MARRIAGE AND PERSONAL

RELATIONS BETWEEN SPOUSES

unreasonable
withdrawal
from
the
wedding is contrary to morals, good
customs or public policy. Wassmers cause
of action is supported under Article 21 of
the Civil Code which provides in part any
person who wilfully causes loss or injury to
another in a manner that is contrary to
morals, good customs or public policy
shall compensate the latter for the
damage.
And under the law, any violation of Article
21 entitles the injured party to receive an
award for moral damages as properly
awarded by the lower court in this case.
Further, the award of exemplary damages
is also proper. Here, the circumstances of
this case show that Velez, in breaching his
promise to Wassmer, acted in wanton,
reckless, and oppressive manner this
warrants the imposition of exemplary
damages against him.

BREACH OF PROMISE TO MARRY

Wassmer v. Velez
12 SCRA 648
FACTS:
In 1954, Francisco Velez and
Beatriz Wassmer planned their marriage.
They decided to schedule it on September
4, 1954.
Wassmer made preparations such
as:
making
and
sending
wedding
invitations, bought her wedding dress and
other apparels, and other wedding
necessities. But 2 days before the
scheduled day of wedding, Velez sent a
letter to Wassmer advising her that he will
not be able to attend the wedding
because his mom was opposed to said
wedding.
One day before the wedding, he
sent another message to Wassmer
advising her that nothing has changed and
that he will be returning soon. However,
he never returned.This prompted Wassmer
to file a civil case against Velez.
Velez never filed an answer and
eventually judgment was made in favor of
Wassmer. The court awarded exemplary
and moral damages in favor of Wassmer.
On appeal, Velez argued that his
failure to attend the scheduled wedding
was because of fortuitous events. He
further argued that he cannot be held
civilly liable for breaching his promise to
marry Wassmer because there is no law
upon which such an action may be
grounded. He also contested the award of
exemplary and moral damages against
him.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the award of
damages is proper.
HELD:
Yes. The defense of fortuitous
events raised by Velez is not tenable and
also unsubstantiated.
It is true that a breach of promise
to marry per se is not an actionable
wrong. However, in this case, it was not a
simple breach of promise to marry.
because of such promise, Wassmer made
preparations for the wedding. Velezs

Tanjanco v CA
TOPIC: Agreements Prior
Breach of Promise to Marry

to

Marriage:

PETITION: An appeal from the decision of

the Court of Appeals revoking an order of
the Court of First Instance of Rizal,
dismissing appellants action for support
and damages

FACTS
From December 1957, Apolonio Tanjanco,
through his attestations of love and
PROMISE OF MARRIAGE to Araceli Santos,
succeeded in having carnal knowledge of
Araceli Santos regularly until December
1959
Araceli then conceived a child (July 1959)
as
a
result,
which
brought
her
embarrassment and social humiliation and
forced her to resign her job as a Secretary
in IBM (salary: 230/month)
Apolonio
refusal
to
marry
Araceli
prompted Araceli to file in the CFI Rizal:
A decree for Apolonio to recognize the
unborn child;
To pay for support for the baby
430/month;
Plus Php 100,000 in moral and exemplary
damages;
And Php 10,000 attorneys fees

CFI Rizal dismissed the case

Araceli appealed to the CA, which held
that:
No cause of action was shown to compel
recognition of a child as yet UNBORN
BUT the complainant DID state a cause of
action for damages premised on ART 21 of
the Civil Code
ART. 21. Any person who willfully causes
loss or injury to another in a manner that
is contrary to morals,good customs or
public policy shall compensate the latter
for the damage.
And Art 23
ART. 23. Any person who willfully causes
loss or injury to another in a manner that
is contrary to morals,good customs or
public policy shall compensate the latter
for damage
A previous ruling that when a nineteen
year old girl was seduced and became
pregnant, there was no crime but she has
a right of action based on Art 23
Apolonio Tanjanco appeals the decision of
the CA
ISSUE
W/N Tanjancos breach of promise to
marriage can bring any action for
damages in court based on Art 21 and Art
23 of the Civil Code

HELD
Conduct based on the Facts are
incompatible with the idea of seduction
Definition of Seduction: "To constitute
seduction there must in all cases be some
sufficient promise or inducement and the
woman must yield because of the promise
or other inducement. If she consents
merely from carnal lust and the
intercourse is from mutual desire, there is
no seduction
In the case: Plainly there is here
voluntariness and mutual passion; for had
the appellant been deceived, had she
surrendered exclusively because of the
deceit, artful persuasions and wiles of the
defendant, she would not have again
yielded to his embraces, much less for one
year, without exacting early fulfillment of
the alleged promises of marriage, and
would have cut short all sexual relations
upon finding that defendant did not intend
to fulfill his promises.

No case is made under Art 21 of the Civil

Code and no other cause of action being
alleged
Araceli was a woman of adult age,
maintained repeated sexual acts with
Tanjanco from 1958 to 1959
- Decision of the CA is reversed, decision
of the CFI is affirmed
Gashem Shookat Baksh vs. Hon.
Court
of
Appeals
and
Marilou
Gonzales
Topic: Breach of Promise to Marry
Facts: This is a petition on Certiorari under
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking to
set aside the decision of the CA who
affirmed Pangasinans RTC ruling in toto.
In August 1986, while working as a
waitress
in
Mabuhay
Luncheonette
Dagupan
City,
Pangasinan,
Marilou
Gonzales, then 21 years old, has been
introduced by the manager of the said
establishment to Gashem Shookat Baksh,
a 29 year old exchange student from Iran
taking
up
medicine
in
Lyceum
Northwestern in Dagupan. A few days
after they met, the petitioner started
courting Gonzales and soon after he made
a proposal to marry private respondent,
she decided to accept both his love and
proposal to marry the latter; on the same
day, they even went home to Gonzales
hometown in Bugallon to meet the girls
parents and discuss their plan of
celebrating their marriage towards the
end of the semester.
In the middle of the following year, Private
Respondent started living in Bakshs
apartment in Lozano Apartment. During
their cohabitation, she got pregnant but
her pregnancy was terminated after
petitioner made her drink medicines to
abort the fetus. In October of the same
year, Marilou Gonzales filed 2 complaints
with the RTC of Pangasinan without the
assistance of counsel seeking petitioner to
pay her moral damages for allegedly
maltreatment she him and breaking his
initial promise to marry after asserting
that he has already married a girl from
Bacolod City. After finding merit in the

complaint, the RTC of Pangasinan, ruled in

favour of Gonzales thereby ordering
petitioner to pay the former a total of
P20,000.00 for moral damages. Upon
appeal, petitioner alleged that the RTC
erred in not dismissing the case for lack of
legal basis and for ordering him to pay for
moral damages to Gonzales, however,
after the review of the evidences
presented, the CA ruled to affirm the RTCs
decision in toto for his fraudulent
protestations of love to the private
respondent and that he be ordered to
compensate for the moral damages
inflicted upon Gonzales in accordance with
the provision of Article 21 of the New Civil
Code.
Discontented with the CAs ruling, the
petitioner elevated the case to the SC
contending that Article 21 should not be
applied to him because being a Muslim he
is not familiar with the Catholic and
Christian ways. Furthermore, he also
argued that the court erred in ruling that
he does not possess good moral character
for according to him he has not proposed
marriage to Gonzales and that even if he
has, failure on his part to fulfil the same is
is wholly excusable and tolerable because
of his Muslim upbringing.
Issue: Whether or not the petitioner
should be ordered to compensate the
private respondent for his failure to fulfil
his promise to marry the latter.
Ruling: The Court in this case said that
the failure to fulfil a promise to marry per
se does not constitute a wrong for the
Congress has deliberately eliminated said
provision from their draft of the New Civil
Code.
In
resolution
thereof,
they
formulated Article 21 which grants
adequate legal remedies and expands the
concept of torts and quasi-delicts for the
untold number of moral wrongs impossible
for humans to specifically punish under
statute books. Applying the same to the
case at hand, the Court found the assailed
decisions justifiable for the rendered
judgement does not merely punish
petitioners failure to fulfil his promise but
also his application fraud and deceit as
shown through his acts and the wilful
injury he has inflicted upon private

respondents honor. In conclusion thereof,

the petition was DENIED.
Mary Jane Abanag vs. Nicolas B. Mabute
A.M. No. P-11-2922 April 4, 2011

Topic: Breach of Marriage

Facts:

Mary Jane Abanag (23 years old,

complainant) filed an administrative case
against Nicolas B. Mabute (respondent),
Court Stenographer I in theMunicipal
Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) of Paranas,
Samar for Disgraceful and Immoral
Conduct. Complainant and respondents
were sweethearts. Both were unmarried.

Complainant alleged that she met the

respondent when he joined as a member
of the Singles for Christ. Respondent
courted her and professed his undying
love for her. Believing respondent's
promise that he would marry her, she
agreed to live with him. She became
pregnant, but after several months into
her pregnancy, respondent brought her to
a "manghihilot" and tried to force her to
take drugs to abort her baby. When she
did not agree, the respondent turned cold
and eventually abandoned her. She
became depressed resulting in the loss of
her baby. She also stopped schooling
because of the humiliation that she
suffered.

Respondent
admitted
that
the
complainant would join him at his rented
room three to four times a week. When
the complainant became pregnant, he
asked her to stay and live with him. He
vehemently denied having brought the
complainant to a local "manghihilot" and
that he had tried to force her to abort her
baby. He surmised that the complainant's
miscarriage could be related to her
epileptic attacks during her pregnancy.
The respondent further testified that the

complainant's mother did not approve of

him, but the complainant defied her
mother and lived with him. He proposed
marriage to the complainant, but her
mother did not like him as a son-in-law
and ordered the complainant to return
home. The complainant obeyed her
mother. They have separated
ways since then, but he pledged his
undying love for the complainant.

Held/Ratio:

The Court find that the acts complained of

cannot be considered as disgraceful or
grossly immoral conduct.

Mere sexual relations between two

unmarried and consenting adults are not
enough to warrant administrative sanction
for illicit behavior. The Court has
repeatedly held that voluntary intimacy
between a man and a woman who are not
married, where both are not under any
impediment to marry and where no deceit
exists, is neither a criminal nor an
unprincipled act that would warrant
disbarment or disciplinary action.

While the Court has the power to regulate

official conduct and, to a certain extent,
private conduct, it is not within our
authority to decide on matters touching on
employees' personal lives, especially
those that will affect their and their
family's future. We cannot intrude into the
question of whether they should or should
not marry.

The Court resolves to DISMISS the present

administrative complaint against Nicolas
Mabute for lack of merit. No costs.

ISSUE
WON Ret. Justice Onofre A. Villaluz should
be suspended from his practice of law.

Castillo vda de Mijarez v Villaluz

HELD
What
complainant
and
respondent
contracted was a valid marriage borne out
by law and evidence
All essential and formal requisites of a
valid marriage under the Family Code
were satisfied and complied with
Legal capacity of the contracting parties,
who must be male and female
Consent freely given in the presence of
the solemnizing officer
A valid marriage license except for those
cases provided in the FC
Marriage ceremony with the appearance
of the contracting parties before the
solemnizing officer, and their personal
declaration that they take each other as
husband and wife, in the presence of not
less than two witnesses of legal age
Citing Rule 1.01 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, the Supreme
Court found the respondent engaging in
an unlawful, dishonest, immoral or
deceitful
conduct
and
recommends
SUSPENSION with the specific WARNING
that a more severe penalty shall be
imposed should he commit the same or a
similar offense hereafter
Respondent fails to meet the standard of
moral fitness for continued membership in
the legal profession
The nature of the office requires that he
shall be a person of good moral character,
a qualification not only a condition
precedent for admission to the practice if
law, but whose continued possession is
essential to remain in the practice

Topic: Kinds of requisites and effects of

non-compliance

FACTS
Complaint for disbarment due to gross
immorality and grave misconduct
Respondent, a Justice of the Court of
Appeals, was charged with Bigamy by
complainant and is being recommended
for suspension from practice of law
Priscilla Castillo vda de Mijares and Justice
Onofre Villaluz married each other pending
the court's decision on the former's
marriage
Complainant was widowed by the death of
her first husband, and obtained a decree
declaring her husband presumptively
dead, after an absence of 16 years
Their relationship was shortlived as right
after their marriage, the complainant left
their would-be-honeymoon place after
some unbearable utterances made by the
respondent
Such unbearable utterances started when
complainant confronted the respondent
regarding the identity of the woman who
called
complainant
on
the
phone,
offending her with insulting remarks
Several months after, the complainant
learned that respondent subsequently
married a certain Lydia Geraldez
Thus, the basis of this complaint
She gathered evidence to show that
complainant falsified his civil status as
single, when he married Geraldez, in order
for him to lead an immoral and indiscreet
life
In respondents defense, he claims that
what he had with the complainant was but
a sham marriage to help her in an
administrative case filed against her
He further alleged that at the time of his
marriage to complainant, his first marriage
to Librada Pena was still valid and
subsisting as the decision of the court
annulling their marriage has not yet
reached finality

o
o

Silverio v Republic
GR No. 174689
October 22, 2007
-

FACTS:
Petitioner Rommel Silverio is a male
transsexual. He is biologically male and
had a gender re-assignment in Bangkok to
have a female body.

Silverio filed a petition to change his first

name from Rommel to Mely. The
petition also aims to change his sex from
male to female in his birth certificate
because of his sex reassignment. His claim
is based on the fact that he may be male
on the outside, he acts like a female.
He filed his petition in the Manila RTC and
was granted. The RTC ruled that in
consonance with the principles of justice
and equality, he could have his sex and
name changes.
Respondent Republic, through the office of
the Solicitor General, filed a petition for
certiorari in the Court of Appeals. They
argue that petitioner cannot be allowed to
change his name because there is no law
that allow him to do so.
Silverio filed a petition for reconsideration
but was denied. Court of Appeals reversed
the decision of the RTC.
ISSUE:
W/N Silverio is allowed to change his name
and sex in his birth certificate because of
his sex reassignment

HELD:
No. No law allows the change of entry in
the birthday certificate of sex on the
ground of sex reassignment.
- RA 9048 (AN ACT AUTHORIZING THE CITY
OR MUNICIPAL CIVIL REGISTRAR OR THE
CONSUL GENERAL TO CORRECT A
CLERICAL OR TYPOGRAPHICAL ERROR IN
AN ENTRY AND/OR CHANGE OF FIRST
NAME OR NICKNAME IN THE CIVIL
REGISTER WITHOUT NEED OF A JUDICIAL
ORDER). This law provides that it should
be the local civil registrar that has
jurisdiction in petitions for the change of
first names and not the regular courts. The
petition of Silverio insofar as his first name
is concerned is procedurally infirm. Even
assuming that the petition filed properly, it
cannot be granted still because the
ground upon which it is based (gender reassignment) is not one of those provided
for by the law. Under the law, a change of
name may only be grounded on the
following:
1. The petitioner finds the first name or
nickname to be ridiculous, tainted with
dishonor or extremely difficult to write or
pronounce;
-

2. The new first name or nickname has been

habitually and continuously used by the
petitioner and he has been publicly known
by that first name or nickname in the
community; or
3. The change will avoid confusion.
- Silverio did not allege any of the above, he
merely alleged gender re-assignment as
the basis.
- Silverio cant change his sex because
again, there is no law that allows the
change. He was born a male hence it was
just but right that the entry written in
his birth certificate is that he is a male.
The sex of a person is determined at birth,
visually done by the birth attendant by
examining the genitals of the infant.
Considering that there is no law legally
recognizing
sex
reassignment,
the
determination of a persons sex made at
the time of his or her birth, if not attended
by error, is immutable.
- Allowing the changes Silverio sought will
substantially reconfigure and greatly alter
the laws on marriage and family relations.
- SC emphasized: If the legislature intends
to confer on a person who has undergone
sex reassignment the privilege to change
his name and sex to conform with his
reassigned sex, it has to enact legislation
laying down the guidelines in turn
governing
the
conferment
of
that
privilege.
Garcia v Recio
GR No. 138322
October 2, 2002
-

FACTS:
On March 1, 1987Rederic Recio, a Filipino
citizen, married a woman named Editha
Samson, an Australian citizen, in Malabon
A decree of divorce dissolving the
marriage was issued by an Australian
family court on May 18, 1989
On June 26, 1992 Recio became an
Australian citizen, which was evidence by
a certificate of Australian citizenship
that the Australian government issued.
June 26, 1992: Recio became an Australian
citizen, as shown by a "Certificate
of Australian
Citizenship"
issued
by
the Australian government

Recio remarried a Filipino woman named

Grace Garcia in Cabanatuan city on
January 12, 1994. Garcia and Recio lived
separately without prior judicial dissolution
of their marriage on October 22, 1995.
Garcia field a complaint for Declaration of
Nullity of Marriage to Recio, on the ground
of Bigamy, and that she never knew of the
previous marriage he had. Recio prays
that the action be dismissed and argues
that his previous marriage with Editha
Samson has been validly dissolved by a
decree of divorce obtained in Australia,
therefore claiming that his marriage with
Garcia is valid.

ISSUE:
W/N Garcia and Recio can dissolve their
marriage for the grounds charged against
Recio
HELD:
- The SC remanded the case to the court a
quo to receive evidence. Based on the
records, the court cannot conclude that
Recio who
was
then
a
naturalized
Australian citizen was legally capacitated
to marry Garcia. Neither can the court
grant Garcias prayer to declare her
marriage null and void on the ground of
bigamy. After all it may turn out that under
Australian law he was really capacitated to
marry Garcia as result of the divorce
decree.
- The SC laid down the following basic legal
principles; a marriage between two Filipino
cannot be dissolved even by a divorce
decree obtained
abroad
because
of
Articles 15 and 17 of the Civil Code.
- Divorce:
1. A marriage between two Filipinos cannot
be dissolved even by a divorce obtained
abroad, because of Articles 15 and 17 of
the Civil Code.
2. In mixed marriages involving a Filipino and
a foreigner, Article 26 of the Family Code
allows
the
former
to
contract
a
subsequent marriage in case the divorce is
"validly obtained abroad by the alien
spouse capacitating him or her to
remarry."
3. A divorce obtained abroad by a couple,
who are both aliens, may be recognized in
the Philippines, provided it is consistent
with their respective national laws.
-

1.
2.
1.

2.
-

1.
2.
-

Before a foreign divorce decree can be

recognized by our courts, the party
pleading it must prove the divorce as a
fact and demonstrate its conformity to the
foreign law allowing it
legal capacity to contract marriage is
determined by the national law of the
party concerned
A divorce obtained abroad is proven by
the divorce decree itself. The decree
purports to be a written act or record of an
act of an officially body or tribunal of a
foreign country
Under Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132, on
the other hand, a writing or document
may be proven as a public or official
record of a foreign country by either:
an official publication; or
a copy thereof attested by the officer
having legal custody of the document.
If the record is not kept in the Philippines,
such copy must be:
accompanied by a certificate issued by the
proper diplomatic or consular officer in the
Philippine foreign service stationed in the
foreign country in which the record is kept;
and
authenticated by the seal of his office
Divorce was a defense raised by Recio, the
burden of proving the pertinent Australian
law validating it falls squarely upon him
Divorce means the legal dissolution of a
lawful union for a cause arising after
marriage. But divorces are of different
types:
Absolute divorce or a vinculo matrimonii terminates the marriage
Limited divorce or a mensa et thoro suspends it and leaves the bond in full
force
Recio presented a decree nisi or an
interlocutory decree a conditional or
provisional judgment of divorce
On its face, the herein Australian divorce
decree contains a restriction that reads:
"1. A party to a marriage who marries
again before this decree becomes
absolute (unless the other party has died)
commits the offence of bigamy."
G.R. 126746 November 29, 2000
ARTHUR TE, petitioner,

vs. COURT OF APPEALS, and LILIANA

CHOA, respondents

judgment
declaring
marriage as void.

FACTS:

3. Under the law, a marriage, even one

which is void or voidable, shall be deemed
valid until declared otherwise in a judicial
proceeding.

Arthur Te and Liliana Choa were married in

civil rites on Sept. 14, 1988. They did not
live together after marriage although they
would meet each other regularly.
On April 29, 1989, Liliana gave birth to a
girl. Thereafter, Arthur stopped visiting
her.
On May 20, 1990, Arthur contracted a
second marriage with Julieta Santella while
marriage with Liliana was subsisting.
Liliana filed bigamy case against Arthur.
She also filed an administrative case
(revocation of engineering license for
grossly immoral act) against Arthur and
Julieta.
Arthur petitioned for the nullity of his
marriage with Liliana on the grounds of
concealment of pregnancy by another
man at the time of their marriage and that
she was psychologically incapacitated.
RTC and Board rendered decision while the
petition for annulment of first marriage
was pending.
ISSUE:

previous

RULING:
The petition is hereby DENIED for lack of
merit.

W/N marriage annulment case had to be

resolved
first
before
criminal
and
administrative case be rendered judgment
HELD/RATIO:
NO. The following reasons show that
criminal and administrative case may
proceed and be rendered judgment even
before the annulment of marriage of the
spouses involved:

1. In People v. Mendoza and People v.

Aragon, no judicial decree is necessary to
establish the invalidity of a marriage
which is void ab initio.

2. Art. 40 of the Family Code states that

the absolute nullity of a previous marriage
may not be invoked for purposes of
remarriage unless there is a final

such

NOLLORA v. PEOPLE
[G.R. No. 191425; September 7, 2011]
TOPIC:
Absence of Impediment
PETITIONER: Atilano Nollora, Jr.
RESPONDENT:
People
of
the
Philippines
PONENTE:
Carpio, J. (2nd Div)
LAW:
Revised Penal Code (RPC)
Art. 349. Bigamy. The penalty of prision
mayor shall be imposed upon any person
who shall contract a second or
subsequent marriage before the
former marriage has been legally
dissolved xxx
Family Code (FC)
Art. 41. A marriage contracted by any
person during subsistence of a previous
marriage shall be null and void, unless
before
the
celebration
of
the
subsequent
marriage,
the
prior
spouse had been absent for four
consecutive years and the spouse
present has a well-founded belief
that the absent spouse was already
dead. xxx
Code of Muslim Personal Laws (CMPL)
Art. 13 (2) [i]n case of a marriage
between a Muslim and a non-Muslim,
solemnized not in accordance with
Muslim law or this Code, the [FC, in
lieu
of
the
Civil
Code
of
the
Philippines] shall apply.
Art. 27. [N]o Muslim male can have more
than one wife unless he can deal with
them in equal companionship and just
treatment as enjoined by Islamic Law
and only in exceptional cases.
Art. 180. The provisions of the Revised
Penal Code relative to the crime of
bigamy shall not apply to a person

o
o

married in accordance with the

provisions of this Code or, before its
effectivity, under Muslim law.
NOTE: Red highlights are immaterial to
petitioners
case
since
Rowenas
innocence is not being deliberated upon.
FACTS:
Petition for review of RTC decision which
found petitioner guilty of Bigamy. Coaccused Rowena Geraldino was acquitted
for failure to prove her guilty beyond
reasonable doubt
Apr 6, 1999: marriage between petitioner
and Jesusa Nollora in Bulacan
They met in Saudi Arabia. Jesusa was a
Staff Midwife in a hospital
Dec 8, 2001: petitioner contracted a
subsequent marriage with Rowena in
Quezon City
Petitioner and Rowena were childhood
friends and neighbors
Apr 18, 2005: petitioner refused to enter
plea during arraignment (plea of not guilty
was entered by the Court).
Jun 14, 2005: Rowena pleaded not guilty
Evidence for the Prosecution
Jesusa was still working in Saudi when she
got wind of this news, which was
confirmed when she came back here
According to Jesusa, she confronted
Rowena in her workplace in Taguig. Here,
the latter admitted that she knew of the
marriage between petitioner and Jesusa
Prosecution witness Ruth Santos backed
up her testimony by declaring that she
went with Jesusa to confront Rowena,
where the latter admitted to knowing
about the marriage
Jesusa also said that she already met her
before, when petitioner was introducing
her to his parents and overheard their
plans of marriage
Claims for damages
Due to this case, Jesusa was unable to
return to work in Saudi, losing the income
opportunity of P34K/month
As to moral damages, she claimed that
because of the incident, she started
entertaining thoughts of suicide, her
mother died, and she was almost raped
(because petitioner left her in Saudi)
Just asked for the return of her P50K
Evidence for the Defense

o
o

o
o
o

Petitioner claimed that he was a Muslim

convert on Jan 10, 1992, even before his
1st marriage
As a Muslim convert, he was entitled to
marry 4 wives under the Muslim belief
Presented a Certificate of Conversion
(dated Aug 2, 2004) which provides that
he converted on Jan 10, 1992
Presented a Pledge of Conversion (dated
Jan 10, 1992) issued by their Imam
Claimed that Jesusa knew of his being a
Muslim prior to their marriage and that the
complaint was due to hatred
Testified that Rowena did not know of his
prior marriage, since he didnt tell her due
to fears of losing her (a Catholic)
His marriage certificate with Rowena
stating that he was Catholic and single
was in line with his ruse
NOTE: in his marriage certificate with
Jesusa,
his
religion
was
Catholic
Pentecostal, (claimed ignorance)
Defense
witness
Hadji
Madueno
(President,
Balik Islam Tableegh Foundation of the
Philippines)
testified that he indoctrinated and
converted petitioner, and that the latter
was made to report every Sunday
claimed that he was not aware of the first
marriage but was aware of the second
explained that a Muslim could marry more
than once, but before marrying another,
the consent of the first Muslim wife must
be secured. If the first is not a Muslim,
then there is no need to secure her
consent
if a Muslim convert gets married not in
accordance with the Muslim faith, the
same is contrary to their teachings. Since
his 2nd marriage was not in accordance
with this, he advised petitioner to re-marry
Rowena under
Muslim
marriage
celebration - otherwise, he will not be
considered as a true Muslim
Rowenas Defense
alleged that she was only a victim in this
incident of bigamous marriage and claims
to not know Jesusa before the trial.
Denies the confrontation or her confession
of awareness of the 1st marriage
claims that she is lawfully married to
petitioner. Prior to their marriage, she
asked him if he was single and he said
yes.

o
o

o
o

thought that petitioner was a Catholic

prior to their marriage, but after learning
of the 1st marriage, she knew that he is a
Muslim convert. After this realization, they
married in accordance with the Muslim
rites
RTC Ruling convicting petitioner and
acquitting Rowena
There are only 2 exceptions to Bigamy: (1)
Art 41, FC and (2) Art 27 & 180, CMPL
In Islam, monogamy is the general rule
and polygamy is allowed only to meet
urgent needs.
Only with the permission of the court can
a Muslim have a 2nd wife, subject to
certain requirements
having plurality of wives is merely
tolerated, not encouraged
Arbitration is necessary: a Muslim husband
who wants subsequent marriages must
first notify the Sharia Circuit Court, the
clerk of which shall serve a copy thereof to
the current wife/ves. If any objects, an
Agama Arbitration Council shall be
constituted. If said council fails to secure
the wifes consent, the Court shall, subject
to Article 27, decide WON to sustain her
objection
Petitioner did not comply with the
procedure required by law
he did not even declare that he was a
Muslim convert
in both
marriages
(indicative of criminal intent)
petitioner mistakenly believed that he can
just marry anybody again after marrying
Jesusa
a Muslim is not given an unbridled right to
just marry anybody the second, third or
fourth time
There
are
requirements
that
the Sharia law imposes (not met by
petitioner)
petitioner
should
have
notified
the Sharia Court where his family resides
so that copy of said notice should be
furnished to the first wife
argument that notice to the first wife is
not required since she is not a Muslim is of
no moment
attempt
to
escape
liability
by
recelebrating their marriage under Muslim
rights is not a cure since the criminal
violation has already been committed
no sufficient evidence that would pin
Rowena of being guilty

o
o

1.
2.

3.

4.

insufficient evidence presented against

her as these were open to several
interpretations
Their meeting when Jesusa was introduced
to petitioners parents cannot lead to the
conclusion that she understood what was
going on
Proof against the accused must survive
the test of reason, and the strongest
suspicion cannot sway judgment
CA denied petitioners appeal
Both
marriages
werent
conducted
according to Muslim rites, thus the Family
Code must apply
His claim of religious freedom will not
immobilize the State and render it
impotent in protecting the general welfare
ISSUE:WON petitioner is guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of Bigamy
RULING:
Yes, he is GUILTY beyond
reasonable
doubt
of
Bigamy.
Petition DENIED. RTC decision
AFFIRMED. Imprisonment for 2
years, 4 months, 1 day prision
correccional as minimum to 8
years, 1 day prision mayor as
maximum.
Elements of Bigamy (all present)
That the offender has been legally
married. = Legally married to Jesusa
That the marriage has not been legally
dissolved or, in case his or her spouse is
absent, the absent spouse could not yet
be presumed dead according to the Civil
Code. = Marriage with Jesusa was not
legally dissolved prior to marriage with
Rowena
That
he
contracts
a second or subsequent marriage.
=
Petitioner admitted the existence of 2 nd
marriage
That the second or subsequent marriage
has all the essential requisites for validity.
= 2nd marriage has all the essential
requisites, except for his lack of
capacity due to a subsisting marriage
Even granting arguendo that petitioner
was of Muslim faith at the time of
celebration of both marriages, he cannot
deny that both ceremonies were not
conducted in accordance with the CMPL
(Art 14-20)

o
o

o
o
o

Art. 13 (2) provides that marriages

solemnized not in accordance to Muslim
rites shall be governed by FC.
Thus,
regardless
of
his
professed
religion, petitioner cannot claim exemption
from liability for bigamy
Although the truth or falsehood of the
declaration of ones religion in the
marriage certificate is not an essential
requirement for marriage, such omissions
are sufficient proofs of petitioners liability
His false declaration about his civil status
is thus further compounded by these
omissions
In
his
petition
before
the
SC, petitioner casted doubt on the validity
of his marriage to Rowena
He may not impugn his 2nd marriage in
order to extricate himself from criminal
liability
To allow such would open the doors to the
solemnization of multiple flawed marriage
ceremonies
Such a void ab initio marriage may still
produce legal consequences, like a
criminal liability for bigamy
Nollora v People
FACTS:
While Jesusa Pinat Nollora was still in
Saudi Arabia, she heard rumors that her
husband of two years has another wife.
She returned to the Philippines and
learned that indeed, Atilano O. Nollora, Jr.,
contracted second marriage with a certain
Rowena Geraldino on December 8, 2001.
Jesusa filed an instant case against Atilano
and Rowena for bigamy. When asked
about the moral damages she suffered,
she declared that money is not enough to
assuage her sufferings. Instead, she just
asked for return of her money in the
amount of P 50,000.
Atilano admitted having contracted 2
marriages, however, he claimed that he
was a Muslim convert way back to 1992.
He presented Certificate of Conversion
and Pledge of Conversion, proving that he
allegedly converted as a Muslim in January
1992. And as a Muslim convert, he is

allegedly entitled to marry

allowed under the Islam belief.

wives

as

Accused Rowena alleged that she was a

victim of bigamous marriage. She claimed
that she does not know Jesusa and only
came to know her when the case was
filed. She insisted that she is the one
lawfully married to Nollora because she
believed him to be single and a Catholic,
as he told her so prior to their
marriage. After she learned of the first
marriage of her husband, she learned that
he is a Muslim convert. After learning that
Nollora was a Muslim convert, she and he
also got married in accordance with the
Muslim rites.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the second marriage is
bigamous.
RULING:
Yes, the marriage between the Nollora and
Geraldino is bigamous under Article 349 of
the Revised Penal Code, and as such, the
second marriage is considered null and
void ab initio under Article 35 of the
Family Code.
The elements of the crime of bigamy are
all present in the case: that 1) Atilano is
legally married to Jesusa; 2) that their
marriage has not been legally dissolved
prior to the date of the second marriage;
3)that Atilano admitted the existence of
his second marriage to Rowena; and 4) the
second marriage has all the essential
requisites for validity except for the lack of
capacity of Atilano due to his prior
marriage.
Before the trial and appellate courts,
Atilano put up his Muslim religion as his
sole defense. Granting arguendo that he is
indeed of Muslim faith at the time of
celebration of both marriages, he cannot
deny that both marriage ceremonies were
not conducted in accordance with Articles
14, 15, 17 up to 20 of the Code of Muslim
Personal Laws .
In Article 13 (2) of the Code of Muslim
Personal Laws states that any marriage

between a Muslim and a non-Muslim

solemnized not in accordance with the
Muslim law, hence the Family Code of the
Philippines shall apply. Nollora's religious
affiliation or his claim that his marriages
were solemnized according to Muslim law.
Thus, regardless of his professed religion,
he cannot claim exemption from liability
for the crime of bigamy.
His second marriage did not comply with
the Article 27 of the Muslim Personal Laws
of the Philippines providing: "[N]o Muslim
male can have more than one wife unless
he can deal with them in equal
companionship and just treatment as
enjoined by Islamic Law and only in
exceptional
cases."
Only
with
the
permission of the Shari'a Circuit Court can
a Muslim be permitted to have a second,
third or fourth wife. The clerk of court shall
serve a copy to the wife or wives, and
should any of them objects, an Agama
Arbitration Council shall be constituted. If
the said council fails to secure the wife's
consent to the proposed marriage, the
Court shall subject to Article 27, decide
whether on not to sustain her objection
(Art. 162, Muslim Personal Laws)
Atilano asserted in his marriage certificate
with Rowena that his civil status is
"single." Both of his marriage contracts do
not state that he is a Muslim. Although the
truth or falsehood of the declaration of
one's religion in the marriage is not an
essential requirement for marriage, his
omissions are sufficient proofs of his
liability for bigamy. His false declaration
about his civil status is thus further
compounded by these omissions.
It is not for him to interpret the Shari'a
law, and in apparent attempt to escape
criminal liability, he recelebrated their
marriage in accordance with the Muslim
rites. However, this can no longer cure the
criminal liability that has already been
violated.
PEREGRINA MACUA VDA. DE AVENIDO,
Petitioner, v. TECLA HOYBIA AVENIDO,
Respondent.
G.R. No. 173540, January 22, 2014

TOPIC:
Nature of Marriage in the Philippine
Law
FACTS OF THE CASE:
Respondent Tecla Hoybia Avenido
(Tecla) instituted on 11 November 1998, a
Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of
Marriage against Peregrina Macua Vda. de
Avenido (Peregrina) on the ground that
she (Tecla), is the lawful wife of the
deceased Eustaquio Avenido (Eustaquio).
In her complaint, Tecla alleged that her
marriage to Eustaquio was solemnized on
30 September 1942 in Talibon, Bohol in
rites officiated by the Parish Priest of the
said town. According to her, the fact of
their marriage is evidenced by a Marriage
Certificate recorded with the Office of the
Local Civil Registrar (LCR) of Talibon,
Bohol. However, due to World War II,
records were destroyed. Thus, only a
Certification3 was issued by the LCR.
During the existence of Tecla and
Eustaquios union, they begot four (4)
children, namely: Climaco H. Avenido, born
on 30 March 1943; Apolinario H. Avenido,
born on 23 August 1948; Editha A. Ausa,
born on 26 July 1950, and Eustaquio H.
Avenido, Jr., born on 15 December 1952.
Sometime in 1954, Eustaquio left his
family and his whereabouts was not
known. In 1979, Tecla learned that her
husband Eustaquio got married to another
woman by the name of Peregrina, which
marriage she claims must be declared null
and void for being bigamous - an action
she sought to protect the rights of her
children over the properties acquired by
Eustaquio.
On 12 April 1999, Peregrina filed
her answer to the complaint with
counterclaim, essentially averring that she
is the legal surviving spouse of Eustaquio
who died on 22 September 1989 in Davao

City,
their
marriage
having
been
celebrated on 30 March 1979 at St. Jude
Parish in Davao City. She also contended
that the case was instituted to deprive her
of the properties she owns in her own right
and as an heir of Eustaquio. Then the Trial
ensued. The RTC ruled against Tecla for
failure of the latter to present the
marriage contract of her and Eustaquio.
Aggrieved, Tecla appealed to the CA and
the latter reversed the ruling of the RTC
and ruled in favor of Tecla by declaring the
validity of her marriage to Eustaquio,
while pronouncing on the other hand, the
marriage
between
Peregrina
and
Eustaquio to be bigamous, and thus, null
and void. The CA ruled that the RTC
committed an error when it failed to
consider the other evidence presented by
Tecla. Peregrina now questions the said
ruling assigning as error, among others,
the failure of the CA to appreciate the
validity of her marriage to Eustaquio.

shown by the certifications issued by the

NSO and LCR of Talibon, Bohol. These are
relevant,
competent
and
admissible
evidence. Since the due execution and the
loss of the marriage contract were clearly
shown by the evidence presented,
secondary evidence - testimonial and
documentary - may be admitted to prove
the fact of marriage. In PUGEDA v. TRIAS,
the Supreme Court held that marriage
may be proven by any competent and
relevant evidence. The testimony by one
of the parties to the marriage or by one of
the witnesses to the marriage has been
held to be admissible to prove the fact of
marriage. The person who officiated at the
solemnization is also competent to testify
as an eyewitness to the fact of marriage.
2. In a long line of cases, a
presumption of marriage is always upheld.
As early as the case of Adong v. Cheong
Seng Gee, this Court has elucidated on the
rationale behind the presumption:

ISSUE:
1. Whether or not the evidence
presented during the trial proves the
existence of the marriage of Tecla to
Eustaquio.
2. Whether or not the court can
validly rely on the presumption of
marriage to overturn the validity of a
subsequent marriage

RULING:
1. YES. The evidence presented in
the RTC was sufficient to prove that the
existence of the marriage of Tecla to
Eustaquio. As correctly stated by the
appellate court, the celebration of
marriage between [Tecla] and EUSTAQUIO
was established by the testimonial
evidence furnished by [Adelina] who
appears to be present during the marriage
ceremony, and by [Tecla] herself as a
living witness to the event. The loss was

The basis of human society

throughout the civilized world is that of
marriage. Marriage in this jurisdiction is
not only a civil contract, but it is a new
relation, an institution in the maintenance
of which the public is deeply interested.
Consequently, every intendment of the
law leans toward legalizing matrimony.
Persons dwelling together in apparent
matrimony are presumed, in the absence
of any counter-presumption or evidence
special to the case, to be in fact married.
The reason is that such is the common
order of society, and if the parties were
not what they thus hold themselves out as
being, they would be living in the constant
violation of decency and of law.
A
presumption established by our Code of
Civil Procedure is that a man and a woman
deporting themselves as husband and wife
have entered into a lawful contract of
marriage. (Sec. 334, No. 28) Semper -

praesumitur pro matrimonio

presume marriage.

Always

Anaya vs. Palaroan

36 SCRA 97
FACTS:
Aurora Anaya and Fernando Palaroan were
married in 1953. Palaroan filed an action
for annulment of the marriage in 1954 on
the ground that his consent was obtained
through force and intimidation.
The
complaint was dismissed and upheld the
validity of the marriage and granting
Auroras counterclaim. While the amount
of counterclaim was being negotiated,
Fernando divulged to her that several
months prior to their marriage, he had
pre-marital relationship with a close
relative of his. According to her, the nondivulgement to her of such pre-marital
secret constituted fraud in obtaining her
consent. She prayed for the annulment of
her marriage with Fernando on such
ground.
ISSUE: Whether or not the concealment
to a wife by her husband of his pre-marital
relationship with another woman is a
ground for annulment of marriage.
HELD:
The concealment of a husbands premarital relationship with another woman
was not one of those enumerated that
would constitute fraud as ground for
annulment and it is further excluded by
the last paragraph providing that no
other misrepresentation or deceit as to..
chastity shall give ground for an action to
annul a marriage. Hence, the case at bar
does not constitute fraud and therefore
would not warrant an annulment of
marriage.

Villanueva vs CA
GR No. 132955
October 27, 2006
FACTS:
In April 1988, Orly married Lilia before a
trial court judge in Puerto Princesa. In
November 1992, Orly filed to annul the
marriage. He claimed that threats of
violence and duress forced him to marry
Lilia. He said that he had been receiving
phone calls threatening him and that Lilia
even hired the service of a certain Ka
Celso, a member of the NPA, to threaten
him. Orly also said he was defrauded by
Lilia by claiming that she was pregnant
hence he married her but he now raises
that he never impregnated Lilia prior to
the marriage. Lilia on the other hand
denied Orlys allegations and she said that
Orly freely cohabited with her after the
marriage and she showed 14 letters that
shows Orlys affection and care towards
her.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the subject marriage may
be annulled on the ground of vitiated
consent
HELD:
The SC ruled that Orlys allegation of fraud
and intimidation is untenable. On its face,
it is obvious that Orly is only seeking to
annul his marriage with Lilia so as to have
the pending appealed bigamy case [filed
against him by Lilia] to be dismissed. On
the merits of the case, Orlys allegation of
fear was not concretely established. He
was not able to prove that there was a
reasonable and well-grounded reason for
fear to be created in his mind by the
alleged intimidation being done against
him by Lilia and her party. Orly is a
security guard who is well abreast with
self-defense and that the threat he so
described done against him is not
sufficient enough to vitiate him from freely
marrying Lilia. Fraud cannot be raised as a
ground as well. His allegation that he
never had an erection during their sexual
intercourse is incredible and is an outright
lie. Also, there is a prolonged inaction on
the part of Orly to attack the marriage. It
took him 4 and a half years to file an

action which brings merit to Lilias

contention that Orly freely cohabited with
her after the marriage.
WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTLY
GRANTED. The January 26, 1998 Decision
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No.
51832 affirming with modification the
January 12, 1996 Decision of the Regional
Trial Court of Valenzuela, Metro Manila,
Branch 172 in Civil Case No. 3997-V-92
dismissing petitioner's petition for the
annulment of his marriage with private
respondent, is AFFIRMED. However, the
award of moral and exemplary damages
is DELETED for lack of basis.
JIMENEZ vs. CAIZARES
Topic: Parental Consent - Effect of
force,
intimidation
and
undue
influence
Facts:
Joel Jimenez prays for a decree annulling
his marriage to the defendant Remedios
Caizares, upon the ground that the office
of her genitals or vagina was too small to
allow the penetration of a male organ or
penis for copulation.
The Court ordered the defendant to
submit to a physical examination by a
competent lady physician to determine
her physical capacity for copulation and to
submit, within ten days from receipt of the
order, a medical certificate on the result
thereof.
The Court warned her that failure to
undergo medical examination and submit
the required doctor's certificate would be
deemed lack of interest on her part in the
case, and that judgment upon the
evidence presented by her husband would
be rendered.
After hearing, at which the defendant was
not present, the Court entered a decree
annulling the marriage between the
plaintiff and the defendant. The city
attorney filed a motion for reconsideration
of the decree thus entered, upon the
ground,
among
others,
that
the

defendant's impotency has not been

satisfactorily established as required by
law; that she had not been physically
examined because she had refused to be
examined; that instead of annulling the
marriage the Court should have punished
her for contempt of court and compelled
her to undergo a physical examination and
submit a medical certificate. He prayed
that the complaint be dismissed or that
the wife be subjected to a physical
examination.
The
motion
for
reconsideration was denied.
Issue:
W/n the marriage in question may be
annulled on the strength only of the lone
testimony of the husband who claimed
and testified that his wife was and is
impotent. The wife did not answer the
complaint, was absent during the hearing,
and refused to submit to a medical
examination.
Ruling:
The state has surrounded marriage with
safeguards
to
maintain
its
purity,
continuity and permanence.
The law specifically enumerates the legal
grounds that must be proved to exist by
indubitable evidence, to annul a marriage.
In the case at bar, the annulment of the
marriage in question was decreed upon
the sole testimony of the husband.
Whether the wife is really impotent cannot
be deemed to have been satisfactorily
established,
because
from
the
commencement of the proceedings until
the entry of the decree she had abstained
from taking part therein. Although her
refusal to be examined or failure to appear
in court show indifference on her part, yet
from such attitude the presumption arising
out of the suppression of evidence could
not arise or be inferred because women of
this country are by nature coy, bashful
and shy and would not submit to a
physical examination unless compelled to
by competent authority.

Her infringement in this case is not selfincrimination. She is not charged with any
offense. She is not being compelled to be
a witness against herself. "Impotency
being an abnormal condition should not be
presumed. The presumption is in favor of
potency."2 The lone testimony of the
husband that his wife is physically
incapable
of
sexual
intercourse
is
insufficient to tear asunder the ties that
have bound them together as husband
and wife.
Alcazar vs Alcazar G.R. No. 174451
October 13, 2009
(Antonio,
Michael)
Doctrine:
Psychological Incapacity. Issue: Was
Rey psychologically incapacitated to
perform his obligation as husband to
Veronica?
Facts of the Case: On 11 Oct 2000, Rey
Alcazar got married to Veronica Alcazar
got married on October 11, 2000. After
the wedding, they lived for five days in
San Jose, Mindoro Occidental, at the
residence of Reys parents. When they
returned to Manila, Rey did not live with
Veronica at her residence in Tondo. On 23
Oct 2000, Rey left for Riyadh, Kingdom of
Saudi Arabia to work as an upholsterer.
Rey did not communicate with his wife
while he was in Riyadh. In March 2002,
Rey returned to the country but did not go
to his wife in Tondo but instead proceeded
to San Jose, Occidental Mindoro. At this
time, Veronica surmised that that Rey
physically incapable of consummating his
marriage with her, providing sufficient
cause for annulment of their marriage
pursuant to paragraph 5, Article 45 (That
either party was physically incapable of
consummating the marriage with the
other, and such incapacity continues and
appears to be incurable; ) of the Family
Code of the Philippines . There was also
no more possibility of reconciliation
between petitioner and respondent.
During trial, Veronica presented Clinical
Psychologist Dr. Tayag who claimed that
Rey was suffering from Narcissistic
Personality Disorder and recommended

the declaration of nullity of marriage

between Rey and Veronica. Dr. Tayag did
not examine Rey personally but based her
diagnosis on the account of Veronicas
interpretation of Reys behavior as
husband. On June 4, 2004, RTC denied
Veronicas Complaint holding that Reys
acts of not living with her does not
translate to psychological incapacity.
There was no showing that his alleged
defects were already present at the
inception of their marriage. Upon appeal,
Court of Appeals affirmed the RTC
decision.
The petitioner went to the
Supreme Court to review the decision
made by the CA and RTC.
Decision: Psychological incapacity must
be more than just a difficulty, a
refusal,
or
a
neglect
in
the
performance of some marital obligations.
No evidence was presented to prove that
Rey was in any way physically incapable
to consummate
his marriage
with
petitioner. Veronica even admitted during
her cross-examination that she and Rey
had sexual intercourse after their wedding
and before respondent left for abroad.
There obviously being no physical
incapacity on respondents part, then,
there is no ground for annulling
petitioners marriage to respondent.
From
the
court
deliberations,
the
petitioner failed to persuade the Court
that respondents failure to communicate
with petitioner since leaving for Saudi
Arabia to work, and to live with petitioner
after returning to the country, are grave
psychological maladies that are keeping
him from knowing and/or complying with
the essential obligations of marriage. The
Court emphasized that it is not
downplaying petitioners frustration and
misery in finding herself shackled, so to
speak, to a marriage that is no longer
working. Regrettably, there are situations
like this one, where neither law nor society
can provide the specific answers to every
individual problem.
The court decided that the May 24, 2006
Decision and 28 August 2008 Resolution of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No.
84471, which affirmed the 9 June 2004

Decision of the Regional Trial Court of

Malolos City, Branch 85, dismissing
petitioner Veronica Cabacungan Alcazars
Complaint in Civil Case No. 664-M-2002,
are affirmed.
Topic: Formal marriage requisite:
Marriage license
Law 4 provides that no marriage shall
be solemnized without a marriage
licence issued first by a local civil
registrar. Being one of the essential
requisites of a valid marriage,
absence of a licence would render the
marriage void ab initio
REPUBLIC
OF
THE
PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, v. COURT OF
APPEALS AND ANGELINA M. CASTRO,
Respondents.
[G.R. No.
1994.]

103047.

September

"TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:

2,

This is to certify that the names

EDWIN F. CARDENAS and ANGELINA
M. CASTRO who were allegedly
married in the Pasay City Court on
June 21, 1970 under an alleged
(s)upportive marriage license no.
3196182 allegedly issued in the
municipality on June 20, 1970
cannot be located as said license
no. 3196182 does not appear from
our
records.

Facts:

The first case filed was in the RTC of

Quezon City by Angelina M. Castro for the
nullity of her marriafe between Edwin F.
Cardenas as she claims that no marriage
license
was
issued
prior
to
the
solemnization of marriage.
On June 24, 1970, Angelina and Edwin
entered into a civil marriage presided by
Judge Pablo Malvar of Pasay City. This
happened
without
knowledge
of
Angelinas parents.
Edwin Cardenas was the one who took
care of the processing of documents
including the marriage license. Their
marriage contract states that marriage
license no. 3196182 was issued in the
name of the contracting parties on June
24, 1970 in Pasig, Metro Manila.
The couple did not live together at first
because Angelinas parents do not know
about the marriage and only in March

1971 when Angelina got pregnant that

they decided to live together.
After four months, they separated. In Oct.
19,1971, Angelina gave birth and with
consent from her and Edwin, agreed to
have Angelinas brother adopt their
daughter
The baby went to the United States. In
Angelinas desire to follow her child, she
fixed her marriage status first and sought
the help of Atty. Frumencio Pulgar
regarding the nullity of her marriage. The
layer then found out that there was no
marriage
license
issued
prior
the
solemnization of marriage.
A certification from the Civil Register of
Pasig City Manila was given by Angelina as
proof which states:
"February
20,
1987

Issued upon request of Mr. Ed

Atanacio
(Sgd.)
Senior

CENONA
Civil

D.

QUINTOS
Registry

Officer"

Angelina Castro that she never went to the

civil registrar in Pasig on or before June 24,
1970 to apply for a license or even sign
one. She testified that she only signed the
marriage contract on June 24, 1970 in
Pasay City.
The trial court denied the petition and
ruled that the certification is inadequate to
establish the non-issuance of marriage

licence and that the inability of the civil

register official to locate such license is
not conclusive in proving that there is
really no marriage license.
Angelina then went to the appellate court
for an appeal. Appellate court reversed
the decision and declared the marriage
null and void ordering the Civil registrar of
Pasig to cancel the marriage contract.
Hence, this petition for review on certiorari
Issue:

1. W/N the documentary and testimonial

evidence presented by private respondent
are sufficient to establish are sufficient to
establish that no marriage license was
issued by the Civil Registrar of Pasig prior
to the celebration of marriage of private
respondent to Edwin F. Cardenas?
Ratio:
1. Yes. Angelina and Edwin got married on
June 24, 1970. The law governing the
marital relations at the time was the New
Civil Code. Law 4 provides that no
marriage shall be solemnized without a
marriage licence issued first by a local civil
registrar. Being one of the essential
requisites of a valid marriage, absence of
a licence would render the marriage void
ab initio. The presentation of the
certification was also recognized by the
court in accordance with Sec. 29, Rule 132
of the Rules of Court,
Sec. 29. Proof of lack of record.- A
written statement by an officer having
custody of an official record or by his
deputy, that after diligent search, no
record or entry of a specified tenor is
found to exist in the records of his
office; accompanied by a certificate as
above provided, is admissible as
evidence that the records of his
contain no such record or entry.
In addition, Angelina Castro was the
only one who offered her testimony

because her husband Edwin had no

interest to participate in any of the
proceedings which he was duly
informed. However, no answer was still
received from him. The only reason
they were not able to present other
witnesses
was
the
unusual
circumstance that happened with their
marriage. The marriage was a civil
ceremony presided by a judge of a city
court but the marriage is one of those
commonly
known
as
secret
marriage- a legally non-existent
phrase but ordinarily used to refer to a
civil marriage celebrated without the
knowledge of the relatives and/or
friends of either or both of the
contracting parties. If we look at the
records, the marriage of Angelina and
Edwin was not known to Angelinas
parents.

Final Decision:
Petition is denied.

SY v. CA
GR No. 127263
April 12, 2000
Facts:
> Nov. 15, 1973 - Filipina Sy and
Fernando Sy got married at Church of Our
Lady of Lourdes in Quezon City
> The union was blessed with children:
Frederick
and
Farrah
Sheryll
and
established a residence and operated
lumber and hardware business in Sto.
Tomas, Pampanga.
> Sept. 15, 1983 - Fernando left the
conjugal dwelling and transferred to
Masangkay, Tondo, Manila.
> May 15, 1988 - their son, Frederick
joined his father in Tondo and from then
on, lived with his father.

> Feb. 11, 1987 - Filipina filed a petition

for legal separation, which was later
amended to a petition for separation of
property on the grounds:
a) he abandoned her without just cause
b) they have been living separately for
more than one year
c) they voluntarily entered into a
Memorandum
of
Agreement
dated
September 29, 1983, containing the rules
that would govern the dissolution of their
conjugal partnership
> Judgment: Conjugal partnership of gains
has been dissolved and regime of
separation of properties has been
approved based on the Memorandum of
Agreement executed. The custody of the
children has been granted to Filipina.
> May 1988 - Filipina filed a criminal
action against Fernando for attempted
parricide. She alleged that it took place
when she fetched her son at Fernandos
house in Tondo. She got mad and spanked
Frederick when he ignored her and
continued to play computer. Fernando
pulled her away from their son, and
punched her in the different parts of her
body, and choked her until she fell on the
ground when he thought she was dead.
> April 26, 1990 - RTC convicted Fernando
only of the lesser crime of slight physical
injuries, and sentenced him to 20 days
imprisonment.
> Filipina filed a new action - Legal
Separation on the ff. grounds:
a) repeated physical violence
b) sexual infidelity
c) attempt by respondent against her life;
d) abandonment of her by her husband
without justifiable cause for more than one
year
> Dec. 4, 1991 - RTC - Pampanga granted
the petition on the grounds of repeated
physical violence and sexual infidelity, and
issued a decree of legal separation. It
awarded custody of their daughter Farrah
Sheryll to petitioner, and their son
Frederick to respondent.
> Aug. 4, 1992 - Filipina filed a petition for
the declaration of absolute nullity of her

marriage to Fernando on the ground of

psychological incapacity citing the ff.
manifestations:
1) habitual alcoholism
2) refusal to live with her without fault on
her part, choosing to live with his mistress
instead
3) refusal to have sex with her, performing
the marital act only to satisfy himself.
- She also alleged hat such psychological
incapacity of her husband existed from the
time of the celebration of their marriage
and became manifest thereafter.
RTC Decision: Denied. Alleged acts do
not constitute psychological incapacity
which may warrant the declaration of
absolute nullity of their marriage.
CA Decision: Affirmed the decision of
RTC.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the marriage between
petitioner and private respondent is void
from the beginning for lack of a marriage
license at the time of the ceremony
2. Whether or not private respondent is
psychologically incapacitated at the time
of said marriage celebration to warrant a
declaration of its absolute nullity
SC Decision:
1. Petitioner, for the first time, raises the
issue of the marriage being void for lack of
a valid marriage license at the time of its
celebration. It appears that, according to
her, the date of the actual celebration of
their marriage and the date of issuance of
their marriage certificate and marriage
license are different and incongruous.
Petitioner states that though she did not
categorically state in her petition for
annulment of marriage before the trial
court that the incongruity in the dates of
the marriage license and the celebration
of the marriage itself would lead to the
conclusion that her marriage to Fernando
was void from the beginning, she points
out that these critical dates were
contained in the documents she submitted

before the court (Date of issue of marriage

license = Sept. 17, 1974; Celebration of
Marriage = Nov. 15, 1973)

Restituto Alcantara - petitioner; husband

SC did not find any denial of such dates

on the part of the respondent. There being
no claim of an exceptional character, the
purported marriage between petitioner
and private respondent could not be
classified among those enumerated in
Articles 7279 of the Civil Code. We thus
conclude that under Article 80 of the Civil
Code, the marriage between petitioner
and private respondent is void from the
beginning.

