyed or encumbered
Guiang vs. CA, G.R. NO. 125172, Jun. 26, 1998 291
SCRA 372
The sale of a conjugal property requires the consent of both the
husband and the wife. The absence of the consent of one
renders the sale null and void, while the vitiation thereof makes
it merely voidable. Only in the latter case can ratification
cure the defect.

Jader-Manalo vs.
23, 2002 374
SCRA 498

Camaisa,

G.R.

NO.

147978,

Jan.

Respondent Norma Camaisa admittedly did not give her

written consent to the sale. Even G.R.anting that respondent
Norma actively participated in negotiating for the sale of the
subject properties, which she denied, her written consent
to the sale is required by law for its validity.

Significantly, petitioner herself admits that Norma refused to

sign the contracts to sell.

Rules under the Family Code

Uy vs. CA, G.R. NO. 10955, Nov. 29, 2000 346 SCRA
246
In regular manner, the rules on summary judicial proceedings
under the Family Code govern the proceedings under Article
124 of the Family Code. The situation contemplated is one
where the spouse is absent, or separated in fact or has
abandoned the other or consent is withheld or cannot be
obtained. Such rules do not apply to cases where the non consenting spouse is incapacitated or incompetent to give
consent. In this case, the trial court found that the subject
spouse "is an incompetent" who was in comatose.
Ravina v. Villa Abrille
2009 604 SCRA
120

G.R. NO. 160708, Oct.

16,

Just like the rule in absolute community of property, if the

husband, without knowledge and consent of the wife, sells
conjugal property, such sale is void. If the sale was with the
knowledge but without the approval of the wife, thereby
resulting in a disagreement, such sale is annullable at the
instance of the wife who is given five (5) years from the date
the contract implementing the decision of the husband to
institute the case.
De la Cruz v. Segovia,
2008 555 SCRA
453

G.R. NO.

149801, Jun. 26,

While Florindas husband did not affix his signature to the

above- mentioned Agreement, we find no ground to disturb
the uniform findings of the trial court and appellate court that
Renato, by his actuations, agreed and gave his conformity to
the Agreement. As found by the courts below, Renatos
consent to the Agreement was drawn from the fact that he
was present at the time it was signed by the sisters and their
witnesses; he had knowledge of the Agreement as it was
presented to him for his signature, although he did not sign
the same because his wife Florinda insisted that her signature

already carried that of her husband; Renato witnessed the

fact that Leonila contributed her hard earned savings in the
amount of P36,000.00 to complete their share in the purchase
price of the properties in question in the total amount of
P180,000.00.
Section 6. Dissolution of the Conjugal Partnership
Regime (Articles 126-128)

After the marriage of petitioner and respondent has been declared

void, petitioner filed a complaint for the partition of the house and lot
obtained by them during their marriage. The SC ruled that what
governs them is Art. 147 of the Family Code. Under this article,
property acquired by both spouses through their work and industry
shall be governed by the rules on equal co-ownership. Any property
acquired during the union is prima facie presumed to have been
obtained through their joint efforts. A party who did not participate in
the acquisition of the property shall be considered as having
contributed to the same jointly if said party's efforts consisted in the
care and maintenance of the family household. Efforts in the care and
maintenance of the family and household are regarded as contributions
to the acquisition of common property by one who has no salary or
income or work or industry. In the case at bar since the former spouses
both agreed that they acquired the subject property during the
subsistence of their marriage, it shall be presumed to have been
obtained by their joint efforts, work or industry, thus, the property is
jointly owned by them in equal shares. MARIETTA N. BARRIDO vs.
LEONARDO V. NONATO, G.R. No. 176492, October 20, 2014, J.
Peralta

MBTC v. Pascual, G.R. NO. 163744, Feb. 29, 2008 547

SCRA 246
Termination of Conjugal Property Regime does not ipso facto End
the Nature of Conjugal Ownership. While the declared nullity of
marriage of Nicholson and Florencia severed their marital bond
and dissolved the conjugal partnership, the character of the
properties
acquired
before such declaration continues
to
subsist as conjugal properties until and after the liquidation
and partition of the partnership.
Dio v. Dio, G.R. NO. 178044, Jan. 19, 2011 640
SCRA 178
The trial court erred in ordering that a decree of absolute nullity
of marriage shall be issued only after liquidation, partition
and distribution of the parties properties under Article 147 of
the Family Code. The ruling has no basis because Section 19(1)
of the Rule does not apply to cases governed under Articles 147
and 148 of the Family
Code.
Espinosa v. Omaa, AC. 9081, Oct 12, 2011 659 SCRA
1

Extrajudicial dissolution of the conjugal partnership without

judicial approval is void. The Court has also ruled that a
notary public should not facilitate the disintegration of a
marriage and the family by encouraging the separation of the
spouses
and
extrajudicially
dissolving the conjugal
partnership, which is exactly what Omaa did in this case.
The "Kasunduan Ng Paghihiwalay" has no legal effect and is
against public policy.

Section 7. Liquidation of the Conjugal Partnership

Assets & Liabilities (Articles 129-133);
Agtarap v. Agtarap, G.R. NO. 177099, Jun. 8, 2011
651 SCRA 455
We hold that the general rule does not apply to the instant
case considering that the parties are all heirs of Joaquin and that
no rights of third parties will be impaired by the resolution of
the ownership issue. More importantly, the determination of
whether the subject properties are conjugal is but collateral to
the probate courts jurisdiction to settle the estate of
Joaquin.

Go v. Servacio, G.R. NO. 157537, Sept. 7, 2011 657

SCRA 10
There being no dispute that Protacio, Sr. and Marta were married
prior to the effectivity of the Family Code on August 3, 1988,
their property relation was properly characterized as one of
conjugal partnership governed by the Civil Code. Upon Martas
death in 1987, the conjugal partnership was dissolved, pursuant
to Article 175 (1) of the Civil Code, and an implied ordinary
co-ownership ensued among Protacio, Sr. and the other heirs
of Marta with respect to her share in the assets of the conjugal
partnership pending a liquidation following its liquidation.

CHAPTER 5.SEPARATION
OF
PROP.
OF
THE
SPOUSES
& ADM INISTRATION OF COMMON
PROPERTY BY ONE SPOUSE DURING THE MARRIAGE
(Arts 134-142)
CHAPTER 6. REGIME OF SEPARATION OF PROPERTY
(Articles 143 - 146)
Grounds
Voluntary Separation of Property
Maquilan
2007 524
166

v. Maquilan, G.R. NO.

SCRA

155409, Jun. 08,

Under Article 143 of the Family Code, separation of property may

be effected voluntarily or for sufficient cause, subject to

judicial approval. The questioned Compromise Agreement which

was judicially approved is exactly such a separation of property
allowed under the law.
Effects of Decree Granting Separation of Property

CHAPTER 7. PROPERTY REGIMES OF UNIONS W ITHOUT

MARRIAGE
(Articles 147-148)
Valdes vs. RTC Br. 102,
31, 1996 260
SCRA 221

QC G.R.

NO. 122749, Jul.

Whether or not, Articles 50, 51 and 52 in relation to Articles

102 and 129 of the Family Code govern the disposition of the
family dwelling in cases where a marriage is declared void ab
initio, including a marriage declared void by reason of the
psychological incapacity of the spouses. The rules set up to
govern the liquidation of either the absolute community or the
conjugal partnership of gains, the property regimes recognized
for valid and voidable marriages (in the latter case until the
contract is annulled), are irrelevant to the liquidation of the coownership that exists between common-law spouses.
Mallilin, Jr. vs. Castillo, G.R. NO. 136803, Jun. 16,
2000 333 SCRA
628
The Family Code, in addition to providing that a co-ownership
exists between a man and a woman who live together as
husband and wife without the benefit of marriage, likewise
provides that, if the parties are incapacitated to marry each
other, properties acquired by them through their joint
contribution of money, property or industry shall be owned by
them in common in proportion to their contributions which, in
the absence of proof to the contrary, is presumed to be equal.
Dio v. Dio, G.R. NO. 178044,Jan. 19, 2011 640
SCRA 178
Petitioners marriage to respondent was declared void under
Article 36 of the Family Code and not under Article 40 or 45.
Thus, what governs the liquidation of properties owned in
common by petitioner and respondent are the rules on coownership. In Valdes, the Court ruled that the property
relations of parties in a void marriage during the period of
cohabitation is governed either by Article 147 or Article 148 of
the Family Code. The rules on co-ownership apply and the
properties of the spouses should be liquidated in accordance
with the Civil Code provisions on co- ownership. Under Article
496 of the Civil Code, partition may be made by aG.R.eement
between the parties or by judicial proceedings. It is not

necessary to liquidate the properties of the spouses in

same proceeding for declaration of nullity of marriage.

the

Lacbayan v. Samoy, G.R. NO. 165427, Mar. 21, 2011

645 SCRA 677
A careful perusal of the contents of the so-called Partition
AG.R.eement indicates that the document involves matters
which necessitate prior settlement of questions of law, basic
of which is a determination as
to

whether the parties have the right to freely divide among

themselves the subject properties. Moreover, to follow
petitioners argument would be to allow respondent not only to
admit against his own interest but that of his legal spouse as
well, who may also be lawfully entitled co-ownership over the
said properties.
Cario v. Cario, G.R. NO. 132529, Feb. 02, 2001 351
SCRA 127
As to the property regime of petitioner Susan Nicdao and the
deceased, Article 147 of the Family Code governs. This article
applies to unions of parties who are legally capacitated and
not barred by any impediment to contract marriage, but
whose marriage is nonetheless void for other reasons, like the
absence of a marriage license

San Luis v. San Luis G.R. NO. 133743, Feb. 06, 2007 514
SCRA
294
In the instant case, respondent would qualify as an
interested person who has a direct interest in the estate of
Felicisimo by virtue of their cohabitation, the existence of
which was not denied by petitioners. If she proves the
validity of the divorce and Felicisimos capacity to remarry,
but fails to prove that her marriage with him was validly
performed under the laws of the U.S.A., then she may be
conside red as a co-owner under Article 144 76 of the Civil
Code

TITLE V. THE FAMILY HOME

CHAPTER 1. THE FAMILY AS AN INSTITUTION
(Articles 149-151) Tuason vs. CA, 256 SCRA 158
(1996)
Our family law is based on the policy that marriage is not a
mere contract but a social institution in which the state is
vitally interested.
Hontiveros vs. RTC Iloilo City, G.R. NO. 125465, Jun.
29, 1999 309
SCRA 340

Religious relationship and relationship by affinity are not given

any legal effect in this jurisdiction. Consequently, private
respondent Ayson, who is described in the complaint as the
spouse
of respondent Hontiveros, and petitioner Maria
Hontiveros, who is admittedly the spouse of petitioner
Augusto Hontiveros, are considered strangers to
the
Hontiveros family, for purposes of Art. 151.
Gayon v. Gayon, 36 SCRA 104 (1970)

The enumeration of "brothers and sisters" as member of the

same family does not comprehend "sisters-in-law." In that
case, then Chief Justice Concepcion emphasized that "sistersin-law" (hence, also "brother-in- law") are not listed under Art.
217 of the New Civil Code as members of the same family.

Magbaleta vs. Gonong, 76 SCRA 511

Efforts to compromis are not a jurisdictional prerequisite
for the maintenance of an action whenever a stranger to the
family is a party thereto, whether as necessary or
indispensable one.
Tiggangay v. W acas, AM OCA 09-3243, April 1, 2013
694 SCRA 264
Indeed, "there is no affinity between the blood relatives of one
spouse
and the blood relatives of the other. A husband is
related by affinity to his wifes brother, but not to the wife of
his wifes brother. There is no affinity between the husbands
brother and the wifes sister; this is called affinitas affinitatis."
CHAPTER 2. THE FAMILY HOME (Arts 152-162)

Taneo, Jr. vs. CA, CA, 304 SCRA 308

Family home is a real right, which is gratuitous, inalienable
and free
from attachment, constituted over the dwelling
place and the land on which it is situated, which confers upon
a particular family the right to enjoy such properties, which
must remain with the person constituting it and his heirs.
Taneo vs. Court of
09, 1999
304
SCRA 308

Appeals, G.R. NO. 108562, Mar.

By the very definition of the law that the family home is the
dwelling house where a person and his family resides and the
land on which it is situated, it is understood that the house
should be constructed on a land not belonging to another.

Arriola v. Arriola, G.R. NO. 177703, Jan. 28, 2008 542

SCRA 666
Furthermore, Articles 152 and 153 specifically extend the scope
of the family home not just to the dwelling structure in which
the family resides

but also to the lot on which it stands. Thus, applying these

concepts, the subject house as well as the specific portion of
the subject land on which it stands are deemed constituted
as a family home by the deceased and petitioner Vilma from
the moment they began occupying the same as a family
residence 20 years back
Modequillo vs. Breva, G.R. No. 86355, May 31, 1990.
There is no need to constitute the same judicially or
extrajudicially as required in the Civil Code. If the family
actually resides in the premises,
it is, therefore, a family
home as contemplated by law
Patricio vs. Dario, G.R. NO. 170829, November 20,
2006.
Three requisites must concur before a minor beneficiary is
entitled to the benefits of Art. 159: (1) the relationship
enumerated in Art. 154 of the Family Code; (2) they live in the
family home, and (3) they are dependent for legal support
upon the head of the family.
Cabang v. Basay, G.R. NO. 180587, Mar. 20, 2009 582
SCRA 172
The family home must be established on the properties of (a) the
absolute community, or (b) the conjugal partnership, or (c) the
exclusive property of either spouse with the consent of the
other. It cannot be established on property held in coownership with third persons. However, it can be established
partly on community property, or conjugal property and
partly on the exclusive property of either spouse with the
consent of the latter.
Olivia De Mesa v. Acero, G.R. NO. 185064 Jan. 16,
2012 663 SCRA 40
The family homes exemption from execution must be set up
and proved to the Sheriff before the sale of the property at
public auction. The petitioners now are barred from raising the
same. Failure to do so estop them from later claiming the said
exemption.
Manacop vs. CA, 277 SCRA 57 (1997)

Articles 152 and 153 of the Family Code do not have a

retroactive effect such that all existing family residences are
deemed to have been constituted as family homes at the time
of their occupation prior to the effectivity of the Family Code and
are exempt from execution for the payment of obligations
incurred before the effectivity of the Family Code.

TITLE VI. PATERNITY & FILIATION

Chapter I Legitimate
Children Types of Filiation
Status of Children
Distinction between Paternity and
Filiation Laws governing Paternity
and Filiation
Presumption of Legitimacy
How to impugn Childs Legitimacy

Benitez-Badua vs. CA G.R. NO. 105625, Jan. 24, 1994

229 SCRA 468
Article 170 of the Family Code is inapplicable to this case
because this is not an action to impugn the legitimacy of a
child, but an action of the private respondents to claim their
inheritance as legal heirs of their childless deceased aunt.
They do not claim that petitioner Violeta Cabatbat Lim is an
illegitimate child of the deceased, but that she is not the
decedent's child at all.
Liyao vs. Tanhoti-Liyao,G.R. NO. 138961, Mar. 07,
2002 378 SCRA
563
The grounds for impugning the legitimacy of the child
mentioned in Article 255 of the Civil Code may only be
invoked by the husband, or in proper cases, his heirs under
the conditions set forth under Article 262 of the Civil Code.
Labagla vs. Santiago, G.R. NO. 132305, Dec. 04, 2001
371 SCRA 360
A baptismal certificate, a private document, is not conclusive
proof of filiation. More so are the entries made in an income
5
0

tax return, which only shows that income tax has been paid
and the amount thereof.
Macadangdang vs. Court of Appeals, 100 SCRA 73
In this case the husband and the wife continued to live in the
same province after their alleged separation, the Court did not
discount the possibility of physical access to each other
considering their proximity to

5
0

each other and considering further that the wife still visited and
recuperated in her mothers house where her spouse resided
with their children.
Andal vs. Macaraig, 89 Phil 165
The court held that just because tuberculosis is advanced in a
man does not necessarily mean that he is incapable
of
sexual intercourse. There are cases where persons suffering
from tuberculosis can do the carnal act even in the most
crucial stage of health because then they seemed to be more
inclined to sexual intercourse.
Tison vs CA, 276 SCRA 582 (1997)
The issue of legitimacy cannot be attacked collaterally.
CHAPTER 2. PROOF OF FILIATION (Articles 172-174)
RODOLFO S. AGUILAR vs. EDNA G. SIASAT, G.R. No. 200169,
January 28, 2015, J.
Del Castillo
The filiation of illegitimate children, like legitimate children, is
established by (1) the record of birth appearing in the civil register or a
final judgment; or (2) an admission of legitimate filiation in a public
document or a private handwritten instrument and signed by the
parent concerned. In the absence thereof, filiation shall be proved by
(1) the open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate
child; or (2) any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special
laws. The due recognition of an illegitimate child in a record of birth, a
will, a statement before a court of record, or in any authentic writing is,
in itself, a consummated act of acknowledgment of the child, and no
further court action is required. In fact, any authentic writing is treated
not just a ground for compulsory recognition; it is in itself a voluntary
recognition that does not require a separate action for judicial
approval.
51

It must be concluded that Rodolfo who was born during the marriage
of Alfredo Aguilar and Candelaria Siasat-Aguilar and before their
respective deaths has sufficiently proved that he is the legitimate
issue of the Aguilar spouses. He correctly argues, Alfredo Aguilars
SSS satisfies the requirement for proof of filiation and relationship to
the Aguilar spouses under Article 172 of the Family Code; by itself, said
document constitutes an admission of legitimate filiation in a public
document or a private handwritten instrument and signed by the
parent concerned.

52

Solinap vs. Locsin Jr. G.R. NO. 146737 , Dec. 10,

2001 371 SCRA
711
Whether or not the certificate of live birth (Exhibit D) as
presented by the respondent, including the photograph showing
that he and his mother attended the deceased funeral, is
sufficient to proof filiation of the petitioner to the deceased. A
birth certificate offers only prima facie evidence of filiation
and may be refuted by contrary evidence.
Verceles v. Posada, G.R. NO.159785, Apr. 27, 2007
522 SCRA 518
The court held that the due recognition of an illegitimate child
in a record of birth, a will, a statement before a court of record,
or in any authentic writing is, in itself, a consummated act of
acknowledgement of the child, and no further court action is
required
De Asis vs CA, 303 SCRA 176
Paternity or filiation, or the lack of it, is a relationship that must
be judicially established and it is for the court to declare its
existence or absence.
Lucas v. Lucas, G.R. NO. 190710, Jun. 6, 2011 650
SCRA 667
Although a paternity action is civil, not criminal, the
constitutional prohibition against unreasonable searches and
seizures is still applicable, and a proper showing of sufficient
justification under the particular factual circumstances of the
case must be made before a court may order a compulsory
blood test.
Rodriguez vs. CA, G.R. NO. 85723, Jun. 19, 1995 245
SCRA 150
When a recognition has been made by one parent, the name of
the other parent may be revealed in an action by the child to
compel such other parent to recognize him also.
Heirs of Cabais vs. CA, G.R. NO. 106314-15,Oct. 08,
1999 316 SCRA 338
A baptismal certificate, a private document, which, being
hearsay, is not a conclusive proof of filiation.

Cenido vs. Apacionado,

1999 318 SCRA
688

G.R

.NO.

132474, Nov.

19,

Under the law, this statement must be made personally by the

parent himself or herself, not by any brother, sister or
relative; after all, the

concept of recognition speaks of a voluntary declaration by

the parent, or if the parent refuses, by judicial authority, to
establish the paternity or maternity of children born outside
wedlock.

Tayag v. Tayag-Gallor, G.R. NO. 174680, Mar. 24, 2008

549 SCRA 68
Petitioner, however, overlooks the
fact that
respondents
successional rights may be established not just by a judicial
action to compel recognition but also by proof that she had
been voluntarily acknowledged and recognized as an illegitimate
child. Respondent in this
case had not been given the
opportunity to present evidence to show whether she had been
voluntarily recognized and acknowledged by her deceased father
because of petitioners opposition to her petition and motion
for hearing on affirmative defenses.

Puno v. Puno Ent. Inc., G.R. NO. 177066, Sept. 11,

2009 599 SCRA
585
A certificate of live birth purportedly identifying the putative
father is not competent evidence of paternity when there is no
showing that the putative father had a hand in the preparation
of the certificate. The local civil registrar has no authority to
record the paternity of an illegitimate child on the information
of a third person.

Gotardo v. Buling, G.R. NO. 165166, Aug. 15, 2012

678 SCRA 436
We have held that such other proof of one's filiation may be a
"baptismal certificate, a judicial admission, a family bible in
which [his] name has been entered, common reputation
respecting his pediG.R.ee, admission by
silence,
the
testimonies of witnesses, and other kinds of proof
admissible under Rule 130 of the Rules of Court." In this case,
the respondent established a prima facie case that the
petitioner is the putative father of Gliffze through testimony
that she had been sexually involved only with one man, the
petitioner, at the time of her
conception.
Rodulfo

corroborated her testimony that the petitioner

respondent had intimate relationship.

and the

Lucas v. Lucas, G.R . NO. 190710, Jun. 6, 2011 650

SCRA 667
Although a paternity action is
constitutional prohibition against
and seizures
is still

civil, not criminal, the

unreasonable searches

applicable, and a proper showing of sufficient justification

under the particular factual circumstances of the case must
be made before a court may order a compulsory blood test.

CHAPTER 3. ILLEGITIM ATE CHILDREN (Articles 175-176)

Rights of Illegitimate Children
Tonog vs. CA, G.R. NO. 122906 , Feb. 07, 2002 376
SCRA 523
In the case at bar, bearing in mind that the welfare of the
said minor as the controlling factor, the appellate court did
not err in allowing her father to retain in the meantime
parental custody over her. Meanwhile, the child should not be
wrenched from her familiar surroundings, and thrust into a
strange environment away from the people and places to
which she had apparently formed an attachment.

Guy v. CA, G.R. NO. 163707, Sept. 15, 2006 502 SCRA
151
It is clear therefore that the resolution of the issue of
prescription depends on the type of evidence to be adduced by
private respondents in proving their filiation. However, it would
be impossible to determine the same in this case as there has
been no reception of evidence yet.

De La Cruz v. Gracia G.R. NO. 177728, Jul. 31, 2009

594 SCRA 648
Where the private handwritten instrument is the lone piece of
evidence submitted to prove filiation, there should be strict
compliance with the requirement that the same must be signed
by the acknowledging parent. Where the private handwritten
instrument is accompanied by other relevant and competent
evidence, it suffices that the claim of filiation therein be shown
to have been made and handwritten by the acknowledging
parent as it is merely corroborative of such other evidence.

Uy v. Chu, G.R. NO. 183965, Sept. 18, 2009 600 SCRA

806
It is settled, then, in law and jurisprudence, that the status
and filiation of a child cannot be compromised. Public policy
demands that there be no compromise on the status and
filiation of a child. Paternity and filiation or the lack of the
same, is a relationship that must be judicially

established, and it is for the Court to declare its existence or

absence. It cannot be left to the will or aG.R.eement of the
parties.

CHAPTER 4. LEGITIM ATED CHILDREN (Articles

177-182); See RA 9858
Legitimation
Concept and
Definition Who can
be Legitimated
Procedure and effects of Legitimation
Abadilla vs. Tabiliran, Jr. A.M NO. MTJ-92-716, Oct.
25, 1995 249 SCRA 447
Whether or not, a child born out of wedlock, by parents who
have a legal impediment to marry each other, can be
legitimated. As a lawyer and a judge, respondent ought to
know that, despite his subsequent marriage to Priscilla, these
three children cannot be legitimated nor in any way be
considered legitimate since at the time they were born, there
was an existing valid marriage between respondent and his
first wife, Teresita B. Tabiliran.
TITLE VII. ADOPTION

Domestic Adoption Act of 1988 (RA

8552) as amended by RA 9523
(March 2009)
A.M . NO. 02-6-02-SC - Re: Proposed Rule on Domestic
Adoption Inter country Adoption Act of 1995 (RA
8043)
Amended IRR
2004)

on Inter-Country Adoption (January

8,

Definition and concept of Adoption

Domestic Adoption and Inter country
Adoption Law governing Domestic
Adoption
Who are qualified to adopt and to be
Effects of Adoption
Rescission of
Adoption

adopted

Procedure under ICA and DAA

Republic vs. Vergara, G.R. NO. 95551, Mar. 20, 1997
270 SCRA 206
The law here does not provide for an alien who is married to a
former Filipino citizen seeking to adopt jointly with his or her
spouse a relative by consanguinity, as an exception to the
general rule that aliens may not adopt.
Rosalina Dye cannot, on her own, adopt her brother and
sister for the law mandates joint adoption by husband and
wife, subject to exceptions.

Republic vs. Miller, G.R. NO.125932, Apr. 21, 1999

306 5CRA 183
An alien qualified to adopt under the Child and Youth Welfare
Code, which was in force at the time of the filing of the petition,
acquired a vested right which could not be affected by the
subsequent enactment of a new law disqualifying him.
Republic vs. Toledano, G.R. NO.94147, Jun. 08, 1994
233 SCRA 9
The Family Code reiterated the rule by requiring that husband
and wife "must" jointly adopt, except in the cases mentioned
before. Under the said new law, joint adoption by husband
and wife is mandatory

Cang vs. CA, G.R. NO.105308, Sept. 25, 1998 296

SCRA 128
Physical estrangement alone, without financial and moral
desertion, is not tantamount to abandonment. While
admittedly, petitioner was physically absent as he was then
in the United States, he was not remiss in his natural and
legal obligations of love, care and support for his children.
In re: Adoption of Michelle & Michael
NO.168992-93, May 21, 2009 588 SCRA 98

Lim

G.R.

The filing of a case for dissolution of the marriage between

petitioner and Olario is of no moment. It is not equivalent to a

decree of dissolution of marriage. Until and unless there is a

judicial decree for the dissolution of the marriage between
petitioner and Olario, the marriage still subsists. That being
the case, joint adoption by the husband and the wife is
required.

Republic vs. CA & Bobiles, G.R. NO.92326, Jan. 24,

1992 205 SCRA
356
Under the Child and Youth Welfare Code, private respondent
had the right to file a petition for adoption by herself,
without joining her husband therein. When Mrs. Bobiles filed
her
petition,
she
was
exercising her explicit and
unconditional right under said law.
Lahom vs. Sibulo, G.R. NO. 143989, July 14, 2003
R.A. NO. 8552 has unqualifiedly withdrawn from an adopter
a consequential right to rescind the adoption decree even in
cases where the adoption might clearly turn out to be
undesirable.
TITLE VIII. SUPPORT
Concept of Support
G.R.ounds for Action for
Support Right to support
Order of liability for support
Contractual support vs Legal
Support
Mangonon v. CA, G.R. NO. 125041 , June.30, 2006 494
SCRA 1
The grandparents are liable to support their grandchildren if the
parent cannot give support or sufficient support.
Lim v. Lim, G.R. NO. 163209, Oct. 30, 2009 604 SCRA
691
The inability of the parents to sufficiently provide for their
children shifts a portion of their obligation to the ascendants in
the nearest degree, both in the paternal (petitioners) and
maternal lines, following the ordering in Article 199.
Gan vs. Reyes, G.R. NO.145527, May.28, 2002 382
SCRA 357
A judgment ordering for support is immediately executory
despite pendency of appeal.
De Asis vs. CA, G.R. NO.127578, Feb. 15, 1999 303
SCRA 176

Whether or not, a renunciation of the existence of filiation of

the child and the putative father, made by the mother, is
valid. It is true that in order to claim support, filiation and,or
paternity must first be shown between the claimant and the
parent, however, paternity and filiation or the lack of the
same is a relationship that must be judicially established and
it is for the court to declare its existence or absence.

TITLE IX. PARENTAL AUTHORITY

CHAPTER 1. GENERAL PROVISIONS (Articles 209-215)
Concept
Effects of Parental Authority
Santos Sr. v. CA, G.R. NO. 113054, Mar. 16, 1995 242
SCRA 407
When a parent entrusts the custody of a minor to another,
such as a friend or godfather, even in a document, what is
given is merely temporary custody and it does not constitute
a renunciation of parental authority. Even if a definite
renunciation is manifest, the law still disallows the same.
Parents who exercises Parental
Authority Joint Parental
Authority
Rule in case of Separation of Parents
Perez v. CA, G.R. NO. 118870, Mar. 29, 1996 255
SCRA 661
Only the most compelling of reasons shall justify the court's
awarding the custody of such a child to someone other than
his mother, such as her unfitness to exercise sole parental
authority. In the past the following grounds have been
considered ample justification to deprive a mother of custody
and parental authority: neglect, abandonment, unemployment
and immorality, habitual drunkenness, drug addiction,
maltreatment of the child, insanity and being sick with a
communicable disease.

Laxamana v. Laxamana, G.R. NO. 144763, Sept. 3,

2002 388 SCRA
296
It is clear that every child [has] rights which are not and
should not be dependent solely on the wishes, much less the
whims and caprices, of his parents. His welfare should not
be subject to the parents' say-so or mutual agreement alone.
Where, as in this case, the parents are already separated in
fact, the courts must step in to determine in whose custody

the child can better be assured the rights granted to him by

law. The need, therefore, to present evidence regarding this
matter, becomes imperative.
Beckett v. Sarmiento, Jr. AM NO. RTJ-12-2326, Jan.
30, 2013 689 SCRA 494
In a very real sense, then, a judgment involving the custody of
a minor child cannot be accorded the force and effect of
res judicata. Now to

another point. In disputes concerning post-separation custody

over a minor, the well-settled rule is that no child under seven
(7) years of age shall be separated from the mother, unless
the court finds compelling reasons to order otherwise.
CHAPTER
2.
SUBSTITUTE
AUTHORITY (Arts 216-219)

&

SPECIAL

PARENTAL

Parental Preference Rule

Concept
Who may exercise Substitute Parental
Authority Liability of persons exercising
special Parental Authority
St. Marys Academy v. Carpitanos, G.R. NO. 143363,
Feb. 6, 2002 376 SCRA 473
The liability for the accident, whether caused by the
negligence of the minor driver or mechanical detachment of
the steering wheel guide of the jeep, must be pinned on the
minors parents primarily. The negligence of petitioner St.
Marys Academy was only a remote cause of the accident.
CHAPTER 3. EFFECT OF PARENTAL AUTHORITY UPON
THE PERSONS OF THE CHILDREN
Right to Childs Custody
Sagala-Eslao vs. CA, 266 SCRA 317, 323 (1997).
It is a rule long accepted by the courts that the right of parents
to the custody of their minor children is one of the natural rights
incident to parenthood, a right supported by law and sound
public policy.
Cang vs. CA, 296 SCRA 128 (1998).
Parental authority cannot be entrusted to a person simply
because he could give the child a larger measure of material
comfort than his natural parent.

Duty to Provide Support

BBB, vs. AAA, G.R. No. 193225, February 09, 2015, J.