Facts:

He did not object as well the presentation

of the said documents (marriage license &
marriage certificates), which were only
photocopies.
Nevertheless,
the
said
documents were marked as Exhibits
during the course of the trial below, which
shows that these have been examined and
admitted by the trial court, with no
objections having been made as to their
authenticity and due execution. Likewise,
no objection was interposed to petitioner's
testimony in open court when she affirmed
that the date of the actual celebration of
their marriage was on November 15,
1973. SC, therefore, that having been
admitted in evidence, with the adverse
party failing to timely object thereto, these
documents are deemed sufficient proof of
the facts contained therein.
2)
The
remaining
issue
on
the
psychological incapacity need no longer to
be discussed as concluded by the SC, the
marriage is void ab initio for lack of a
marriage license at the time their
marriage was solemnized.
Alcantara vs. Alcantara
G.R. No. 167746
Aug. 28, 2007
Petition for Review on Certiorari assailing
the decision of CA, which affirmed the
decision of RTC (dismissing the petition
for annulment of marriage)
Parties:

Rosita Alcantara - respondent; wife

> Restituto filed a petition for annulment

of marriage against Rosita. He alleged:
1. that on Dec. 8, 1982, they went to Manila
City Hall to look for a person who could
arrange a marriage for them. They met
one, who for a fee, arranged their wedding
before a certain Rev. Aquilino Navarro,
Minister of the Gospel of CDCC BR Chapel.
They got married on that same day,
without securing the required marriage
license.
1. March 26, 1983 - they went through
another marriage at the San Jose Manuguit
Church in Tondo, again without a marriage
license.
1. The alleged marriage license, procured in
Carmona, Cavite, appearing in marriage
contract, is sham.
> Oct. 14, 1985 - Rosita gave birth to Rose
Ann Alcantara
> 1988 - the couple parted ways and lived
separately.
> Petitioners prayer: after due hearing,
judgment be issued declaring their
marriage void and ordering the Civil
Registrar to cancel the corresponding
marriage contract and its entry on file.
> Respondents answer to the petition:
1. asserts the validity of their marriage and
maintains that there was a marriage
license issued as evidenced by a
certification from the Office of the Civil
Registry of Carmona, Cavite.
1. contrary to petitioners representation,
respondent gave birth to their first child
named Rose Ann Alcantara on 14 October
1985 and to another daughter named
Rachel Ann Alcantara on 27 October 1992.
2. petitioner has a mistress with whom he
has three children.
3. he only filed the annulment of their
marriage to evade prosecution for
concubinage.

4. in fact, has filed a case for concubinage

against
petitioner
before
MTCMandaluyong

RTC Decision: Dismissed for lack of merit

CA Decision: Dismissed for lack of merit
as well as the Motion for Reconsideration
- the marriage license of the parties is
presumed to be regularly issued and
petitioner had not presented any evidence
to overcome the presumption. Moreover,
the parties marriage contract being a
public document is a prima facie proof of
the questioned marriage under the Rules
of Court
Issues:
Whether or not the marriage between the
petitioner and respondent is void:
1. when there was no marriage license at the
precise moment of the solemnization of
the marriage,
2. when a marriage license appeared both
parties were neither resident of the place
where the license was presumably issued
3. when there was a discrepancy on the
marriage license number issued in Cavite
and the marriage license number in the
marriage contract
SC Decision:
1. - The marriage involved herein having
been solemnized prior to the effectivity of
Family Code, the applicable law would be
the Civil Code which was the law in effect
at the time of its celebration.
A valid marriage license is a requisite of
marriage under Article 53 of the Civil
Code, the absence of which renders the
marriage void ab initio pursuant to Article
80(3) in relation to Article 53 of the same
Code. The law requires that the absence of
such marriage license must be apparent
on the marriage contract, or at the very
least, supported by a certification from the
local civil registrar that no such marriage
license was issued to the parties. In the
case at bar, the marriage contract
between the petitioner and respondent
reflects a marriage license number.
Moreover, the certification issued by the
local civil registrar specifically identified

the parties to whom the marriage license

was issued further validating the fact that
a license was issued to the parties herein.
Issuance of a marriage license in a city or
municipality, not the residence of either of
the contracting parties, and issuance of a
marriage license despite the absence of
publication or prior to the completion of
the 10-day period for publication are
considered mere irregularities that do not
affect the validity of the marriage. The
court still holds that there is no sufficient
basis to annul their marriage. An
irregularity in any of the formal requisites
of marriage does not affect its validity but
the parties or party responsible for the
irregularity
are
civilly,
criminally,
administratively liable.

The discrepancy between the marriage

license number in the certification of the
Municipal civil registrar, which states that
the marriage license number issued to the
parties is No. 7054133, while the marriage
contract states that the marriage license
number of the parties is number 7054033.
It is not impossible to assume that the
same is a mere typographical error. It
therefore does not detract from our
conclusion regarding the existence and
issuance of said marriage license to the
parties.
De Castro v De Castro, G.R. No.
160172, February 13, 2008
FACTS:
Reinel and Annabelle met and became
sweethearts in 1991. They applied for a
marriage license in Pasig City in
September 1994. They had their first
sexual relation sometime in October 1994,
and had regularly engaged in sex
thereafter. When the couple went back to
the Office of the Civil Registrar, the
marriage license had already expired.
Thus, in order to push through with the
plan, in lieu of a marriage license, they
executed an affidavit dated 13 March 1995
stating that they had been living together
as husband and wife for at least five
years. The couple got married on the
same date.
Nevertheless, after the
ceremony, petitioner and respondent went

back to their respective homes and did not

live together as husband and wife. On 13
Nov 1995, Annabelle gave birth to a child
named Reinna Tricia A. De Castro. Since
the childs birth, the mother has been the
one supporting her out of her income as a
government dentist and from her private
practice.
On 4 June 1998, respondent filed a
complaint for support against petitioner
before the Regional Trial Court of Pasig
City . In her complaint, respondent alleged
that she is married to petitioner and that
the
latter
has
reneged
on
his
responsibility/obligation
to
financially
support her as his wife and Reinna Tricia
as his child. Reinel denied his marriage
with Annabelle claiming that the marriage
is void ab initio because the affidavit they
jointly executed is a fake. And that he was
only forced by Annabelle to marry her to
avoid the humiliation that the pregnancy
sans marriage may bring her. The trial
court ruled that the marriage between
petitioner and respondent is not valid
because it was solemnized without a
marriage license. However, it declared
petitioner as the natural father of the
child, and thus obliged to give her
support. The Court of Appeals denied the
appeal. Prompted by the rule that a
marriage is presumed to be subsisting
until a judicial declaration of nullity has
been made, the appellate court declared
that the child was born during the
subsistence and validity of the parties
marriage. In addition, the Court of
Appeals frowned upon petitioners refusal
to undergo DNA testing to prove the
paternity and filiation, as well as his
refusal to state with certainty the last time
he had carnal knowledge with respondent,
saying that petitioners forgetfulness
should not be used as a vehicle to relieve
him of his obligation and reward him of his
being irresponsible. Moreover, the Court
of Appeals noted the affidavit dated 7 April
1998 executed by petitioner, wherein he
voluntarily admitted that he is the
legitimate father of the child. The
appellate court also ruled that since this
case is an action for support, it was
improper for the trial court to declare the
marriage of petitioner and respondent as
null and void in the very same case.

There was no participation of the State,

through the prosecuting attorney or fiscal,
to see to it that there is no collusion
between the parties, as required by the
Family Code in actions for declaration of
nullity of a marriage. The burden of proof
to show that the marriage is void rests
upon petitioner, but it is a matter that can
be raised in an action for declaration of
nullity, and not in the instant proceedings.
ISSUE: Whether or not their marriage is
valid.
HELD: The SC holds that the trial court
had jurisdiction to determine the validity
of the marriage between petitioner and
respondent. The
validity
of
a
void
marriage may be collaterally attacked.
Under the Family Code, the absence of
any of the essential or formal requisites
shall
render
the
marriage
void ab
initio, whereas a defect in any of the
essential requisites shall render the
marriage voidable. In the instant case, it
is clear from the evidence presented that
petitioner and respondent did not have a
marriage license when they contracted
their marriage. Instead, they presented
an affidavit stating that they had been
living together for more than five years.
However, respondent herself in effect
admitted the falsity of the affidavit when
she was asked during cross-examination.
The falsity of the affidavit cannot be
considered as a mere irregularity in the
formal requisites of marriage. The law
dispenses with the marriage license
requirement for a man and a woman who
have lived together and exclusively with
each other as husband and wife for a
continuous and unbroken period of at least
five years before the marriage. The aim of
this provision is to avoid exposing the
parties to humiliation,
shame and
embarrassment concomitant with the
scandalous
cohabitation
of
persons
outside a valid marriage due to the
publication of every applicants name for a
marriage license. In the instant case,
there was no scandalous cohabitation to
protect; in fact, there was no cohabitation
at all. The false affidavit which petitioner
and respondent executed so they could

push through with the marriage has no

value whatsoever; it is a mere scrap of
paper. They were not exempt from the
marriage license requirement. Their failure
to obtain and present a marriage license
renders their marriage void ab initio.

Abbas v Abbas
Facts: In January 1993, Syed Azhar Abbas
was invited to the house of Felicitas Goo,
mother of Gloria Goo. He said he was
asked to participate in a ceremony which
was meant to welcome him to the
Philippines (Abbas is a Pakistani). He said
he did not know that the ceremony was
actually his marriage with Gloria Goo.
Later, Gloria filed a bigamy case against
Abbas. Abbas allegedly married a certain
Maria Corazon Buenaventura.
To avoid the bigamy case, Abbas filed a
petition for the declaration of nullity of his
marriage to Gloria Goo.
To prove the validity of their marriage,
Gloria presented a marriage contract
signed by Abbas as well as the
solemnizing officer who celebrated their
marriage.
The
marriage
contract
contained the alleged marriage license
issued to Abbas.
Abbas presented a certification issued by
the Local Civil Registrar which states that
the marriage license, based on its number,
indicated in the marriage contract was
never issued to Abbas but to someone
else.
The RTC ruled in favor of Abbas. However,
the Court of Appeals reversed the RTC on
the ground that there was no diligence to
search for the real source of the marriage
license issued to Abbas (for it could be
that the marriage license was issued in
another municipality).
ISSUE: Whether or not the marriage
between Abbas and Goo is void ab initio.

HELD: Yes. Their marriage lacked one of

the essential requisites of marriage which
is the issuance of a valid marriage license.
The Court of Appeals is wrong in reversing
the RTC. The Local Civil registrars
certification enjoyed probative value as
her duty was to maintain records of data
relative to the issuance of a marriage
license. There is a presumption of
regularity of official acts in favor of the
local civil registrar. Gloria was not able to
overcome this presumption hence it
stands to favor Abbas.
The fact that Abbas did sign the marriage
contract does not make it conclusive that
there was in fact a valid marriage license
issued to him nor does it cure the fact that
no marriage license was issued to Abbas.
Article 4 of the Family Code is clear when
it says, The absence of any of the
essential or formal requisites shall render
the marriage void ab initio. Article 35(3)
of the Family Code also provides that a
marriage solemnized without a license is
void from the beginning.
Ninal vs. Bayadog
G.R. No. 133778
March 14, 2000
Topic: Marriages exempt from License
Requirement
Facts: Pepito Ninal was married with
Teodulfa Bellones on September 26, 1974.
They had 3 children namely Babyline,
Ingrid and Archie, petitioners. Due to the
shot inflicted by Pepito to Teodulfa, the
latter died on April 24, 1985 leaving the
children under the guardianship of
Engrace Ninal. 1 year and 8 months later,
Pepito and Norma Badayog got married
without any marriage license.
They
instituted an affidavit stating that they
had lived together for at least 5 years
exempting from securing the marriage
license. Pepito died in a car accident on
February 19, 1977. After his death,
petitioners filed a petition for declaration
of nullity of the marriage of Pepito and
Norma alleging that said marriage was
void for lack of marriage license.
Issues:
1. Whether or not the second marriage of
Pepito was void?

2. Whether or not the heirs of the

deceased may file for the declaration of
the nullity of Pepitos marriage after his
death?
Held:
1.
Yes. The marriage of Pepito and
Norma is void for absence of the marriage
license. They cannot be exempted even
though they instituted an affidavit and
claimed that they cohabit for at least 5
years because from the time of Pepitos
first marriage was dissolved to the time of
his marriage with Norma, only about 20
months had elapsed. Although, Pepito and
his first wife had separated in fact, and
thereafter both Pepito and Norma had
started living with each other that has
already lasted for five years, the fact
remains that their five-year period
cohabitation was not the cohabitation
contemplated by law. Hence, his marriage
to Norma is still void.
2.
Yes, it can be questioned even after
the death of one of the parties and any
proper interested party may attack a void
marriage. Jurisprudence under the Civil
Code states that no judicial decree is
necessary in order to establish the nullity
of a marriage. But Article 40 of the Family
Code expressly provides that there must
be a judicial declaration of the nullity of a
previous marriage, though void, before a
party can enter into a second marriage.
However, other than for purposes of
remarriage, no judicial action is necessary
to declare a marriage an absolute nullity.
For other purposes, such as but not limited
to determination of heirship, legitimacy or
illegitimacy of a child, settlement of
estate, dissolution of property regime, or a
criminal case for that matter, the court
may pass upon the validity of marriage
even in a suit not directly instituted to
question the same so long as it is essential
to the determination of the case. This is
without prejudice to any issue that may
arise in the case. When such need arises,
a final judgment of declaration of nullity is
necessary even if the purpose is other
than to remarry. The clause on the basis
of a final judgment declaring such
previous marriage void in Article 40 of
the Family Code connotes that such final

judgment need not be obtained only for

purpose of remarriage.
REPUBLIC
OF
THE
PHILIPPINES,
Petitioner, versus JOSE A. DAYOT,
Respondent
3/28/2008, Chicho-Nazario
TOPIC: Kinds of Void Marriages: Absence of
Requisites
PETITION:
2
consolidated
petitions.
Petitions for Review under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court filed by Republic of the
Philippines and Felisa Tecson-Dayot, both
challenging the amended decision of the
CA (11/7/2006) which declared the
marriage between Jose Dayot and Felisa
Tecson-Dayot Void Ab Initio
FACTS
24 Nov 1986 Marriage
Jose and Felisa, in lieu of a
marriage license, executed a sworn
affidavit dated the same day
attesting that both had attained
age
of
maturity
and
being
unmarried,
they
have
lived
together as husband and wife for at
least 5 years

27 July 1993 Jose filed a complaint for

Annulment and/or Declaration of Nullity of
Marriage
with
the
RTC,
Laguna,
contending:
That his marriage is a sham as no
marriage ceremony was celebrated
That he did not execute the sworn affidavit
that they have lived in for 5 years
That his consent to the marriage was
secured through fraud
Joses version of events:
1986, he became a boarder in Felisas
house
3 weeks after, Felisa requested him to
accompany her to the Pasay City hall
where she could claim a package from her
brother at Saudi
Upon a pre-arranged signal from Felisa, a
man bearing three pieces of folded paper
approached them and told Jose that he
needed to sign them so that the package
can be released to Felisa

Jose refused but was cajoled by Felisa

saying that his refusal will get them both
killed by her brother who had learned of
their relationship
He reluctantly signed
On Feb 1987 he discovered he contracted
marriage with Felisa
He saw their marriage contract on Felisas
table
Felisa feigned ignorance when confronted
Felisas denial and defense on validity of
their marriage:
That they maintained their relationship
absent the legality of marriage since early
1980
That because of their age difference she
deferred contracting marriage
That while their marriage was subsisting,
Jose contracted marriage with a Rufina
Pascual (8/31/1990)
That on 3 June 1993, she filed Bigamy
against Jose with the Office of the
Ombudsman since they were both
employees of the National Statistics and
Coordinating Board
Ombudsman suspended Jose from service
for 1 year

RTC dismissed the complaint, dismissing

Joses version and confirming validity of
their marriage
Joses story is implausible
Jose has signed the name of Felisa as wife
in the duly notarized statement of assets
and liabilities he filed in the past
Joses sister testified on their marriage
Joses action has prescribed
Art 87 of the new civil code requires the
action for annulment of marriage be
commenced within 4 years from discovery
of fraud
CA affirmed RTC ruling BUT:
(!) In Joses motion for reconsideration
claiming that the requisites for the proper
application of the exemption from a
marriage license under Art 76 of the Civil
Code were not fully attendant, citing the
legal condition that the man and woman
must have been living together as
husband and wife for at least 5 years
before the marriage and that their marital
cohabitation was false..
THE CA REVERSED ITSELF (!)

Citing Ninal v Bayadog:

This 5-year period should be the years
immediately before the day of the
marriage and it should be a period of
cohabitation characterized by exclusivity meaning no third party was involved at
any time within the 5 years and continuity
- that is unbroken. Otherwise, if that
continuous
5-year
cohabitation
is
computed without any distinction as to
whether the parties were capacitated to
marry each other during the entire five
years, then the law would be sanctioning
immorality and encouraging parties to
have common law relationships and
placing them on the same footing with
those who lived faithfully with their
spouse.
Marriage
being
a
special
relationship must be respected as such
and its requirements must be strictly
observed.
Art 80(3) Civil Code provides that
a marriage solemnized without a marriage
license, save marriages of exceptional
character, shall be void from the
beginning. Inasmuch as the marriage
between Jose and Felisa is not covered by
the exception to the requirement of a
marriage license, it is, therefore, void ab
initio because of the absence of a
marriage license.
Meanwhile, Republic of the Ph through the
OSG filed a Petition for Review, praying
that their marriage be declared valid and
subsisting
ISSUE
W/N the marriage of Jose with Felisa is
valid

HELD
NO
Their marriage which was celebrated
before the enactment of the family code is
covered by the Civil Code
Art 76 has indeed rendered their marriage
void ab initio
ART. 76. No marriage license shall be
necessary when a man and a woman who
have attained the age of majority and
who, being unmarried, have lived together
as husband and wife for at least five
years, desire to marry each other. The

contracting parties shall state the

foregoing facts in an affidavit before any
person authorized by law to administer
oaths. The official, priest or minister who
solemnized the marriage shall also state in
an affidavit that he took steps to ascertain
the ages and other
Reason for the law: the publicity attending
a marriage license may discourage such
persons who have lived in a state of
cohabitation from legalizing their status.

They have fallen short of the minimum 5year requirement

For the exception in Article 76 to apply, it
is a sine qua non thereto that the man and
the woman must have attained the age of
majority, and that, being unmarried, they
have lived together as husband and wife
for at least five years.
We must read the law as it is plainly
written
A question if whether they satisfied the
min 5yr requirement is factual in nature
A question of fact arises when there is a
need to decide on the truth or falsehood of
the alleged facts
Factual findings are ordinarily not subject
to this Court's review
We cannot accept the insistence of the
Republic that the falsity of the statements
in the parties' affidavit will not affect the
validity of marriage, since all the essential
and formal requisites were complied with
- Petition
AFFIRMED

is

DENIED;

CA

decision

is

Mercedita Aranes vs. Judge Salvador

Occiano
Topic: Authority of Solemnizing OfficerWho are authorized
Facts: Petitioner in this case filed a
charge for Gross Ignorance of Law against
the Presiding Judge of Balatan, Camarines
Sur,
Judge
Salvador
Occiano
for
solemnizing petitioners marriage with
Dominador Orobia without the requisite
marriage license and for solemnizing the
same at Nabua, Camarines Sur which was
outside
his
territorial
jurisdiction.
According to the petitioner, after the said
marriage, she and Orobia lived together as

husband and wife until the latters death.

After Orobias death, petitioner allege that
because of the nullity of the marriage
theyve contracted, she was denied of the
right to receive inheritances from her
husbands vast properties and from
receiving her husbands pension for being
a retired Commodore of the Philippine
Navy.
After the case was referred to Elepano,
who
was
then
the
Acting
Court
Admnistrator, she required the respondent
to comment and in his comment, he
narrated that on Feb 15, 2000, a certain
Juan Arroyo requested him to solemnize
the marriage of petitioner furthermore
assuring that all documents pertinent to
the marriage has been completed;
because of this he agreed to solemnized
the marriage in Balatan., however, upon
the information of Orobias difficulty to
travel, he agreed to conduct the marriage
in Nabua. Also, according to him, before
officiating the said wedding, he first
examined the documents and upon finding
out that the petitioner does not possess a
marriage license refused to solemnized
the wedding and suggested that it be
reset to another date. But because of the
insistence of the parties, he was forced to
solemnize on the condition that the
petitioner would provide him with the
document within the day and that he
further stressed the necessity of the
marriage license arguing that without
which the marriage would be void; but the
petitioner failed to comply.
Upon further review of the records of the
case, it appeared that petitioner and
Orobia was able to file their Application for
Marriage License but neither of them
claimed said license after it was released.
The Court likewise found through the
Office of the Civil Registrar General and
the Office of the Local Civil Registry that
there is no record of such marriage.
Issue: Whether or not respondent judge is
guilty
for
(1)solemnizing
petitioner
wedding without the requisite marriage
license and (2)for conducting the same
outside of his territorial jurisdiction.
Ratio: Yes. As ruled in the case of People
vs. Lara, the Court held that except for
cases provided by law it is the marriage
license which gives the solemnizing officer

the authority to solemnize a wedding,

hence, a marriage which preceded the
issuance of such license should be
rendered void.
Yes. For solemnizing marriages outside of
his territorial jurisdiction, the Court said
that under the Judiciary Reorganization Act
of 1980 or BP129, the authority of RTC and
Inferior Court judges to solemnize
marriages is confined to their territorial
jurisdiction as defined by the Supreme
Court, this ruling was further supported by
the SCs decision in the case of Navarro
vs. Domagtoy ruling the same. Applying
this to the case at hand, that the
respondent judges act of conducting a
marriage in Nabua which is outside of his
jurisdiction in Balatan constitutes a
violation of the law; and although he
cannot be charged with ignorance of the
law, he may still be held liable for violating
the law on marriage.
In conclusion thereof, respondent was
order to pay a fine of P5,000.00 with a
STERN WARNING that the repetition of
similar instances in the future would be
dealt with more severity.
Navarro vs Domagtoy S.C. AM MTJ-961088 July 19, 1996

seven years, thereby giving rise to the

presumption that she is already dead.
Judge Domagtoy maintains that this is
sufficient proof of the first wifes
presumptive death, and ample reason for
him to proceed with the marriage
ceremony.

The second alleged act is that Judge

Domagtoy
performed
a
marriage
ceremony
between
Floriano
Dador
Sumaylo and Gemma G. del Rosario
outside his court's jurisdiction. The
wedding was solemnized at the judge's
residence in the municipality of Dapa
which is located some 40-45 kilometers
away from where he holds office and has
jurisdiction in the MCTC of Sta. MonicaBurgos, Surigao del Norte.

Held:

Topic: Authority of the Solemnizing officer

Sub Topic: Who are Authorized

This administrative case is filed by

Municipal Mayor Rodolfo G. Navarro in
relation to two specific acts committed by
MCTC Judge Hernando Domagtoy, alleging
that said judge exhibits gross misconduct
as well as inefficiency in office and
ignorance of the law.

The first alleged act is solemnizing the

wedding between Gaspar A. Tagadan and
Arlyn F. Borga, despite the knowledge that
the groom is merely separated from his
first wife (Ida Pearanda). Judge Domagtoy
countered that he relied on an Affidavit
stating that Ida Pearanda has not
returned nor been heard of for almost

Presumptive Death for Purposes of

Remarriage

1.Even if the spouse present has a wellfounded belief that the absent spouse was
already dead, a summary proceeding
for the declaration of presumptive
death is necessary in order to
contract
a subsequent
marriage
(Article 41, Family Code)

2.Gaspar Tagadan did not institute a

summary proceeding for the declaration of
his first wifes presumptive death. Absent
this judicial declaration, he remains
married to his first wife.

3.The marriage between Gaspar Tagadan

and Arlyn Borga is considered bigamous
and void, there being a subsisting
marriage between Gaspar Tagadan and
Ida Penaranda.

Authority
(Judge)

of

Solemnizing

Officer

4.Article 8 of the Family Code, which is a

directory provision, refers only to the
venue of the marriage ceremony and does
not alter or qualify the authority of the
solemnizing officer as provided in the
preceding
provision.
Non-compliance
herewith will not invalidate the marriage.

5. A marriage can be held outside of the

judges
chambers or courtroom only
in the following instances:

5.1

judge solemnizes a marriage outside his

courts jurisdiction, there is a resultant
irregularity in the formal requisite laid
down in Article 3 of the Family Code
which while it may not affect the
validity of the marriage, may subject
the
officiating
official
to
administrative liability.

at the point of death,

5.2 in remote places in
accordance with Article 29
or (3) upon request of both
parties in writing in a sworn
statement to this effect.

6. Under Article 3 of the Family Code, one

of the formal requisites of marriage is the
"authority of the solemnizing officer."

7. Under Article 7, marriage may be

solemnized by, among others, "any
incumbent member of the judiciary
within the court's jurisdiction." Where a

8. A priest who is commissioned and

allowed by his local ordinary to marry the
faithful, is authorized to do so only
within the area of the diocese or place
allowed by his Bishop.

9. An Court of Appeals Justice or a

Supreme Court Justice has jurisdiction
over the entire Philippines to solemnize
marriages, regardless of the venue, as
long as the requisites of the law are
complied with.

10. However, judges who are appointed to

specific jurisdictions, may officiate in
weddings only within said areas
and not beyond.

11. Since Judge Domagtoys jurisdiction

covers the municipalities of Sta. Monica
and Burgos, he was not clothed with
authority to solemnize a marriage in the
municipality of Dapa, Surigao del
Norte. By citing Article 8 and the
exceptions therein as grounds for the
exercise of his misplaced authority,
respondent judge demonstrated a lack of
understanding of the basic principles of
civil law.

Respondent Judge Hernando C. Domagtoy

is hereby SUSPENDED for a period of six

(6) months and given a STERN WARNING

that a repetition of the same or similar
acts will be dealt with more severely.

minister of the religious organization to

which he belonged for the purpose of
launching his candidacy why did he not
resign in due form and have the
acceptance of his resignation registered
with the Bureau of Public Libraries.

Vilar v Paraiso
Formal requisites marriage license how
authorized

-The importance of resignation cannot be

underestimated.
The
purpose
of
registration is two-fold: to inform the
public not only of the authority of the
minister to discharge religious functions,
but equally to keep it informed of any
change in his religious status. This
information is necessary for the protection
of the public. This is specially so with
regard to the authority to solemnized
marriages, the registration of which is
made by the law mandatory (Articles 9296, new Civil Code). It is no argument to
say that the duty to secure the
cancellation of the requisite resignation
devolves, not upon respondent, but upon
the head of his organization or upon the
official in charge of such registration, upon
proper showing of the reason for such
cancellation, because the law likewise
imposes upon the interested party the
duty of effecting such cancellation, who in
the instant case is the respondent himself.
This he failed to do. And what is more, he
failed to attach to his certificate of
candidacy, a copy of his alleged
resignation as minister knowing full well
that a minister is disqualified by law to run
for a municipal office.

FACTS:
- November 13, 1951 general elections,
Vilar and Paraiso were candidates for
mayor in Rizal, Nueva Ecija. After the
canvassing,
Paraiso
was
proclaimed
mayor.
-Vilar (petitioner)contended that Paraiso
was ineligible to hold office as mayor
because he was then a minister of the
United Church of Christ in the Philippines
and such was disqualified to be a
candidate under section 2175 of the
Revised Administrative Code. Vilar further
contended that on April 7, 1951,
respondent applied for and was granted a
license to solemnize marriages by the
Bureau of Public Libraries as minister of
the new church up to the end of April,
1952. Such license has never been
cancelled, nor respondent has requested
for
its
cancellation.
-Paraiso (respondent) in his answer denied
his ineligibility and claimed that he
resigned as minister of the United Church
of Christ in the Philippines on August 21,
1951 and such resignation was accepted.
ISSUE: W/N Paraiso ceased to be a
minister before the date of the elections
thereby removing his disability.
HELD: No
-The resignation Paraiso claims to have
filed months before the date of the
elections is but a mere scheme to
circumvent the prohibition of the law
regarding ecclesiastics who desire to run
for a municipal office. If respondent really
and sincerely intended to resign as

Martinez v. Tan
Form of ceremony
FACTS
Plaintiff commenced this action for the
cancellation of the certificate of marriage
and for damages
Plaintiff claims that what took place before
the justice of the peace did not constitute
a legal marriage
Under Gen. Order No. 68, Sec. 6, "No
particular form for the ceremony of
marriage is required, but the parties must
declare, in the presence of the person

o
o

solemnizing the marriage, that they take

each other as husband and wife."
Plaintiff and defendant were married
before a justice of the peace in Leyte
where they executed an expediente de
matrimonio civil, a document written in
Spanish, and consists of a petition
directed to the justice of the peace,
stating that they have mutually agreed to
enter into a contract of marriage, and
asking him to solemnize their marriage
The statement was signed by them in the
presence of two witnesses
A certificate was then made out by the
justice of the peace, signed by him and
the witnesses, stating the parties had
been married by him
Both the parties knew the contents of the
document which they signed
The couple, however, did not live together
When Plaintiff Martinez went home to
Ormoc, she was convinced to file charges,
claiming that the marriage was not valid
since she signed the document in her own
home thinking it was a paper authorizing
Defendant to ask the consent of her
parents to the marriage

ISSUE
WON the marriage was valid

HELD
Yes. They were validly married since there
was an expression of mutual consent and
both of them appeared before the justice
of the peace
The
evidence
presented
were
the
following
The document itself which the plaintiff
admits that she signed
Defendant who testified that they
appeared before the justice of the peace,
together with 2 witnesses to sign the
document mentioned
One of the witnesses who testified that
plaintiff,
defendant
and
witnesses
appeared before the justice of the peace
and signed the document mentioned
The other witness who testified to the
same effect
The bailiff of the court of the justice of the
peace who testified to the same effect
Evidence consisting of letters written by
the plaintiff

On the other hand, the only direct

evidence in favor of the plaintiff was her
own testimony that she never appeared
before the justice of the peace and never
married to the defendant, stating that
although she did sign the document, it
was signed in her home, without reading it
and at the request of the defendant who
told her it was a paper authorizing him to
ask the consent of her parents to marriage
The Court believes that the plaintiff was
not telling the truth in stating that she did
not appear before the justice of the peace,
and the testimonies of the plaintiff are not
sufficient to overcome the positive
testimony of the witnesses for the
defendant
Morigo v People
GR No. 145226
February 6, 2004
Facts:
Morigo and Barrete were board mates at
Tagbilaran City for four years. After school
year 1977-98, they lost contact with each
other.
1984, Morigo received letter from Barrete
from Singapore. Soon they exchanged
letters and became sweethearts. They
maintained constant communication after
Barrete went back to the Philippines and
left for Canada
1990, Barette proposed to Morigo to join
her in Canada. They both got married on
August 30, 1990 at the iglesia de Filipina
nacional at Catagdaan,Bohol
Soon Barrete went back to Canada to
work. On 1991, Barette filed a divorce
against Morigo which the court granted
and took effect on February 17, 1992
Morigo remarried a woman named Maria
Lumbago on October 4, 1992. Morigo
fileda complaint for judicial declaration of
nullity of marriage with Barette in the RTC,
claiming that no marriage ceremony took
place
Morigo was charged by Barette with
Bigamy and he moved for the suspension
of the case.
Issue:
W/N Morigo should have filed a declaration
for the nullity of marriage with Barette
before remarrying to relieve him from
bigamy

Held:
Morigos marriage with Barrete is void ab
intio because there was no actual
marriage ceremony performed between
them by a solemnizing officer instead they
just merely signed a marriage contract.
The petitioner does not need to file
declaration of the nullity of his marriage
when he contracted his second marriage
with Lumbago. Hence, he did not commit
bigamy and is acquitted in the case filed.
Morigos
G.R. No. L-32473 October 6, 1930
MELECIO MADRIDEJO, assisted by his
guardian ad litem, Pedro Madridejo,
plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
GONZALO DE LEON, ET AL., defendantsappellants.
VILLA-REAL, J.:
FACTS:

Eulogio de Leon and Flaviana Perez, man

and wife, had but one child, Domingo de
Leon. The wife and son survived Eulogio
de Leon who died in the year 1915.
During her widowhood, Flaviana Perez
lived with Pedro Madridejo, a bachelor.
The registry of births of the municipality of
Siniloan, Laguna, shows that on June 1,
1917, a child was born to Pedro Madridejo
and Flaviana Perez, who was named
Melecio Madridejo,
On June 17, 1917, a 24-day old child of
Siniloan, Laguna, is known as the son of
Flaviana Perez, no mention being made of
the father.
On July 8, 1920, Flaviana Perez, being at
death's door, was married to Pedro
Madridejo, a bachelor (30 years of age) by
the parish priest of Siniloan. She died on
the following day, July 9, 1920, leaving
Domingo de Leon, her son by Eulogio de
Leon, and the plaintiff-appellee Melecio
Madridejo, as well as her alleged second
husband, Pedro Madridejo.

Domingo de Leon died on the 2nd of May,

1928.
Lower Court ruled that the marriage of
Madridejo and Perez was valid and that
Melecio Madridejo was legitmated by that
marriage.
Appellant (Gonzalo de leon) contends that
trial court erred in declaring that the
marriage in question was valid and that
Pedro Madridejo was legitimated by that
marriage.
* This is a rehearsing of the appeal taken
by the defendants, Gonzalo de Leon et al.
from the judgment of the Court of First
Instance of Laguna holding that Melecio
Madridejo is Domingo de Leon's next of kin
and order the defendants to restore and
deliver the ownership and possession of
the property described in the complaints
filed in the aforesaid case, to Melecio
Madridejo.
ISSUES:

1. W/N the marriage of Flaviana Perez to

Pedro Madridejo is valid
2. W/N
the
marriage
subsequently
legitimated Melecio Madridejo

HELD/RATIO:
1. With regard to the first assignment of
error, the mere fact that the parish priest
of Siniloan, Laguna, who married Pedro
Madridejo and Flaviana Perez, failed to
send a copy of the marriage certificate to
the
municipal
secretary
does
not
invalidate the marriage in articulo mortis;
the reason for this is that the essential
requisites required by law for its validity
were not lacking in the ceremony; the
forwarding of a copy of the marriage
certificate is not one of said essential
requisites.
2. In the second issue, it is evident that
Melecio
Madridejo
has
not
been
acknowledged by Pedro Madridejo and

Flaviana Perez, either voluntarily or by

compulsion, before or after their marriage.
Therefore, the second marriage of
Flaviana to Pedro did not legitimate him as
their son.

o
o

RULING:
The judgment is reversed, the complaint
dismissed, and the defendants absolved
with costs against the appellee without
prejudice to any right he may have to
establish or compel his acknowledgment
as the natural son of Pedro Madridejo and
Flaviana Perez.

ISSUE:WON
the
accused
and
the
deceased can be deemed to be married

PEOPLE v. BORROMEO
[G.R. No. L-61873; October 31, 1984]
TOPIC:
Certificate

Issuance

of

Marriage

PLAINTIFF/APPELLEE:
People of the
Philippines
DEFENDANT/APPELLANT: Elias
Borromeo
PONENTE:
Relova, J. (1st Div)

o
o
o

o
o

FACTS:
Appeal from the Circuit Criminal Court
(now RTC) decision finding accused guilty
of parricide
Jul 3, 1981: 4 y.o. niece of Elias and
Susana Borromeo reported to Matilde
Tabora (mother of Susana) that Susana
was shouting for help because Elias was
killing her
Matilde told the neice to go to Geronimo
(her son) who was working in the mango
plantation
Geronimo told his dad and they went to
Susanas hut
Geronimo could only peep through the
bamboo slats at the huts wall where he
saw Susana dead (intestines spilling out)
beside her crying 1-m.o. child and Elias
lying near Susana, holding a bloody
kitchen bolo
The dad called the Mabolo police, who
demanded Elias to go out. Elias calmly
complied (after smoking)
Dr. Serna (police medico-legal) report:
cause of death was "stab wounds, multiple
chest, abdomen, left supraclavicular

region and left shoulder." 5 incised wounds

and 6 stab wounds
Defense
concurs with RTC's finding that he killed
Susana without legal justification
Elias should only be guilty of homicide,
since he and Matilde were not legally
married, as attested by the officiating
priest on the absence of a marriage
contract executed on the occasion of the
celebration or later on
Presence of mitigating circumstances of
provocation or obfuscation and voluntary
surrender,
without
any
aggravating
circumstance to offset the same

o
o

RULING:
Yes, they are married.
Accused committed parricide and is
sentenced to Reclusion Perpetua.
The indemnity of P12K is increased
to P30K, with costs. Petition
DENIED, RTC decision is AFFIRMED.
There is no better proof of marriage than
the admission of the accused of the
existence of such marriage. (Tolentino vs.
Paras)
Contrary to his counsels submission, Elias
admitted upon being questioned that
Susana was his legitimate wife
Persons living together in apparent
matrimony are presumed, in the absence
of any counter presumption or evidence
special to the case, to be in fact married
Reason: such is the common order of
society, otherwise the parties would be
living in constant violation of decency and
law. (Son Cui vs. Guepangco)
presumption in favor of matrimony is one
of the strongest known in law.
law presumes morality, not immorality;
marriage, not concubinage: legitimacy,
not bastardy
Marriage is not only a civil contract, but it
is an institution which the public is deeply
interested in. Every intendment of the law
leans toward legal matrimony. (Perido v.
Perido)
the mere fact that no record of the
marriage exists in the registry of
marriage does not invalidate it

o
o

as long as in the celebration thereof,

all requisites for its validity are
present
forwarding of a copy of the marriage
certificate to the registry is not a
requisite. (Pugeda vs. Trias)

Yao Kee v. Sy-Gonzales

G.R. No. L-55960
November 24, 1988
Topic: Special Rule in Marriage
Facts: Sy Kiat, a Chinese national, died on
January
17,
1977
leaving
behind
properties here in the Philippines.
Thereafter, Aida Sy-Gonzales et al filed a
petition for the grant of letters of
administration alleging that they are the
children of the deceased with Asuncion
Gillego. The petition was opposed by Yao
Kee et al alleging that Yao Kee is the lawful
wife of the deceased whom he married in
China.
The trial court rendered decision in favor
of the opposition. On appeal, the Court of
Appeals rendered a decision, modifying
the decision declaring the marriage of Sy
Kiat to Yao Kee as not has been proven
valid in accordance with the laws of China.
Hence,
both
parties
moved
for
reconsideration to which the Supreme
Court granted.
Issue: Whether or not the marriage of Yao
Kee and Sy Kiat is valid in accordance with
Philippine laws.
Held: No. The law on foreign marriages is
provided by Article 71 of the Civil Code
which states that:
Art. 71. All marriages performed outside
the Philippines in accordance with the
laws in force in the country where they
were performed and valid there as such,
shall also be valid in this country, except
bigamous, Polygamous, or incestuous
marriages, as determined by Philippine
law. (Emphasis supplied.) ***
Construing this provision of law the Court
has held that to establish a valid foreign
marriage two things must be proven,
namely: (1) the existence of the foreign
law as a question of fact; and (2) the
alleged foreign marriage by convincing
evidence.

Well-established in this jurisdiction is the

principle that Philippine courts cannot take
judicial notice of foreign laws. They must
be alleged and proven as any other fact.
To establish the validity of marriage, the
existence of foreign law as a question of
fact and the alleged marriage must be
proven by clear and convincing evidence.
Further, even assuming for the sake of
argument that the Court has indeed taken
judicial notice of the law of China on
marriage
in
the
aforecited
case,
petitioners however have not shown any
proof that the Chinese law or custom
obtaining at the time the Sy Joc Lieng
marriage was celebrated in 1847 was still
the law when the alleged marriage of Sy
Kiat to Yao Kee took place in 1931 or
eighty-four (84) years later.
For failure to prove the foreign law or
custom and consequently of the marriage,
the marriage between Yao Kee and Sy Kiat
in China cannot be recognized in the
jurisdiction of Philippine courts.
Republic vs Orbecida
GR No. 154380
October 5, 2005
Facts:
In 1981, Cipriano Orbecido III married Lady
Myros M. Villanueva in Ozamis City,
Philippines. They had a son and a
daughter.In 1986, Cipriano's wife left for
the United States bringing along their son
Kristoffer.
In 2000, Cipriano learned that his wife,
who had been naturalized as an American
citizen, had obtained a divorce decree in
the USA and then married a certain
Innocent Stanley and they now live in
California.
Cipriano thereafter filed with the Philippine
trial court a petition for authority to
remarry invoking Article 26 par. 2 of the
Family Code. The court granted the same.
The Republic, through the Office of the
Solicitor General, contends that Article 26

par 2 does not apply to Cipriano since it

only applies to a valid mixed marriage
(between a Filipino citizen and an alien).
The proper remedy is to file a petition for
annulment
or
for
legal
separation
Issue:
WON respondent can remarry invoking
Article 26 of the Family Code
Held:
Art 26, Par. 2 of the Family Code
1. The second paragraph of Art 26, Family
Code reads: Where a marriage between a
Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly
celebrated and a divorce is thereafter
validly obtained abroad by the alien
spouse capacitating him or her to remarry,
the Filipino spouse shall have capacity to
remarry
under
Philippine
law
2. On its face, the foregoing provision does
not appear to govern the situation at
hand. It seems to apply only to cases
where at the time of the celebration of the
marriage, the parties are a Filipino citizen
and a foreigner. The instant case is one
where at the time the marriage was
solemnized, the parties were two Filipino
citizens, but later on, the wife was
naturalized as an American citizen and
subsequently obtained a divorce granting
her
capacity
to
remarry
3. Records of the proceedings of the
Family Code deliberations showed that the
intent of Paragraph 2 of Article 26,
according to Judge Alicia Sempio-Diy, a
member of the Civil Code Revision
Committee, is to avoid the absurd
situation where the Filipino spouse
remains married to the alien spouse who,
after obtaining a divorce, is no longer
married
to
the
Filipino
spouse.
4. Taking into consideration the legislative
intent and applying the rule of reason, we

hold that Paragraph 2 of Article 26

should be interpreted to include
cases involving parties who, at the
time of the celebration of the
marriage were Filipino citizens, but
later on, one of them becomes
naturalized as a foreign citizen and
obtains a divorce decree. The Filipino
spouse should likewise be allowed to
remarry as if the other party were a
foreigner at the time of the solemnization
of the marriage. To rule otherwise would
be to sanction absurdity and injustice.
5. The twin elements for the application of
Paragraph 2 of Article 26 as follows:
(a) There is a valid marriage that has been
celebrated between a Filipino citizen and a
foreigner;
and
(b) A valid divorce is obtained abroad by
the alien spouse capacitating him or her to
remarry.
6.
The reckoning
point is not the
citizenship of the parties at the time of the
celebration
of
the
marriage,
but
their citizenship at the time a valid
divorce is obtained abroad by the
alien spouse capacitating the latter
to
remarry.
7. Clearly, the twin requisites for the
application of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 are
both present in this case. Thus Cipriano,
the "divorced" Filipino spouse, should be
allowed
to
remarry.
Statutory Construction (Ratio Legis
est
Anima)
8. Where the interpretation of a statute
according to its exact and literal import
would lead to mischievous results or
contravene the clear purpose of the
legislature, it should be construed
according to its spirit and reason,

disregarding as far as necessary the letter

of the law. A statute may therefore be
extended to cases not within the literal
meaning of its terms, so long as they
come
within
its
spirit
or
intent.
Burden of Proof; Recognition of
Foreign Divorce by Philippine Courts
9. Cipriano did not present any evidence
concerning the divorce decree and the
naturalization of his (ex) wife. It is settled
rule that one who alleges a fact has the
burden of proving it and mere allegation is
not
evidence.
10. For his plea to prosper, he must prove
his allegation that his wife was naturalized
as an American citizen. Likewise, before a
foreign
divorce
decree
can
be
recognized by our own courts, the
party pleading it must prove
(a) the divorce as a fact and demonstrate
its conformity to the foreign law allowing
it.
(b) such foreign law must also be proved
as our courts cannot take judicial notice of
foreign laws. Like any other fact, such laws
must
be
alleged
and
proved.
(c) that the divorce decree allows his
former spouse to remarry as specifically
required in Article 26.
Fujiki vs. Marinay
Topic: Special law in Marriage - lex
loci celebrationis
Facts:
Fujiki is a Japanese national who married
respondent Marinay in the Philippiness. As
Fujikis parents opposed the marriage,
Fujiki could not bring his wife to Japan
where he resides. They eventually lost
contact with each other. Later, Marinay
met another Japanese, Maekara. Without
the first marriage being dissolved, Marinay
and Maekara were married in Quezon City,

Philippines. Maekara brought Marinay to

Japan,
however,
Marinay
allegedly
suffered physical abuse from Maekara, so
she left Maekara and started to contact
Fujiki. Fujiki and Marinay met in Japan and
they were able to reestablish their
relationship. Fujiki helped Marinay obtain a
judgment from a family court in Japan
which declared the marriage between
Marinay and Maekara void on the ground
of bigamy. Fujiki then filed a petition in the
RTC. Fujiki asked the Philippine court to:
1. Recognize the judgment of the Japanese
Family Court ;
2. Declare void ab initio the bigamous
marriage between Marinay; and
3. Direct the Local Civil Registrar of
Quezon City to annotate the Japanese
Family Court judgment on the Certificate
of Marriage between Marinay and Maekara
and to endorse such annotation to the
Office of the Administrator and Civil
Registrar General in the National Statistics
Office(NSO).
The RTC dismissed the petition, citing the
following provisions of the Rule on
Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void
Marriages and Annulment of Voidable
Marriages
Sec. 2. Petition for declaration of absolute
nullity of void marriages.
(a) Who may file. A petition for declaration
of absolute nullity of void marriage may
be filed solely by the husband or the
wife...
Sec. 4. Venue.
The petition shall be filed in the Family
Court of the province or city where the
petitioner or the respondent has been
residing for at least six months prior to the
date of filing, or in the case of a nonresident respondent, where he may be
found in the Philippines, at the election of
the petitioner.
The
RTC
ruled,
explanation, that the
"gross violation" of the
The trial court held
"jurisdictional ground"
petition

without
further
petition was in
above provisions.
that this is a
to dismiss the

The Solicitor General, on the other hand,

argued that Fujiki, as the spouse of the
first marriage, is an injured party who can
sue to declare the bigamous marriage
between Marinay and Maekara void.
Issue:
1) Whether the Rule on Declaration of
Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and
Annulment of Voidable Marriages is
applicable.
2) Whether a husband or wife of a prior
marriage can file a petition to recognize a
foreign
judgment
nullifying
the
subsequent marriage between his or her
spouse and a foreign citizen on the ground
of bigamy.
3) Whether the Regional Trial Court can
recognize the foreign judgment in a
proceeding for cancellation or correction
of entries in the Civil Registry under Rule
108 of the Rules of Court.
Ruling:
SC granted the Petition
1) The Rule on Declaration of Absolute
Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of
Voidable Marriages does not apply in a
petition to recognize a foreign judgment
relating to the status of a marriage where
one of the parties is a citizen of a foreign
country. Moreover, the Court held that the
rule that only the husband or wife can file
a declaration of nullity or annulment of
marriage "does not apply if the reason
behind the petition is bigamy."
Petitioner needs to present (1) an official
publication or (2) a certification or copy
attested by the officer who has custody of
the judgment.
However, the effect of a foreign judgment
is not automatic. To extend the effect of a
foreign judgment in the Philippines,
Philippine courts must determine if the
foreign judgment is consistent with
domestic
public
policy
and
other
mandatory laws.
Article 15 of the Civil Code provides that
"laws relating to family rights and duties,
or to the status, condition and legal
capacity of persons are binding upon
citizens of the Philippines, even though

living abroad." This is the rule of lex

nationalii in private international law.
A petition to recognize a foreign judgment
declaring a marriage void does not require
relitigation under a Philippine court of the
case as if it were a new petition for
declaration
of
nullity
of
marriage.
Philippine courts cannot presume to know
the foreign laws under which the foreign
judgment was rendered.
While the Philippines does not have a
divorce law, Philippine courts may,
however, recognize a foreign divorce
decree under the second paragraph of
Article 26 of the Family Code, to
capacitate a Filipino citizen to remarry
when his or her foreign spouse obtained a
divorce decree abroad.
2) There is no doubt that the prior spouse
has a personal and material interest in
maintaining the integrity of the marriage
he contracted and the property relations
arising from it. When Section 2(a) states
that "[a] petition for declaration of
absolute nullity of void marriage may be
filed solely by the husband or the
wife"it refers to the husband or the wife
of the subsisting marriage. Under Article
35(4) of the Family Code, bigamous
marriages are void from the beginning.
Thus, the parties in a bigamous marriage
are neither the husband nor the wife
under the law. The husband or the wife of
the prior subsisting marriage is the one
who has the personality to file a petition
for declaration of absolute nullity of void
marriage under Section 2(a)
3) It is an action for Philippine courts to
recognize the effectivity of a foreign
judgment, which presupposes a case
which was already tried and decided
under foreign law.
Article 26 of the Family Code confers
jurisdiction on Philippine courts to extend
the effect of a foreign divorce decree to a
Filipino spouse without undergoing trial to
determine the validity of the dissolution of
the marriage.

Lesaca vs Lesaca G.R. No. L-3605

April 21, 1952
(Antonio, Michael) Doctrine: Common
law marriages, Issue: 1) Whether the
allowances for support granted by the
court to the legitimate minor children of
the deceased are subject to collation and
deductible from their share of the
inheritance; 2) Whether money received
after marriage, as purchase price of land
sold before such marriage to one of the
consorts constitutes conjugal property;
and 3) Whether 1,040 cavans of palay of
the value of 20,800 received as rent on
decedents land for the years of 19461947 should be considered conjugal
property so that one-half should go to the
widow?
Facts of the case: Baldomaro J. Lesaca
died in the City of Manila on November 8,
1946. He was survived by his second wife
(Juana Felix), two minor children by the
latter, two children by his marriage, and
three acknowledged natural children by a
third woman. In his will he named Juana F.
Lesaca and Consuelo F. Lesaca, his
children by his first marriage, coexecutrices. The case had three appeals.
On the first appeal: the Court of First
Instance declared that Baldomaros two
minor children are allocated a monthly
allowance of P100.00 for their living
expenses and an additional P300.00 for
the matriculation fees and uniform
expenses. The Court instructed Juana and
Consuelo Lesaca to deposit in the court all
the allowances stated. The co-executrices
refused to make the deposit, contending
that if any amount were to be paid for the
support and education of the minors the
same should be charged against their
share of the inheritance. The primary
issue of the first appeal - is whether the
allowances for support granted by the
court to legitimate minor children of the
deceased pending liquidation of his estate
are subject to collation and deductible
from their share of the inheritance.
The Second Appeal of case stated that the
co-executrices from another order of
March 11, 1949, declaring that the sum of

P2,500 received by them as repurchase

price of land bought by the deceased
before the marriage is conjugal property
and directing that one-half of said sum be
paid to the Juana Felix.
Interestingly,
Baldomaro and Juana were married in
1945, but the three parcels of land in
question were purchased in 1930.
According to the court records Garcia sold
the land for P2,500 to Baldomaro Lesaca
before the latter's marriage to Juana Felix
and repurchased it to for the same
amount after said marriage. If the money
paid by Baldomaro Lesaca was his own
exclusively, surely the mere fact that it
was returned or repaid after marriage
cannot convert it to conjugal property.
The
Third
Appeal
discussed
that
Baldomaro did not cultivate his land
personally but had it cultivated by one
who gave him a certain percentage of the
crop every year by way of rent. The lower
court found that the 1,040 cavans of palay
in dispute was the rent or the decedent's
share of the harvest from palay planted in
June or July 1946 that is, after his
marriage to Juana Felix and which must
have already matured or been near
maturity at the time when the conjugal
partnership was dissolved by the death of
the Baldomaro in November, 1946.
Decision: The order of March 11, 1949,
declaring that the allowances granted the
minors pending liquidation of the estate
should be deducted from their hereditary
shares in so far as they exceed what they
may be entitled to as fruits or income is
affirmed by the Court. Basis of the ruling:
Article 1430 of the Civil Code of 1898 (reenacted as Article 188 of the new Civil
Code) which provides that "the surviving
spouse and his or her children shall be
given an allowance for their support out of
the general estate, pending the liquidation
of the inventoried estate, and until their
share has been delivered to them, but it
shall be deducted from their portion
insofar as it exceeds what they may have
been entitled to as fruits or income."
The order of March 11, 1949, declaring the
sum of P2,500 received by the coexecutrices from Ramon Garcia as

repurchase price of the three parcels of

land resold to the latter is conjugal
property and that the widow is entitled to
one-half thereof is reversed and the said
sum is declared to be part of the estate of
the deceased. The widow is not entitled
to receive one half of the money. In the
present case there is no showing that the
sum paid to Garcia was earned by the joint
efforts of the deceased and his widow. In
the absence of such proof the sum must
be deemed to have been the property of
the deceased to whom the land for which
it was given in payment was sold by
Garcia. It follows that the order below
adjudging one-half of the sum in question
to the widow is erroneous. The order of
April 28, 1949, declaring that the
decedents share of standing crop of palay
planted
during
the
coverture
and
harvested after the dissolution of the
marriage are fruits and income within the
purview of Article 1401 of the Civil Code
and, therefore, should be considered
conjugal property, of which one-half
should be delivered to Juana Felix is
affirmed. The Court reiterated that it is
immaterial that the rent was actually
received after the dissolution of the
marriage through the death of one of the
spouses. It is the date of accrual that is
important.

TERESITA C. YAPTINCHAY, Petitioner,

vs. HON. GUILLERMO E. TORRES,
Judge of the Court of First Instance of
Rizal, Pasig Branch; VIRGINIA Y.
YAPTINCHAY, in her own behalf and in
her capacity as Special Administratrix
in the Intestate Estate of the
deceased Isidro Y. Yaptinchay and
JESUS MONZON, MARY YAPTINCHAY
ELIGIR,
ERNESTO
YAPTINCHAY,
ANTONIO
YAPTINCHAY,
ASUNCION
YAPTINCHAY,
JOSEFINA
Y.
YAPTINCHAY,
ROSA
Y.
MONZON,
ISABEL Y. VALERIANO, REMEDIOS Y.
YAPTINCHAY,
FELICIDAD
Y.
ARGUELLES, MARY DOE and JOHN
DOE, Respondents.

Facts:

Original petition on certiorari

On July 13, 1965, petitioner Teresita C.

Yaptinchay sought the Court of First
Instance of Rizal first as special
administratix and as regular administratix
of the estate of Isidro Y. Yaptinchay.
Isidro Yaptinchay died in Hongkong on July
7, 1965. Teresita alleged that the they
lived together for 19 years and has
proclaimed themselves openly to the
public as husband and wife. They first
resided in 1951Taft Avenue Pasay City
from 1946 to 1964 and at 60 Russel
Avenue Pasay City from 1965 to 1960.
Isidro died without a will and left personal
and
real
properties
in
Philippines,
Hongkong and other places estimated with
an amount of PHP500,000.
Isidro has three daughters, Virginia
Yaptinchay, Mary Yaptinchay Eligir, and
Asuncion Yaptinchay all of age who on July
7,8 and 11, 1965, on behalf of other
parties took away certainproperties from
residences of the deceased which the
petitioner alleges that some are her own
personal property thus the petitioner on
her appointment as special and regular
administratix becomes an urgent matter.
On July 17, 1965, the court ordered the
appointment of Teresita as special
administratix under a Php25,000 bond.
An opposition was filed by Josefina
Yaptinchay, the alleged legitimate wife
with her other children on the ground that
even if Teresita has cohabited with the
deceased does not give her right to the
properties and serve as administratix for
want of integrity. Josefina also filed a
petition to appoint her daughter Victoria
Yaptinchay as special administratix and
herself as regular administratix. The court
has set aside its order on July 17 to give
the opposition a chance to be heard. On
July 30, 1965, after both parties were
given a chance to speak, the court
appointed Victoria Yaptinchay as special
administratix under a PHp50,000 bond.
Victoria submitted an inventory of all
assets
including
a
bungalow
with

swimming pool located in \North Forbes

Park.
On Aug. 14, 1965, Teresita Yaptinchay filed
in the Court of First Instance Rizal on the
Pasig Branch for damages and an action
for replevin and for liquidation of the
partnership formed during cohabitation
between her and Isidro. Case was
docketed as Civil Case 8873. Judge
Guillermo Torres issued an order on Aug
17,1965 to prevent respondents from
disposing properties during the pending
hearing.
On Aug. 25, 1965, private respondents
resisted the action because they contend
that exclusive jurisdiction was already
given by the Court of First Instance Pasay
City, present liquidation case was filed to
oust this court of jurisdiction over said
properties and plaintiff was not entitled to
remedy or injunction, her alleged right
being in dispute and doubtful. They also
prayed for a writ of preliminary injunction
to direct Teresita Yaptinchay to cease and
desist
from
disturbing
Victoria
Yaptinchays exercise of administration on
possession of properties of the deceased
in any manner. Employees of Teresita
inside the North Forbes Park are ordered
to be removed from its property.
In June 15, 1966, an order was issued in
Civil Case 8873, that the court denies the
petition of preliminary writ of injunction
and temporary restraining order which the
plaintiff (Teresita) petitioned is lifted. That
upon the information given while the
disputed property in Forbes Park was
under construction, it was administered by
the deceased and after his death, it was
under the administration of her daughter
Victoria. The court ordered also the
plaintiff(Teresita) to return any properties
to North Forbes Park and not disturb in
any manner the defendant (Victoria
Yaptinchay).
On June 15, 1965 the court order was
amended and clarified its decision by
enjoining the defendants from selling,
disposing or encumbering said property
while case is pending. Teresitas motion for
reconsideration for the order on June 15,

1966 was overturned by the judges order

on Aug. 8, 1966 : Considering that
defendants, principally Virginia Yaptinchay
took actual or physical possession of the
said properties which were formerly held
by the deceased Isidro Yaptinchay and
plaintiff, by virtue of her appointment and
under
her
authority,
as
Special
Administratix of the estate of the
deceased , Motion for Reconsideration is
hereby denied.
Issue:
1. W/N this Court in the exercise of its
supervisory powers should stake down as
having been issued in excess of
jurisdiction or with grave abuse of
discretion, the respondent judges order of
June 15, 1966, in Civil Case 8873 (Court of
First Instance of Rizal)
2. W/N petitioner can claim ownership?
Ratio:
1. No. A rule of long standing echoed and reechoed in jurisprudence is that injunction
is not to be granted for the purpose of
taking property out of possession and/or
control of a party and placing it in that of
another title thereto has not been clearly
established.
With
this
being
said,
petitioner should have been correct if she
were lawfully in possession of the said
house when writ of injunction under Civil
Case 8873 was issued and if special
administratix had no right to property.
However, the situation was different.
Properties in dispute belong to Isidro
Yaptinchay and his legitimate wife Josefina
Yaptinchay by conjugal partnership.
Teresita Yaptinchay has also shown
varying versions one on the court
stating
that
she
exclusively
contributed funds for the North
Forbes House while in the affidavit
she submitted on Aug.3, 1965, she
alleged that the deceased and
herself has both contributed to the
construction of the house. She also

gave an evidence of seven

promissory notes she had acquired
from the Republic Bank stating that
it was for the construction of the
house. But upon observation, not
one was used for the purpose of
construction having one for the
purpose of fishpond development
and other purpose not related with
the construction of the house.
2. No. Article 144 of the Civil Code states
that: When a man and a woman live
together as husband and wife, but they
are not married, or their marriage is void
from the beginning, the property acquired
by either or both of them through their
work or industry or their wages and
salaries shall be governed by the rules on
co-ownership. Conditions are provided in
this article one being that there must be a
clear showing that petitioner, during
cohabitation has in fact contributed to the
acquisition of said property. Petitioner
failed to prove such condition.

Final Decision:
Petition is dismissed.
Writ of preliminary mandatory injunction
issued by this Court is hereby dissolved.
Estrada vs. Escritor
AM P-02-1651, August 4, 2003
FACTS:
Soledad Escritor is a court interpreter
since 1999 in the RTC of Las Pinas City.
Alejandro Estrada, the complainant, wrote
to Judge Jose F. Caoibes, presiding judge of
Branch 253, RTC of Las Pinas City,
requesting for an investigation of rumors
that Escritor has been living with Luciano
Quilapio Jr., a man not her husband, and
had eventually begotten a son. Escritors
husband, who had lived with another
woman, died a year before she entered
into the judiciary. On the other hand,

Quilapio is still legally married to another

woman. Estrada is not related to either
Escritor or Quilapio and is not a resident of
Las Pinas but of Bacoor, Cavite.
According to the complainant, respondent
should not be allowed to remain employed
in the judiciary for it will appear as if the
court allows such act.
Escritor is a member of the religious sect
known as the Jehovahs Witnesses and the
Watch Tower and Bible Tract Society where
her conjugal arrangement with Quilapio is
in conformity with their religious beliefs.
After ten years of living together, she
executed on July 28, 1991 a Declaration
of Pledging Faithfulness which was
approved by the congregation. Such
declaration is effective when legal
impediments render it impossible for a
couple to legalize their union. Gregorio,
Salazar, a member of the Jehovahs
Witnesses since 1985 and has been a
presiding minister since 1991, testified
and explained the import of and
procedures for executing the declaration
which was completely executed by
Escritor and Quilapios in Atimonan,
Quezon and was signed by three
witnesses and recorded in Watch Tower
Central Office.
ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent should be
found guilty of the administrative charge
of gross and immoral conduct and be
penalized by the State for such conjugal
arrangement.
HELD:
A distinction between public and secular
morality and religious morality should be
kept in mind. The jurisdiction of the Court
extends only to public and secular
morality.

The Court states that our Constitution

adheres
the
benevolent
neutrality
approach
that
gives
room
for
accommodation of religious exercises as
required by the Free Exercise Clause. This
benevolent neutrality could allow for
accommodation of morality based on
religion, provided it does not offend
compelling state interests.

The states interest is the preservation of

the
integrity
of
the
judiciary
by
maintaining among its ranks a high
standard of morality and decency. There
is nothing in the OCAs (Office of the Court
Administrator) memorandum to the Court
that demonstrates how this interest is so
compelling that it should override
respondents plea of religious freedom.
Indeed, it is inappropriate for the
complainant, a private person, to present
evidence on the compelling interest of the
state. The burden of evidence should be
discharged by the proper agency of the
government which is the Office of the
Solicitor General.
In order to properly settle the case at bar,
it is essential that the government be
given an opportunity to demonstrate the
compelling state interest it seeks to
uphold in opposing the respondents
position that her conjugal arrangement is
not immoral and punishable as it is within
the scope of free exercise protection. The
Court could not prohibit and punish her
conduct where the Free Exercise Clause
protects it, since this would be an
unconstitutional encroachment of her right
to religious freedom. Furthermore, the
court cannot simply take a passing look at
respondents claim of religious freedom
but must also apply the compelling state
interest test.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the case is REMANDED
to the Office of the Court Administrator.

The Solicitor General is ordered to

intervene in the case where it will be given
the opportunity (a) to examine the
sincerity and centrality of respondent's
claimed religious belief and practice; (b) to
present
evidence
on
the
state's
"compelling
interest"
to
override
respondent's religious belief and practice;
and (c) to show that the means the state
adopts in pursuing its interest is the least
restrictive
to
respondent's
religious
freedom. The rehearing should be
concluded thirty (30) days from the Office
of the Court Administrator's receipt of this
Decision.
So vs. Valera
G.R. No. 150677
June 5, 2009
Petition for Review on Certiorari assailing
the decision of CA, which reversed the
RTC decision, declaring the marriage of
the petitioner and respondent Lorna
Valera (respondent) null and void on the
ground of the latters psychological
incapacity under Article 36 of the Family
Code. The assailed resolution denied the
petitioners motion for reconsideration.
Parties:
Renato Reyes So - petitioner
Lorna Valera - respondent
Facts:
> Renato and Lorna first met at a party
after being introduced to each other by a
common friend. Renato was 17 (HS) and
Lorna was 21 (college) during that time. It
led to a 19-year common-law relationship,
culminating of marital vows at the
Caloocan City Hall (1991). They had 3
children
in
their
relationship
and
subsequent marriage.
> May 14, 1996 - Renato filed a Petition
for the Declaration of the Nullity of
Marriage, alleging:
a) their marriage was null and void
for want of the essential and formal

requisites
b) Lorna was psychologically
incapacitated to exercise the
essential
obligations
of
marriage
because:
- she failed and refused to
cohabit and make love with him
- she did not love and
respect him
- did not remain faithful to
him
did
not
give
him
emotional,
spiritual,
physical
and
psychological
help & support
- failed and refused to have
a family domicile
- failed and refused to enter
into a permanent union & established
conjugal & family
life with him
c) he and Lorna eloped 2
months after the party and love in
Bulacan,
Caloocan and Muntinlupa.
d) he does not what happened to
the blank marriage application form and
marriage contract that he
signed in 1986.
e) no marriage took place in 1991
however e submitted a certified true copy
of their marriage contract as
part of his documentary evidence.
f) she does not want to practice her
profession as a dentist that she even
sold the dental equipment he
bought for her
g) she disagreed with many of his
business decisions that led to many failed
deals for his communication
company
h) she did not take care of the
children
i) she gambles with his employees
whenever there were no clients
> He narrated that she locked him out of
the house when he came home late,
where he felt embarrassed when his
employees would wake him up inside the
car. And one time, he found his things
outside the house when he came home
later after closing a deal with clients. He
stayed at his friends house for 2 months.

He tried to go back however he was

prevented by her and told him that he was
not loved by her anymore. He attempted
to reconcile for the sake of their children
but she refused to accept him back.
> July 17 1996 - summons was served to
Lorna however she failed to file an answer.
> RTC ordered Prosecutor Andres Marcos
to investigate of there was a collusion to
see if the evidence was fabricated.
However he was unable to make a ruling
on the issue of collusion since the
respondent failed to appear before him.
RTC Decision: It nullified the marriage of
Renato and Lorna. The RTC concluded that
Lorna was psychologically incapacitated to
comply with her marital obligations.
> The Republic of the Philippines, through
the Office of the Solicitor General,
appealed the RTC decision to the Court of
Appeals (CA).

CA Decision: Set aside the RTC decision

and dismissed the petition
Renato
failed
to
prove
Lornas
psychological incapacity. According to the
CA, Lornas character, faults, and defects
did not constitute psychological incapacity
warranting the nullity of the parties
marriage.
although Lornas condition was clinically
identified by an expert witness to be an
Adjustment
Disorder,
it
was
not
established that such disorder was the
root cause of her incapacity to fulfill the
essential marital obligations.
it failed to establish that Lornas disorder
was incurable and permanent in
such a way as to disable and/or
incapacitate Lorna from complying with
obligations essential to marriage.
Lornas hostile attitude towards Renato
when the latter came home late was a
normal reaction of an ordinary housewife
under a similar situation; and her
subsequent refusal to cohabit with him
was not due to any psychological
condition, but due to the fact that she no
longer loved him.
CA concluded that the declaration of
nullity of a marriage was not proper when

the psychological disorder does not meet

the guidelines set forth by the Supreme
Court in the case of Molina
> Renato moved to reconsider the
decision, but the CA denied his motion.

SC Decision: Affirmed CA decision.

agreed with CA and ruled that the totality
of evidence presented by Ramon failed to
establish Lornas psychological incapacity
to
perform
the
essential
marital
obligations.
SC did not give much credence to the
testimony and report of Renatos expert
witness, who is the psychologist, as
sufficiently in-depth and comprehensive to
warrant
the
conclusion
that
a
psychological incapacity existed that
prevented the respondent from complying
with the essential marital obligations of
marriage. The facts on which the
psychologist based her conclusions were
all derived from statements by the
petitioner whose bias in favor of his cause
cannot be doubted.
If in fact the respondent does not want to
provide the support expected of a wife,
the cause is not necessarily a grave and
incurable psychological malady whose
effects go as far as to affect her capacity
to provide marital support promised and
expected when the marital knot was tied.

Vincent Paul Mercado vs Consuelo

Tan
Topic:
Bigamous
marriages

and

polygamous

Facts:
v Petition for Certiorari assailing the
decision of the CA and the RTC of Bacolod
thereby convicting Mercado guilty of the
crime of Bigamy.
v In 91, Vincent Mercado contracted
marriage with Consuelo Tan despite his
prior marriage to one Ma. Thelma
Oliva(1976)

v On October 1992, Tan filed a bigamy

case against Mercado with the City
Prosecutor of Bacolod City
v One month after said filing, Mercado
filed an action for the Declaration for the
Nullity of the marriage with Oliva; The
year after, the court rendered their
decision on Mercados petition thereby
declaring the marriage between Mercado
and Olive as null and void
v Ruling of the RTC and CA: Mercado is
guilty for the crime of Bigamy furthermore
stating that he violated Article 40 of the
Family Code which provides that:
The absolute nullity of a previous
marriage may be invoked for purposes of
remarriage on the basis solely of a final
judgment
declaring
such
previous
marriage null void.
Applying this on the case at hand, the
declaration of nullity of Mercados first
marriage came only after the complaint
has already been filed and while the case
is already in trial.
Issue: Whether or not petitioner is guilty of
Bigamy
Ruling:
v Yes . Because all the elements of
bigamy are present in the present case as
follows:
1. That the offender has been legally
married;
2. That the marriage has not been legally
dissolved or, in case his or her spouse is
absent, the absent spouse could not yet
be presumed dead according to the Civil
Code;
3. That he contracts a second or
subsequent marriage;
4. That the second or subsequent
marriage has all the essential requisites
for validity
v All the elements are present when
Mercado married Tan. When he married
Tan, his first marriage was still subsisting
and was not declared void. In fact,
Mercado only filed an action to declare his
first marriage void after Tan filed the
bigamy case. By then, the crime of bigamy
had already been consummated.
v Under Article 40 of the Family Code, a
judicial declaration of nullity of a void
previous marriage must be obtained

before a person can marry for a

subsequent time. Absent that declaration
a person who marries a second time shall
be guilty of bigamy.
Bobis v Bobis
G.R. No. 138509
July 31, 2000
Topic:
Bigamous
Marriages

and

invoke that very same judgment to

prevent his prosecution for bigamy.
If such would be allowed, all that a
bigamist must do is to disregard Article 40
of the Family Code, contract a subsequent
marriage and escape a bigamy charge by
simply claiming that the first marriage is
void and that the subsequent marriage is
equally void for lack of a prior judicial
declaration of nullity of the first.
In the light of Article 40 of the Family
Code, respondent, without first having
obtained the judicial declaration of nullity
of the first marriage, cannot be said to
have validly entered into the second
marriage. Any decision in the civil action
for nullity would not erase the fact that
respondent entered into a second
marriage during the subsistence of a first
marriage. Thus, a decision in the civil case
is not essential to the determination of the
criminal charge.
Furthermore, in the case of Landicho v.
Relova the SC stated that he who
contracts a second marriage before the
judicial declaration of nullity of the first
marriage assumes the risk of being
prosecuted for bigamy, and in such a case
the criminal case may not be suspended
on the ground of the pendency of a civil
case for declaration of nullity.

Polygamous

Facts: On Oct. 21, 1985, respondent

contracted a first marriage with Maria
Dulce Javier. Without said marriage having
been annulled, respondent contracted a
second marriage with petitioner Imelda
Marbella-Bobis on Jan. 25, 1996 and a
third marriage with Julia Hernandez.
Based on petitioners complaint, an
information for bigamy was filed against
respondent in the RTC of Quezon City.
Thereafter, respondent initiated a civil
action for judicial declaration of absolute
nullity of first marriage and filed a motion
to suspend the criminal case for bigamy
on the ground that the pending civil case
of nullity of the first marriage is a
prejudicial question to the criminal case.
The RTC granted the said motion.
Issue: Whether or not the subsequent
filing of a civil action for declaration of
nullity of a previous marriage constitutes
prejudicial question to a criminal case of
bigamy
Held: No. A prejudicial question is one
which arises in a case the resolution of
which is a logical antecedent of the issue
involved therein. Its two elements are: (a)
the civil action involves an issue similar or
intimately related to the issue raised in
the criminal action; and (b) the resolution
of such issue determines whether or not
the criminal action may proceed.
Article 40 of the Family Code, which was
effective at the time of celebration of the
second marriage, requires a prior judicial
declaration of nullity of a previous
marriage before a party may remarry. In
the case at bar, respondent's clear intent
is to obtain a judicial declaration of nullity
of his first marriage and thereafter to

OFELIA P. TY, petitioner, vs. THE

COURT OF APPEALS and EDGARDO M.
REYES,
Respondents
11/27/2000, Quisumbing
TOPIC: Kinds of Void Marriages: Bigamous
and Polygamous Marriages
PETITION: Seeking the reversal of the CA
decision (7/24/1996) that affirmed RTC
Pasig, declaring the marriage contract
between Edgardo Reyes and Ofelia Ty null
and void ab initio and ordering Reyes to
pay Php 15,000 as monthly support for
children Faye and Rachel

FACTS
First Marriage
March 29, 1977: Edgardo Reyes married
Anna Maria Regina Villanueva in a civil
ceremony in Manila

August 27, 1977: Church wedding of

Villanueva and Reyes
August 4, 1980: Declaration of Villanueva
and Reyes Marriage Null and Void Ab Initio,
by the Juvenile and Domestic Relations
Court of QC for lack of marriage license
and lack of consent of the parties
Second Marriage
April 4, 1979: Edgardo Reyess married
Ofelia Ty, officiated by judge of the City
Court of Pasay
April 4, 1982: Church wedding of Reyes
and Ty in Makati
Edgardo reyes files a case with RTC Pasig
praying that his marriage with Ty be
declared Null and Void
Alleges they had no marriage license
when they got married
Avers that he was still married with Anna
Maria Villanueva
Nullity of marriage with Villanueva has still
not been issued
Ofelia Ty defends their marriage
Submits marriage license dated Apr 3,
1979
Submits decision of the Juvenile and
Domestic Relations Court
Avers that their church wedding on April 4,
1982 is undisputable
RTC declared the wedding Null and Void ab
initio which was affirmed by the CA (after
appeal) ruling that:
A judicial declaration of nullity of the first
marriage must first be secured before a
subsequent marriage could be validly
contracted
And ordering Edgardo Reyes to give
monthly support to the children (Php 15k)
Ofelia Tys motion for reconsideration was
denied
ISSUE
W/N the decree of nullity of the first
marriage is required before a subsequent
marriage can be entered into validly
HELD

Jurisprudence appears to be conflicting (!)

NO - People v Mendoza and People v
Aragon no need for a judicial declaration
that 2nd marriage is void
YES - Gomez v Lipana and Consuergra v
GSIS there was a need

NO Odayat v Amante
YES - Wiegel v Sempio-Diy
NO Yap v CA reverted Odayat, Mendoza
and Aragon
Finally put to rest when it eventually
was embodied in the Family code
Art 40. The absolute nullity of a previous
marriage may be invoked for purposes of
remarriage on the basis solely of a final
judgement
declaring
such
previous
marriage void
YES Terre v Terre court applied again
Gomez, Consuerga and Wiegel
YES Domingo v CA
(!) However, in the peculiar case of
Apiag v Cantero, court again said that
there is NO need for judicial
declaration of its nullity before he
could contract again a second
marriage BECAUSE:
The 2nd marriage and birth of children
happened before the promulgation of
Wiegel case (YES) AND the effectivity of
the family code
THEREFORE, similar to Apiag v Cantero:
Second marriage was entered in 1979 in
which the prevailing ruling was Odayat,
Mendoza, and Aragon (NOs)
There was NO need for judicial declaration
of its nullity
Second marriage is VALID
The provisions of the family code CANNOT
be retroactively applied, for to do so would
prejudice the vested rights of petitioner
and of her children
(Petitioner also made a counterclaim for
damages and attorneys fees but this was
not granted because in ordering Reyes
payment for damages, we would have a
situation where the husband pays wife
damages from conjugal or common funds
since the court has held that their
marriage is VALID)
Petition is GRANTED. CA decisions and
resolutions are reversed partially: Marriage
is VALID and SUBSISTING; and the amount
of Php15 k is RATIFIED and MAINTAINED
for as long as the children are of minor
age or legally entitled thereto

Lucio Morigo vs People of the

Philippines
Topic: Marriage-Form of Marriage
Facts: This is a petition for Certiorari
seeking to reverse the October 21,1999
decision and resolution of of the Court of
Appeals which affirmed Bohol RTCs
decision finding herein petitioner guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of Bigamy
punishable by a minimum prison term of
seven months of prision correccional to six
years and one day of prison mayor as
maximum.
The facts of the case are as follows: Lucio
Morigo and Lucia Barrete first knew each
other after being boarddmates at the
house of Catalina Tortor in Bohol for 4
years. Towards the end of school year
1977-1978 however, they left the said
house and lost contact but reunited after
petitioner received a card from Barrete
which paved way to various exchanges of
letters until they eventually became
sweethearts. On August 30, 1990, they
were married at the Iglesia de Filipina
Nacional at Pilar, Bohol; weeks after the
said marriage, Barrete went back to her
work in Canada leaving petitioner behind.
One
year
immediately
after
their
marriage, Barrete filed for divorce with the
Ontario Court which was subsequently
granted after almost 3 months.
On October of 1992, petitioner believing
that the decision of the Canadian Court is
applicable
here
contracted
another
marriage with Maria Jececha Lumbago at
the Virgen sa Barangay Parish. On
September 1993, he formally filed for a
civil complaint for the declaration of nullity
of the marriage he had with Barrete with
the RTC of Bohol arguing that the marriage
they had was void ab initio in the absence
of a formal ceremony. During the
pendency of said civil case the City
Prosecutor filed a criminal charge of
bigamy against him; thereafter trial
ensued for the criminal case wherein the
RTC of Bohol found petitioner guilty of
Bigamy, likewise on a separate decision,
the same court rendered their decision on
the civil case granting Morigos petition for
the declaration of nullity of his first
marriage. In deciding over the case the
Court was convinced that: First, parties to
a marriage should not assume that their

marriage is void and even if the marriage

was indeed void, they should first file for
the declaration of nullity of marriage
before contracting another marriage and
secondly, the Court reiterated that a court
of a foreign country to which neither of the
parties are domiciled have no proper
jurisdiction to declare the marital status of
the parties. Upon appeal, the CA affirmed
the decision of Bohol RTC in toto on the
ground that they believe that the
petitioner is guilty for contracting a
second marriage before the dissolution of
the first one as punished under Article 349
of the Revised Penal Code; the appellate
court likewise dismissed petitioners
motion for reconsideration for lack of
merit.; hence, the present petition.
Issue: Whether or not the first marriage
of petitioner is valid thereby making him
liable for Bigamy.
Ratio: In rendering their decision, the SC
took into consideration of the trial courts
decision on the civil case filed by the
petitioner wherein they declared that the
marriage of Morigo with Barrete was void
ab initio on the ground that they merely
signed a marriage contract and that there
was no actual marriage ceremony
performed between them by a solemnizing
office. In the absence of a formal
marriage, there is also no need for the
petitioner to file for a declaration for the
nullity of marriage. Subsequently, he
cannot be likewise held liable for Bigamy
for in the absence of a legal marriage, the
requisites for the crime of bigamy would
not be satisfied. In conclusion thereof,
Morigos petition was granted thereby
acquitting the petitioner of Bigamy.
Note: Elements of Bigamy under Article
349 of the Revised Penal Code:
1.
That the offender has been legally
married
2.
That the marriage has not been
legally dissolved
3.
That he contracts a second or
subsequent marriage
That the second marriage he contracted is
also valid
Tenebro vs CA GR 150758 February 18,
2004

Topic: Bigamous and Polygamous Marriage

Facts:

Veronico Tenebro contracted marriage with

Leticia Ancajas in 1990. They lived
together continuously until the latter part
of 1991, when Tenebro informed Ancajas
that he had been previously married to
Villareyes in 1986. Tenebro showed
Ancajas a photocopy of a marriage
contract between him and Villareyes.
Invoking this previous marriage, Tenebro
thereafter left the conjugal dwelling which
he shared with Ancajas, stating that he
was going to cohabit with Villareyes.

In 1993, Tenebro contracted a third

marriage with Nilda Villegas, before Judge
Lee, Jr. of Branch 15, RTC of Cebu City.
When Ancajas learned of this third
marriage, she verified from Villareyes
whether the latter was indeed married to
Tenebro. In a handwritten letter, Villareyes
confirmed that Tenebro, was indeed her
husband. Ancajas thereafter filed a
complaint for bigamy against Tenebro.

For his first defense, Tenebro admitted to

co-habiting with Villareyes but he denied
that he and Villareyes were validly married
to each other since no marriage ceremony
took place to solemnize their union. He
alleged that he signed a marriage contract
merely to enable her to get the allotment
from his office in connection with his work
as a seaman. He presented a certifications
issued by the NSO and the City Civil
Registry of Manila attesting that the
respective issuing offices have no record

of a marriage celebrated between Tenebro

and Villareyes For his second defense,
Tenebro argues that the declaration of the
nullity of the second marriage to Ancajas
on the ground of psychological incapacity,
which is an alleged indicator that his
marriage lacks the essential requisites for
validity, retroacts to the date on which the
second marriage was celebrated.

Held/Ratio:

Best Evidence of Marriage

1. The certified copy of the marriage

contract, issued by a public officer in
custody thereof, is admissible as the best
evidence of its contents. The marriage
contract plainly indicates that a marriage
was celebrated between Tenebro and
Villareyes on and it should be accorded
the full faith and credence given to public
documents.
2. The marriage contract presented by the
prosecution serves as positive evidence as
to the existence of the marriage between
Tenebro and Villareyes, which should be
given greater credence than documents
testifying merely as to absence of any
record of the marriage, especially
considering that there is absolutely no
requirement in the law that a marriage
contract needs to be submitted to the civil
registrar as a condition precedent for the
validity of a marriage.

3. The mere fact that no record of a marriage

exists does not invalidate the marriage,
provided all requisites for its validity are
present.

solemnizing officer in the presence of at

least two witnesses).
Bigamy

4. Since a marriage contracted during the

subsistence of a valid marriage is
automatically void, the nullity of this
second marriage is not per se an
argument for the avoidance of
criminal liability for bigamy.
5. Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code
penalizes the mere act of contracting a
second or a subsequent marriage during
the subsistence of a valid marriage.
6. The subsequent judicial declaration of
nullity of marriage does not retroact to the
date of the celebration of the marriage
insofar as the Philippines' penal laws are
concerned. As such, an individual who
contracts a second or subsequent
marriage during the subsistence of a valid
marriage is criminally liable for bigamy,
notwithstanding
the
subsequent
declaration that the second marriage is
void ab initio on the ground of
psychological incapacity.

8. The declaration of the nullity of the second

marriage on the ground of psychological
incapacity is not an indicator that
petitioners marriage to Ancajas lacks the
essential requisites for validity. All the
essential and formal requisites for the
validity of marriage were satisfied by
Tenebro and Ancajas.
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing,
the instant petition for review is DENIED.
The assailed decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 21636,
convicting petitioner Veronico Tenebro of
the crime of Bigamy and sentencing him
to suffer the indeterminate penalty of four
(4) years and two (2)
months of prision correccional, as
minimum, to eight (8) years and one (1)
day of prision mayor, as maximum, is
AFFIRMED in toto.

SO ORDERED.
Teves v. People
Bigamous marriage

Requisites for Validity of Marriage

7. The requisites for the validity of a

marriage are classified by the Family Code
into essential (legal capacity of the
contracting parties and their consent
freely given in the presence of the
solemnizing officer) and formal (authority
of the solemnizing officer, marriage
license, and marriage ceremony wherein
the parties personally declare their
agreement
to
marry
before
the

FACTS:
-26 November 1992 Cenon Teves and
Thelma
Jaime-Teves
married
-After the marriage, Thelma left to work
abroad and would only come home to the
Philippines
for
vacations.
- 2002, Thelma was informed that her
husband had contracted marriage with
Edita
Calderon.
-confirmed
by
NSO
marriage
contract between her husband and Edita.
-2006, the uncle of Thelma, filed a
complaint accusing petitioner Cenon of
bigamy.
-During the pendency of the

criminal case for bigamy, the RTC of

Caloocan City, rendered a decision
declaring the marriage of petitioner and
Thelma null and void on the ground that
Thelma is physically incapacitated to
comply
with
her
essential
marital
obligations pursuant to Article 36, Family
Code. Decision became final by a
Certification of Finality issued on 27 June
2006.
-Petitioner Cenon appealed before the CA
contending that the court a quo erred in
not ruling that his criminal liability had
already been extinguished. Petitioner
claims that since his previous marriage
was declared null and void, there is in
effect no marriage at all, and thus, there is
no bigamy to speak of.

legal infirmity is a final judgment declaring

the previous marriage void. Parties to a
marriage should not be allowed to assume
that their marriage is void even if such be
the fact but must first secure a judicial
declaration of the nullity of their marriage
before they can be allowed to marry
again.
With the judicial declaration of the nullity
of his or her marriage, the person who
marries again cannot be charged with
bigamy. A judicial declaration of nullity is
required before a valid subsequent
marriage can be contracted; or else, what
transpires is a bigamous marriage,
reprehensible and immoral.
Montanez v Cipriano

ISSUE: W/N petitioner may be held guilty

for the crime of Bigamy (Article 346, RPC)
despite the judicial declaration that his
previous marriage with Thema is null and
void.

HELD: YES.

The court held that it does not

matter
whether
the
case
for
declaration of nullity was filed before
the case for bigamy was instituted,
for as long as the offender contracted
a subsequent marriage while his
previous
marriage
is
subsisting
thereby not being able to secure a
Declaration of Nullity of the First marriage.
His contention that he cannot be charged
with bigamy in view of the declaration of
nullity of his first marriage is bereft of
merit.

Bigamous and Polygamous marriages

o
A declaration of the absolute nullity of a
marriage is now explicitly required either
as a cause of action or a ground for
defense. Where the absolute nullity of a
previous marriage is sought to be invoked
for purposes of contracting a second
marriage, the sole basis acceptable in law
for said projected marriage to be free from

FACTS
On April 8, 1976, respondent married
Socrates Flores
On January 24, 1983, during the
subsistence of their marriage, respondent
married Silverio Cipriano
In 2001, respondent filed with the RTC of
Muntinlupa a Petition for the Annulment of
her marriage with Socrates on the ground
of his psychological incapacity, as defined
under the Family Code
On July 18, 2003, the RTC of Muntinlupa
declared
the
marriage
between
respondent and Socrates as null and void
Decision became final and executory on
October 13, 2003
On May 14, 2004, petitioner, Silverios
daughter from his first marriage, filed with
the MTC of San Pedro, Laguna a complaint
for Bigamy against respondent
Lourdes Cipriano alleged that her first
marriage was already declared void ab
initio in 2003, thus there ws no more
marriage to speak of prior to her marriage
to Silverio on January 1983
The prosecution argued that the crime of
bigamy had already been consummated
when respondent filed her etition for
declaration of nullity

RTC ruled in favor of respondent on the

ground
that
both
marriages
were
governed by the Civil Code, and not the
Family Code, hence no judicial declaration
of absolute nullity as a condition
precedent to contracting a subsequent
marriage
ISSUE
WON the declaration of nullity of the
respondents first marriage in 2003
justifies the dismissal of the complaint for
bigamy filed against her

o
o

HELD
No
The retroactive application of procedural
laws is not violative of any right of an
individual who may feel that he is
adversely affected
As a general rule, no vested right may
attach to, nor arise from, procedural laws
In this case, it is clear that the
respondents intent was to obtain a
judicial declaration of nullity to escape
from the bigamy charges against her
Capili v People
GR No. 183805
July 3, 2013

Facts:
September 1999, Capili married Karla
Medina. Three months later in December
1999, he married another woman named
Shirley Tismo.
In 2004, Medina filed an action for
declaration of nullity of the second
marriage between Capili and Tismo. In
June 2004, Tismo filed a bigamy case
against Capili.
Before a decision can be held in the
bigamy case, the action filed by Medina
was granted and Capilis marriage with
Tismo was declared void by reason of the
subsisting marriage between Medina and
Capili.
Capili filed a motion to dismiss in the
bigamy case. He alleged that since the
second marriage was already declared
void ab initio that marriage never took
place and that therefore, there is no
bigamy to speak of.

Issue:
W/N a declaration of nullity of the second
marriage avoids a prosecution for bigamy.

Held:
- No. The elements of bigamy are:
1. That the offender has been legally
married;
2. That the first marriage has not been
legally dissolved or, in case his or her
spouse is absent, the absent spouse could
not yet be presumed dead according to
the Civil Code;
3. That he contracts a second or subsequent
marriage;
4. That the second or subsequent marriage
has all the essential requisites for validity.
- When Capili married Tismo, all the above
elements are present. The crime of
bigamy was already consummated. It is
already
immaterial
if
the
was
subsequently declared void.
- The outcome of the civil case filed by
Karla Medina had no bearing to the
determination of Capilis guilt or innocence
in the bigamy case because all that is
required for the charge of bigamy to
prosper is that the first marriage be
subsisting at the time the second marriage
is contracted. He who contracts a second
marriage before the judicial declaration of
the first marriage assumes the risk of
being prosecuted for bigamy.
- The Supreme Court also notes that even if
a party has reason to believe that his first
marriage is void, he cannot simply
contract a second marriage without having
such first marriage be judicially declared
as void.
The parties to the marriage should not be
permitted to judge for themselves its
nullity, for the same must be submitted to
the judgment of competent courts and
only when the nullity of the marriage is so
declared can it be held as void, and so
long as there is no such declaration the
presumption is that the marriage exists.
G.R. No. 191566 July 17, 2013
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,
v. EDGARDO V. ODTUHAN, Respondent.

PERALTA, J.:
FACTS:

On July 2, 1980, respondent Edgardo

Odtuhan married Jasmin Modina. On
October 28, 1993, he also married Eleanor
Alagon.
In August 1994, he later filed a petition for
annulment of his marriage with Modina.
On February 23, 1999, the RTC granted
the petition.
On November 10, 2003, Eleanor Alagon
died.
In
the
meantime,
private
complainant Evelyn Alagon learned of
respondents previous marriage with
Modina and filed a Complaint-Affidavit
charging respondent with Bigamy.
Respondent
moved
to
quash
the
information on two grounds: (1) that the
facts do not charge the offense of bigamy;
and (2) that the criminal action or liability
has been extinguished.
The RTC held that the facts constitute the
crime of bigamy. There was a valid
marriage
between
respondent
and
Modina; without such marriage having
been dissolved, respondent contracted a
second marriage with Alagon. It further
held that neither can the information be
quashed on the ground that criminal
liability has been extinguished because
the declaration of nullity of the first
marriage is not one of the modes of
extinguishing criminal liability.
Respondent appealed to the CA on
certiorari. He concluded that the RTC
gravely abused its discretion in denying
respondents motion to quash the
information, considering that the facts
alleged in the information do not charge
an offense.
ISSUES:

1. W/N not the motion to quash by

respondent is appropriate
2. W/N the courts judgment declaring
respondents first marriage void ab initio
extinguished respondents criminal liability
HELD/RATIO:

1. NO. A motion to quash information is the

mode by which an accused assails the
validity of a criminal complaint or
information
filed
against
him
for
insufficiency for defects which are
apparent in the face of the information. In
this case however, there is sufficiency of
the allegations in the information to
constitute the crime of bigamy. It
contained all the elements of the crime as
provided for in Article 349 of the Revised
Penal Code: (1) that respondent is legally
married to Modina; (2) that without such
marriage having been legally dissolved;
(3) that respondent willfully, unlawfully,
and feloniously contracted a second
marriage with Alagon; and (4) that the
second marriage has all the essential
requisites for validity.
Respondents evidence showing
the courts declaration that his marriage
to Modina is null and void from the
beginning should not be considered
because matters of defense cannot
be
raised in a motion to quash. It is not
proper, therefore, to resolve the charges
at the very outset without the
benefit of a full blown trial.
2. NO. Respondents claim that there are
more reasons to quash the information
against him because he obtained the
declaration of nullity of marriage before
the filing of the complaint for bigamy
against him is without merit. Criminal
culpability attaches to the offender upon
the commission of the offense, and from
that instant, there is already liability. The
time of filing of the criminal complaint or
information
is
material
only
for
determining prescription. It has been held
in a number of cases that a judicial
declaration of nullity is required before a
valid subsequent marriage can be
contracted. Therefore, he who contracts a
second marriage before the judicial
declaration of nullity of the first marriage
assumes the risk of being prosecuted for
bigamy.


RULING:
The petition for review on ceritorari is
granted. The CAs decision is set aside,
and the case is remanded to the RTC.
IWASAWA v. GANGAN
[G.R. No. 204169; September 11, 2013]
TOPIC:
Bigamous
and
Polygamous Marriages
PETITIONER: Yasuo Iwasawa (Japanese
National)
RESPONDENT:
Felisa Gangan, Local
Civil Registrar of Pasay City
PONENTE:
Villarama, Jr., J. (1st Div)
LAW:
Family Code (FC)
Art. 35. The following marriages shall be
VOID FROM THE BEGINNING:
4. Those
bigamous
or
polygamous
marriages not falling under Art. 41.
Art. 41. A marriage contracted by any
person during subsistence of a
previous marriage shall be NULL AND
VOID, unless before the celebration of the
subsequent marriage, the prior spouse
had been absent for four consecutive
years and the spouse present has a wellfounded belief that the absent spouse was
already dead. xxx
Civil Code (NCC)
Art. 410. The books making up the civil
register and all documents relating thereto
shall be considered public documents
and shall be prima facie evidence of
the facts therein contained.

FACTS:
Petition for review of the RTC decision
which denied the petition for declaration
of nullity of the marriage of petitioner and
Felisa due to insufficient evidence
Jun 20, 2004: Felisa married Raymond
Arambulo
2002: Petitioner met Felisa in one of his
trips to the Philippines. She told him that
she was single and has never been
married. The two became close.
Nov 28, 2002: Petitioner came back and
married Felisa in Pasay City. Afterwards,
they resided in Japan.

o
o

o
o

o
o

July 2009: Petitioner noticed that Felisa

was depressed and confronted her as to
why.
He was shocked when she told him that
her previous husband had just died (Jul 14,
2009).
Petitioner filed for a declaration of nullity
of his marriage with Felisa due to it being
a bigamous one
Evidences forwarded: both marriage
certificates, Raymonds certificate of
death, and an NSO certification that Felisa
had 2 entries of marriage. (Prosecutor
appearing on behalf of the OSG confirmed
these documents authenticity)
evidence presented are public documents
which are considered self-authenticating.
As such it was unnecessary to call the NSO
Records Custodian as witness (cites NCC
Art 410 + trial prosecutors admission of
authenticity)
RTC ruled that there was insufficient
evidence to prove Felisas prior existing
valid marriage to another man
Only petitioner testified to Felisas first
marriage, which is unreliable as he has no
personal knowledge of this or Raymonds
death, making him a stranger to their
marriage certificate. Same reasoning for
the NSO certification.
OSG disagrees with the RTC
Evidence
presented
by
petitioner
completely establish the facts in issue.
the Law on Registry of Civil Status (RA
3753) and the NCC declared the records
and entries made by the civil registrar as
public documents. As such, these are
admissible in evidence even without
further proof of their genuineness
There was no need for the court to require
petitioner to present the NSO records
custodian or officer testify
public documents have probative value
since they are prima facie evidence of the
facts stated therein (NCC Art 410)
Mar 19, 2013: Felisa sent a letter to the SC
She indicated that she is not against her
husbands petition to nullify their marriage
admitted therein that she married
Raymond
and
thereafter
married
petitioner. Her marrying petitioner without
telling the latter of her previous marriage
was due to poverty and joblessness
After confessing to petitioner, they
separated


o
o

ISSUE:WON the testimony of the NSO

records custodian certifying the
authenticity and due execution of
the public documents issued by
them was necessary before they
could be accorded evidentiary
weight
RULING:
No, it is not necessary.
Petition
GRANTED.
Marriage
between petitioner and Felisa is
NULL
and
VOID
for
being
BIGAMOUS
No doubt that subject documents are
those listed by the NCC Art 410 as public
documents.
proof of authenticity and due execution
was not anymore necessary
not only are said documents admissible,
they deserve to be given evidentiary
weight because they constitute prima
facie evidence of the facts stated therein
facts stated therein remain unrebutted
since no party presented evidence to the
contrary
the second marriage of private respondent
to petitioner is BIGAMOUS and NULL and
VOID
a judicial declaration of nullity is
required before a valid subsequent
marriage can be contracted; or else,
what transpires is a bigamous
marriage (void ab initio) [FC Art 35
(4)]
there being no judicial declaration of
nullity of marriage between Felisa and
Raymond, it was still subsisting at the time
of Felisa and petitioners marriage
celebration
Jones v. Hortiguela, 64 Phil 179
FACTS: Marciana Escano and Arthur Jones
got married in December 1914. On
January 10, 1918, Jones secured a
passport. She never heard from him again.
In 1919, she filed for a proceeding to
judicially declare Arthur missing. On
October 25, 1919, the court declared
Arthur as an absentee with the proviso
that said judicial declaration of absence
would not take effect until six months after
its publication in the official newspapers

pursuant to Art. 186 of the Old Civil Code.

In 23 April 1921, the court issued another
order for the taking effect of the
declaration of absence, publication thereof
having been made in the Official Gazette
and in "El Ideal." On May 6, 1927,
Marciana contracted a second marriage
with Felix Hortiguela. When Marciana died
intestate, Felix was appointed as judicial
administrator of the estate. Angelita Jones,
Marcianas daughter from her first
marriage, filed a case and alleged that she
is the only heir of her mother and that her
mothers marriage to Felix was null and
void on the ground that from April 23,
1921 (when the court issued an order for
the taking effect of declaration of absence
& publication thereof) to May 6, 1927 (her
mother and Felixs marriage) was below
the 7-year prescriptive period. With this,
the marriage would be null and void and
would render her as the sole heir.

ISSUE: W/N the marriage of Marciana and

Felix is null and void. W/N Felix is a
legitimate heir of Marciana.
HELD. Yes and Yes. the absence of
Marciana Escao's former husband should
be counted from January 10, 1918, the
date on which the last news concerning
Arthur W. Jones was received, and from
said date to May 6, 1927, more than nine
years elapsed. The validity of the marriage
makes him a legitimate heir.
Republic vs Nolasco
GR No. 94053
March 17, 1993
FACTS:
Nolasco, a seaman, first met Janet Monica
Parker in a bar in England. After that, she
lived with him on his ship for 6 months.
After his seaman's contract has expired,
he brought her to his hometown in San
Jose, Antique. They got married in January
1982.

After the marriage celebration, he got

another employment contract and left the
province. In January 1983, Nolasco
received a letter from his mother that 15
days after Janet gave birth to their son,
she left. He cut short his contract to find
Janet. He returned home in November
1983.
He did so by securing another contract
which England is one of its port calls. He
wrote several letters to the bar where he
and Janet first met, but all were returned
to him. He claimed that he inquired from
his friends but they too had no news about
Janet. In 1988, Nolasco filed before the
RTC of Antique a petition for the
declaration of presumptive death of his
wife Janet.
RTC granted the petition. The Republic
through the Solicitor-General, appealed to
the CA, contending that the trial court
erred in declaring Janet presumptively
dead because Nolasco had failed to show
that there existed a well-founded belief for
such declaration. CA affirmed the trial
court's decision.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Nolasco has a wellfounded belief that his wife is already
dead.
RULING:
No. Nolasco failed to prove that he had
complied with the third requirement under
the Article 41 of the Family Code, the
existence of a "well-founded belief" that
Janet is already dead.
Under Article 41, the time required for the
presumption to arise has been shortened
to 4 years; however, there is a need for
judicial declaration of presumptive death
to enable the spouse present to marry.
However, Article 41 imposes a stricter
standard before declaring presumptive
death of one spouse. It requires a "wellfounded belief" that the absentee is
already dead before a petition for
declaration of presumptive death can be
granted.

In the case at bar, the Court found

Nolasco's alleged attempt to ascertain
about Janet's whereabouts too sketchy to
form the basis of a reasonable or wellfounded belief that she was already dead.
Nolasco,
after
returning
from
his
employment, instead of seeking help of
local authorities or of the British Embassy,
secured another contract to London.
Janet's alleged refusal to give any
information about her was too convenient
an excuse to justify his failure to locate
her. He did not explain why he took him 9
months to finally reached San Jose after
he asked leave from his captain. He
refused to identify his friends whom he
inquired from. When the Court asked
Nolasco about the returned letters, he said
he had lost them. Moreover, while he was
in London, he did not even dare to solicit
help of authorities to find his wife.
The circumstances of Janet's departure
and Nolasco's subsequent behavior make
it very difficult to regard the claimed belief
that Janet was dead a well-founded one.
Bienvenido vs CA
Topic: Subsequent marriage, upon
reappearance of absent spouse
Facts:
Aurelio P. Camacho married Consejo
Velasco in Manila in
1942. In 1962, without his marriage to
Consejo Velasco being dissolved, Aurelio
contracted
another
marriage
with
respondent Luisita C. Camacho (Luisita)
with whom he had been living since 1953
and by whom he begot a child, Chito, born
in 1961. The marriage was solemnized in
Tokyo, Japan where Aurelio and Luisita had
been living since 1958.
There were instances during Luisita and
Aurelios marriage when, because of their
quarrels, one or the other left the dwelling
place for long periods of time.
In 1967 Aurelio met petitioner Nenita T.
Bienvenido, who had been estranged from

her husband, Luis Rivera. He lived with her

from June
1968 until Aurelios death on May 28,
1988. He lived with her, the last time in a
duplex
apartment
in
Quezon
City.
Petitioners daughter,
Nanette, stayed with them as did Aurelios
son, Chito, who lived with them for about
a year in 1976.
In 1982, Aurelio bought the house and the
lot on Delgado
Street in which they were staying from the
owners, Paz Lorenzo Infante and Suzette
Infante-Moozca. In the deed of sale and
Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 288350 of the
Registry of Deeds of Quezon
City, issued in his name, Aurelio was
described as single.
In November 26, 1984, Aurelio executed a
deed of sale of the property in favour of
petitioner Nenita in consideration of the
sum of
P250,000.00, by virtue of which Transfer
Certificate of Title No.
326681 was issued in petitioners name in
1985.
In 1988, Luisita and her son Chito brought
this case in the Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City, seeking the annulment of the
sale of the property to petitioner and the
payment to them of damages.
Luisita alleged that the deed of sale was a
forgery and that in any event it was
executed in fraud of her as the legitimate
wife of
Aurelio.
In answer petitioner Nenita claimed that
she and the late Aurelio had purchased
the property in question using their joint
funds which they had accumulated after
living together for fourteen years, that the
sale of the property by the late Aurelio to
her was with respondent
Luisitas consent; and that she was a
purchaser in good faith.
Issues:

Whether the marriage of Aurelio and

Luisita is valid.
Whether the deed of sale between Aurelio
and Nenita is valid.
Ruling:
RTC: In 1989, the trial court rendered a
decision upholding the sale of the property
to petitioner and dismissing the complaint
of
Luisita. It found the deed of sale in favor of
petitioner to be genuine and respondents
Luisita and Chito to be in estoppel in not
claiming the property until 1988 despite
knowledge of the sale by the late Aurelio
who had represented himself to be single.
Respondents moved for a reconsideration
but the trial court denied their motion.
Court of Appeals:
On appeal the respondents prevailed. In
1993, the Court of
Appeals reversed the decision of the trial
court and declared respondents to be the
owners of the house and lot in dispute.
Although
Luisita had admitted that as early as 1985
she knew that Nenita had been staying in
the premises, the appellate court held that
respondents action was not barred by
laches because Luisita allegedly did not
know that Nenita had obtained title to the
property. On the merit, the Court of
Appeals ruled that in the absence of proof
to the contrary, Aurelios first wife must be
presumed to have been absent for seven
years without Aurelio having news of her
being alive when Aurelio contracted a
second marriage. On this premise, it held
(1) that the property in dispute belonged
to the conjugal partnership of Aurelio and
Luisita and (2) that the sale of the
property to Nenita was void for the same
reason that donations between persons
who are guilty of concubinage or adultery
are declared void under Art. 739 of the
Civil Code.
Supreme Court:
The decision appealed from is REVERSED
and another one is entered,
DISMISSING
the
complaint
against
petitioner and DECLARING the deed of

sale executed in her favor and Transfer

Certificate of the Register of Deeds of
Quezon City issued in her name to be
VALID.
Art. 83 of the Civil Code provides:
Art. 83. Any marriage subsequently
contracted by any person during
the lifetime of the first spouse of
such person with any person other
than such first spouse shall be
illegal
and
void
from
its
performance, unless:
(1) the first marriage was annulled
or dissolved; or
(2) the first spouse had been
absent for seven consecutive years
at the time of the second marriage
without the spouse present having
news of the absentee being alive,
or if the absentee, though he has
been absent for less than seven
years, is generally considered as
dead and believed to be so by the
spouse present at the time of
contracting
such
subsequent
marriage, or if the absentee is
presumed
dead
according
to
articles 390 and 391. The marriage
so contracted shall be valid in any
of the three cases until declared
null and void by a competent court.

years. In fact the couple begot a child, in

1961, even before their marriage in 1962.
Consequently, there is no basis for holding
that the property in question was property
of the conjugal partnership of Luisita and
the late Aurelio because there was no
such partnership in the first place.
The sale to petitioner must be presumed.
Petitioners ownership is evidenced by a
deed of absolute sale executed with all the
solemnity of a public document and by
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 326681
issued in due course in her name.
Indeed, the property in question was
acquired by Aurelio during a long period of
cohabitation with petitioner which lasted
for twenty years (1968-1988). While
petitioner knew respondent Chito to be
Aurelios son way back in 1976, there is
nothing to show that she knew Aurelio to
be married to Luisita. To the contrary,
Aurelio represented himself to be single.
As far as petitioner was concerned, Chito
could have been Aurelios child by a
woman not his wife. There was, therefore,
no basis for the Court of Appeals ruling
that Nenita was not a buyer in good faith
of the property because she ought to have
known that Aurelio was married to Luisita.

In the case at bar, the burden of proof was

on respondents to show that Luisita and
Aurelios marriage falls under any of these
exceptions in order to be considered valid.
They failed to discharge this burden.
Instead the contrary appears.
It has been held that the first exception
refers to the subsequent marriage of the
abandoned spouse and not the remarriage
of the deserting spouse, after the period of
seven years had lapsed. This exception
cannot be invoked in this case in order to
sustain the validity of Aurelios marriage
to Luisita because apparently it was
Aurelio who had left his first wife. At the
time of his second marriage to Luisita, he
and Luisita had already been living
together as husband and wife for five

SSS vs. Jarque G.R. No. 165545 March

24, 2006

Issue: Mere appearance of the absent

spouse declared presumptively dead
automatically terminates the subsequent
marriage.

Facts of the Case: In 1955 Clemente

Bailon and Alice Diaz married in
Barcelona, Sorsogon. 15+ years later,
Clemente filed an action to declare the
presumptive death of Alice she being an
absentee. The petition was granted in
1970. In 1983, Clemente married Jarque.
The two live together until Clementes
death in 1998. Jarque then sought to claim
her husbands SSS benefits and the same
were granted her. On the other hand, a
certain Cecilia Bailon-Yap who claimed that
she is the daughter of Bailon to a certain
Elisa Jayona petitioned before the SSS that
they be given the reimbursement for the
funeral spending for it was actually them
who shouldered the burial expenses of
Clemente. They further claim that
Clemente contracted three marriages; one
with Alice, another with Elisa and the
other with Jarque. Cecilia also averred that
Alice is alive and kicking and Alice
subsequently emerged; Cecilia claimed
that Clemente obtained the declaration of
Alices presumptive death in bad faith for
he was aware of the whereabouts of Alice
or if not he could have easily located her
in her parents place.

She was in Sorsogon all along in her

parents place. She went there upon
learning that Clemente had been having
extra-marital affairs. SSS then ruled that
Jarque should reimburse what had been
granted her and to return the same to
Cecilia since she shouldered the burial
expenses and that the benefits should go
to Alice because her reappearance had
terminated Clementes marriage with
Jarque. Further, SSS ruled that the RTCs
decision in declaring Alice to be
presumptively death is erroneous. Teresita
appealed the decision of the SSS before
the Social Security Commission and the
SSC affirmed SSS. The CA however ruled
the contrary.

Decision: There is no previous marriage

to restore for it is terminated upon
Clementes death. Likewise there is no

subsequent marriage to terminate for the

same is terminated upon Clementes
death. SSS is correct in ruling that it is
futile for Alice to pursue the recording of
her reappearance before the local civil
registrar through an affidavit or a court
action. But it is not correct for the SSS to
rule upon the declaration made by the
RTC. The SSC or the SSS has no judicial
power to review the decision of the RTC.
SSS is indeed empowered to determine as
to who should be the rightful beneficiary
of the benefits obtained by a deceased
member in case of disputes but such
power does not include the appellate
power to review a court decision or
declaration. In the case at bar, the RTC
ruling is binding and Jarques marriage to
Clemente is still valid because no affidavit
was filed by Alice to make known her
reappearance legally. Alice reappeared
only after Clementes death and in this
case she can no longer file such an
affidavit; in this case the bad faith [or
good faith] of Clemente can no longer be
raised the marriage herein is considered
voidable and must be attacked directly not
collaterally it is however impossible for a
direct attack since there is no longer a
marriage to be attacked for the same has
been terminated upon Clementes death.