Reyes

It was improper for BBB, knowing that CCC was not his biological son,
to have CCC legitimated after the celebration of BBB and AAAs
marriage. The legal process of legitimation was trifled with when BBB
voluntarily but falsely acknowledged CCC as his son. The principle of
estoppel under Article 1431 thus applies, and it now bars BBB from
making an assertion contrary to his previous representations. He
should not be allowed to evade a responsibility arising from his own
misrepresentations.
He is bound by the effects of the legitimation process. CCC remains to
be BBBs son, and pursuant to Article 179 of the Family Code, the
former is entitled to the same rights as those of a legitimate child,
including the receipt of his fathers support.
Duty of Representation
Obedencio vs. Murillo, A.M. NO. RTJ-03-1753. Feb. 5,
2004 422 SCRA 21
Licel was only 14 years old, definitely a minor, on May 22,
2001, when she was presented before respondents sala to
affirm the execution of her affidavit of desistance. This being
the case, said affidavit should have been executed with the
concurrence of her parents. Licel could not validly give
consent to an affidavit of desistance, for
a
minor
is
incompetent to execute such an instrument.

Liability of Parents for

children

damages

caused

by their minor

CHAPTER 4. EFFECT OF PARENTAL AUTHORITY

UPON
THE PROPERTY OF THE CHILDREN
(Articles 225-227)

Lindain v. CA, G.R. NO. 95305 , Aug. 20, 199 212

SCRA 725
Under the law, a parent, acting merely as the legal (as
distinguished from judicial) administrator of the property of
his/her minor children, does not have the power to dispose of,
or alienate, the property of said children
without
judicial
approval.
6
0

Neri v. Heirs of
10, 2012 683
SCRA 253

Hadji

Yusop, G.R. No

194366, Oct.

Administration includes all acts for the preservation of the

property and the receipt of fruits according to the natural
purpose of the thing. Any act of disposition or alienation, or
any reduction in the substance of the patrimony of child,
exceeds the limits of administration. Thus, a father or

6
0

mother, as the natural guardian of the minor under parental

authority, does not have the power to dispose or encumber
the property of the latter
CHAPTER 5. SUSPENSION
OR
TERMINATION OF PARENTAL AUTHORITY
(Arts 228-233)
G.R.ounds for termination and suspension of parental
authority

Bondagjy vs. Bondagjy, G.R. NO. 140817, Dec. 07,

2001 371 SCRA
64
Indeed, what determines the fitness of any parent is the
ability to see to the physical, educational, social and moral
welfare of the children, and the ability to give them a healthy
environment as well as physical and financial support taking
into consideration the respective resources and social and
moral situations of the parents.
Cang vs CA,296 SCRA 128
In reference to abandonment of a child by his parent, the act
of abandonment imports any conduct of the parent which
evinces a settled purpose to forego all parental duties and
relinquish all parental claims to the child. It means neglect
or refusal to perform the natural and legal obligations of care
and support which parents owe their children.
Title X. EMANCIPATION AND AGE OF MAJORITY; See
RA 6809; 2176 & 2180 NCC
Concept
Effects of Emancipation
Title XI SUMMARY JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS IN THE FAM
ILY LAW

61

Family Courts Act and SC AM Orders and

Circulars CHAPTER 1. SCOPE OF
APPLICATION (Article 238)
CHAPTER 2. SEPARATION IN FACT BETWEEN HUSBAND
AND W IFE
(Articles 239-248)
See RA 9262 (Anti Violence against W omen and
Children [VAWC]) and Implementing Rules &
Regulations
CHAPTER
3.
INCIDENTS
AUTHORITY
(Articles 249-252)

INVOLVING

PARENTAL

62

See RA 9262 (Anti Violence against W omen and Children

[VAW C]) & IRR
A.M . NO. 02-11-12-SC- Re: Proposed
Provisional Orders (March 4, 2003)

Rule

on

A.M . NO. 03-02-05-SC- Re: Proposed

Guardianship of Minors (April 1, 2003)

Rule

on

A.M . NO. 03-04-SC- Re: Proposed Rule on Custody of

Minors and Writ of
Habeas Corpus in Relation to Custody of Minors (April
30, 2003)
CHAPTER 4. OTHER MATTERS SUBJECT TO SUMMARY
PROCEEDINGS (Article 253)

Uy (Jardeleza) vs. CA, G.R. NO. 109557, Nov. 29,

2000 346 SCRA
246
Rule 95 of the ROC, not the Rule on Summary Proceedings in
the Family Code, shall apply in a sale of a conjugal property
where one spouse is is an incompetent. A comatose spouse is
incompetent.

Republic v. Tango, G.R. NO.161062, Jul. 31, 2009 594

SCRA 560
By express provision of law, the judgment of the court in a
summary proceeding shall be immediately final and executory.
As a matter of course, it follows that no appeal can be had
of the trial courts judgment in a summary proceeding for the
declaration of presumptive death of an absent spouse under
Article 41 of the Family Code.

Rep. v. Bermudez-Lorino G.R. NO. 160258 , Jan. 19,

2005 449 SCRA
5
In Summary Judicial Proceedings under the Family Code, there is
no reglementary period within which to perfect an appeal,
precisely because judgments rendered thereunder, by express

provision of Section 247, Family Code, supra, are "immediately

final and executory". It was erroneous, therefore, on the part of
the RTC to give due course to the Republics appeal and order
the transmittal of the entire records of the case to the Court
of Appeals.

Title X. FUNERAL (Articles 305 -310,

NCC)

The petitioner alleges that being a common law spouse who took care
of the deceased, she has the right to make funeral arrangements for
the deceased. The Supreme Court ruled that the duty and the right to
make funeral arrangements are confined within the family of the
deceased particularly the spouse of the deceased to the exclusion of a
common law spouse. FE FLORO VALINO vs. ROSARIO D. ADRIANO,
FLORANTE D. ADRIANO, RUBEN D. ADRIANO, MARIA TERESA
ADRIANO ONGOCO, VICTORIA ADRIANO BAYONA, and LEAH
ANTONETTE D. ADRIANO, G.R. No. 182894, April 22, 2014, J.
Mendoza

Title XII. CARE AND EDUCATION OF CHILDREN

(Articles 356 363, NCC)
PD 603 The Child and Youth W elfare

Code

RA 9262 (Anti Violence against W omen and Children

[VAW C]) and IRR; RA 9523

Title XIII. USE OF SURNAMES (Articles 364-380, NCC)

RA

9255

An

Act

Allowing Illegitimate

Children
to Use

the Surname of their Father (Amending Art.

176 of the Family Code); IRR of 9255; Passport
Law (RA 8239) Title XIV. ABSENCE (Articles 381396, NCC);
See Article 41 FC;
Revised Rules of
Court;

Rules

(Section

4)

73, 74,107,

Arts.774 & 777; Art. 1456; Arts 22, 2142-2175; Wills &
Succession

Chapter 1. Provisional Measures in Case of

Absence Chapter 2. Declaration of Absence

Chapter 3. Administration of the Property of the

Absentee Chapter 4. Presumption of Death
Chapter 5. Effect of
Rights of
the
Absentee

Absence Upon the Contingent

TITLE XII FINAL PROVISIONS (Articles 254-257)

P ROP ERTY

Title I. CLASSIFICATION OF
PROPERTY PRELIM INARY
PROVISIONS

Concept of Property
Classification of Property
Immovable vs Movable
Properties
Laurel
2009

vs. Abrogar,

G.R. NO.

155076,

Jan.

13,

International telephone calls placed by Bay Super Orient Card

holders, the telecommunication services provided by PLDT
and its business of providing said services are not personal
properties under Article 308 of the Revised Penal Code. The
construction by the respondents of Article
308 of the said Code to include, within its coverage, the
aforesaid international telephone calls, telecommunication
services and business is contrary to the letter and intent of
the law.
The words "Personal property" under the Revised Penal Code
must be considered in tandem with the word "take" in the law.
The statutory definition of "taking" and movable property
indicates that, clearly, not all personal properties may be the
proper subjects of theft. The general rule is that, only
movable properties which have physical or material
existence and susceptible of occupation by another are
proper obje cts of theft.
Kinds of Immovable Properties

Bicerra vs. Teneza, 6 SCRA 649, 651 (1962).

A house (or a building) is classified as immovable property by
reason of its adherence to the soil on which it is built. Thus, a
building which is merely superimposed on the soil is not a
real property.
Punzalan, Jr. v. Vda. De Lacsamana, 121 SCRA 331
(1983)

A building treated separately from the land on which it stood

is immovable property and the mere fact that the parties to a
contract seem to have dealt with it separate and apart from
the land on which it stood in no wise changed its character
as immovable property.
Tsai vs. CA, 366 SCRA 324
In the instant case, the parties: (1) executed a contract styled
as Real Estate Mortgage and Chattel Mortgage, instead of
just Real Estate Mortgage if indeed their intention is to treat
all properties included therein as immovable, and (2) attached
to the said contract a separate LIST OF MACHINERIES &
EQUIPMENT. These facts, taken together, evince the
conclusion that the parties intention is to treat these units of
machinery as chattels.
Caltex

Phils.,

Inc.,

vs.

CBAA, May

31,

1982

SC held that the said equipment

and
machinery,
as
appurtenances to the gas station building or shed owned by
Caltex (as to which it is
subject to realty tax) and which
fixtures are necessary to the operation of the gas station, for
without them the gas station would be useless, and which
have been attached or affixed permanently to the gas station
site or embedded therein, are taxable improvements and
machinery within the meaning of the Assessment Law and the
Real Property Tax Code.
MERALCO vs.

CBAA,

May

31,

1982

While the two storage tanks are not embedded in the land, they
may, nevertheless, be considered as improvements on the land,
enhancing its utility and rendering it useful to the oil industry. It
is undeniable that the two tanks have been installed with some
deG.R.ee of permanence as receptacles for the considerable
quantities of oil needed by Meralco for its operations.
Rights as property
MBTC v. Alejo, 364 SCRA 812, 819 (2001)

A real estate mortgage is a real right and a real property by

itself.

Chapter 2 Movable
Property Concept

Kinds of Movable Property

Chapter 3 Property in Relation to the Person to
whom it belongs Public Dominion vs Private
Ownership
Classification of Property depending on
ownership Constitutional basis of State
Ownership Jura Regalia Chavez v. Public
Estates Authority, 415 SCRA 403 (2003)
Submerged lands are part of the States inalienable natural
resources and classified as property of public dominion.
Republic v.Santos, G.R. NO.
677 SCRA 144

180027,July

18, 2012

Jura Regalia simply means that the State is the original

proprietor of all lands and, as such, is the general source of
all private titles. Thus, pursuant to this principle, all claims of
private title to land, save those acquired from native title,
must be traced from some grant, whether express or implied,
from the State. Absent a clear showing that land had been let
into private ownership through the States imprimatur, such
land is presumed to belong to the State
Public ownership vs State
Ownership Public Service vs
Public Use
Villarico v. Sarmiento, 442 SCRA 110, 115
2004
Public use means use which is not confined to privileged
individuals, but is open to the indefinite public.

Characteristics of Properties of Public

Dominion Menchavez vs Teves, Jr, 449
SCRA 380
Properties of public dominion may not be alienated but may be
subject to
joint venture, or production-sharing agreements with private
individuals or corporations for their exploration, development
and utilization.
Dacanay vs Asistio,Jr 208 SCRA 404

Properties of public dominion is outside the commerce of mend

and it cannot be alienated or leased or otherwise be the subject
matter of contracts.
Manila Lodge 761 vs CA, 73 SCRA 162
An intention to devote it to public use or to public service is
sufficient and it is not necessary that it must actually be
used as such.
Republic vs CA, 132 SCRA 514
Properties of public dominion is not susceptible to private
appropriation
and cannot be acquired
by
acquisitive
prescription and thus they cannot be registered under the
Land Registration Law and be the subject of a torrents title.
Manila International Airport Authority vs CA, 495 SCRA
591
Properties of public dominion, being for public use, are not
subject to levy, encumbrance or disposition through public or
private sale. Any encumbrance, levy on execution or auction
sale of any property of public dominion is void for being
contrary to public policy.
Tufexis v. Olaguera 32 Phil. 654.
The usufruct of the public market was not subject
attachment on account of its being of a public character.

to

Kinds of Properties of Public

Dominion Santos vs Moreno, 21
SCRA 1141
Canals constructed by private persons within their private lands
and
devoted exclusively for private
use
are of private
ownership.
Almagro vs.
2010

Kwan, G.R. NO. 175806, Oct.

20,

To qualify as foreshore land, it must be shown that the land

lies between the high and low water marks and is alternately
wet and dry according to the flow of the tide. The land's
proximity to the waters alone does not automatically make it
a foreshore land.
Binalay v. Manalo, 195 SCRA 374, 384 (1991)

The buyer did not acquire private ownership of the bed of the
eastern branch of the Cagayan River even if it was included in
the deeds of absolute sale executed by the sellers since the
sellers could not have validly sold land that constituted
property of public dominion.
Hilario vs City of Manila, G.R. No. L-19570, April 27,
1967
The phrase banks of a river is understood to be those lateral
strips orzones of its beds which are washed by the stream only during such
highfloods as do not cause inundations. In other words, the banks
refer to the lateral lines or strips reached by the waters when
the river is at high tide.
Manila International Airport Authority vs. CA, 495 SCRA
591
No one can dispute that properties of public dominion
mentioned in Article 420 of the Civil Code, like roads, canals,
rivers, torrents, ports and bridges constructed by the State,
are owned by the State. The term ports includes seaports
and airports. The MIAA Airport Lands and Buildings constitute
a port constructed by the State.
Reclaimed Properties
Republic
vs.
Paraaque, G.R.
NO.
191109,July 18, 2012 677 SCRA 246
The subject reclaimed lands are still part of the public
domain, owned by the State and, therefore, exempt from
payment of real estate taxes. Here, the subject lands are
reclaimed lands, specifically portions of the foreshore and
offshore areas of Manila Bay. As such, these lands remain
public lands and form part of the public domain.

Patrimonial Property of the State

Conversion of Property of Public Dominion to

Patrimonial Property Yu

Chang v. Republic, G.R. NO.

171726. Feb. 23, 2011

The classification of land is descriptive of its legal nature or
status and
does not have to be descriptive of what the land actually
looks like. The fact that the area within which the subject parcels
of land are located is being used for residential and commercial
purposes does not serve to convert the subject parcels of
land into aG.R.icultural land. It is

fundamental that before any land may be declassified from

the forest G.R.oup and converted into alienable or disposable
land for aG.R.icultural or other purposes, there must be a
positive act from the government.
Laurel v. Garcia,187 SCRA 797
Any conveyance of a real property
falling
under the
patrimonial property
of the State must be authorized and
approved by a law enacted by the Congress.
Property for public use of Provinces, Cities, and
Municipalities Patrimonial Property of Political
Subdivision
Title II Ownership
Ownership in General
DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, represented by its REGIONAL
DIRECTOR TERESITA DOMALANTA vs. MARIANO TULIAO, G.R.
No. 205664, June 9, 2014, J.
Mendoza
In actions for recovery of possession, the plaintiff must show proof to
support his claim of his right to possession of the property. The
defendant in turn must show proof to controvert the plaintiffs claim;
otherwise the court will rule for the plaintiff. Thus, when a landowner
filed an action for recovery of possession against a public school which
built a gymnasium on a parcel of land which the owner allowed the
school to use as an access road for the schoolchildren, and the plaintiff
showed as evidence tax declarations and a certificate of title over the
property, the lone testimonial evidence the DepEd presented is not
sufficient to controvert the landowners case. In addition, the
landowners claim is not barred by laches when the schools possession
of the property is not adverse, and when the landowner brought suit
two years after he learned that the school is constructing a gymnasium
over the property.

HEIRS OF PACIANO YABAO, represented by REMEDIOS CHAN vs.

PAZ LENTEJAS VAN DER KOLK, G.R. No. 207266, June 25, 2014, J.
Mendoza
A tax declaration is not a proof of ownership; it is not a conclusive
evidence of ownership of real property. In the absence of actual,
public, and adverse possession, the declaration of the land for tax
purposes does not prove ownership.

MIDWAY
MARITIME
AND
TECHNOLOGICAL
FOUNDATION,
represented by its
Chairman/President PhD in Education DR. SABINO M.
MANGLICMOT vs. MARISSA E. CASTRO, ET AL., G.R. No.
189061, August 6, 2014, J. Reyes
The petitioner is a lessee of a parcel of land and disputes the title of the
owners of the building built on the land they are leasing. The Supreme
Court ruled that it is settled that "[o]nce a contact of lease is shown to
exist between the parties, the lessee cannot by any proof, however
strong, overturn the conclusive presumption that the lessor has a valid
title to or a better right of possession to the subject premises than the
lessee." Section 2(b), Rule 131 of the Rules of Court prohibits a tenant
from denying the title of his landlord at the time of the commencement
of the relation of landlord and tenant between them.
SUBIC BAY LEGEND RESORTS AND CASINOS, INC VS. BERNARD
C.
FERNANDEZ, G.R. No. 193426, September 29, 2014, J. Del
Castillo
Though casino chips do not constitute legal tender, there is no law
which prohibits their use or trade outside of the casino which issues
them. In any case, it is not unusual nor is it unlikely that respondent
could be paid by his Chinese client at the former' s car shop with the
casino chips in question; said transaction, if not common, is
nonetheless not unlawful. These chips are paid for anyway; petitioner
would not have parted with the same if their corresponding
representative equivalent - in legal tender, goodwill, or otherwise was
not received by it in return or exchange. Given this premise - that
casino chips are considered to have been exchanged with their
corresponding representative value - it is with more reason that this
Court should require petitioner to prove convincingly and persuasively
that the chips it confiscated from Ludwin and Deoven were indeed
stolen from it; if so, any Tom, Dick or Harry in possession of genuine
casino chips is presumed to have paid for their representative value in
exchange therefor. If petitioner cannot prove its loss, then Article 559
cannot apply; the presumption that the chips were exchanged for value
remains..

ROLANDO S. ABADILLA, JR. vs. SPOUSES BONIFACIO P.

OBRERO and BERNABELA N. OBRERO, G.R. No. 199448,
November 12, 2014, J. Reyes
7
0

The petitioner claims that they are the rightful owners of the disputed
property. Thus, an ejectment proceeding cannot be commenced
against them. The Supreme Court ruled that "ejectment proceedings
are summary proceedings intended to provide an expeditious means of
protecting actual possession or right to possession of property. Title is
not involved. The sole issue to be resolved is who is entitled to the
physical or material possession of the premises or possession de
facto." "Issues as to the right of possession or ownership are not
involved in the action; evidence

7
0

thereon is not admissible, except only for the purpose of determining

the issue of possession."
Concept of Ownership
Attributes of Ownership
Recovery of Property
Accion Reinvindicatoria; Ejectment
THE HEIRS OF EUGENIO LOPEZ, SR. NAMELY, OSCAR M. LOPEZ,
MANUEL M. LOPEZ AND PRESENTACION L. PSINAKIS, vs. THE
HONORABLE FRANCISCO QUERUBIN, IN HIS CAPACITY AS PRESIDING
JUDGE OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF ANTIPOLO, BRANCH 74, THE
HEIRS OF ALFONSO SANDOVAL AND HIS WIFE ROSA RUIZ,
REPRESENTED BY THEIR ATTORNEY-IN-FACT, MRS. IMELDA RIVERA,
G.R. No. 155405/HEIRS OF EUGENIO LOPEZ, vs. ALFONSO SANDOVAL AND
ROMAN OZAETA, JR., G.R. No. 164092, MARCH 18, 2015, J. Leonardo-de
Castro
One who claims to be the owner of a property that is possessed by
another must bring the appropriate judicial action for its physical
recovery. The term "judicial process" could mean no less than an
ejectment suit or reinvindicatory action in which the ownership claims
of the contending parties may be properly heard and adjudicated.
Del Fierro v. Seguiran G.R. NO. 152141,Aug. 8, 2011
The first requisite in an accion reinvindicatoria requires that
the person who claims that he has a better right to the
property must first fix the identity of the land he is claiming by
describing the location, area and boundaries thereof. Anent the
second requisite, i.e., the claimant's title over the disputed
area, the rule is that a party can claim a right of ownership only
over the parcel of land that was the object of the deed.
Del
Rosario
v. Roxas
Foundation,
G.
R.
NO. 170575,June 2011
8,
In forcible entry, the possession is illegal from the beginning and
the only issue is who has the prior possession de facto. In
unlawful detainer, possession was originally lawful but became
unlawful by the expiration or termination of the right to
possess and the issue of rightful possession is the
one
71

decisive, for in
in

such

action, the

defendant is the

party

72

actual possession and the plaintiff's cause

termination
of the
defendant's
right
possession.

of action is the
to
continue
in

Jose v. Alfuerto, G.R. No 169380, Nov. 26, 2012

Acts merely tolerated are "those which by reason of
neighborliness or familiarity, the owner of property allows his
neighbor or another person to do on the property; they are
generally those particular services or
benefits which ones
property can give to another without material injury or
prejudice to the owner, who permits them out of friendship
or courtesy.
Barrientos v.Rapal, G.R. NO. 169594,July

20, 2011

A person who occupies the land of another at the latter's

tolerance or permission, without any contract between them,
is necessarily bound by an implied promise that he will vacate
the same upon demand, failing which a summary action for
ejectment is the proper remedy against them.
Doctrine of Self Help
German Management & Services, Inc. v. CA. 177 SCRA
495 (1989)
The doctrine of self-help can only be exercised at the time of
actual or threatened dispossession, and not when possession
has already been lost.
Right to Enclose or
Fence Limitations on
Ownership
Right to sub-surface and airspace
Republic of the
SCRA 228

Philippines v. Court of

Appeals,

160

Rights to the sub-surface or sub-soil are indivisible, and,

consequently,
require
a
definitive
and
categorical
classification.
National Power Corporation v. Ibrahim,
(2007)

526 SCRA 149

The landowners right extends to such height or depth where

it is possible for them to obtain some benefit or enjoyment,
and it is extinguished beyond such limit as there would be no
more interest protected by law. In this case, the landowners
could have dug upon their

property motorized deep wells but were prevented from doing

so by the authorities precisely because of the construction
and existence of the tunnels underneath the surface of their
property.

Right to Hidden Treasure

Palero-Tan v. Urdaneta AM NO. P-07-2399, Jun. 18,
2008 - When a person who finds a thing that has been lost or
mislaid by the owner takes the thing into his hands, he
acquires physical
custody
only
and does not become
vested with legal possession. In assuming such custody, the
finder is charged with the obligation of restoring the thing to
its owner. It is thus respondents duty to report to his superior
or his officemates that he found something.
Right to Airspace
Chapter 2 Right of
Accession General Provision
Accession
VILLASI VS. GARCIA, G.R. No. 190106, January 15, 2014, J. Perez
While it is a hornbook doctrine that the accessory follows the principal,
that is, the ownership of the property gives the right by accession to
everything which is produced thereby, or which is incorporated or
attached thereto, either naturally or artificially, such rule is not without
exception. In cases where there is a clear and convincing evidence to
prove that the principal and the accessory are not owned by one and
the same person or entity, the presumption shall not be applied and
the actual ownership shall be upheld. To set the record straight, while
petitioner may have proven his ownership of the land, as there can be
no other piece of evidence more worthy of credence than a Torrens
certificate of title, he failed to present any evidence to substantiate his
claim of ownership or right to the possession of the building.
The rule on accession is not an iron-clad dictum. On instances where
this Court was confronted with cases requiring judicial determination of

the ownership of the building separate from the lot, it never hesitated
to disregard such rule. The case at bar is of similar import. When there
are factual and evidentiary evidence to prove that the building and the
lot on which it stands are owned by different persons, they shall be
treated separately. As such, the building or the lot, as the case may
be, can be made liable to answer for the obligation of its respective
owner.

BANK OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS vs. VICENTE VICTOR C.

SANCHEZ ET AL.; GENEROSO TULAGAN ET AL. vs. VICENTE
VICTOR C. SANCHEZ ET AL.; REYNALDO V. MANIWANG vs.
VICENTE VICTOR C. SANCHEZ and FELISA GARCIA YAP, G.R.
No. 179518; G.R. No. 179835; G.R. No. 179954, November 19,
2014, J. Velasco Jr.
Article 453 of the Civil Code clearly reads that a landowner is
considered in bad faith if he does not oppose the unauthorized
construction thereon despite knowledge of the same. The fact that the
Sanchezes did take action to oppose the construction on their property
by writing the HLURB and the City Building Official of Quezon City. The
Court agrees with both the RTC and the CA that Garcia and TSEI are
builders in bad faith. They knew for a fact that the property still
belonged to the Sanchezes and yet proceeded to build the townhouses
not just without the authority of the landowners, but also against their
will.
Prevailing jurisprudence reveals the following established
rules:
1.Well settled is the rule that all persons dealing with property covered
by a torrens certificate of title are not required to go beyond what
appears on the face of the title. When there is nothing on the certificate
of title to indicate any cloud or vice in the ownership of the property, or
any encumbrance thereon, the purchaser is not required to explore
further than what the torrens title upon its face indicates in quest for
any hidden defect or inchoate right that may subsequently defeat his
right thereto.
2.This rule, however, admits of an exception as where the purchaser or
mortgagee has knowledge of a defect or lack of title in the vendor, or
that he was aware ofsufficient facts to induce a reasonably prudent
man to inquire into the status of the property in litigation.
3.Likewise, one who buys property withfull knowledge of the flaws and
defects in the title of the vendor is enough proof of his bad faith and
estopped from claiming that he acquired the property in good faith
against the owners.

4.To prove good faith, the following conditions must be present: (a) the
seller is the registered owner of the land; (b) the owner is in possession
thereof; and (3) at the time of the sale, the buyer was not aware of any
claim or interest of some other person in the property, or of any defect

or restriction in the titleof the seller or in his capacity to convey title to

the property. All these conditions must be present, otherwise, the
buyer is under obligation to exercise extra ordinary diligence by
scrutinizing the certificates of title and examining all factual
circumstances to enable him to ascertain the sellers title and capacity
to transfer any interest in the property.

Definition
Kinds of Accession
Right of Accession with respect to what is produced
by property Accession Discreta
Kinds of Fruits
Right of Accession with respect to
immovable property Accession Continua
Fundamental
rules Industrial
Accession
Building, Planting, and Sowing (BPS)
Rules in BPS in the presence of good faith and
bad faith Concept of Good Faith
Rules governing BPS
Floreza v. Evangelista, 96 SCRA 130
The rule under article 448 of the NCC applies only when the
builder, planter or sower believes he had the right so to build,
plant or sow because he thinks he owns the land or believes
himself to have a claim of title.
Mercado v. CA, 162 SCRA 75, 85 1988
To be deemed a builder in good faith, it is essential that a
person asserts title to the land on which he builds, i.e., it is
essential that he be a possessor in concept of owner and that
he be unaware that there exists in his title or mode of
acquisition any flaw which invalidates it.
Bulacanag v. Francisco, 122 SCRA 498, 502 (1983)

Article 448 applies only to a case where one builds on land in

the belief that he is the owner thereof and it does not apply
where ones only interest in the land is that of a lessee
under a rental
contract.

PNB vs De Jesus, 411 SCRA

557

The landowner cannot refuse to exercise either option and

compel instead the owner of the building or improvement to
remove it from the land.
Javier v. Concepcion, Jr 94 SCRA 212 (1979)
The value of the useful improvements consisting of various
fruits, bamboos, a house and camarin made of strong
materials based on the market value of the said
improvements.
Nuguid v. CA, 452 SCRA 243, 252 (2005)
The right of retention is considered as one of the measures
devised by the law for the protection of builders in good faith.
Its object is to guarantee full and prompt reimbursement as it
permits the actual possessor to remain in possession while he
has not been reimbursed (by the person who defeated him in
the case for possession of the property) for those necessary
expenses and useful improvements made by him on the
things possessed.
Ballatan v. Court of Appeals 304 SCRA 37 (1999)- In the
event the landowner elects to sell the land to the builder in
good faith, the price must be fixed at the prevailing market
value at the time of payment. In the event of the failure of
the builder to pay the land, after the owner thereof has
chosen this alternative, the builders right of retention
provided in Article 546 is also lost.
Natural Accession
Kinds of Natural
Accession Alluvion
Rules governing Alluvion

Heirs of Emiliano Navarro v. IAC, 268 SCRA 74, 85

(1997)
Riparian owners are, strictly speaking, distinct from owners, the
latter being owners of lands bordering the shore of the sea or
lakes or other tidal waters.
Vda. de Nazareno v. CA, 257 SCRA 598 (1996)

Since the subject land was the direct result of the dumping
of sawdust by the Sun Valley Lumber Co., the accretion was
man-made, hence, Art. 457 does not apply. Ergo, the subject
land is part of the public domain.
Roxas v. Tuason, 9 Phil. 408.
The right of the owners of the bank adjacent to rivers to the
accretion which they receive by virtue of the action of the
waters of the river is ipso jure and there is no need of an
action of the owner of the bank to possess the new addition
since it belongs to him by the very fact of the addition.
Cureg v. IAC, 177 SCRA 313 (1989)
The accretion to registered land does not preclude
acquisition of the additional area by another person through
prescription.
Avulsion
Definition
Avulsion vs Alluvion
Rules Governing
Avulsion Change of
course of River
Agne v. Director of Lands, 181 SCRA 793, 805 (1990)
There need be no act on their part to subject the old river bed
to their ownership, as it is subject thereto ipso jure from the
moment the mode of acquisition becomes evident, without
need of any formal act of acquisition. Such abandoned
riverbed had fallen to the private ownership of the owner of
the land through which the new river bed passes even
without any formal act of his will and any unauthorized
occupant thereof will be considered as a trespasser.

Formation of Island
Right of Accession with respect to Movable
Property Adjunction or Conjunction
Rules governing Adjunction or
Conjunction Presence and absence
of badfaith

Commixtion or
Confusion
Specification
Chapter 3 Quieting of
Title Action to Quiet
Title
HEIRS OF PACIFICO POCIDO, ET AL. VS. ARSENIA AVILA AND
EMELINDA CHUA G.R. No.
199146, March 19, 2014, J. Carpio

The DENR Decision was affirmed by the Office of the President which
held that lands within the Baguio Townsite Reservation belong to the
public domain and are no longer registrable under the Land
Registration Act. The Office of the President ordered the disposition of
the disputed property in accordance with the applicable rules of
procedure for the disposition of alienable public lands within the Baguio
Townsite Reservation, particularly Chapter X of Commonwealth Act No.
141 on Townsite Reservations and other applicable rules. Having
established that the disputed property is public land, the trial court was
therefore correct in dismissing the complaint to quiet title for lack of
jurisdiction. The trial court had no jurisdiction to determine who among
the parties have better right over the disputed property which is
admittedly still part of the public domain.

For an action to quiet title to prosper, two indispensable requisites

must concur, namely: (1) the plaintiff or complainant has a legal or
equitable title to or interest in the real property subject of the action;
and (2) the deed, claim, encumbrance, or proceeding claimed to be
casting cloud on the title must be shown to be in fact invalid or
inoperative despite its prima facie appearance of validity or efficacy.
The first requisite was not complied with. Petitioners alleged open,

continuous, exclusive, and uninterrupted possession of the subject

property is belied by the fact that respondents, in 2005, entered into a
Contract of Lease with the Avico Lending Investor Co. over the subject
lot without any objection from the petitioners.
Petitioners inability to offer evidence tending to prove that
Bienvenido and Escolastica Ibarra transferred the ownership
over the property in favor of petitioners is likewise fatal to the
latters claim.
JUANARIO G. CAMPIT v ISIDRA B. GRIP A, PEDRO BARDIAGA,
and SEVERINO
BARDIAGA, represented by his son ROLANDO BARDIAGA, G.R
No. 195443, September 17, 2014. J. BRION

Considering that the action for annulment and cancellation of title filed
by the respondents is substantially in the nature of an action for
reconveyance based on an implied or constructive trust, combined
with the fact that the respondents have always been in possession of
the subject property, the Court treated Civil Case No.
18421 as an action to quiet title, the filing of which does not prescribe.
Requisites
HERMINIO M. DE GUZMAN, FOR HIMSELF AND AS ATTORNEY-INFACT
OF:
NILO M. DE GUZMAN, ANGELINO DE GUZMAN,
JOSEFINO M. DE GUZMAN, ESTRELLA M. DE GUZMAN, TERESITA
DE GUZMAN, ELSA MARGARITA M. DE GUZMAN, EVELYN M. DE
GUZMAN, MA. NIMIA M. DE GUZMAN, ANTOLIN M. DE GUZMAN,
AND
FERDINAND
M.
DE
GUZMAN
vs.
TABANGAO
REALTY
INCORPORATED, G.R. No. 154262, February 11, 2015, J.
Leonardo-De Castro
The petitioners allege that they are the owners of the disputed
property. This allegation is anchored on the assertion that at the time of
the death of their parents, the disputed property is still under the
latters name. The Supreme Court ruled that for an action to quiet title
to prosper, two indispensable requisites must concur: (1) the plaintiff or
complainant has a legal or equitable title or interest in the real property
subject of the action; and (2) the deed, claim, encumbrance, or
proceeding claimed to be casting a cloud on his title must be shown to
be in fact invalid or inoperative despite its prima facie appearance of
validity or legal efficacy. Petitioners Complaint in Civil Case No. TM1118 failed to allege these two requisites for an action to quiet title.
CLT REALTY DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION vs. PHIL-VILLE
DEVELOPMENT AND HOUSING CORPORATION, REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES (THROUGH THE OFFICE OF THE SOLICITOR
GENERAL) AND THE REGISTER OF DEEDS OF METRO MANILA
DISTRICT III, CALOOCAN, G.R. No. 160728, March 11, 2015, J.
Leonardo-De Castro
Thus, both requisites in order for an action for quieting of title to
prosper have been met in this case: (1) Phil-Ville had established its
equitable title or interest in the 16 parcels of land subject of the action;
and (2) TCT No. T-177013, found to overlap titles to said properties of
Phil-Ville, was previously declared invalid.

Chung
2012

Jr.

vs.

Mondragon, G.R.

179754,Nov.

21,

The issues in a case for quieting of title are fairly simple; the
plaintiff need to prove only two things, namely: "(1) the
plaintiff or complainant has a legal or an equitable title to or
interest in the real property subject of the action; and (2) that
the deed, claim, encumbrance or proceeding claimed to be
casting a cloud on his title must be shown to be in fact

invalid or inoperative despite its prima facie appearance of

validity or legal efficacy. Stated differently, the plaintiff must
show that he has a legal or at least an equitable title over
the real property in dispute, and that some deed or
proceeding beclouds its validity or efficacy."
Bahais v.

Pascual, G.R. 169272,July

11,

2012

Under Articles 476 and 477 of the Civil Code, the two (2)
indispensable requisites in an action to quiet title are: (1)
that the plaintiff or complainant has a legal or an equitable
title to or interest in the real property subject of the action;
and (2) that a deed, claim, encumbrance or proceeding is
claimed to be casting cloud on his title.
In this case, an action to quiet title is not the proper remedy
because petitioner no longer had any legal or equitable title to
or interest in the lots. The petitioners status as possessor and
owner of the lots had been settled in the final and executory
December 4, 1985 decision of the Bureau of Lands that the
DENR Secretary and the OP affirmed on appeal. Thus, the
petitioner is not entitled to the possession and ownership of
the lots.

Vda.de Aviles v. CA, 264 SCRA 473

An action for quieting of title may not be brought for the
purpose of settling a boundary dispute.

Title III- Co-ownership

Definition
Requisites
Nature of Co-ownership

8
0

LOURDES C. FERNANDEZ v NORMA VILLEGAS and any person

acting in her behalf including her family, G.R No. 200191,
August 20, 2014. J. PERLAS- BERNABE
Article 487 of the Civil Code explicitly provides that any of the coowners may bring an action for ejectment, without the necessity of
joining all the other co-owners as co-plaintiffs because the suit is
deemed to be instituted for the benefit of all. To reiterate, both
Lourdes and Cecilia are co-plaintiffs in the ejectment suit. Thus, they
share a commonality of interest and cause of action as against
respondents. Hence,

8
0

the lone signature of Lourdes on the verification attached to the

CA petition constituted substantial compliance with the rules.
EXTRAORDINARY DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION vs. HERMINIA
F. SAMSON- BICO and ELY B. FLESTADO, G.R. No. 191090,
October 13, 2014, J. Perez
A co-owner cannot rightfully dispose of a particular portion of a coowned property prior to partition among all the co-owners. However,
this should not signify that the vendee does not acquire anything at all
in case a physically segregated area of the co-owned lot is in fact sold
to him. Since the co-owner/vendors undivided interest could properly
be the object of the contract of sale between the parties, what the
vendee obtains by virtue of such a sale are the same rights as the
vendor had as co - owner, in an ideal share equivalent to the
consideration given under their transaction. In other words, the
vendee steps into the shoes of the vendor as co - owner and acquires
a proportionate abstract share in the property held in common.
VICENTE TORRES, JR., CARLOS VELEZ, AND THE HEIRS OF
MARIANO VELEZ, NAMELY: ANITA CHIONG VELEZ, ROBERT
OSCAR CHIONG VELEZ, SARAH JEAN CHIONG VELEZ AND TED
CHIONG VELEZ vs. LORENZO LAPINID AND JESUS VELEZ, G.R.
No. 187987, November 26, 2014, J. Perez
Under Article 493 of the New Civil Code, a co-owner has an absolute
ownership of his undivided and pro-indiviso share in the co-owned
property. He has the right to alienate, assign and mortgage it, even to
the extent of substituting a third person in its enjoyment provided that
no personal rights will be affected. In this case, Jesus can validly
alienate his co-owned property in favor of Lapinid, free from any
opposition from the co-owners. Lapinid, as a transferee, validly
obtained the same rights of Jesus from the date of the execution of a
valid sale. Absent any proof that the sale was not perfected, the
validity of sale subsists. In essence, Lapinid steps into the shoes of
Jesus as co-owner of an ideal and proportionate share in the property
held in common. Thus, from the perfection of contract on 9 November
1997, Lapinid eventually became a co-owner of the property. Even
assuming that the petitioners are correct in their allegation that the
disposition in favor of Lapinid before partition was a concrete or
definite portion, the validity of sale still prevails.
Alejandrino v. Court of Appeals, 295 SCRA 536, 548,
Sept. 17, 1998
81

Each co-owner of property which is held pro indiviso exercises his

rights over the whole property and may use and enjoy the same
with no other limitation than that he shall not injure the
interests of his co-owners.
Sources

of

Co-

ownership Rules
Governing Co-ownership

82

A stipulation in a contract requiring a co-owner to secure an authority

from his co- owners for the alienation of his share, as seemingly
indicated in this case, should be considered mere surplusage and does
not, in any way, affect the validity or the enforceability of the contract.
Pursuant to Article 493, a co-owner has the right to alienate his
proindiviso share in the co-owned property even without the consent
of his co-owners.
REYNALDO DELA ROSA, Namely: TEOFISTA DELA ROSA,
JOSEPHINE SANTIAGO AND JOSEPH DELA ROSA v MARIO A. BA
TONGBACAL, IRENEO BATONGBACAL, JOCELYN BA TONGBACAL,
NESTOR BATONGBACAL AND LOURDES BA TONGBACAL, G.R No.
179205, July 30, 2014 J. PEREZ
A contract of sale is a consensual contract, which becomes valid and
binding upon the meeting of minds of the parties on the price and the
object of the sale. The mere inadequacy of the price docs not affect its
validity when both parties are in a position to form an independent
judgment concerning the transaction, unless fraud, mistake or undue
influence indicative of a defect in consent is present. A contract may
consequently be annulled on the ground of vitiated consent and not
due to the inadequacy of the price. In the case at bar, however, no
evidence to prove fraud, mistake or undue influence indicative of
vitiated consent is attendant.
RAUL V. ARAMBULO AND TERESITA DELA CRUZ VS. GENARO
NOLASCO AND JEREMY SPENCER NOLASCO, G.R. No. 189420
March 26, 2014, J. Perez

The issue in this case is whether respondents, as coowners, can be

compelled by the court to give their consent to the sale of their shares
in the coowned properties. The ultimate authorities in civil law,
recognized as such by the Court, agree that co owners such as
respondents have over their part, the right of full and absolute
ownership. Such right is the same as that of individual owners which is
not diminished by the fact that the entire property is coowned with
others. That part which ideally belongs to them, or their mental
portion, may be disposed of as they please, independent of the
decision of their coowners. Therefore the respondents cannot be
ordered to sell their portion of the coowned properties.

De Guia v. CA, 413 SCRA 114, 124 (2003).

A co-owner of an undivided thing or right is an owner of the

whole and over the whole he exercises the right of
dominion.
Bailon-Casilao v. CA, 160 SCRA 738, 745, April 15,
1988
The appropriate recourse of co-owners in cases where their
consent were not secured in a sale of the entire property as well
as in a sale merely of the undivided shares of some of the coowners is an action for partition under Rule 69 of the Revised
Rules of Court.

Gapacan v. Omipet, 387 SCRA 383.

A state of co-ownership exists only because there is unity of
the object or property and plurality of subjects.

Extinguishment of Co-ownership
VILMA QUINTOS, represented by her Attorney-in-Fact FIDEL I.
QUINTOS, JR.; FLORENCIA I. DANCEL, represented by her
Attorney-in-Fact FLOVY I. DANCEL; and CATALINO L. IBARRA v
PELAGIA I. NICOLAS, NOLI L. IBARRA, SANTIAGO L. IBARRA,
PEDRO L. IBARRA, DAVID L. IBARRA, GILBERTO L. IBARRA,
HEIRS OF AUGUSTO L. IBARRA, namely CONCHITA R., IBARRA,
APOLONIO IBARRA, and NARCISO IBARRA, and the spouses
RECTO CANDELARIO and ROSEMARIE CANDELARIO. G.R No.
210252, June 16, 2014. J. VELASCO, JR.
A partition case of a land co-owned by ten siblings was dismissed for
the failure of the parties and counsels to appear despite due notice
under Rule 17, Section 3 of the Rules of Court. Later, in a quieting of
title case involving the same property, the siblings demanded partition.
The occupant of the lot claimed that the action for partition is barred
by res judicata.
It is indeed true that dismissal with prejudice under the above-cited
rule amply satisfies one of the elements of res judicata. However,
dismissal with prejudice under Rule 17, Sec. 3 of the Rules of Court
cannot defeat the right of a co-owner to ask for partition at any time,
provided that there is no actual adjudication of ownership of shares
yet.
A perusal of Article 494 of the Civil Code shows that the law generally
does not favor the retention of co-ownership as a property relation,
and is interested instead in ascertaining the co-owners specific shares
so as to prevent the allocation of portions to remain perpetually in
limbo. Thus, the law provides that each co-owner may demand at any
time the partition of the thing owned in common.
Between dismissal with prejudice under Rule 17, Sec. 3 and the right
granted to co - owners under Art. 494 of the Civil Code, the latter must
prevail. To construe otherwise would diminish the substantive right of a
co-owner through the promulgation of procedural rules. Such a
construction is not sanctioned by the principle, which is too well

settled to require citation, that a substantive law cannot be amended

by a procedural rule. This is supported by Art. 496 of the New Civil
Code.
Thus SC held that Art. 494is an exception to Rule 17, Sec. 3 of the
Rules of Court to the effect that even if the order of dismissal for
failure to prosecute is silent on

whether or not it is with prejudice, it shall be deemed to be without

prejudice.
This is not to say, however, that the action for partition will never be
barred by res judicata. There can still be res judicata in partition cases
concerning the same parties and the same subject matter once the
respective shares of the co-owners have been determined with finality
by a competent court with jurisdiction or if the court determines that
partition is improper for co-ownership does not or no longer exists.
Adille v. Court of Appeals, 157 SCRA 455, Jan. 29,
1988.
The rule in this jurisdiction is that the redemption by one coheir or co- owner of the property in its totality does not vest in
him ownership over it since redemption is not a mode of
terminating a co-ownership.

Sanchez v. Court of Appeals, 404 SCRA 541, 548, June

20, 2003
Co-ownership is a form of trust and every co-owner is a
trustee for the others, hence, the relationship of such coowner to the other co-owners is fiduciary in character and
attribute.
Pangan v. Court of Appeals, 166 SCRA 375, 382, Oct.
17, 1988
If the co-owner actually holding the property asserts exclusive
dominion over it against the other co-owners, the corollary of
the rule is that he can acquire sole title to it after the lapse of
the prescribed prescriptive period.
Heirs of Flores Restar v. Heirs of Dolores R. Cichon 475
SCRA 731, Nov. 22, 2005
While the action to demand partition of a co-owned property
does not prescribe, a co-owner may acquire ownership thereof
by prescription where there exists a clear repudiation of the coownership, and the co- owners are apprised of the claim of
adverse and exclusive ownership.

Delima v. Court of Appeals, 201 SCRA 641, Sept. 24,

1991
From the moment one of the co-owners claims that he is the
absolute and exclusive owner of the properties and denies the
others any share therein, the question involved is no longer one
of partition but of ownership
Maritegui v. Court of Appeals 205 SCRA 337,

When a co-owner or co-heir registered the properties in his

name in fraud of other co-owners or co-heirs, prescription can
only be deemed to have commenced from the time the latter
discovered the formers act of defraudation.
Lacbayan v.
2011

Samoy, G.R. NO. 165427,

Mar.

21,

The first phase of a partition and,or accounting suit is taken up

with the determination of whether or not a co-ownership in fact
exists, and a partition is proper (i.e., not otherwise legally
proscribed) and may be made by voluntary aG.R.eement of all
the parties interested in the property. This phase may end with
a declaration that plaintiff is not entitled to have a partition
either because a co-ownership does not exist, or partition is
legally prohibited.
Cruz v.
2008

Catapang

G.R.

164110,

Feb.

12,

Alterations include any act of strict dominion or ownership

and any encumbrance or disposition has been held implicitly
to be an act of alteration. The construction of a house on the
co-owned property is an act of dominion.
Santos

v.

Heirs
of
Lustre,
G.R. NO.
151016,
Aug.
06,
2008 - any adverse ruling in the earlier case will not, in any
way, prejudice the heirs who did not join, even if such case
was actually filed in behalf of all the co-owners. In fact, if an
action for recovery of property is dismissed, a subsequent
action by a co- heir who did not join the earlier case should
not be barred by prior judgment.
Title V Possession
SPOUSES REYNALDO AND HILLY G. SOMBILON v ATTY. REY
FERDINAND GARAY AND PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK, G.R No.
179914, June 16, 2014. DEL CASTILLO

The spouses Sombilon executed a mortgage over their property to

secure a loan from PNB, who upon the Sombilons default, foreclosed
the mortgage and acquired the property. The spouses then approached
their neighbor Atty. Garay if he could advance the money needed to
repurchase the lot. However, the spouses later found out that PNB sold
the lot to Atty. Garay. PNB applied for a writ of possession. The
Sombilons claim that PNB has no legal personality to apply for the writ
since the lot had already been sold to Atty. Garay, who is disqualified
from purchasing the subject property pursuant to paragraph 5, Article
1491 of the Civil Code.

The Court ruled that PNB has the right to the writ. The allegedly
invalidity of the sale between PNB and Atty. Garay is not a ground to
oppose or defer the issuance of the Writ of Possession as this does not
affect PNBs right to possess the subject
property. As the registered owner, PNB is entitled to the possession
of the subject property as a matter of right.
NORMA V. JAVATE vs. SPOUSES RENATO J. TIOTUICO AND LERMA
C. TIOTUICO,
G.R. No. 187606, March 09, 2015, J. Peralta
If the purchaser is a third party who acquired the property after the
redemption period, a hearing must be conducted to determine whether
possession over the subject property is still with the mortgagor or is
already in the possession of a third party holding the same adversely
to the defaulting debtor or mortgagor. In the instant case, while
respondents' petition for the issuance of a writ of possession was filed
ex-parte, a hearing was, nonetheless, conducted when the RTC gave
petitioner her day in court by giving her the opportunity to file various
pleadings to oppose respondent's petition. Moreover, there is no
dispute that petitioner remained in possession of the subject property
prior to the issuance of the questioned writ of possession. It is, thus,
clear that respondents' resort, as a subsequent or third-party
purchaser, the petition for the issuance of a writ of possession is
proper.
MARCELA M. DELA CRUZ VS. ANTONIO O. HERMANO, ET AL.
G.R. No. 160914.
March 25, 2015, J. Sereno
To prove their claim of having a better right to possession, respondents
submitted their title thereto and the latest Tax Declaration prior to the
initiation of the ejectment suit. The CA erred in considering those
documents sufficient to prove respondents prior physical possession.
Similarly, tax declarations and realty tax payments are not conclusive
proofs of possession. They are merely good indicia of possession in the
concept of owner based on the presumption that no one in ones right
mind would be paying taxes for a property that is not in ones actual or
constructive possession.
The respondents have claimed from the inception of the controversy up
to now that they are using the property as their vacation house, this
claim, however, is not substantiated by any corroborative evidence.
Their uncorroborated claim of that fact, even if made under oath, is

self-serving. . The respondents failed to discharge their burden of

proving the element of prior physical possession.
Concept of Possession
Elements of
Possession

Kinds of Possession
Possession in Good Faith and Bad

Faith

PNB v. De Jesus, G.R. NO. 149295, September 23, 2003

- One is considered in good faith if he is not aware that there
exists in his title or mode of acquisition any flaw which
invalidates it.
Parilla v. Pilar, G.R. NO. 167680, Nov. 30, 2006 - One
whose interest is merely that of a holder, such as a mere
tenant, agent or usufructuary, is not qualified to become a
possessor builder in good faith.
Abalos
v.
Heirs
of
Torio,
G.R. NO.
175444,
Dec. 14,
2011
Acts
of
possessory character executed due to license or by mere
tolerance of the owner are inadequate for purposes of
acquisitive prescription.
Possession,
to constitute
the
foundation of a prescriptive right, must be en concepto de
dueo, or, to use the common law equivalent of the term,
that possession should be adverse, if not, such possessory
acts, no matter how long, do not start the running of the
period of prescription.
Chapter 2 Acquisition of Possession
ANACLETO C. MANGASER, REPRESENTED BY HIS ATTORNEY-INFACT EUSTAQUIO DUGENIAvs. DIONISIO UGAY, G.R. No. 204926,
December 03, 2014,
J. Mendoza
For a forcible entry suit to prosper, the plaintiffs must allege and prove:
(a) that they have prior physical possession of the property; (b) that
they were deprived of possession either by force, intimidation, threat,
strategy or stealth; and, (c) that the action was filed within one (1)
year from the time the owners or legal possessors learned of their
deprivation of the physical possession of the property.
There is only one issue in ejectment proceedings: who is entitled to
physical or material possession of the premises, that is, to
possession de facto, not possession de Jure? Issues as to the right of
possession or ownership are not involved in the action; evidence

thereon is not admissible, except only for the purpose of determining

the issue of possession.
As a rule, the word "possession" in forcible entry suits indeed refers to
nothing more than prior physical possession or possession de facto, not
possession de Jure or legal possession in the sense contemplated in
civil law. Title is not the issue, and the absence of it "is not a ground for
the courts to withhold relief from the parties in an ejectment case."

Possession can be acquired by juridical acts. These are acts to which

the law gives the force of acts of possession. Examples of these are
donations, succession, execution and registration of public instruments,
inscription of possessory information titles and the like. The reason for
this exceptional rule is that possession in the eyes of the law does not
mean that a man has to have his feet on every square meter of ground
before it can be said that he is in possession. It is sufficient that
petitioner was able to subject the property to the action of his will.

CARMENCITA SUAREZ VS. MR. AND MRS. FELIX E. EMBOY JR. AND
MARILOU P. EMBOY- DELANTAR G.R. No. 187944 March 12, 2014, J.
Reyes

In a complaint for unlawful detainer, the following key jurisdictional

facts must be alleged and sufficiently established: (1) initially,
possession of property by the defendant was by contract with or by
tolerance of the plaintiff;(2) eventually, such possession became illegal
upon notice by plaintiff to defendant of the termination of the latters
right of possession; (3) thereafter, the defendant remained in
possession of the property and deprived the plaintiff of the enjoyment
thereof; and (4) within one year from the last demand on defendant to
vacate the property, the plaintiff instituted the complaint for
ejectment.
In the case at bar, the first requisite mentioned above
is
markedly absent. Carmencita failed to clearly allege and prove how
and when the respondents entered the subject lot and constructed a
house upon it. Carmencita was likewise conspicuously silent about the
details on who specifically permitted the respondents to occupy the
lot, and how and when such tolerance came about. Instead,
Carmencita cavalierly formulated a legal conclusion, sans factual
substantiation, that (a) the respondents initial occupation of the
subject lot was lawful by virtue of tolerance by the registered owners,
and (b) the respondents became deforciants unlawfully withholding the
subject lots possession after Carmencita, as purchaser and new
registered owner, had demanded for the former to vacate the property.
It is worth noting that the absence of the first requisite assumes even
more importance in the light of the respondents claim that for
decades, they have been occupying the subject lot as owners thereof .

SPOUSES EDMUNDO DELA CRUZ AND AMELIA CONCIO-DELA

CRUZ VS. SPOUSES RUFINO R. CAPCO AND MARTY C. CAPCO
G.R. No. 176055, March 17, 2014
"The only issue in an ejectment case is the physical possession of real
property possession de facto and not possession de jure." But
"[w]here the parties to an ejectment case raise the issue of ownership,
the courts may pass upon that issue to determine who between the
parties has the better right to possess the property." Here, both parties
anchor their right to possess based on ownership, i.e., the spouses
Dela Cruz by their own ownership while the spouses Capco by the
ownership of Rufino as one of the heirs of the alleged true owner of the
property. Thus, the MeTC

and the RTC correctly passed upon the issue of ownership in this case
to determine the issue of possession. However, it must be emphasized
that "[t]he adjudication of the issue of ownership is only provisional,
and not a bar to an action between the same parties involving title to
the property."
BONIFACIO PIEDAD, MARIA PIEDAD represented by INSPIRACION DANAO
v SPOUSES VICTORIO GURIEZA and EMETERIA M. GURIEZA, G.R No.
207525, June 18, 2014. J. PERLAS-BERNABE
Unlawful detainer is an action to recover possession of real property
from one who unlawfully withholds possession thereof after the
expiration or termination of his right to hold possession under any
contract, express or implied. An ejectment case, based on the
allegation of possession by tolerance, falls under the category of
unlawful detainer. Where the plaintiff allows the defendant to use
his/her property by tolerance without any contract, the defendant is
necessarily bound by an implied promise that he/she will vacate on
demand, failing which, an action for unlawful detainer will lie. In
unlawful detainer actions, the Court shall solely resolve the issue as to
who between the parties has the better right of possession de facto
over the subject lot. Corollary thereto, issues pertaining to ownership
are better threshed out in another action instituted for such purpose.
FE U. QUIJANO v ATTY. DARYLL A. AMANTE, G.R No. 164277,
October 8, 2014. J. BERSAMIN
Where the plaintiff does not prove her alleged tolerance of the
defendant's occupation, the possession is deemed illegal from the
beginning. Hence, the action for unlawful detainer is an improper
remedy. But the action cannot be considered as one for forcible entry
without any allegation in the complaint that the entry of the defendant
was by means of force, intimidation, threats, strategy or stealth.

ROBERT AND NENITA DE LEON, vs. GILBERT AND ANALYN DELA

LLANA, G.R.
No. 212277, February 11, 2015, J. Perlas-Bernabe
An unlawful detainer complaint was filed by Gilbert dela Llana against
petitioner Robert de Leon and Gil de Leon. Robert and Gil contend that
the lease contract was simulated. It is quite apparent that the MCTCNabunturan-Mawab actually intended to mean that the undated lease

contract subject of this case was absolutely simulated. Its

pronouncement that the parties did not intend to be bound by their
agreement is simply inconsistent with relative simulation.
Bunyi v.
591

Factor, G.R.
NO.
350

172547,

Jun.

30,

200
9

For one to be considered in possession, one need not have

actual or physical occupation of every square inch of the
property at all times. Possession can be acquired not only by
material occupation, but also by the fact that a thing is
subject to the action of ones will or by the proper acts and
legal formalities established for acquiring such right,
possession can be acquired by juridical acts.
People v.
10,
2008

Peaflorida, G.R. NO.

175604,

Apr.

Knowledge refers to a mental state of awareness of a fact.

Since courts cannot penetrate the mind of an accused and
thereafter state its perceptions with certainty, resort to other
evidence is necessary. Animus possidendi, as a state of mind,
may be determined on a case-to-case basis by taking into
consideration the prior or contemporaneous acts of the
accused, as well as the surrounding circumstances.
Soledad v. People, G.R. NO. 184274, Feb 23, 2011 The acquisition of possession involves two elements: the
corpus or the material holding of the thing, and the animus
possidendi or the intent to possess it. Animus possidendi is a
state of mind, the presence or determination of which is
largely dependent on attendant events in each case. It may
be inferred from the prior or contemporaneous acts of the
accused, as well as the surrounding circumstances.
Chua-Bruce
27,
2000

v.

CA, G.R. NO.

109595,

Apr.

Juridical possession means a possession which gives the

transferee a right over the thing which the transferee may
set up even against the owner.In this case, petitioner was a
cash custodian who was primarily responsible for the cash-invault. Her possession of the cash belonging to the bank is
akin to that of a bank teller, both being mere bank
employees
9
0

Effects of Possession
PAUL P. GABRIEL, JR, et al. vs. CARMELING CRISOLOGO, G.R. No. 204626,
June 9, 2014, J. Mendoza
When it is shown that the plaintiff in a case of accion publiciana had a
valid title issued in her name in 1967, within the period which the
Supreme Court held that titles issued over the same properties were
valid; that she has been paying the realty taxes on the said properties
since l969; that she likewise appointed an administrator of the
disputed lands, and more importantly, there is no question that she
offered to sell to petitioners the portions of the subject properties
occupied by

9
0

them, then she deserves to be respected and restored to her lawful

possession as provided in Article 539 of the New Civil Code.
SUBIC BAY LEGEND RESORTS AND CASINOS, INC. vs. BERNARD
C. FERNANDEZ,
G.R. No. 193426, September 29, 2014, J. Del
Castillo
Though casino chips do not constitute legal tender, there is no law
which prohibits their use or trade outside of the casino which issues
them. In any case, it is not unusual nor is it unlikely that respondent
could be paid by his Chinese client at the former's car shop with the
casino chips in question; said transaction, if not common, is
nonetheless not unlawful. These chips are paid for anyway petitioner
would not have parted with the same if their corresponding
representative equivalent in legal tender, goodwill, or otherwise was
not received by it in return or exchange. Given this premise that
casino chips are considered to have been exchanged with their
corresponding representative value it is with more reason that the
Court should require petitioner to prove convincingly and persuasively
that the chips it confiscated from the Fernandez brothers were indeed
stolen from it; if so, any Tom, Dick or Harry in possession of genuine
casino chips is presumed to have paid for their representative value in
exchange therefor. If SBL cannot prove its loss, then Art. 559 cannot
apply; the presumption that the chips were exchanged for value
remains.
PENTA PACIFIC REALTY CORPORATION
vs. LEY
CONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION,
G.R. No. 161589, November 24, 2014, J.
Bersamin
Penta Pacific leased its properties to Ley Construction. Both parties
then entered into a contract to sell. Ley Construction failed to pay
its amortizations prompting Penta Pacific to file an action for
ejectment.
The MeTC correctly exercised its authority in finding for the petitioner
as the plaintiff. In unlawful detainer, the possession was originally
lawful but became unlawful by the expiration or termination of the
right to possess; hence, the issue of rightful possession is decisive for,
in the action, the defendant is in actual possession and the plaintiffs
cause of action is the termination of the defendant's r ight to continue
in possession.

91

A defendant's claim of possession de jure or his averment of ownership

does not render the ejectment suit either accion publiciana or accion
reivindicatoria. The suit remains an accion interdictal, a summary
proceeding that can proceed independently of any claim of ownership.
Even when the question of possession cannot be resolved without
deciding the issue of ownership, the issue of ownership is to be
resolved only to determine the issue of possession.

92

HOMER C. JAVIER, represented by his mother and natural

guardian, SUSAN G. CANENCIA, vs. SUSAN LUMONTAD, G.R.
No. 203760, December 3, 2014, J.
Perlas-Bernabe
In forcible entry, the complaint must necessarily allege that one in
physical possession of a land or building has been deprived of that
possession by another through force, intimidation, threat, strategy or
stealth. It is not essential, however, that the complaint should
expressly employ the language of the law, but it would suffice that
facts are set up showing that dispossession took place under said
conditions.
EDCA
V. Santos, G.R.
Publ.SCRA 614
NO.
184

80298, Apr.

26,

199
0

Actual delivery of the books having been made, Cruz acquired

ownership over the books which he could then validly
transfer to the private respondents. The fact that he had not
yet paid for them to EDCA was a matter between him and
EDCA and did not impair the title acquired by the private
respondents to the books.
BPI Family
23,
2007

v.

Franco, G.R. NO.

123498,

Nov.

Bad faith
does not simply
connote
bad judgment or
negligence; it imports
a dishonest purpose or some moral
obliquity and conscious doing of wrong; it partakes of the
nature of fraud. We have held that it is a breach of a known
duty through some motive of interest or ill will.
Title VI Usufruct
Characteristics and
Nature
Rights and Obligations of the
Parties Title VII. Easements or
Servitude

Different kind of Easement

DEMETRIA DE GUZMAN, AS SUBSTITUTED BY HER HEIRS OLGA C.
BARBASO AND NOLI G. CEMENTTNA;* LOLITA A. DE GUZM AN; ESTHER
G.MILAN; BANAAG A. DE GUZMAN; AMOR G. APOLO, AS SUBSTITUTED
*
BY HIS HEIRS ALBERTO T. APOLO, MARK APOLO AND GEORGE APOLO;
HERMINIO A. DE GUZM AN; LEONOR G. VTVENCIO; NORMA A. DE
GUZMAN; AND
JOSEFINA G.
HERNANDEZ, vs. FBLINVEST

DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION,G.R. No. 191710, January 14, 2015, J.