G. 1 (c) Subsequent marriage, upon

reappearance
of
absent
spouse:
Procedure
Republic of the Philippines vs. Yolanda
Cadacio Granada
G.R
NO.
187512
June 13, 2012
Facts:

Rule 45 Petition seeking the reversal of

Resolution (Jan.23,2009 & Apr. 9, 2009)
issued by the Court of Appeals who
affirmed the decision by the Regional Trial
Court of Petition for Declaraton of
presumptive death of the absent husband
of Yolanda Granada (respondent).
The antecedent facts:

In May 1991, Yolanda met Cyrus Granada

at
Sumida
Electric
Philippines,
an
electronics
company
situated
in
Paranaque where both were working. The
two got married in Manila City Hall on Mar.
3, 1993. They had a son after named
Cyborg Dean Cadacio Granada.
In May 1994, Cyrus went to Taiwan to seek
for employment when Sumida closed
down. After Yolandas husband went there,
she was not able to communicate with him
ever again with all efforts made to locate
him. Yolandas brother testified that he
went to relatives of Cyrus to ask of his
whereabouts but failed to locate him as
well.
After nine years, Yolanda filed a petition to
declare Cyrus presumptively dead.
The petition was presided by Judge Avelino
Demetriaof RTC Lipa City and on Feb. 7,
2005, RTC ruled a decision declaring Cyrus
as presumptively dead.
On March 10, 2005, petitioner represented
by Office of the Solicitor General filed a
motion for reconsideration on the gorunds
that Yolanda failed to earnestly locate
Cyrus and failed to prove a well-founded
belief that Cyrus was in fact, dead. In June
29, 2007, RTC denied the motion.
Petitioner then filed a notice of Appeal to
elevate the case to the Court of Appeals in
accordance with Rule 41, Section 2(a) of
the Rules of Court but Yolanda filed a
motion to dismiss on the grounds that the
CA has no jurisdiction over the appeal
sought by petitioner. She contends that
according to Article 41 of the Family Code,
the Petition for Declaration of Presumptive
Death was a judicial proceeding, in which
rendered judgment is immediately final
and executory thus, is not appealable.
In Jan. 23,2009 resolution, Court of
Appeals granted Yolandas motion to
dismiss based on the case of Republic vs.
Bermudez-Lorino and ruled that a petition
for declaration of presumptive death
under Art. 41 of the Family Code is a
summary proceeding. Judgment therefore,

is immediately final and executor upon

notice to parties.
Petitioner
filed
for
a
motion
for
reconsideration but was denied by
appellate court through a resolution dated
April 3, 2009.

Issue:
1. W/N the CA seriously erred in dismissing
the Petition on the ground that the
Decision of the RTC in a summary
proceeding
for
the
declaration
of
presumptive death is immediatiately final
and executor upon notice to the parties
and, hence, is not subject to ordinary
appeal
2. W/N the CA seriously erred in affirming the
RTCs grant of the Petition for Declaration
of Presumptive Death under Article 41 of
the Family Code based on the evidence
that respondent presented.
Ratio:
1. No. The Court affirms with the decision of
CA. Art. 41 providesA marriage contracted by any person
during the subsistence of a previous
marriage shall be null and void, unless
before the celebration of the subsequent
marriage, the prior spouse had been
absent for four consecutive years and the
spouse present has a wel-founded belief
that the absent spouse was already dead,
In case of disappearance where there is
danger of death under the circumstances
set forth in the provisions of Article 391 of
the Civil Code, an absence of only two
years shall be sufficient.
For the purpose of contracting the
subsequent marriage under the preceding
paragraph the spouse present must
institute a summary proceeding as
provided in this code for the declaration of
presumptive death of the absentee,

without prejudice to the effect

reappearance of the absent spouse.

of

The article has clearly stated that Art. 41

of The Family Code is a summary
proceeding. Under now the provisions of
summary proceedings in Title XI of the
Family
Code:
Summary
Judicial
Proceedings in the Family Law, on Art. 238
and Art. 247:
Art. 238 Until modified by the Supreme
Court, the procedural rules in this Title
shall apply in all cases provided for in this
Code
requiring
summary
court
proceedings, such cases shall be decided
in an expeditious manner without regard
to technical rules.
Art. 247 The judgment of the court shall
be immediately be final and executory.
In Art. 453 of The Family Code, it provides:
Art. 253 The foregoing rules in Chapters 2
and 3 hereof shall likewise govern
summary proceedings filed under Articles
41,51,69,73,96,124,and 217, insofar as
they are applicable.
Connecting all the provisions together, the
petition for declaration of presumptive
death is a summary proceeding and
therefore, judgment of the court shall
immediately be final and executory.
For us to be guided accordingly, the
Supreme Court cited different cases and
explained each that can be used for future
reference.
In Republic vs. Bermudez-Lorino: Republic
also appealed the CAs affirmation to
decision of RTC for the same petition.
Court held that it was an error for Republic
to file a Notice of Appeal because in
Summary proceedings under the Family
Code, there is no reglementary period to
prepare for an appeal because according
to Art. 247, summary proceedings are final
and executory.

In Republic vs. Jomoc (which petitioner

contends that superseded the previous
case): The Supreme Court does not think
the same and explained that they
reversed the ruling of RTC and CA on not
allowing the petition for an appeal
because an action for declaration of death
of absence under Rule 72, Sec. 1, (m) is
under a category of special proceedings
and is not under art. 41 which is a
summary proceeding.
In Republic vs. Tango: The Supreme Court
settled the rule regarding appeals invoking
the same under Art. 41 of the Family Code
that it is final and executory. However, the
losing party in a summary proceeding for
the declaration of presumptive death may
file a petition for certiorati with the CA on
the ground that, in rendering judgment
thereon, the trial court committed grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
jurisdiction. From the decision of the CA,
the aggrieved party may elevate the
matter to this Court via a petition for
review on certiorari under Rule 45.
At the case at bar, it is evident that the CA
did not commit any grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction
and is not therefore, subject to ordinary
appeal.
2.

No. The Supreme Court has taken

into consideration the argument of
the petitioner is constrained to
deny the petition. The petitioner
argued that respondent did not put
all efforts in finding her husband.
They argued that Yolanda would
have gone to the Taiwanese
Consular office to inquire about her
husbands whereabouts or would
have sought the mass media in
acquiring
the
same.
Also,
testimonies were given only by her
brother and relatives of her
husband were not present to
testify. The Court has considered
this but invoked that when the RTC
rendered
its
judgment,
the
summary
proceeding
was
immediately considered final and
executory.

Held:
Resolutions of CA are hereby affirmed.
Chi Ming Tsoi v. CA
G.R. No. 119190

the defendant using an eyebrow pencil

and sometimes the cleansing cream of his
mother.
he married her, a Filipino citizen, to
acquire or maintain his residency status
here in the country and to publicly
maintain the appearance of a normal man.
> She is not willing to reconcile with her
husband.

Jan. 16, 1997

> Defendants claim: he does not want
his marriage with his wife annulled
because...
> May 22, 1988 - they got married at the
Manila
Cathedral,
evidenced
by
a
marriage contract, followed by a reception
at South Villa in Makati.

> For the first night of their married life,

they proceeded to the house of the
defendants mother, slept together on the
same bed. Contrary to the plaintiffs
expectation that as newlyweds, they were
supposed to enjoy making love, the
defendant just went to bed, slept on one
side thereof, then turned his back and
went to sleep. The same thing happened
on the second, third and fourth nights,
even when they went to Baguio City.

> January 20, 1989 - because of what

happened they submitted themselves for
medical examinations to Dr. Eufemio
Macalalag, a urologist at the Chinese
General Hospital.The results of their
physical examinations were that she is
healthy, normal, still a virgin and no
medication prescribed, while that of her
husbands examination and prescribed
medication were kept confidential up to
this time. Her husband was asked by the
doctor to return but he never did.

he loves her very much

he has no defect on his part and he is
physically and psychologically capable
since the relationship is still very young
and if there is any differences between the
two of them, it can still be reconciled and
that, according to him, if either one of
them has some incapabilities, there is no
certainty that this will not be cured
if there is any defect, it can be cured by
the intervention of medical technology or
science
> He also admitted that: everytime he
wants to have sexual intercourse with his
wife, she always avoided him and when he
forced his wife to have sex with him only
once but he did not continue because she
was shaking and she did not like it. So he
stopped.
> Also, according to him , the reasons why
she filed this case against him are:
she is afraid that she will be forced to
return the pieces of jewelry of his mother
her
husband,
the
defendant,
will
consummate their marriage.
> The defendant submitted himself to a
physical examination. His penis was
examined by Dr. Sergio Alteza, Jr., for the
purpose of finding out whether he is
impotent.
> Petitioner appealed in SC with the
following arguments:

> Petitioners claim: her husband is...

impotent
a closet homosexual as he did not show
his penis. She said, that she had observed

CA erred in affirming the conclusions of

the lower court that there was no sexual

intercourse between the parties without

making any findings of fact.
in holding that the refusal of private
respondent to have sexual communion
with
petitioner
is
a
psychological
incapacity inasmuch as proof thereof is
totally absent.
in holding that the alleged refusal of both
the petitioner and the private respondent
to have sex with each other constitutes
psychological incapacity of both.
in affirming the annulment of the marriage
between the parties decreed by the lower
court without fully satisfying itself that
there was no collusion between them.
SC DECISION:
affirmed.

with another. Indeed, no man is an island,

the cruelest act of a partner in marriage is
to say I could not have cared less. This
is so because an ungiven self is an
unfulfilled self. The egoist has nothing but
himself. In the natural order, it is sexual
intimacy which brings spouses wholeness
and oneness. Sexual intimacy is a gift and
a participation in the mystery of creation.
It is a function which enlivens the hope of
procreation and ensures the continuation
of family relations.
Republic vs. CA and Molina
G.R. No. 108763 February 13, 1997

CAs assailed decision is

FACTS:

The abnormal reluctance or unwillingness

to consummate his marriage is strongly
indicative of a serious personality disorder
which to the mind of the Supreme Court
clearly demonstrates an utter insensitivity
or inability to give meaning and
significance tot the marriage within the
meaning of Article 36 of the Family Code.

Evidently, one of the essential marital

obligations under the Family Code is To
procreate children based on the universal
principle that procreation of children
through sexual cooperation is the basic
end of marriage. Constant non-fulfillment
of this obligation will finally destroy the
integrity or wholeness of the marriage. In
the case at bar, the senseless and
protracted refusal of one of the parties to
fulfill the above marital obligation is
equivalent to psychological incapacity.

While the law provides that the husband

and the wife are obliged to live together,
observe mutual love, respect and fidelity.
(Art. 68, Family Code), the sanction
therefor is actually the spontaneous,
mutual affection between husband and
wife and not any legal mandate or court
order. Love is useless unless it is shared

The case at bar challenges the decision of

CA affirming the marriage of the
respondent Roridel Molina to Reynaldo
Molina void in the ground of psychological
incapacity. The couple got married in
1985, after a year, Reynaldo manifested
signs of immaturity and irresponsibility
both as husband and a father preferring to
spend more time with friends whom he
squandered his money, depends on his
parents for aid and assistance and was
never honest with his wife in regard to
their finances. In 1986, the couple had an
intense quarrel and as a result their
relationship was estranged. Roridel quit
her work and went to live with her parents
in Baguio City in 1987 and a few weeks
later, Reynaldo left her and their child.
Since then he abandoned them.
ISSUE: Whether or not the marriage is void
on the ground of psychological incapacity.
HELD:
The marriage between Roridel and
Reynaldo subsists and remains valid.
What constitutes psychological incapacity
is not mere showing of irreconcilable
differences and confliction personalities. It
is indispensable that the parties must

exhibit inclinations which would not meet

the essential marital responsibilites and
duties due to some psychological illness.
Reynaldos action at the time of the
marriage
did
not
manifest
such
characteristics
that
would
comprise
grounds for psychological incapacity. The
evidence shown by Roridel merely showed
that she and her husband cannot get
along with each other and had not shown
gravity of the problem neither its juridical
antecedence nor its incurability.
In
addition, the expert testimony by Dr Sison
showed no incurable psychiatric disorder
but only incompatibility which is not
considered as psychological incapacity.

The following are the guidelines as to the

grounds of psychological incapacity laid
set forth in this case:

burden of proof to show nullity

belongs to the plaintiff

root causes of the incapacity must

be medically and clinically inclined

such incapacity should be in

existence at the time of the
marriage

such incapacity must be grave so

as to disable the person in
complying with the essentials of
marital obligations of marriage

such incapacity must be embraced

in Art. 68-71 as well as Art 220,
221 and 225 of the Family Code

decision
of
the
National
Matrimonial Appellate Court or the
Catholic Church must be respected

court shall order the prosecuting

attorney and the fiscal assigned to
it to act on behalf of the state.

Brenda Marcos v Wilson Marcos

G.R. No. 136490
October 19, 2000
Topic: Psychological Incapacity

Facts:

Both Wilson and Brenda

worked for the military. They met
each other when they were
assigned at the Malacanang Palace.
Brenda worked as an escort for
Imee Marcos while Wilson worked
for
President
Marcos
as
a
presidential
guard.
Through
telephone
conversations,
they
became acquainted and eventually
got married.

After the downfall of the

Marcos regime, Wilson engaged in
different business ventures that did
not however prosper, rendering
him unemployed. Due to his
unemployment, they would often
quarrel and as a consequence,
Wilson would inflict physical harm
to Brenda and his children and
sometimes force her to have sex
with him. As a result, they lived
separately in 1992.

As
they
were
living
separately, one day Brenda saw
Wilson
in
her
house
which
prompted the former to be angry
that she lambasted him. Wilson
then turned violent and inflicted
physical harm on Brenda and her
mother who came to her aid. The
following day after the incident,
she sought refuge in her sisters
house.

Brenda filed before the RTC a

petition for declaration of nullity of
her marriage on the ground of
psychological incapacity on the
part of Wilson. The RTC ruled in
favour of Brenda, declaring the
marriage void ab initio due to
psychological incapacity because
of Wilsons failure to find work to
support his family and his violent
attitude towards Brenda and their
children.

However, the CA reversed

the decision of the RTC stating that
psychological incapacity had not
been established by the totality of
the evidence because Wilson did
not subject himself to psychological
evaluation. That it was not

medically or clinically proven by

experts and clearly explained in the
decision.
Issues:
1.
Whether or not the CA erred
in setting aside the RTC decision
simply because Wilson did not
subject himself to psychological
evaluation
2.
Whether or not the totality
of evidence presented should be
the determination of the merits of
the Petition for declaration of
nullity
Held:
1.
Yes.
Psychological
incapacity may be established by
the totality of the evidence
presented.
There
is
no
requirement, however, that the
respondent should be examined by
a physician or a psychologist as a
condition sine qua non for such
declaration.
In this case, Brenda had no choice
but to rely on other sources of
information in order to determine
the psychological incapacity of
Wilson, who had refused to submit
himself
to
such
tests.
The
guidelines promulgated in the case
of Molina do not require that a
physician examine the person to be
declared
psychologically
incapacitated. If the totality of
evidence presented is enough to
sustain a finding of psychological
incapacity, then actual medical
examination
of
the
person
concerned need not be resorted to.
2.
No. The acts of Wilson does
not lead to a conclusion of
psychological incapacity on his
part. There was absolutely no
showing that his defects were
already present at the celebration
of the marriage or that it is
incurable. His behaviour can be
attributed to the fact that he was
unemployed and that this was the
period that he failed to perform his
marital obligations and not at the
inception of the marriage.

At the best, Brendas evidence

refers only to ground for legal
separation and not for declaring a
marriage
void.

REPUBLIC
OF
THE
PHILIPPINES,
Petitioner, versus ERLINDA MATIAS
DAGDAG, Respondent
2/9/2001, Quisumbing
TOPIC: Psychological Incapacity under FC
36
PETITION: Review on certiorari on CA
decision (4/22/1993) which affirmed RTC
Olongapo decision declaring the marriage
of Erlinda Matias Dagdag and Avelino
Dagdag void under Art 36 of the FC
FACTS
A week after the marriage of
Erlinda (16yo) and Avelino (20yo)
at Iglesia Filipina Independent
Church in Cuyapo, Nueva Ecija on
Sept 7, 1975, Avelino started
leaving
his
family
without
explanation
o Avelino would disappear for
months then reappear a few
months wherein he would
always be drunk and forced
his wife to sex or inflict
physical injuries if refused
Oct 1993 (??may typo ata
mga online sources, could
be 1983) was the last time
Avelino left his family
o Erlinda
had
to
be
a
manicurist
to
support
herself and children
o Erlinda learned Avelino was
imprisoned for some crime
and escaped from jail on Oct
22, 1985
July 3, 1990, Erlinda filed
with RTC Ologapon for
judicial declaration of nullity
of marriage on the ground
of psychological incapacity
under Article 36 of the
Family Code
o Summons was served by
publication
in
Olongapo

News since Avelino could

not be located (Sept. 3, 10
& 17, 1990)
On
presentation
of
evidence, Erlinda appeared
with sister-in-law Virginia
Dagdag who testified that
Avelino has been gone for
long
RTC issued an order giving
the Investigating Prosecutor
(IP) up to Jan 2, 1991 to
manifest W/N he would
present
controverting
evidence
Dec 27, 1990, without
waiting
for
the
IPs
manifestation, RTC rendered
marriage void under Art 26
FC
Jan 29, 1991 the IP filed a
motion
to
set
aside
judgment,
that decision
was premature
The OSG likewise filed a
motion for recon that it is
not in accordance with the
evidence of and the law
Denied by RTC (Aug 21,
1991)

That the findings of

facts
are
uncontroverted

That
In rerum
natura, these traits
are manifestations of
lack
of
marital
responsibility
and
appear now to be
incurable.
Nothing
can be graver since
the family members
are now left to fend
for
themselves.
Contrary
to
the
opinion
of
the
Solicitor-General,
these
are
not
common
in
marriage.

The
Solicitor
General
appealed to the Court of
Appeals raising that the

lower court erred that the

psychological incapacity of
the nature contemplated by
the law not having been
proven to exist
However,
CA
affirmed the decision
of RTC
Emotionally
immature
and
irresponsible,
an
alcoholic,
and
a
criminal
Plaintiff is endowed
with right to seek the
nullity
ISSUE
W/N the trial court and the Court of
Appeals correctly declared the marriage as
null and void under Article 36 of the Family
Code, on the ground that the husband
suffers from psychological incapacity as
he
is
emotionally
immature
and
irresponsible, a habitual alcoholic, and a
fugitive from justice
HELD
Whether or not psychological incapacity
exists in a given case calling for
annulment of a marriage, depends
crucially, more than in any field of the law,
on the facts of the case. Each case must
be judged, not on the basis of a priori
assumptions,
predilections
or
generalizations but according to its own
facts. In regard to psychological incapacity
as a ground for annulment of marriage, it
is trite to say that no case is on "all fours"
with another case. The trial judge must
take pains in examining the factual milieu
and the appellate court must, as much as
possible, avoid substituting its own
judgment for that of the trial court.
Republic v Molina guidelines
1. Incapacity must be permanent or
incurable
2. Root
cause
of
psychological
incapacity must be :
1. Medically
or
clinically
identified
2. Alleged in the complaint
1. Sufficiently
proven
by experts

b.
c.
d.
e.
f.

g.

2. Clearly explained in
the decision
Marital obligations refer to Art 6871, 220, 221 and 225 of the FC
Plaintiff has burden of proof
Incapacity proven to be existing at
the time of the celebration of
marriage
Trial
court
must
order
the
prosecuting attorney or fiscal and
the SolGen to appear for the state
Interpretations of the National
Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of
the
Catholic
Church
of
the
Philippines while not controlling
should be given great respect: and
Illness is grave enough to bring
about
disability
to
assume
essential marital obligations
Erlinda failed to comply with
guideline No. 2
The allegation that the husband is
a fugitive from justice was not
sufficiently proven; crime was not
even alleged
Investigating prosec was not given
an
opportunity
to
present
controverting
evidence;
RTCs
decision was prematurely rendered
Hernandez v. Court of Appeals:
o expert testimony should
have been presented to
establish the precise cause
of
private
respondent's
psychological incapacity
o burden of proof to show the
nullity of the marriage rests
upon petitioner
o court is mindful of the policy
of the 1987 Constitution to
protect and strengthen the
family
as
the
basic
autonomous
social
institution and marriage as
the foundation of the family
o any
doubt
should
be
resolved in favor of the
validity of the marriage

- GRANTED, CA decisions is REVERSED

Republic of the
Quintero-Hamano

Philippines vs.

Lolita

Topic:
Kinds
of
void
Psychological Incapacity
Facts:

marriages-

This is petition to review the decision

rendered by the CA affirming the
declaration for nullity of marriage on the
ground of psychological incapacity of the
RTC of Rizal Branch 72.
In October 1986, Lolita and Toshio started
a common-law relationship in Japan. They
later lived in the Philippines where Lolita
gave birth to their child on November
16,1987; 3 months after which, they
celebrated their marriage before Judge
Isauro Balderia . A month after their
marriage, Toshio returned to Japan,
however after sending money for 2
months, stopped communicating with his
wife; this lead respondent to file a
complaint and a motion for the declaration
for nullity of marriage against Toshio.
Due to the impossibility of locating Toshio,
respondent filed for an ex parte motion for
leave to effect service of summons by
publication, however, after the lapse of 60
days after publication, respondent filed a
motion referring the case to the
prosecutor for investigation. Almost a year
after which, the RTC rendered its decision
thereby granting petitioners plea and
declaring the marriage between Lolita and
Toshio as NULL and VOID on the ground
that
Toshio
failed
to
fulfil
his
responsibilities as a husband to Lolita and
a father to their daughter and that such
behaviour could be traced to respondents
mental incapacity. This decision was
appealed by the OSG, representing the
Republic of the Philippines, but said appeal
was denied by the appellate court stating
that manifested thru Toshios acts, he is
psychologically
incapacitated
of
performing his marital obligations as
expressly provided in Article 68 of the
Family Code. The appellate Court likewise
stated that the case cannot be equated to
the cases of PR vs.CA and Molina and
Santos vs CA, for the present case involve
a mixed marriage with a Japanese
husband. Hence, this present appeal
alleging that the CA erred in declaring that
respondent was able to prove Toshios

incapacity mainly because of his act of

abandoning his family and that Lolita
failed to prove the incapacity using the
guidelines set forth by the SC in the case
of Molina.
Issue:
1.
Whether or not the ruling in Molina
and Santos are applicable in the present
case
2.
Whether or not respondent was able
to prove Toshios psychological incapacity
to fulfil his marital obligations.
Ruling: No. Petition GRANTED and the
challenged ruling was SET ASIDE.
1.
First, contrary to the ruling of the
appellate Court that the ruling Molin and
Santos does not apply in the instant case,
the Supreme Court found that no
distinction must be made between
marriages celebrated between foreign and
Filipino spouses.
2.
Second, the SC ruled that although
Toshios act of abandoning his family was
undoubtedly irresponsible, the same
cannot be considered as a valid ground for
the declaration for nullity of marriage for
respondent fell short in satisfying the
guidelines set forth in the case of Molina
and Santos. In addition to this,as ruled in
Molina, it is not enough that to prove that
a spouse failed to meet his responsibility
to fulfil marital obligations; it must also be
shown and proven that such incapability is
because of some psychological and not
physical illness. Hence, respondents
failure to prove the same would lead to
the presumption of validity for the
inviolability of marriage is guaranteed by
no less that the fundamental law of the
land.
[Notes]
Guidelines issued in the case of Republic
of the Philippines vs CA and Molina for the
declaration of nullity on the ground of
Psychological Incapacity
1.
The burden of proof belongs to the
plaintiff and any doubt should be resolved
in favour of the continuation of marriage
2.
Root cause of P.I must be:
a.
Medically identified
b.
Alleged in the complaint
c.
Clearly explained in the decision

3.
Incapacity must be proven to be
existing at the time of the celebration of
marriage.
4.
Incapacity must be medically or
clinically permanent or incurable
5.
Illness must be grave enough to
bring about the disability of the party to
assume the essential marital obligations
6.
That the marital obligations must be
those embraced in Article 68-71 of the
Family Code as well as Article 220,221 and
225 of the same Code.
7.
Interpretations given by the
National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of
the Catholic Church in the Philippines,
while not controlling should be given great
respect by our Courts
8.
Trial Court must order the
prosecuting attorney and the Solicitor
General to appear as counsel of the state.
Guidelines issued in the case of Santos vs
Court of Appeals, which provides that
Psychological
Incapacity
must
be
characterized by:
1.
Gravity
2.
Juridical Antecedence
3.
Incurability
LEONILO ANTONIO Petitioner, vs.
MARIE IVONNE F. REYES, Respondent.
Topic: Psychological Incapacity
155800 March 10, 2006

Facts
-The Petition for Review on Certiorari
assailing the Decision and Resolution of
the Court of Appeals dated 29 November
2001 and 24 October 2002.
-The Court of Appeals had reversed the
judgment of the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
of Makati declaring the marriage of Leonilo
N. Antonio (petitioner) and Marie Ivonne F.
Reyes (respondent), null and void.
- SC reversed and affirmed the trial courts
decision.

-Petitioner and respondent met in August

1989, when petitioner was 26 years old
and respondent was 36 years of age.
- They got married before a minister of the
Gospel at the Manila City Hall, and then a
subsequent church wedding at the Sta.
Rosa de Lima Parish, Bagong Ilog, Pasig,
Metro Manila on
December 6,1990. A
child was born on 19 April 1991, who died
five months later.
Petitioner
-On 8 March 1993, petitioner filed a
petition to have his marriage to
respondent declared null and void, citing
Article 36 of the Family Code alleging that
respondent
was
psychologically
incapacitated to comply with the essential
obligations of marriage. He asserted that
respondent's incapacity existed at the
time their marriage was celebrated and
still subsists up to the present.
-Petitioner
alleges
that
respondent
persistently lied about herself, the people
around her, her occupation, income,
educational attainment and other events
or things, to wit:
(1)
She concealed the fact that she
previously gave birth to an illegitimate
son, and instead introduced the boy to
petitioner as the adopted child of her
family. She only confessed the truth about
the boy's parentage when petitioner
learned about it from other sources after
their marriage.
(2)
She fabricated a story that her
brother-in-law, Edwin David, attempted to
rape and kill her when infact, no such
incident occurred.
(3)
She misrepresented herself as a
psychiatrist to her obstetrician, Dr.
Consuelo Gardiner, and toldsome of her
friends that she graduated with a degree
in psychology, when she was neither.

(4)
She claimed to be a singer or a
free-lance voice talent affiliated with
Blackgold Recording Company(Blackgold);
yet, not a single member of her family
ever witnessed her alleged singing
activities with the group. In the same vein,
she postulated that a luncheon show was
held at the Philippine Village Hotel in her
honor and even presented an invitation to
that effect but petitioner discovered per
certification by the Director of Sales of
said hotel that no such occasion had taken
place.
(5)
She invented friends named Babes
Santos and Via Marquez, and under those
names, sent lengthy letters to petitioner
claiming to be from Blackgold and touting
her as the "number one moneymaker" in
the commercial industry worth P2 million.
Petitioner later found out that respondent
herself was the one who wrote and sent
the letters to him when she admitted the
truth in one of their quarrels. He likewise
realized that Babes Santos and Via
Marquez were only figments of her
imagination when he discovered they were
not known in or connected with Blackgold.
(6)
She represented herself as a
person of greater means, thus, she altered
her payslip to make itappear that she
earned a higher income. She bought a sala
set from a public market but told
petitioner that she acquired it from a
famous furniture dealer. She spent lavishly
on unnecessary items and ended up
borrowing money from other people on
false pretexts.
(7)
She exhibited insecurities and
jealousies over him to the extent of calling
up
his
officemates
tomonitor
his
whereabouts. When he could no longer
take her unusual behavior, he separated
from her in August 1991. He tried to
attempt a reconciliation but since her
behavior did not change, he finally left her
for good in November 1991.

Medical Opinion
-Medical opinion was sought by the
petitioner. He presented Dr. Dante Herrera
Abcede (Dr. Abcede), a psychiatrist, and
Dr. Arnulfo V. Lopez (Dr. Lopez), a clinical
psychologist, who stated, based on the
tests they conducted, that petitioner was
essentially a normal, introspective, shy
and conservative type of person. They
also observed the respondent and her
persistent and constant lying to the
petitioner as that which was abnormal or
pathological, thus, undermining the basic
relationship that should be based on love,
trust and respect. They doctors also stated
that respondent's extreme jealousy was
also pathological such that it has reached
the point of paranoia since there was no
actual basis for her to suspect that
petitioner was having an affair with
another woman. They concluded based on
the foregoing that respondent was
psychologically incapacitated to perform
her essential marital obligations.
Respondents
-Respondent opposed the allegations and
claimed that she performed her marital
obligations by attending to all the needs of
her husband. She asserted that there was
no truth to the allegation that she
fabricated stories, told lies and invented
personalities. She presented her version,
thus:
(1)
She concealed her child by another
man from petitioner because she was
afraid of losing her husband.
(2)
She told petitioner about David's
attempt to rape and kill her because she
surmised such intent fromDavid's act of
touching her back and ogling her from
head to foot.
(3)
She was actually a BS Banking and
Finance graduate and had been teaching

psychology at thePasig Catholic School for

two (2) years.
(4)
She was a free-lance voice talent of
Aris de las Alas, an executive producer of
Channel 9 and shehad done three (3)
commercials with McCann Erickson for the
advertisement of Coca-cola, Johnson &
Johnson, and Traders Royal Bank. She told
petitioner she was a Blackgold recording
artist although she was not under contract
with the company, yet she reported to the
Blackgold office after office hours. She
claimed that a luncheon show was indeed
held in her honor at the Philippine Village
Hotel on 8
December 1979.
(5)
She vowed that the letters sent to
petitioner were not written by her and the
writers thereof were notfictitious. Bea
Marquez Recto of the Recto political clan
was a resident of the United States while
Babes
Santos
was
employed
with
Saniwares.
(6)
She admitted that she called up an
officemate of her husband but averred
that she merely asked the latter in a
diplomatic matter if she was the one
asking for chocolates from petitioner, and
not
to
monitor
her
husband's
whereabouts.
(7)
She belied the allegation that she
spent lavishly as she supported almost ten
people from hermonthly budget of
P7,000.00.
-Respondent argued that apart from her
non-disclosure of a child prior to their
marriage, the other lies attributed to her
by petitioner were mostly hearsay and
unconvincing. Her stance was that the
totality of the evidence presented is not
sufficient for a finding of psychological
incapacity on her part.
Medical Opinion

In addition, respondent presented Dr.

Antonio Efren Reyes (Dr. Reyes), a
psychiatrist, to refute the allegations
about her psychological condition. Dr.
Reyes testified that the series of tests
conducted by his assistant, together with
the
screening procedures
and the
Comprehensive Psycho-Pathological Rating
Scale (CPRS) he himself conducted, led
him to conclude that respondent was not
psychologically incapacitated to perform
the essential marital obligations. He
postulated that regressive behavior, gross
neuroticism, psychotic tendencies, and
poor control of impulses, which are signs
that might point to the presence of
disabling trends, were not elicited from
respondent.
In rebuttal, Dr. Lopez stated that there
were flaws in the evaluation conducted by
Dr. Reyes because he was not the one who
administered and interpreted respondent's
psychological evaluation, and that he
made use of only one instrument called
CPRS which was not reliable because a
good liar can fake the results of such test.
Annulment by the Catholic Church
-The
Metropolitan
Tribunal
of
the
Archdiocese of Manila annulled the
Catholic marriage of the parties on the
ground of lack of due discretion on the
part of the parties. During the pendency of
the appeal before the Court of Appeals,
the Metropolitan Tribunal's ruling was
affirmed with modification by both the
National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal,
which held instead that only respondent
was impaired by a lack of due discretion.
Subsequently, the decision of the National
Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal was upheld
by the Roman Rota of the Vatican.
CA still reversed RTCs judgment.
Facts of the case as presented by
petitioner sufficiently meets the standards

set for the declaration of nullity of a

marriage under Article 36 of the Family
Code. These standards were definitively
laid down in the Court's 1997 ruling in
Republic v. Court of Appeals[44] (also
known as the Molina case[45]), and indeed
the Court of Appeals cited the Molina
guidelines in reversing the RTC in the case
at bar. Since Molina was decided in 1997,
the Supreme Court has yet to squarely
affirm the declaration of nullity of
marriage under Article 36 of the Family
Code.
Legal Guides to Understanding Article
36 (Legal Premises used by the Court
in Deciding the Case)
-Beginning with Santos v. Court of
Appeals wherein the Court acknowledged
that "psychological incapacity should refer
to no less than a mental (not physical)
incapacity that causes a party to be truly
incognitive
of
the
basic
marital
covenants that concomitantly must be
assumed and discharged by the parties to
the marriage.
-This was affirmed in the Molina case
wherein it states that psychological
incapacity pertains to the inability to
understand the obligations of marriage, as
opposed to a mere inability to comply with
them.
The Court further observes that ,the
evidence [to establish psychological
incapacity] must convince the court that
the parties, or one of them, was mentally
or psychically ill to such extent that the
person could not have known the
obligations he was assuming, or knowing
them, could not have given valid
assumption thereto. Jurisprudence since
then has recognized that psychological
incapacity "is a malady so grave and
permanent as to deprive one of awareness
of the duties and responsibilities of the

matrimonial bond one is about to assume.In Republic v. Dagdag:

Whether or not psychological incapacity
exists in a given case calling for
annulment of a marriage, depends
crucially, more than in any field of the law,
on the facts of the case. Each case must
be judged, not on the basis of a priori
assumptions,
predilections
or
generalizations but according to its own
facts. In regard to psychological incapacity
as a ground for annulment of marriage, it
is trite to say that no case is on "all fours"
with another case. The trial judge must
take pains in examining the factual milieu
and the appellate court must, as much as
possible, avoid substituting its own
judgment for that of the trial court
-The Court also cited Sections 1 and 2,
Article XV of the Constitution, which
respectively
state
that
"the
State
recognizes the Filipino family as the
foundation of the nation. Accordingly, it
shall strengthen its solidarity and actively
promote its total development," and that
"marriage,
as
an
inviolable
social
institution, is the foundation of the family
and shall be protected by the State."
These provisions highlight the importance
of the family and the constitutional
protection accorded to the institution of
marriage.
-Indeed, Article 36 of the Family Code,
in classifying marriages contracted by a
psychologically incapacitated person as a
nullity, should be deemed as an
implement of this constitutional protection
of marriage. Given the avowed State
interest in promoting marriage as the
foundation of the family, which in turn
serves as the foundation of the nation,
there is a corresponding interest for the
State to defend against marriages illequipped to promote family life. Void ab
initio marriages under Article 36 do not
further the initiatives of the State

concerning marriage and family, as they

promote wedlock among persons who, for
reasons independent of their will, are not
capacitated to understand or comply with
the essential obligations of marriage.
Molina Guidelines As Applied in This
Case
The Court has consistently applied Molina
since its promulgation in 1997, and the
guidelines therein operate as the general
rules. They warrant citation in full:
1)
The burden of proof to show the
nullity of the marriage belongs to the
plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in
favor of the existence and continuation of
the marriage and against its dissolution
and nullity. This is rooted in the fact that
both our Constitution and our laws cherish
the validity of marriage and unity of the
family. Thus, our Constitution devotes an
entire Article on the Family, recognizing it
"as the foundation of the nation." It
decrees marriage as legally "inviolable,"
thereby protecting it from dissolution at
the whim of the parties. Both the family
and marriage are to be "protected"' by the
state.
The Family Code echoes this constitutional
edict on marriage and the family and
emphasizes their permanence, inviolability
and solidarity.
2)
The root cause of the psychological
incapacity must be: (a) medically or
clinically identified, (b) alleged in the
complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by
experts and (d) clearly explained in the
decision. Article 36 of the Family Code
requires that the incapacity must be
psychological-not physical, although its
manifestations and/or symptoms may be
physical. The evidence must convince the
court that the parties, or one of them, was
mentally or psychically ill to such an
extent that the person could not have
known the obligations he was assuming,

or knowing them, could not have given

valid assumption thereof. Although no
example of such incapacity need be given
here so as not to limit the application of
the provision under the principle of
ejusdem generis, nevertheless such root
cause
must
be
identified
as
a
psychological illness and its incapacitating
nature fully explained. Expert evidence
may be given by qualified psychiatrists
and clinical psychologists.
3)
The incapacity must be proven to
be existing at "the time of the celebration"
of the marriage. The evidence must show
that the illness was existing when the
parties exchanged their "I do's." The
manifestation of the illness need not be
perceivable at such time, but the illness
itself must have attached at such
moment, or prior thereto.
4)
Such incapacity must also be
shown to be medically or clinically
permanent or incurable. Such incurability
may be absolute or even relative only in
regard to
the
other spouse,
not
necessarily absolutely against everyone of
the
same
sex.
Furthermore,
such
incapacity must be relevant to the
assumption of marriage obligations, not
necessarily to those not related to
marriage, like the exercise of a profession
or employment in a job. Hence, a
pediatrician
may
be
effective
in
diagnosing illnesses of children and
prescribing medicine to cure them but not
be
psychologically
capacitated
to
procreate, bear and raise his/her own
children as an essential obligation of
marriage.
5)
Such illness must be grave enough
to bring about the disability of the party to
assume the essential obligations of
marriage. Thus, "mild characteriological
peculiarities, mood changes, occasional
emotional outbursts" cannot be accepted
as root causes. The illness must be shown

as downright incapacity or inability, not a

refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill
will. In other words, there is a natal or
supervening disabling factor in the person,
an adverse integral element in the
personality structure that effectively
incapacitates the person from really
accepting and thereby complying with the
obligations essential to marriage.
6)
The essential marital obligations
must be those embraced by Articles 68 up
to 71 of the Family Codeas regards the
husband and wife as well as Articles 220,
221 and 225 of the same Code in regard
to parents and their children. Such noncomplied marital obligation(s) must also
be stated in the petition, proven by
evidence and included in the text of the
decision.
7)
Interpretations
given
by
the
National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of
the Catholic Church in the Philippines,
while not controlling or decisive, should be
given great respect by our courts. It is
clear that Article 36 was taken by the
Family Code Revision Committee from
Canon 1095 of the New Code of Canon
Law, which became effective in 1983 and
which provides:
"The following are incapable of contracting
marriage: Those who are unable to
assume the essential obligations of
marriage due to causes of psychological
nature."
Since the purpose of including such
provision in our Family Code is to
harmonize our civil laws with the religious
faith of our people, it stands to reason that
to achieve such harmonization, great
persuasive weight should be given to
decisions of such appellate tribunal.
Ideally-subject to our law on evidencewhat is decreed as canonically invalid
should also be decreed civilly void.

Molina had provided for an additional

requirement that the Solicitor General
issue a certification stating his reasons for
his agreement or opposition to the
petition. This requirement however was
dispensed
with
following
the
implementation of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC,
or the Rule on Declaration of Absolute
Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of
Voidable Marriages. Still, Article 48 of the
Family
Code
mandates
that
the
appearance of the prosecuting attorney or
fiscal assigned be on behalf of the State to
take steps to prevent collusion between
the parties and to take care that evidence
is not fabricated or suppressed. Obviously,
collusion is not an issue in this case,
considering
the
consistent
vigorous
opposition of respondent to the petition for
declaration of nullity. In any event, the
fiscal's participation in the hearings before
the trial court is extant from the records of
this case.
The Court finds that the present case
sufficiently satisfies the guidelines in
Molina.
First. Petitioner had sufficiently overcome
his burden in proving the psychological
incapacity of his spouse.
Second. The root cause of respondent's
psychological
incapacity
has
been
medically or clinically identified, alleged in
the complaint, sufficiently proven by
experts, and clearly explained in the trial
The trial court itself accepted the veracity
of petitioner's factual premises, there is no
cause to dispute the conclusion of
psychological incapacity drawn therefrom
by petitioner's expert witnesses.

Third.
Respondent's
psychological
incapacity was established to have clearly
existed at the time of and even before the
celebration of marriage. She fabricated

friends and made up letters from fictitious

characters well before she married
petitioner. Likewise, she kept petitioner in
the dark about her natural child's real
parentage as she only confessed when the
latter had found out the truth after their
marriage.
Fourth. The gravity of respondent's
psychological incapacity is sufficient to
prove her disability to assume the
essential obligations of marriage. A person
unable to distinguish between fantasy and
reality would similarly be unable to
comprehend the legal nature of the
marital bond, much less its psychic
meaning,
and
the
corresponding
obligations attached to marriage, including
parenting. One unable to adhere to reality
cannot be expected to adhere as well to
any legal or emotional commitments.
Fifth. Respondent is evidently unable to
comply
with
the
essential
marital
obligations as embraced by Articles 68 to
71 of the Family Code. Article 68, in
particular, enjoins the spouses to live
together, observe mutual love, respect
and fidelity, and render mutual help and
support. As noted by the trial court, it is
difficult to see how an inveterate
pathological liar would be able to commit
to the basic tenets of relationship between
spouses based on love, trust and respect.
Sixth. The Court of Appeals clearly erred
when it failed to take into consideration
the fact that the marriage of the parties
was annulled by the Catholic Church. Such
deliberate ignorance is in contravention of
Molina, which held that interpretations
given
by
the
National
Appellate
Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic
Church in the Philippines, while not
controlling or decisive, should be given
great respect by our courts.
Seventh. The final point of contention is
the requirement in Molina that such

psychological incapacity be shown to be

medically or clinically permanent or
incurable. Petitioner points out that one
month after he and his wife initially
separated, he returned to her, desiring to
make their marriage work. However,
respondent's aberrant behavior remained
unchanged, as she continued to lie,
fabricate stories, and maintained her
excessive jealousy. From this fact, he
draws the conclusion that respondent's
condition is incurable.
The Court decides these cases on legal
reasons and not vapid sentimentality.
Marriage, in legal contemplation, is more
than the legitimatization of a desire of
people in love to live together.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED.
The decision of the RTC dated 10 August
1995, declaring the marriage between
petitioner and respondent NULL and
VOID under Article 36 of the Family Code,
is REINSTATED. No costs.

Republic v Tanyag-San Jose

Topic: Psychological incapacity under FC
36
FACTS:
Manolito San Jose and Laila Tanyag-San
Jose married in 1988 and had two children.
o Nine years, the couple stayed with
Manolitos parents. He was jobless and
was hooked
to gambling and drugs. She sold fish at
the wet market of Taguig. On August 20,
1998,

of psychological incapacity.
Testifying for Laila, Dr. Nedy Tayag, a
clinical psychologist at the National Center
for Mental
Health,
declared
that
from
the
psychological test and clinical interview
she conducted on Laila,
she found Manolito, whom she did not
personally examine, to be psychologically
incapacitated
to perform the duties of a husband.
RTC denied Lalilas petition. CA reversed
RTCs decision.
ISSUE: W/N Manolitos alleged defects
constutite psychological incapacity.
HELD: No
Petitioners portrayal of respondent as
jobless and irresponsible is not enough. As
the Supreme Court
said in the Molina case It is not enough to
prove that the parties failed to meet their
responsibilities
and duties as married persons; it is
essential that they must be shown to be
incapable of doing so, due
to some
illness."

psychological

(not

physical)

Dr. Tayags Psychological Report does not

even show that the alleged anti-social
personality disorder
of Manolito was already present at the
inception of the marriage or that it is
incurable. Neither does

Laila left Manolito and transferred to her

parents house.

it explain the incapacitating nature of the

alleged disorder nor identify its root cause.
It merely states

o March 9, 1999, Laila filed a Petition for

Declaration of Nullity of Marriage on the
ground

that "[s]uch disorder is considered to be

grave and is deeply [immersed] within the
system [and]


continues to influence the individual until
the later stage of life."
The term "psychological incapacity" to be
a ground for the nullity of marriage under
Article 36 of the
Family Code, refers to a serious
psychological illness afflicting a party even
before the celebration of
the marriage.
CA decision set aside.
FACTS:

On January 29, 1989, petitioner

Manuel and respondent Leonida
were married, and had three
children
o Manuel and Leonida are
both medical practitioners,
an
anesthesiologist
and
pediatrician, respectively
After 11 years of marriage, Leonida
filed with the RTC of Las Pinas a
petition to annul their marriage on
the ground that Manuel was
psychologically incapacitated to
perform his marital obligations
o She alleges that in the
public eye, Manuel was the
perfect picture of a husband
and father but that was not
the case in their private life
She
describes
Manuel as a harsh
disciplinarian,
unreasonably
meticulous,
and
easily angered
Manuels
unreasonable way of
imposing
discipline
on their children was
the cause of their
frequent fights as a
couple
She says this is in
stark contrast to the
affection Manuel has
for his mother

She also says that

her
husband
is
homosexual and that
he concealed it from
her
She
caught
him
in
a
indiscreet
telephone
conversation
manifesting
his affection
for a male
caller
She
also
found several
pornographic
homosexual
materials
in
his
possession
Furthermore
she
saw
Manuel
kiss
another man,
a certain Dr.
Nogales,
on
the lips
o When
she
confro
nted
him
about
it, he
denied
everyt
hing
Thi
s
bro
ug
ht
her
to
tak
e
her
chil
dre
n
wit
h
her
an

ISSUE:

d
lea
ve
the
con
jug
al
ho
me
o Since
then,
Manue
l
stoppe
d
giving
suppor
t
to
their
childre
n
Dr. Valentina del Fonso Garcia, a
clinical psychologist, was presented
to prove Leonidas claim
o She
testified
that
she
conducted
evaluative
interviews and psychiatric
tests on Leonida
o She also had a one time
interview with Manuel face
to face
She concluded that
Manuel
is
psychologically
incapacitated
and
such incapacity is
marked
by
antecedence,
existing even before
the marriage and
appeared
to
be
incurable
Manuel countered that the true
cause of Leonidas hostility against
him was their professional rivalry,
Leonidas wife owning a hospital
withing the same area as Manuels
RTC nullified the marriage, not on
the ground of Art 36, but Art 45 of
the FC
CA denied the appeal

WON the marriage between the two can

be declared as null and void due to fraud
by reason of Manuels concealment of his
homosexuality

HELD:

Concealment of homosexuality is
the proper ground to annul a
marriage, not homosexuality per se
It is not proven that Manuel is a
homosexual
o No sufficient proof was
presented to substantiate
the allegations that Manuel
is a homosexual and that he
concealed this to Leonida at
the time of their marriage
The lower court considered the
public perception of Manuels
sexual preference without the
corroboration of witnesses, and
took
cognizance
of
Manuels
peculiarities and interpreted them
against his sexuality
o These mush not be ruled as
indications of his sexuality
as they are not conclusive
and
are
not
sufficient
enough to prove so
Even granting that Manuel is
homosexual, there was nothing in
the complaint or anywhere in the
case was it alleged and proven that
Manuel hid such sexuality from
Leonida and that Leonidas consent
to the marriage had been vitiated
by such

G.R. No. 180668 May 26, 2009

MARIETA C. AZCUETA, Petitioner,
versus
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES AND THE
COURT OF APPEALS,

Respondents

the RTCs decision. However, petitioner

brought before the Supreme Court on a
petition for review on certiorari.

LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.
ISSUE:
FACTS:
Marietta C. Azcueta, the petitioner, and
Rodolfo Azcueta got married on July 24,
1993, less than two months after their first
meeting, at St. Anthony of PaduaChurch,
Antipolo City.
At the time of their
marriage, petitioner was 23 years old
while respondent was 28. They had no
children; thy separated in 1997 after four
years of marriage.
Marietta filed a petition for declaration of
absolute nullity of marriage with Rodolfo
Azcueta before RTC on the ground of
psychological incapacitated. Her husband
was not gainfully employed and never
bothered to look for a job. He just relied on
the allowance given by his mother who
also paid the rentals for the room the
couple lived in.
It was found through the testimony of Dr.
Cecilia Villegas, the psychiatrist presented
by Marietta, that Rodolfo was suffering
from Dependent Personality Disorder
characterized by loss of self-confidence,
constant self-doubt, inability to make his
own decisions and dependency on other
people. She added that the problem began
during the early stages of Rodolfos life
but manifested only after his marriage and
that the problem was severe because he
would not be able take on the
responsibilities of a spouse. Moreover, the
disorder was incurable because it began in
early development and had been deeply
ingrained in his personality. Thus, she
concluded
that
Rodolfo
was
psychologically incapacitated to perform
his marital duties and responsibilities.
RTC subsequently declared that the
marriage void ab initio. However, the
Solicitor General appealed the RTCs
decision since the psychiatric report was
purely based on the information given by
Marietta. The Court of Appeals reversed

W/N
Rodolfo
is
psychologically
incapacitated to justify a declaration that
his marriage to Marrieta is void ab initio
under Article 36 of the Family Code

HELD/RATIO:
YES.
Rodolfo
was
psychologically
incapacitated to perform his marital duties
because of his Dependent Personality
Disorder.

First, petitioner successfully discharged

her burden to prove the psychological
incapacity of her husband. The totality of
evidence presented is adequate to sustain
a finding of psychological incapacity.
Mariettas testimony was corroborated in
material points by Rodolfos close relative,
and supported by the psychiatrists
testimony linking the manifestations of
Rodolfos psychological incapacity and the
psychological disorder itself.

Second, the root cause of Rodolfos

psychological
incapacity
has
been
medically or clinically identified, alleged in
the petition, sufficiently proven by expert
testimony, and clearly explained in the
trial courts decision. As alleged in the
petition, Rodolfo was not gainfully
employed, relied on his mother too much,
had inadequate sexual relations with
Marietta (once a month only as he looked
at sex as being sacred and that he could
not distinguish his wife from the his
mother), and refused to have children.

Third, Rodolfos psychological incapacity

was established to have clearly existed at
the time of and even before the

celebration
of
marriage.
The
manifestations of Rodolfos dependent
personality disorder existed even prior to
the marriage being rooted in his early
development and a by-product of his
upbringing and family life.

Fourth, Rodolfos psychological incapacity

has been shown to be sufficiently grave,
so as to render him unable to assume the
essential obligations of marriage. The fact
that at the time of his marriage to
petitioner, he was nearly 29 years old or
the fact that the expert testimony has
identified a grave clinical or medical cause
for his abnormal behavior cannot be
overlooked.

RULING:
The petition is GRANTED. The Amended
Decision dated July 19, 2005 of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 72, Antipolo
City is REINSTATED.
HALILI v. HALILI
[G.R. No. 165424; June 9, 2009]
PETITIONER: Lester Halili
RESPONDENT: Chona Halili
PONENTE: Corona, J.
LAW: Art. 36, Family Code (FC)

Fifth, Rodolfo is evidently unable to comply

with the essential marital obligations
embodied in Articles 68 to 71 of the Family
Code. Indeed, one who is unable to
support himself, much less a wife; one
who cannot independently make decisions
regarding even the most basic and
ordinary matters.

Sixth,
the
incurability
of Rodolfos
condition which has been deeply ingrained
in his system since his early years was
supported by evidence and duly explained
by the expert witness.

Lastly, it is a settled principle of civil

procedure that the conclusions of the trial
court regarding the credibility of witnesses
are entitled to great respect from the
appellate courts because the trial court
had an opportunity to observe the
demeanor of witnesses while giving
testimony which may indicate their candor
or lack thereof.

Since
Rodolfos
psychologically
incapacitated had been established, the
marriage is void ab initio.

FACTS:
This decision resolves the MR of the April
16, 2008 SC resolution which denied
petitioners petition to set aside CA
decision
(which declared parties marriage as valid)
Petitioner sought to declare his marriage
to respondent null and void due to
psychological incapacity to perform the
essential
obligations of marriage in the RTC Pasig
City
o alleged that he wed respondent in civil
rites thinking that it was a joke
o After the ceremonies, they never lived
together as husband & wife, but
maintained the relationship
o They started fighting constantly a year
later, so petitioner stopped seeing
respondent and started dating other
women
o He received prank calls telling him to
stop dating other women as he was
already a married man

o It was only upon making an inquiry that

he found out that the marriage was not
fake

petitioners expert witness testified that

petitioner was suffering from dependent
personality disorder

RTC declared the marriage null & void

o Te v. Yu-Te: courts should rule on

psychological
incapacity
(for
the
declaration of nullity of a marriage) on a
case-tocase basis guided by experience, expert
findings in psychological disciplines and by
decisions of church tribunals

o found petitioner to be suffering from a

mixed personality disorder (dependent
and self-defeating personality disorder)
o held that petitioners personality
disorder was serious and incurable and
directly affected his capacity to comply
with

o Courts have the burden of making

decisions, but we must still consider as
essential the expert opinion on the

CA reversed and set aside the RTC

decision

Dr. Dayans testimony:

o totality of the evidence presented failed

to establish petitioners psychological
incapacity

o He is suffering from a mixed personality

disorder

from
self-defeating
to
[dependent] personality disorder (grave,

o Petitioners MR was denied

psychological and mental disposition of

the parties

SC affirmed CAs decision

o Petitioner filed MR, reiterating his
arguments that his evidence, especially
the testimony of his expert witness, was
as diagnosed by his expert witness, Dr.
Dayan
his essential
respondent

marital

obligations

to

more than enough to sustain the

conclusion that he was and still is
psychologically incapable of complying
with the
essential obligations of marriage
ISSUE: WON the evidence presented is
enough to declare him as psychologically
incapable of complying with the essential
obligations of marriage
RULING:
YES,
it
is.
Motion
for
Reconsideration GRANTED. Marriage is
NULL & VOID for psychological incapacity.

incurable, and already existent at the time

of the celebration of his marriage)
disorder characterized by a pattern of
dependent and submissive behavior
lack self-esteem and frequently belittle
their capabilities
fear criticism and are easily hurt by
others comments
o evident in the fact that petitioner was
very much attached to his parents and
depended on them for decisions
o allowed himself to be dominated by his
father and, later, by respondent
o brought about by his dysfunctional
family (abusive, domineering father;
unhappy mother; children w/o affirmation)
o he also suffered from partner relational
problem during his marriage with Chona
o His motivation for marriage was very
questionable, as it was a very impulsive,
spur-of-the-moment decision

o He didnt understand what it meant to

be married. After the marriage, there was
no consummation, sexual
o After 3 months, he refused to see or talk
with the respondent and the relationship
died a natural death
o they didnt appreciate the civil [rites
which] they had undergone or even
considered themselves married
personality disorders are long-standing,
inflexible
ways
of
behaving
(as
dysfunctional styles of living). These
disorders affect all
areas of functioning and, beginning in
childhood or adolescence, create problems
for those who display them and for
others.
intercourse, or cohabitation. He never
thought it was a really serious matter at
all.
After 3 months, he refused to see or talk
with the respondent and the relationship
died a natural death
o they didnt appreciate the civil [rites
which] they had undergone or even
considered themselves married
personality disorders are long-standing,
inflexible
ways
of
behaving
(as
dysfunctional styles of living). These
disorders affect all
areas of functioning and, beginning in
childhood or adolescence, create problems
for those who display them and for
others.