Castillo

del

Petitioners sought to establish a permanent easement upon the

subservient estate. Pursuant to the second paragraph of Article 649,
the proper indemnity in this case shall consist of the value of the land
plus the damages caused to the servient estate.

ALICIA B. REYES vs. SPOUSES VALENTIN RAMOS, FRANCISCO S.

AND ANATALIA,
G.R. No. 194488, February 11, 2015, J. Leonen
An easement of right of way is a real right. When an easement of right
of way is granted to another person, the rights of the propertys owner
are limited. An owner may not exercise some of his or her property
rights for the benefit of the person who was granted the easement of
right of way.
Hence, the burden of proof to show the existence of the above
conditions is imposed on the person who seeks the easement of right
of way.
Here the petitioner failed to establish that there was no adequate
outlet to the public highway and that the proposed easement was
the least prejudicial to respondents estate.
Mere convenience for the dominant estate is not what is required by
law as the basis of setting up a compulsory easement. Even in the face
of necessity, if it can be satisfied without imposing the easement, the
same should not be imposed.
Based on the Ocular Inspection Report, petitioners property had
another outlet to the highway. In between her property and the
highway or road, however, is an irrigation canal, which can be
traversed by constructing a bridge, similar to what was done by the
owners of the nearby properties.
There is, therefore, no need to utilize respondents property to serve
petitioners needs. Another adequate exit exists. Petitioner can use
this outlet to access the public roads.

Restrictive Covenant

Fajardo v. Freedom
to Build, G.R. NO.
134692, Aug. 1, 2000
While it may be correct to state that restrictive covenants on
the use of land or the location or character of buildings or other
structures thereon may broadly be said to create easements or
rights, it can also be contended
that
such
covenants,
being limitations on the manner
in

which one may use his own property, do not result in true
easements,
but a case of servitudes (burden), sometimes
characterized to be negative easements or reciprocal negative
easements.
Abellana v. CA, G.R. NO.

97039, Apr.24, 1992

The use of a footpath or road may be apparent but it is not a

continuous easement because its use is at intervals and
depends upon the acts of man. It can be exercised only if a
man passes or puts his feet over somebody else's land.
Bicol Agro-Ind
v.
Obias,
G.R. NO.
172077,
Oct.
09, 2009 - The easement of right of way the
privilege of persons or a particular class of persons to pass
over anothers land, usually through one particular path or
linen is characterized as a discontinuous easement
because its use is in intervals and depends on the act of man.
Because of this character, an easement of a right of way may
only be acquired by virtue of a title.
Quintanilla v.
2008

Abangan,

G.R. NO. 160613, Feb.12,

As between a right of way that would demolish a fence of

strong materials to provide ingress and egress to a public
highway and another right of way which although longer will
only require a van or vehicle to make a turn, the second
alternative should be preferred. Mere convenience for the
dominant estate is not what is required by law as the basis for
setting up a compulsory easement.
Quimen
1996

v.

CA,

G.R. NO.

112331,

May

29,

As between a right of way that would demolish a store of

strong materials to provide egress to a public highway, and
another right of way which although longer will only require an
avocado tree to be cut down, the second alternative should
be preferred.

Unisource v.
17,
2009

Chung, G.R. NO.

173252,

Jul.

Registration of the dominant estate under the Torrens system

without the annotation of the voluntary easement in its favor
does not extinguish the easement. On the contrary, it is the
registration of the servient estate as free, that is, without
the annotation of the voluntary easement, which extinguishes
the easement.
Title VIII Nuisance

Classification of Nuisance
LINDA RANA vs. TERESITA LEE WONG, SPS. SHIRLEY LEE ONG and
RUBEN ANG ONG and SPS. ROSARIO and WILSON UY; SPS. ROSARIO and
WILSON UY; WILSON UY as attorney-in-fact of TERESITA LEE WONG, and
SPS. SHIRLEY LEE ONG and RUBEN ANG ONG vs. SPS. REYNALDO and
LINDA LANA, G.R. No. 192861; G.R. No. 192862, June 30, 2014, J. Perlas-Bernabe
It is a standing jurisprudential rule that unless a nuisance is a nuisance
per se, it may not be summarily abated. Aside from the remedy of
summary abatement which should be taken under the parameters
stated in Articles 704 (for public nuisances) and 706 (for private
nuisances) of the Civil Code, a private person whose property right
was invaded or unreasonably interfered with by the act, omission,
establishment, business or condition of the property of another may
file a civil action to recover personal damages. Abatement may be
judicially sought through a civil action therefor if the pertinent
requirements under the Civil Code for summary abatement, or the
requisite that the nuisance is a nuisance per se, do not concur. To note,
the remedies of abatement and damages are cumulative; hence, both
may be demanded.
LINDA RANA v TERESITA WONG, G.R No. 192861, June 30,
2014. J. PERLAS- BERNABE
The spouses Wong and the spouses Rana are neighbors who live
across a road from each other. The Ranas elevated and cemented the
road without consultation from the spouses Wong. Wong et al availed
of the remedy of judicial abatement and damages against Spouses
Rana, claiming that the elevated and cemented portion are nuisances
that curtailed their use and enjoyment of their properties.

With respect to the elevated and cemented subject portion, the Court
finds that the same is not a nuisance per se. By its nature, it is not
injurious to the health or comfort of the community. It was built
primarily to facilitate the ingress and egress of Sps. Rana from their
house which was admittedly located on a higher elevation than the
subject road and the adjoining Uy and Wong-Ong properties. Since
the subject portion is not a nuisance per se, it cannot be summarily
abated. The demolition order secured by Wong was thus unwarranted,
entitling the spouses Rana to nominal and temperate damages.

CRISOSTOMO B. AQUINO v MUNICIPALITY OF MALAY, AKLAN,

represented by HON. MAYOR JOHN P. YAP, SANGGUNIANG BA
YAN OF MALAY, AKLAN, represented by HON. EZEL FLORES,
DANTE PASUGUIRON, ROWEN AGUIRRE, WILBEC GELITO,
JUPITER GALLENERO, OFFICE OF THE MUNICIPAL ENGINEER,

OFFICE OF THE MUNICIPAL TREASURER, BORACAY PNP CHIEF,

BORACAY FOUNDATION, INC., represented by NENETTE
GRAF, MUNICIPAL AUXILIARY POLICE, and JOHN and JANE
DOES. G.R No. 211356, September 29, 2014. J. VELASCO
Article 694 of the Civil Code defines nuisance as any act, omission,
establishment, business, condition or property, or anything else that
(1) injures or endangers the health or safety of others; (2) annoys or
offends the senses; (3) shocks, defies or disregards decency or
morality; (4) obstructs or interferes with the free passage of any public
highway or street, or any body of water; or (5) hinders or impairs the
use of property.
Challenging the validity of the public respondents actuations,
petitioner posits that the hotel cannot summarily be abated because it
is not a nuisance per se, given the hundred million peso-worth of
capital infused in the venture. Petitioner also argues that respondents
should have first secured a court order before proceeding with the
demolition.
SC said that the property involved cannot be classified as a nuisance
per se, but not for the reason he so offers. Property valuation, after all,
is not the litmus test for such a determination. More controlling is the
propertys nature and conditions, which should be evaluated to see if
it qualifies as a nuisance as defined under the law.
Nuisances are of two kinds: nuisance per se and nuisance per
accidens. The first is recognized as a nuisance under any and all
circumstances, because it constitutes a direct menace to public
health or safety, and, for that reason, may be abated summarily
under the undefined law of necessity. The second is that which
depends upon certain conditions and circumstances, and its existence
being a question of fact, it cannot be abated without due hearing
thereon in a tribunal authorized to decide whether such a thing does
in law constitute a nuisance. cralawlawlibrary
In the case at bar, the hotel, in itself, cannot be considered as a
nuisance per se since this type of nuisance is generally defined as an
act, occupation, or structure, which is a nuisance at all times and
under any circumstances, regardless of location or surrounding.
Here, it is merely the hotels particular incidentits locationand not
its inherent qualities that rendered it a nuisance. Otherwise stated, had
it not been constructed in the no build zone, Boracay West Cove could
have secured the necessary permits without issue. As such, petitioner
is correct that the hotel is not a nuisance per se, but, it is still a
nuisance per accidens.

Remedies
Telmo v. Bustamante, G.R. NO.
13,
2009

182567, Jul.

A nuisance per se is that which affects the immediate safety of

persons and property and may be summarily abated under
the undefined law of necessity. Evidently, the concrete posts
summarily removed by petitioner did not at all pose a hazard
to the safety of persons and properties, which would have
necessitated immediate and summary abatement.
Gancayco v.
11,
2011

Quezon

City, G.R. NO.

177807,Oct

The wing walls do not per se immediately and adversely

affect the safety of persons and property. The fact that an
ordinance may declare a structure illegal does not necessarily
make that structure a nuisance.
Perez v. Madrona G.R. NO. 184478, Mar. 21, 2012
- Respondents fence is not a nuisance per se. By its nature, it
is not injurious to the health or comfort of the community. It
was built primarily to secure the property of respondents and
prevent intruders from entering it.
Donation
CHARLES BUMAGAT, JULIAN BACUDIO, ROSARIO PADRE,
SPOUSES ROGELIO and ZOSIMA PADRE, and FELIPE DOMINCIL v
REGALADO ARRIBAY, G.R No. 194818, June 9, 2014. J. DEL
CASTILLO
Under Article 749 and 709 of the Civil Code, it may be inferred that as
between the parties to a donation of an immovable property, all that is
required is for said donation to be contained in a public document.
Registration is not necessary for it to be considered valid and effective.
However, in order to bind third persons, the donation must be
registered in the Registry of Land Titles and Deeds. Although the nonregistration of a deed of donation shall not affect its validity, the
necessity of registration comes into play when the rights of third
persons are affected, as in the case at bar.
In this case, the donation executed by Gonzales in favor of his
grandchildren, although in writing and duly notarized, has not been
registered in accordance with law. Hence, while the deed of donation is
valid between the donor and the donees, such deed, however, did not
bind the tenants-farmers who were not parties to the donation. Nonregistration of a deed of donation does not bind other parties ignorant
of a previous transaction. It is of no moment that the right of the
tenant- farmers in this case was created by virtue of a decree or law.

They are still considered "third persons" contemplated in our laws on

registration, for the fact remains that these tenant-farmers had no
actual knowledge of the deed of donation.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, REPRESENTED BY THE
SECRETARY OF AGRICULTURE vs. FEDERICO DACLAN, JOSEFINA
COLLADO, AND HER HUSBAND FEDERICO DACLAN AND
MINVILUZ DACLAN, AS SURVIVING HEIRS OF

DECEASED JOSE DACLAN, G.R. No. 197115 (consolidated), March

23, 2015, J.
Del Castillo
The Daclans lament the supposed failure of the Province to provide
agricultural extension and on-site research services and facilities as
required under the IRR of the LGC of 1991, which failure they believe,
constituted a violation of the stipulation contained in the deeds of
donation to develop and improve the livestock industry of the country.
Yet this cannot be made a ground for the reversion of the donated
lands; on the contrary, to allow such an argument would condone
undue interference by private individuals in the operations of
government. The deeds of donation merely stipulated that the donated
lands shall be used for the establishment of a breeding station and shall
not be used for any other purpose, and that in case of non-use,
abandonment or cessation of the activities of the BAI, possession or
ownership shall automatically revert to the Daclans. It was never
stipulated that they may interfere in the management and operation of
the breeding station. Even then, they could not directly participate in
the operations of the breeding station.
Nature of Donations
Classification of
Donations
Persons who may giver or receive a
Donation Formalities of Donation
ESPERANZA C. CARINAN vs. SPOUSES GAVINO CUETO and CARMELITA
CUETO, G.R. No.
198636, October 8, 2014, J. Reyes

In order to sufficiently substantiate her claim that the money paid by

the respondents was actually a donation, petitioner should have also
submitted in court a copy of their written contract evincing such
agreement. As earlier ruled by the Court, a donation must comply with
the mandatory formal requirements set forth by law for its validity.
When the subject of donation is purchase money, Article 748 of the
NCC is applicable. Accordingly, the donation of money as well as its
acceptance should be in writing. Otherwise, the donation is invalid for
non-compliance with the formal requisites prescribed by law.

Effects and limitation of Donation

Republic v. Guzman, G.R. No. 132964, February 18,

2000
The donation is null and void when (a) the deed of donation
fails to show the acceptance, or (b) where the formal notice of
the acceptance made in

a separate instrument is either not given to the donor or else

noted in the deed of donation, and in the separate
acceptance.
Villanueva vs. Spouses Branoco, G.R. No. 172804,
January 24, 2011
When the donor used the words that the gift "does not pass
title during my lifetime; but when I die, she shall be the true
owner of the two aforementioned parcels"] the donor meant
nothing else than that she reserved of herself the possession
and usufruct of said two parcels of land until her death, at
which time the donee would be able to dispose of them freely.
Central Philippines University vs. CA, G.R. No.
112127 July 17, 1995
If there was no fulfillment or compliance with the condition,
the donation may now be revoked and all rights which the donee
may have acquired under it shall be
deemed lost and
extinguished.

Insular
Life
28,
1977

v.

Ebrado, G.R. NO.

44059,

Oct.

In essence, a life insurance policy is no different from a civil

donation insofar as the beneficiary is concerned. Both are
founded upon the same consideration: liberality. A beneficiary
is like a donee, because from the premiums of the policy
which the insured pays out of liberality, the beneficiary will
receive the proceeds or profits of said insurance.
Zamboanga
30,
2008

v.

Plagata, G.R. NO. 148433,

Sept.

Since Article 1306 of said Code authorizes the parties to a

contract to establish such stipulations, . . . not contrary to
law, . . . public order or public policy, we are of the opinion
that, at the very least, that stipulation of the parties
providing for automatic revocation of the deed of donation,
without prior judicial action for that purpose, is valid subject
to the determination of the propriety of the rescission sought.
Where such propriety is sustained, the decision of the court

will be merely declaratory of the revocation, but it is not in

itself the revocatory act.
Quijada
1998.

vs.

CA, G.R. NO.

126444,

Dec.

4,

Since no period was imposed by the donor on when must the

donee comply with the condition, the latter remains the owner
so long as he has tried to comply with the condition within a
reasonable period. Only then - when the non-fulfillment of
the resolutory condition was brought

to the donor's knowledge - that ownership of the donated

property reverted to the donor as provided in the automatic
reversion clause of the deed of donation.

PRESCR IPTION
METROPOLITAN FABRICS INC. ET AL. VS. PROSPERITY CREDIT
RESOURCES ENC. ET AL. G.R. No. 154390 March 17, 2014, J.
Bersamin
With the contract being voidable, petitioners action to annul the real
estate mortgage already prescribed. Article 1390, in relation to Article
1391 of the Civil Code, provides that if the consent of the contracting
parties was obtained through fraud, the contract is considered voidable
and may be annulled within four years from the time of the discovery
of the fraud. The discovery of fraud is reckoned from the time the
document was registered in the Register of Deeds in view of the rule
that registration was notice to the whole world. Thus, because the
mortgage involving the seven lots was registered on September 5,
1984, they had until September 5, 1988 within which to assail the
validity of the mortgage. But their complaint was instituted in the RTC
only on October 10, 1991.Hence, the action, being by then already
prescribed, should be dismissed.

RURAL BANK OF CABADBARAN, INC v JORGITA A. MELECIO-YAP,

LILIA
MELECIO PACIFICO (deceased, substituted by her only child
ERILL* ISAAC M. PACIFICO, JR.), REYNALDO A. MELECIO
DELOSO, and SARAH MELECIO PALMA- GIL, G.R No. 178451,
July 30, 2014. J. PERLAS-BERNABE
In this case, the complaint for nullification of the SPA was filed before
the RTC on April 17,1996, or barely three years from the discovery of
the averred forgery in 1993, which is within the four-year prescriptive
period provided under Article 1146 of the Civil Code to institute an
action upon the injury to their rights over the subject properties. A
delay within the prescriptive period is sanctioned by law and is not
considered to be a delay that would bar relief. Laches applies only in
the absence of a statutory prescriptive period.
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SPOUSES FRANCISCO SIERRA (substituted by DONATO,

TERESITA, TEODORA, LORENZA, LUCINA, IMELDA, VILMA, and
MILAGROS SIERRA) and ANTONINA SANTOS, SPOUSES ROSARIO
SIERRA and EUSEBIO CALUMA LEYVA, and SPOUSES SALOME
SIERRA and FELIX GATLABAYAN (substituted by BUENA
VENTURA, ELPIDIO, PAULINO, CATALINA, GREGORIO, and
EDGARDO GATLABAYAN, LORETO REILLO, FERMINA PEREGRINA,
and NIDA HASHIMOTO) vs. PAIC SAVINGS AND MORTGAGE
BANK, INC., G.R. No. 197857, September 10,
2014, J. Perlas- Bernabe

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Since the complaint for annulment was anchored on a claim of

mistake, i.e., that petitioners are the borrowers under the loan secured
by the mortgage, the action should have been brought within four (4)
years from its discovery. As mortgagors desiring to attack a mortgage
as invalid, petitioners should act with reasonable promptness, else its
unreasonable delay may amount to ratification. Verily, to allow
petitioners to assert their right to the subject properties now after their
unjustified failure to act within a reasonable time would be grossly
unfair to PSMB, and perforce should not be sanctioned. As such,
petitioners' action is already barred by laches, which, as case law
holds, operates not really to penalize neglect or sleeping on one's
rights, but rather to avoid recognizing a right when to do so would
result in a clearly inequitable situation.
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
SHANG PROPERTIES REALTY CORPORATION (formerly THE
SHANG GRAND TOWER CORPORATION) and SHANG
PROPERTIES, INC. (formerly EDSA PROPERTIES HOLDINGS,
INC.), v ST. FRANCIS DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION,
G.R No. 190706, July 21, 2014. J. PERLAS-BERNABE

St. Francis Development Corporation (SFDC) uses the mark ST.

FRANCIS to identify numerous development projects at Ortigas
Center. When Shang Properties Realty (SPR) used the marks The St.
Francis Towers and The St. Francis Shangri- La Place, SFDC filed a
complaint for intellectual property violation for unfair competition and
damages.
For unfair competition to be established, there must be a showing
that SPR employed means to induce the public towards a false
belief that it was offering SFDCs goods/services. Here, this was
not proven.
On the contrary, the Court upheld SPRs use of the St. Francis mark
since the use was meant not to ride on SFDCs goodwill, but merely to
identify, or at least associate, their real estate project/s with its
geographical location. In the real estate business, here can be no
description of its geographical origin as precise and accurate as that of
the name of the place where they are situated.
ILLAWARE PRODUCTS CORPORATION V JESICHRIS
MANUFACTURING CORPORATION, G.R No. 195549,
September 3, 2014. J. PERALTA
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1

In order to qualify the competition as "unfair," it must have two

characteristics: (1) it must involve an injury to a competitor or trade
rival, and (2) it must involve acts which are characterized as "contrary
to good conscience," or "shocking to judicial sensibilities," or otherwise
unlawful; in the language of our law, these include force, intimidation,
deceit, machination or any other unjust, oppressive or high-handed

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2

method. The public injury or interest is a minor factor; the essence

of the matter appears to be a private wrong perpetrated by
unconscionable means.
It is evident that petitioner Willaware is engaged in unfair competition
as shown by his act of suddenly shifting his business from
manufacturing kitchenware to plastic- made automotive parts; his
luring the employees of the respondent to transfer to his employ and
trying to discover the trade secrets of the respondent.
ABS-CBN CORPORATION, vs. FELIPE GOZON, GILBERTO R.
DUAVIT, JR., MARISSA L. FLORES, JESSICA A. SOHO, GRACE
DELA PEA-REYES, JOHN OLIVER
T. MANALASTAS, JOHN DOES AND JANE DOES, G.R. No. 195956,
March 11, 2015,
J. Leonen
Several employees of GMA-7 were charged with copyright
infringement. ABS-CBN claims that news footage is subject to
copyright and prohibited use of copyrighted material is punishable
under the Intellectual Property Code. It argues that the new footage is
not a "newsworthy event" but "merely an account of the arrival of
Angelo dela Cruz in the Philippines the latter being the newsworthy
event".
The Supreme Court held that the news footage is copyrightable. he
news footage is copyrightable.
The Intellectual Property Code is clear about the rights afforded to
authors of various kinds of work. Under the Code, "works are protected
by the sole fact of their creation, irrespective of their mode or form of
expression, as well as of their content, quality and purpose." These
include "[audio-visual works and cinematographic works and works
produced by a process analogous to cinematography or any process
for making audiovisual recordings."
It is true that under Section 175 of the Intellectual Property Code,
"news of the day and other miscellaneous facts having the character
of mere items of press information" are considered unprotected
subject matter. However, the Code does not state that expression of
the news of the day, particularly when it underwent a creative
process, is not entitled to protection.
GMA-7's rebroadcast of ABS-CBN's news footage without the latter's
consent is not an issue. The mere act of rebroadcasting without
authority from the owner of the broadcast gives rise to the probability
that a crime was committed under the Intellectual Property Code.

Respondents cannot invoke the defense of good faith to argue that no

probable cause exists.Infringement under the Intellectual Property
Code is malum prohibitum. The Intellectual Property Code is a special
law.
TAIWAN KOLIN CORPORATION, LTD VS. KOLIN ELECTRONICS CO.,
INC G.R. No.
209843. March 25, 2015, J. Velasco Jr.

The issue to be resolved in the case at bar is whether or not petitioner

is entitled to its trademark registration of KOLIN over its specific
goods of television sets and DVD players. Petitioner postulates, in the
main, that its goods are not closely related to those of Kolin Electronics.
On the other hand, respondent hinges its case on the CAs findings that
its and petitioners products are closely-related. Thus, granting
petitioners application for trademark registration, according to
respondent, would cause confusion as to the public.
The Supreme Court held that identical marks may be registered for
products for the same classification. Mere uniformity in categorization,
by itself, does not automatically preclude the registration of what
appears to be an identical mark, if that be the case. In fact, SC, in a
long line of cases, has held that such circumstance does not
necessarily result in any trademark infringement. It is hornbook
doctrine that emphasis should be on the similarity of the products
involved and not on the arbitrary classification or general description of
their properties or characteristics. The mere fact that one person has
adopted and used a trademark on his goods would not prevent the
adoption and use of the same trademark by others on unrelated
articles of a different kind.
It is erroneous to conclude that all electronic products are related and
that the coverage of one electronic product necessarily precludes the
registration of a similar mark over another. In this digital age wherein
electronic products have not only diversified by leaps and bounds, and
are geared towards interoperability, it is difficult to assert readily, as
respondent simplistically did, that all devices that require plugging into
sockets are necessarily related goods. In addition, Supreme court rule
that there is no confusing similarity between the marks, given that the
products covered by the trademark, i.e., jeans, were, at that time,
considered pricey, typically purchased by intelligent buyers familiar with
the products and are more circumspect, and, therefore, would not
easily be deceived.Hence, petitioner's trademark registration not only
covers unrelated good, but is also incapable of deceiving the ordinary
intelligent buyer.
OBLIGATIONS

I. DEFINITION
MAKATI STOCK EXCHANGE vs. CAMPOS, G.R. NO.
138814, April 16, 2009

Respondent used the terms "right and obligation" in his

Petition from which he concluded that that such Petition
sufficiently states a cause of action. Right and obligation are
legal terms with specific legal meaning;

A right is a claim or title to an interest in anything whatsoever

that is enforceable by law, while an obligation is defined in the
Civil Code as a juridical necessity to give, to do or not to do and
in the words of Arias Ramos "An obligation is a juridical relation
whereby a person (called the creditor) may
demand from
another (called the debtor) the observance of a determinative
conduct (the giving, doing or not doing), and in case of breach,
may demand satisfaction from the assets of the latter."
II.

ELEMENTS OF AN OBLIGATION

DEGAOS vs. PEOPLE

NO. 162826,
October 14, 2013

OF

THE

PHILIPPINES,

G.R.

Degaos claims that his

partial
payments
to
the
complainants novated his contract with them from agency to
loan, thereby converting his liability from criminal to civil. The
incompatibility in novation must take
place in any of the
essential elements of the obligation, such as its object, cause or
principal conditions thereof; otherwise, the change would be
merely modificatory in nature and insufficient to extinguish the
original obligation.
ASUNCION vs. CA, G.R. NO. 109125, December 2,
1994
An obligation is a juridical necessity to give, to do or not to do
(Art. 1156, Civil Code) and is constituted upon the
concurrence of the essential elements thereof, viz: (a) The
vinculum juris or juridical tie which is the efficient cause
established by the various sources of obligations (law,
contracts, quasi-contracts, delicts and quasi-delicts); (b) the
object which is the prestation or conduct; required to be
observed (to give, to do or not to do); and (c) the subjectpersons who, viewed from the demandability of the
obligation, are the active (obligee) and the passive (obligor)
subjects.

III.

DIFFERENT KINDS OF PRESTATIONS

SSS vs MOONWALK DEVELOPMENT & HOUSING

CORPORATION, G.R. NO. 73345. April 7, 1993.

For failure to pay on time the amortization, SSS imposed the

12% penalty contained in the penal clause of the contract
entered into between the parties. Inpositive obligations, (to
give and to do), the penalty is demandable when the debtor
is in mora; hence, the necessity of demand by the debtor
unless the same is excused.

ASIAN
CONSTRUCTION
AND
DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION
vs.
PHILIPPINE
COMMERCIAL
INTERNATIONAL BANK, G.R. NO. 153827
April 25, 2006

The [petitioner] may have experienced financial difficulties

because of the "1997 economic crisis" that ensued in Asia,
however, the same does not constitute a valid justification for
the [petitioner] to renege on its obligations to the [respondent],
and [petitioner] cannot even find solace in Articles 1266 and
1267 of the New Civil Code, since it is applicable only to
obligations "to do," and not obligations "to give." An obligation
"to do" includes all kinds of work or service; while an obligation
"to give" is a prestation which consists in the delivery of a
movable or an immovable thing in order to create a real right,
or for the use of the recipient, or for its simple possession, or
in order to return it to its owner.
IV. CLASSIFICATION OF
OBLIGATIONS AS TO BASIS
AND ENFORCEABILITY
1.NATURAL OBLIGATIONS
ANSAY vs. BOARD OF DIRECTORS, G.R. NO. L-13667,
April 29, 1960

Appellants filed against appellees in the CFI a complaint

praying for a 20% Christmas bonus, contending that there
exists a cause of action in their complaint because their claim
rests on moral grounds or what in brief is defined by law as a
natural obligation.
Article 1423 of the New Civil Code classifies obligations into
civil or natural, "Civil obligations are a right of action to
compel their performance, while Natural obligations, not
being based on positive law but on equity and natural law, do
not grant a right of action to enforce their performance, but
after voluntary fulfillment by the obligor, they authorize the
retention of what has been delivered or rendered by reason
thereof".

DBP vs. CONFESSOR, G.R. NO. L-48889 May 11, 1989

Appellee refuses to pay his obligation despite his execution of a

new promissory note in consideration of a previous promissory
note which remained unpaid even after the lapse of 10 years on
the ground of prescription. When a debt is already barred by
prescription, it cannot be enforced by the creditor but a new
contract recognizing and assuming the prescribed debt with
full knowledge of the prescription would be valid and enforceable
and he thereby waives the benefit of prescription.

2. CIVIL OBLIGATIONS
ANSAY vs. NDC, G.R. NO. L-13667, April 29, 1960

Appellants contend that there exists a cause of action in their

complaint because their claim rests on moral grounds or what
in brief is defined by law as a natural obligation. Article 1423
of the New Civil Code classifies obligations into civil or
natural. "Civil obligations are a right of action to compel their
performance. Natural obligations, not being based on
positive law but on equity and natural law, do not grant a
right of action to enforce their performance, but after
voluntary fulfillment by the obligor, they authorize the
retention of what has been delivered or rendered by reason
thereof".
V.SOURCES OF OBLIGATIONS
ABS-CBN
vs. OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, G.R.
NO.
133347
April 23, 2010

Petitioner asserts that a criminal complaint may continue and

be prosecuted as an independent civil action. The claim for civil
liability survives notwithstanding the death of accused, if the
same may also be predicated on a source of obligation other
than delict. Article 1157 of the Civil Code enumerates these
other sources of obligation from which the civil liability may
arise as a result of the same act or omission: a) law. b) contracts.
c) quasi-contracts. d) xxx xxx xxx. e) quasi-delicts.
1. OBLIGATIONS ARISING FROM LAW
SALEN vs. BALCE, G.R. NO. L-14414, April 27, 1960

Delfin, the father, was held jointly and severally liable with his
minor son Dante arising from the criminal act committed by

the latter. The civil liability which the law imposes upon the
father and, in case of his death or incapacity, the mother, for
any damages that may be caused by the minor children who
live with them, is a necessary consequence of the parental
authority they exercise over them which imposes upon the
parents the "duty of supporting them, keeping them in their
company, educating them in proportion to their means",
while, on the other hand, gives them the "right to correct and
punish them in moderation" .
2. OBLIGATIONS ARISING FROM CONTRACTS

METROPOLITAN BANK AND TRUST COMPANY vs. ANA GRACE

ROSALES AND
YO YUK TO, G.R. No. 183204, January 13, 2014 J. del Castillo
Petitioner bank uses as basis for its refusal The Hold Out clause
found in the agreement it entered into with respondents. The Supreme
Court held that the Hold Out clause applies only if there is a valid
and existing obligation arising from any of the sources of obligation
enumerated in Article 115779of the Civil Code, to wit: law, contracts,
quasi-contracts, delict, and quasi-delict. No such ground exists in this
case, hence the bank is guilty of breach of contract when it
unjustifiably refused to release respondents deposit despite demand.
SALUDAGA vs. FEU, G.R. NO. 179337 April 30, 2008

Saludaga, a sophomore law student of respondent FEU filed a

case for damages against it after he was shot by one of the
security guards on duty at the school premises. When an
academic institution accepts students for enrollment, there is
a established contract between them, resulting in bilateral
obligations which both parties are bound to comply with but
which FEU failed to perform when it did not provide a safe and
secure environment to its students.

MERALCO vs RAMOY, G.R. NO. 158911, March 4, 2008

The respondents' cause of action against MERALCO is anchored

on culpa contractual or breach of contract for the latter's
discontinuance of
its
service to respondents. In culpa
contractual the mere proof of the existence of the contract
and the failure of its compliance
justify,
prima
facie, a
corresponding right of relief from law, recognizing the obligatory
force of contracts, the law will not permit a party to be set free
from
liability for any
kind of misperformance
of the
contractual undertaking or a contravention of the tenor
thereof.