Digna Najera vs. Eduardo Najera

G.R. No 164817
July 3, 2009
Topic: Psychological Incapacity
Facts of the case:
On January 27, 1997, petitioner
filed with the RTC a verified Petition for

Declaration of Nullity of Marriage with

Alternative Prayer for Legal Separation,
with Application for Designation as
Administrator Pendente Lite of the
Conjugal Partnership of Gains. In support
of her petition, she claimed:
1.
that at the time of the
celebration of marriage, respondent was
psychologically incapacitated to comply
with the essential marital obligations of
the marriage, and such incapacity became
manifest only after marriage.
2. that at the earlier part of their
married life, she was the only one working
for them. Eduardo was unemployed. That
when respondent became seaman and
while on board a ship, respondent refused
to give support to their family.
3. That when the respondent came
home from abroad, nothing in their life
happened but quarrels and she always
suffered beatings from the respondent.
4. As a seaman, respondent was
away from home from nine to ten months
each year. In May 1989, when he came
home from his ship voyage, he started to
quarrel with petitioner and falsely accused
her of having an affair with another man.
He took to smoking marijuana and tried to
force petitioner into it. When she refused,
he insulted her and uttered unprintable
words against her. He would go out of
the house and when he arrived home, he
was always drunk.
5. Respondent left the family home,
taking along all their personal belongings.
He lived with his mother at Pangasinan,
and he abandoned petitioner.
6. a Psychologist was able to
examine the petitioner but not the
respondent. Psychologist Cristina Gates
testified that the chances of curability of
respondents psychological disorder were
nil. Its curability depended on whether
the established organic damage was
minimal -- referring to the malfunction of
the composites of the brain brought about
by habitual drinking and marijuana, which

possibly
afflicted
respondent
with
borderline
personality
disorder
and
uncontrollable impulses.
7. Petitioner disclosed that she also
filed a petition for the annulment of her
marriage with the Matrimonial Tribunal of
the Diocese of Alaminos, Pangasinan on
the ground of psychological incapacity of
respondent.
8. Petitioner even alleged that she
was tried to kill by the respondent.
After the trial, the RTC promulgated
a decision but only a decree of legal
separation and not for declaration of
nullity of marriage dissolution of conjugal
property. Aggrieved, petitioner appealed
to the CA, petitioner alleged that the
National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal
made a declaration of nullity of their
marriage. But the CA did not give
credence on the said decree because the
basis in annulling the said decree was not
based on psychological incapacity of the
respondent. CA also reasoned out that the
totality of evidence especially the
Psychology Report of Ms. Gates was not
convincing to warrant the reversal of RTC
decision. Not satisfied, petitioner appealed
the case via petition for review on
certiorari.
Issue:
The main issue is whether or not
the totality of petitioners evidence was
able to prove that respondent is
psychologically incapacitated to comply
with the essential obligations of marriage
that would justify annulment of marriage.
Ruling:
No. the petition is untenable. The
Court agrees with the Court of Appeals
that the totality of the evidence submitted
by petitioner failed to satisfactorily prove
that respondent was psychologically
incapacitated to comply with the essential
obligations of marriage. The root cause of

respondents
alleged
psychological
incapacity was not sufficiently proven by
experts or shown to be medically or
clinically permanent or incurable. The
petitioner also failed to prove that the
maltreatment made upon her by the
respondent was a ground for nullity of
marriage. Such ground was only for legal
separation. The factual basis of the
decision of National Appellate Matrimonial
Tribunal is not also binding to the court
because the basis of such decision was
refers to those who suffer from a grave
lack of discretion of judgment concerning
essential
matrimonial
rights
and
obligations to be mutually given and
accepted and not on psychological
incapacity as what was alleged in the
Regional Trial Court by the petitioner.
Petitioner, therefore, erred in stating that
the conclusion of Psychologist Cristina
Gates
regarding
the
psychological
incapacity of respondent is supported by
the decision of the National Appellate
Matrimonial Tribunal.

The petition was denied.

Camacho-Reyes vs Reyes
GR No. 185286
August 18, 2010
FACTS:
Petitioner Maria Socorro Camacho-Reyes
met respondent Ramon Reyes at the UP
Diliman, in 1972 when they were both 19
years old. Petitioner enjoyed respondents
style of courtship which included dining
out, unlike other couples their age who
were restricted by a university students
budget. At that time, respondent held a
job in the family business, the Aristocrat
Restaurant. Petitioners good impression
of the respondent was not diminished by
the latters habit of cutting classes, not
even by her discovery that respondent
was taking marijuana. On December 5,
1976, petitioner and respondent got
married. They lived with Ramons parents

and they were supported by them. They

had a child which made their financial
difficulties worse. All the business
ventures of Ramon were unsuccessful and
Socorro became the breadwinner of the
family. To make things worse, despite the
fact that Socorro would undergo an
operation for removal of a cyst,
respondent remained unconcerned and
unattentive;
and
simply
read
the
newspaper, and played dumb when
petitioner requested that he accompany
her as she was wheeled into the operating
room. They tried to attend counseling
sessions but nothing has changed.
Sometime in 1996, petitioner confirmed
that respondent was having an extramarital affair. RTC granted the petition to
nullify the marriage on the ground of
psychological incapacity. CA reversed.
Hence, this petition.
ISSUE: W/N Ramon is psychologically
incapacitated
Ruling:
Yes, there existed psychological incapacity.
The marriage between the petitioner and
the respondent was nullified. Psychological
incapacity was shown by respondents (1)
sporadic financial support; (2) extramarital affairs; (3) substance abuse; (4)
failed business attempts; (5) unpaid
money obligations; (6) inability to keep a
job that is not connected with the family
businesses; and (7) criminal charges of
estafa.
The high
court
found that
the marriage between the parties from its
inception had this congenital infirmity w
hichpertains to the inability of the parties
to
effectively
function
emotionally,
intellectually and socially towards each
other in relation to their essential duties to
mutually observe love, fidelity and respect
as well as to mutually render help and
support as mandated by Article 68 of the
Family Code.
Such finding was anchored by the unanim
ous findings of three psychology
experts: petitioner manifested inadequaci
es along her affective sphere that made h
er less responsive to the emotional needs
of her husband, while the respondent
manifested
strong
senseof Inadequacy along masculine strivi

ngs and narcissistic features that renders

him psychologically
incapacitated to perform the duties and re
sponsibilities of marriage. The Supreme
Court further ruled that such psychological
incapacity, as stated by psychology
experts, is permanent, incurable, and
stable
over
time,
and
mere
recommendation of one psychology expert
that the incapacity is curable does not
automatically imply curability. The Court
arrived with such decision even though
two of the consulted experts based their
findings on mere hearsays while only one
based it from factual antecedence.
Therefore, the case has the gravity,
juridical antecedence, and incurability
the three requirements of nullifying
marriage
based
on
psychological
incapacity.
Republic vs. Encelan
Topic: Psychological Incapacity
Facts:
Cesar Married Lolita, and they
had two children. To support the family,
Cesar went abroad and worked as an OFW
in Saudi Arabia. After two years of working
abroad, Cesar learned that Lolita is having
an illicit affair with Alvin
Perez, and thereafter, left the conjugal
dwelling together with the two children.
But even with such circumstances, Cesar
never failed to send financial support for
the family. On June 1995, Cesar filed a
petition against Lolita for the declaration
of the nullity of his marriage based on
Lolitas psychological incapacity. Cesar,
during a hearing even presented a
psychological evaluation report on Lolita
with the finding that Lolita was not
suffering from any form of psychiatric
illness, but had been unable to provide the
expectations expected of her for a good
and lasting marital relationship.... and her
transferring from one job to another
depicts some interpersonal problem with
co-workers as well as her impatience in
attaining her ambitions .... and her refusal
to go with her husband abroad signifies
her reluctance to work out a good marital
and family relationship... Cesar found
ally in RTC as it gave him a favourable
decision which declared his marriage to
Lolita null and void. The court of Appeals

also affirmed the decision of RTC, and

thereafter, the case was elevated to the
Supreme Court, thus, this case.
Issue:
Whether or not psychological
incapacity is indeed present in the person
of Lolita as to nullify a valid marriage.
Ruling:
No. Marriage is an inviolable
social institution protected by the State
and any doubt should be resolved in
favour of its existence and continuation
against its dissolution and nullity. In this
case, sexual infidelity and abandonment
of the conjugal dwelling do not necessarily
constitute psychological incapacity; these
are simply grounds for legal separation. To
constitute psychological incapacity, it
must be shown that the unfaithfulness and
abandonment are manifestations of a
disordered
personality
that
actually
prevented
the
erring
spouse
from
discharging
the
essential
marital
obligations, which the court found not
present in the person of Lolita.
2. Who can invoke nullity
Section
2(a)
of The
Rule
on
Declaration of Absolute Nullity of
Void Marriages and Annulment of
Voidable Marriages, which took effect
on March 15, 2003, provides:
SECTION 2. Petition for declaration of
absolute nullity of void marriages.'
(a) Who may file. - A petition for
declaration of absolute nullity of void
marriage may be filed solely by the
husband or the wife.
Catalan vs. Court of Appeals, 514
SCRA 607, February 6, 2007
Facts:

Petition for review assailing the

decision of the court of appeals

Orlando Catalan and Felicitas

Catalan were married on June 4,
1950 in Mabini Pangasinan. They
went to United States of America
and eventually became naturalized
citizens. After 38 years of marriage,
both got divorced on April 1988.

Two months (June 16, 1988) after

the
divorce,
Orlando married
Merope in calasiao pangasinan.

Petitioner Felicitas alleges that

such marriage between Orlando
and Merope was bigamous because
Merope had a subsisting marriage
with certain Eugenio Bristol and a
petition for declaration of nullity of
marriage with damages was filed
against Orlando and Merope by
petitioner
Felicitas
in
RTC
Dagupan.

Respondents filed a motion to

dismiss on the ground that
petitioner is not the real party in
interest but was denied by RTC.
Trial ensued.

On October 10, 2000, the RTC

rendered judgment in favor of the
petitioner, the dispositive portion of
which reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is declared in
favor of plaintiff Felicitas Amor Catalan
and against defendants Orlando B.
Catalan and Merope E. Braganza, as
follows:
1) The subsequent marriage of Merope
Braganza with Orlando B. Catalan is
declared null and void ab initio;
2) The defendants are ordered jointly and
severally to pay plaintiff by way of moral
damages the amount of P300,000.00,
exemplary damages in the amount of
P200,000.00 and attorney's fees in the
amount of P50,000.00, including costs of
this suit; andcralawlibrary
3) The donation in consideration of
marriage is ordered revoked and the
property donated is ordered awarded to
the heirs of Juliana Braganza.

Respondents appealed to the court

of appeals which the latter
reversed the decision of rtc in part:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, we
hereby
GRANT
the
appeal
and
consequently REVERSE and SET ASIDE the
appealed decision. We likewise DISMISS
Civil Case No. D-10636, RTC, Branch 44,
Dagupan City. No costs.

After motion for reconsideration

was denied, instant petition was
raised in this court
Issue:

1. W/N petitioner has the required

standing in court to question the nullity of
the mariage between respondents
2. W/N the failure of the Court of Appeals
to declare the questioned marriage void
constitutes reversible error.
Ratio:
1. The two basic ones of divorce are (1)
absolute divorce or a vinculo matrimonii
and (2) limited divorce or a mensa et
thoro. The first kind terminates the
marriage, while the second suspends it
and leaves the bond in full force
A petition to declare the nullity of
marriage, like any other actions, must be
prosecuted or defended in the name of
the real party in interest iand must be
based on a cause of actionii
Thus, in Nial v. Bayadog, the Court held
that the children have the personality to
file the petition to declare the nullity of the
marriage of their deceased father to their
stepmother as it affects their successional
rights.iii
According to Section 2(a) of The Rule on
Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void
Marriages and Annulment of Voidable
Marriages, which took effect on March 15,
2003, provides:
SECTION 2. Petition for declaration of
absolute nullity of void marriages.'
(a) Who may file. - A petition for
declaration of absolute nullity of void
marriage may be filed solely by the
husband or the wife.
However, If it was proved that a valid
divorce decree was obtained and the
decree does not allow Orlando to remarry,
the
trial
court
shall
declare
the
respondent's marriage as bigamous and
void ab initio but if it is proved that a valid
divorce decree was obtained which allows
Orlando to remarry, then the trial court
must dismiss the petition to declare nullity
of marriage on the ground that petitioner
lacks legal personality to file such
petition.
2. A settled rule is that the Court is not a
trier of facts and does not undertake the
re-examination of evidence presented by
parties during the trial of the case but an
exception to this is when the findings of
the RTC and the Court of Appeals are

conflicting or when the findings are

conclusions without citation of specific
evidence on which they are based. Upon
findings of the pieces of evidence provided
to the RTC and Court of Appeals, the
evidence lack competent proof that they
are indeed naturalized and a divorce
decree was obtained.
A divorce obtained abroad by an alien
may be recognized in our jurisdiction,
provided such decree is valid according to
the national law of the foreigner. iv
However, before it can be recognized by
our courts, the party pleading it must
prove the divorce as a fact and
demonstrate its conformity to the foreign
law allowing it, which must be proved
considering that our courts, cannot take
judicial notice of foreign laws.v Without the
divorce decree and foreign law as part of
the evidence, we cannot rule on the issue
of whether petitioner has the personality
to file the petition for declaration of nullity
of marriage.
In such case, the RTC would be correct to
declare the marriage of the respondents
void for being bigamous, there being
already in evidence two existing marriage
certificates, which were both obtained in
the Philippines, one in Mabini, Pangasinan
dated December 21, 1959 between
Eusebio
Bristol
and
respondent
Merope,vi and the other, in Calasiao,
Pangasinan dated June 16, 1988 between
the respondents.vii
Held:
Case is remanded to trial court for proper
disposition

Avenido Vs Avenido G.R. No. 173540

January 22, 2014
Doctrine: Rules of evidence to prove
marriage, Issue: Failure to produce a
marriage certificate as evidence that
the marriage is null and void
Facts of the case: Tecla Hoybia Avenido
filed November 1998, a Complaint for
Declaration of Nullity of Marriage against
Peregrina Macua Vda. De Avenido on the
ground that Tecla is the lawful wife of the

deceased Eustaquio Avenido (Eustaquio).

In her complaint, Tecla alleged that her
marriage to Eustaquio was solemnized on
30 September 1942 in Talibon, Bohol in
rites officiated by the Parish Priest of the
said town. According to her, the fact of
their marriage is evidenced by a Marriage
Certificate recorded with the Office of the
Local Civil Registrar (LCR) of Talibon,
Bohol. However, due to World War II,
records were destroyed. Thus, only a
Certification was issued by the LCR. In
1979, Tecla learned that her husband
Eustaquio got married to another woman
by the name of Peregrina, which marriage
she claims must be declared null and void
for being bigamous.
On April 1999,
Peregrina filed her answer to the
complaint with counterclaim, essentially
averring that she is the legal surviving
spouse of Eustaquio who died on
September 22, 1989 in Davao City, their
marriage having been celebrated on
March 30, 1979 at St. Jude Parish in Davao
City. She also contended that the case was
instituted to deprive her of the properties
she owns in her own right and as an heir
of Eustaquio.
During the trial, presented the testimonies
of three persons which include herself to
attest to her marriage to Eustaquio, as
well
as
submitting
pertinent
legal
documents to substantiate her marriage.
On the other hand, Peregrina contend that
her marriage to Eustaquio that took place
in Davao City on March 1979; her life as a
wife and how she took care of Eustaquio
when he already had poor health, as well
as her knowledge that Tecla is not the
legal wife, but was once a common law
wife of Eustaquio. The RTC decided that
the petition for the DECLARATION OF
NULLITY OF MARRIAGE filed by Tecla is
denied.
The counter claim filed by
Peregrina was dismissed. Tecla elevated
the case to the Court of Appeals. In its
August 31, 2005 Decision, the CA ruled in

favor of Tecla by declaring the validity of

her
marriage
to
Eustaquio,
while
pronouncing on the other hand, the
marriage
between
Peregrina
and
Eustaquio to be bigamous, and thus, null
and void. The CA emphasized that the:
the court a quo committed a reversible
error when it disregarded (1) the
testimonies of Adelina, the sister of
Eustaquio
who
testified
that
she
personally
witnessed
the
wedding
celebration of her older brother and Tecla
Climaco, the eldest son of Eustaquio and
Tecla, who testified that his mother was
married to his father, and (2) the
documentary evidence mentioned at the
outset. It should be stressed that the due
execution and the loss of the marriage
contract, both constituting the condition
sine qua non, for the introduction of
secondary evidence of its contents, were
shown by the very evidence the trial court
has disregarded.
Peregrina questions the CA ruling because
the CA failed to appreciate the validity of
her marriage to Eustaquio. For its part, the
Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), in its
Memorandum25dated 5 June 2008, raises
the following legal issues: 1. Whether or
not the court can validly rely on the
"presumption of marriage" to overturn the
validity of a subsequent marriage; 2.
Whether or not secondary evidence may
be considered and/or taken cognizance of,
without proof of the execution or existence
and the cause of the unavailability of the
best evidence, the original document; and,
3. Whether or not a Certificate of Marriage
issued by the church has a probative value
to prove the existence of a valid marriage
without the priest who issued the same
being presented to the witness stand.
Decision: The Court stated that based on
the ruling made by the RTC Tecla could not
produce the documents to prove her
marriage to Eustaquio and did not take

into
account
the
testimonies
she
presented. The CA, on the other hand,
concluded that there was a presumption of
lawful marriage between Tecla and
Eustaquio as they deported themselves as
husband and wife and produced four
children. Such presumption, supported by
documentary evidence consisting of the
same Certifications disregarded by the
trial court, as well as the testimonial
evidence especially that of Adelina,
created sufficient proof of the fact of
marriage.
The Court upheld the CA ruling and cited
the case of Aonuevo v. Intestate Estate of
Rodolfo G. Jalandoni to substantiate its
decision. Said case stated that: While a
marriage certificate is considered the
primary evidence of a marital union, it is
not regarded as the sole and exclusive
evidence of marriage. Jurisprudence
teaches that the fact of marriage may be
proven by relevant evidence other than
the marriage certificate. Hence, even a
persons
birth
certificate
may
be
recognized as competent evidence of the
marriage between his parents. The Court
reiterated that the due execution and the
loss of the marriage contract were clearly
shown by the evidence presented,
secondary
evidencetestimonial
and
documentarymay be admitted to prove
the fact of marriage. The establishment of
the fact of marriage was completed by the
testimonies of Adelina, Climaco and Tecla;
the certifications of marriage issued by the
parish priest of the Most Holy Trinity
Cathedral of Talibon, Bohol. The Petition
to reverse the CA decision is denied. The
marriage between petitioner Peregrina
Macua
Avenido
and the
deceased
Eustaquio Avenido is hereby declared
NULL and VOID.
AURORA
A.
ANAYA, PlaintiffAppellant,
v.
FERNANDO
O.
PALAROAN, Defendant-Appellee.

G.R. No. L-27930. November 26, 1970

Facts:

Petitioners appeal from an order of

dismissal of Civil Case No. E-00431
on the complaint of annulment of
marriage between Aurora and
Fernando
Palaroan
issued
by
Juvenile&Domestic Relations Court,
Manila
Petitioner
and
Fernando
(respondent) got married on Dec.
4, 1953.
Fernando filed for an annulment of
marriage on Jan. 7, 1954 by reason
of force and intimidation.
It was filed in the Court of First
Instance of Manila (Civil Case No.
21589) and judgment was made on
Sept.
23,
1959
dismissing
Fernandos complaint and retaining
the marriage of Aurora and
Fernando.
The
Court
granted
Auroras
contention that while the amount
(payment) of counterclaim was
placed under negotiation to settle
the judgment; Fernando confessed
to Aurora that months before their
marriage, he had a pre-marital
relationship with one of his close
relative and this non-divulgement
to her has definitely wrecked their
marriage. This confession has
therefore made her want to put a
stop to it as their marriage
constituted FRAUD in obtaining her
consent, in accordance with no. 4
of Art. 85 of the Civil Code. She
seeks for the annulment of
marriage and moral damages.
Fernando denied having pre-marital
relations with a close relative. He
also said that he and Aurora never
lived together as he escaped from
her and her relatives after they got
married on Dec. 4, 1953. He now
alleges Aurora to have a lack of

cause of action and estoppel

(A legal principle that bars a party f
rom denying or alleging a certain f
act owing to that party's previous c
onduct, allegation, or denial.) for
her having prayed in Civil Case No.
21589 for validity of marriage and
enjoying the support that had been
granted to her.
Fernando
counterclaimed
for
damages for malicious filing of the
suit. However, he did not pray for
the dismissal of the complaint but
for the dismissal on the alleged
moral damages.
Aurora in her reply made several
allegations to quote:

and to convince them of his

intention not to live with plaintiff,
carried on a courtship with a third
girl with whom, after gaining the
latters love cohabited and had
several children during the whole
range of nine years that Civil Case
No. 21589, had been litigated
between them (parties);" (Record
on
Appeal,
pages
10-11)

"(1) that prior to their marriage on

4 December 1953, he paid court to
her, and pretended to shower her
with love and affection not because
he really felt so but because she
merely happened to be the first girl
available to marry so he could
evade marrying the close relative
of his whose immediate members
of her family were threatening him
to force him to marry her (the close
relative);
"(2) that since he contracted the
marriage for the reason intimated
by him, and not because he loved
her, he secretly intended from the
very beginning not to perform the
marital duties and obligations
appurtenant
thereto,
and
furthermore, he covertly made up
his mind not to live with her;
"(3) that the foregoing clandestine
intentions intimated by him were
prematurely concretized for him,
when in order to placate and
appease the immediate members
of the family of the first girl
(referent being the close relative)

Because of the failed attempt to

reconcile both parties, trial was
scheduled to proceed on August
26, 1966. This was postponed.
When the court was reviewing the
expediente
(documents)
,they
found out that Auroras allegations
were insufficient citing the case of
Brown vs. Yambao, 102 PHIL 168
to quote:
"It is true that the wife has not
interposed
prescription
as
a
defense. Nevertheless, the courts
can take cognizance thereof,
because actions seeking a decree
of legal separation, or annulment
of marriage, involve public interest,
and it is the policy of our law that
no such decree be issued if any
legal obstacles thereto appear
upon
the
record."

The court required Aurora to

submit a memorandum the reason
why the case should not be
dismissed. When Aurora submitted
such memorandum, the Court
found it inadequate and on Oct. 7,
1966 the Court dismissed the
complaint. The Court also denied
for reconsideration.

Issue:
1. W/N the non-disclosure to a wife by
her husband of his pre-marital
relationship with another woman is

a
ground
marriage

for

annulment

of

Ratio:
1. No. The non-disclosure is not a
ground for annulment of marriage.
If we take a look at Art. 85 Par. 4 of
the Civil Code (now Art. 45 Par. 3 of
the Family Code):

"ART. 85. A marriage may be

annulled for any of the following
causes, existing at the time of the
marriage:

"(4) That the consent of either

party was obtained by fraud, unless
such party afterwards, with full
knowledge of the facts constituting
the fraud, freely cohabited with the
other as her husband or his wife, as
the case may be;"

Under Art. 86 (now Art. 46 of the

Family Code and amended), the
circumstances
that
constitutes
fraud are specified stating that:

"ART. 86. Any of the following

circumstances
shall
constitute
fraud referred to in number 4 of the
preceding article:

(1) Misrepresentation as to the

identity of one of the contracting
parties;
(2) Non-disclosure of the previous
conviction of the other party of a
crime involving moral turpitude,
and the penalty imposed was

imprisonment
more;

for

two

years

or

(3) Concealment by the wife of the

fact that at the time of the
marriage, she was pregnant by a
man other than her husband.
"No other misrepresentation or
deceit as to character, rank,
fortune or chastity shall constitute
such fraud as will give grounds for
action for the annulment of
marriage."
The non-disclosure of Fernando to Aurora
of the alleged pre-marital relations to a
close relative was not indicated in the said
provisions. Art. 86 was enacted by the
Congress to specifically mention the scope
of fraud. The legislative made it clear that
only those enumerated are the only
circumstances that constitute fraud by
including the last paragraph of Art. 86 that
no other misrepresentation or deceit as
to character, rank, fortune or chastity shall
constitute such fraud as will give grounds
for action for the annulment of marriage.
Although the Court feels the grief of
Aurora on the lewd acts of her husband,
they cannot relax the provision as she is
not the only interested party in the
marriage constituted but the Society as
well.
Aurora has stressed another fact that
since her marriage with Fernando,
Fernando failed to do his marital duties
and obligations and covertly made up his
mind not to live together. She said that the
Court failed to emphasize this fact too.
Aurora amended her reply in answer
adding another allegation. The Court in
their reply has said that this is another
cause of action entirely different from the
first cause that Aurora presented and
would mean that another case would have
to be filed to accommodate the cause of

action. The Court cannot accept changes

not alleged in the first reply of Aurora as
this would make the case endless. Also,
even if Auroras contention of Fernandos
failure for marital obligations were indeed
true, she would have raised this four years
within their marriage. Seeing that they
were married in 1953 and pleadings only
started on 1966, it must be declared
already barred.
Held:
Appealed order is affirmed
SY v. CA
GR No. 127263
April 12, 2000
Facts:
> Nov. 15, 1973
- Filipina Sy and
Fernando Sy got married at Church of Our
Lady of Lourdes in Quezon City
> The union was blessed with children:
Frederick
and
Farrah
Sheryll
and
established a residence and operated
lumber and hardware business in Sto.
Tomas, Pampanga.
> Sept. 15, 1983 - Fernando left the
conjugal dwelling and transferred to
Masangkay, Tondo, Manila.

that would govern the dissolution of their

conjugal partnership
> Judgment: Conjugal partnership of gains
has been dissolved and regime of
separation of properties has been
approved based on the Memorandum of
Agreement executed. The custody of the
children has been granted to Filipina.
> May 1988 - Filipina filed a criminal
action against Fernando for attempted
parricide. She alleged that it took place
when she fetched her son at Fernandos
house in Tondo. She got mad and spanked
Frederick when he ignored her and
continued to play computer. Fernando
pulled her away from their son, and
punched her in the different parts of her
body, and choked her until she fell on the
ground when he thought she was dead.
> April 26, 1990 - RTC convicted Fernando
only of the lesser crime of slight physical
injuries, and sentenced him to 20 days
imprisonment.
> Filipina filed a new action - Legal
Separation on the ff. grounds:

> May 15, 1988 - their son, Frederick

joined his father in Tondo and from then
on, lived with his father.

a) repeated physical violence

> Feb. 11, 1987 - Filipina filed a petition

for legal separation, which was later
amended to a petition for separation of
property on the grounds:

c) attempt by respondent against her life;

a) he abandoned her without just cause

b) they have been living separately for
more than one year
c) they voluntarily entered into a
Memorandum
of
Agreement
dated
September 29, 1983, containing the rules

b) sexual infidelity

d) abandonment of her by her husband

without justifiable cause for more than one
year
> Dec. 4, 1991 - RTC - Pampanga granted
the petition on the grounds of repeated
physical violence and sexual infidelity, and
issued a decree of legal separation. It
awarded custody of their daughter Farrah
Sheryll to petitioner, and their son
Frederick to respondent.

> Aug. 4, 1992 - Filipina filed a petition for

the declaration of absolute nullity of her
marriage to Fernando on the ground of
psychological incapacity citing the ff.
manifestations:
1) habitual alcoholism
2) refusal to live with her without fault on
her part, choosing to live with his mistress
instead
3) refusal to have sex with her, performing
the marital act only to satisfy himself.
- She also alleged hat such psychological
incapacity of her husband existed from the
time of the celebration of their marriage
and became manifest thereafter.
RTC Decision: Denied. Alleged acts do not
constitute psychological incapacity which
may warrant the declaration of absolute
nullity of their marriage.
CA Decision: Affirmed the decision of RTC.
ISSUES:
Whether or not the marriage between
petitioner and private respondent is void
from the beginning for lack of a marriage
license at the time of the ceremony
Whether or not private respondent is
psychologically incapacitated at the time
of said marriage celebration to warrant a
declaration of its absolute nullity
SC Decision:
Petitioner, for the first time, raises the
issue of the marriage being void for lack of
a valid marriage license at the time of its
celebration. It appears that, according to
her, the date of the actual celebration of
their marriage and the date of issuance of
their marriage certificate and marriage

license are different and incongruous.

Petitioner states that though she did not
categorically state in her petition for
annulment of marriage before the trial
court that the incongruity in the dates of
the marriage license and the celebration
of the marriage itself would lead to the
conclusion that her marriage to Fernando
was void from the beginning, she points
out that these critical dates were
contained in the documents she submitted
before the court (Date of issue of marriage
license = Sept. 17, 1974; Celebration of
Marriage = Nov. 15, 1973)
SC did not find any denial of such dates on
the part of the respondent. There being no
claim of an exceptional character, the
purported marriage between petitioner
and private respondent could not be
classified among those enumerated in
Articles 7279 of the Civil Code. We thus
conclude that under Article 80 of the Civil
Code, the marriage between petitioner
and private respondent is void from the
beginning.
He did not object as well the presentation
of the said documents (marriage license &
marriage certificates), which were only
photocopies.
Nevertheless,
the
said
documents were marked as Exhibits
during the course of the trial below, which
shows that these have been examined and
admitted by the trial court, with no
objections having been made as to their
authenticity and due execution. Likewise,
no objection was interposed to petitioner's
testimony in open court when she affirmed
that the date of the actual celebration of
their marriage was on November 15,
1973. SC, therefore, that having been
admitted in evidence, with the adverse
party failing to timely object thereto, these
documents are deemed sufficient proof of
the facts contained therein.

The remaining issue on the psychological

incapacity need no longer to be discussed
as concluded by the SC, the marriage is
void ab initio for lack of a marriage license
at
the
time
their
marriage
was
solemnized.

ISSUE: Whether or not the marriage

between Abbas and Goo is void ab initio.

Abbas vs Abbas, G.R. No. 183896

The Court of Appeals is wrong in reversing

the RTC. The Local Civil registrars
certification enjoyed probative value as
her duty was to maintain records of data
relative to the issuance of a marriage
license. There is a presumption of
regularity of official acts in favor of the
local civil registrar. Gloria was not able to
overcome this presumption hence it
stands to favor Abbas.

In January 1993, Syed Azhar Abbas was

invited to the house of Felicitas Goo,
mother of Gloria Goo. He said he was
asked to participate in a ceremony which
was meant to welcome him to the
Philippines (Abbas is a Pakistani). He said
he did not know that the ceremony was
actually his marriage with Gloria Goo.
Later, Gloria filed a bigamy case against
Abbas. Abbas allegedly married a certain
Maria Corazon Buenaventura.
To avoid the bigamy case, Abbas filed a
petition for the declaration of nullity of his
marriage to Gloria Goo.
To prove the validity of their marriage,
Gloria presented a marriage contract
signed by Abbas as well as the
solemnizing officer who celebrated their
marriage.
The
marriage
contract
contained the alleged marriage license
issued to Abbas.
Abbas presented a certification issued by
the Local Civil Registrar which states that
the marriage license, based on its number,
indicated in the marriage contract was
never issued to Abbas but to someone
else.
The RTC ruled in favor of Abbas. However,
the Court of Appeals reversed the RTC on
the ground that there was no diligence to
search for the real source of the marriage
license issued to Abbas (for it could be
that the marriage license was issued in
another municipality).

HELD: Yes. Their marriage lacked one of

the essential requisites of marriage which
is the issuance of a valid marriage license.

The fact that Abbas did sign the marriage

contract does not make it conclusive that
there was in fact a valid marriage license
issued to him nor does it cure the fact that
no marriage license was issued to Abbas.
Article 4 of the Family Code is clear when
it says, The absence of any of the
essential or formal requisites shall render
the marriage void ab initio. Article 35(3)
of the Family Code also provides that a
marriage solemnized without a license is
void from the beginning.
Yao Kee v. Sy-Gonzales
G.R. No. L-55960
November 24, 1988
Topic: Special Rule in Marriage
Facts: Sy Kiat, a Chinese national, died on
January
17,
1977
leaving
behind
properties here in the Philippines.
Thereafter, Aida Sy-Gonzales et al filed a
petition for the grant of letters of
administration alleging that they are the
children of the deceased with Asuncion
Gillego. The petition was opposed by Yao
Kee et al alleging that Yao Kee is the lawful
wife of the deceased whom he married in
China.

The trial court rendered decision in favor

of the opposition. On appeal, the Court of
Appeals rendered a decision, modifying
the decision declaring the marriage of Sy
Kiat to Yao Kee as not has been proven
valid in accordance with the laws of China.
Hence,
both
parties
moved
for
reconsideration to which the Supreme
Court granted.

marriage of Sy Kiat to Yao Kee took place

in 1931 or eighty-four (84) years later.

Issue: Whether or not the marriage of Yao

Kee and Sy Kiat is valid in accordance with
Philippine laws.

ALEJANDRO ESTRADA, complainant,

vs.
SOLEDAD
S.
ESCRITOR,
respondent.
2003-08-04 | A.M. No. P-02-1651
Puno, J:

Held: No. The law on foreign marriages is

provided by Article 71 of the Civil Code
which states that:
Art. 71. All marriages performed
outside
the
Philippines
in
accordance with the laws in force
in the country where they were
performed and valid there as such,
shall also be valid in this country,
except bigamous, Polygamous, or
incestuous
marriages,
as
determined by Philippine law.
(Emphasis supplied.) ***
Construing this provision of law the Court
has held that to establish a valid foreign
marriage two things must be proven,
namely: (1) the existence of the foreign
law as a question of fact; and (2) the
alleged foreign marriage by convincing
evidence.
Well-established in this jurisdiction is the
principle that Philippine courts cannot take
judicial notice of foreign laws. They must
be alleged and proven as any other fact.
To establish the validity of marriage, the
existence of foreign law as a question of
fact and the alleged marriage must be
proven by clear and convincing evidence.
Further, even assuming for the sake of
argument that the Court has indeed taken
judicial notice of the law of China on
marriage
in
the
aforecited
case,
petitioners however have not shown any
proof that the Chinese law or custom
obtaining at the time the Sy Joc
Lieng marriage was celebrated in 1847
was still the law when the alleged

For failure to prove the foreign law or

custom and consequently of the marriage,
the marriage between Yao Kee and Sy Kiat
in China cannot be recognized in the
jurisdiction of Philippine courts.

FACTS:
Complaint:
Alejandro Estrada wrote a letter to
the judge of RTC Branch 253, Las
Pinas City, complaining of immoral
acts
committed
by
Soledad
Escritor, a court interpreter in said
court
o allegedly living with a man
not her husband
o begot a son by him
o tarnishing the image of the
courts and should not be
allowed to remain employed
Respondent:
During the investigation, Escritor
admitted that she has been living
with Luciano Quilapio, Jr. without
the benefit of marriage for twenty
years and that they have a son
But as a member of the religious
sect known as Jehovah's Witnesses
and the Watch Tower and Bible
Tract
Society,
their
conjugal
arrangement is in conformity with
their religious beliefs
o after ten years of living
together, she executed on
July 28, 1991 a "Declaration
of Pledging Faithfulness
o Quilapio executed a similar
pledge
o That their faith claims that
marriage
should
be
presented:
First and foremost to
God
Secondly to society
(if all legal means

are exhausted then

one may use a
Declaration
of
Pledging
Faithfulness)
That such a
declaration is
effective
when
legal
impediments
render
it
impossible for
a couple to
legalize their
union

At the time Escritor executed her

pledge, her husband was still alive
but living with another woman
o Insofar as the congregation
is
concerned,
there
is
nothing immoral about the
conjugal
arrangement
between
Escritor
and
Quilapio and they remain
members in good standing
in the congregation.
Moreover, at the time
Escritor joined the judiciary,
her husband has already
died and there was no
longer
any
legal
impediment to marry on her
part, although Quilapio was
still married to another but
separated
Escritor, who is charged with
committing "gross and immoral
conduct"
under
the
Revised
Administrative Code, invokes the
moral standards of her religion, the
Jehovah's Witnesses, in asserting
that her conjugal arrangement with
a man not her legal husband does
not constitute disgraceful and
immoral conduct for which she
should be held administratively
liable

ISSUE:
W/N the respondents right to religious
freedom should carve out an exception
from the prevailing jurisprudence for

which government employees are held

administratively liable
HELD:
UNDETERMINED (!)
- only a compelling interest can prevail
over the fundamental right to religious
liberty
- there is no doubt that choosing between
keeping her job and abandoning her
religion and family on the one hand and
giving up her employment and keeping
her religious practice and family on the
other puts a burden on her free exercise of
religion
- it is thus inappropriate for the
complainant, a private person to present
evidence on the compelling interest of the
state. The burden of evidence must be
discharged by the proper agency (the
state)
- the state should have the right to have
its say on the matter, therefore the case is
remanded to the office of the Court Admin
and the Solicitor General will review the
case
GUIDING PRINCIPLES:
- Man does not live in isolation but in
society. Society is kept together by the
invisible bonds of common thought, thus
society is justified in taking steps to
preserve its moral code and the interests
of the state
Free exercise clause
The Free Exercise Clause embraces two
concepts - freedom to believe and
freedom to act.
The first is absolute but, in the
nature of things, the second cannot
be
Conduct
remains
subject
to
regulation for the protection of
society.
absolute protection to individual
religious convictions and beliefs
and
prescribes
gov.
from
questioning a persons beliefs or
imposing penalties solely on just
those beliefs
Evolution of Different Tests employed
by the courts under the Free Exercise
Clause

(a) The belief-action test under this test,

regulation of religiously dictated conduct
would be upheld no matter how central
the conduct was to the exercise of religion
and no matter how insignificant was the
government's
non-religious
regulatory
interest so long as the government is
proscribing action and not belief.
(b) The Court abandoned the simplistic
belief-action
distinction
and
instead
recognized
the
deliberate-inadvertent
distinction, i.e., the distinction between
deliberate
state
interference
of
religiousexercise for religious reasons
which was plainly unconstitutional and
government's inadvertent interference
with religion in pursuing some secular
objective.
(c) The two-part balancing test of validity
of the infringing regulation where the first
step was for plaintiff to show that the
regulation placed a real burden on his
religious exercise. Next, the burden would
be upheld only if the state showed that it
was pursuing an overriding secular goal by
the means which imposed the least
burden on religious practices.
(d) Then came the stricter compelling
state interest test, this latter test stressed
that the state interest was not merely any
colorable state interest, but must be
paramount and compelling to override the
free exercise claim. A compelling state
interest
is
the
highest
level
of
constitutional scrutiny short of a holding of
a per se violation. Thus, when general
laws conflict with scruples of conscience,
exemptions ought to be granted unless
some
'compelling
state
interest'
intervenes.
Non-Establishment Clause
U.S.
Supreme
Court
adopted
Jefferson's metaphor of "a wall of
separation between church and
state"
as
encapsulating
the
meaning of the Establishment
Clause.
The Lemon v. Kurtzman test
requires a challenged policy to
meet the following criteria to pass
scrutiny under the Establishment
Clause.
(i) the statute must have a secular
legislative purpose

(ii) its primary or principal effect

must be one that neither advances nor
inhibits religion
(iii) the statute must not foster 'an
excessive entanglement with religion.'
(Establishment of religion clausestate cannot pass laws which aid
one religion, aid all religion or
prefer one over the other)
Strict
Neutrality
vs.
Benevolent
Neutrality
The two main standards used by
the Court in deciding religion
clause cases: separation (strict
neutrality) and accommodation
(benevolent neutrality)
o Under the strict neutrality
approach, the government
should base public policy
solely
on
secular
considerations,
without
regard to the religious
consequences of its actions.
It adopts a policy of
religious blindness. This
approach has been used in
education cases where the
court refused to allow any
form of prayer, spoken or
silent, in public schools.
However, this separationist
approach
has
become
problematic
in
contemporary times when
both the government and
religion are growing and
expanding their spheres of
involvement and activity,
resulting in the intersection
of government and religion
at many points
o (b)
The
benevolent
neutrality
approach
allows
for
interaction
between the church and
state as called for by
necessity or practicality.
Benevolent neutrality allows
accommodation of religion
under
certain
circumstances.
Accommodations
are
government policies that
take religion specifically into

account not to promote the

government's favored form
of religion, but to allow
individuals and groups to
exercise
their
religion
without hindrance. Their
purpose or effect therefore
is to remove a burden on, or
facilitate the exercise of, a
person's
or
institution's
religion. As Justice Brennan
explained, the "government
[may] take religion into
account . . .to exempt, when
possible,
from generally
applicable
governmental
regulation individuals whose
religious
beliefs
and
practices would otherwise
thereby be infringed, or to
create
without
state
involvement an atmosphere
in which voluntary religious
exercise may flourish."
Accommodation theory
A three-step process (also referred
to as the "two-step balancing
process" when the second and
third steps are combined) is
followed in weighing the state's
interest and religious freedom
when these collide.
Three questions are answered in
this process:
(a) Has the statute or government
action created a burden on the free
exercise of religion?
The courts often look into the sincerity
of the religious belief, but without
inquiring into the truth of the belief
because the Free Exercise Clause
prohibits inquiring about its truth. The
sincerity of the claimant's belief is
ascertained to avoid the mere claim of
religious beliefs to escape a mandatory
regulation.
(b) Is there a sufficiently compelling
state
interest
to
justify
this
infringement of religious liberty?
In this step, the government has to
establish that its purposes are
legitimate for the state and that they
are compelling.

(c) Has the state in achieving its

legitimate purposes used the least
intrusive means possible so that the
free exercise is not infringed any more
than necessary to achieve the
legitimate goal of the state?
Philippine
jurisdiction
adopts
Benevolent Neutrality approach
The
Philippine
constitution's
religion clauses prescribe not a
strict but a benevolent neutrality
(Recognizes the religious nature of
the Filipino people and the
elevating influence of religion in
society,
and
could
allow
accommodation of morality based
on religion provided it does not
offend compelling state interests)
Benevolent neutrality recognizes
that government must pursue its
secular goals and interests but at
the same time strives to uphold
religious liberty to the greatest
extent possible within flexible
constitutional limits. Thus, although
the morality contemplated by laws
is secular, benevolent neutrality
could allow for accommodation of
morality
based
on
religion,
provided it does not offend
compelling state interests.
In other words, in the absence of
legislation granting exemption from
a law of general applicability, the
Court can carve out an exception
when the religion clauses justify it.
(Religious Freedom Doctrine
Incumbent upon the court to
determine whether a certain ritual
is religious or not
Religious freedom will not be
upheld if it clashes with the
established institutions of society
and with the law such that when a
law
of
general
applicability
incidentally burdens the exercise of
ones religion, ones right to
religious freedom cannot justify
exemption from compliance with
the law)
(Victoriano Doctrine

Test of immediate and grave

danger to the security and welfare
of the community
Religious exercise may be indirectly
burdened by a general law whish
has for its purpose and effect the
advancement of the states secular
goals provided that there is no
other means by which the state
can
accomplish
this
purpose
without imposing such burden
The
court
referres
to
the
Compelling state interest test
which grants exemptions when
general laws conflict with religious
exercise, unless a compelling state
interest intervenes)

Tests applied on exercise of religious

freedom
The case at bar does not involve
speech where the "clear and
present danger" and "grave and
immediate danger" tests were
appropriate.
The present case involves purely
conduct arising from religious
belief.
The
"compelling
state
interest" test is proper where
conduct is involved. Under this
test, not any interest of the state
would suffice to prevail over the
right to religious freedom as this is
a fundamental right that enjoys a
preferred position in the hierarchy
of rights.
In determining which shall prevail
between the state's interest and
religious liberty, reasonableness
shall be the guide.
Religious clauses and Morality
The morality referred to in the law
is public and secular morality, not
religious morality. The distinction is
important because the jurisdiction
of the Court extends only to public
and secular morality.
Whatever
pronouncement
the
Court makes in the case at bar
should be understood only in this
realm.

Application of Benevolent Neutrality

and the Compelling State Interest
Test
In ruling on Escritors claim of
religious freedom, the court applied
the compelling state interest test
from a benevolent neutrality
stance - i.e. the claim of religious
freedom would warrant carving out
an exception from the Civil Service
Law,
unless
the
government
succeeds in demonstrating a more
compelling state interest.
Applying the balancing process
earlier discussed, the court found
that Escritor's right to religious
freedom has been burdened as she
is made to choose between
keeping her employment and
following her religious precept. She
appears to be sincere in her
religious belief and practice and is
not merely using the "Declaration
of Pledging Faithfulness" to avoid
punishment for immorality
However, the case must be
remanded to the Office of the Court
Administrator to properly settle the
issue of the existence of a
compelling state interest. The
government should be given the
opportunity to demonstrate the
compelling state interest it seeks to
uphold
which
can
override
respondent's religious belief and
practice. The burden of evidence
should be discharged by the proper
agency of the government which is
the Office of the Solicitor General.

Vincent Paul Mercado vs Consuelo

Tan
Topic: Bigamous
marriages

and

polygamous

Facts:
v Petition for Certiorari assailing the
decision of the CA and the RTC of Bacolod
thereby convicting Mercado guilty of the
crime of Bigamy.

v In 91, Vincent Mercado contracted

marriage with Consuelo Tan despite his
prior marriage to one Ma. Thelma
Oliva(1976)
v On October 1992, Tan filed a bigamy
case against Mercado with the City
Prosecutor of Bacolod City
v One month after said filing, Mercado
filed an action for the Declaration for the
Nullity of the marriage with Oliva; The
year after, the court rendered their
decision on Mercados petition thereby
declaring the marriage between Mercado
and Olive as null and void
v Ruling of the RTC and CA: Mercado is
guilty for the crime of Bigamy furthermore
stating that he violated Article 40 of the
Family Code which provides that:
The absolute nullity of a previous
marriage may be invoked for purposes of
remarriage on the basis solely of a final
judgment
declaring
such
previous
marriage null void.
Applying this on the case at hand, the
declaration of nullity of Mercados first
marriage came only after the complaint
has already been filed and while the case
is already in trial.

v All the elements are present when

Mercado married Tan. When he married
Tan, his first marriage was still subsisting
and was not declared void. In fact,
Mercado only filed an action to declare his
first marriage void after Tan filed the
bigamy case. By then, the crime of bigamy
had already been consummated.
v Under Article 40 of the Family Code, a
judicial declaration of nullity of a void
previous marriage must be obtained
before a person can marry for a
subsequent time. Absent that declaration
a person who marries a second time shall
be guilty of bigamy.
Santos v CA
Psychological Incapacity

FACTS:

Leouel, a member of the Army, met

Julia
in
Iloilo
City.
Married
September 1986

The couple latter lived with Julias

parents. Julia gave birth to a son in
1987. Their marriage, however,
was marred by the frequent
interference of Julias parent as
averred by Leouel. The couple also
occasionally quarrels about as to,
among other things, when should
they start living independently
from Julias parents.

Julia went to the US to work as a

nurse despite Leouels opposition.

Issue: Whether or not petitioner is guilty

of Bigamy
Ruling:
v Yes . Because all the elements of
bigamy are present in the present case as
follows:
1. That the offender has been legally
married;
2. That the marriage has not been legally
dissolved or, in case his or her spouse is
absent, the absent spouse could not yet
be presumed dead according to the Civil
Code;
3. That he contracts a second or
subsequent marriage;
4. That the second or subsequent
marriage has all the essential requisites
for validity

7 months later, she and

Leouel got to talk and she
promised to return home in
1989. She never went home
that year.

In 1990, Leouel got the

chance to be in the US due
to a military training. During
his stay, he desperately
tried to locate his wife but
to no avail.

Leouel, in an effort to at
least have his wife come
home, filed to nullify their
marriage due to Julias
psychological incapacity.

Leouel asserted that due to

Julias failure to return home
or at least communicate
with him even with all his
effort
constitutes
psychological
incapacity.
Julia attacked the complaint
and she said that it is Leouel
who is incompetent.

The prosecutor ascertained

that there is no collusion
between the two. Leouels
petition is however denied
by the lower and appellate
court.

ISSUE: W/N
Julia
incapacitated.

is

psychological

HELD:

Before deciding on the case, the SC

noted that the Family Code did not
define the term psychological
incapacity, which is adopted from
the Catholic Canon Law.

Deliberations of the Family Code

Revision Committee, the provision
in PI, adopted with less specificity
than expected, has been designed

to allow some resiliency in its

application. The FCRC did not give
any examples of PI for fear that the
giving of examples would limit the
applicability of the provision under
the principle of ejusdem generis.
Rather, the FCRC would like the
judge to interpret the provision on
a case-to-case basis, guided by
experience, the findings of experts
and researchers in psychological
disciplines, and by decisions of
church tribunals which, although
not binding on the civil courts, may
be given persuasive effect since
the provision was taken from
Canon
Law.
The
term
psychological incapacity defies
any
precise
definition
since
psychological causes can be of an
infinite variety.

Article 36 of the Family Code

cannot be taken and construed
independently of but must stand in
conjunction with, existing precepts
in our law on marriage. PI should
refer to no less than a mental (not
physical) incapacity that causes a
party to be truly incognitive of the
basic
marital
covenants
that
concomitantly must be assumed
and discharged by the parties to
the marriage which (Art. 68),
include their mutual obligations to
live together, observe love, respect
and fidelity and render help and
support. The intendment of the law
has been to confine the meaning of
PI to the most serious cases of
personality
disorders
clearly
demonstrative
of
an
utter
insensitivity or inability to give
meaning and significance to the
marriage.
This
psychological
condition must exist at the time the
marriage is celebrated.

The SC also notes that PI must be

characterized by (a) gravity, (b)
juridical antecedence, and (c)
incurability. The incapacity must
be grave or serious such that the
party would be incapable of
carrying out the ordinary duties
required in marriage; it must be
rooted in the history of the party
antedating the marriage, although
the overt manifestations may
emerge only after the marriage;
and it must be incurable or, even if
it were otherwise, the cure would
be beyond the means of the party
involved.
In the case at bar, although Leouel
stands aggrieved, his petition must
be dismissed because the alleged
PI of his wife is not clearly shown
by the factual settings presented.
The factual settings do not come
close to to the standard required to
decree a nullity of marriage.

DENIED

Florence Malcampo Sin vs. Philipp Sin

GR No. 137590
March 26, 2001
Family code
- Emphasizes the permanent nature
of marriage, it is the foundation of
the family.
- Central to our traditional and
religious concepts of morality and
provides the bedrock where our
society finds stability.
- Marriage is immutable and when
both spouses give their consent to
enter it, it becomes irrevocable.
- A declaration of nullity of marriage
under Article 36 of the Family Code
requires
the
application
of
procedural
and
substantive
guidelines. While compliance with
these
requirements
mostly

devolves upon petitioner, the State

is likewise mandated to actively
intervene in the procedure. Should
there be non-compliance by the
State with its statutory duty, there
is a need to remand the case to the
lower court for proper trial.
Facts:
- Appeal from a decision of the court
of appeals which affirmed decision
of the RTC which dismissed
petitioners petition for declaration
of nullity of marriage due to
psychological
incapacity
for
insufficiency of evidence
- 1987, petitioner Florence and
respondent Philipp (A Portuguese
citizen) got married at St. Jude
Catholic parish in San Miguel
Manila
- 1994, petitioner filed in the RTC a
complaint for declaration of nullity
of marriage against Philipp. 1995
the RTC dismissed the petition
where
the
State
had
no
participation in the proceedings
- 1994, Jabson filed with the RTC a
manifestation stating that he found
no collusion between the parties
- 1998, petitioner filed with the CA a
motion for reconsideration but was
denied a year after
Issue:
- W/N declaration of nullity maybe
declared even with the absence of
the participation of the State in the
proceedings
Held:
- ARTICLE 48. In all cases of
annulment
or
declaration
of
absolute nullity of marriage, the
Court shall order the prosecuting
attorney or fiscal assigned to it to
appear on behalf of the State to
take steps to prevent collusion
between the parties and to take
care that evidence is not fabricated
or suppressed (italics ours).
- The protection of marriage as a
sacred institution requires not just
the defense of a true and genuine
union but the exposure of an

invalid one as well. This is made

clear
by
the
following
pronouncement: "The trial court
must
order
the
prosecuting
attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor
General to appear as counsel for
the state. No decision shall be
handed down unless the Solicitor
General issues a certification,
which will be quoted in the
decision,17 briefly stating therein
his reasons for his agreement or
opposition as the case may be, to
the petition. The Solicitor-General
shall discharge the equivalent
function of the defensor vinculi
contemplated under Canon 1095
(italics ours).

Cabreza v Cabreza

SERENO, J.
FACTS:
On January 2001, RTC of Pasig declared
the
marriage
between
Ceferino
(petitioner) and Amparo (respondent) as
null and void and ordered dissolution and
liquidation of the conjugal partnership.
Petitioner executed a deed of absolute
sale in favor of BJD Holdings Corp
involving the conjugal dwelling. He further
asked the RTC to authorize him to sign in
behalf of the respondent and order the
occupants to vacate the property.
The respondent then countered by filling a
Motion to Hold in Abeyance the Writ of
Possession and Notice to Vacate. Her
arguments are as follows: (1) the parties
had another conjugal lot apart from the
conjugal dwelling; and (2) under Article
129 of the Family Code, the conjugal
dwelling should be adjudicated to her as
the spouse, with whom four of the five
Cabreza children were staying.
ISSUE:

W/N the CA erred in reversing the RTC

decision by dismissing the complaint of
declaring the nullity of Deed of Sale on the
basis of litis pendentia and forum
shopping
HELD/RATIO:
YES. The CA erred in giving merit to the
respondents argument. The Complaint for
the Declaration of Nullity of the Deed of
Sale cannot prosper because, like the
Petition to nullify the Writ of Possession, it
effectively seeks the modification of an
already final Order of RTC Br. 70. Amparo
cannot be allowed to impugn the already
final Order of RTC Br. 70 which directed
the sale of the conjugal dwelling.
Litis pendentia has been properly invoked.
The following requisites have been met for
the proper invocation of litis pendentia as
a ground for dismissing an action: (a)
Identity of parties or representation in
both cases; (b) Identity of rights asserted
and relief prayed for, the relief being
founded on the same facts and the same
basis; and (c) Identity of the two preceding
particulars, such that any judgment that
may be rendered in the other action will,
regardless of which party is successful,
amount to res judicata in the action under
consideration.
With regard to forum shopping, it exists
where the elements of litis pendentia are
present or where a final judgment in one
case will amount to res judicata (bar) in
the other.
RULING:
The Petition is GRANTED. The decision and
resolution of the CA are REVERSED. The
resolution of the RTC Branch 67, Pasig
City, which dismissed the Complaint for
Declaration of Nullity of Deed of Sale on
the ground of the litis pendencia and
forum shopping, is REINSTATED.
Buenaventura vs Court of Appeals
G.R.
No.
127449
March 31, 2005
Facts:

Petitioner
deceived
private
respondent into marrying him by
professing true love instead of
revealing to her that he was under
heavy parental pressure to marry
and that because of pride he
married his wife. Respondent
claimed that this caused her to
suffer mental anguish, anxiety,
besmirched reputation, sleepless
nights not only in those years the
parties were together but also after
and throughout their separation.
Petitioner filed a petition for the
declaration of nullity of marriage
on the ground that both he and his
wife
were
psychologically
incapacitated.
The RTC promulgated its decision,
declaring that:
o The marriage entered into
between
petitioner
and
respondent null and void
o Petitioner to pay respondent
P2.5million
for
moral
damages,
P1million
exemplary damages with
6% interest and P100,000
attorneys fees
o Petitioner to pay respondent
P50,000 litigation costs
o Liquidation of the assets of
the conjugal partnership
property, particularly the
retirement
benefits
of
petitioner by giving 50% of
its net amount and 12%
interest per annum to his
wife; and 50% of his
outstanding shares of stock
o Petitioner to give a regular
monthly support of P15,000
in favor of his son, subject
to modification as the
necessity arises
o Awarding of the care and
custody of the minor to his
mother
Petitioner appealed before the
Court of Appeals. While the appeal
was pending, the CA, upon
respondents motion issued a
resolution increasing the regular
monthly
support
to
P20,000.