3. OBLIGATIONS ARISING FROM QUASI

CONTRACT CRUZ vs.TUASON, G.R. NO. L23749 April 29, 1977

Cruz alleged that Tuason had been enriched at the expense of

Cruz by virtue of an agreement made by Cruz and the Deudors
in the clearing, improving, subdividing and selling the large tract
of land for the reasons that said improvements are being
used and enjoyed by Tuason.
A

presumed quasi-contract cannot emerge as against one party

when the subject matter thereof is already covered by an
existing contract with another party.
A. NEGOTIORUM GESTIO
ADILLE vs. CA, G.R. NO. L-44546 January 29, 1988

Petitioner claims exclusive ownership on a land after

exercising his right of repurchase to the prejudice of the co
owners. The redemption by one co-heir or co-owner of the
property in its totality does not vest in him ownership over it
but the petitioner, in taking over the property, did so either on
behalf of his co-heirs, in which event, he had constituted
himself a negotiorum gestor under Article 2144 of the Civil
Code, or for his exclusive benefit, in which case, he is guilty
of fraud, and must act as trustee, the private respondents
being the beneficiaries, under the Article 1456.

B. SOLUTIO INDEBITI
ANDRES vs. MANUFACTURERS HANOVER
CORPORATION,
G.R. NO. 82670 September 15, 1989

&

TRUST

Petitioner refuses to return the second remittance to the

respondent
bank when the respondent bank mistakenly
remitted a certain amount for a specific transaction twice on
behalf of the buyer on the premise that the buyer still owes
the petitioner money. For quasi-contract of solutio indebiti to
apply the following requisites must concur: "(1) that he who
paid was not under obligation to do so; and, (2) that payment
was made by reason of an essential mistake of fact", hence
petitioner must return to the bank the amount which was
mistakenly remitted for it is the buyer not the respondent
bank who has the obligation to the petitioner and not the
bank.

PUYAT & SONS, INC. vs. CITY OF MANILA, G.R. NO. L17447, April 30, 1963

The City Treasurer of Manila refused to refund the retail

dealer's tax erroneously paid by the petitioner on it's belief
that it was not exempted from such, on the ground that the
tax was voluntarily paid and not under protest which was a
condition sine qua non in order that a legal basis may arise.
Voluntariness is incompatible with mistake being a

case of solutio indebiti, protest is not required as a condition

sine qua non for its application.
4. OBLIGATIONS ARISING FROM DELICT
CINCO vs. CANONOY, G.R. NO. L-33171,May 31, 1979

Respondent Judge acted with grave abuse of discretion when

he upheld the Decision of the Lower court suspending the civil
action based on a quasi-delict until after the criminal case is
finally terminated. When
the civil action is based on an
obligation not arising from the act or omission complained of as
a felony, such civil action may proceed independently of the
criminal proceedings and regardless of the result of the latter.
5. OBLIGATIONS ARISING FROM QUASI
DELICT NAPOCOR vs. CA, G.R. NO.
124378, March 8, 2005

The negligence of NPC as a result of its inability to maintain

the level of water in its dams has been satisfactorily and
extensively established. In crimes and quasi-delicts, the
defendant shall be liable for all damages, which are the
natural and probable consequences of the act or omission
complained of and it is not necessary that such damages
have been foreseen or could have reasonably been foreseen
by the defendant.

NAPOCOR vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS,

G.R. NO. 124378. March 8, 2005

NPC as a result of its inability to maintain the level of water in

its dam brought damages to defendants but asserts that the
damages, if any, were due to the heavy rains and should be

regarded as a fortuitous event. Negligence or imprudence is

human factor which makes the whole occurrence humanized,
as it were, and removed from the rules applicable to acts of
God
JIMENEZ vs. CITY OF MANILA, G.R. NO. 71049, May
29, 1987

Respondent alleged that it is the Asiatic Integrated

Corporation that is managing the public market. Hence, it
cannot be liable for the injuries sustained by the petitioner
when he fell into an open drainage hole. The

City of Manila is likewise liable for damages under Article 2189

of the Civil Code, respondent City having retained control and
supervision over the Sta. Ana Public Market and as tort-feasor
under Article 2176 of the Civil Code on quasi-delicts
Respondent
City
of
Manila
and
Asiatic Integrated
Corporation being joint tort-feasors are solidarily liable under
Article 2194 of the Civil Code.
JIMENEZ vs. CITY OF MANILA, G.R. NO. 71049, May
29, 1987

Petitioner fell into the open drainage holes, causing him

physical injuries, in a public market being managed by
Asiatic Integrated Corporation but such public market is still
under the control and supervision of the City of Manila. As a
defense against liability on the basis of a quasi-delict, one
must have exercised the diligence of a good father of a family.
(Art. 1173 of the Civil Code).
VI.

NATURE AND EFFECTS OF OBLIGATION

A.OBLIGATION TO GIVE
GENERIC THING

DETERMINATE

THING

vs

SANCHEZ vs. RIGOS, G.R. NO. L-25494 June 14, 1972

In his complaint, plaintiff alleges that, by virtue of the option

under consideration, "defendant agreed and committed to sell"
and "the plaintiff agreed and committed to buy" the land
described in the option, hence, plaintiff maintains that the
promise contained in the contract is "reciprocally demandable.
"A promise to buy and sell a determinate thing for a price
certain is reciprocally demandable and an accepted unilateral
promise to buy or to sell a determinate thing for a price certain
is binding upon the promissor if the promise is supported by a
consideration distinct from the price.

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GAISANO CAGAYAN, INC. vs INSURANCE COMPANY

OF NORTH AMERICA, G.R. NO. 147839, June 8, 2006

Petitioners argument is that it is not liable for the unpaid

accounts because the fire is a fortuitous event. If the
obligation is generic in the sense that the object thereof is
designated merely by its class or genus without any particular
designation or physical segregation from all others of the
same class, the loss or destruction of anything of the same
kind even without the debtors fault and before he has
incurred in delay will not have the effect of extinguishing the
obligation, based on the principle

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that the genus of a thing can never perish, (Genus nunquan

perit) and an obligation to pay money is generic; therefore, it is
not excused by fortuitous loss of any specific property of the
debtor.
GAISANO CAGAYAN, INC. vs INSURANCE COMPANY
OF NORTH AMERICA, G. R. NO. 147839, June 8, 2006

Petitioners argument is that it is not liable for the unpaid

accounts because the fire is a fortuitous event. The rule that an
obligor should be held exempt from liability when the loss
occurs thru a fortuitous event only holds true when the
obligation consists in the delivery of a determinate thing and
there is no stipulation holding him liable even in case of
fortuitous event and it does not apply when the obligation is
pecuniary in nature.
B.FAILURE OF
PERFORMANCE ART 1170
ARRIETA vs. NARIC, G.R. NO. L-15645, January 31,
1964

It is clear upon the records that the sole and principal reason for
the cancellation of the allocation of rice contracted by the
appellee herein in Burma, was the failure of the letter of credit
to be opened by NARIC within the contemplated period
which resulted in the consequent damage. Every debtor who
fails in performance of his obligations due to fraud, negligence,
or delay is bound to indemnify for the losses and damages
caused thereby.
TELEFAST vs. CASTRO, G.R. NO. 73867, February 29,
1988

Petitioner and private respondent entered into a contract

whereby, for a fee, petitioner undertook to send said private
respondent's message overseas by telegram but which
11
1

petitioner did not do, despite performance by said private

respondent of her obligation by paying the required charges.
Those who in the performance of their obligations are guilty of
fraud, negligence or delay, and those who in any manner
contravene the tenor thereof, are liable for damages.
C.DELAY
1. MORA SOLVENDI
ART 11

11
2

SANTOS VENTURA HOCORMA FOUNDATION, INC., vs.

SANTOS, G.R. NO. 153004, November 5, 2004

When respondents wrote a demand letter to petitioner, the

obligation was already due and demandable, and when the
petitioner failed to pay its due obligation after the demand
was made, it incurred delay. Delay as used in this article is
synonymous to default or mora solvendi which means delay in
the fulfillment of obligations with respect to time and in order
for the debtor to be in default, it is necessary that the
following requisites be present: (1) that the obligation be
demandable and already liquidated; (2) that the debtor delays
performance; and
(3) that the creditor requires the
performance judicially or extrajudicially.
2. MORA ACCIPIENDI

MANUEL vs. CA, G.R. NO. 95469

July 25, 1991

Petitioner contends that private respondents are in mora

accipiendi. The failure of the owners to collect or their refusal
to
accept
the
rentals
are not valid defenses, since
consignation under such circumstances, is necessary, and by
this we mean one that is effected in full compliance with the
specific requirements of the law therefor.
3. COMPENSATIO MORAE
CORTES vs. CA, G.R. NO. 126083, July 12, 2006

Cortes admission agreed that the Corporations full payment of

the sum would depend upon his delivery of the TCTs of the
three lots. Considering that their obligation was reciprocal,
performance thereof must be simultaneous and the mutual
inaction of Cortes and the Corporation therefore gave rise to a
compensation morae or default on the part of both parties
because neither has completed their part in their reciprocal
obligation.

UNLAD RESOURCES DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION

vs. DRAGON, G.R. NO. 149338, July 28, 2008

Petitioners contend that they have fully complied with their

obligation under the Memorandum of Agreement but due to
respondents failure to increase the capital stock of the
corporation to an amount that will accommodate their
undertaking, it had become impossible for them to perform their
end of the Agreement. In reciprocal obligations, failure of the
other party to perform the obligation renders the other party to
demand fulfillment of the obligation or asked for the rescission of
the contract, but not simply not performing their part of the
Agreement.
D. NEGLIGENCE
1. DEGREE OF DILIGENCE
SICAM vs. JORGE, G.R. NO. 159617, August 8, 2007

Sicam exempts himself from liability on the ground that the

robbery of his pawnshop is a fortuitous event which is by
definition
is
an extraordinary event not foreseeable or
avoidable. In order for a fortuitous event to exempt one from
liability, it is necessary that one has committed no negligence
or misconduct that may have occasioned the loss and robbery
per se, just like carnapping, is not a fortuitous event for it
does not foreclose the possibility of negligence on the part of
herein petitioners.
MERALCO vs. RAMOY, G.R. NO. 158911, March 4, 2008

The respondents' cause of action against MERALCO is

anchored on culpa contractual or breach of contract for the
latter's discontinuance of its service to respondents. Article
1173 also provides that the fault or negligence of the obligor
consists in the omission of that diligence which is required by
the nature of the obligation and corresponds with the
circumstances of the persons, of the time and of the place,
hence, as a public utility, MERALCO has the obligation to
discharge its functions with utmost care and diligence.

MINDANAO TERM INAL AND BROKERAGE SERVICE,

INC. vs.
PHOENIX
ASSURANCE
COMPANY
OF
NEW
YORK,MCGEE & CO., INC., G.R. NO. 162467, May 8,
2009

Mindanao Terminal was required to observe ordinary diligence

only in loading and stowing the cargoes of Del Monte Produce
aboard M,V Mistrau since there is nothing in the contract which
requires a higher degree of diligence. If the law or contract
does not state the degree of diligence which is to be observed
in the performance of an obligation then that which is
expected of a good father of a family or ordinary diligence
shall be required.
2. FORTUITOUS EVENT
COMGLASCO CORPORATION/AGUILA GLASS vs. SANTOS CAR
CHECK CENTER CORPORATION, G.R. No. 202989, March 25,
2015, J. Reyes
The principle of rebus sic stantibus neither fits in with the facts of the
case. Under this theory, the parties stipulate in the light of certain
prevailing conditions, and once these conditions cease to exist, the
contract also ceases to exist. This theory is said to be the basis of
Article 1267 of the Civil Code. This article, which enunciates the
doctrine of unforeseen events, is not, however, an absolute
application of the principle of rebus sic stantibus, which would
endanger the security of contractual relations. The parties to the
contract must be presumed to have assumed the risks of unfavorable
developments. It is therefore only in absolutely exceptional changes of
circumstances that equity demands assistance for the debtor.
Relying on Article 1267 of the Civil Code to justify its decision to
pre-terminate its lease with respondent, petitioner invokes the 1997
Asian currency crisis as causing it much difficulty in meeting its
obligations. In Philippine National Construction Corporation v. CA, the
Court held that the payment of lease rentals does not involve a
prestation to do envisaged in Articles 1266 and 1267 which has been
rendered legally or physically impossible without the fault of the
obligor- lessor. Article 1267 speaks of a prestation involving service
which has been rendered so difficult by unforeseen subsequent events
as to be manifestly beyond the contemplation of the parties. To be
sure, the Asian currency crisis befell the region from July 1997 and for
sometime thereafter, but petitioner cannot be permitted to blame its
difficulties on the said regional economic phenomenon because it
entered into the subject lease only on August 16, 2000, more than
three years after it began, and by then petitioner had known what
business risks it assumed when it opened a new shop in Iloilo City.

NAKPIL & SONS v. CA, G.R. NO. L-47851 April 15,

1988

There was an earthquake which caused the building heavy

damage but the other nearby structures had less damages as
compared to the said building, the architects, engineers and
contractors are claiming fortuitous event as a defense. To be
exempt from liability due to an act of God, the ff must occur:
1) cause of breach must be independent of the will of the debtor
2) event must be unforeseeable or unavoidable
3) event must be such that it would render it impossible for the
debtor to fulfill the obligation
4) debtor must be free from any participation or agG.R.avation of
the industry to the creditor.
3. EXTRAORDINARY INFLATION
ALMEDA vs. BATHALA
January 28, 2008

MARKETING,G.R.NO.150806,

The lower court denied petitioners right to pass on to

respondent the burden of paying the VAT and their right to
collect the demanded increase in rental, there being no
extraordinary inflation or devaluation as provided for in the
seventh clause of the contract. Extraordinary inflation exists
when there is a decrease or increase in the purchasing power
of the Philippine currency which is unusual or beyond the
common fluctuation in the value of said currency, and such
increase or decrease could not have been reasonably foreseen
or was manifestly beyond the contemplation of the parties at
the time of the establishment of the obligation.

4. BREACH FOR RESCISSION

UNIVERSAL FOOD CORPORATION vs. THE COURT OF
APPEALS, G.R. NO. L-29155
May 13, 1970
Respondent patentee was dismissed as the permanent chief
chemist of the corporation without any fault or negligence on
his part after the execution of the Bill of Assignment, prompting
him to rescind the contract. The general rule is that rescission

of a contract will not be permitted for a slight or casual breach,

but only for such substantial and fundamental breach as would
defeat the very object of
the
parties
in
making
the
agreement.
VII.

KINDS OF CIVIL OBLIGATIONS

A.PURE OBLIGATIONS
ART 1179
HONGKONG AND SHANGHAI BANKING CORP. vs.
BROQUEZA, G.R. NO. 178610 November 17, 2010
Respondents executed undated promissory notes. They were not
able to pay the monthly amortizations of their respective loans,
which were suppose to be paid through salary deduction, to the
petitioner because of their dismissal. Loans secured by their
future retirement benefits to which they are no longer entitled
are reduced to unsecured and pure civil obligations and the
absence of a period within which to pay the obligation, the
fulfillment of which is demandable at once.
PAY vs. PALANCA, G.R. NO. L-29900June 28, 1974

Oppositor-appellee alleged that the rights of the petitionercreditor had already prescribed when the action based on a
dated promissory note was filed 15 years after. The wordings
of the promissory note being "upon demand," the obligation was
immediately due and had prescribed upon the lapse of ten
years from the date on the promissory
note.
B. CONDITIONAL
OBLIGATIONS
SUSPENSIVE CONDITION
183 SCRA 171
Art. 1181
JAVIER vs. CA, G.R. No. L-48194 March 15, 1990
When a contract is subject to a suspensive condition, its birth
and effectivity can take place only if and when the event
which constitutes the condition happens or is fulfilled, and if
the suspensive condition does not take place, the parties
would stand as if the conditional obligation had never
existed.
HEIRS OF PAULINO ATIENZA vs. ESPIDOL, G.R. NO.
180665

First, since Espidol failed to pay the installment on a day certain

fixed in their agreement, the Atienzas can afterwards validly
cancel and ignore the contract to sell because their
obligation to sell under it
did not arise. Since the
suspensive condition did not arise, the parties stood as if
the conditional obligation had never existed.
Second, it was not a pure suspensive condition in the sense
that the Atienzas
made
no
undertaking
while
the
installments were not yet

due. Mr. Justice Edgardo L. Paras gave a fitting example of

suspensive condition: Ill buy your land for P1,000.00 if you
pass the last bar examinations. This he said was suspensive
for the bar examinations results will be awaited. Meantime
the buyer is placed under no immediate obligation to the
person who took the examinations.
Here, however, although the Atienzas had no obligation as yet
to turn over title pending the occurrence of the suspensive
condition, it was implicit that they were under immediate
obligation not to sell the land to another in the meantime.
When Espidol failed to pay within the period provided in their
agreement, the Atienzas were relieved of any obligation to
hold the property in reserve for him.

REYES vs. TUPARAN, G.R. NO. 188064, June 1, 2011

The petitioner was rescinding the subject Deed of Conditional
Sale pursuant to Article 1191 of the Civil Code because of the
respondents failure,refusal to pay the balance of the total
purchase price of
the petitioners properties within the
stipulated period. The full payment of the purchase price is
the positive suspensive condition, the failure of which is not a
breach of contract, but simply an event that prevented the
obligation of the vendor to convey title from acquiring binding
force.
SPS. SANTOS vs. CA, G.R. NO. 120820, August 1,
2000

In view of our finding in the present case that the

aG.R.eement between the parties is a contract to sell, it
follows that the appellate court erred when it decreed that a
judicial rescission of said aG.R.eement was necessary. In a
contract to sell, the payment of the purchase price is a
positive suspensive condition and failure to pay the price
agreed upon is not a mere breach, casual or serious, but a

situation that prevents the obligation of the vendor to convey

title from acquiring an obligatory force.

CONDITION PRECEDENT
PARKS vs. PROVINCE OF TARLAC, G.R. NO. L-24190,
July 13, 1926

Appellant contends that a condition precedent having been

imposed in the donation and the same not having been
complied with, the donation never became effective. The
characteristic of a condition precedent is that the acquisition
of the right is not effected while said condition is not
complied
with
or
is not
deemed
complied
with,
consequently, when a

condition is imposed, the compliance of which cannot be

effected except when the right is deemed acquired, such
condition cannot be a condition precedent but a condition
subsequent.

RESOLUTORY
CONDITION ART 1181
CENTRAL PHILIPPINE UNIVERSITY vs. CA, G.R. NO.
112230. July 17, 1995

Petitioner failed to comply to build a school on the donated

land given by the private respondent, which prompted the
private respondent to rescind the donation. On conditional
obligations,
the
acquisition
of
rights
as
well
the
extinguishment or loss of those already acquired shall depend
upon the happening of the event which constitutes the
condition, thus, when a person donates land to another on
the condition that the latter would build upon the land a
school is such a resolutory one and if there was no fulfillment
with the condition such as what obtains in the instant case,
the donation may be revoked & all rights which the donee
may have acquired shall be deemed lost & extinguished.
C. OBLIGATIONS W ITH A PERIOD
ROWENA
R.
SALONTE
vs.
COMMISSION
ON
AUDIT,
CHAIRPERSON MA. GRACIA PULIDO-TAN,
COMMISSIONER
JUANITO G. ESPINO, JR., COMMISSIONER HEIDI
L. MENDOZA, and FORTUNATA M. RUBICO, DIRECTOR IV, COA
COMMISSION SECRETARIAT, G.R. No. 207348, August 19, 2014,
J. Velasco, Jr.,
Obligations with a resolutory period take effect at once, but terminate
upon arrival of the day certain. A day certain is understood to be that
which must necessarily come, although it may not be known when. If
the uncertainty consists in whether the day will come or not, the
obligation is conditional. In the instant case, a plain reading of the
Contract of Reclamation reveals that the six (6)-year period provided

for project completion, or termination of the contract was a mere

estimate and cannot be considered a period or a "day certain" in the
context of Art. 1193. To be clear, par. 15 of the Contract of Reclamation
states: "the project is estimated to be completed in six (6) years." The
lapse of six (6) years from the perfection of the contract did not, make
the obligation to finish the reclamation project demandable, such as to
put the obligor in a state of actionable delay for its inability to finish.
Thus, F.F. Cruz cannot be deemed to be in delay.

RADIOWEALTH FINANCE COMPANY vs. Spouses DEL

ROSARIO, G.R. NO. 138739. July 6, 2000

Petitioner claimed that respondents are liable for the whole

amount of their debt and the interest thereon, after they
defaulted on the monthly installments, due to acceleration
clause therein. Respondents, on the other hand, countered
that the installments were not yet due and demandable,
evidenced by the blank space left for the date on which the
installments should have commenced and theorized that
fulfillment of the obligation is dependent on the sole will of
the debtor, hence proper court should first fix a period for
payment. The act of leaving blank the due date of the first
installment did not necessarily mean that the debtors were
allowed to pay as and when they could, since the presence of
an acceleration clause and a late payment penalty, showed
the intention of the parties that the installments should be
paid at a definite date, this is an obligation with a period.
LIM vs.PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. NO. L-34338
November 21, 1984

Petitioner seeks the reversal of the decision of the lower court

which convicted her of the crime of Estafa when she failed to
give the proceeds of the sale of the tobacco in accordance with
their agreement which says that ''...payment should be given
as soon as the tobaccos are sold...'' and contended that the court
should first fix the period. It is clear in the aG.R.eement, that
the obligation was immediately demandable as soon as the
tobacco was disposed of hence, Article 1197 of the New Civil
Code, which provides that the courts may fix the duration of the
obligation if it does not fix a period, does not apply.
ART 1197
ARANETA, INC., vs.PHILIPPINE SUGAR ESTATES, G.R.
NO. L-22558 May 31, 1967
Araneta, who was not able to comply with his obligation to
create side streets on the sides of the land which were sold to
the PSE due to the presence of squatters, questions the

decision of the lower court ordering him to comply with his

obligation within 2 years from the finality of the decision. It
must be recalled that Article 1197 of the Civil Code involves a
two-step process, the Court must first determine that "the
obligation does not fix a period", or from the nature and the
circumstances it can be inferred that a period was intended,
because courts can not fix a period merely because in its
opinion it is or should be reasonable and the

complaint not having sought that the court should set a

period, but must set the time that the parties are shown to
have intended.
4. OBLIGATIONS W ITH A PENAL CLAUSE
SSS vs. MOONWALK DEVELOPMENT & HOUSING
CORPORATION, G.R. NO. 73345, April 7, 1993.
Is the penalty demandable even after the extinguishment of
the principal obligation? For all purposes the principal
obligation of defendant- appellee was deemed extinguished
as well as the accessory obligation of real estate mortgage,
the penal clause which is also an accessory obligation must
also be deemed extinguished, it would be otherwise, if the
demand for the payment of the penalty was made prior to the
extinguishment of the obligation because by then the debtor
would be in mora and therefore liable for the penalty.
THE BACHRACH MOTOR CO., INC., vs. ESPIRITU, G.R.
NO. L-28497
November 6, 1928

Defendant alleged that the decision of the lower court to pay

25 percent
of the amount of the trucks in addition to the
amount of the
trucks plus
12 per cent per annum is
unconscionable and exceeds the rate fixed by law. The penalty
agreed upon does not include the interest, and which may
be demanded separetely and the penalty is not to be added to
the interest for the determination of whether the
interest
exceeds the rate fixed by the law, since said rate was fixed
only for the interest.
ROBES-FRANCISCO
REALTY
&
DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION vs. CFI, G.R. NO. L-41093, October 30,
1978

Petitioner corporation questions the award for nominal damages

and attorney's fee since the contract agreed upon indicated an
interest at 4% per annum of the total amount to be paid which
should be considered as penalty clause for failure to comply with
12
0

the obligation hence, the vendee cannot recover more than what
is agreed upon. Those who in the performance of their
obligations are guilty of fraud, negligence, or delay, and those
who in any manner contravene the tenor thereof, are liable for
damages and nominal damages are not
intended
for
indemnification
of
loss suffered but for the vindication or
recognition of a right violated or invaded.
5. RECIPROCAL OBLIGATION

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GOLDEN VALLEY EXPLORATION, INC. vs. PINKIAN MINING COMPANY

and COPPER VALLEY, INC., G.R. No. 190080, June 11, 2014, J. PerlasBernabe

In reciprocal obligations, either party may rescind the contract upon the
others substantial breach of the obligation/s he had assumed
thereunder. The basis therefor is Article 1191 of the Civil Code. PMC
rescinded the operating agreement with GVEI due to failure of the latter
to advance payment for actual cost. The court ruled that in reciprocal
obligations, either party may rescind the contract upon the others
substantial breach of the obligation/s he had assumed thereunder.
SWIRE REALTY DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION vs. JAYNE YU, G.R. No.
207133, March 09, 2015, J. Peralta
The right of rescission of a party to an obligation under Article 1191 of
the Civil Code is predicated on a breach of faith by the other party
who violates the reciprocity between them. The breach contemplated
in the said provision is the obligors failure to comply with an existing
obligation. When the obligor cannot comply with what is incumbent
upon it, the obligee may seek rescission and, in the absence of any
just cause for the court to determine the period of compliance, the
court shall decree the rescission. Thus, the delay in the completion of
the project as well as of the delay in the delivery of the unit are
breaches of statutory and contractual obligations which entitle
respondent to rescind the contract, demand a refund and payment of
damages.
AGCAOILI vs. GSIS, G.R. NO. L-30056, August 30,
1988

GSIS sold a house to Agcaoili, and required him to

immediately occupy it under pain of cancellation of the sale,
but Agcaoili found out that
the house was uninhabitable
hence payment was suspended which prompted GSIS to
cancel the sale. It is axiomatic that "(i)n reciprocal
obligations, neither party incurs in delay if the other does not
comply or is not ready to comply in a proper manner with
what is incumbent upon him."
UNLAD RESOURCES DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION
vs. DRAGON, G.R. NO. 149338, July 28, 2008
12
1

Petitioners contend that they have fully complied with their

obligation under the Memorandum of Agreement but due to
respondents failure to increase the capital stock of the
corporation to an amount that will accommodate their
undertaking, it had become impossible for them to perform their
end of the Agreement. In reciprocal obligations, failure of the
other party to perform the obligation renders the other
party
to

12
2

demand fulfillment of the obligation or asked for the rescission

of the contract, but not simply not performing their part of the
Agreement.
AGCAOILI vs. GSIS, G.R. NO. L-30056, August 30,
1988

GSIS sold a house to Agcaoili, and required him to

immediately occupy it under pain of cancellation of the sale,
but Agcaoili found out that the house was uninhabitable
hence payment was suspended which prompted GSIS to
cancel the sale. It is axiomatic that "(i)n reciprocal
obligations, neither party incurs in delay if the other does not
comply or is not ready to comply in a proper manner with
what is incumbent upon him."
VIII.

JOINT AND SOLIDARY

OBLIGATIONS SOLIDARY
OBLIGATION
SPOUSES RODOLFO BEROT AND LILIA BEROT vs.FELIPE C.
SIAPNO, G.R. No.
188944, July 9, 2014, CJ. Sereno
As previous ruled by the Court, The well entrenched rule is that
solidary obligations cannot be inferred lightly. They must be positively
and clearly expressed. A liability is solidary only when the obligation
expressly so states, when the law so provides or when the nature of the
obligation so requires. Respondent was not able to prove by a
preponderance of evidence that petitioners' obligation to him was
solidary. Hence, applicable to this case is the presumption under the
law that the nature of the obligation herein can only be considered as
joint. It is incumbent upon the party alleging otherwise to prove with a
preponderance of evidence that petitioners' obligation under the loan
contract is indeed solidary in character.
OLONGAPO CITY vs. SUBIC WATER AND SEWERAGE CO., INC., G.R. No.
171626, August 6, 2014, J. Brion

Solidary liability must be expressly stated. In the present case, the

joint and several liability of Subic Water and OCWD was nowhere clear
in the agreement. The agreement simply and plainly stated that
Olongapo City and OCWD were only requesting Subic Water to be a comaker, in view of its assumption of OCWDs water operations. Under
these circumstances, Olongapo City cannot proceed after Subic Water
for OCWDs unpaid obligations. The law explicitly states that solidary
liability is not presumed and must be expressly provided for. Not being
a surety, Subic Water is not an insurer of OCWDs obligations under
the compromise agreement.

ESTANISLAO AND AFRICA SINAMBAN VS. CHINA BANKING

CORPORATION G.R. No. 193890. March 11, 2015, J. REYES
A co-maker of a promissory note who binds himself with the maker
jointly and severally renders himself directly and primarily liable
with the maker on the debt, without reference to his solvency.
INIMACO vs. NLRC, G.R. NO. 101723, May 11, 2000

The absence of the word "solidary" in the dispositive portion of

the Decision, renders the liability joint. Well-entrenched is the
rule that solidary obligation cannot lightly be inferred, and
there is a solidary liability only when the obligation expressly
so states, when the law so provides or when the nature of the
obligation so requires.

PNB vs. INDEPENDENT PLANTERS ASSOCIATION,

INC., G.R. NO.L- 28046.
May 16, 1983

PNB assails the order of dismissal of the lower court

dismissing its complaint against several solidary debtors on
the gr.ound that one of the defendants died during the
pendency of the case and therefore the complaint, being a
money claim based on contract, should be prosecuted in the
testate or intestate proceeding for the settlement of the
estate of the deceased. The choice is undoubtedly left to the
solidary creditor to determine against whom he will enforce
collection and in case of the death of one of the solidary
debtors, the creditor may, if he so chooses, proceed against
the surviving solidary debtors without necessity of filing a
claim in the estate of the deceased debtors.
JOINT OBLIGATIONS
TOPIC: JOINT and SOLIDARY OBLIGATIONS
RONQUILLO vs.CA, G.R. NO. L-55138September 28,
1984

Respondent filed a modification of the order of the lower court in

a collection case praying for the "execution of the decision in its
entirety against all defendants, jointly and severally." In the
absence of a finding of facts that the defendants made
themselves individually liable for the debt incurred they are
each liable only for one-fourth of said amount, the obligation
being described as "individually and jointly".

JOINT and SOLIDARY OBLIGATIONS

SPOUSES CHIN KONG WONG CHOI AND ANA O. CHUA VS.
UNITED COCONUT PLANTERS BANK, G.R. No. 207747. March
11, 2015, J. Carpio
Spouses Choi entered into contract to sell with Primetown Property
Group, Inc. a domestic corporation engaged in the business of
condominium construction and real estate development. Primetown
on the other hand assigned its receivables to United Coconut Planters
Bank. Despite full payment Primetown failed to deliver the
condominium unit. Spouses Choi sued UCPB and Primetown. UCPB
was not Primetowns successor-in-interest and was not jointly and
severally liable with Primetown for the latters failure to deliver the
condominium unit. The Supreme Court held that considering that
UCPB is a mere assignee of the rights and receivables under the
Agreement, UCPB did not assume the obligations and liabilities of
Primetown under its contract to sell with Spouses Choi.
CALANG vs. PEOPLE
NO. 190696
August 3, 2010

OF

THE

PHILIPPINES,

G.R.

Philtranco Bus has been held solidarily liable with its bus
driver, Calang, when Calang accidentally collided with a
jeepney killing a bystander and two jeepney passengers while
other passengers were seriously injured. Since the cause of
action against Calang was based on delict, Philtranco cannot
be held jointly and severally liable with Calang, based on
quasi- delict under Articles 2176 and 2180 of the Civil Code
which pertain to
the vicarious liability of an employer for
quasi-delicts that an employee has committed.
IX. EXTINGUISHMENT OF
OBLIGATIONS MODES OF
EXTINGUISHING OBLIGATIONS

SAURA IMPORT and EXPORT CO., INC. vs.