The CA dismissed petitioners

appeal for lack of merit and
affirmed in to the RTC decision.
Petitioners
motion
for
reconsideration was denied, hence
this petition.
Issue:
WON equal property shares shall
be owned by both parties even
though only one party exerted
efforts to acquire the properties
Ruling:
Since the present case does not
involve the annulment of a
bigamous marriage, the provisions
of article 50 in relation to articles
41, 42 and 43 of the Family Code,
providing for the dissolution of the
absolute community or conjugal
partnership of gains, as the case
maybe, do not apply. Rather the
general rule applies, which is in
case a marriage is declared void ab
initio,
the
property
regime
applicable
to
be
liquidated,
partitioned and distributed is that
of equal co-ownership.
Since the properties ordered to be
distributed by the court a quo were
found, both by RTC and CA, to have
been acquired during the union of
the parties, the same would be
covered by the co-ownership. No
fruits of a separate property of one
of the parties appear to have been
included or involved in the said
distribution.
The
liquidation,
partition and distribution of the
properties owned in common by
the parties herein as ordered by
the court a quo should therefore,
be sustained, but on the basis of
co-ownership and not of the regime
of conjugal partnership of gains
Quiao vs Quiao
Topic: Effects of annulment - On the
property regime of the marriage
Rita C. Quiao (Rita) filed a complaint for
legal separation against petitioner Brigido
B. Quiao (Brigido). RTC rendered a decision
declaring the legal separation thereby

awarding the custody of their 3 minor

children in favor of Rita and all remaining
properties shall be divided equally
between the spouses subject to the
respective legitimes of the children and
the payment of the unpaid conjugal
liabilities.
Brigidos share, however, of the net profits
earned by the conjugal partnership is
forfeited in favor of the common children
because Brigido is the offending spouse.
Neither
party
filed
a
motion
for
reconsideration and appeal within the
period. After more than nine months from
the promulgation of the Decision, the
petitioner filed before the RTC a Motion for
Clarification, asking the RTC to define the
term Net Profits Earned.
RTC held that the phrase NET PROFIT
EARNED denotes the remainder of the
properties of the parties after deducting
the separate properties of each [of the]
spouse and the debts. It further held that
after determining the remainder of the
properties, it shall be forfeited in favor of
the common children because the
offending spouse does not have any right
to any share of the net profits earned,
pursuant to Articles 63, No. (2) and 43, No.
(2) of the Family Code.
The petitioner claims that the court a quo
is wrong when it applied Article 129 of the
Family Code, instead of Article 102. He
argues that Article 102 applies because
there is no other provision under the
Family Code which defines net profits
earned subject of forfeiture as a result of
legal separation.
When a couple enters into a regime of
absolute community, the husband and the
wife become joint owners of all the
properties of the marriage. Whatever
property each spouse brings into the
marriage, and those acquired during the
marriage (except those excluded under
Article 92 of the Family Code) form the
common mass of the couple's properties.
And when the couple's marriage or
community is dissolved, that common
mass is divided between the spouses, or
their respective heirs, equally or in the
proportion the parties have established,

irrespective of the value each one may

have originally owned.
In this case, assuming arguendo that Art
102 is applicable, since it has been
established that the spouses have no
separate properties, what will be divided
equally between them is simply the net
profits. And since the legal separation
decision states that the share of Brigido
in the net profits shall be awarded to the
children, Brigido will still be left with
nothing.
On the other hand, when a couple enters
into a regime of conjugal partnership of
gains under Article 142 of the Civil Code,
the husband and the wife place in
common fund the fruits of their separate
property and income from their work or
industry, and divide equally, upon the
dissolution of the marriage or of the
partnership, the net gains or benefits
obtained indiscriminately by either spouse
during the marriage. From the foregoing
provision, each of the couple has his and
her own property and debts. The law does
not intend to effect a mixture or merger of
those debts or properties between the
spouses. Rather, it establishes a complete
separation of capitals.
In the instant case, since it was already
established by the trial court that the
spouses have no separate properties,
there is nothing to return to any of them.
The listed properties above are considered
part of the conjugal partnership. Thus,
ordinarily, what remains in the abovelisted properties should be divided equally
between
the
spouses and/or
their
respective heirs. However, since the trial
court found the petitioner the guilty party,
his share from the net profits of the
conjugal partnership is forfeited in favor of
the common children, pursuant to Article
63(2) of the Family Code. Again, lest we be
confused, like in the absolute community
regime, nothing will be returned to the
guilty party in the conjugal partnership
regime, because there is no separate
property which may be accounted for in
the guilty party's favor.
Article 124 of the Family Code of which
applies to conjugal partnership property, is
a reproduction of Article 96 of the Family

Code which
property.

applies

to

community

Both Article 96 and Article 124 of the

Family Code provide that the powers do
not include disposition or encumbrance
without the written consent of the other
spouse. Any disposition or encumbrance
without the written consent shall be void.
However, both provisions also state that
the transaction shall be construed as a
continuing offer on the part of the
consenting spouse and the third person,
and may be perfected as a binding
contract upon the acceptance by the other
spouse x x x before the offer is withdrawn
by either or both offerors.
In this case, the Promissory Note and the
Deed of Real Estate Mortgage were
executed on 31 October 1995. The Special
Power of Attorney was executed on 4
November 1995. The execution of the SPA
is the acceptance by the other spouse that
perfected the continuing offer as a binding
contract between the parties, making the
Deed of Real Estate Mortgage a valid
contract.

SSS vs. Teresita Jarque Vda De Bailon

G.R. no. 165545 March24, 2006

Issue: Mere appearance of the absent

spouse declared presumptively dead
automatically terminates the subsequent
marriage.

Facts of the Case: In 1955 Clemente

Bailon and Alice Diaz married in
Barcelona, Sorsogon. 15 years later,
Clemente filed an action to declare the

presumptive death of Alice she being an

absentee. The petition was granted in
1970. In 1983, Clemente married Jarque.
The two live together until Clementes
death in 1998. Jarque then sought to claim
her husbands SSS benefits and the same
were granted her. On the other hand, a
certain Cecilia Bailon-Yap who claimed that
she is the daughter of Bailon to a certain
Elisa Jayona petitioned before the SSS that
they be given the reimbursement for the
funeral spending for it was actually them
who shouldered the burial expenses of
Clemente. They further claim that
Clemente contracted three marriages; one
with Alice, another with Elisa and the
other with Jarque. Cecilia also averred that
Alice is alive and kicking and Alice
subsequently emerged; Cecilia claimed
that Clemente obtained the declaration of
Alices presumptive death in bad faith for
he was aware of the whereabouts of Alice
or if not he could have easily located her
in her parents place.

She was in Sorsogon all along in her

parents place. She went there upon
learning that Clemente had been having
extra-marital affairs. SSS then ruled that
Jarque should reimburse what had been
granted her and to return the same to
Cecilia since she shouldered the burial
expenses and that the benefits should go
to Alice because her reappearance had
terminated Clementes marriage with
Jarque. Further, SSS ruled that the RTCs
decision in declaring Alice to be
presumptively death is erroneous. Teresita
appealed the decision of the SSS before
the Social Security Commission and the
SSC affirmed SSS. The CA however ruled
the contrary.

Decision: There is no previous marriage

to restore for it is terminated upon
Clementes death. Likewise there is no
subsequent marriage to terminate for the
same is terminated upon Clementes
death. SSS is correct in ruling that it is
futile for Alice to pursue the recording of

her reappearance before the local civil

registrar through an affidavit or a court
action. But it is not correct for the SSS to
rule upon the declaration made by the
RTC. The SSC or the SSS has no judicial
power to review the decision of the RTC.
SSS is indeed empowered to determine as
to who should be the rightful beneficiary
of the benefits obtained by a deceased
member in case of disputes but such
power does not include the appellate
power to review a court decision or
declaration. In the case at bar, the RTC
ruling is binding and Jarques marriage to
Clemente is still valid because no affidavit
was filed by Alice to make known her
reappearance legally. Alice reappeared
only after Clementes death and in this
case she can no longer file such an
affidavit; in this case the bad faith [or
good faith] of Clemente can no longer be
raised the marriage herein is considered
voidable and must be attacked directly not
collaterally it is however impossible for a
direct attack since there is no longer a
marriage to be attacked for the same has
been terminated upon Clementes death.

Marriage

when

one

spouse

is

absent

G.R.
NO.
180863
September 8, 2009

ANGELITA
VALDEZ, Petitioner, v. REPUBL
IC
OF
THE
PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

Facts:

Petition for review on certiorari

under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
assailing decision of RTC Camiling
(Nov. 12, 2007) dismissing the
Angelita
Valdezs
(petitioner)
petition for presumptive death of
her husband Sofio Polborosa.

Angelita and Sofio got married on

Jan. 11, 1971 in Pateros, Rizal.
Petitioner gave birth to their only
daughter Nancy on Dec. 13, 1971.
March 1972, Sofio left their
dwelling.
Both
mother
and
daughter waited for Sofio to return
but to no avail.
May 1972 (2months after), Angelita
decided to go to her parents home
in Bancay 1st, Camiling, Tarlac.
Three years had passed without
hearing any word from Sofio and on
Oct. 1975, Sofio went to Angelitas
current dwelling. After talking for
several hours, they both decided to
separate. This was executed on a
document. After that meeting,
Angelita never saw or heard any
news from Sofio again. That was
the last time they saw each other.
In Angelitas belief that Sofio was
already dead, she married Virgilio
Reyes on June 20, 1985.
Virgilio Reyes application for
naturalization with the United
States Department of Homeland
Security was denied on the
grounds that marriage of Angelita
to Sofio was still in effect.
On March 29, 2007, Petitioner
Angelita filed a petition in RTC
Camiling on the declaration of
presumptive death of Sofio.
On Nov. 12, 2007, RTC dismissed
the petition for lack of merit
because Angelita was not able to
prove the well-grounded belief that
her husband was already dead.
Applying Art. 41 of the Family
Code, the present spouse is has the
burden to prove that her spouse
who has been absent and that she
has a well-founded belief that the
absent spouse is already dead.
The RTC said that this belief must
be proven by honest to goodness
inquiries and efforts to know the

location of the absent spouse.

However, on petitioners own
admission, she did not try to find
her husband because of the mutual
agreement to live separately. Also,
her
daughter
testified
that
petitioner prohibited her daughter
from finding Sofio.
RTC also believed that there is a
strong possibility that Sofio is still
alive since he will just be 61 years
old at the time. Even if Angelita
says that her husband is a chain
smoker and drunkard, we do not
have evidence that he is still under
the same vice or if he even
stopped from doing so.
Petitioner filed for a motion of
consideration and stated that it is
the Civil Code that shall apply in
this case and not the Family Code
as they got married on Jan.11,
1971, way before the Family Code
was taken into effect. Petitioner
also argued that she had a vested
right under the Civil Code and it
must be Art. 384 and Art.390 Title
XIV that shall apply and not the
stricter provisions of the Family
Code as these were not expressly
repealed by the Family Code.
Applying
the
Family
Code
provisions would impair rights of
petitioner.
Motion for reconsideration was
denied by RTC on Dec. 10, 2007.
Hence, the petition for reversal of
the RTC decision.
In the manifestation and motion,
the Office of the Solicitor General
(OSG) recommended that the RTC
set aside assailed decision and
declare Sofio presumptively dead.
OSG argues that Art. 41 of the
Family Code is not applicable to the
case on the requirement of a wellfounded belief because it did not
exist
yet
when
Virgilio
and

petitioner were married. A vested

right was already obtained by
petitioner under the Civil Code and
OSG claims that such right cannot
be affected by the Family Code.
Acc. to art. 256 of the Family Code,
it shall not be retroactively applied
if they will prejudice or impair
vested or acquired rights.
Issue:
1. W/N the RTC erred in applying the
provisions of the Family Code and
holding that petitioner needed to
prove a well-founded belief that
Sofio was already dead
2. W/N petitioners marriage with
Virgilio is valid despite lack of
declaration of presumptive death of
Sofio
Ratio:
1. Yes. Art. 41 of the Family Code
states:

Art. 41. A marriage contracted by

any person during subsistence of a
previous marriage shall be null and
void, unless before the celebration
of the subsequent marriage, the
prior spouse had been absent for
four consecutive years and the
spouse present has a well-founded
belief that the absent spouse was
already
dead.
In
case
of
disappearance where there is
danger
of
death
under
the
circumstances set forth in the
provisions of Article 391 of the Civil
Code, an absence of only two years
shall be sufficient.
For the purpose of contracting the
subsequent marriage under the
preceding paragraph the spouse
present must institute a summary
proceeding as provided in this
Code for the declaration of

presumptive
death
of
the
absentee, without prejudice to the
effect of reappearance of the
absent spouse. (83a)

As what was stated, the petitioner

and Sofio got married on June 11,
1971 while petitioner and Virgilio
on June 25, 1985 both covered at
the time under the Civil Code. Art.
83 of the Civil Code states that:
Art. 83. Any marriage subsequently
contracted by any person during
the lifetime of the first spouse of
such person with any person other
than such first spouse shall be
illegal
and
void
from
its
performance, unless:
(1) The first marriage was annulled
or dissolved; or
(2) The first spouse had been
absent for seven consecutive years
at the time of the second marriage
without the spouse present having
news of the absentee being alive,
of if the absentee, though he has
been absent for less than seven
years, is generally considered as
dead and believed to be so by the
spouse present at the time of
contracting
such
subsequent
marriage, or if the absentee is
presumed
dead
according
to
Articles 390 and 391. The
marriage so contracted shall be
valid in any of the three cases until
declared null and void by a
competent court.
In Art. 390 of the Civil Code:
Art. 390. After an absence of seven
years, it being unknown whether or
not the absentee still lives, he shall
be presumed dead for all purposes,
except for those of succession.

The
absentee
shall
not
be
presumed dead for the purpose of
opening his succession till after an
absence of ten years. If he
disappeared after the age of
seventy-five years, an absence of
five years shall be sufficient in
order that his succession may be
opened.
The Court, on several occasions,
had
interpreted
the
above-quoted
provision in this wise:
For the purposes of the civil
marriage law, it is not necessary to
have the former spouse judicially
declared
an
absentee.
The
declaration of absence made in
accordance with the provisions of
the Civil Code has for its sole
purpose to enable the taking of the
necessary precautions for the
administration of the estate of the
absentee. For the celebration of
civil marriage, however, the
law only requires that the
former spouse has been absent
for seven consecutive years at
the
time
of
the
second
marriage, that the spouse
present does not know his or
her former spouse to be living,
that such former spouse is
generally reputed to be dead
and the spouse present so
believes at the time of the
celebration of the marriage.
The Court affirmed the decision of RTC but
denying the petition on different grounds
from the RTC decision, the ground being
the right application of jurisprudence on
the case.
2. Yes. Under the Civil Code, the
presumption of death is established
by law and no court declaration is
needed for the presumption to

arise. Citing the case of In re

Szatraw, when the petitioner filed
for a presumption of death on the
husband, there is no right to be
enforced nor is there a remedy
prayed for by the petitioner against
her absent husband. A proceeding
on the presumption of death
cannot run independently in a
special case or proceeding as the
cause
of
action.
But
this
declaration, even if judicially made,
would not improve the petitioner's
situation,
because
such
a
presumption is already established
by law. A judicial pronouncement to
that effect, even if final and
executory, would still be a prima
facie presumption only. It is still
disputable. It is for that reason that
it cannot be the subject of a judicial
pronouncement or declaration, if it
is the only question or matter
involved in a case, or upon which a
competent court has to pass. It is,
therefore, clear that a judicial
declaration that a person is
presumptively dead, because he
had been unheard from in seven
years, being a presumption juris
tantum only, subject to contrary
proof, cannot reach the stage of
finality or become final.
Since
death is presumed to have taken
place by the seventh year of
absence, Sofio is to be presumed
dead
starting
October
1982.
Therefore, marriage is valid under
par. 2 of Art. 83 of the Civil Code.

Held:
In sum, we hold that the Petition must be
dismissed since no decree on the
presumption of Sofio's death can be
granted under the Civil Code, the same
presumption having arisen by operation of

law. However, we declare that petitioner

was capacitated to marry Virgilio at the
time their marriage was celebrated in
1985 and, therefore, the said marriage is
legal and valid.
Wherefore, petition is denied.
ARCA v. JAVIER
GR No. L-6768
July 31, 1954
Facts:
> Respondent Alfredo Javier was a native
born citizen of the Philippines who, in
1937, married petitioner, Salud R. Arca,
another Filipino citizen. Before their
marriage they had already a child, Alfredo
Javier, Jr., who thereby became legitimate.
> In 1927 appellant enlisted in the U.S.
Navy and in 1938 sailed for the United
States aboard a navy ship in connection
with his service leaving behind his wife
and child.
> On August 13, 1940, he filed an action
for divorce in the Circuit Court of Mobile
County, Alabama, U.S.A., alleging that he
had abandoned by his wife.
> Having received a copy of the
complaint, Salud R. Arca filed an answer
alleging, among other things, that
appellant was not a resident of Mobile
County, but of Naic, Cavite, Philippines,
and that it was not true that the cause of
their separation was abandonment on her
part but that appellant was in the United
States, without her, because he was then
enlisted in the U.S. Navy.
> Nevertheless, the Circuit Court of Mobile
County rendered judgment granting
appellant a decree of divorce on April 9,
1941.

> July 1941 - Alfredo Javier married

Thelma Francis, who later on obtained a
divorce from him for undisclosed reasons.
> Alfredo returned to the country and
married Maria Odvina before the Municipal
Court of Manila.
> Salud filed a criminal case against
Alfredo for Bigamy which was dismissed
by the Court of First Instance of Manila marriage of Alfredo to Maria Odvina was
made in all good faith and in the honest
belief that his marriage with Salud has
been legally dissolved by the decree of
obtained by him from the Circuit Court of
Mobile County.
Issue: WON the decree granted by the
Circuit Court of Mobile County has a valid
effect in this jurisdiction
Ruling:

Philippines. He could not have acquired

legal residence or domicile at Mobile
County when he moved to that place in
1938 because at that time he was still in
the service of the U.S. Navy and merely
rented a room where he used to stay
during his occasional shore leave for shift
duty. That he never intended to live there
permanently is shown by the fact that
after his marriage to Thelma Francis in
1941, he moved to New York where he
bought a house and a lot, and after his
divorce from Thelma in 1949 and his
retirement from the U.S. Navy, he returned
to the Philippines and married Maria
Odvina of Naic, Cavite, where he lived
ever since. It may therefore be said that
appellant went to Mobile County, not with
the intention of permanently residing
there, or of considering that place as his
permanent abode, but for the sole
purpose of obtaining divorce from his wife.
Such residence is not sufficient to confer
jurisdiction on the court.

No.
Van Dorn v. Romillo, 139 SCRA 139
One of the essential conditions for the
validity of a decree of divorce is that the
court must have jurisdiction over the
subject matter and in order that this may
be acquired, plaintiff must be domiciled in
good faith in the State in which it is
granted.
The Intention of a Filipino to take up
residence in s state for the sole purpose of
obtaining divorce from his wife is not
sufficient to confer jurisdiction on the
court and while the aggrieved spouse may
have filed an answer, the act does not
place her under the jurisdiction of the
foreign court.
It cannot therefore be said that the Mobile
County Court of Alabama had acquired
jurisdiction over the case for the simple
reason that at the time it was filed
appellant's legal residence was then in the

FACTS
Petitioner Alice Reyes is a citizen of the
Philippines while private respondent is a
citizen of the United States; they were
married in Hongkong. Thereafter, they
established
their
residence
in
the
Philippines and begot two children.
Subsequently, they were divorced in
Nevada, United States, and that petitioner
has re-married also in Nevada, this time to
Theodore Van Dorn.
Private respondent filed suit against
petitioner,
stating
that
petitioners business in Manila is their
conjugal property; that petitioner he
ordered to render accounting of the
business and that private respondent be

declared to manage the conjugal property.

Petitioner moved to dismiss the case
contending that the cause of action is
barred by the judgment in the divorce
proceedings before the Nevada Court. The
denial now is the subject of the certiorari
proceeding.

ISSUE: Whether or not the divorce

obtained by the parties is binding only
to the alien spouse.

HELD: Is it true that owing to the

nationality principle embodied in Article
15 of the Civil Code, only Philippine
nationals are covered by the policy against
absolute divorces the same being
considered contrary to our concept of
public policy and morality. However, aliens
may obtain divorces abroad, which may be
recognized in the Philippines, provided
they are valid according to their national
law. In this case, the divorce in Nevada
released private respondent from the
marriage from the standards of American
Law, under which divorce dissolves the
marriage.
Thus, pursuant to his national law, private
respondent is no longer the husband
petitioner. He would have no standing to
sue in the case below as petitioners
husband entitled to exercise control over
conjugal assets. As he is bound by the
decision of his own countrys court, which
validly exercised jurisdiction over him, and
whose decision he does not repudiate, he
is stopped by his own representation
before said court from asserting his right
over the alleged conjugal property.

Somera v. Pilapil

GR No. 80116
June 30, 1989
Topic: Marriages dissolved by a foreign
judgement
Facts: Petitioner Imelda Pilapil, a Filipino
citizen, and private respondent Erich
Geiling, a German national, were married
in Germany. After about three and a half
years of marriage, such connubial
disharmony
eventuated
in
Geiling
initiating a divorce proceeding against
Pilapil in Germany. The Local Court,
Federal Republic of Germany, promulgated
a decree of divorce on the ground of
failure of marriage of the spouses.
More than five months after the issuance
of the divorce decree, Geiling filed two
complaints for adultery before the City
Fiscal of Manila alleging in one that, while
still married to said Geiling, Pilapil had an
affair with a certain William Chia. The
Assistant Fiscal, after the corresponding
investigation, recommended the dismissal
of the cases on the ground of insufficiency
of evidence. However, upon review, the
respondent city fiscal Victor approved a
resolution directing the filing of 2
complaint for adultery against the
petitioner.
The
case
entitled
PP
Philippines vs. Pilapil and Chia was
assigned to the court presided by the
respondent judge Ibay-Somera.
A motion to quash was filed in the same
case which was denied by the respondent.
Pilapil filed this special civil action for
certiorari and prohibition, with a prayer for
a TRO, seeking the annulment of the order
of the lower court denying her motion to
quash.
As cogently argued by Pilapil, Article 344
of the RPC thus presupposes that the
marital relationship is still subsisting at the
time of the institution of the criminal
action for adultery.
Issue: Whether or not private respondent
can prosecute petitioner on the ground of
adultery even though they are no longer
husband and wife as decree of divorce
was already issued.

Held: No. Under Article 344 of the RPC, the

crime of adultery cannot be prosecuted
except upon a sworn written complaint
filed by the offended spouse. It has long
since been established, with unwavering
consistency, that compliance with this rule
is a jurisdictional, and not merely a formal,
requirement.
Corollary to such exclusive grant of power
to the offended spouse to institute the
action, it necessarily follows that such
initiator must have the status, capacity or
legal representation to do so at the time of
the filing of the criminal action. This is a
logical consequence since the raison
detre of said provision of law would be
absent where the supposed offended party
had ceased to be the spouse of the
alleged offender at the time of the filing of
the criminal case.

FACTS:
Fe Quita married Arturo Padlan on
May 18, 1941 but had no children.
Eventually Fe sued Arturo for
divorce in San Francisco, California,
USA, submitting a private writing
dated 19 July 1950 on their
agreement to live separately and
settle their conjugal properties.
o 23 July 1954, obtained final
judgment of divorce
o Fe then obtained her 2nd and
3rd marriages in the USA

16 April 1972, Arturo died without a

will

31 August 1972, Lino Javier Inciong

filed a petition with RTC QC for
issuance of letters concerning the
estate of Arturo in favor of the
Philippine Trust Company
o Blandina Dandan, who was
married to Arturo on April
1947
and
had
five
legitimate children (plus 1
illegitimate child) with the
deceased, claimed to be the
surviving
spouse
and
opposed the petition
o Ruperto T. Padlan, sole
surviving spouse of Arturo
intervened
Fe Quita moved for the
immediate declaration of
heirs of the decedent and
the distribution of Arturos
estate
o Blandina
Dandan
and
children, plus Ruperto failed
to appear at the scheduled
hearing
o Records of birth of the
Padlan children were not
submitted,
prescribed
petiod lapsed

The trial court invoked the ruling in

Tenchavez v. Escano, which held
that a foreign divorce between
Filipino citizens sought and decreed
after the effectivity of the Civil
Code
was
not
entitled
to
recognition was valid in this

Stated differently, the inquiry would be

whether
it
is
necessary
in
the
commencement of a criminal action for
adultery that the marital bonds between
the complainant and the accused be
unsevered and existing at the time of the
institution of the action by the former
against the latter.
In the present case, the fact that private
respondent obtained a valid divorce in his
country, the Federal Republic of Germany,
is admitted. Said divorce and its legal
effects may be recognized in the
Philippines insofar as private respondent is
concerned in view of the nationality
principle in our civil law on the matter of
status of persons Under the same
considerations and rationale, private
respondent, being no longer the husband
of petitioner, had no legal standing to
commence the adultery case under the
imposture that he was the offended
spouse at the time he filed suit.
FE D. QUITA, petitioner, vs. COURT OF
APPEALS and BLANDINA DANDAN,
respondents
1998-12-22, Bellosillo, J
TOPIC: Marriages
foreign judgment

dissolved

by

jurisdiction, and discarded the

divorce between Fe and Arturo. It
expressed the view that their
marriage subsisted until the death
of Arturo.
o Declared only Fe Quita and
Ruperto Padlan as declared
intestate heirs of Arturo
o On motion for consideration,
partial consideration was
granted
declaring
the
Padlan children (5)
o Declared
Blandinas
marriage void since it was
celebrated
during
the
existence of marriage with
Fe

On Blandinas appeal, CA declared

null and void the RTC decision and
order, and directed the remand of
the case to the trial court for
further proceeding
o CA found Blandinas claim
that RTC case was decided
without a hearing, holding it
to be sufficient ground to
sustain the appeal
o Fe claims that there is no
need to remand, which the
court dismissed
SC: the provision relied
upon by respondent court is
clear
o If there is a controversy
before the court as to who
are the lawful heirs of the
deceased person or as to
the distributive shares to
which
each
person
is
entitled under the law, the
controversy shall be heard
and decided as in ordinary
cases
During the proceedings, when
asked by Blandina whether or not
Fe was entitled to inherit from
decedent considering their divorce,
Fe replied that Arturo was a Filipino
and as such remained legally
married to her in spite of the
divorce they obtained

Reading between the lines,

implied that Fe was no
longer a Filipino citizen at
the time of her divorce
Should
have
prompted the trial
court to conduct a
hearing establishing
her citizenship
Blandina
stressed
that
citizenship of Fe is relevant
Van
Dorn
v.
Romillo Jr: that
aliens may obtain
divorces
abroad,
which
may
be
recognized in the
Philippines,
provided they are
valid according to
their national law
Once proved that
she was no longer a
Filipino citizen at the
time of their divorce,
Van
Dorn
would
become
applicable
and petitioner could
very well lose her
right to inherit from
Arturo

ISSUE:
WON Fe is entitled to inherit in spite of the
divorce secured in the United States
HELD:
No
When asked whether she was an
American
citizen
petitioner
answered that she was since 1954.
Significantly, the decree of divorce
of petitioner and Arturo was
obtained in the same year. [ Van
Dorn is applicable] (Consequently,
respondent appellate court did not
err in ordering the case returned to
the
trial
court
for
further
proceedings)
HOWEVER, Private respondent's
claim to heirship was already
resolved by the trial court. She and
Arturo were married on 22 April
1947 while the prior marriage of
petitioner
and
Arturo
was
subsisting thereby resulting in a

bigamous marriage considered void

from the beginning under Arts. 80
and 83 of the Civil Code.
Consequently,
she
is
not
a
surviving spouse that can inherit
from
him
as
this
status
presupposes
a
legitimate
relationship
- Petition is DENIED
- CA Decision that petitioner Fe D. Quita
and Ruperto T. Padlan as intestate heirs is
NULL AND VOID is AFFIRMED
- CA Order modifying its previous decision
by granting one-half (1/2) of the net
hereditary estate to the Padlan children,
namely,
Claro,
Ricardo,
Emmanuel,
Zenaida and Yolanda, with the exception
of Alexis, all surnamed Padlan, instead of
Arturo's brother Ruperto Padlan, is likewise
AFFIRMED
Paula Llorente vs Court of Appeals
and Alicia Llorente
Topic: Marriages dissolved by foreign
judgement
Facts:
Petitioner and Lorenzo Llorente were
married in a Roman Catholic Church in
Nabua, Camarines Sur.
Lorenzo, being an enlisted serviceman
of the US Navy left for the US before the
outbreak of the Pacific War. In 1943,
Lorenzo acquired his American Citizenship.

After the Philippines have been

liberated by American Forces in 1945,
Lorenzo was able to get an accrued leave
to visit his wife in the Philippines.
Unfortunately though, upon arrival he
found out that his wife has been having an
adulterous relationship with his brother
and that she has been carrying a child;
whose paternal origin has not been
specified in the registry of the Office of the
Registrar of Nabua.
In 1946, a duly notarized agreement
has been entered by both Lorenzo and
Paula stating that:
o All forms of support provided for Paula
including all allowances provided by the
US Navy will be suspended.
o They would dissolve their marital union

o A separate agreement will be made

regarding their conjugal properties
o Lorenzo would not prosecute Paula for
her infidelity since she admitted her
wrongs and agreed to separate
Upon his return to the US, Lorenzo filed
for divorce with the Superior Court of the
State of California; said petition for divorce
was granted.
After which, Lorenzo went back to the
Philippines, he then met and soon after
married Alicia Llorente(who has no
knowledge of his prior marriage), to whom
he had 3 children.
In 1981, he executed a will, leaving all
his estates exclusively to his wife and 3
children. However, before the proceedings
in the RTC were concluded, Lorenzo died.
Questioning the validity of the said will,
Paula, Lorenzos former wife file for a
petition for letters of administrations over
Lorenzos estate in her favour; to which
the Court after finding merit in her claim
declared Paula the rightful successor of
Lorenzos estates.
Upon appeal however, the Court
modified the RTC ruling considering Alicia
as a co-owner of the properties. Hence,
the instant petition.
Issue: Whether or not the divorce
judgement rendered in the US enabled
Lorenzo to contract a second marriage
thus invalidating Paulas claim.
Ratio:
In Van Dorn vs Ramillo Jr. the Supreme
Court held that owing to the nationality
principle embodied in Article 15 of the
Civil Code, only Philippine nationals are
covered by the policy against absolute
divorce. In the same case, the Court ruled
that aliens may obtain divorce abroad
provided that they are valid according to
their national law. The Supreme Court held
that divorce obtained by Lorenzo from his
first wife Paula was valid and recognized in
this jurisdiction as a matter of comity.
The Supreme Court remanded the case
to the court of origin for the determination
of the intrinsic validity of Lorenzos will
and determine the successional rights
allowing proof of foreign law. The
deceased is not covered by our laws on
family rights and duties, status, condition

and legal
foreigner.

capacity

since

he

was

Republic of the Philippines vs.

Cipriano
Orbecido
Marriages dissolved by foreign judgement

FACTS:

1981, Cipriano Orbecido III married

Lady Myros M. Villanueva in
Ozamis City, Philippines. They had
a son and a daughter.
1986, Cipriano's wife left for the
United States bringing along their
son Kristoffer.
2000, Cipriano learned that his
wife, who had been naturalized as
an American citizen, had obtained
a divorce decree in the USA and
then married Innocent Stanley and
now live in California.
Cipriano thereafter filed with the
Philippine trial court a petition for
authority to remarry invoking
Article 26 par. 2 of the Family
Code. The court granted the
same.
RP, through the Office of the
Solicitor General, assails
RTC
decision.
o Contends that Article 26 par
2 does not apply to Cipriano
since it only applies to a
valid
mixed
marriage
(between a Filipino citizen
and an alien). The proper
remedy is to file a petition
for annulment or for legal
separation

HELD:

The second paragraph of Art

26, Family Code reads: Where
a marriage between a Filipino
citizen and a foreigner is validly
celebrated and a divorce is

thereafter
validly
obtained
abroad by the alien spouse
capacitating him or her to
remarry, the Filipino spouse
shall have capacity to remarry
under Philippine law.
o On
its
face,
the
foregoing provision does
not appear to govern the
situation at hand. It
seems to apply only to
cases where at the time
of the celebration of the
marriage, the parties are
a Filipino citizen and a
foreigner. The instant
case is one where at the
time the marriage was
solemnized, the parties
were
two
Filipino
citizens, but later on, the
wife was naturalized as
an American citizen and
subsequently obtained a
divorce
granting
her
capacity to remarry
o Records
of
the
proceedings
of
the
Family
Code
deliberations
showed
that
the
intent
of
Paragraph 2 of Article
26, according to Judge
Alicia
Sempio-Diy,
a
member of the Civil
Code
Revision
Committee, is to avoid
the
absurd
situation
where
the
Filipino
spouse remains married
to the alien spouse who,
after
obtaining
a
divorce, is no longer
married to the Filipino
spouse.
o
Taking
into
consideration
the
legislative intent and

applying the rule of

reason, we hold that
Paragraph 2 of Article 26
should be interpreted to
include cases involving
parties who, at the time
of the celebration of the
marriage were Filipino
citizens, but later on,
one of them becomes
naturalized as a foreign
citizen and obtains a
divorce
decree.
The
Filipino spouse should
likewise be allowed to
remarry as if the other
party were a foreigner at
the
time
of
the
solemnization
of
the
marriage.
To
rule
otherwise would be to
sanction absurdity and
injustice.
The twin elements for
the
application
of
Paragraph 2 of Article 26
as follows: (a) There is a
valid marriage that has
been
celebrated
between
a
Filipino
citizen and a foreigner;
and (b) A valid divorce is
obtained abroad by the
alien
spouse
capacitating him or her
to remarry.
The reckoning point is
not the citizenship of the
parties at the time of the
celebration
of
the
marriage,
but
their
citizenship at the time a
valid divorce is obtained
abroad by the alien
spouse capacitating the
latter to remarry.
Clearly,
the
twin
requisites
for
the

application of Paragraph
2 of Article 26 are both
present in this case.
Thus
Cipriano,
the
"divorced"
Filipino
spouse,
should
be
allowed to remarry.
Cipriano did not present any evidence
concerning the divorce decree and the
naturalization of his (ex) wife. It is settled
rule that one who alleges a fact has the
burden of proving it and mere allegation is
not evidence. For his plea to prosper, he
must prove his allegation that his wife was
naturalized as an American citizen.
Likewise, before a foreign divorce decree
can be recognized by our own courts, the
party pleading it must prove
(a) the divorce as a fact and demonstrate
its conformity to the foreign law allowing
it.
(b) such foreign law must also be proved
as our courts cannot take judicial notice of
foreign
laws.
Like any other fact, such laws must be
alleged
and
proved.
(c) that the divorce decree allows his
former spouse to remarry as specifically
required in Article 26.
GRANTED
Felcitas Amor- Catalan v Court of
Appeals, Manila, Orlando Catalan and
Merope Braganza
GR No. 167109
February 6, 2007
Facts:
- Petition assailing the decision of CA
in declaring the marriage between
respondents Catalan and Braganza
void on the grounds of bigamy
- 1950, Petitioner married Orlando
Catalan. They migrated to the USA
and became naturalized citizen.
- 1988
petitioner
and
Orlando
divorced after 38 years of marriage

1988, two months after divorce

Orlando married Merope. Petitioner
filed a declaration of nullity of
marriage in the RTC against the
relationship of Orlando and Merope
on the grounds of bigamy, alleging
that Merope had a prior subsisting
marriage with Bristol
Motion to dismiss was filed by
respondents for lack of cause of
action since petitioner was not a
real art-in-interest. Motion was
denied.
2009 RTC rendered judgment in
favor of petitioner
Respondents appealed the decision
in the CA, which reversed the
decision of the RTC

Issues:
- W/N petitioner has standing to
question
nullity
of
marriage
between respondents
- W/N failure of the CA to declare the
questioned
marriage
void
constitutes a reversible error
Held:
- Settled rule that the Court is not a
trier of facts and does not normally
undertake the re-examination of
the evidence presented by the
contending parties during the trial
of the case. There are, however,
exceptions to this rule, like when
the findings of facts of the RTC and
the
Court
of
Appeals
are
conflicting, or when the findings
are conclusions without citation of
specific evidence on which they are
based.
- Petition to declare nullity of
marriage must be prosecuted or
defended in the name of the real
party in interest and must be based
on cause of action
- Petitioners personality to file the
petition the declare nullity of
marriage cant be ascertained
because of the absence of the
divorce decree and the foreign law
allowing it.
G.R. No. 186571 August 11, 2010

Gerbert R. Corpuz, Petitioner

versus
Daisylyn Tirol Sto. Tomas and the
Solicitor General, Respondents

BRION, J.

FACTS:
This is a petition for review on certiorari
seeking a direct appeal from the decision
of the Regional Trial Court of Laoag City.
Petitioner, Gerbert R. Corpuz, is a
naturalized Canadian citizen who married
respondent Daisylyn Tirol Sto. Tomas.
Subsequently, he left for Canada due to
work and other professional commitments.
Upon return to the Philippines, he
discovered that Sto. Tomas was already
romantically involved with another man.
As a result, he filed for a petition for
divorce in Canada which was eventually
granted by the Court Justice of Windsor,
Ontario, Canada. The divorce decree took
effect a month later.

After two years, Corpuz had fallen in love

with another Filipina and wanted to marry
her. He went to Civil Registry Office of
Pasig City to register the Canadian divorce
decree of his marriage certificate with Sto.
Tomas. However, despite the registration,
an official of National Statistics Office
informed him that the former marriage still
subsists under the Philippine law until
there has been a judicial recognition of the
Canadian divorce by a competent judicial
court in view of NSO Circular No. 4, series
of 1982.

Subsequently, a petition for judicial

recognition of foreign divorce and/or
declaration of dissolution of marriage with
the RTC was filed by Corpuz. However, the
RTC denied the petition reasoning out that

Corpuz cannot institute the action for

judicial recognition of the foreign divorce
decree because he is a naturalized
Canadian citizen. It was provided further
that Sto. Tomas was the proper party who
can institute an action under the principle
of Article 26 of the Family Code which
capacitates a Filipino citizen to remarry in
case the alien spouse obtains a foreign
divorce decree.

Court, not from the second paragraph of

Article 26 of the Family Code.
RULING:
The petition is GRANTED. The decision, as
well as the order, of the RTC is REVERSED.
Moreover, a REMAND of the case to the
trial court for further proceedings is
necessary.
VILLANUEVA v. CHIONG
[G.R. No. 159889; June 5, 2008]

ISSUE:
W/N the second paragraph of Article 26 of
the Family Code grants aliens like Corpuz
the right to institute a petition for judicial
recognition of a foreign divorce decree

HELD/RATIO:
NO. The foreign divorce decree is
presumptive evidence of a right that
clothes the party with legal interest to
petition for its recognition in this
jurisdiction

The second paragraph of Article 26 of the

Family Code bestows no rights in favor of
aliens. However, this provision is not
sufficient basis to dismiss Corpuz petition
before the RTC. In other words, the
unavailability of the second paragraph of
Article 26 of the Family Code to aliens
does not necessarily strip off his legal
interest to petition the RTC for the
recognition of his foreign divorce decree.
The foreign divorce decree itself, after its
authenticity and conformity with the
aliens national law, have been duly
proven according to our rules of evidence,
serves as a presumptive evidence of right
in favor of him, pursuant to Section 48,
Rule 39 of the Rules of Court which
provides for the effect of foreign
judgments.
Therefore, the right of Corpuz to claim the
recognition of the foreign divorce arises
from Section 48, Rule 39 of the Rules of

TOPIC:
Charges
upon
obligations of CPG without consent

and

PETITIONER: Sps. Walter and Aurora

Villanueva
RESPONDENT:
Sps. Florentino and
Elisera Chiong
PONENTE:
Quisumbing, J. (2nd Div)
LAW:
Civil Code
Art 160
o all property acquired by the
spouses during the marriage is
presumed to belong to the
conjugal partnership of gains,
unless it is proved that it
pertains exclusively to the
husband or to the wife
Art 166
o Unless the wife has been
declared
a non
compos
mentis or a spendthrift, or is
under civil interdiction or is
confined in a leprosarium, the
husband cannot alienate or
encumber any real property
of the conjugal partnership
without the wifes consent
o This article shall not apply to
property
acquired
by
the
conjugal partnership before the
effective date of this Code.
Art 173
o The wife may, during the
marriage, and within
ten
years
from
the
transaction questioned, ask t
he courts for the annulment
of
any
contract of
the
husband
entered
into

without her consent, when

such consent is required, or any
act or contract of the husband
which tends to defraud her or
impair her interest in the
conjugal
partnership
property. Should the wife fail to
exercise this right, she or her
heirs, after the dissolution of
the marriage, may demand the
value of property fraudulently
alienated by the husband.
Art 178
o separation in fact between
husband and wife without
judicial approval shall not affect
the conjugal partnership
Art 1398
o An obligation having been
annulled,
the
contracting
parties shall restore to each
other the things which have
been the subject matter of
the contract, with their fruits,
and the price with its interest,
except in cases provided by
law. xxx

FACTS:
Petition for review which seeks to
modify the CA decision which affirmed
the RTCs annulment of the sale of
respondent Florentino to petitioners of
a parcel of land which the respondents
acquired during their marriage
Jan 1960: respondents were married
o Acquired the lot in question and
its Transfer Certificate of Title
(TCT)
o Respondents were separated in
fact since 1975
1985: Florentino sold of the lots
western part to petitioners for P8K
(installments)
o Florentino allowed petitioners
to occupy the lot and build a
store, a shop, and a house
there
o Dec 13, 1986: after the
payment
of
the
last
installment, petitioners
demanded the execution of a
deed
of
sale
in
their

favor. Elisera refused to sign a

deed of sale
Jul 5, 1991: Elisera filed with the RTC a
complaint for the Quieting of Title with
damages (Civ Case 4384)
Feb 12, 1992: petitioners filed with the
RTC
a
complaint
for
specific
performance with damages (CC 4460)
May 13, 1992: Florentino executed the
questioned Deed of Absolute Sale in
favor of petitioners
Jul 19, 2000: RTC consolidated the
cases
and
decided
upon
a
preponderance of evidence to: (1)
annul the Deed, (2) order petitioners to
vacate
and
remove
their
improvements from the lot, and (3)
order Florentino to return to petitioners
their payment, with interest from May
13, 1992
o Affirmed by CA
Petitioners arguments
o The lot is not conjugal property
but
Florentinos
exclusive
property
1. respondents
were
already separated in fact
at the time of sale
2. while there was no
formal
liquidation
of
respondents properties,
their separation in fact
resulted in its actual
liquidation
3. Eliseras share (eastern
part of the lot) had
previously been sold to
Sps Castro and Cuenca
o assuming arguendo that the lot
is conjugal, the transaction
should not be entirely voided as
Florentino had one-half share
over it
Eliseras arguments
o lot is conjugal property so its
sale to petitioners w/out her
knowledge,
consent
or
authority, was void
o sale was neither authorized by
any competent court nor did it
redound to their childrens
benefit
o Proof: TCT, a real property tax
declaration, and a MoA between

respondents
for
the
administration of their conjugal
properties
ISSUES:
1. WON the subject lot an exclusive
property of Florentino or a conjugal
property of respondents
a. If it is conjugal, WON the
transaction should be entirely
voided (Florentinos share of
the lot)
2. WON its sale by Florentino without
Eliseras consent was valid
RULING:
Petition DENIED. CA decision
is AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATIONS.
Order of payment of interest is
DELETED.
1. Yes, it is a conjugal property. Yes, the
alienation must be annulled in its
entirety and not only insofar as the
share of the spouse in the conjugal
property is concerned
Respondents separation in fact
neither affected the conjugal
nature of the lot nor prejudiced
Eliseras interest over it (Art 178,
NCC)
Petitioners mere insistence as to
the lots supposed exclusive nature
is insufficient to overcome the
presumption
of
a
property
belonging
to
the
conjugal
partnership (Art 160) when taken
against all the evidence for
respondents
o the
CTC
alone
isnt
sufficient to support the
presumption that the lot is
conjugal property since it
was registered in the
name of Florentino Chiong
xxx married to Elisera
Chiong
o But Eliseras real property
tax declaration stating her
and Florentino as owners of
the lot and
o the MoA they executed that
the lot is a conjugal
property is enough proof of
its conjugal nature
o the conjugal nature was
also admitted by Florentino

in the Deed, where he

declared his capacity to sell
as a co-owner of the
subject lot
the laws language (Art 173)
provides that the contract, in its
ENTIRETY,
executed
by
the
husband w/o the wife's consent,
may be annulled by the wife
o Had Congress intended to
limit such annulment in so
far as the contract shall
prejudice the wife, such
limitation should have been
spelled out in the statute
o the 1st sentence of Art 173
revokes prior jurisprudence
which held that annulment
refers only to the extent of
the interest of the wife

2. No, the lack of Eliseras consent to the

sale does not render it void ab initio
only VOIDABLE.
Villaranda v. Villaranda: w/o the
wifes consent, the husbands
alienation or encumbrance of
conjugal property prior to the
effectivity of the FC (Aug 3,
1988) is not void, but merely
voidable (Art 166-167)
o consent of both Elisera and
Florentino is necessary for
the sale of a conjugal
property to be valid
o contract
entered
by
Florentino is annullable at
Eliseras instance, during
the marriage and within 10
years from the transaction
questioned
consent of Elisera was not
obtained when Florentino sold the
lot (1985) and executed the Deed
(1992)
Elisera timely questioned the sale
when she filed CC 4383 (Jul 5,
1991), perfectly w/in 10 years from
the date of sale and execution of
the deed
if a voidable contract is annulled,
the restoration of what has been
given is proper (art 1398)

o
o

effect of annulment is to
wipe
out
a
contrcts
existence, and to restore
the
parties, insofar
as
legally
and
equitably
possible, to their original
situation
before
the
contract was entered into
petitioners should return to
respondents the land with
its fruits
respondent
Florentino
should return to petitioners
the P8,000 he received as
the price of the land
Under these circumstances,
however,
it
would
be
equitable to offset the two
amounts (legal interest for
the use of the money and
for the use of the land) with
each
other.
Award
of
payment of interest should
be deleted.

Gandionco vs Pearanda
GR No. 72984
November 27, 1987
Facts:
Private respondent, Teresita Gandionco,
filed a complaint against herein petitioner,
Froilan Gandionco for legal separation on
the ground of concubinage as a civil case.
Teresita also filed a criminal complaint of
concubinage against her husband. She
likewise filed an application for the
provisional remedy of support pendent
elite which was approved and ordered by
the respondent judge. Petitioner moved to
suspend the action for legal separation
and the incidents consequent thereto such
as the support for pendent elite, in view of
the criminal case for concubinage filed
against him. He contends that the civil
action for legal separation is inextricably
tied with the criminal action thus, all
proceedings related to legal separation
will have to be suspended and await the
conviction or acquittal of the criminal
case.

Issue:
WON a civil case for legal
separation can proceed pending
the resolution of the criminal case
for concubinage
Ruling:
Supreme Court ruled that the contentions
of the petitioner were incorrect. The
governing rule is now Sec. 3, Rule 111,
1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure which
refers to civil actions to enforce the civil
liability arising from the offense instead
of the contention of petitioner citing Art.
III Sec. 3 of the Rules on Criminal
Procedure.
A civil action for legal
separation on the ground of concubinage
may proceed ahead of, or simultaneously
with, a criminal action for concubinage,
because said civil action is not one to
enforce the civil liability arising from the
offense, even if both the civil and criminal
actions arise from or are related to the
same offense. Such civil action is one
intended to obtain the right to live
separately, with the legal consequences
thereof including the dissolution of the
conjugal partnership of gains, custody of
the children, support and disqualifications
from inheriting from the innocent spouse.
Decree of legal separation may be issued
upon proof by preponderance of evidence,
where
no
criminal
proceeding
or
conviction is necessary.
Furthermore, the support pendente lite, as
a remedy, can be availed of in an action
for legal separation, and granted at the
discretion of the judge. If in case, the
petitioner
finds
the
amount
of
support pendente lite ordered as too
onerous, he can always file a motion to
modify or reduce the same.
Kalaw vs Fernandez
Topic: Concept of legal separation,
compare with NCC 97 - Sexual
infidelity

FACTS:
Tyrone
Kalaw
and
Malyn
Fernandez got married in 1976. After the
birth of their 4th child, Tyrone had an affair
with Jocelyn Quejano. In May 1985, Malyn
left the conjugal home and her four
children with Tyrone. Meanwhile, Tyrone
started living with Jocelyn, and they had
three more children. In 1990, Tyrone went
to the United States (US) with Jocelyn and
their children. On July 6, 1994, nine years
since the de facto separation from his
wife, Tyrone filed a petition for declaration
of nullity of marriage based on Article 36
of the Family Code. He alleged that Malyn
was psychologically incapacitated to
perform and comply with the essential
marital obligations at the time of the
celebration of their marriage. He alleged
that 1) She leaves the children without
proper care and attention as she played
mahjong all day and all night; 2) She
leaves the house to party with male
friends and returned in the early hours of
the following day; and 3) She committed
adultery on June 9, 1985 in Hyatt Hotel
with one Benjie whom he saw half-naked
in the hotel room. Tyrone presented a
psychologist, Dr. Cristina Gates (Dr.
Gates), and a Catholic canon law expert,
Fr. Gerard Healy, S.J. (Fr. Healy), to testify
on Malyns psychological incapacity. Dr.
Gates explained that Malyn suffers from
Narcissistic Personalityu Disorder and that
it may have been evident even prior to
her marriage because it is rooted in her
family background and upbringing. Fr.
Healy
concluded
that
Malyn
was
psychologically incapacitated to perform
her marital duties. He explained that her
psychological incapacity is rooted in her
role as the breadwinner of her family. This
role allegedly inflated Malyns ego to the
point that her needs became priority,
while her kids and husbands needs
became secondary.
ISSUE: Whether Tyrone has sufficiently
proven
that
Malynsuffers
from
psychological incapacity
HELD: No. He presented the testimonies
of two supposed expert witnesses who
concluded
that
respondent
is

psychologically incapacitated, but the

conclusions of these witnesses were
premised on the alleged acts or behavior
of respondent which had not been
sufficiently proven. No proof whatsoever
was presented to prove her visits to
beauty salons or her frequent partying
with friends. Malyns sexual infidelity was
also not proven because she was only
dating other men. Even assuming that
she had an extramarital affair with another
man, sexual infidelity cannot be equated
with obsessive need for attention from
other men. Sexual infidelity per se is a
ground for legal separation, but it does not
necessarily
constitute
psychological
incapacity.

Republic of the Philippines vs Quintos

G.R. 159594 November 12, 2012
Doctrine: Psychological incapacity to be
proven to nullify marriage. There must be
sufficient evidence to prove psychological
incapacity to declare nullity of marriage.
Facts of the case: Eduardo and Catalina
were married on March 16, 1977 in civil
rites solemnized by the Municipal Mayor of
Lingayen, Pangasinan.
The couple was
not blessed with a child due to Catalinas
hysterectomy
following
her
second
miscarriage. On April 6, 1998, Eduardo
filed a petition for the declaration of
nullity of their marriage, citing Catalinas
psychological incapacity to comply with
her essential marital obligations. Catalina
did not interpose any objection to the
petition, but prayed to be given her share
in the conjugal house and lot located in
Bacabac, Bugallon, Pangasinan.
After conducting an investigation, the
public prosecutor determined that there
was no collusion between Eduardo and

Catalina. Eduardo testified that Catalina

always left their house without his
consent; that she engaged in petty
arguments with him; that she constantly
refused to give in to his sexual needs; that
she spent most of her time gossiping with
neighbors instead of doing the household
chores and caring for their adopted
daughter; that she squandered by
gambling all his remittances as an
overseas worker in Qatar since 1993; and
that she abandoned the conjugal home in
1997 to live with Bobbie Castro, her
paramour.
Catalina
underwent
a
neuropsychiatric examination by Dr.
Reyes. The results showed that Catalina
exhibited traits of Borderline Personality
Disorder that was no longer treatable.
Catalina did not appear during trial but
submitted
her
Answer/Manifestation,
whereby she admitted her psychological
incapacity, but denied leaving the
conjugal home without Eduardos consent
and flirting with different men. She
insisted that she had only one live-in
partner; and that she would not give up
her share in the conjugal residence
because she intended to live there or to
receive her share should the residence be
sold.
The RTC ruled in favor of Eduardo but the
case was elevated to the Court of Appeals.
The CA then affirmed the decision made
by the RTC. On appeal with the SC, the
Office of the Solicitor General argues that
the RTC and CA erred in their decision.
The OSG argued that Catalinas infidelity,
gambling habits and abandonment of the
conjugal home were not grounds under
Article 36 of the Family Code; that there
was no proof that her infidelity and
gambling had occurred prior to the
marriage, while her abandonment would
only be a ground for legal separation
under Article 55(10) of the Family Code;
that the neuro-psychiatric evaluation by
Dr. Reyes did not sufficiently establish
Catalinas psychological incapacity; that
Dr. Reyes was not shown to have exerted
effort to look into Catalinas past life,
attitudes, habits and character as to be
able to explain her alleged psychological
incapacity; that there was not even a
finding of the root cause of her alleged

psychological incapacity; and that there

appeared to be a collusion between the
parties inasmuch as Eduardo admitted
during the trial that he had given
P50,000.00 to Catalina in exchange for her
non-appearance in the trial.
Decision:
The Court stated that the
incapacity should be established by the
totality of evidence presented during trial,
making it incumbent upon the petitioner
to sufficiently prove the existence of the
psychological incapacity.
The Court
reversed the decision made by the CA in
declaring the nullity of marriage of
Eduardo and Catalina.
The Court
presented the following arguments for its
decision.
First, Catalinas supposed behavior (i.e.,
her frequent gossiping with neighbors,
leaving the house without Eduardos
consent, refusal to do the household
chores and to take care of their adopted
daughter, and gambling), were not even
established. Secondly, both lower courts
noticeably relied heavily on the results of
the neuro-psychological evaluation by Dr.
Reyes despite the paucity of factual
foundation to support the claim of
Catalinas psychological in capacity. Dr.
Reyes tendered no explanation on the root
cause that could have brought about such
behavior on the part of Catalina. Thirdly,
Dr. Reyes had only one interview with
Catalina, and did not personally seek out
and meet with other persons, aside from
Eduardo, who could have shed light on
and established the conduct of the
spouses before and during the marriage.
For that reason, Dr. Reyes report lacked
depth and objectivity. Fourth, in Suazo v.
Suazo the Court stated that that there
must be proof of a natal or supervening
disabling factor (an adverse integral
element in the respondents personality
structure) that effectively incapacitated
the respondent spouse from complying
with the basic marital obligations. The
only fact established here, which Catalina
even admitted in her Answer, was her
abandonment of the conjugal home to live
with another man. Yet, abandonment was
not one of the grounds for the nullity of
marriage under the Family Code. Lastly,

the Court does not concur with the

assertion by the OSG that Eduardo
colluded with Catalina.

Campos v Campos, A.M. No. MTJ-101761, Feb. 08, 2012

Facts:

Aida Campos, wife and children Alistair

and Charmaine filed a complaint against
Judge Eliseo Campos (Former Judge at the
MTC Bayugan, Agusan del Sur), husband
and father on grounds of dishonesty,
serious misconduct and immorality.
On July 16, 2008, respondent filed a
declaration of nullity of marriage (Civil
Case No. 1118)in RTC Bayugan Agusan del
sur. Aida and Eliseo got married on
September 9, 1981 and had two children,
Alistair and Charmaine.
In the complaint, respondent said that
both him and Aida are psychologically
incapacitated therefore failing to comply
with their marital obligations. Respondent
admitted that he is a homosexual and he
imagined he was with another man just so
he could be intimate with his wife while his
wife had affairs with other men which he
did not question nor stopped such.
Aida denied the things respondent said
about her and said that respondent was
only saying this only because respondent
wants to marry another woman, the
reason why respondent wants to nullify
their marriage. Aida opposed the petition
and instead filed another petition for legal
separation.
Aida said that after respondent filed for a
petition of nullity of marriage, Eliseo
Campos also filed for an affidavit of loss
on the land title under the name of Alistair.
She said that the land is her property and
was wrongfully registered under Alistair.
She also said that the title has been in the
possession of Alistair when respondent
filed for the affidavit of loss. She claimed
that respondent only filed for the affidavit
of loss in case the Court grants the
petition of nullity of marriage.
Respondent admitted that indeed, he filed
for an affidavit of loss after the petition for
nullity of marriage only to protect his

interest after learning that his wife and

son are planning to use the property as
collateral for a loan. On the other hand, he
denied the allegations of Aida on him
having another woman and said that he
even admitted his homosexuality and
infidelity of their mother to his children.
He now sleeps in the basement after his
children abandoned him upon discovery of
his identity. In July 2, 2010, case was
referred to Executive Judge of RTC for
investigation, report and recommendation.
According to the report of Executive Judge
Hector
B.
Salise,
admission
of
homosexuality does not automatically
make the person immoral. The judge also
did not find any proof of respondent
having another woman. Respondent was
not guilty of dishonesty as having children
with Aida is not a sufficient proof that
Eliseo was lying about his identity for the
pending petition on nullity of marriage.
The Judge also said that Eliseo was only
protecting his interest on the title when he
filed for an affidavit of loss and the
complainants did not invalidate the
allegation of respondent regarding who
really owns the property.
What the Executive Judge only found was
Eliseo Campos guilty of misconduct after
contracting the land title under Alistairs
name when he was still a minor. The Judge
found out that respondent and Aida
conspired into entering this transaction for
fear that they would lose the property
during a pending case against respondent
at that time. Judge left it to the Court to
impose the proper penalty.
On the report and recommendation of
Office of the Court Administrator, burden
of proving the immorality of respondent
rests with the complainants. On the truth
about the homosexuality of Eliseo Camps,
this can be further proven in the
proceeding before the trial court. On the
affidavit of loss, Eliseos son Alistair
admitted that Eliseo is the real owner but
it was just registered under his name. The
perjury filed by Aida was dismissed
regarding the affidavit of loss because the
prosecutor found that respondent was
acting in good faith to protect his right.
Office of Court Administrator also found
respondent guilty of simple misconduct in
naming the title under the name of Alistair

when respondent knows that Alistair is

only a minor. Office of Court Administrator
recommends the dismissal of complaints
for immorality and dishonesty but
recommends an administrative penalty of
deduction of three months salary from the
time of respondents resignation on July 1,
2009.

Issue:

1. W/N Judge Campos is guilty of immorality

and dishonesty?
2. W/N respondent is guilty of simple
misconduct?
Ratio:

1. No. The Court ruled that complainants

failed to prove the immorality of
homosexuality of respondent. As said by
the OCA, the burden of proof rests on the
complainants. They were not able to prove
that respondent acted in any scandalous
manner nor prove of the another woman
alleged by complainants. However, the
Court reminded Eliseo Campos that as a
Judge, he is a subject of public scrutiny
and he must conduct himself in a way that
is consistent with the dignity of Judicial
Office. The alleged homosexuality is for
the determination of the trial court where
the case is pending. In regards to
dishonesty, the proof that they had
children is not enough to say that
respondent is lying about his identity. With
the affidavit of loss, it was also discovered
that respondent was only acting in good
faith to protect his interest. The said title
was kept in the respondents drawer and
when he came to look for it, it was gone.
The advice of the Register of deeds made
him file an affidavit of loss and the fact
that his own son did not invalidate the
claim that respondent is the real owner of
the property means that respondent is not
guilty of dishonesty.
2. Yes. Respondent is guilty of simple
misconduct. As the Court defined it : it is
an
unacceptable
behavior
that
transgresses the established rules of

conduct for public officers. It generally

means wrongful, improper, unlawful
conduct motivated by a premeditated,
obstinate, or intentional purpose although
it may not necessarily imply corruption or
criminal intent In the case at bar,
respondent as a Judge and who is familiar
with the law, has knowledge of such
transaction that it is not allowed to enter
Alistair in the said title because he was
still a minor and does not have legal
capacity yet on contracts for fear of losing
in the pending case at the time. What
Eliseo did was an unlawful conduct. Under
Section 9 in relation to Section 11(B), Rule
140 of the Rules of Court, simple
misconduct is a less serious offense
punishable by suspension from office
without salary and other benefits for not
less than one month nor more than three
months or a fine of more than P10,000 but
not exceeding P20,000. Seeing that
respondent already resigned, the Court
modified the penalty of deducting three
months salary from respondents benefits.
Held:
Guilty of simple misconduct
Ordered to pay PHP20,000 or deduct it
from his salary from benefits.
It is within the court handling the
declaration of nullity of marriage to
determine his claim of homosexuality.

Lapuz v. Eufemio
43 SCRA 177
Facts:
Carmen Lapuz-Sy filed a petition for legal
separation against Eufemio Eufemio on
August 1953. They were married civilly on
September 21, 1934 and canonically after
nine days. They had lived together as
husband and wife continuously without
any children until 1943 when her husband
abandoned her. They acquired properties
during their marriage.
Petitioner then discovered that her
husband cohabited with a Chinese woman
named Go Hiok on or about 1949. She
prayed for the issuance of a decree of
legal separation, which among others,
would order that the defendant Eufemio
should be deprived of his share of the
conjugal partnership profits.
Eufemio
counterclaimed
for
the
declaration of nullity of his marriage with
Lapuz-Sy on the ground of his prior and
subsisting marriage with Go Hiok. Trial
proceeded and the parties adduced their
respective evidence.
However, before the trial could be
completed, respondent already scheduled
to present surrebuttal evidence, petitioner
died in a vehicular accident on May 1969.
Her counsel duly notified the court of her
death.
Eufemio moved to dismiss the petition for
legal separation on June 1969 on the
grounds that (1) the said petition was filed
beyond the one-year period provided in
Article 102 of the Civil Code and (2) that
the death of Carmen abated the action for
legal separation.
Petitioners counsel moved to substitute
the deceased Carmen by her father,
Macario Lapuz.
Issue:

Whether the death of the plaintiff, before

final decree in an action for legal
separation, abate the action and will it
also apply if the action involved property
rights.
Ruling:
Yes.
An action for legal separation, which
involves nothing more than the bed-andboard separation of the spouses, is purely
personal and only the innocent spouse
may claim legal separation. Being
personal in character, it follows that the
death of of one party to the action causes
the death of the action itself: actio
personalis moritur cum persona.
This is also true even if property rights are
involved. These rights are mere effects of
decree of separation, their source being
the decree itself; without the decree, such
rights do not come into existence, so that
before the finality of a decree, these
claims are merely rights in expectation. If
death supervenes during the pendency of
the action, no decree can be forthcoming,
death producing a more radical and
definitive separation; and the expected
consequential rights and claims would
necessarily remain unborn.
The petition of Eufemio for declaration of
nullity is moot and academic and there
could be no further interest in continuing
the same after her demise, that
automatically dissolved the questioned
union.
Any property rights acquired by either
party as a result of Article 144 of the Civil
Code of the Philippines 6 could be
resolved and determined in a proper
action for partition by either the appellee
or by the heirs of the appellant

G.R. No. L-11766

1960

In January, 1955, defendant began

cohabiting with one Asuncion Rebulado
and on September 1, 1955, said Asuncion
gave birth to a child who was recorded as
the child of said defendant (Exh. C.).It was
shown also that defendant and Asuncion
deported themselves as husband and wife
and were generally reputed as such in the
community.

October 25,

SOCORRO MATUBIS, plaintiff-appellant,

vs.
ZOILO PRAXEDES, defendant-appellee.
FACTS:

Alleging abandonment and concubinage,

plaintiff Socorro Matubis, filed with the
Court of First Instance of Camarines Sur,
on April 24, 1956, a complaint for legal
Separation and changed of surname
against her husband defendant Zoilo
Praxedes.

After the trial, without the defendant

adducing any evidence, the court a
quo rendered judgment holding that the
acts
of
defendant
constituted
concubinage,
a
ground
for
legal
separation. It however, dismissed the
complaint by stating:

The allegations of the complaint were

denied by defendant spouse, who
interposed the defense that it was plaintiff
who left the conjugal home. During the
trial, wherein the plaintiff alone introduced
oral as well as documentary evidence, the
following facts were established:

While this legal ground exist, the suit must

be dismissed for two reasons, viz:

Under Art. 102 of the new Civil Code, an

action for legal separation cannot be filed
except within one year from and after the
date on which the plaintiff became
cognizant of the cause and within five
years from and after the date when the
cause occurred.

Article 100 of the new Civil Code provides

that the legal separation may be claimed
only by the innocent spouse, provided
there has been no condonation of or
consent to the adultery or concubinage.

This stipulation is an unbridled license she

gave her husband to commit concubinage.
Having consented to the concubinage, the
plaintiff cannot claim legal separation.

Plaintiff and defendant were legally

married on January 10, 1943 at Iriga,
Camarines Sur. For failure to agree on how
they should live as husband and wife, the
couple, on May 30, 1944, agreed to live
separately from each other, which status
remained unchanged until the present. On
April 3, 1948, plaintiff and defendant
entered into an agreement (Exhibit B), the
significant portions of which are hereunder
reproduced..

a) That both of us relinquish our right over

the other as legal husband and wife.
b) That both without any interference by
of us, nor either of us can prosecute
other for adultery or concubinage or
other crime or suit arising from
separation.

any
the
any
our

c) That I, the, wife, is no longer entitled for

any support from my husband or any
benefits he may received thereafter, nor I
the husband is not entitled for anything
from my wife.
d) That neither of us can claim anything from
the other from the time we verbally
separated, that is from May 30, 1944 to
the present when we made our verbal
separation into writing.

ISSUE

WON it was error for the lower court to

have considered that the period to bring
the action has already elapsed and that
there was consent on the part of the
plaintiff to the concubinage.
HELD:

The complaint was filed outside the

periods provided for by the above Article.
By the very admission of plaintiff, she
came to know the ground (concubinage)
for the legal separation in January, 1955.
She instituted the complaint only on April

24, 1956. It is to be noted that appellant

did not even press this matter in her brief.

The very wording of the agreement Exhibit

B. gives no room for interpretation other
than that given by the trial judge.

Condonation and consent on the part of

plaintiff are necessarily the import of
paragraph 6(b) of the agreement. The
condonation and consent here are not only
implied but expressed. The law (Art. 100
Civil Code), specifically provides that legal
separation may be claimed only by the
innocent spouse, provided there has been
no condonation of or consent to the
adultery or concubinage. Having condoned
and/or consented in writing, the plaintiff is
now undeserving of the court's sympathy
(People vs. Scheneckenburger, 73 Phil.,
413). Plaintiff's counsel even agrees that
the complaint should be dismissed. He
claims however, that the grounds for the
dismissal should not be those stated in the
decision of the lower court, "but on the
ground that plaintiff and defendant have
already been legally separated from each
other, but without the marital bond having
been affected, long before the effectivity
of the new Civil Code" (appellants brief,
pp. 7-8). Again, we cannot subscribed to
counsel's contention, because it is
contrary to the evidence.

Conformably with the foregoing, we find

that the decision appealed from is in
accordance with the evidence and the law
on the matter. The same is hereby
affirmed, with costs.

People v Zapata
G.R. No. L-3047
May 16, 1951
Topic: Concept of Legal Separation When may petition be filed
Facts:

In the CFI of Pampanga, a complaint

for adultery was filed by Andres Bondoc
against his wife, Guadalupe Zapata, and
her paramour, Dalmacio Bondoc; for
cohabiting and having repeated sexual
intercourse during the period from the
year 1946 14 March 1947. Guadalupe
entered the plea of guilty.

In the same court, on 17 September

1948, the offended husband filed another
complaint for adulterous acts committed
by his wife and her paramour from 15
March 1947 to 17 September 1948.

Each of the defendants filed a

motion to quash the complaint of the
ground that they would be twice put in
jeopardy of punishment for the same
offense.

CFI upheld the contention of the

defendants and quashed the second
complaint.
o That the adulterous acts charged in the
first and second complains must be
deemed one continuous offense, the
defendants in both complaints being the
same and identical persons and the two
sets of unlawful acts having taken place
continuously during the years 1946, 1947
and part of 1948, and that the acts or two
sets of acts that gave rise to the crimes of
adultery complained of in both cases
constitute one and the same offense,
within the scope and meaning of the
constitutional provision that "No person
shall be twice put in jeopardy of
punishment for the same offense."

Hence, this present petition.

Issue: Whether or not the filing of another
complaint of adultery constitutes double
jeopardy
Held:

No. For as long as the status of the

spouses
remain
unchanged,
the
relationship undissolved and unbroken, an
encroachment or trespass upon that
status constitutes a crime. There is no
constitutional or legal provision which bars

the filing of as many complaints for

adultery as there were adulterous acts
committed, each constituting one crime.

The culprits perpetrate the crime in

every sexual intercourse and they need
not do another consummate it. If the
defendants again committed adulterous
acts not included in the 1st complaint and
for which the 2nd complaint was filed,
another crime of adultery was committed.

Another reason is that if the 2nd

complaint places the defendants in double
jeopardy, the adultery committed by the
male charged in the 2nd complaint, should
he be absolved or acquitted of the 1st
complaint upon the evidence that he did
not know that his co-defendant was a
married woman, would remain or go
unpunished.
o The defense set up by him against the
1st complaint upon which he was acquitted
would no longer be available, because at
the time of the commission of the crime
charged in the 2nd complaint, he already
knew that this defendant was a married
woman and he continued to have carnal
knowledge of her. Even if the husband
should pardon his adulterous wife, such
pardon would not exempt the wife and her
paramour from criminal liability for
adulterous acts committed after the
pardon was granted because the pardon
refers to previous and not to subsequent
adulterous acts

LUIS MA. ARANETA, Petitioner, vs.

HONORABLE
HERMOGENES
CONCEPCION, as judge of the Court of
First Instance of Manila, Branch VI
and
EMMA
BENITEZ
ARANETA,
Respondents.
7/31/1956, LABRADOR, J.:
TOPIC: Court procedure in legal separation

FACTS:
Petitioner Luis Araneta filed for legal
separation against Emma on the ground of
Adultery
Emma filed omnibus petition supported by
her affidavit
to secure custody of their three minor
children
monthly support of P5,000 for herself and
said children
return of her passport
to
enjoin Plaintif from
ordering
his
hirelings from harassing and molesting her
to have Plaintif therein pay for the fees of
her attorney in the action.
Luis opposed the petition supported by
affidavits and documents
denying the misconduct imputed to him
and
alleging
that Defendant had
abandoned the children
alleging that conjugal properties were
worth only P80,000, not one million pesos
as alleged by Emma
denying the taking of her passport or the
supposed vexation
contesting her right to attorneys fees.
prayed that as the petition for custody and
support cannot be determined without
evidence, the parties be required to
submit their respective evidence
contended that Emma is not entitled to
the custody of the children as she had
abandoned them and had committed
adultery
that there are no conjugal assets and she
is not entitled to support because of her
infidelity and that she was able to support
herself
The Respondent judge, Hon. Concepcion
resolved the omnibus petition, granting
the custody of the children to Emma and a
monthly allowance of P2,300 for support

for her and the children, P300 for a house

and P2,000 as attorneys fees
Main reason: Art 103 of the Civil Code - An
action for legal separation shall in no case
be tried before six months shall have
elapsed since the filing of the petition
That the provision is mandatory
Case cannot be tried within the period of
six months from the filing of the complaint
Admitting evidence now will make
reconciliation difficult if not impossible
The court should act as if nothing yet had
happened, ignore adultery, ignore any act
of cruelty to his wife
The status quo of the family must be
restored as much as possible
In this country, unlike perhaps in any other
country of the globe, a family or a home is
a petite corporation. The father is the
administrator who earns the family funds,
dictates rules in the home for all to follow,
and protects all members of his family.
The mother keeps home, keeps children in
her company and custody, and keeps the
treasure of that family. In a typical Filipino
family, the wife prepares home budget
and makes little investment without the
knowledge of her husband. A husband
who holds the purse is un-Filipino. He is
shunned in Filipino community. The court
therefore, in taking action on petition No.
1 should be guided by the above
considerations
Petitioner files the present petition for
certiorari against said order and for
mandamus
to
compel
the
Respondent judge to require the parties to
submit evidence before deciding the
omnibus petition
ISSUE:
W/N submission of evidence on the
question of custody and support should be
granted before deciding on the omnibus
petition

HELD:
YES
We granted a writ of preliminary injunction
against the order
More than 6 months has elapsed since the
filing of the petition questioned BUT Art
103 is intended as a cooling off period to

make possible a reconciliation between

the spouses AND it does not have the
effect of overriding other provisions such
as the determination of the custody of the
children
and
alimony and
support
pendente
lite
according
to
the
circumstances
Article 105, Civil Code; The law expressly
enjoins that these should be determined
by
the
court
according
to
the
circumstances. If these are ignored or the
courts close their eyes to actual facts,
rank in justice may be caused.
Why should the court ignore the claim of
adultery? Why assume that the children
are in the custody of the wife? Evidence of
all these disputed allegations should be
allowed that the discretion of the court as
to the custody and alimony pendente lite
may be lawfully exercised.
The rule is that all the provisions of
the
law
even
if
apparently
contradictory, should be allowed to
stand and given effect by reconciling
them if necessary.
A statute is passed as a whole and not in
parts or sections and is animated by one
general purpose and intend (STATCON!)
Thus the determination of the custody and
alimony should be given effect and force
provided it does not go to the extent of
violating the policy of the cooling off
period. That is, evidence not affecting the
cause of the separation, like the actual
custody of the children, the means
conducive
to
their
welfare
and
convenience during the pendency of the
case, these should be allowed that the
court may determine which is best for
their custody.
- Writ prayed for is hereby ISSUED and
the Respondent judge or whosoever takes
his place is ordered to proceed on the
question of custody and support pendente
lite in accordance with this opinion. The
courts order fixing the alimony and
requiring payment is REVERSED. Without
costs.

Jose De Ocampo vs. Serafina Florenciano

Topic: Court Procedure in Legal Separatin
Facts:
Ocampo and Florenciano were married
in April 5, 1938.
In 1951, Ocampo discovered that his
wife is having an illicit affair with one Jose
Alcaraz; because of said discovery,
Ocampo sent Seferina to Manila to study
beauty culture for one year.
Towards the end of 1952, after Seferina
finished school, she left Ocampo and from
then on the lived separately from one
another.
After a lapse of 3 years, Jose again
discovered his wife having an illicit
relation with another man named Nelson
Ozarme and immediately signified his
intention to terminate their union and to
file for a petition for legal separation to
which defendant, Seferina manifested her
conformity with Ocampo on the condition
that he will not charge her further with
adultery.
Upon the questioning by the Fiscal, she
admitted having an illicit affair to a man
other than her husband
CFI of Nueva Ecija and CA: Dismissed
the case on the grounds of collusion,
condonation and prescription for filing the
complaint in accordance with Article 100
and 101 of the Civil Code.
Issue: Whether or not the Court of Appeals
erred in dismissing the case
Ruling: Yes.
In their ruling, the Supreme Court said
that contrary to the believe of the lower
court and the CA, the mere expression of
the defendant that she too wants to obtain
legal separation is no obstacle to the
prosecution for it does not constitute
collusion.
In relation to the above and as
mentioned in Article 100 of the Civil Code,
collusion as a ground for the dismissal for
a petition for legal separation should be
defined as an agreement between
husband and wife for one of them to
commit, or to appear to commit, of to be
represented in court as having committed

a valid matrimonial offense, or to suppress

evidence of a valid defense, for the
purpose of enabling the other to obtain
divorce.
With regards the alleged condonation of
the husband to his wifes illicit activities,
the SC said that plaintiffs failure to look
for
his
wife
does
not
constitute
condonation or consent for it was already
established that it was she who left their
home, hence, hers was the obligation to
return.

proper remedy, which must be availed of

within five years from the date of the
contract implementing such decision.

Sabalones v. Court of Appeals

GR No. 106169
February 14, 1994
-

Facts
As member of diplomatic service assigned
to different countries, petitioner left his
wife, respondent, the administration of
some of their conjugal properties.
1985 petitioner retired as an ambassador
and returned to the Philippines but not to
his wife and children. 4 years later he filed
a judicial authorization to sell a building
belonging to his conjugal partnership with
the wife, claiming that he was living alone
with no income
Respondent opposed authorization and
filed for legal separation. That the house
was being occupied by her and her 6
children.
She asked the court to grant the decree of
legal separation and order the liquidation
of their conjugal properties, with forfeiture
of her husband's share therein because of
his adultery. She also prayed that it enjoin
the petitioner and his agents from a)
disturbing the occupants of the Forbes
Park property and b) disposing of or
encumbering
any
of
the
conjugal
properties.
After trial, Judge Umali found petitioner
guilty
for
contracting
a
bigamous
marriage. Court then decreed
legal
separation
between
petitioner
and
respondent, forfeiture of his share in the
conjugal properties and non-entitlement to
support
Pendente lite, respondent filed a motion
for the issuance of a writ of preliminary
injunction to enjoin the petitioner from
interfering with the administration of their
properties
1992, CA granted the preliminary injuction
Petitioner argued that the law provides of
a joint administration of the conjugal
properties by the husband and wife,
according to Ar. 124 of the FC:
Art.
124.
The
administration
and
enjoyment of the conjugal partnership
property shall belong to both spouses
jointly. In case of disagreement, the
husband's decision shall prevail, subject to
recourse to the court by the wife for

In the event that one

spouse is incapacitated or
otherwise
unable
to
participate
in
the
administration
of
the
conjugal
properties,
the
other spouse may assume
sole
powers
of
the
administration.
These
powers do not include
disposition or encumbrance
without authority of the
court or the written consent
of the other spouse. In the
absence of such authority or
consent, the disposition or
encumbrance shall be void.
However, the transaction
shall be construed and the
third person, and may be
perfected as a binding
contract
upon
the
acceptance by the other
spouse or the authorization
by the court before the offer
is withdrawn by either or
both offerors.
-

Petitioner also argues that CA falied to

appoint an administrator of the conjugal
assests as mandated by Art. 60 of FC

Art. 61 After the filing of the petition for

legal separation, the spouses shall be
entitled to live separately from each other.
The court, in the absence of
a
written
agreement
between the spouses, shall
designate either of them or
a third person to administer
the absolute community or
conjugal
partnership
property. The administrator
appointed by the court shall
have the same powers and
duties as those of a
guardian under the Rules of
Court.

Issue
W/N respondent, pendent lite, can enter
into a contract of lease of a conjugal

property without the consent of both

spouses
-

Held
While the law does indeed grant the
spouses
joint administration
over
conjugal properties under Art. 124
FC, Art. 61 of the same code is to be
applied in the instant case since the
legal separation case filed by the
wife is stil pending
Pending the appointment of an admin
istrator over the conjugal assets, CA
was justified in allowing the wife to
continue with her administration
pursuant to Art. 61FC. This provision
states that after a petition for legal
separation has benefited, the trial
court shall, in the absence of a
written
agreement
between
the
couple, appoint either one of the
spouses or a third person to act as
the administrator.
While it is true that no formal
designation of the administrator has
been made, such designation was
implicit in the decision of the trial
court denying the petitioner any
share in the conjugal properties (and
thus
also
disqualifying
him
as
administrator thereof).
The
primary
purpose
of
the
provisional remedy of injunction is to
preserve the status quo of the things
subject of the action or the relations
between
the
partiesand thus protect the rights of
the plaintiff respecting these matters
during thependency
of
the
suit.
Otherwise, the defendant may, before
final judgment, do or continue doing
the act which the plaintiff asks the
court
to
restrain
and
thus
makeineffectual the final judgment th
at may be rendered afterwards in fav
or of theplaintiff

G.R. No. 996, October 13, 1902

LUIS R. YANGCO, petitioner,

versus

pending litigation, should be granted the

said allowance.

ISSUE:
W/N the alimony should be granted to
Victorina who claimed to be Luis wife

WILLIAM J. ROHDE, respondent

HELD/RATIO:
ARELLANO, C.J.:
FACTS:
A complaint was filed by Victorina Obin
which prayed that she be declared the
lawful wife of petitioner, Luis R. Yangco.
She further prayed for that she be granted
a divorce, an allowance for alimony, and
attorneys fees. A demurrer was then filed
by the petitioner, but then Judge William
Rohde of the Court of First Instance of the
City of Manila overruled the same. He
further ordered that on the 22nd of July
the petitioner should pay the plaintiff, in
advance, a monthly allowance of 250
Mexican pesos from and after the 11th of
March last past; furthermore, there must
be payment on the 1st day of August
following all accrued allowances, in
addition to the allowance for the said
month, amounting to the sum of 1,500
pesos. The plaintiff, in the said action,
owned no property, and the judge did not
require from her any security.

Petitioner then filed a case of prohibition

against the said order of Judge William
Rohde because the former claimed that
Victorina was not his wife and that there
was insufficient evidence to prove of
Victorinas claim.

The respondent judge said that the SC had

no jurisdiction over the subject-matter and
that the petition did not state facts
sufficient to create a cause of action. He
further claimed that Victorina, as a
married woman, by reason of divorce

NO. The respondent judge was in error

when he enacted judgment for alimony
because of lack of evidence. In addition,
there was no law or reason which allows
the granting of alimony to a person who
merely claims to be a spouse without
supporting such a claim with evidence.

RAMOS v. VAMENTA
[G.R. No. L-34132]
[July 29, 1972]
TOPIC:
Support and custody
pendente lite
PETITIONER: Lucy Somosa-Ramos
RESPONDENT:
Hon.
Cipriano
Vamenta, Jr. (Presiding Judge, CFI Negros
Oriental), Clemente Ramos
PONENTE:
Fernando, J. (En Banc)

LAW:
NCC
Art.
97.
A
petition
for
legal
separation may be filed: (1) For
adultery on the part of the wife and
for concubinage on the part of the
husband as defined in the Penal
Code; or (2) An attempt by one
spouse against the life of the other.
Art.
103.
An
action
for
legal
separation shall in no case be tried
before six months shall have elapsed
since the filing of the petition.
Art. 104. After the filing of the
petition for legal separation, the
spouse shall be entitled to live
separately from each other and
manage their respective property.
The husband shall continue to
manage the conjugal partnership
property but if the court deems it
proper, it may appoint another to
manage said property, in which case
the administrator shall have the same
rights and duties as a guardian and
shall not be allowed to dispose of the
income or of the capital except in
accordance with the orders of the
court.
FACTS:
Jun 18, 1971: Petitioner filed Civ Case
in the sala of respondent judge vs.
Clemente for legal separation on the
grounds of concubinage and an
attempt at her life on his part.
She also sought for the issuance of a
writ
of
preliminary
mandatory
injunction for the return to her of her
paraphernal and exclusive property,

o
o

then under the administration and

management of Clemente
Jul 3, 1971: opposition to the hearing
of such a motion based on Art 103,
NCC
Jul 16, 1971 pleading of respondent:
if the motion asking for preliminary
mandatory injunction were heard, the
prospect of the reconciliation of the
spouses would become even more
dim
Respondent judge favorably ruled on
respondents plea and held that Art
103 also prohibits the court from
acting on a motion for preliminary
mandatory injunction
ordered the suspension of the
hearing on petitioners motion for a
writ
of
preliminary
mandatory
injunction filed simultaneously with
the suit for legal separation
Petitioner disputes this ruling
ISSUE:WON NCC Art 103 which prohibits
the hearing of an action for legal
separation before the lapse of 6
months from the filing of the
petition would also preclude the
court from acting on a motion for
preliminary mandatory injunction
applied for as an ancillary remedy
to such a suit

o
o

RULING:
No, it is not an absolute bar
to
the
hearing
motion
for
preliminary injunction prior to the
expiration of the 6-month period.
Petition
GRANTED.
Assailed
decision SET ASIDE. Respondent
judge directed to proceed to hear
the
motion
for
preliminary
mandatory
injunction.
Costs
against Clemente.
Ordinarily, no delay in the Courts
action is permissible
Justice to parties would not thereby
be served
The sooner the dispute is resolved,
the better for all concerned
A suit for legal separation, however,
is something else
involves a relationship on which the
law would attach the quality of
permanence

o
o
o
o

o
o

its undeniable that there are times

when domestic felicity is less than it
ought to be
Nonetheless, it will not serve public
interest or the welfare of the
husband or the wife, to allow them to
go their respective ways
Especially where there are offspring
A suit for legal separation lies
Even then, the hope that the parties
may settle their differences is not all
together abandoned
time may aid in the process
Guilty parties may mend his or her
ways, and the offended party may in
turn exhibit magnanimity
interposition of a six-month period
before an action for legal separation
is to be tried
The court where the action is pending
according to NCC Art 103 is to remain
passive
let
the
parties
alone
in
the
meanwhile; precluded from hearing
the suit
lower courts view: an ancillary
motion such as one for preliminary
mandatory injunction is not to be
acted on; otherwise, there would be a
failure to abide by the literal
language of such codal provision
Nonetheless,
the
law
remains
cognizant of the need in certain cases
for judicial power to assert itself
Art 104 recognizes that the question
of management of the husband and
wifes respective property need not
be left unresolved even during such
six-month period
The absolute limitation from which
the court suffers under Art. 103 is
eased; parties may in the meanwhile
be heard
Otherwise, the husband whom she
accused of concubinage and an
attempt against her life would in the
meanwhile
continue
in
the
management of what she claimed to
be her paraphernal property
Araneta v. Concepcion: the period of
6 months fixed in NCC Art. 103 is
intended as a cooling off period for a
possible reconciliation between the
spouses, but this practical expedient
does not have the effect of overriding

other
provisions,
such
as
the
determination of the custody of the
children and alimony and support
pendente lite according to the
circumstance ... The law expressly
enjoins
that
these
should
be
determined by the court according to
the circumstances. If these are
ignored or the courts close their eyes
to actual facts, rank injustice may be
caused
At any rate, more than six months
had elapsed. No more impediment for
the lower court to act on the motion
of petitioner for the issuance of a writ
of preliminary mandatory injunction
SEPARATE OPINIONS:
Reyes, J., [concurring]
Concurs, specially in view of
ruling in De la Via vs. Villareal

the

LERMA VS CA
GR No. L-33352 December 20, 1974
FACTS:
Teodoro E. Lerma and Concepcion Diaz
were married on May 19, 1951. On August
22, 1969 the petitioner filed a complaint
for adultery against the respondent and a
certain
Teodoro
Ramirez
and
on
September 26, 1972 the court of First
Instance of Rizal decided the adultery case
of the respondent and found her and her
co-accused, Teodoro Ramirez, guilty of the
charge, sentencing them to a term of
imprisonment. During the pendency of the
adultery case against the respondent, on
November 18, 1969 the respondent filed
with the lower court, a complaint against
the petitioner for legal separation and/or
separation of properties, custody of their
children and support, with an urgent
petition for support pendente lite for her
and their youngest son, Gregory, who was
then and until now is in her custody.
The respondent's complaint for legal
separation is based on two grounds:
concubinage and attempt against her life.
The application for support pendente lite
was granted in an order dated December
24,1969, which was amended in an order
dated February 15, 1970. The petitioner
filed his opposition to the respondent's
application for support pendente lite,
setting up as defense the adultery charge
he had filed against the respondent. On
March 12, 1970 the petitioner filed with
respondent Court of Appeals a petition for
certiorari and prohibition with preliminary
injunction to annul the aforementioned
orders on the ground that they were
issued with grave abuse of discretion. The
next day the respondent court gave due
course to the petition and issued a writ of
preliminary injunction to stop Judge
Luciano from enforcing said orders. The
respondent court, in its decision of
October 8, 1970, set aside the assailed
orders and granted the petitioner an
opportunity to present evidence before
the lower court in support of his defense
against the application for support
pendente lite. The respondent moved to

reconsider the decision on the ground that

the petitioner had not asked that he be
allowed to present evidence in the lower
court. The respondent court, in its
resolution of January 20, 1971, set aside
the decision of October 8 and rendered
another, dismissing the petition. This is
now the subject of the instant proceeding
for review.
ISSUE:
W/N adultery is a good defense against
the respondents claim for support
pendent lite
HELD:
The lower court and CA erred in upholding
Art 292 of NCC because it is not in itself
the source of the legal right to receive
support. It is not a defense when the
support is to be taken from the conjugal
partnership property. The right to separate
support or maintenance, even from the
conjugal
partnership
property,
presupposes the existence of a justifiable
cause for the spouse claiming such right
to live separately. This is implicit in Article
104 of the Civil Code, which states that
after the filing of the petition for legal
separation the spouses shall be entitled to
live separately from each other. A petition
in bad faith, such as that filed by one who
is himself or herself guilty of an act which
constitutes a ground for legal separation
at the instance of the other spouse,
cannot be considered as within the
intendment of the law granting separate
support. In fact under Article 303 of the
same Code the obligation to give support
shall cease "when the recipient, be he a
forced heir or not, has committed some
act which gives rise to disinheritance;"
and under Article 921 one of the causes
for disinheriting a spouse is "when the
spouse has given cause for legal
separation." The loss of the substantive
right to support in such a situation is
incompatible with any claim for support
pendente lite. CA and lower courts
decision were set aside and their
enforcement enjoined, without prejudice
to such judgment as may be rendered in
the pending action of legal separation
between the parties.

Benjamin Bugayong vs. Leonila Ginez

1956(Civil Code provisions apply here)

Facts:

Benjamin Bugayong and Leonila Ginez

were married in Asingan Pangasinan when
Bugayong was on leave as a serviceman in the
US navy.
Both lived in the house of Bugayongs
sister and before he left for work, they came to
an agreement that Leonila would stay with his
sister.
His sister transferred to Sampaloc Manila
and sometime in July, 1951, Leonila left his
sisters house and informed Benjamin through
a letter. She went to stay with her mother in
Pangasinan but transferred to Dagupan after
to study for college.
Benjamin on that same month that Leonila
left his sisters abode started receiving letters
from Valeriana Polangco, Benjamins sister in
law and from unknown senders (which were
not even produced during the proceeding)
stating acts of infidelity of his wife that he did
not state as well.
On cross-examination, Benjamin also said
that a letter was destroyed containing
information about a certain Eliong kissing
her.
All these letters prompted him to consult
the Navy chaplain sometime in Oct. 1951 for a
legal separation due to acts of infidelity of his
wife to which the chaplain directed him to the
navy legal department.
In Aug. 1952, Benjamin went to
Pangasinan to find his wife. He found him in
their godmothers house Mrs. Malalang but
both went and stayed in Pedro Bugayongs
house,his first cousin as husband and wife for
two nights and one day. Thereafter, they went
to Benjamins house and again lived together
as husband and wife to which he confronted
Leonila for the truth regarding her alleged acts
of infidelity. Leonila instead of replying packed
up her stuff and left Benjamin. Leonilas act of
leaving was a confirmation to Benjamins view

of infidelity and went then to Bacarra, Ilocos

Norte to soothe his feelings.
Benjamin filed in the Court of first instance
a complaint of legal separation but Leonila
with her counsel filed a motion to dismiss the
case on the ground that assuming that it was
true, of Leonilas infidelity, husband condoned
to such acts and complainant failed to state a
cause of action to render a valid judgment.
Case was dismissed which was elevated to
the Court of Appeals.

Issue:
W/N the lower court erred in entertaining
the condonation as a ground for dismissal in as
much as same was not raised in the answer or
in a motion to dismiss.
Ratio:
No. The Court did not err in dismissing the
case due to condonation of the spouse.
According to Art. 97 of the Civil Code: A
petition for a legal separation may be filed:
(1) For adultery on the part of the wife and for
concubinage on the part of the husbans as
defined in the Penal Code; or
(2) An attempt by one spouse against the life
of the other.
Art. 100 of the Civil Code states: The legal
separation may be claimed by the
innocent spouse provided there has been
no condonation of or consent to the
adultery or concubinage. Where both
spouses are offenders a legal separation
cannot be claimed by either of them. Collusion
between the parties to obtain legal separation
shall cause the dismissal of the petition.
Art.102 of the Civil Code states- An action for
legal separation cannot be filed except within
one year from and after the date on which the
plaintiff became cognizant of the cause and
within five years from and after the date when
such cause occurred.
In Benjamin testimony, he admitted that they
both slept together twice first in his cousins
house and second, in his house.

In Shackleton vs. Shackleton, it has been

held that "condonation is implied from sexual
intercourse after knowledge of the other
infidelity.
such
acts
necessary
implied
forgiveness. It is entirely consonant with
reason and justice that if the wife freely
consents to sexual intercourse after she has
full knowledge of the husband's guilt, her
consent should operate as a pardon of his
wrong."
If there had been cohabitation, to what
extent
must
it
be
to
constitute
condonation? Single voluntary act of
marital intercourse between the parties
ordinarily is sufficient to constitute
condonation, and where the parties live in
the same house, it is presumed that they
live on terms of matrimonial cohabitation
(27 C. J. S., section 6-d).
It is clear that the act of Benjamin of having
sexual intercourse is an implied act of his
condonation to his spouses supposed
infidelity acts as stipulated in Art. 100 of the
Civil Code that legal separation may not be
claimed if there was condonation involved.
The U.S jurisprudence was cited, as there was
no jurisprudence here regarding this matter at
the time.

Held:
Order appealed is affirmed

Brown v. Yambao 102 Phil 168

Facts:

- William Brown filed an action to obtain

legal separation from his lawful wife,
Juanita Yambao.

- He alleged that while he was under

internment
during
the
Japanese
occupation, his wife engaged in adulterous
relations with one Field, of whom she
begot a baby girl; that he learned of his
wife's infidelity only upon his release in
1945; that thereafter the spouses lived
separately and later executed a document
liquidating their conjugal partnership.

- The wife failed to answer the summons

in due time, and upon petition of the
plaintiff, the court declared her in default.
- However, the Court, in accordance with
article 101 of the new Civil Code, directed
the City Fiscal to investigate whether or
not a collusion existed between the
parties.
- The examination by the Assistant City
Fiscal during the trial elicited the fact that
after liberation, Brown had lived maritally
with another woman and had begotten
children by her. Thereafter, the court
rendered judgment denying the legal
separation granted on the ground that,
while the wife's adultery was established,
Brown had incurred a similar misconduct,
thus barring his right of action under
Article 100 of the new Civil Code, which
provides that where both spouses are
offenders, a legal separation cannot be
claimed
by
either
of
them.
Furthermore,the action had prescribed
because Brown, although he had learned
of his wife's infidelity in 1045, only filed
action in 1955.

- Plaintiff appealed.

Issue: WON
separation

Brown

can

obtain

legal

Ruling:

- SC affirmed the decision of the lower

court.

- It was legitimate for the Fiscal to bring to

light any circumstance that could give rise
to the inference that the wife's default was
calculated, or agreed on, to enable
appellant to obtain a decree of legal
separation that he sought without regard
to the legal merits of his case." Inasmuch
as it was clearly established that Brown
had cohabited with a woman other than
his wife, such fact bars him from claiming
legal separation. The policy of Article 101
of the new Civil Code, calling for the
intervention of the state attorneys in case
of uncontested proceedings for legal
separation (and of annulment of marriages
under article 88) is to emphasize that
marriage is more than a mere contract,
that it is a social institution in which the
state is vitally, interested, so that its
continuance or interruption cannot be
made to depend upon the parties
themselves. it is proper that the Fiscal's
inquiry be allowed to focus upon any
relevant matter that may indicate whether
the
proceedings
for
separation
or
annulment are fully justified or not.

- As to the prescription of the action, it is

clearly brought out of time. Under article
102 of the new Civil Code, not only must
the party aggrieved bring his action for
legal separation within one year after he
has knowledge of the cause but such
action can no longer be maintained after
the lapse of five years from the date when
such cause occurred, whether the
complainant was cognizant of the cause or

no. In the instant case, Brown did not

bring his action until 10 years from the
time he learned of his wife's misconduct.
While it is true that the wife did not
interpose prescription as a defense, yet
the courts can take cognizance thereof, in
line with the policy of the law that no
decree of legal separation be issued if any
legal obstacles thereto appear upon the
record.

Ong vs Ong, G.R. No. 153206, October

23, 2006

FACTS:

William Ong and Lucita Ong were married on July

13, 1975. Union was blessed with 3 children.
On March 21, 1996, Lucita filed a
complaint for legal separation under Art
55 (1) of FC on grounds of physical
violence, threats, intimidation and grossly
abusive conduct of petitioner. RTC granted
prayer for legal separation. CA upheld
RTCs decision when herein petitioner filed
a Motion for Reconsideration (MR). The
climax of the couples drama was on
December 14, 1995when the respondent
asked petitioner to bring Kingston, their
son, back from Bacolod which turned into
a violent quarrel with the petitioner hitting
the respondent on the head, left
cheek, eye, stomach, arms, and ultimately
pointing a gun at respondents head
asking her to leave the conjugal house.
William argues that since respondent
herself has given ground for legal
separation by abandoning the family
simply because of a quarrel and refusing
to return thereto unless the conjugal
properties
were
placed
in
the
administration of petitioners in-laws, no
decree of legal separation should be
issued in her favor.

ISSUE:

Whether or not CA erred in upholding the

RTCs decision granting legal separation to
Lucita when she herself has given ground
for legal separation when abandoned her
family.

HELD:
No.
RATIO:

It is true that a decree of legal separation

should not be granted when both parties
have given ground for legal separation
(Art
56 (4)
FC).
However,
the
abandonment referred to in the Family
Code is abandonment without justifiable
cause for more than one year. Also, it was
established that Lucita left William due to
his abusive conduct which does not
constitute the abandonment contemplated
in the said provision. Petition is denied.

Armando Medel (Medel) instituted an

action before the CFI of Manila for legal
separation against Rosario Matute (P),
upon the ground of adultery committed by
P with his brother. The CFI of Manila found
P guilty of the charge against her,
decreeing the said legal separation and
awarding to Medel the custody of their 4
children.

Thereafter, Medel went to the US, leaving

the children under the care of his sister, in
whose house P subsequently lived in order
to be with her children. When Medel came
back in the Philippines, he and his children
lived in Cebu.

One day, P, with the permission from

Medel and the condition that P will return
their children after 2 weeks, brought the
children in Manila to attend the funeral of
her father. However, P did not return the
children but instead, filed a civil case
praying to issue an order awarding the
custody of their children in favour of her. P
alleged that the children, 3 of whom (16,
14 and 12 years old), do not want to
return to Medel, because he is living with
another woman.

Matute v Macadaeg
GR L-9325
May 30, 1956

Medel opposed the petition of P and filed a

petition to declared and punish P for
contempt of court, in view of her failure
and refusal to restore the custody of their
children to him.

Topic: Effects of Decree of Legal

Separation on the custody of children

Facts:

After hearing, the CFI, presided by Judge

Macadaeg (R), issued an order absolving P
from contempt but denying Ps motion for
her custody of the children and ordering
her to deliver them to Medel within 24
hours from notice.

This prompted P to institute an action

certiorari and prohibition against Medel
and R with preliminary injunction, upon
the ground that the order of R has been
issued with grave abuse of discretion.

Also, the facts remains that P is without

means of livelihood and, according to her
own admission, she lives on the charity of
her brothers. She has no home of her own
to offer to her children, but only she would
shelter them under the roof of her
brothers.

Issue:
Laperal v Republic of the Philippines
Whether or not P can have the custody of
her children with Medel

GR No L-18008
10/30/1962

Held:
FACTS:
No. By virtue of the decree of legal
separation, Medel already had the custody
of the children. P merely obtained his
permission to bring them to Manila. Thus,
P obtained and has the physical
possession of the minors in a precarious
manner. P hold it in the name, on behalf
and by authority of Medel. Medel may,
therefore, demand the return of their
children anytime, and P is bound to
comply immediately with such demand.

Under Rule 100, Section 6 of the Rules of

Court, it is conceded that children over ten
(10) years of age, whose parents are
divorced or living separately, may choose
which parent they prefer to live with,
unless the parent chosen is unfit to take
charge of their care by reason of moral
depravity,
habitual
drunkenness,
incapacity or poverty.
Without deciding whether the adultery
committed by P with her own brother-inlaw involves moral depravity.

May 1960, Laperal filed in CFI Baguio a

petition for change of name/ to resume
using her maiden name
That she and her husband were given a
decree of legal separation and that she
has ceased to live with him for many years
now
Petition was opposed by the City Attorney
of Baguio on the ground that it violates Art
372 of the Civil Code and that it is
sanctioned by the Rules of Court
Court denied petition on the same ground
Art 372. When legal separation has been
granted, the wife shall continue using her
name and surname employed before legal
separation
In motion for recon, it was granted
ISSUE: WON Laperal after having obtained
legal separation may be granted to
resume using her maiden name

HELD:

Art 372, language of the statute is

mandatory because her marriage status is

unaffected by the legal separation, there

being no severance of the vinvulum
Rule 103 of the Rules of Court for change
of name may be observed HOWEVER, her
only reason for change of name was her
legal separation which alone is not a
sufficient ground to justify a change of
name, for to do so would circumvent the
mandatory provisions of Art 372
- DISMISSED

ARROYO vs. VASQUEZ de ARROYO

GR No. L-17014, August 11, 1921

FACTS:
Mariano Arroyo and Dolores Vasquez de
Arroyo were married in 1910 and have
lived together as man and wife until July 4,
1920 when the wife went away from their
common home with the intention of living
separate from her husband. Marianos
efforts to induce her to resume marital
relations were all in vain. Thereafter,
Mariano initiated an action to compel her
to return to the matrimonial home and live
with him as a dutiful wife. Dolores averred
by way of defense and cross-complaint
that she had been compelled to leave
because of the cruel treatment of her
husband. She in turn prayed that a decree
of separation be declared and the
liquidation of the conjugal partnership as
well as permanent separate maintenance.

The trial judge, upon consideration of the

evidence before him, reached the
conclusion that the husband was more to
blame than his wife and that his continued
ill-treatment of her furnished sufficient
justification for her abandonment of the
conjugal home and the permanent
breaking off of marital relations with him.

ISSUE: Whether or not the courts can

compel one of the spouses to cohabit with
each other

HELD: NO.
It is not within the province of the courts
of this country to attempt to compel one
of the spouses to cohabit with, and render
conjugal rights to, the other. Of course
where the property rights of one of the
pair are invaled, an action for restitution of
such rights can be maintained. But we are
disinclined to sanction the doctrine that an
order, enforcible by process of contempt,
may be entered to compel the restitution
of
the
purely
personal
rights
of
consortium. At best such an order can be
effective for no other purpose than to
compel the spouses to live under the
same roof; and the experience of these
countries where the court of justice have
assumed to compel the cohabitation of
married people shows that the policy of
the practice is extremely questionable.

We are therefore unable to hold that

Mariano B. Arroyo in this case is entitled to
the unconditional and absolute order for
the return of the wife to the marital
domicile, which is sought in the petitory
part of the complaint; though he is,
without doubt, entitled to a judicial
declaration that his wife has presented
herself without sufficient cause and that it
is her duty to return.

Therefore,
reversing
the
judgment
appealed from, in respect both to the
original complaint and the cross-bill, it is
declared that Dolores Vasquez de Arroyo
has absented herself from the marital

home without sufficient cause; and she is

admonished that it is her duty to return.
The plaintiff is absolved from the crosscomplaint, without special pronouncement
as to costs of either instance.

Rights and obligations of spouses

Cuaderno
Nov 28, 1964

Cuaderno

Complaint for support on Aug 1957

by
Lourdes
Ramirez-Cuaderno
against
her
husband
Angel
Cuaderno
o Couple living separately
since
Nov
1956
when
husband
inflicted
bodily
injuries in course of quarrel
& took her to her mothers
house util claim for support
Juvenile and Domestic Relations
court ordered Angel to give his wife
a monthly support of P150.
o She was driven out of
dwelling,
or
at
least
prevented to because of his
maltreatment.
CA on appeal reversed above so
that appellant and appellee may
again resume cohabitation which
they are hereby admonished to do
as their duty as husband and wife."
o Cohabitation is not yet
impossible
Wife filed instant petiton for review.

For while marriage entitles both

parties
to
cohabitation
or
consortium, the sanction therefor is
the spontaneous, mutual affection
between husband and wife2 and
not any legal mandate or court
order. This is due to the inherent
characteristic
and
nature
of
marriage in this jurisdiction
The fact that the wife allegedly
accepted money from her husband
and desisted from accepting any
later, because according to the
latter, she was demanding for
more, only indicates that even
before the filing of the present
case, the defendant-husband was
already providing something for the
separate maintenance.
o Considering that the wife
has no income of her own,
while the husband has an
employment, the sum of
P150.00 fixed by the trial
court for the wife's monthly
support does not seem to
be unreasonable.
o As the separation has been
brought
about
by
the
husband and under the
circumstances established
during the trial, the same
shall subsist until a different
situation
between
the
parties shall take place.

Juvenile court decision revived

ISSUE: W/N Lourdes is entitled to support.

HELD: Yes

It would be taking an unrealistic

view for us to compel or urge them
to live together when, at least for
the present, they specially the
husband
are
speaking
of
impossibility of cohabitation.

Abella v Comelec
201 SCRA 253
Facts:
- Silvestre dela Cruz (Benjamin
Abella was allowed to interevene)
filed a petition with the Comelec to
disqualify Larrazabal from running

as governor of Leyte on the ground

that
she
misrepresented
her
residence in her certificate of
candidacy in Leyte. She was in fact
a resident of Ormoc City like her
husband who was disqualified from
running in the same
office
(Governor of Leyte)
COMELEC granted the petition, but
Larrazabal was already proclaimed
Governor. Her disqualification lead
to Abella- who had second highest
votes, took his oath as governor in
Leyte.
Petitioner avers that COMELEC
decision is erroneous when it relied
on the provisions of the Family
Code to rule that petitioner lacks
required residence to qualify her to
run for governor. Citing the Election
law, she argues that the Election
Law, the matter of determination of
the residence is more on the
principle of intention, the animus
revertendi rather than anything
else.
She states that her subsequent
physical transfer residence to
Ormoc
thereafter,
did
not
necessarily erase her residence in
Leyte, for as long as she had the
animus revertendi evidenced by
her continuous and regular acts of
returning there in the course of the
years, although she has physically
moved to Ormoc

within a province whose charters

do not provide a similar prohibition.
Component cities like Ormoc,
where Larrazabal comes from,
prohibit their voters from voting for
provincial elective officials are
treated like highly urbanized cities
which is outside the supervisory
power of the province to which
they are attached.
Sec. 89 of RA 179 prohibits
registered voters of Ormoc from
voting and being voted for elective
offices in Leyte.
Second Issue, No. The local election
in Leyte proceeded with Larrazabal
considered
as
a
bona
fide
candidate. The voters of the
province voted for her in the belief
that she was qualified for the
position of governor therefore
Abella lost in the election since he
only got second highest vote.
Public policy dictates that public
elective offices are filled by those
who have received the highest
number of votes in the election for
that office. It does not necessarily
mean that the disqualification of
the person with the highest vote
entitles the next person with
second highest as the next winner.

SSS v. GLORIA DE LOS SANTOS G.R. No.

164790 August 29, 2008

Issue:
- W/N Larrazabal is registered voter
of Leyte
- W/N Abella, who got the second
highest vote, maybe proclaimed as
governor when larrazabal was
disqualified

REYES, R.T.

Held:
- First issue, No. Sec. 12, Article X of
the Constitution provides that aside
from
highly-urbanized
cities,
component cities whose charters
prohibit their voters from voting for
provincial elective officials are
independent of the province and it
provides for other component cities

FACTS: Antonio de los Santos and

respondent Gloria de los Santos, both
Filipinos, were married on April 29,1964 in
Manila. Less than one year after, Gloria
left Antonio and contracted another
marriage with a certain Domingo Talens in
Nueva Ecija. Sometime in 1969, Gloria
went back to Antonio and lived with him
until 1983. They had three children: Alain

DOCTRINE: An estranged wife who was not

dependent upon her deceased husband
for support is not qualified tobe his
beneficiary.

Vincent, Arlene, and Armine. In 1983,

Gloria left Antonio and went to the United
States. Later on, she filed for divorce
against Antonio in California and executed
a document waiving all her rights to their
conjugal properties and other matters. The
divorce was granted on November 5,
1986. In 1987, Antonio married Cirila de
los Santos in Camalig, Albay. Their union
produced one child, May-Ann N. de los
Santos. On the other hand, Gloria married
Larry Thomas Constant, an American
citizen, on July 11, 1987, in the US. In
1989, Antonio amended his records at SSS
and changed his beneficiaries from Mrs.
Margarita delos Santos to Cirila de los
Santos; from Gloria de los Santos to MayAnn de los Santos; and from Erlindade los
Santos to Armine de los Santos. Antonio
retired from his employment in 1996, and
from then on he began receiving monthly
pension. He died of respiratory failure on
May 15, 1999. Upon his death, Cirila
applied for and began receiving his SSS
pension benefit, beginning December
1999. On December 21, 1999, Gloria filed
a claim for Antonios death benefits with
SSS. Her claim was denied because she
was not a qualified beneficiary of Antonio.
ISSUE: Whether or not the respondent is
still qualified as a primary beneficiary of
the deceased SSS member Antonio
HELD/RATIO: As found by both the Social
Security Commission (SSC) and the CA,
the divorce obtained by respondent
against the deceased Antonio was not
binding
in
this
jurisdiction.
Under
Philippine law, only aliens may obtain
divorces abroad, provided they are valid
according to their national law. The
divorce was obtained by respondent Gloria
while she was still a Filipino citizen and
thus covered by the policy against
absolute divorces. It did not sever her
marriage ties with Antonio. However,
although respondent was the legal spouse
of the deceased, she is still disqualified to

be the primary beneficiary under the

Social Security (SS) Law. She fails to fulfill
the requirement of dependency upon her
deceased husband Antonio. In Social
Security System v. Aguas, it held the
instructive information in determining the
extent of the required dependency
under the SS Law. In Aguas, the Court
ruled that although a husband and wife
are obliged to support each other, whether
one is actually dependent for support
upon the other cannot be presumed from
the fact of marriage alone. Further, Aguas
pointed out that a wife who left her family
until her husband died and lived with
other men, was not dependent upon her
husband
for
support,
financial
or
otherwise, during the entire period. Said
the Court: In a parallel case involving a
claim for benefits under the GSIS law, the
Court defined a dependent as one who
derives his or her main support from
another. Meaning, relying on, or subject to,
someone else for support; not able to exist
or sustain oneself, or to perform anything
without the will, power, or aid of someone
else. In that case, the Court found it
obvious that a wife who abandoned the
family for more than 17 years until her
husband died, and lived with other men,
was not dependent on her husband for
support, financial or otherwise, during that
entire period. Hence, the Court denied
Glorias claim for death benefits.

SSS v. FAVILA
[G.R. No. 170195]
[March 28, 2011]

TOPIC:

Joint obligation to support

PETITIONER: Social Security Commission;

Social Security System

RESPONDENT:
PONENTE:

Teresa Favila

Del Castillo, J.