DEVELOPMENT BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. NO.
L-24968
April 27, 1972
RFC turned down the request of Saura, Inc. for an additional
loan which prompted Saura, Inc. to ask that the mortgage be
cancelled, which was done. The action thus taken by both
parties was in the nature mutual desistance what Manresa
terms "mutuo disenso" which is a mode of extinguishing
obligations, a concept that derives from the principle that
since mutual aG.R.eement can create a contract, mutual
disaG.R.eement by the parties can cause its extinguishment.

A. EXTINGUISHMENT BY PAYMENT OR
PERFORMANCE
RIVELISA REALTY, INC. VS. FIRST STA. CLARA BUILDERS
CORPORATION G.R.
No. 189618, January 15, 2014, J. Perlas-Bernabe
First Sta. Clara is entitled to be compensated for the development
works it had accomplished on the project based on the principle of
quantum meruit. Case law instructs that under this principle, a
contractor is allowed to recover the reasonable value of the thing or
services rendered despite the lack of a written contract, in order to
avoid unjust enrichment. Quantum meruit means that, in an action for
work and labor, payment shall be made in such amount as the plaintiff
reasonably deserves. The measure of recovery should relate to the
reasonable value of the services performed because the principle aims
to prevent undue enrichment based on the equitable postulate that it is
unjust for a person to retain any benefit without paying for it. In this
case, it is undisputed that First Sta. Clara already performed certain
works on the project with an estimated value of P4,578, 152.10. Clearly,
to completely deny it payment for the same would result in Rivelisa
Realty's unjust enrichment at the former' s expense. Besides, as may
be gleaned from the parties' correspondence, Rivelisa Realty obligated
itself to unconditionally reimburse First Sta. Clara the amount of
P3,000,000.00 (representing First Sta. Clara's valuation of its
accomplished works at P4,578,152.10, less the cash advances and
subcontractor's fees) after the JV A had already been terminated by
them through mutual assent. As such, Rivelisa Realty cannot
unilaterally renege on its promise by citing First Sta. Clara's nonfulfilment of the terms and conditions of the terminated JVA. For all
these reasons, the CA' s ruling must be upheld.
PHILIPPINE COMMERCIAL INTERNATIONAL BANK (now BDO
UNIBANK, INC.),
vs. ARTURO P. FRANCO, substituted by his heirs, namely:
MAURICIA P. FRANCO, FLORIBEL P. FRANCO, AND ALEXANDER
P. FRANC0,G.R. No. 180069,
March 5, 2014, J. Peralta
Payment: Although Article 1271 of the Civil Code provides for a legal
presumption of renunciation of action (in cases where a private
document evidencing a credit was voluntarily returned by the creditor
to the debtor), this presumption is
merely prima facie and is not conclusive; the presumption loses
efficacy when faced

with evidence to the contrary. The provision merely raises a

presumption, not of payment, but of the renunciation of the credit
where more convincing evidence would be required than what
normally would be called for to prove payment.
NETLINK COMPUTER INCORPORATED vs. ERIC DELMO, G.R No.
160827, June
18, 2014, J. Bersamin
One who pleads payment has the burden of proving it. Even where the
plaintiff must allege non-payment, the general rule is that the burden
rests on the defendant to prove payment, rather than on the plaintiff to
prove non-payment. When the

creditor is in possession of the document of credit, he need not prove

non-payment for it is presumed. The creditor's possession of the
evidence of debt is proof that the debt has not been discharged by
payment. In this case, respondent's possession of the original copies of
the subject Trust Indenture Certificate strongly supports his claim that
petitioner Bank's obligation to return the principal plus interest of the
money placement has not been extinguished.
As a general rule, all obligations shall be paid in Philippine currency.
However, the contracting parties may stipulate that foreign
currencies may be used for settling obligations. This notwithstanding,
the practice of a company of paying its sales agents in US dollars
must be taken into consideration.
Thus, in the absence of a written agreement between the employer
and the employee that sales commissions shall be paid in a foreign
currency, the latter has the right to be paid in such foreign currency
once the same has become an established practice of the former. The
rate of exchange at the time of payment, not the rate of exchange at
the time of the sales, controls.
With the payment of US dollar commissions having ripened into a
company practice, there is no way that the commissions due to Delmo
were to be paid in US dollars or their equivalent in Philippine currency
determined at the time of the sales. To rule otherwise would be to
cause an unjust diminution of the commissions due and owing to
Delmo.
ELIZABETH DEL CARMEN vs. SPOUSES RESTITUTO
SABORDO and MIMA MAHILUM-SABORDO, G.R. No.
181723, August 11, 2014, J. Peralta
It is settled that compliance with the requisites of a valid consignation
is mandatory. Failure to comply strictly with any of the requisites will
render the consignation void. One of these requisites is a valid prior
tender of payment. In the instant case, the SC finds no cogent reason
to depart from the findings of the CA and the RTC that Del Carmen and
her co-heirs failed to make a prior valid tender of payment to Sabordo.

Under Article 1256, the only instances where prior tender of payment is
excused are: (1) when the creditor is absent or unknown, or does not
appear at the place of payment; (2) when the creditor is incapacitated

to receive the payment at the time it is due; (3) when, without just
cause, the creditor refuses to give a receipt; (4) when two or more
persons claim the same right to collect; and (5) when the title of the
obligation has been lost. None of these instances are present in the
instant case.
Hence, the fact that the subject lots are in danger of being foreclosed
does not

excuse petitioner and her co-heirs from tendering payment to

respondents, as directed by the court.
LEONARDO BOGNOT vs. RRI LENDING CORPORATION,
REPRESENTED BY ITS GENERAL MANAGER, DARIO J.
BERNARDEZ, G.R. No. 180144, September 24,
2014, J. Brion
Novation: In order to give novation legal effect, the creditor should
consent to the substitution of a new debtor. Novation must be
clearly and unequivocally shown, and cannot be presumed.
RODRIGO RIVERA VS. SPOUSES SALVADOR C. CHUA AND
VIOLETA S. CHUA/ SPOUSES SALVADOR C. CHUA AND VIOLETA
S. CHUA VS. RODRIGO RIVERA, G.R.
Nos. 184458/184472. January 14, 2015, J. Perez
There are four instances when demand is not necessary to constitute
the debtor in default: (1) when there is an express stipulation to that
effect; (2) where the law so provides; (3) when the period is the
controlling motive or the principal inducement for the creation of the
obligation; and (4) where demand would be useless. In the first two
paragraphs, it is not sufficient that the law or obligation fixes a date for
performance; it must further state expressly that after the period
lapses, default will commence. Based on a promissory note the parties
evidently agreed that the maturity of the obligation at a date certain,
31 December 1995. Until 31 December 1995, demand was not
necessary before Rivera could be held liable for the principal amount
of P120,000.00. Thereafter, on 1 January 1996, upon default, Rivera
became liable to pay the Spouses Chua not only the principal
obligation but also damages, in the form of stipulated interest.
THE WELLEX GROUP INC. VS. U-LAND AIRLINES CO. LTD. G.R.
No. 167519.
January 14, 2015, J. Leonen
Petitioner Wellex and respondent U-Land bound themselves to
negotiate with each other within a 40-day period to enter into a share
purchase agreement. If no share purchase agreement was entered
into, both parties would be freed from their respective undertakings. It
is the non-occurrence or non-execution of the share purchase
agreement that would give rise to the obligation to both parties to free
each other from their respective undertakings. This includes returning
to each other all that they received in pursuit of entering into the share
purchase agreement. At the lapse of the 40-day period, the parties
failed to enter into a share purchase agreement. This lapse is the first

circumstance provided for in Article 1185 that gives rise to the

obligation. Applying Article 1185, the parties were then obligated to
return to each other all that they had received in order to be freed from
their respective undertakings.

NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION vs. LUCMAN M. IBRAHIM et al.,

G.R. No.
175863, February 18, 2015, J. Perez
Article 1242 of the Civil Code is an exception to the rule that a valid
payment of an obligation can only be made to the person to whom
such obligation is rightfully owed. It contemplates a situation where a
debtor pays a possessor of credit i.e., someone who is not the real
creditor but appears, under the circumstances, to be the real creditor.
In such scenario, the law considers the payment to the possessor of
credit as valid even as against the real creditor taking into account
the good faith of the debtor. Hence, NAPOCORs payment to
Mangondato of the fees and indemnity due for the subject land as a
consequence of the execution of Civil Case No. 605 -92 and Civil Case
No. 610-92 could still validly extinguish its obligation to pay for the
same even as against the Ibrahims and Maruhoms.
AZCONA vs. JAMANDRE, G.R. NO. L-30597, SCRA,
June 30, 1987

The rental stipulated therein was P7,200.00 but payment

being acknowledged in the receipt was P7,000.00 only, yet no
mention was made in the receipt of the discrepancy and, on
the contrary, the payment was acknowledged "as per
contract". When the obligee accepts the performance,
knowing its incompleteness or irregularity, and without
expressing any protest or objection, the obligation is deemed
fully complied with.
J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc. vs. Javier, NO. L-28569,
February 27, 1970

Apart from the initial installment of P396.12, paid upon the

execution of the contract, the defendant religiously satisfied
the monthly installments accruing thereafter, for a period of
almost eight (8) years and although the principal obligation
under the contract was P3,691.20, the total payments made
by the defendant including stipulated interest, aggregated
P4,134.08.

If the obligation has been substantially performed in good

faith, the obligor may recover as though there had been a
strict and complete fulfillment, less damages suffered by the
obligee.
ART 1240
TO W HOM PAYMENT SHOULD BE MADE
SPOUSES MINIAN0 vs. CONCEPCION, G.R. 172825,
October 11, 2012

Admittedly, payment of the remaining balance of P200,000.00

was not made to the creditors themselves, but rather, it was
allegedly made to a certain Losloso who was the authorized
agent of
petitioners. Respondents obligation consists of
payment of a sum of money, and in general, a payment in order
to be effective to discharge an obligation, must be made to
the proper person, thus, payment must be made to the obligee
himself or to an agent having authority, express or implied, to
receive the particular payment. Payment made to one having
apparent authority to receive the money will, as a rule, be
treated as though actual authority had been given for its
receipt. If payment is made to one who by law is authorized
to act for the creditor, it will work as a
discharge.
ARANAS vs. TUTAAN, 127 SCRA 828
All dividends accruing to the said shares after the rendition of
judgment belonged to Aranas but UTEX paid the codefendants despite its knowledge and understanding of the
final judgment. It is elementary that payment made by a
judgment debtor to a wrong party cannot extinguish the
obligation of such debtor to its creditor.
PAYMENT NOT IN PHIL CURRENCY
HYDRO RESOURCES vs. NATIONAL IRRIGATION
INISTRATION,
G.R. NO. 160215, November 10, 2004

ADM

The contract between NIA and Hydro is an internationally

tendered contract considering that it was funded by the
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development
(IBRD). As a contract funded by an international organization,
particularly one recognized by the Philippines,3 the contract is
exempt from the provisions of R.A. No. 529, as amended by.
R.A. No. 4100 (Act To Assure Uniform Value to Philippine
Coin And Currency).
PONCE vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, G.R.
NO. L-49494 May 31, 1979

The promissory note in question provided on its face for

payment of the obligation in Philippine currency, but the
aG.R.eement between the parties originally involved a dollar
transaction.
If there is any agreement to pay an obligation in a currency
other than Philippine legal tender, the same is null and void as
contrary to public policy, pursuant to Republic Act No. 529, and
the most that could be demanded is to pay said obligation
in Philippine currency, hence, a

creditor herein cannot oblige the debtor to pay him in dollars,

even if the loan were given in said currency.
KALALO vs. LUZ, G.R. NO. L-27782, July 31, 1970
Appellant claims that lower court erred in declaring and
holding that the balance owing from defendant-appellant to
plaintiff-appellee on the IRRI Project should be paid on the
basis of the rate of exchange of the U.S. dollar to the
Philippine peso at the time of payment of judgment. Even if
the obligation assumed by the defendant was to pay the
plaintiff a sum of money expressed in American currency, the
indemnity to be allowed should be expressed in Philippine
currency at the rate of exchange at the time of judgment
rather than at the rate of exchange prevailing on the date of
defendant's breach.
LEGAL TENDER
TIBAJIA vs. CA, G.R. NO. 100290, June 4, 1993

Checks representing deposit money do not have legal tender

power and their acceptance in the payment of debts, both
public and private, is at the option of the creditor.
ROMAN CATHOLIC vs. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE
COURT, G.R. NO. 72110. November 16, 1990.
Since a negotiable instrument is only a substitute for money
and not money, the delivery of such an instrument does not,
by itself, operate as payment. A check, whether a managers
check or ordinary check, is not legal tender, and an offer of a
check in payment of a debt is not a valid tender of payment
and may be refused receipt by the obligee or creditor.
PAPA vs. VALENCIA, G.R. NO. 105188, January 23,
1998
Petitioner received the payment partly in cash and partly in
check but
was not able to encash the check, and now
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0

questions the said payment after 10 years. Respondents, on

the other hand, want the petitioner to deliver to them the
owners duplicate of the title and the peaceful possession
and enjoyment of the lot in question.
The geneal rule is delivery of a check produces the effect of
payment only when it is cashed, pursuant to Art. 1249 of the
Civil Code. The rule does not apply, however, if the debtor is
prejudiced by the creditors unreasonable delay in the
presentment of the check. Acceptance of a check implies an
undertaking of due diligence in presenting it for

13
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payment, and if he from whom it is received sustains loss by

want of such diligence, it will be held to operate as actual
payment of the debt or obligation for which it was given.
B. CONSIGNATIO
N ART 1257
SOCO vs. MILITANTE, G.R. NO. L-58961 June 28, 1983
Defendant authorized the Commercial Bank and Trust
Company to issue checks to the plaintiff for the payment of
rentals, but the plaintiff refused to accept them. In view of
such
refusal, defendant instructed said
bank
to make
consignation with the Clerk of Court of the City Court, but the
bank did not send notice to Soco that the checks will be
deposited in consignation with the Clerk of Court.
The purpose of the notice, which is essential to the validity of
the consignation, is in order to give the creditor an
opportunity to reconsider his unjustified refusal and to
accept payment thereby avoiding consignation and the
subsequent litigation, hence, failure to give such notice
renders the consignation void.
DALTON vs. FG.R. and
NO. 172577
January 19, 2011

DEVELOPMENT CORP,

G.R.

The withdrawal by the creditor of the amounts consigned was

subject to the express reservation of assailing the validity of
the consignation. In such case, the creditor is not deemed to
have waived the claims he reserved against his debtor. When
the amount consigned does not cover the entire obligation,
the creditor may accept it, reserving his right to the balance.
ART 1258
SOCO vs. MILITANTE, G.R. NO. L-58961 June 28, 1983
If the creditor to whom tender of payment has been made
refuses without just cause to accept it, the debtor shall be
released from responsibility by consignation which is the act of
13
1

depositing the thing due with the court or judicial authorities

but it generally requires a prior tender of
payment.
ART 1259
SOCO vs. MILITANTE, G.R. NO. L-58961 June 28, 1983

13
2

Defendant contended that payments of rental thru checks

were made to the plaintiff but the latter refused to accept
them, hence defendant authorized the bank to make
consignation with the Clerk of Court. In order to be valid, the
tender of payment must be made in lawful currency, but
payment in check by the debtor may be acceptable as valid,
if no prompt objection to said payment is made.
SOCO vs. MILITANTE, G.R. NO. L-58961 June 28, 1983
The decision subject of the present petition for review holds
the view that there was substantial compliance with the
requisites of consignation and so ruled in favor of private
respondent. Substantial compliance is not enough and the
essential requisites of a valid consignation, under Articles
1256 to 1261 of the New Civil Code must be complied with
fully and strictly in accordance with the law and must be
accorded a mandatory construction.
Immaculata vs. Navarro, G.R. NO.L-42230, April 15,
1988
Respondents alleged that the offer to redeem was not
sincere, because there was no consignation. The right to
redeem is a RIGHT, not an obligation, therefore, there is no
consignation required to preserve the right to redeem.
TENDER OF PAYMENT
SPOUSES CACAYORIN vs. ARMED FORCES AND
POLICE MUTUAL BENEFIT ASSOCIATION, INC., G.R.
NO.171298, April 15, 2013

Petitioner alleged that the lack of prior tender of payment to

their consignation case is because they were at a loss as to
which between the two the Rural Bank or AFPMBAI was
entitled to such a tender of payment. Article 1256 authorizes
consignation alone, without need of prior tender of payment,
where the ground for consignation is that the creditor is

unknown, or does not appear at the place of payment; or is

incapacitated to receive the payment at the time it is due; or
when, without just cause, he refuses to give a receipt; or
when two or more persons claim the same right to collect; or
when the title of the obligation has been lost.
SPOUSES TEOFILO
February 20, 2003

vs.

REYES,

G.R.

NO.

150913,

Petitioners failed to (a) offer a valid and unconditional tender

of payment;
(b) notify respondents of the intention to deposit the amount
with the court; and
(c) show the acceptance by the
creditor of the amount

deposited as full settlement of the obligation, or in the

alternative, a declaration by the court of the validity of the
consignation.
In order that consignation may be effective the debtor must
show that (a) there was a debt due; (b) the consignation of
the obligation had been made because the creditor to whom a
valid tender of payment was made refused to accept it; (c)
previous notice of the consignation had been given to the
person interested in the performance of the obligation; (d) the
amount due was placed at the disposal of the court; and, (e)
after the consignation had been made the person interested
was notified thereof.

SPOUSES CACAYORIN vs. ARMED FORCES AND

POLICE MUTUAL BENEFIT ASSOCIATION, INC., G.R.
NO.171298 : April 15, 20 13

Petitioner alleged that the lack of prior tender of payment to

their consignation case was because they were at a loss as to
which between the two the Rural Bank or AFPMBAI was
entitled to such a tender of payment.
Article 1256 authorizes consignation alone, without need of
prior tender of payment, where the ground for consignation is
that the creditor is unknown, or does not appear at the place
of payment; or is incapacitated to receive the payment at the
time it is due; or when, without just cause, he refuses to give
a receipt; or when two or more persons claim the same right
to collect; or when the title of the obligation has been lost.
C. DACION EN PAGO
CALTEX (PHILIPPINES), INC., vs. CA, G.R. NO. 72703,
November 13, 1992

Dation in payment does not necessarily mean total

extinguishment of the obligation but only up to the value of

the thing given and the obligation is totally extinguished only

when the parties, by aG.R.eement, express or implied, or by
their silence, consider the thing as equivalent to the
obligation.
PNB vs. PINEDA, G.R. NO. L-46658 May 13, 1991
Dation in payment is the delivery and transmission
of
ownership of a thing by the debtor to the creditor as an
accepted equivalent of the performance of the obligation. The
repossession of the machinery and equipment in question was
merely to secure the payment of TCC's loan

obligation and not for the purpose of transferring

thereof to PNB in satisfaction of said loan.

ownership

FILINVEST vs PHILIPPINE ACETYLENE, G.R. NO. L50449 January 30, 1982

In the absence of clear consent of appellee to the proferred
special mode of payment, there can be no transfer of
ownership from appellant to appellee by mere delivery to and
acceptance by him of the vehicle and should not be construed
as actual payment or more specifically, dacion en pago.
CITIZENS SURETY vs. COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. NO.
L-48958 June 28, 1988
In opposing the money claim, Respondent alleged that the
surety bonds and the indemnity agreements had been
extinguished by the execution of the deed of assignment,
because this amounted to dation in payment whereby the
former is considered to have alienated his property in favor of
the latter in satisfaction of a monetary debt (Artide 1245).
The transaction could not be dation in payment because
the deed of assignment was executed on December 4, 1959,
the obligation of the assignor to refund the assignee had not
yet arisen, hence, there was no obligation yet on the part of
the petitioner.
D. COMPENSATION
FIRST UNITED CONSTRUCTIONS CORPORATION AND BLUE STAR
CONSTRUCTION CORPORATION vs. BAHANIHAN AUTOMOTIVE
CORPORATION,
G.R. No. 164985, January 15, 2014, J. Bersamin
A debt is liquidated when its existence and amount are determined.
Accordingly, an unliquidated claim set up as a counterclaim by a
defendant can be set off against the plaintiffs claim from the moment
it is liquidated by judgment. Article 1290 of the Civil Code provides
that when all the requisites mentioned in Article 1279 of the Civil Code
are present, compensation takes effect by operation of law, and
extinguishes both debts to the concurrent amount. With petitioners
expenses for the repair of the dump truck being already established

and determined with certainty by the lower courts, it follows that legal
compensation could take place because all the requirements were
present. The legal interest rate to be imposed from February 11,
1993,the time of the extrajudicial demand by respondent, should be
6% per annum in the absence of any stipulation in writing in
accordance with Article 2209 of the Civil Code.

UNION BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. DEVELOPMENT BANK OF

THE
PHILIPPINES, G.R. No.191555,
January 20, 2014, J. PerlasBernabe
Compensation is defined as a mode of extinguishing obligations
whereby two persons in their capacity as principals are mutual debtors
and creditors of each other with respect to equally liquidated and
demandable obligations to which no retention or controversy has been
timely commenced and communicated by third parties
In this case, Union Bank filed a motion to seek affirmation that legal
compensation had taken place in order to effectively offset (a) its own
obligation to return the funds it previously received from DBP as
directed under the September 6, 2005 Writ of Execution with (b) DBPs
assumed obligations under the Assumption Agreement. However, legal
compensation could not have taken place between these debts for the
apparent reason that requisites 3 and 4 under Article 1279 of the Civil
Code are not present. Since DBPs assumed obligations to Union Bank
for remittance of the lease payments are in the Courts words in its
Decision dated January 13, 2004 in
G.R. No. 155838 " contingent on the prior payment thereof by [FW] to
DBP," it cannot be said that both debts are due (requisite 3 of Article
1279 of the Civil Code). Also, in the same ruling, the Court observed
that any deficiency that DBP had to make up (by December 29, 1998
as per the Assumption Agreement) for the full satisfaction of the
assumed obligations " cannot be determined until after the satisfaction
of Foodmasters obligation to DBP." In this regard, it cannot be
concluded that the same debt had already been liquidated, and
thereby became demandable (requisite 4 of Article 1279 of the Civil
Code).
In fine, since requisites 3 and 4 of Article 1279 of the Civil Code have
not concurred in this case, no legal compensation could have taken
place between the above-stated debts pursuant to Article 1290 of the
Civil Code. Perforce, the petition must be denied, and the denial of
Union Banks motion to affirm legal compensation sustained.
CESAR V. AREZA and LOLITA B. AREZA V EXPRESS SAVINGS
BANK, INC. and MICHAEL POTENCIANO. G.R No. 176697,
September 10, 2014. J. Perez
Under Art. 1278 of the New Civil Code, compensation shall take
place when two persons, in their own right, are creditors and
debtors of each other.

The relationship of the depositors and the Bank or similar institution is

that of creditor-debtor. Article 1980 of the New Civil Code provides that
fixed, savings and current deposits of money in banks and similar
institutions shall be governed by the provisions concerning simple
loans. The bank is the debtor and the depositor is the creditor. The
depositor lends the bank money and the bank agrees to pay the
depositor on demand. The savings deposit agreement between the
bank and the

depositor is the contract that determines the rights and obligations of

the parties.
Petitioners are not liable for the deposit of the altered checks. The
Bank, as the depositary and collecting bank ultimately bears the loss.
Thus, there being no indebtedness to the Bank on the part of
petitioners, legal compensation cannot take place.Under Art. 1278 of
the New Civil Code, compensation shall take place when two persons,
in their own right, are creditors and debtors of each other.
FEDERAL BUILDERS, INC. vs.FOUNDATION SPECIALISTS, INC., G.R. No.
194507,
September 8, 2014, J. Peralta

In the landmark case of Eastern Shipping Lines, Inc. v. Court of Appeals,

as regards particularly to an award of interest in the concept of actual
and compensatory damages, the rate of interest, as well as the accrual
thereof, is imposed, as follows: When the obligation is breached, and it
consists in the payment of a sum of money, i.e., a loan or forbearance
of money, the interest due should be that which may have been
stipulated in writing. Furthermore, the interest due shall itself earn legal
interest from the time it is judicially demanded. In the absence of
stipulation, the
rate of interest shall be 12% per annum to be
computed from default, i.e., from judicial or extrajudicial demand
under and subject to the provisions of Article 1169 of the Civil Code. In
line with the recent circular of the Monetary Board of the Bangko
Sentral ng Pilipinas No. 799 (July 1, 2013), the Court has modified the
guidelines in Nacar v. Gallery Frames, wherein the interest due shall
itself earn legal interest from the time it is judicially demanded and in
the absence of stipulation, the rate of interest shall be 6% per annum
to be computed from default, i.e., from judicial or extrajudicial demand
under and subject to the provisions of Article 1169 of the Civil Code.
This case, however, does not involve acquiescence to the temporary
use of a partys money but a performance of a particular service,
specifically the construction of the diaphragm wall, capping beam, and
guide walls
of the Trafalgar Plaza. Thus, in the absence of any
stipulation as to interest in the agreement between the parties herein,
the matter of interest award arising from the dispute in this case would
actually fall under the second paragraph of the above- quoted
guidelines in the landmark case of Eastern Shipping Lines, which
necessitates the imposition of interest at the rate of 6%, instead of the
12% imposed by the courts below. As to the rate of interest due

thereon, however, the Court notes that the same should be reduced to
6% per annum considering the fact that the obligation involved herein
does not partake of a loan or forbearance of money.
SOLINAP vs. DEL ROSARIO, G.R. No. L-50638 July 25,
1983
For compensation to take place, it is required that the amount
involved be certain and liquidated. Compensation cannot take
place where one's claim against the other is still the subject
of court litigation.
ART 1980
BPI vs CA, G.R. NO. 136202, January 25, 2007

Petitioner, as a collecting agent, debited Salazar's account. The

account was different from the original account to which the
proceeds
of
the check were credited but both accounts
belonged to Salazar. The debited account was the account of the
sole proprietorship she owns. The other account
was
her
personal account.
A bank generally has a right of set-off over the deposits
therein for the payment of any withdrawals on the part of a
depositor, because fixed, savings, and current deposits of
money in banks and similar institutions are governed by the
provisions concerning simple loan, hence, the relationship
between banks and depositors is that of creditor and debtor.
Legal compensation under Article 1278 of the Civil Code may
take place when all the requisites mentioned in Article 1279
are present.
GAN TION vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. NO. L22490, May 21, 1969

The award for attorney's fees is made in favor of the litigant,

not of his counsel, hence, it is the litigant, not his counsel,
who is the judgment creditor and who may enforce the
judgment by execution, such credit, therefore, may properly
be the subject of legal compensation.
ART 1278
PNB vs VDA. DE ONG
February 27, 1987

ACERO,

G.R.

NO.

L-69255,

PNB's main thesis is that when it opened a savings account

for ISABELA, it (PNB) became indebted to ISABELA, so that
when ISABELA itself subsequently came to be indebted to it
on account of ISABELA's breach of the terms of the Credit
Agreement, ISABELA and PNB became at the same time
creditors and debtors of each other, thus compensation

automatically took place between them, in accordance with

Article 1278 of the Civil Code.
Compensation shall take when two persons, in their own right,
are
creditors and debtors of each other and that
compensation may transpire by operation of law, as when all
the requisites therefor, set out in Article 1279, are present.
Nonetheless these legal provisions can not apply if it has not
proven by competent evidence that PNB is a creditor of
ISABELA.
FRANCIA vs. IAC, G.R. NO. L-67649 June 28, 1988

Francia contends that his tax delinquency has been

extinguished by legal compensation and claims that the
government owed him when a portion of his land was
expropriated, hence, his tax obligation had been set-off by
operation of law.
The general rule based on grounds of public policy is well-settled
that no set-off admissible against demands for taxes levied for
general or local governmental purposes because taxes are not in
the nature of contracts between the party and party but grow out
of duty to, and are the positive acts of the government to the
making and enforcing of which, the personal consent of
individual taxpayers is not required.
SYCIP vs. HONORABLE
NO. L-38711,
January 31, 1985

COURT

OF

APPEALS,

G.R.

Petitioner contends that respondent Court of Appeals erred

in not applying the provisions on compensation or setting-off
debts despite evidence showing that Lapuz, an agent of
Albert Smith and/or Dr. Dwight Dill, owed him. Compensation
takes place only when two persons in their own right are
creditors and debtors of each other, and that each one of the
obligors is bound principally and is at the same time a
principal creditor of the other.
MINDANAO PORTLAND CEMENT CORPORATION vs. CA,
G.R. NO. L62169, February 28, 1983
It is clear from the record that both corporations, petitioner
Mindanao Portland Cement Corporation (appellant) and
respondent Pacweld Steel Corporation (appellee), were
creditors and debtors of each other, their debts to each other
consisting in final and executory judgments of the Court of
First Instance in two (2) separate cases, ordering the payment
to each other of the sum of P10,000.00 by way of attorney's
fees. The two

(2) obligations,
therefore,
respectively
offset
each
other,
compensation having taken effect by operation of law and
extinguished
both debts to the concurrent
amount of
P10,000.00, pursuant to the provisions of Arts. 1278, 1279
and 1290 of the Civil Code, since all the requisites provided in
Art. 1279 of the said Code for automatic compensation "even
though the creditors and debtors are not aware of the
compensation" were duly present.
THE INTERNATIONAL CORPORATE BANK INC. vs. IAC,
G.R. NO. L- 69560 June 30, 1988
Petitioner contended that, after extrajudicially foreclosing the
mortgage, private respondent still owes the former an
amount, by way of deficiency.

Petitioner also claimed that it has the right to apply or set off
private respondent's money market claim despite the fact that
the validity of the extrajudicial foreclosure sale and petitioner's
claim for deficiency are still in question.
Article 1279 of the Civil Code requires among others, that in
order that legal compensation shall take place, "the two debts
be due" and "they be liquidated and demandable", because
compensation is not proper where the claim of the person
asserting the set-off against the other is not clear nor
liquidated.
MONDRAGON vs.
January 21, 2013

SOLA,

JR.,

G.R.

NO.

174882

Respondent reneged on his

promise
to
pay
petitioner.
Petitioner thereafter withheld the payment of respondent's
service fees and applied the same as partial payments of the
debt by way of compensation.
Compensation is a mode of extinguishing to the concurrent
amount the obligations of persons who in their own right and
as principals are reciprocally debtors and creditors of each
other. Legal compensation takes place by operation of law
when all the requisites are present, as opposed to
conventional compensation which takes place when the
parties aG.R.ee to compensate their mutual obligations even
in the absence of some requisites.
MONTEMAYOR vs. M ILLORA, G.R. NO. 168251.
27, 2011

July

Jesus contends that offsetting cannot be made because the

judgment
of
the RTC failed to specify
the
amount
of
attorneys fees and maintains that for offsetting to apply, the
two debts must be liquidated or ascertainable and the trial
court merely awarded to Vicente attorneys fees based on
quantum meruit without specifying the exact amount thereof.
A debt is considered liquidated, not only when it is expressed

already in definite figures which do not require verification,

but also when the determination of the exact amount depends
only on a simple arithmetical operation.
E. NOVATION
ARCO PULP AND PAPER CO., INC. and CANDIDA A. SANTOS
vs. DAN T. LIM,
doing business under the name and style of QUALITY PAPERS &
PLASTIC PRODUCTS ENTERPRISES, G.R. No. 206806, June 25,
2014, J. Leonen
Arco Pulp and Paper had an alternative obligation whereby it would
either pay Dan
T. Lim the value of the raw materials or deliver to him their finished
products of

equivalent value. When petitioner Arco Pulp and Paper tendered a

check to Lim in partial payment for the scrap papers, they exercised
their option to pay the price. This choice was also shown by the terms
of the memorandum of agreement which declared in clear terms that
the delivery of petitioner Arco Pulp and Papers finished products would
be to a third person, thereby extinguishing the option to deliver the
finished products of equivalent value to respondent. The trial court
erroneously ruled that the execution of the memorandum of agreement
constituted a novation of the contract between the parties. Novation
extinguishes an obligation between two parties when there is a
substitution of objects or debtors or when there is subrogation of the
creditor. The consent of the creditor must be secured for the novation
to be valid. In this case, Lim was not privy to the memorandum of
agreement, thus, his conformity to the contract need not be secured. If
the memorandum of agreement was intended to novate the original
agreement between the parties, respondent must have first agreed to
the substitution of Eric Sy as his new debtor.
THE WELLEX GROUP, INC. vs. U-LAND AIRLINES, CO., LTD.,
G.R. No. 167519.
January 14, 2015, J. Leonen
Because novation requires that it be clear and unequivocal, it is never
presumed. The parties did not enter into any subsequent written
agreement that was couched in unequivocal terms. The transaction of
the First Memorandum of Agreement involved large amounts of money
from both parties. Any subsequent agreement would be expected to be
clearly agreed upon with their counsels assistance and in writing, as
well. Thus there was no express novation. There was also no implied
novation of the original obligation. There was no incompatibility
between the original terms of the First Memorandum of Agreement
and the remittances made by respondent U-Land for the shares of
stock. These remittances were actually made with the view that both
parties would subsequently enter into a share purchase agreement. It
is clear that there was no subsequent agreement inconsistent with the
provisions of the First Memorandum of Agreement.
FORT BONIFACIO DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION vs. VALENTIN L.
FONG., G.R.
No. 209370, March 25, 2015, J. Perlas-Bernabe
By virtue of the Deed of Assignment, the assignee is deemed
subrogated to the rights and obligations of the assignor and is bound
by exactly the same conditions as those which bound the assignor.
Accordingly, an assignee cannot acquire greater rights than those
pertaining to the assignor. The general rule is that an assignee of a
14
0

non- negotiable chose in action acquires no greater right than what was
possessed by his assignor and simply stands into the shoes of the
latter.55 Applying the foregoing, the Court finds that MS Maxco, as the
Trade Contractor,
cannot
assign or transfer any of its rights,
obligations, or liabilities under the Trade Contract without the written
consent of FBDC.

14
0

BANK OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS VS. AMADOR DOMINGO

(DECEASED) SUBSTITUTED BY HIS CHILDREN, JOANN MOYA, ET
AL. G.R. No. 169407. March
25, 2015, J. Leonardo-De Castro
The acceptance by a creditor of payments from a third person, who has
assumed the obligation, will result merely to the addition of debtors
and not novation. The creditor may therefore enforce the obligation
against both debtors. As the Court pronounced in Magdalena Estates,
Inc. v. Rodriguez, 33 [t]he mere fact that the creditor receives a
guaranty or accepts payments from a third person who has agreed to
assume the obligation, when there is no agreement that the first debtor
shall be released from responsibility, does not constitute a novation,
and the creditor can still enforce the obligation against the original
debtor. A stranger to a contract may agree to assume an obligation;
and while this may have the effect of adding to the number of persons
liable, it does not necessarily imply the extinguishment of the liability of
the first debtor. Neither would the fact alone that the creditor receives
guaranty or accepts payments from a third person who has agreed to
assume the obligation, constitute an extinctive novation absent an
agreement that the first debtor shall be released from responsibility.
Absent proof that BPI gave its clear and unmistakable consent to
release the spouses Domingo from the obligation to pay the car loan,
Carmelita is simply considered an additional debtor. Consequently, BPI
can still enforce the obligation against the spouses Domingo even 30
months after it had started accepting payments from Carmelita.
LBP vs. ONG, , G.R. NO. 190755, November 24, 2010
Land Bank faults the CA for finding that novation given that
substitution of debtors was made without its consent, thus, it
was not bound to recognize the substitution under the rules
on novation. Novation which consists in substituting a new
debtor in the place of the original one, may be made even
without the knowledge or against the will of the latter, but not
without the consent of the creditor.
BOYSAW vs. INTERPHIL PROMOTIONS, G.R. NO. L22590, March 20, 1987
The assignment and transfer, first to Araneta, and
subsequently, to appellant Yulo, Jr., of the managerial rights
14
1

over Boysaw is without the knowledge or consent of Interphil.

The consent of the creditor to the change of debtors,
whether in expromision or delegacion is an, indispensable
requirement , since substitution of one debtor for another
may delay or prevent the fulfillment of the obligation by
reason of the

14
2

inability or insolvency of the new debtor, hence, the creditor

should agree to accept the substitution in order that it may be
binding on him.
CALIFORNIA BUS LINES, INC. vs. STATE INVESTMENT
HOUSE, INC.,
G.R. NO. 147950. December 11, 2003

There was no change in the object of the prior obligations in

the restructuring agreement since it merely provided for a
new schedule of payments and additional security giving
Delta authority to take over the management and operations
of CBLI in case CBLI fails to pay installments equivalent to
60 days. With respect to obligations to pay a sum of money,
this Court has consistently applied the well-settled rule that
the obligation is not novated by an instrument that
expressly recognizes the old, changes only the terms of
payment, and adds other obligations not incompatible with
the old ones, or where the new contract merely supplements
the old one.
AJAX MARKETING vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, G.R.
NO. 118585
September 14, 1995
In their interrelated first and second assignment of errors,
petitioners argue that a novation occurred when their three
(3) loans, which are all secured by the same real estate
property were consolidated into a single loan of P1 million
under Promissory Note, thereby extinguishing their monetary
obligations and releasing the mortgaged property from
liability. The well settled rule is that novation is never
presumed and it will not be allowed unless it is clearly shown
by express agreement, or by acts of equal import, thus, to
effect an objective novation it is imperative that the new
obligation expressly declare that the old obligation is thereby
extinguished, or that the new obligation be on every point
incompatible with the new one.
F. RESCISSION

SANGGUNIANG PANLUNGSOD NG BAGUIO CITY VS. JADEWELL

PARKING SYSTEMS
CORPORATION
G.R.
NOS
160025/163052/164107/165564/172215/172216/173043/17 April 23,.
4879/,J. SERENO
2014,

Rescission under Article 1191 takes place through either of two modes:
(1) through an extrajudicial declaration of rescission; or (2) upon the
grant of a judicial decree of rescission.
Extrajudicial declaration of rescission is recognized as a power which
does not require judicial intervention. If the rescission
is not
opposed, extrajudicial

declaration of rescission produces legal effect such that the injured

party is already relieved from performing the undertaking. However,
the power of declaring extrajudicial rescission conferred upon the
injured party is regulated by the Civil Code. If the extrajudicial
rescission is impugned by the other party, it shall be subject to a
judicial determination where court action must be taken, and the
function of the court is to declare the rescission as having been
properly or improperly made, or to give a period within which the
debtor must perform the obligation alleged to be breached. A unilateral
cancellation of a contract may be questioned in courts by the affected
party to determine whether or not cancellation is warranted. Thus, in
an extrajudicial decree of rescission, revocation cannot be completely
exercised solely on a partys own judgment that the other has
committed a breach of the obligation but always subject to the right of
the other party to judicially impugn such decision.
METROPOLITAN BANK AND TRUST COMPANY VS. WILFRED N. CHIOK/
BANK OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS VS. WILFRED N. CHIOK/ GLOBAL
BUSINESS BANK INC. VS. WILFRED N. CHIOK G.R. Nos.
172652/175302/175394. November 26, 2014 J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO
The injured party may choose between the fulfilment and the
rescission of the obligation, with the payment of damages in either
case. He may also seek rescission, even after he has chosen fulfilment,
if the latter should become impossible.
The court shall decree the rescission claimed, unless there be just
cause authorizing the fixing of a period. This is understood to be
without prejudice to the rights of third persons who have acquired the
thing, in accordance with Articles 1385 and 1388 and the Mortgage
Law.
The cause of action supplied by the above article, however, is clearly
predicated upon the reciprocity of the obligations of the injured party
and the guilty party. Reciprocal obligations are those which arise from
the same cause, and in which each party is a debtor and a creditor of
the other, such that the obligation of one is dependent upon the
obligation of the other. They are to be performed simultaneously such
that the performance of one is conditioned upon the simultaneous
fulfillment of the other. When Nuguid failed to deliver the agreed
amount to Chiok, the latter had a cause of action against Nuguid to ask
for the rescission of their contract. On the other hand, Chiok did not

have a cause of action against Metrobank and Global Bank that would
allow him to rescind the contracts of sale of the managers or cashiers
checks, which would have resulted in the crediting of the amounts
thereof back to his accounts.
THE WELLEX GROUP, INC. vs. U-LAND AIRLINES, CO., LTD., G.R.
No. 167519.
January 14, 2015, J. Leonen

Wellex and U-Land bound themselves to negotiate with each other

within a 40-day period to enter into a share purchase agreement. If no
share purchase agreement was entered into, both parties would be
freed from their respective undertakings. For Article 1191 to be
applicable, however, there must be reciprocal prestations as
distinguished from mutual obligations between or among the parties. A
prestation is the object of an obligation, and it is the conduct required
by the parties to do or not to do, or to give. Parties may be mutually
obligated to each other, but the prestations of these obligations are
not necessarily reciprocal. The reciprocal prestations must necessarily
emanate from the same cause that gave rise to the existence of the
contract. U-Land correctly sought the principal relief of rescission or
resolution under Article 1191. The obligations of the parties gave rise to
reciprocal prestations, which arose from the same cause: the desire of
both parties to enter into a share purchase agreement that would allow
both parties to expand their respective airline operations in the
Philippines and other neighboring countries.
SWIRE REALTY DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION VS. JAYNE YU.
G.R. No. 207133. March 9, 2015, J. PERALTA
Based on the ocular inspection conducted on the subject
condominium project and subject unit shows that the amenities under
the approved plan have not yet been provided as of May 3, 2002, and
that the subject unit has not been delivered to respondent as of
August 28, 2002, which is beyond the period of development of
December 1999 under the license to sell. Incontrovertibly, petitioner
had incurred delay in the performance of its obligation amounting to
breach of contract as it failed to finish and deliver the unit to
respondent within the stipulated period. The delay in the completion
of the project as well as of the delay in the delivery of the unit are
breaches of statutory and contractual obligations which entitle
respondent to rescind the contract under Article 1191, demand a
refund and payment of damages.
UNIVERSAL FOOD CORPORATION vs. CA, G.R. NO. L29155, May 13, 1970
Respondent patentee was dismissed as the permanent chief
chemist of the corporation without any fault or negligence on
his part after the execution of the Bill of Assignment, prompting
him to rescind the contract. The general rule is that rescission
of a contract will not be permitted for a slight or casual breach,
but only for such substantial and fundamental breach as would

defeat the very object of

agreement.

the

parties

in

making

ART 1191
DEL CASTILLO Vda. DE MISTICA vs. SPOUSES
NAGUIAT, G.R. NO.
137909, December 11, 2003

the

In the present case, the failure of respondents to pay the

balance of the purchase price within ten years from the
execution of the Deed did not amount to a substantial breach.
Under Article 1191 of the Civil Code, the right to rescind an
obligation is predicated on the violation of the reciprocity
between parties, brought about by a breach of faith by one of
them however, rescission is allowed only where the breach is
substantial and fundamental to the fulfillment of the
obligation.
PALAY vs. CLAVE , G.R. NO. L-56076 September 21,
1983

The contract agreed upon by the parties provided for

automatic extrajudicial rescission upon default in payment
without need of notice and with forfeiture of all installments
paid. Upon default of the respondent, petitioner rescinded
the contract. Responde nt
questioned the validity of the
rescission. The judicial action for the rescission of a contract is
not necessary where the contract provides that it may be
revoked and cancelled for violation of any of its terms and
conditions, however there should be at least a written notice
sent to the defaulter informing him of the rescission.
ART 1169,1191
RODRIGO RIVERA vs. SPOUSES SALVADOR CHUA AND VIOLETA
S. CHUA, G.R.
No. 184458 (consolidated), January 14, 2015, J. Perez
There are four instances when demand is not necessary to constitute
the debtor in default: (1) when there is an express stipulation to that
effect; (2) where the law so provides; (3) when the period is the
controlling motive or the principal inducement for the creation of the
obligation; and (4) where demand would be useless. In the first two
paragraphs, it is not sufficient that the law or obligation fixes a date for
performance; it must further state expressly that after the period
lapses, default will commence.

Corollary thereto, Art. 2209 solidifies the consequence of payment of

interest as an indemnity for damages when the obligor incurs in delay.
Art. 2209 is specifically applicable in this instance where: (1) the
obligation is for a sum of money; (2) the debtor, Rivera, incurred in
delay when he failed to pay on or before 31 December 1995; and (3)
the Promissory Note provides for an indemnity for damages upon
default of Rivera which is the payment of a 5% monthly interest from
the date of default.

SOLAR HARVEST, INC., vs DAVAO CORRUGATED

CARTON CORPORATION, G.R. NO. 176868.
July
26, 2010

The CA added that even assuming that the agreement was

for respondent to deliver the boxes, respondent would not be
liable for breach of contract as petitioner had not yet
demanded from it the delivery of the boxes. Without a
previous
demand
for
the
fulfillment
of the obligation,
petitioner would not have a cause of action for rescission against
respondent as the latter would not yet be considered in breach
of its contractual obligation, since the right to rescind a
contract
arises
once
the
other party
defaults in
the
performance of his obligation.
OSMEA III vs SSS, September 13, 2007

The Letter-Agreement, the SPA, the SSC resolutions assailed

in this recourse, and the Invitation to Bid sent out to
implement said resolutions, all have a common subject: the
Shares the 187.84 Million EPCIB common shares, which, as a
necessary consequence of the BDO- EPCIB merger which saw
EPCIB being absorbed by the surviving BDO, have been
transferred to BDO and converted into BDO common shares
under the exchange ratio set forth in the BDO-EPCIB Plan of
Merger. As thus converted, the subject Shares are no
longer equity security issuances of the now defunct EPCIB,
but those of BDO-EPCI, which, needless to stress, is a totally
separate and distinct entity from what used to be EPCIB.
Under the law on obligations and contracts, the obligation to
give a determinate thing is extinguished if the object is lost
without the fault of the debtor, and per Art. 1192 (2) of the
Civil Code, a thing is considered lost when it perishes or
disappears in such a way that it cannot be recovered.
VILLAMAR vs. MANGAOIL, G.R. NO. 188661 : April 11,
2012

Petitioner alleged that the absence of stipulations in the

aG.R.eement
and absolute deed of sale entered into by
Petitioner
and
Respondent
expressly
indicating
the
consequences of the former's failure to deliver the physical
possession of the subject property and the certificate of title
covering the same, the Respondent is not entitled to demand
for the rescission of their contract pursuant to Article 1191 of
the NCC.
The power to rescind obligations is implied in reciprocal ones, in
case one of the obligors should not comply with what is
incumbent upon
him",

this remains true notwithstanding the absence of express

stipulations in the agreement indicating the consequences of
breaches which the parties may commit.
AYSON-SIM ON
August 28, 1984

vs.

ADAMOS,

G.R.

NO.

L-39378,

Defendants contend (1) that the fulfillment and the rescission

of the obligation in reciprocal ones are alternative remedies,
and plaintiff having chosen fulfillment in the Civil Case, she
cannot now seek rescission; and (2) that even if plaintiff
could seek rescission the action to rescind the obligation has
prescribed. The rule that the injured party can only choose
between fulfillment and rescission of the obligation, and
cannot have both, applies when the obligation is possible of
fulfillment, if the fulfillment has become impossible, Article
1191 (3) allows the injured party to seek rescission even after
he has chosen fulfillment.
ART 1234
ANGELES, ET AL vs. CALASANZ, G.R. NO. L-42283,
March 18, 1985

The breach of the contract adverted to by the defendantsappellants is so slight and casual when we consider that
apart from the initial downpayment of P392.00 the plaintiffsappellees had already paid the monthly installments for a
period of almost nine (9) years. If the obligation has been
substantially performed in good faith,
the
obligor may
recover as though there had been a strict and complete
fulfillment, less damages suffered by the obligee.
UP vs.
DE LOS
September 29,

ANGELES,

G.R.

NO.

L-28602,

In the first place, UP and ALUMCO had expressly stipulated in the

"Acknowledgment of Debt and Proposed Manner of Payments"
that, upon default by the debtor ALUMCO, the creditor (UP) has

"the right and the power to consider, the Logging Agreement

dated as rescinded without the necessity of any judicial suit."
The party who deems the contract violated may consider it
resolved or rescinded, and act accordingly, without previous
court action, but it proceeds at its own risk, for it is only the
final judgment of the corresponding court that will conclusively
and finally settle whether the action taken was or was not
correct in law.
G. RESTITUTION

UNIVERSAL FOOD CORPORATION vs. THE COURT OF

APPEALS,
MAGDALO
V.
FRANCISCO,
SR.,
and
VICTORIANO N. FRANCISCO, G.R. NO. L-29155, May
13, 1970

Petitioner contends that the Court of Appeals erred in

ordering the corporation to return to the respondents the
trademark and formula for Mafran sauce. Rescission creates
the obligation to return the things which were the object of
the contract.
C O N T R A C T S
SM LAND, INC. VS. BASES CONVERSION AND DEVELOPMENT
AUTHORITY AND ARNEL PACIANO D. CASANOVA, ESQ., IN HIS
OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS PRESIDENT AND CEO OF BCDA, G.R.
No. 203655, August 13, 2014, J. Velasco
Jr.
BCDA and SMLI have agreed to subject SMLIs Original Proposal to
Competitive Challenge. This agreement is the law between the
contracting parties with which they are required to comply in good
faith. Verily, it is BCDAs subsequent unilateral cancellation of this
perfected contract which this Court deemed to have been tainted with
grave abuse of discretion. BCDA could not validly renege on its
obligation to subject the unsolicited proposal to a competitive challenge
in view of this perfected contract, and especially so after BCDA gave its
assurance that it would respect the rights that accrued in SMLIs favor
arising from the same.
GIDWANI VS. PEOPLE, G.R. No. 195064, January 15, 2014, J. Sereno
Considering that there was a lawful Order from the SEC, the contract is
deemed suspended. When a contract is suspended, it temporarily
ceases to be operative; and it again becomes operative when a
condition occurs or a situation arises warranting the termination of
the suspension of the contract.
AVELINA ABARIENTOS REBUSQUILLO [substituted by her heirs,
except Emelinda R. Gualvez] and SALVADOR A. OROSCO v SPS.
DOMINGO and EMELINDA REBUSQUILLO GUALVEZ and the CITY
ASSESSOR OF LEGAZPI CITY,
G.R No. 204029, June 4, 2014. J. VELASCO, JR.

In absolute simulation, there is a colorable contract but it has no

substance as the parties have no intention to be bound by it. The main
characteristic of an absolute simulation is that the apparent contract is
not really desired or intended to produce legal effect or in any way
alter the juridical situation of the parties. As a result, an

absolutely simulated or fictitious contract is void, and the parties may

recover from each other what they may have given under the
contract.
In the present case, the true intention of the parties in the execution of
the Deed of Absolute Sale is immediately apparent from respondents
very own Answer wherein they admitted that the purpose of the Deed
of Absolute Sale was simply to facilitate the titling of the subject
property. considering that the Deed of Absolute Sale has been shown
to be void for being absolutely simulated, petitioners are not precluded
from presenting evidence to modify, explain or add to the terms of the
written agreement as an exception to the parol evidence rule.
I. A. DEFINITION
SPOUSES BALILA vs. IAC, G.R. NO. L-68477 October
29, 1987

A contract is a meeting of minds between two persons whereby

one binds himself with respect to the other to give something
or render some service, the Central Bank of the Philippines in
the exercise of its Administrative power did not create any
contractual obligations.
B. CONTRACTS AS A SOURCE OF

OBLIGATIONS

BATCHELDER vs. THE CENTRAL BANK OF THE

PHILIPPINES, G.R. NO. L-25071, July 29, 1972

Obligations arise from 1) law; 2) contracts; 3) quasi-contracts; 4)

acts or omissions punished by law and 5) quasi-delicts, the
circular issued by the Central Bank has the force and effect of
the law. Obligations arising from law, howe ver, is never
presumed.
II.

ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF A CONTRACT

SPOUSES TONGSON vs. EMERGENCY PAWNSHOP

BULA, G.R. 167874. January 15, 2010

A valid contract requires the concurrence of the following

essential elements: (1) consent or meeting of the minds, that is,
consent to transfer ownership in exchange for the price; (2)
determinate subject matter; and
(3) price certain in money or its equivalent.
In the present case, there is no question that the subject
matter of the sale is the 364-square meter Davao lot owned
by the Spouses Tongson and the selling price agreed upon
by the parties is P3,000,000, but the

existence of the remaining element, which is consent of the

contracting parties, to sell the property, claiming that their
consent was vitiated by fraud, renders the contract of sale
void.
A. CONSENT
SPOUSES VICTOR AND EDNA BINUA vs. LUCIA P. ONG, G.R. No.
207176, June 18,
2014, J. Reyes
Article 1390(2) of the Civil Code provides that contracts where the
consent is
vitiated by mistake, violence, intimidation, undue influence or fraud
are voidable or annullable.
Intimidation may vitiate consent and render the contract invalid, the
following requisites must concur: (1) that the intimidation must be
the determining cause of the contract, or must have caused the
consent to be given; (2) that the threatened act be unjust or
unlawful; (3) that the threat be real and serious, there being an
evident disproportion between the evil and the resistance which all
men can offer, leading to the choice of the contract as the lesser evil;
and (4) that it produces a reasonable and well-grounded fear from
the fact that the person from whom it comes has the necessary
means or ability to inflict the threatened injury.
Based on the petitioners own allegations, what the respondent did was
merely inform them of petitioner Ednas conviction in the criminal
cases for estafa. It might have evoked a sense of fear or dread on the
petitioners part, but certainly there is nothing unjust, unlawful or evil
in the respondent's act. The petitioners also failed to show how such
information was used by the respondent in coercing them into signing
the mortgages.
SC affirmed the finding of the CA that if the judgment of conviction is
the only basis of the [petitioners] in saying that their consents were
vitiated, such will not suffice to nullify the real estate mortgages and
the subsequent foreclosure of the mortgaged properties. No proof was
adduced to show that [the respondent] used [force], duress, or threat
to make [petitioner] Victor execute the real estate mortgages.
Also, the threat to prosecute for estafa not being an unjust act, but
rather a valid and legal act to enforce a claim, cannot at all be
considered as intimidation.
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ECE REALTY AND DEVELOPMENT INC. vs.RACHEL G. MANDAP,

G.R. No. 196182,
September 1, 2014, J. Peralta
Article 1338 of the Civil Code provides that "[t]here is fraud when
through insidious words or machinationsof one of the contracting
parties, the other is induced to enter into a contract which, without
them, he would not have agreed to."

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0

In addition, under Article 1390 of the same Code, a contract is

voidable or annullable "where the consent is vitiated by mistake,
violence, intimidation, undue influence or fraud."
Also, Article 1344 of the same Codeprovides that "[i]n order that fraud
may make a contract voidable, it should be serious and should not
have been employed by both contracting parties."
In order to constitute fraud that provides basis to annul contracts, it
must fulfill two conditions.
First, the fraud must be dolo causante or it must be fraud in obtaining
the consent of the party. This is referred to as causal fraud. The deceit
must be serious. The fraud is serious when it is sufficient to impress, or
to lead an ordinarily prudent person into error; that which cannot
deceive a prudent person cannot be a ground for nullity.
The circumstances of each case should be considered, taking
into account the personal conditions of the victim.
Second, the fraud must be proven by clear and convincing evidence
and not merely by a preponderance thereof.
While the SC found that petitioner is guilty of false representation of
a fact, it held that the misrepresentation made by petitioner in its
advertisements does not constitute causal fraud which would have
been a valid basis in annulling the Contract to Sell between
petitioner and respondent.
Thus, absent, as here, of (sic) any controverting evidence, it is
reasonable to presume that Mandap knew the contents of the Contract
to Sell which was executed with legal formalities
The rule that one who signs a contract is presumed to know its
contentshas been applied even to contract of illiterate persons on the
ground that if such persons are unable to read, they are negligent if
they fail to have the contract read to them. If a person cannot read
the instrument, it is as much his duty to procure some reliable persons
to read and explain it tohim, before he signs it, as it would be to read
it before he signed it if he were able to do so and his failure to obtain
a reading and explanation of it is such gross negligence as will estop
him from avoiding it on the ground that he was ignorant of its
contents.
In any case, even assuming that petitioners misrepresentation
consists of fraud which could bea ground for annulling their Contract
to Sell, respondent's act of affixing her signatureto the said
15
1

Contract, after having acquired knowledge of the property's actual

location, can be construed as an implied ratification thereof.
SPOUSES FRANCISCO SIERRA (substituted by DONATO,
TERESITA, TEODORA, LORENZA, LUCINA, IMELDA, VILMA, and
MILAGROS SIERRA) and ANTONINA

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2

SANTOS, SPOUSES ROSARIO SIERRA and EUSEBIO CALUMA

LEYVA, and SPOUSES SALOME SIERRA and FELIX GATLABAYAN
(substituted by BUENA VENTURA, ELPIDIO, PAULINO, CATALINA,
GREGORIO, and EDGARDO GATLABAYAN, LORETO REILLO,
FERMINA PEREGRINA, and NIDA HASHIMOTO) vs.PAIC SAVINGS
AND MORTGAGE BANK, INC., G.R. No. 197857, September 10,
2014, J. Perlas-Bernabe
One who alleges any defect or the lack of a valid consent contract
must establish the same by full, clear, and convincing evidence, not
merely by preponderance of evidence. The rule is that he who alleges
mistake affecting a transaction must substantiate his allegation, since
it is presumed that a person takes ordinary care of his concerns and
that private transactions have been fair and regular. Where mistake or
error is alleged by parties who claim to have not had the benefit of a
good education, as in this case, they must establish that their personal
circumstances prevented them from giving their free, voluntary, and
spontaneous consent to a contract.
AVELINA ABARIENTOS REBUSQUILLO [substituted by her heirs,
except Emelinda R. Gualvez] and SALVADOR A. OROSCO, vs.
SPS. DOMINGO and EMELINDA REBUSQUILLO GUALVEZ and the
CITY ASSESSOR OF LEGAZPI CITY,
G.R. No. 204029, June 4, 2014, J. Velasco, Jr.
The Deed of Absolute Sale executed by Avelina in favor of respondents
was correctly nullified and voided by the RTC. Avelina was not in the
right position to sell and transfer the absolute ownership of the subject
property to respondents. As she was not the sole heir of Eulalio and her
Affidavit of Self-Adjudication is void, the subject property is still subject
to partition. Avelina, in fine, did not have the absolute ownership of the
subject property but only an aliquot portion. It is apparent from the
admissions of respondents and the records of this case that Avelina had
no intention to transfer the ownership, of whatever extent, over the
property to respondents. Hence, the Deed of Absolute Sale is nothing
more than a simulated contract.
SPOUSES VICTOR and EUNA BINUA v LUCIA P. ONG, G.R. No. 207176,
June 18, 2014. J. REYES
Edna Binua was convicted by the RTC of Estafa. For fear of conviction,
Edna executed several real estate mortgages over her husbands
properties to be able to pay her creditor, Lucia Ong. Subsequently, the
whole scenario was novated into purely civil in nature. When Edna

failed to settle her obligation, Ong foreclosed on the mortgages. Edna

now claims that the real estate mortgages were voidable under
Articles 1335 and1390 of the Civil Code as they were executed under
duress and intimidation in the form of the estafa conviction.

Article 1390(2) of the Civil Code provides that contracts where the
consent is
vitiated by mistake, violence, intimidation, undue influence or fraud
are voidable or annullable. Article 1335 of the Civil Code, meanwhile,
states that "there is intimidation when one of the contracting parties
is compelled by a reasonable and well-grounded fear of an imminent
and grave evil upon his person or property, or upon the person or
property of his spouse, descendants or ascendants, to give his
consent." The same article, however, further states that a "threat to
enforce ones claim through competent authority, if the claim is just or
legal, does not vitiate consent."
In this case, Ong merely informed the spouses of Ednas conviction in
the criminal cases for estafa. It might have evoked a sense of fear or
dread on Ednas part, but certainly there is nothing unjust, unlawful or
evil in Ongs act. The judgment of conviction was a result of a valid
judicial process and will not suffice to nullify the real estate mortgages
and the subsequent foreclosure of the mortgaged properties. No proof
was adduced to show that Ong used [force], duress, or threat to make
Edna execute the real estate mortgages.
MARIANO C. MENDOZA and ELVIRA LIM v SPOUSES LEONORA
J. GOMEZ and GABRIEL V. GOMEZ, G.R No. 160110, June 18,
2014. J. PEREZ
Article 2211 of the Civil Code provides that in crimes and quasidelicts, interest as part of the damage, may, in a proper case, be
adjudicated in the discretion of the court. Generally, interest is
allowed as a matter of right for failure to pay liquidated claims when
due. For unliquidated claims, however, Article 2213 of the Civil Code
provides that interest cannot be recovered upon unliquidated claims
or damages, except when the demand can be established with
reasonable certainty. In this case, the Court allowed the award of
interest on the actual and compensatory damages based on justice,
and because these damages could be measured against a reasonably
certain standard.
SPOUSES EDUARDO and LYDIA SILOS v PHILIPPINE NATIONAL
BANK, G.R No. 181045, July 2, 2014. J. DEL CASTILLO
From 1987 to 1998, the spouses Silos executed promissory notes in
favor of PNB, as well as real estate mortgages to secure the loan. The
loan contracts contained an escalation clause: The Borrower agrees
that the Bank may modify the interest rate in the Loan depending on
whatever policy the Bank may adopt in the future, including without
limitation, the shifting from the floating interest rate system to the

fixed interest rate system, or vice versa and the Borrower hereby
agrees that the Bank may, without need of notice to the Borrower,
increase or decrease its spread over the floating interest rate at any
time depending on whatever policy it may adopt in the future.

The Court held that the escalation clause in the loan contract was null
and void for being violative of mutuality of contracts. Any modification
in the contract, such as the interest rates, must be made with the
consent of the contracting parties. The minds of all the parties must
meet as to the proposed modification, especially when it affects an
important aspect of the agreement. In the case of loan agreements,
the rate of interest is a principal condition, if not the most important
component. Thus, any modification thereof must be mutually agreed
upon; otherwise, it has no binding effect.
LAND BANK vs. HEIRS OF SPOUSES SORIANO, G.R.
NO. 178312.
January 30, 2012

Pending resolution of the case, both parties freely and

voluntarily entered into an agreement for the purpose of
finally settling their dispute in this case. As a contract, a
compromise is perfected by mutual consent, however, a
judicial compromise, while immediately binding between the
parties upon its execution, is not executory until it is approved
by the court and reduced to a judgment.
LAGUNZAD vs. VDA. DE GONZALES, G.R. NO. L-32066
August 6, 1979
Petitioner takes the position that he was pressured into signing
the Agreement because of private respondent's demand, for
payment for the "exploitation" of the life story of Moises Padilla,
otherwise, she would "call a press conference declaring the
whole picture as a fake, fraud and a hoax and would
denounce the whole thing in the press, radio, television and
that they were going to Court to stop the picture." It is necessary
to distinguish between real duress and the motive which is
present
when one gives his consent reluctantly because a
contract is valid even though one of the parties entered into it
against his own wish and desires, or even against his
better judgment.

VELASCO vs. HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, G.R.

NO. L-31018 June 29, 1973
The material averments of petitioners' complaint disclose lack
of complete "agreement in regard to the manner of payment" of
the lot in question. A definite agreement on the manner of
payment of the purchase price is an essential element in the
formation of a binding and enforceable contract of sale.

PALATTAO vs. CA, G.R. NO. 131726, May 7, 2002

Appellant made a qualified acceptance of appellees letteroffer of a parcel of land but appellee made a new proposal to
pay the amount in staggered amounts within two years in
quarterly amortizations. To convert the offer into a contract,
the acceptance must be absolute and must not qualify the
terms of the offer, for a qualified acceptance constitutes a
counter-offer and is a rejection of the original offer and such
acceptance is not sufficient to generate consent.
B. CAUSE OF
CONTRACTS ART
1354
LAW vs. OLYMPIC SAWMILL CO., G.R. NO. L-30771,
May 28, 1984

The defendants admitted the principal obligation but claimed

that the additional amount constituted usurious interest.
Under Article 1354 of the Civil Code, the agreement of the
parties relative to the additional amount is presumed to exist
and is lawful, unless the debtor proves the contrary. Since no
evidentiary hearing had been held, the defendants therefore
had not proven that the obligation was illegal.
C. CONSIDERATION
ART. 1354
PENTACAPITAL
INVESTMENT
CORPORATION
MAHINAY, G.R. NO. 171736, July 5, 2010

vs.

As proof of lack of consideration, respondent (a) denied under

oath that he owed petitioner a single centavo, (b) represented
that he did not apply for a loan and (c) said that when he
signed the promissory notes, they were all blank forms thus
rendering the notes ineffective.

It is presumed that consideration exists and is lawful unless the

debtor proves the contrary and the presumption that a contract
has sufficient consideration cannot be overthrown by the bare,
uncorroborated and self-serving assertion of respondent that it
has no consideration.
HEIRS
OF
URETA, SR. vs. HEIRS
URETA, G.R. NO.
165748.
September 14, 2011

OF

LIBERATO

Although the contract states that the purchase price of

2,000.00 was paid by Policronio to Alfonso for the subject
properties, it has been proven that no such payment was
made. It is well-settled that where a deed of sale states that
the purchase price has been paid but in fact has never been
paid, the deed of sale is null and void for lack of
consideration.
III.

FORMALITI

ES ART 1724
DUE OBSERVANCE OF PRESCRIBED FORMALITIES
WELDON CONSTRUCTION CORPORATION
OF APPEALS,
G.R. NO. L-35721 October 12, 1987

vs.

COURT

There was no written agreement on the additional price to be

paid for said "extra works," hence, private respondent claims
that the contractor aG.R.eed to make the additions without
additional cost.
In the absence of a written authority by the owner for the
changes in the plans and specifications of the building and of
a written agreement between the parties on the additional
price to be paid to the contractor, as required by Article 1724,
the claim for the cost of additional works must be denied.
LAO SOK vs. SABAYSABAY, G.R. NO. L-61898 August
9, 1985

Petitioner Lao Sok promised to give his employees their

separation pay, as soon as he receives the insurance
proceeds for his burned building, but contends that the
contract was orally made hence unenforceable since it does
not comply with the Statute of Frauds. Contracts in whatever
form they may have been entered into are binding on the
parties unless form is essential for the validity and
enforceability of that particular contract.

ART 1356
GALLARDO
vs.HONORABLE
APPELLATE
COURT,
G.R. NO. L-67742 October 29, 1987

INTERMEDIATE

The issue here is whether or not the unnotarized deed of sale

can be considered as a valid instrument for effecting the
alienation by way of sale of a parcel of land registerd under
the Torrens
System.
The general rule enunciated in said Art. 1356 is that contracts
are obligatory, in whatever form they may have been
entered, provided all the essential requisites for their validity
are present, except when the law so requires requiring a
contract to be in some form for validity or enforceability.
IV.

STAGES , PERFECTION

Bugatti v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 138113. October

17, 2000
A contract undergoes three distinct stages preparation or
negotiation, its perfection, and finally, its consummation.
Negotiation begins from the time the prospective contracting
parties manifest their interest in the contract and ends at the
moment of agreement of the parties. The perfection or birth of
the contract takes place when the parties agree upon the
essential elements of the contract. The last stage is the
consummation of the contract wherein the parties fulfill or
perform the terms agreed upon in the contract, culminating in
the extinguishment thereof.
ART 1315 , 1319
TONG BROTHERS CO.,
December 21, 1987

vs.

IAC,

G.R.

NO.

73918

From the exchange of telegrams between the two parties,

there was not yet a meeting of the minds as to the cause of
the contract. The cause of a contract has been defined "as the
essential reason which moves the contracting parties to enter
into it (8 Manresa, 5th Edition, p. 450). In other words, the
cause is the immediate, direct and proximate reason which
justifies the creation of an obligation thru the will of the
contracting parties (3 Castan, 4th Edition, p. 347)." (General
Enterprises, Inc. v. Lianga Bay Logging Co., Inc., 11 SCRA 733,

739). For the private respondent, the cause of the contract

was the repair of its vessel Zamboanga-J while for the
petitioner the cause would be its commitment to repair the
vessel and make it seaworthy. The telegrams dated January
17, January 20, and January 28, 1975 sent by the petitioner
to the private respondent, however, indicate that the former
had not accepted the repair of Zamboanga-J, the reason being
that the extent of the repair to be made necessitated a major
expense so that the petitioner insisted on the presence of
the private respondent for evaluation before it accepted the
repair of the wooden vessel. That the petitioner had not yet
consented to the contract is evident when on January 28,
1975, it sent a

telegram stating: "... NO AGREEMENT AS TO THE EX TENT OF

REPAIRS
AND PAYMENT WILL UNDOCK VESSEL." The fact that the private
respondent who received this telegram ignored it, confirms
that there was no perfected contract to repair Zamboanga-J.
SANCHEZ vs. RIGOS, G.R. NO. L-25494 June 14, 1972
Since there may be no valid contract without a cause or
consideration, the promisor is not bound by his promise
and may, accordingly, withdraw it, and pending notice of its
withdrawal, his accepted promise partakes, however, of the
nature of an offer to sell which, if accepted, results in a
perfected contract of sale.
V.INTERPRETATION OF CONTRACTS
CITIZENS SURETY and INSURANCE
COMPANY, INC., vs. COURT OF APPEALS,
G.R. NO. L-48958 June 28, 1988
It is a basic and fundamental rule in the interpretation of
contract that if the terms thereof are clear and leave no
doubt as to the intention of the contracting parties, then the
literal meaning of the stipulations shall control but when the
words appear contrary to the evident intention of the parties,
the latter shall prevail over the former and in order to judge
the intention of the parties, their contemporaneous and
subsequent acts shall be principally considered.
ART 1375 , 1377
LIM YHI LUYA vs. COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. NO. L40258 September 11, 1980

Words which may have different significations shall be

understood in that which is most in keeping with the nature
and object of the contract and in the interpretation of obscure
words or stipulations in a contract shall not favor the party
who caused the obscurity.
VI.

DEFECTIVE CONTRACTS

A. VOID CONTRACTS
ART 1411, 1420
BRIONES vs. CAMMAYO, ET AL., G.R. NO. L-23559,
October 4, 1971

Stipulations authorizing the imposition of iniquitous or

unconscionable interest are contrary to morals, if not against
the law for these contracts are inexistent and void from the
beginning.

ASIAN CATHAY FINANCE AND LEASING

CORPORATION vs. SPOUSES G.R.AVADOR et
al, G.R. NO. 186550, July 5, 2010
A contract of adhesion may be struck down as void and
unenforceable for being subversive to public policy, when the
weaker party is completely deprived of the opportunity to
bargain on equal footing.
TIU vs. PLATINUM PLANS
163512 February 28, 2007

PHIL.,

INC.,

G.R.

NO.

Respondent contends that the inclusion of the two-year noninvolvement clause in petitioners contract of employment was
reasonable and needed since her job gave her access to the
companys confidential marketing strategies. A non-involvement
clause is not necessarily void for being in restraint of trade as
long as there are reasonable limitations as to time, trade, and
place.
CARIO vs. COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. NO. L-47661,
July 31, 1987
Contracts of sale are void and produce no effect whatsoever
where the price, which appears therein as paid, has in fact
never been paid by the vendee to the vendor.
TOPIC: SIM ULATED CONTRACTS
URETA vs. URETA, G.R. No. 165748, September 14,
2011 -Lacking in an absolutely simulated contract is consent
which is essential to a valid and enforceable contract. Thus,
where a person, in order to place his property beyond the reach
of his creditors, simulates a transfer of it to another, he does not
really intend to divest himself of his title and control of the
property; hence, the deed of transfer is but a sham.
Similarly, in this case, Alfonso simulated a transfer to Policronio
purely for taxation purposes, without intending to transfer
ownership over the subject lands.

RUBIAS vs. BATILLER, G.R. NO. L-35702 May 29, 1973

The lower court held that the purchase by a lawyer of the
property in litigation from his client is categorically prohibited by
Article 1491, paragraph (5) of the Philippine Civil Code, and
that
consequently, plaintiff's purchase of the property in
litigation from his client was void and could produce no legal
effect, by virtue of Article 1409, paragraph (7) of our Civil
Code.
Contracts "expressly prohibited or declared void
by

law' are "inexistent and that "(T)hese contracts cannot be

ratified, neither can the right to set up the defense of illegality
be waived."

ART 1410
TONGOY vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS,
G.R. NO. L- 45645 June 28, 1983
The issue in this case is whether or not the rights of herein
respondents over subject properties, which were the subjects
of simulated or fictitious transactions, have already
prescribed. A void or inexistent contract is one which has no
force and effect from the very beginning, as if it had never
been entered into, and which cannot be validated either by
time or by ratification.
LITA ENTERPRISES, INC.,vs. IAC, G.R. NO. L-64693
April 27, 1984
Unquestionably, the parties herein operated under an
arrangement, commonly known as the "kabit system",
whereby a person who has been granted a certificate of
convenience allows another person who owns motors vehicles
to operate under such franchise for a fee, and the petitioner
prays that private respondents be declared liable to petitioner
for whatever amount the latter has paid. It is a fundamental
principle of in pari delicto that the court will not aid either
party to enforce an illegal contract, but will leave them both
where it finds them.
ARSENAL vs. IAC, G.R. NO. L-66696 July 14, 1986
Petitioner questions the validity of the sale between the
respondent and Suralta but the lower court held that the
benefit of said prohibition in the Public Land Act against the
disposal of any land granted to a citizen under that law does
not inure to any third party. The right to set up the nullity of a
void or non-existent contract is not limited to the parties as in
the case of annulable or voidable contracts. The right to set
up the nullity of a void or non-existent contract is extended
to third persons who are directly affected by the contract.
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MANOTOK REALTY, INC., vs. THE HON. COURT OF

APPEALS, G.R. NO. L-45038 April 30, 1987
Don Legarda sold the paraphernal property of Dona Clara to the
respondent. It was sold three months after he was appointed as
administrator of the estate of Dona Clara Tambunting. The sale
between Don Vicente Legarda and the private respondent is
void
ab
initio,
the former being neither an owner nor
administrator of the subject property,

16
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and the sale cannot be the subject of the ratification by the

probate court.
PORTUGAL vs. IAC, G.R. NO. 73564 March 25, 1988
Respondent, through fraudulent means was able to transfer the
lot from his parents to himself without consideration or cause
through a purported deed of The IAC held that the action had
already prescribed because an action to annul a contract based
on fraud prescribes in four years. The SC, however, held that
the alleged contract of sale is vitiated by the total absence of
a valid cause or consideration which is an indispensable requisite
for the existence of a valid contract. Thus, Article 1410 of the
Civil Code provides that '( T)he action or defense for the
declaration
of the
inexistence
of a contract does not
prescribe.

PHILIPPINE BANKING CORPORATION

G.R. NO.
L17587, September 12, 1967

vs.

LUI

SHE,

The illicit purpose becomes the illegal causa rendering the

contracts void.
TEJA MARKETING vs. IAC, G.R. NO. L-65510 March 9,
1987

The parties operated under an arrangement, commonly

known as the "kabit system" whereby a person who has been
granted a certificate of public convenience allows another
person who owns motor vehicles to operate under such
franchise for a fee. Although not outrightly penalized as a
criminal offense, the kabit system is invariably recognized as
being contrary to public policy and, therefore, void and in
existent and it is a fundamental principle that the court will
not aid either party to enforce an illegal contract, but will
leave both where it finds then.

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1

B. VOIDABLE
CONTRACTS ART
1327
FRANCISCO
vs.
HERRERA,
November 21, 2002

G.R.

NO.

139982,

The vendor Eligio, Sr. entered into an agreement with petitioner,

but that the formers capacity to consent was vitiated by
senile dementia. Insane or demented persons cannot give
consent to a contract, but if an insane or demented person
does enter into a contract, the legal effect is that the contract is
voidable or annullable.

16
2

CORONEL vs. CONSTANTINO, G.R. NO. 121069,

February 7, 2003

Applying Articles 1317 and 1403 of the Civil Code, the Court
of Appeals ruled that through their inaction and silence, the
three sons of Emilia are considered to have ratified the
aforesaid sale of the subject property by their mother.
Ratification means that one under no disability voluntarily
adopts and gives sanction to some unauthorized act or
defective proceeding, which without his sanction would not be
binding on him , hence, an alleged silence and inaction may
not be interpreted as an act of ratification on their part.
C. UNENFORCEABLE CONTRACTS
IGLESIA FILIPINA INDEPENDIENTE vs. HEIRS of BERNARDINO
TAEZA, G.R. No.
179597, February 3, 2014, J. Peralta
Unenforceable contracts are those which cannot be enforced by a
proper action in court, unless they are ratified, because either they
are entered into without or in excess of authority or they do not
comply with the statute of frauds or both of the contracting parties
do not possess the required legal capacity. In the present case,
however, respondents' predecessor-in-interest, Bernardino Taeza,
had already obtained a transfer certificate of title in his name over
the property in question.
Since the person supposedly transferring ownership was not
authorized to do so, the property had evidently been acquired by
mistake. This case clearly falls under the category of unenforceable
contracts mentioned in Article 1403, paragraph (1) of the Civil Code,
which provides, thus: (1) Those entered into in the name of another
person by one who has been given no authority or legal
representation, or who has acted beyond his powers.
YUVIENCO vs. DACUYCUY, G.R. NO. L-55048 May 27,
1981

Respondent judge assumed that as long as the requirements

of perfection of a contract are present in a contract which
involves payment in installments, the Statute of Frauds would
no longer apply as long as the total price or consideration is

mentioned in some note or memorandum and there is no

need of any indication of the manner in which such total price
is to be paid. In any sale of real property on installments, the
Statute of Frauds read together with the perfection requirements
of Article 1475 of the Civil Code must be understood and applied
in the sense that the idea of payment on installments must
be
in the
requisite
of a note
or memorandum therein
contemplated.

BISAYA LAND TRANSPORTATION CO., INC.,

SANCHEZ, G.R. NO. 74623 August 31, 1987

vs.

In the case at bar, it is undisputed that Atty. Adolfo Amor was

entrusted, as receiver, with the administration of BISTRANCO
and it business, but the act of entering into a contract is one
which requires the authorization of the court which appointed
him receiver. The questioned contracts can rightfully be
classified as unenforceable for having been entered into by
one who had acted beyond his powers, due to Receiver
Amor's failure to secure the court's approval of said
Contracts.
STATUTE OF FRAUDS
AINZA vs. SPOUSES PADUA, G.R. NO. 165420, June
30, 2005

The contract of sale between Eugenia and Concepcion was

evidenced by a receipt signed by Eugenia. The verbal contract
of sale between did not violate the provisions of the Statute of
Frauds because when a verbal contract has been completed,
executed or partially consummated, its enforceability will not be
barred by the Statute of Frauds, which applies only to an
executory agreement, thus, where one party has performed his
obligation, oral evidence
will be
admitted to prove
the
agreement.
ORDUA vs. FUENTEBELLA, G.R. NO. 176841, June 29,
2010

Gabriel Sr., during his lifetime, sold the subject property to

Antonita, the purchase price payable on installment basis,
thus, Gabriel Sr. appeared to have been a recipient of some
partial payments but after his death, his son questions the
verbal sale contract between Gabriel Sr. and Antonita, and
alleged that the contract is unenforceable for non-compliance
with the Statute of Frauds. The Statute of Frauds, in context,
provides that a contract for the sale of real property or of an
interest therein shall be unenforceable unless the sale or

some note or memorandum thereof is in writing and

subscribed by the party or his agent. Where the verbal
contract of sale, howe ver, has been partially executed
through the partial payments made by one party duly
received by the vendor, as in the present case, the contract is
taken out of the scope of the Statute.
HERNANDEZ vs. COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. NO. L41132 April 27, 1988

Both courts were of the view essentially that the evidence did
not bear out the claim of fraud; that under the Statute of
Frauds, the parties' covenant as to their properties' metes and
bounds was unenforceable since it was not reduced to writing.
Not every agreement "affecting land" must be put in writing
to attain enforceability, under the Statute of Frauds, Article
1403(2) (e) of the Civil Code, such formality is only required
of contracts involving leases for longer than one year, or for
the sale of real property or of an interest therein.
D. RESCISSIBLE CONTRACTS
CABALIW vs. SADORRA, G.R. NO. L-25650 June 11,
1975

The conveyances made by Sadorra in favor of his son-in-law

were fraudulent since about seven months after a judgment
was rendered against him in and without paying any part of
that judgment, Sadorra sold the only two parcels of land
belonging to the conjugal partnership to his son-in-law.
Contracts by virtue of which the debtor alienates property
by gratuitous title or alienations by onerous title when made
by persons against whom some judgment has been
rendered in any instance or some writ of attachment has
been issued, are presumed to be made in fraud of creditors,
and the decision or attachment need not refer to the property
alienated and need not have been obtained by the party
seeking rescission.
AIR FRANCE vs. HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS,
G.R. NO. 104234 June 30, 1995

Petitioner moved for the issuance of an alias writ of execution

on the ground of unsatisfied judgment against respondents
and It likewise moved to declare the sale to a third party of a
parcel of land in the name of the private respondent as one
in fraud of creditors which was granted by the lower court.
Rescissible contracts, not being void, they remain legally
effective until set aside in a rescissory action and may convey

title, and an action for rescission may not be raised or set up

in a summary proceeding through a motion, but in an
independent civil action and only after a full-blown trial.
VII. EFFECT OF
CONTRACTS
DOCTRINES ,
PRINCIPLES
1. CONSENSUALITY OF
CONTRACTS ART 1306 ,
1336 , 1337

REPUBLIC OF THE
NO. L-18841
January 27, 1969
,

PHILIPPINES

vs.

PLDT

G.R.

The Republic commenced suit against the PLDT commanding

the PLDT to execute a contract with it for the use of the
facilities of latter's telephone system throughout the
Philippines. Parties can not be coerce d to enter into a
contract where no agreement is had between them as to the
principal terms and conditions of the contract since freedom
to stipulate such terms and conditions is of the essence of our
contractual system, and by express provision of the statute, a
contract may be annulled if tainted by violence, intimidation,
or undue influence (Articles 1306, 1336, 1337).
2. AUTONOMY OF
CONTRACTS ART 1306
WILLIAM GOLANGCO CONSTRUCTION CORPORATION vs.
PHILIPPINE COMMERCIAL INTERNATIONAL BANK, G.R.
NO. 142830
March 24, 2006
The provision in the construction contract providing for
defects liability period was not shown as contrary to law,
morals, good customs, pubic order or public policy, and by
the nature of the obligation in such contract, the provision
limiting liability for defects and fixing specific guaranty
periods was not only fair and equitable but was also
necessary.
TIU vs. PLATINUM PLANS
163512 February 28, 2007

PHIL.,

INC.,

G.R.

NO.

Respondent contends that the inclusion of the two-year noninvolvement clause in petitioners contract of employment was
reasonable and needed since her job gave her access to the
companys confidential marketing strategies. A non-involvement

clause is not necessarily void for being in restraint of trade as

long as there are reasonable limitations as to time, trade, and
place.
LEAL vs.IAC, G.R. NO. L-65425 November 5, 1987

It is admitted by both parties that the phrase "they shall not

sell to others these three lots but only to the seller Vicente
Santiago
or
to
his
heirs or successors" is an express
prohibition against the sale of the lots described
in
the
"Compraventa" to third persons or strangers to the

contract. Parties may establish such stipulations, clauses,

terms and conditions as they may deem convenient, provided
they are not contrary to law, morals, good customs, public
order, or public policy.
DEL
CASTILLO
Vda. DE
NAGUIAT, G.R. NO.
137909. December 11, 2003

MISTICA

vs. SPOUSES

In the Kasulatan, it was stipulated that payment could be

made
even
after ten years from the execution of the
Contract, provided the vendee paid percent interest. The
stipulations of the contract constitute the law between the
parties; thus, courts have no alternative but to enforce them
as aG.R.eed upon and written.
MARIMPERIO vs. COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. NO. L40234 December 14, 1987
A contract is the law between the contracting parties, and
when there is nothing in it which is contrary to law, morals,
good customs, public policy or public order, the validity of
the contract must be sustained.
ART 1159
OCCENA vs. HON. JABSON, G.R. NO. L-44349, October
29, 1976
Respondent's complaint seeks that the court "render judgment
modifying the terms and Conditions of the Contract by fixing the
proper shares that should pertain to the herein parties out of the
gross proceeds from the sales of subdivided lots of subject
subdivision", citing ART 1267 of the New Civil Code. The
cited article does not grant the courts this authority to
remake, modify or revise the contract between the parties as
contractually stipulated with the force of law between the
parties, so as to substitute its own terms for those covenanted
by the parties themselves.
CABAHUG vs NAPOCOR, G.R. NO. 186069, January 30,
2013

Disregarding the stipulations in the contract allowing

additional compensation for easement fee, the CA ruled that
Cabahug's attempt to collect further sums by way of
additional easement fee and,or just compensation is violative
of said contract. It is settled that a contract constitutes the
law between the parties who are bound by its stipulations
which, when couched in clear and plain language, should be
applied according to their literal tenor and the courts cannot
supply material stipulations, which contradict the intent of the
parties.

3. MUTUALITY OF CONTRACTS
BANCO FILIPINO SAVINGS vs. NAVARRO, G.R. NO. L46591, July 28, 1987
Escalation clauses to be valid should specifically provide: (1)
that there can be an increase in interest if increased by law or
by the Monetary Board; and (2) in order for such stipulation to
be valid, it must include a provision for reduction of the
stipulated interest "in the event that the applicable maximum
rate of interest is reduced by law or by the Monetary Board"
in order to be valid which is known as deescalation clause.
SPOUSES FLORENDO vs. COURT OF APPEALS, G.R.
NO. 101771
December 17, 1996
In order that obligations arising from contracts may have the
force of law between the parties, there must be mutuality
between the parties based on their essential equality, hence,
a contract containing a condition which makes its fulfillment
dependent exclusively upon the uncontrolled will of one of the
contracting parties, is void.
ART 1308
PHILIPPINE
NATIONAL
BANK
AGUSTIN, G.R. NO.
164549
September 18, 2009

vs.

SPOUSES

The spouses Rocamora posit that their loan would not have
bloated to more than double the original amount if PNB had
not
increased
the
interest rates and had it immediately
foreclosed the mortgages. Any increase in the rate of interest
made pursuant to an escalation clause must not be left solely
to the will of one of the parties, but must be the result of a
mutual agreement between the parties, hence, a de-escalation
clause that would authorize a reduction in the interest rates
corresponding to downward changes made by law or by the

Monetary Board must be included, otherwise,

carries no binding effect.

the change

4. RELATIVITY , PRIVITY OF CONTRACTS

DKC HOLDINGS CORPORATION vs. COURT OF APPEALS,
G.R. NO. 118248 April 5, 2000

Being an heir there is privity of interest between the heir and

the deceased, hence, heirs are bound by
contracts
entered into by their

predecessors-in-interest except when the rights and obligations

arising therefrom are not transmissible by (1) their nature, (2)
stipulation or (3) provision of law.
METROPOLITAN BANK
164538, August 9, 2010

vs.

REYNADO,

G.R.

NO.

Respondents are not parties to the agreement, nor assigns or

heirs
of
either of the parties but who rely on the debt
settlement agreement petitioner and Universal to preclude
prosecution of the offense of estafa or prevent the incipience
of any liability that may arise from the criminal offense. The civil
law principle of relativity of contracts provides that "contracts
can only bind the parties who entered into it, and it cannot
favor or prejudice a third person, even if he is aware of such
contract and has acted with knowledge thereof."
PRUDENTIAL
BANK
AND
ABASOLO, G.R. NO.
186738, September 27, 2010

TRUST

COMPANY

vs.

Contracts take effect only between the parties, their assigns

and heirs, and if a contract should contain some stipulation in
favor of a third person, the contracting parties must have
clearly and deliberately conferred a favor upon the third
person.
VIII.

KINDS OF CONTRACTS

A.INNOMINATE
CONTRACTS ART 1307
CORPUS vs. COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. NO. L-40424
June 30, 1980

There was no express contract between the parties for the

payment of attorney's fees, but the respondent rendered legal
services to petitioner. The payment of attorney's fees to
respondent may be justified by virtue of the innominate
contract of facio ut des (I do and you give which is based on
the principle that "no one shall unjustly enrich himself at the
expense of another" and under Article 1307 such contracts

shall be regulated by the stipulations of the parties, by the

general provisions or principles of obligations and contracts,
by the rules governing the most analogous nominate
contracts, and by the customs of the people.
B. DIVISIBLE CONTRACTS
BRIONES vs. CAMMAYO, ET AL., G.R. NO. L-23559,
October 4, 1971

According to the appellants, a usurious loan is void due to

illegality of cause or object, the rule of pari delicto applies, so
that neither party can bring action against each other. A
contract of loan with usurious interest consists of two
stipulations which are divisible in the sense that the former
can still stand without the latter, the principal and the
accessory stipulations; the principal one is to pay the debt;
the accessory stipulation is to pay interest thereon, and in
case of a divisible contract,
if the illegal terms can be
separated from the legal ones, the latter may be enforced."
C. CONTRACT OF
ADHESION ART 1750
ONG YIU vs. HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, G.R.
NO. L-40597 June 29, 1979

Petitioner contends that respondent Court committed grave

error when it limited PAL's carriage liability to the amount of
P100.00 as stipulated at the back of the ticket and argues that
he had not actually entered into a contract with PAL limiting the
latter's liability for loss or delay of the
baggage of its
passengers. While it may be true that petitioner had not signed
the plane ticket he is nevertheless bound by the provisions
thereof it being a contract of "adhesion", wherein one party
imposes a ready made form of contract on the other and the
one who adheres to the contract is in reality free to reject it
entirely, but if he adheres, he gives his consent.
ART 1326
C & C COMMERCIAL CORPORATION vs. MENOR, G.R.
NO. L-28360
January 27, 1983
Advertisements for bidders are simply invitations to make
proposals, and the advertiser is not bound to accept the highest
or lowest bidder, unless the contrary appears.
ART 1332

TANG vs. COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. NO. L-48563 May

25, 1979

It is the position of the petitioner that because Lee See Guat

was illiterate and spoke only Chinese, she could not be held
guilty of concealment of her health history because the
applications for insurance were in English and the insurer has
not proved that the terms thereof had been fully explained to
her. The obligation to show that the terms of the contract had
been fully explained to the party who is unable to
read or

understand the language of the contract, when fraud or

mistake is alleged, devolves on the party seeking to enforce
it.
BUENAVENTURA ANGELES, ET AL. vs.
TORRES CALASANZ, ET AL., G.R. NO.
March 18, 1985

URSULA
L-42283

The plaintiffs-appellees, eager to acquire a lot upon which

they could build a home, affixed their signatures and
assented to the terms and conditions of the contract and they
had no opportunity to question nor change any of the terms
of the agreement since it was offered to them on a "take it or
leave it" basis. Such contracts are called contracts of
adhesion, because the only participation of the party is the
signing of his signature or his "adhesion" thereto hence must
be construed against the party causing it.

IX.

STIPULATION POR AUTRUI

BONIFACIO BROS., INC., ET AL., vs. MORA, ET AL.,

G.R. NO. L- 20853
May 29, 1967

The appellants seek to recover the insurance proceeds,

relying upon the insurance contract executed by and
between the State Bonding & Insurance Company, Inc. and
Mora. Contracts take effect only between the parties thereto,
except where the contract contains some stipulations, known
as stipulations por atrui, in favor of a third person, who is
allowed to avail himself of a benefit granted to him by the
terms of the contract, provided that the contracting parties
have clearly and deliberately conferred a favor upon such
person, however such third person not a party to the contract
has no action zagainst the parties thereto, and cannot
generally demand the enforcement of the same, if he did not
communicate his acceptance thereto to the obligor before the
revocation.
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FLORENTINO vs. ENCARNACION, SR., G.R. NO. L27696 September 30, 1977
To constitute a valid stipulation pour autrui it must be the
purpose and intent of the stipulating parties to benefit the
third. It is not sufficient that the third person may be
incidentally benefited by the stipulation.
G.R. NO. 120554 September
21, 1999 SO PING BUN vs.
COURT OF APPEALS

17
0

Petitioner prevailed upon DCCSI to lease the warehouse to his

enterprise at the expense of respondent corporation.
Although petitioner took interest in the property of
respondent corporation and benefited from it, nothing on
record imputes deliberate wrongful motives or malice on him.
Any third person who induces another to violate his contract
shall be liable for damages to the other contracting party,
lack of malice, however, precludes damages.

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