LAW:
RA 1161 (SS Law)

Sec 8. Terms Defined

e) Dependent The legitimate,
legitimated or legally adopted
child who is unmarried, not
gainfully employed and not
over twenty-one years of age,
or over twenty-one years of
age, provided that he is
congenitally incapacitated and
incapable
of
self-support,
physically
or
mentally; the
legitimate
spouse
dependent for support upon
the
employee;
and
the
legitimate
parents
wholly
dependent upon the covered
employee for regular support.
k) Beneficiaries The dependent
spouse until he remarries and
dependent children, who shall
be the primary beneficiaries. In
their absence, the dependent
parents and, subject to the
restrictions
imposed
on
dependent
children,
the
legitimate descendants and
illegitimate children who shall
be the secondary beneficiaries.
In the absence of any of the
foregoing, any other person
designated by the covered
employee
as
secondary
beneficiary.
Family Code (FC)

Art 68: The husband and wife are

obliged to live together, observe
mutual love, respect and fidelity, and
render mutual help and support

FACTS:

Aug 5, 2002: respondent Teresa filed a

Petition before SSC
o after she was married to
Florante on Jan 17, 1970, the

latter designated her as the

sole beneficiary in the E-1 Form
he submitted before SSS on
June 30, 1970
o when they begot their 3
children, her husband likewise
designated each of them as
beneficiaries
o when Florante died on Feb 1,
1997, his pension benefits
under the SSS were given to
their only minor child at that
time, Florante II but only until
his emancipation at age 21
o Believing that as the surviving
legal wife she is likewise
entitled to receive his pension
benefits, she filed her claim
which the SSS denied
SSS answer:
o May 6, 1999: the claim for
Florantes pension benefits was
initially settled in favor of
Teresa as guardian of the minor
Florante II.
o She was paid the monthly
pension for a total of 57 months
(Feb 1997 - Oct 2001, when
Florante II reached the age of
21)
o Jul 11, 2002: the claim was readjudicated on July 11, 2002
and the balance of the 5-year
guaranteed pension was again
settled in favor of Florante II
o Estelita
Ramos,
sister
of
Florante, wrote a letter stating
that her brother had long been
separated from Teresa, that
they lived together for 10 years
and then decided to separate
because Teresa had an affair
with a married man (they
allegedly slept with each other
4 times a week)
o an interview conducted in
Teresas neighborhood in Tondo
revealed that though she did
not cohabit with anyone after
their separation, there were
rumors that she had an affair
with a police officer
o cited Sec 8(k) and 13 of RA
1161

SSC concluded that Teresa was not

dependent upon Florante for support
and consequently disqualified her from
enjoying her husbands death benefits
o the
surviving
spouses
entitlement
to
an
SSS
members death benefits is
dependent on two factors which
must concur at the time of the
latters death:
1. that
he/she
is
the
legitimate spouse;
SSC opined that
this is affected by
factors such as
separation de
facto,
marital
infidelity
and
such
other
grounds sufficient
to disinherit a
spouse under the
law
the
word
"remarry" under
under Sec 8(k) of
the
SS
Law
includes a spouse
who
cohabits
with a person
other than the
deceased spouse
(in
an
illicit
relationship)
Notable in this
case is that while
Teresa
denied
having remarried
or cohabited with
another man, she
did not, however,
deny her having
an
adulterous
relationship.
2. that he/she is dependent
upon the member for
support
Although Teresa
is
the
legal
spouse and one
of
Florantes
designated
beneficiaries, she
is
disqualified

from claiming the

death
benefits
because she was
deemed
not
dependent
for
support
from
Florante due to
marital infidelity.
no support is due
to a spouse in an
illicit relationship
or
those
separated-in-fact
due
to
an
adulterous
act
since the actual
absence
of
support from the
member
is
evident
from
such separation
To allow him/her
to
enjoy
the
members death
benefits would be
tantamount
to
circumvention of
the law.
o Teresa did not timely contest
her non-entitlement to the
award of benefits (only when
Florante
IIs
pension
was
stopped did she deem it wise to
file her claim) and is thus
estopped
OSG also believed that she is not
entitled to the benefits claimed
o she lacks the requirement that
the wife must be dependent
upon the member for support
1. This is in view of the rule
that beneficiaries under
the SS Law need not be
the legal heirs but those
who are dependent upon
him for support
o She did not file a protest before
the SSS to contest the award of
the 5-year guaranteed pension
to their son Florante II; as such,
she cannot raise the matter for
the first time before the courts
o no further benefits are due to
Florantes other beneficiaries
considering that the balance of

the 5-year guaranteed pension

has already been settled
CA reversed the SSCs decision in favor
of Teresa
o she is a primary beneficiary
because she is the lawful
surviving spouse of Florante
and in addition, she was
designated by Florante as such
beneficiary
o There was no legal separation
or annulment that could have
disqualified her from claiming
the death benefits and that her
designation as beneficiary had
not been invalidated by any
court of law
o SSS v. Davac: it is only when
there is no designation of
beneficiary
or
when
the
designation is void that the SSS
would have to decide who is
entitled to claim the benefits
o once a spouse is designated by
an SSS member as his/her
beneficiary, same forecloses
any inquiry as to whether the
spouse is indeed a dependent
deriving support from the
member
o when
SSS
conducted
an
investigation
to
determine
whether
Teresa
is
indeed
dependent, SSS was adding a
requirement not imposed by
law
o The result of said investigation
and the basis for her nonentitlement
was
from
unfounded rumors
o SSSs conduct of investigations
was
violative
of
the
constitutional right to privacy.
SSS has no power to investigate
and pry into the members and
his/her familys personal lives

ISSUE:WON
Teresa
is
a
primary
beneficiary in contemplation of the SS Law
and thus entitled to the benefits

RULING:
Petition
GRANTED.
CA
decision REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
Teresa is NOT a dependent spouse
within the contemplation of RA
1161 and is NOT entitled to death
benefits accruing from the death of
Florante

Petitioners arguments
o To be entitled to death benefits,
a surviving spouse must have
been actually dependent for
support upon the member
spouse during the latters
lifetime including the very
moment of contingency
o This is clearly the intention of
the
legislature;
otherwise,
Section 8(k) of the SS law would
have simply stated "spouse"
without the descriptive word
"dependent"
o She is Florantes legal spouse,
but she is not the "dependent
spouse" referred to in the said
provision
Given the reason for the
couples separation
Absence of proof that
Teresa
relied
upon
Florante for support
o In the process of determining
non-dependency status of a
spouse, conviction of a crime
involving marital infidelity is not
an absolute necessity
sufficient for the award
of death benefits that a
thorough
investigation
be conducted by SSS
Here, Florantes sister
(does not stand to
benefit
from
the
controversy)
revealed
that Teresa frequented a
casino and was disloyal
to him so that they
separated after only 10
years
This
was
affirmed
through the interview
conducted in Teresas
neighborhood

Hence, it is not true that

her infidelity was not
sufficiently proven.
o A members designation of a
primary beneficiary does not
guarantee
the
latters
entitlement to death benefits
because such entitlement is
determined only at the time of
happening of the contingency.
there may have been
events
which
supervened subsequent
to the designation
This is why SSS must
conduct an investigation
of all claims for benefits.
o SSS did not intrude into
Florantes and his familys
personal
lives
as
the
investigation did not aggravate
the situation insofar as Teresas
relationship with her deceased
husband was concerned
It merely led to the
discovery of the true
state of affairs between
them
death
benefits
were
awarded to the rightful
primary
beneficiary,
Florante II
such an investigation is
an essential part of
adjudication process
Respondents arguments
o Ceneta v. SSS (CA decision):
the
term
dependent
spouse refers to the
legal spouse who is
entitled
to
receive
support from the other
spouse (and must not
re-marry to be entitled
to
the
SSS
death
benefits)
being legally married to
the
deceased
SSS
member until death is a
dependent for support
(FC Art 68)
marriage
not
having
been lawfully severed,
the law presumes her to

o
o

be
continually
dependent for support
No evidence can be adduced to
prove that petitioner ceased to
derive
all
her
needs
indispensable
for
her
sustenance, and thus, she
remains a legal dependent
mere allegation of adultery not
substantially proven cannot
validly deprive petitioner of
lawful support and her claim
being the legal wife, she is
presumed to be dependent
upon Florante for support
despite their separation and the
rumors of infidelity, Florante
did
not
withdraw
her
designation
as
primary
beneficiary
SSS added to the requirements
of the law the condition of
dependency for support upon
the member spouse during the
latters lifetime. That this could
not have been the lawmakers
intention as it would make it
difficult or even impossible for
beneficiaries
to
claim
for
benefits under the SS Law
courts
(or
quasi-judicial
agencies), may not, in the guise
of interpretation, enlarge the
scope of a statute and include
therein matters not provided
nor intended by lawmakers

SC
o

for a spouse to qualify as a

primary beneficiary under Sec 8
(k), he/she must not only be a
legitimate spouse but also a
dependent as defined under
paragraph (e), that is, one who
is dependent upon the member
for support
SS Law Sec 8 (k) and (e) are
very clear, plain and free from
ambiguity; hence, we need only
apply it by giving it its literal
meaning and applied without
attempted interpretation (verba
legis)
SSS v. Aguas:

for the claimant to

qualify as a primary
beneficiary, she must
prove that she was the
legitimate
spouse
dependent for support
from the employee and
must thus establish 2
qualifying factors: (1)
that she is the legitimate
spouse, and (2) that she
is dependent upon the
member for support
1) that he/she is the
legitimate
spouse; and
2) that he/she is
dependent upon
the member for
support
a wife who is already
separated de facto from
her husband cannot be
said to be dependent
for support upon the
husband, absent any
showing to the contrary
Conversely,
if
the
husband and wife were
still living together at
the time of his death, it
would
be
safe
to
presume that she was
dependent
on
his
support, unless it is
shown
that
she
is
capable of providing for
herself
claimant has the burden
to prove that all the
statutory requirements
(dependency) have been
complied with
no question that Teresa was
Florantes legal wife; but what
is at point is whether she was
dependent
upon
him
for
support in order for her to fall
under the term "dependent
spouse"
her alleged affair with another
man
was
not
sufficiently
established
Memorandum of SSS
Senior Analysts Agilles

and Simpas reveals that

it was Florante who was
in fact living with a
common law wife, Susan
and
their
3
minor
children at the time of
his death
Estelitas
claim
of
Teresas
cohabitation
with a married man is a
mere allegation without
proof
uncorroborated hearsay
or
rumor
does
not
constitute
substantial
evidence
Teresas assertion that being
the legal wife, she is presumed
dependent upon Florante for
support is still untenable
In Re: Application for Survivors
Benefits of Manlavi:
"DEPENDENT" - derives
his/her main support
from another or relying
on,
or
subject
to,
another for support; not
able to exist or sustain
oneself, or to perform
anything w/out the will,
power or aid of another
wifes marriage to the
deceased
was
not
dissolved prior to the
latters death, but the
Court still denied her
claim for survivorship
benefits
from
GSIS
because she abandoned
her family to live with
other men for more than
17
years
until
her
husband died
during this period, she
was not dependent on
her husband for any
support; hence, she is
not a dependent
Teresa only presents a bare
allegation without evidence
that she was dependent upon
her husband for support. She
also has a misplaced reliance
on
the
presumption
of
dependency by reason of her

valid
and
then
subsisting
marriage.
Investigations conducted by
SSS do not violate a persons
right to privacy
SSS is the primary
institution in charge of
extending social security
protection to workers
and their beneficiaries
and is mandated to
require
reports,
compilations
and
analyses of statistical
and economic data and
to make an investigation
as may be needed for its
proper
administration
and development
ensures that the benefits
provided under the SS
Law are received by the
rightful beneficiaries
necessary to carry out
the mandate of Sec 15
of the SS Law (Nontransferability
of
Benefits)

for nullity is pending. On May 16, 2005,

the trial court rendered its decision
declaring the marriage null and void
awarding custody of the children to the
mother and ordering Roxas to provide
support to the children. Several actions
were raised in court; with Roxas asking for
a decrease of monthly support while
Calderon asking for an increase in the
amount and Roxas payment on his
arrears for support.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the matter of support

pendent lite is already interlocutory and
final

HELD:
CALDERON VS ROXAS
GR No. 185595
January 9, 2013

FACTS:

Petitioner Calderon and respondent Roxas

were married on December 4, 2085 and
their union produced four children. On
January 16,1998, petitioner filed a
complaint for declaration of nullity of their
marriage in the ground of psychological
incapacity. While the action was pending,
the trial court granted Calderons request
for support pendent lite (while the action

Petitioner contends that the CA failed to

recognize that the interlocutory aspect of
the assailed orders pertains only to private
respondents motion to reduce support
which was granted, and to her own motion
to increase support, which was denied.
Petitioner points out that the ruling on
support in arrears which have remained
unpaid, as well as her prayer for
reimbursement/payment were in the
nature of final orders assailable by
ordinary appeal. SC disagrees. An
interlocutory
order
merely
resolves
incidental matters and leaves something
more to be done to resolve the merits of
the case. In contrast, a judgment or order
is considered final if the order disposes of
the action or proceeding completely, or
terminates a particular stage of the same

action. Clearly, whether an order or

resolution is final or interlocutory is not
dependent
on
compliance
or
noncompliance by a party to its directive,
as what petitioner suggests. Moreover,
private respondents obligation to give
monthly support in the amount fixed by
the RTC in the assailed orders may be
enforced by the court itself, as what
transpired in the early stage of the
proceedings when the court cited the
private respondent in contempt of court
and ordered him arrested for his
refusal/failure to comply with the order
granting support pendente lite. A few
years later, private respondent filed a
motion to reduce support while petitioner
filed her own motion to increase the same,
and in addition sought spousal support
and support in arrears. This fact
underscores the provisional character of
the order granting support pendente lite.
Petitioners theory that the assailed orders
have ceased to be provisional due to the
arrearages incurred by private respondent
is
therefore
untenable. The
remedy
against an interlocutory order not subject
of an appeal is an appropriate special civil
action under Rule 65 provided that the
interlocutory order is rendered without or
in excess of jurisdiction or with grave
abuse of discretion.

San Diego Vs RTC GR no 193960

January 7, 2013

Issues: 1) whether the RTC has

jurisdiction over the ofense; 2) whether
RA 9262 should be construed in a manner
that will favor the accused; and 3)
whether the Information alleging a fact
contrary to what has been admitted
should be quashed.

Facts of the case: Petitioner (Karlo San

Diego) was charged with violation of
Section 5(a) of RA 9262 before the RTC of
Angeles City, Branch 59, in an Information
which states: On July 13, 2009, in the City
of Angeles, the accused, being then the
boyfriend of the complainant wilfully and
feloniously use personal violence, by
pulling her hair, punching complainant's
back, shoulder and left eye, thereby
demeaning
and
degrading
the
complainant's intrinsic worth and dignity
as a human being, in violation of Section
5(a) of the Republic Act 9262.
After
examining the supporting evidence, the
RTC
found
probable
cause
and
consequently, issued a warrant of arrest
against petitioner on November 19, 2009.
The latter posted a cash bond for his
provisional liberty and on August 12,
2010,
filed
a
Motion
for
Judicial
Determination of Probable Cause with
Motion
to
Quash
the
Information.
Petitioner averred that at the time of the
alleged incident on July 13, 2009, he was
no longer in a dating relationship with
private respondent; hence, RA 9262 was
inapplicable.

In her affidavit, private respondent

admitted that her relationship with
petitioner had ended prior to the subject
incident. She narrated that on July 13,
2009, she sought payment of the money
she had lent to petitioner but the latter
could not pay. She then inquired from
petitioner if he was responsible for
spreading rumors about her which he
admitted. Thereupon, private respondent
slapped petitioner causing the latter to
inflict on her the physical injuries alleged
in the Information.
The RTC denied
petitioner's motion. It did not consider
material the fact that the parties' dating
relationship had ceased prior to the
incident, ratiocinating that since the
parties had admitted a prior dating

relationship, the infliction of slight physical

injuries constituted an act of violence
against women and their children as
defined in Sec. 3(a) of RA 9262.

Decision: The petition has no merit.

Petitioner insists that the act which
resulted in physical injuries to private
respondent is not covered by RA 9262
because its proximate cause was not their
dating relationship. Instead, he claims that
the offense committed was only slight
physical injuries under the Revised Penal
Code which falls under the jurisdiction of
the Municipal Trial Court. The Court is not
persuaded. Sec. 3(a) of RA 9262 reads:
SEC. 3. Definition of Terms.- As used in
this Act, (a) "Violence against women and
their children" refers to any act or a series
of acts committed by any person against a
woman who is his wife, former wife, or
against a woman with whom the person
has or had a sexual or dating relationship,
or with whom he has a common child, or
against her child whether legitimate or
illegitimate, within or without the family
abode, which result in or is likely to result
in physical, sexual, psychological harm or
sufering, or economic abuse including
threats of such acts, battery, assault,
coercion,
harassment
or
arbitrary
deprivation of liberty.

The law is broad in scope but specifies two

limiting qualifications for any act or series
of acts to be considered as a crime of
violence against women through physical
harm, namely: 1) it is committed against a
woman or her child and the woman is the
offender's wife, former wife, or with whom
he has or had sexual or dating relationship
or with whom he has a common child; and
2) it results in or is likely to result in
physical harm or suffering. The Court
emphasized that while it is required that

the offender has or had a sexual or dating

relationship with the offended woman, for
RA 9262 to be applicable, it is not
indispensable that the act of violence be a
consequence
of
such
relationship.
Nowhere in the law can such limitation be
inferred. As correctly ruled by the RTC, it is
immaterial whether the relationship had
ceased for as long as there is sufficient
evidence showing the past or present
existence of such relationship between the
offender and the victim when the physical
harm was committed.

Accordingly,
the
Information
having
sufficiently
alleged
the
necessary
elements of the crime, such as: a dating
relationship between the petitioner and
the private respondent; the act of violence
committed by the petitioner; and the
resulting physical harm to private
respondent, the offense is covered by RA
9262 which falls under the jurisdiction of
the RTC in accordance with Sec. 7 of the
said law which reads: SEC. 7. Venue - The
Regional Trial Court designated as a
Family Court shall have original and
exclusive jurisdiction over cases of
violence against women and their children
under this law. In the absence of such
court in the place where the ofense was
committed, the case shall be filed in the
Regional Trial Court where the crime or
any of its elements was committed at the
option of the complainant.

Finally, the Court finds the Order of the

RTC, giving the prosecutor a period of two
(2) days to amend the Information to
reflect the cessation of the dating
relationship between the petitioner and
the offended party, to be in accord with
Sec. 4 of Rule 117 of the Rules of Court, to
wit: SEC. 4. Amendment of complaint or
information.- If the motion to quash is

based on an alleged defect of the

complaint or information which can be
cured by amendment, the court shall order
that
an
amendment
be
made.
Furthermore, Sec. 14 of Rule 110 of the
Rules of Court provides that information
may be amended, in form or in substance,
without leave of court, at any time before
the accused enters his plea. In the present
case, the accused petitioner has not yet
been arraigned; hence, the RTC was
correct in directing the amendment of the
Information and in denying the motion to
quash the same.

The Court decided that the petition

is dismissed. The Orders dated September
13, 20 I 0 and October 5, 2010 of the
Regional Trial Court of Angeles City,
Branch 59 in Criminal Case No. 09-5210
are
affirmed.

Pana vs. Heirs of Juanite, Sr.

G.R. No. 164201

real properties registered in the names of

Efren and Melencia. Subsequently, a
notice of levy and a notice of sale on
execution were issued.
- Efren and his wife Melecia filed a motion
to quash the writ of execution claiming
that the properties levied were conjugal
assets and not paraphernal of Melecia.
- RTC denied the motion. The spouses
moved for reconsideration but the RTC
denied the same. In this case, it is
submitted that Efren and Melencia were
married when the Civil Code was still in
effect. They did not execute a pre-nuptial
agreement, hence CPG governed their
property relations.
- However, both RTC and CA held that
property regime changed into ACP when
family code took effect, it reason out that
Art. 256 of the Family Code provides that
the Code shall have retroactive effect in so
far as it does not prejudice or impair
vested or acquired rights in accordance
with the Civil Code or other laws.

December 10, 2012

Facts:

- The prosecution accused Efren Pana, his

wife, Melencia and others of murder and
eventually a decision was rendered
acquitting Efren of the charge for
insufficiency of evidence but finding
Melencia and another person guilty as
charged and was sentenced to death.
Supreme Court affirmed RTCs decision but
modified
the
penalty
to
Reclusion
Perpetua.
- Upon motion for execution by the heirs of
the deceased, the RTC ordered the
issuance of the writ resulting in the levy of

Issue: WON the conjugal properties of

spouses Efren and Melencia can be levied
and executed upon for the satisfaction of
Melencias civil liability in the aforesaid
murder case.

Ruling:

Note: SC noted that RTC & CA erred in

holding that property regime changed into
ACP when family code took efect because
it is evident that Article 256 of the Family
Code does not intend to be applied back
and automatically convert into absolute
community of property relations all
conjugal partnership of gains that existed

before 1988 excepting only those with

prenuptial agreements.

- Yes.
- As long as the conditions under Art. 121FC have been covered.
- Supreme Court explained that it is clear
from the facts that Efren and Melencia
were married when the Civil code was still
the operative law on marriages. The
presumption, absent any evidence to the
contrary, is that they were married under
the regime of conjugal partnership of
gains. Article 119 of the Civil Code
provides that the future spouses main in
marriage settlements agree upon absolute
or relative community or conjugal
partnership of gains or upon a complete
separation of property, or upon any other
regime. The family code itself provides in
Article 76 that marriage settlements
cannot be modified except prior to
marriage, and clearly, under this situation,
the spouses cannot modify their regime.
Post marriage modification of settlements
can take place only where (a) the absolute
community or conjugal partnership was
dissolved and liquidated upon a decree of
legal separation; (b) the spouses who were
legally separated reconciled and agreed to
revive their former property regime;
(c)judicial separation of property had been
had on the ground that a spouse
abandons the other without just cause or
fails to comply with his obligations to the
family; (d) there was judicial separation of
property under article 135; (e) the spouses
jointly filed a petition for the voluntary
dissolution of their absolute community or
conjugal partnership of gains. None of
these circumstances exists in this case.
- Article 119 provides as well, that in the
absence of marriage settlements, or when
the same is void, the system of relative

community or conjugal partnership of

gains established under the civil code shall
govern the property regime of the
spouses. the family code contains terms
governing the conjugal partnership of
gains that supersede the terms of the
conjugal partnership of gains under the
civil code. Article 105 of the family code
states that the provisions of such chapter
on the conjugal partnership of gains shall
also apply to conjugal partnerships of
gains
already
established
between
spouses before the effectivity of this
code,without prejudice to vested rights
already acquired in accordance with the
civil or other laws as provided in Article
256.

FORTUNATA SOLIS, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
MAXIMA
BARROSO,
ET
AL., defendants-appellants.
Facts:

The spouses Juan Lambino and

Maria A. Barroso begot three
children named Alejo, Eugenia and
Marciana Lambino. On June 2, 1919
said spouses made a donation
of propter nuptias of the lands
described in the complaint in favor
of their son Alejo Lambino and
Fortunata Solis in a private
document
(Exhibit
A)
in
consideration of the marriage
which the latter were about to
enter into. One of the conditions of
this donation is that in case of the
death of one of the donees, onehalf of these lands thus donated
would revert to the donors while
the surviving donee would retain
the other half. On the 8th of the
said month of June 1919, Alejo

Lambino and Fortunata Solis were

married
and
immediately
thereafter the donors delivered the
possession of the donated lands to
them. On August 3, 1919 donee
Alejo Lambino died. In the same
year donor Juan Lambino also died.
After the latter's death, his wife,
Maxima
Barroso,
recovered
possession of the donated lands.

present case. We are concerned

with a donation propter nuptias,
which, according to article 1328 of
the Civil Code, must be governed
by the rules established in Title II,
Book III of this Code, on donations
(articles 618 to 656), Article 633
provides that in order that a
donation of real property may be
valid, it must be made in a public
instrument. This is the article
applicable
to
donation propter
nuptias in so far as its formal
validity is concerned. The only
exceptions to this rule are onerous
and remuneratory donations, in so
far as they do not exceed the value
of the charge imposed, which are
then governed by the rules on
contracts (art. 622), and those
which are to take effect upon the
donor's death, which are governed
by the rules established for
testamentary
successions
(art.
620).

The surviving donee Fortunata Solis

filed the action, which is the
subject matter of this appeal,
against
the
surviving
donor
Maxima Barroso and Eugenia and
Marcelina Lambino, heirs of the
deceased donor Juan Lambino, with
their
respective
husbands,
demanding of the defendants the
execution of the proper deed of
donation
according
to
law,
transferring one-half of the donated
property, and moreover, to proceed
to the partition of the donated
property and its fruits.

The court rendered judgment

based upon article 1279 of the Civil
Code granting plaintiff's prayer and
ordering the defendants to execute
a deed of donation in favor of the
plaintiff, adequate in form and
substance to transfer to the latter
the legal title to the part of the
donated lands assigned to her in
the original donation.

Issue:
WON Article 1279 of the Civil Code is
applicable
Held:

We are of the opinion that article

1279 of the Civil Code, relating to
contracts, is not applicable to the

We
have,
therefore,
a
donation propter nuptias which is
not valid and did not create any
right, since it was not made in a
public instrument, and hence,
article 1279 of the Civil Code which
the lower court applied is not
applicable thereto. The last named
article provides that, should the
law require the execution of an
instrument or any other special
form in order to make the
obligations of a contract effective,
the contracting parties may compel
each other to comply with such
formality from the moment that
consent has been given, and the
other requirements for the validity
of the contract exist. Suffice it to
state that this article refers to
contracts and is inapplicable to the
donation in question which must be

governed
by
the
rules
on
donations. It may further be noted,
at first sight, that this article
presupposes the existence of a
valid contract and cannot possibly
refer to the form required in order
to make it valid, which it already
has, but rather to that required
simply to make it effective, and for
this reason, it would, at all events,
be inapplicable to the donation in
question, wherein the form is
required precisely to make it valid.

The lower court states in its

judgment that the present donation
is onerous, and pursuant to article
622 of the Civil Code must be
governed by the rules on contracts.
This opinion is not well founded.
Donations
for
valuable
consideration, as may be inferred
from article 619 of the Civil Code,
are such as compensate services
which constitute debts recoverable
from the donor, or which impose a
charge equal to the amount of the
donation upon the donee, neither
of which is true of the present
donation, which was made only in
consideration of marriage. The
lower court insists that, by the fact
that this is a donation propter
nuptias, it is based upon the
marriage as a consideration, and
must be considered onerous.
Neither is this
opinion
well
founded.
In
donations propter
nuptias, the marriage is really a
consideration, but not in the sense
of being necessary to give birth to
the obligation. This may be clearly
inferred from article 1333, which
makes the fact that the marriage
did not take place a cause for the
revocation of such donations, thus
taking it for granted that there may
be a valid donation propter nuptias,

even without marriage, since that

which has not existed cannot be
revoked. And such a valid donation
would be forever valid, even if the
marriage never took place, if the
proper action for revocation were
not instituted, or if it were
instituted after the lapse of the
statutory period of prescription.
This is, so because the marriage in
a donation propter nuptias is rather
a resolutory condition which, as
such, presupposes the existence of
the obligation which may be
resolved or revoked, and it is not a
condition necessary for the birth of
the obligation.

The judgment appealed from is

reversed and the defendants are
hereby
absolved
from
the
complaint,
without
special
pronouncement
of
costs.
So
ordered

Velasquez v CA
GR No 126996
2/15/2000

FACTS:
BACKGROUND/GUIDE

Problem: Ownership of 6 properties left by

Spouses Aquino who died intestate
Petition for Review on Certiorari assailing
CA decision that denied their motion for
recon
6 properties in Pangasinan: 995sqm
residential land; 27849sqm sugar and
coconut farm; 2077sqm land; 2857sqm
residential land; 595sqm residential land;
2077sqm Riceland

o
o

o
o
o

o
o

Family Tree:
Spouses Leoncia De Guzman and Cornelio
Aquino childless
Leoncia De Guzman was survived by her
sisters:
Sister 1: Anatalia De Guzman (mother of
plaintiff, herein CA/respondent)
Sister
2:
Tranquilina
de
Guzman
(grandmother
of
defendants,
herein
Velasquez/petitioner)
Herein CA include heirs of Sister 1
(Anatalia): surnamed Meneses, including
Santiago Meneses
Herein Velasquez include heirs of the
son of Sister 2 (Tranquilina), Cesario
Velasquez: surnamed Velasquez
CASE

In 1989, heirs of Anatalia, surnamed

Meneses, (herein respondent) filed a
complaint for annulment, partition and
damages against heirs of Velasquez
(herein petitioner) for refusal to partition
the 6 properties of the Spouses Aquino
That Leoncia De Guzman, one year before
her death had a talk with her sisters
Anatalia and Tranquilino, witnessed by
their children, that the documents of
donation and partition of the 6 properties
which Leoncia and her husband executed
were not signed by them as it was not
their intention to give all to Cesario
Velasquez since Anatalia had several
children to support
That Cesario Velasquez with Tranquilina
promised to give of the properties
That after death of Leoncia, Velasquez
took possession of ALL properties despite
demands
Pray nullity of any docs for it did not bear
genuine signatures of the Aquinos and
order equal division of the properties
Velasquez filed their Amended Answer
alleging that during the lifetime of the
Aquinos, they had already disposed the
properties in favor to them through an
Escritura de Donation Propter Nuptias,
Deed of Conveyance, and that 4th and 5th
parcels were owned by 3rd parties
Denied the conference and the promise
that the Meneses claim
That their possession has been peaceful,
open, continuous, and adverse to the
exclusion of all others

That by Res Judicata, the petition is

already barred by 3 previous cases on the
same subject which were all dismissed
(last dismissal due to failure to prosecute)
and that there is 4 yrs prescription
RTC granted petition of Meneses, and
ordered division of the 6 properties
Testimony of 80yrs old Santiago Meneses
(re: the conference and promise) was
found to be credible spontaneous, clear,
straightforward, and convincing
Version of Velasquez were incredible and
unbelievable and that they manipulated
the transfer to themselves
On appeal, CA rejected defense of Res
Judicata (as it was not pleaded earlier) and
prescription (that an action for partition is
imprescriptible); CA also denied MR
Velasquez claim that the array of
documents that they presented as
evidence was declared null on the basis of
the telltale story of Meneses
ISSUE:
W/N the petitioners have acquired
absolute and exclusive ownership of
properties in question

HELD:
[- Court confirmed Res Judicata, its
requisites are present the trial courts
should have aready dismissed the petition
of the Meneses]

Petitioners submission is of merit

No preponderance of evidence adduced
during the trial to support its findings and
conclusions; CA and RTC relied solely on
the
testimony
which
was
never
corroborated with evidence
If the testimony was true, the Aquino
spouses could have executed another set
of documents to show alleged intention to
divide the properties
Petitioners were able to adduce the
uncontroverted and ancient documentary
evidence showing that during the lifetime
of the Aquinos they already disposed 4 of
the 6 parcels in year 1919 and 1939 via

Escritura de donation propter nuptias,

Deed of Donation inter vivos, Escritura de
Compravente, Deed of Conveyance
A donation as a mode of acquiring
ownership results in an effective transfer
of title over the property from the donor to
the donee and the donation is perfected
from the moment the donor knows of the
acceptance by the donee. And once a
donation is accepted, the donee becomes
the absolute owner of the property
donated. The donation of the first parcel
made by the Aquino spouses to petitioners
Jose and Anastacia Velasquez who were
then nineteen (19) and ten (10) years old
respectively was accepted through their
father Cesario Velasquez, and the
acceptance was incorporated in the body
of the same deed of donation and made
part of it, and was signed by the donor
and the acceptor. Legally speaking there
was delivery and acceptance of the deed,
and the donation existed perfectly and
irrevocably. The donation inter vivos may
be revoked only for the reasons provided
in Articles 760, 764 and 765 of the Civil
Code. The donation propter nuptias in
favor of Cesario Velasquez and Camila de
Guzman over the third and sixth parcels
including a portion of the second parcel
became the properties of the spouses
Velasquez since 1919. The deed of
donation propter nuptias can be revoked
by the non-performance of the marriage
and the other causes mentioned in article
86 of the Family Code. The alleged
reason for the repudiation of the
deed, i.e., that the Aquino spouses
did not intend to give away all their
properties since Anatalia (Leoncia's
sister)
had
several children to
support is not one of the grounds for
revocation of donation either inter
vivos or propter nuptias, although
the donation might be inofficious.

The Escritura compraventa over another

portion of the second parcel and the Deed
of conveyance dated July 14, 1939 in favor
of Cesario and Camila Velasquez over the
remaining portion of the second parcel is
also valid. In fact in the deed of sale dated
July 14, 1939, the Aquino spouses ratified
and confirmed the rights and interests of
Cesario Velasquez and Camila de Guzman
including
the
previous
deeds
of
conveyance executed by the Aquino
spouses over the second parcel in the
complaint and such deed of sale became
the basis for the issuance of TCT No.
15129 in the names of Cesario Velasquez
and Camila de Guzman on July 25, 1939.
The best proof of the ownership of the
land is the certificate of title and it requires
more than a bare allegation to defeat the
face value of TCT No. 15129 which enjoys
a legal presumption of regularity of
issuance. Notably, during the lifetime of
Cesario Velasquez, he entered into
contracts of mortgage and lease over the
property as annotated at the back of the
certificate of title which clearly established
that he exercised full ownership and
control over the property. It is quite
surprising that it was only after more than
fifty years that private respondents
asserted co-ownership claim over the
subject property.

The Aquino spouses had disposed the four

parcels of land during their lifetime and
the documents were duly notarized so that
these documents enjoy the presumption
of validity. Such presumption has not
been overcome by private respondent
Santiago
Meneses
with
clear
and
convincing evidence. In civil cases, the
party having the burden of proof must
establish his case by a preponderance of
evidence. Petitioners were able
to
establish that these four parcels of land
were validly conveyed to them by the
Aquino spouses hence they no longer

formed part of the conjugal properties of

the spouses at the time of their deaths. As
regards the fourth and fifth parcels,
petitioners alleged that these were also
conveyed to third persons and they do not
claim any right thereto.

The properties sought to be partitioned by

private respondents have already been
delivered to petitioners and therefore no
longer part of the hereditary estate which
could be partitioned
no co-ownership exist between private
respondents and petitioners, no reason to
discuss the other arguments raised by the
petitioners in support of their petition
- GRANTED, RTC and CA decision are SET
ASIDE

In Ps answer, he alleged that R did not

have a valid cause of action against him
because he had inherited that portion
from his parents, that his grandfather (the
original owner), granted to the said land to
his father when he got married to his
mother by means of donation propter
nuptias.

After due proceedings, the MCTC ruled in

favour of R stating that Rs parents had
purchased the said property from Ps
grandfather. Then R inherited the land
when Rs parents died and registered the
same and they were given a Certificate of
Title.

Abobon v Abobon
GR 155380
August 15, 2012

Topic: Donations Propter Nuptias

Facts:

Respondents Felicitas and Gelima Abobon

(R) were the plaintiffs in an action for
recovery of possession against Petitioner
Numeriano Abobon (P) in the MCTC of
Pangasinan. R averred that they were the
registered owners of a parcel of
unirrigated Riceland, that they had
allowed P, their first cousin, the use of the
said land out of benevolence, that they
now immediately need the said land for
their own use and P should vacate it.
However, P refused.

Also, the MCTC found that the land P

referred to as donated to his parents was
not the same as the land in question due
to their boundaries being different and
that in the donation propter nuptias, Ps
grandfather stated that the parcels of land
thereby covered had not been registered
under the provisions of the Spanish
Mortgage Law. Even assuming that the
land P was referring to was in the land
really in question, Ps claim would still not
prosper because the donation propter
nuptias had also been cancelled or
dissolved when his mother had signed as
an instrumental witness and his father had
given his consent to the sale of the land in
question by his grandfather and that this
signified either that his parents had
conformed to the dissolution of the
donation propter nuptias in their favour, or
that the land sold had been different from
the land donated to them.

P appealed to the RTC but it was DENIED.

P then appealed to the CA which was also
DENIED. Hence, this petition.

defensive allegation and such manner of

attack against the title was a collateral
one, which was disallowed by The Property
Registration Decree.

Issue:

Who is the true owner of the land in

question

Held:

Lastly, P insists that the land he occupied

had been donated to his parents and was
different from the land in question.
However, his insistence lacks factual
support. All the lower courts uniformly
found that his evidence related to a parcel
of land entirely different from the land in
question. And that findings of fact by the
lower courts, particularly when affirmed by
the CA, is conclusive to the SC.

The lawful owner of the land in question is

the R and the lower courts did not err in
ruling in their favour.

THE HEIRS OF MARCELINO DORONIO, NAMELY: REG

FLORA,
It is a fundamental principle in land
registration under the Torrens system is
that a certificate of title serves as
evidence
of
an
indefeasible
and
incontrovertible title to the property in
favour of the person whose name appears
therein. The Certificate of Title thus
becomes the best proof of ownership of a
parcel of land; hence, anyone who deals
with property registered under the Torrens
system may rely on the title and need not
go beyond the title. It is only when the
acquisition of the title is attended with
fraud or bad faith that the doctrine of
indefeasibility finds no application. R has
the preferential right to the possession of
the land in question because the
certificate of title is issued in Rs name.

Also, Ps argument lacks basis. In order for

P to properly assail the vailidity of Rs title,
P must himself bring an action for that
purpose. Instead of brining that direct
action, P mounted his attack as a

BOTH SURNAMED DORONIO, Petitioners, versus H

FORTUNATO
DORONIO,
NAMELY:
TRINIDAD
DORONIO-BALMES, MODING DORONIO, FLORENTINA
AND ANICETA ALCANTARA-MANALO, Respondents
G.R. No. 169454 12/27/2007

This case is a review on certiorari is the

Decision of the Court of Appeals reversing
that of the Regional Trial Court (RTC),
Branch 45, Anonas, Urdaneta City,
Pangasinan, in an action for reconveyance
and
damages.
The
CA
declared
respondents as rightful owners of one-half
of the subject property and directed
petitioners to execute a registerable
document
conveying
the
same
to
respondents.

The Facts

Spouses Simeon Doronio and Cornelia

Gante, now both deceased, were the
registered owners of a parcel of land
located at Barangay Cabalitaan, Asingan,
Pangasinan covered by Original Certificate
of Title (OCT) No. 352. The courts below
described it as follows:
The spouses had children but the records
fail to disclose their number. Marcelino
Doronio and Fortunato Doronio, now both
deceased, were among them and that the
parties in this case are their heirs.
Petitioners are the heirs of Marcelino
Doronio, while respondents are the heirs
of Fortunato Doronio. One of the
properties subject of said deed of donation
is the one that it described as follows:

Fourth - A piece of residential land located

in the barrio of Cabalitian but we did not
measure it, the area is bounded on the
north by Gabriel Bernardino; on the east
by Fortunato Doronio; on the south by
Geminiano Mendoza and on the west by a
road to Villasis.

It appears that the property described in

the deed of donation is the one covered by
OCT No. 352. Based on OCT No. 352, the
adjacent owners are Zacarias Najorda and
Alejandro Najorda, whereas based on the
deed of donation, the owner of the
adjacent property is Fortunato Doronio.
Furthermore, said deed of donation
remained a private document as it was
never notarized. According to petitioners,
they are now the owners of the entire
property in view of the private deed of
donation propter nuptias in favor of their
predecessors, Marcelino Doronio and
Veronica Pico.

Respondents, on the other hand, claim that

only half of the property was
actually
incorporated in the said deed of donation
because it stated that Fortunato Doronio,
instead of Zacarias Najorda and Alejandro
Najorda, is the owner of the adjacent
property at the eastern side. Respondents
posit that the donors respected and
segregated the possession of Fortunato
Doronio of the eastern half of the land. They
are the ones who have been possessing said
land
occupied
by
their
predecessor,
Fortunato Doronio.
The heirs of Marcelino Doronio and Veronica
Pico filed, on January 11, 1993, before the
RTC in Urdaneta, Pangasinan a petition "For
the Registration of a Private Deed of
Donation" docketed as Petition Case No. U920. No respondents were named in the said
petition although notices of hearing were
posted on the bulletin boards of Barangay
Cabalitaan, Municipalities of Asingan and
Lingayen. No one interposed an objection to
the petition. The petition was eventually
granted on September 22, 1993. This led to
the registration of the deed of donation,
cancellation of OCT No. 352 and issuance of a
new Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No.
44481 in the names of Marcelino Doronio and
Veronica Pico. Thus, the entire property was
titled
in
the
names
of
petitioners'
predecessors.
On April 28, 1994, the heirs of Fortunato
Doronio filed a pleading before the RTC in the
form of a petition in the same Petition Case
No. U-920. The petition was for the
reconsideration of the decision of the RTC
that ordered the registration of the subject
deed of donation. The petition was dismissed
on May 13, 1994 on the ground that the
decision in Petition Case No. U-920 had
already become final as it was not appealed.
They posited that spouses Simeon Doronio
and Cornelia Gante intended to donate only
one-half of the property.

During the pre-trial conference, the parties

stipulated, among others, that the property
was originally covered by OCT No. 352 which
was cancelled by TCT No. 44481. They also
agreed that the issues are: (1) whether or not
there was a variation in the description of the
property subject of the private deed of
donation and OCT No. 352; (2) whether or not
respondents had acquired one-half of the
property covered by OCT No. 352 by
acquisitive prescription; (3) whether or not the
transfer of the whole property covered by OCT
No. 352 on the basis of the registration of the
private deed of donation notwithstanding the
discrepancy in the description is valid; (4)
whether or not respondents are entitled to
damages; and (5) whether or not TCT No.
44481 is valid.
After due proceedings, the RTC ruled in
favor of petitioner heirs of Marcelino
Doronio (defendants). It concluded that the
parties admitted the identity of the land
which they all occupy; that a title once
registered under the torrens system cannot
be defeated by adverse, open and notorious
possession or by prescription; that the deed
of donation in consideration of the marriage
of the parents of petitioners is valid, hence,
it led to the eventual issuance of TCT No.
44481 in the names of said parents; and
that respondent heirs of Fortunato Doronio
(plaintiffs) are not entitled to damages as
they are not the rightful owners of the
portion of the property they are claiming.
The RTC disposed of the case, thus:
Wherefore, premises considered, the Court
hereby renders judgment DISMISSING the
herein Complaint filed by plaintiffs against
defendants.
Respondents appealed to the CA. They
argued that the trial court erred in not
finding that respondents' predecessor-ininterest acquired one-half of the property
covered by OCT No. 352 by tradition and/or
intestate succession; that the deed of
donation dated April 26, 1919 was null and

void; that assuming that the deed of

donation was valid, only one-half of the
property was actually donated to Marcelino
Doronio and Veronica Pico; and that
respondents acquired ownership of the
other half portion of the property by
acquisitive prescription.
In a Decision dated January 26, 2005, the
CA reversed the RTC decision with the
following disposition:
The assailed Decision dated June 28, 2002
is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Declaring the
appellants as rightful owners of one-half of
the property now covered by TCT No.
44481, the appellees are hereby directed to
execute a registerable document conveying
the same to appellants.
The appellate court determined that the
intention to donate half of the disputed
property to appellees' predecessors can be
gleaned from the disparity of technical
descriptions appearing in the title (OCT No.
352) of spouses Simeon Doronio and Cornelia
Gante and in the deed of donation propter
nuptias executed on April 24, 1919 in favor of
appellees' predecessors."
On the other hand, the property donated to
appellees' predecessors was described in
the deed of donation as:
"Fourth - A piece of residential land located in
the barrio of Cabalitian but we did not
measure it, the area is bounded on the north
by Gabriel Bernardino; on the east by
Fortunato Doronio; on the south by
Geminiano Mendoza and on the west by a
road to Villasis. Constructed on said land is a
house of light materials - also a part of the
dowry
Taking note "that the boundaries of the lot
donated to Marcelino Doronio and Veronica
Pico differ from the boundaries of the land
owned by spouses Simeon Doronio and
Cornelia Gante," the CA concluded that
spouses Simeon Doronio and Cornelia Gante

donated only half of the property covered by

OCT No.
352.
"In default of testamentary heirs, the law vests
the inheritance, x x x, in the legitimate x x x
relatives of the deceased, x x x." As Spouses
Simeon Doronio and Cornelia Gante died
intestate, their property shall pass to their
lawful heirs, namely: Fortunato and Marcelino
Doronio. Donating the entire property to
Marcelino Doronio and Veronica Pico and
excluding
another
heir,
Fortunato,
tantamounts to divesting the latter of his
rightful share in his parents' inheritance.
Besides, a person's prerogative to make
donations is subject to certain limitations, one
of which is that he cannot give by donation
more than what he can give by will (Article
752, Civil Code). If he does, so much of what is
donated as exceeds what he can give by will is
deemed inofficious and the donation is
reducible to the extent of such excess.
Petitioners now contend that the CA erred
in:
1. DECLARING
ADMISSIBILITY
OF
THE
ORIGINAL CERTIFICATE OF TITLE NO. 352
DESPITE
OFLACK
OF
TRANSLATION
THEREOF.

"(d)ocumentary evidence in an unofficial

language shall not be admitted as
evidence, unless accompanied with a
translation into English or Filipino."
The
argument
is
untenable.
The
requirement that documents written in an
unofficial language must be accompanied
with a translation in English or Filipino as a
prerequisite for its admission in evidence
must be insisted upon by the parties at the
trial to enable the court, where a translation
has been impugned as incorrect, to decide
the issue. Moreover, Section 36, Rule 132 of
the Revised Rules of Evidence provides:
SECTION 36. Objection. - Objection to
evidence offered orally must be made
immediately after the offer is made.
Objection to a question propounded in the
course of the oral examination of a witness
shall be made as soon as the grounds
therefor shall become reasonably apparent.
An offer of evidence in writing shall be
objected to within three (3) days after
notice of the offer unless a different period
is allowed by the court.
In any case, the grounds for the objections
must be specified.

2. (RULING THAT) ONLY HALF OF THE

DISPUTED PROPERTY WAS DONATED TO
THEPREDECESSORS-IN-INTEREST OF THE
HEREIN APPELLANTS.

Since petitioners did not object to the offer of

said documentary evidence on time, it is now
too late in the day for them to question its
admissibility

3. (ITS) DECLARATION THAT THE DONATION

PROPTER NUPTIAS IS INNOFICIOUS, IS
PREMATURE, AND THUS IT IS ILLEGAL
AND UNPROCEDURAL.

Issues on Impairment of Legitime Should Be

Threshed Out in a SpeciaL Proceeding, Not in
Civil Action for Reconveyance and Damages

OCT No. 352 in Spanish Although

Translated into English or Filipino Is
Admissible For Lack of Timely Objection

Not

Petitioners fault the CA for admitting OCT

No. 352 in evidence on the ground that it is
written in Spanish language. They posit that

On the other hand, petitioners are correct in

alleging that the issue regarding the
impairment of legitime of Fortunato Doronio
must be resolved in an action for the
settlement of estates of spouses Simeon
Doronio and Cornelia Gante.

Section 3, Rule 1 of the 1997 Rules of Civil

Procedure defines civil action and special
proceedings, in this wise:
x x x a) A civil action is one by which a party
sues another for the enforcement or
protection of a right, or the prevention or
redress of a wrong.
A civil action may either be ordinary or
special. Both are governed by the rules for
ordinary civil actions, subject to specific rules
prescribed for a special civil action.
xxxx
c) A special proceeding is a remedy by which
a party seeks to establish a status, a right or
a particular fact.
Citing American Jurisprudence, a noted
authority in Remedial Law expounds further:
It may accordingly be stated generally that
actions include those proceedings which are
instituted and prosecuted according to the
ordinary rules and provisions relating to
actions at law or suits in equity, and that
special
proceedings
include
those
proceedings which are not ordinary in this
sense, but is instituted and prosecuted
according to some special mode as in the
case of proceedings commenced without
summons and prosecuted without regular
pleadings, which are characteristics of
ordinary actions x x x. A special proceeding
must therefore be in the nature of a distinct
and independent proceeding for particular
relief,
such
as
may
be
instituted
independently of a pending action, by
petition or motion upon notice.
Thus, under Section 2, Rule 90 of the Rules of
Court, questions as to advancement made or
alleged to have been made by the deceased
to any heir may be heard and determined by
the court having jurisdiction of the estate
proceedings, and the final order of the court
thereon shall be binding on the person
raising the questions and on the heir.

While it may be true that the Rules used the

word "may," it is nevertheless clear that the
same provision contemplates a probate court
when it speaks of the "court having
jurisdiction of the estate proceedings."
Declaration of Validity of Donation Can Be
Challenged by an Interested Party Not
Impleaded in Petition for Quieting of Title or
Declaratory Relief or Where There is No Res
Judicata. Moreover, This Court Can Consider a
Factual Matter or Unassigned Error in the
Interest of Substantial Justice.
Nevertheless, petitioners cannot preclude the
determination of validity of the deed of
donation on the ground that (1) it has been
impliedly admitted by respondents; (2) it has
already been determined with finality by the
RTC in Petition Case No. U-920; or (3) the only
issue in an action for reconveyance is who
has a better right over the land.
We cannot agree with petitioners' contention
that respondents may no longer question the
validity of the deed of donation on the
ground that they already impliedly admitted
it. Under the provisions of the Civil Code, a
void contract is inexistent from the
beginning. The right to set up the defense of
its illegality cannot be waived.[49] The right
to set up the nullity of a void or non-existent
contract is not limited to the parties as in the
case of annullable or voidable contracts; it is
extended to third persons who are directly
affected by the contract.
SECTION 1. Who may file petition. - Any
person interested under a deed, will, contract
or other written instrument, or whose rights
are affected by a statute, executive order or
regulation, or ordinance, may, before breach
or violation thereof, bring an action to
determine any question of construction or
validity arising under the instrument or
statute and for a declaration of his rights or
duties thereunder.

An action for the reformation of an

instrument, to quiet title to real property or
remove clouds therefrom, or to consolidate
ownership under Article 1607 of the Civil
Code, may be brought under this rule.
SECTION 2. Parties. - All persons shall be
made parties who have or claim any interest
which would be affected by the declaration;
and no declaration shall, except as otherwise
provided in these rules, prejudice the rights
of persons not parties to the action.
(Emphasis ours)
However, respondents were not made parties
in the said Petition Case No. U-920. Worse,
instead of issuing summons to interested
parties, the RTC merely allowed the posting
of notices on the bulletin boards of Barangay
Cabalitaan, Municipalities of Asingan and
Lingayen, Pangasinan.
Respondents are not bound by the decision in
Petition Case No. U-920 as they were not
made parties in the said case.
The rules on quieting of title expressly
provide that any declaration in a suit to quiet
title shall not prejudice persons who are not
parties to the action.
That respondents filed a subsequent pleading
in the same Petition Case No. U-920 after the
decision there had become final did not
change the fact that said decision became
final without their being impleaded in the
case.
Said
subsequent
pleading
was
dismissed on the ground of finality of the
decision.
the RTC totally failed to give respondents
their day in court. As a result, they cannot be
bound by its orders. Generally accepted is
the principle that no man shall be affected by
any proceeding to which he is a stranger, and
strangers to a case are not bound by
judgment rendered by the court.
Moreover, for the principle of res judicata to
apply, the following must be present: (1) a

decision on the merits; (2) by a court of

competent jurisdiction; (3) the decision is
final; and (4) the two actions involve identical
parties, subject matter and causes of action.
[61] The fourth element is not present in this
case. The parties are not identical because
respondents were not impleaded in Petition
Case No. U-920. While the subject matter
may be the same property covered by OCT
No. 352, the causes of action are different.
Petition Case No. U-920 is an action for
declaratory relief while the case below is for
recovery of property.
We are not persuaded by petitioners' posture
that the only issue in this action for
reconveyance is who has a better right over
the land; and that the validity of the deed of
donation is beside the point although
respondents did not directly raise the issue of
validity of the deed of donation at the
commencement of the case before the trial
court, it was stipulated by the parties during
the pre-trial conference. In any event, this
Court has authority to inquire into any
question necessary in arriving at a just
decision of a case before it. Though not
specifically questioned by the parties,
additional issues may also be included, if
deemed important for substantial justice to
be rendered.
Donation Propter Nuptias of Real Property
Made in a Private Instrument Before the New
Civil Code Took Effect on August 30, 1950 is
Void
Logically, then, the cancellation of OCT No.
352 and the issuance of a new TCT No. 44481
in favor of petitioners' predecessors have no
legal basis. The title to the subject property
should, therefore, be restored to its original
owners under OCT No. 352.
Direct reconveyance to any of the parties is
not possible as it has not yet been
determined in a proper proceeding who
among the heirs of spouses Simeon Doronio
and Cornelia Gante is entitled to it. It is still

unproven whether or not the parties are the

only ones entitled to the properties of
spouses Simeon Doronio and Cornelia Gante.
As earlier intimated, there are still things to
be done before the legal share of all the heirs
can be properly adjudicated.
Titled Property Cannot Be Acquired By
Another By Adverse Possession or Extinctive
Prescription
The claim of respondents that they became
owners of the property by acquisitive
prescription has no merit. Truth to tell,
respondents cannot successfully invoke the
argument of extinctive prescription. They
cannot be deemed the owners by acquisitive
prescription of the portion of the property
they have been possessing. The reason is
that the property was covered by OCT No.
352. A title once registered under the torrens
system cannot be defeated even by adverse,
open and notorious possession; neither can it
be defeated by prescription.[76] It is notice to
the whole world and as such all persons are
bound by it and no one can plead ignorance
of the registration.

Property relations of spouses

Mateo v Lagua

The appealed Decision is REVERSED AND

SET ASIDE. A new one is entered:
(1) Declaring the private deed of donation
propter nuptias in favor of petitioners'
predecessors NULL AND VOID; and
(2) Ordering the
Pangasinan to:

Register

of

Deeds

of

(a) CANCEL Transfer Certificate of Title No.

44481 in the names of Marcelino Doronio and
VeronicaPico; and

(b) RESTORE Original Certificate of Title No. 352

in the names of its original owners, spouses
SimeonDoronio and Cornelia Gante.
SO ORDERED.

Petiton for review on CA decision

reducing
of
donation
propter
nuptias for being inofficious
Cipriano Lagua (wife Alejandra
Lagua) original owner of 3 parcels
of land
o 1917 donated 2 lots to son
Alejandro in consideration of
his marriage to Bonifacia
Mateo

couple
took
possession
but
title
remained with Cipriano
o 1923, Alejandro died. Widow
lived w/ father in law who
undertook farming of lots
giving
Bonifaca
owners
share of harvest
o 1926 Cipriano refused to
deliver her share
o Alejandra
obtained
judgement awarding her
possession of 2 lands
1941 Cipriano executed deed of
sale on same 2 parcels in favour of
youre son Gervasio
o Bonifacia
still
received
ownersshare until 1956
o 1956 she learned of sale
Bonifacia & daughter Anatalia
assisted by husband Luis Alcantara
filed annulment of deed of sale
o CFI Pangasinan granted
ordered Gervasio & Sotera
Gervasio to vacate & deliver
possession
Gervasio & Sotera action for
improvements on lot dismissed

G & S then filed for annulment of

donation. It was their claim that in
donating the two lots, which
allegedly were all that plaintiff
Cipriano Lagua owned, said plaintiff
not
only
neglected
leaving
something for his own support but
also prejudiced the legitime of his
forced heir, plaintiff Gervasio
Lagua.
CA held that the donation to
Alejandro Lagua of the 2 lots with a
combined area of 11,888 square
meters execeeded by 494.75
square meters his (Alejandro's)
legitime and the disposable portion
that Cipriano Lagua could have
freely given by will, and, to the
same
extent
prejudiced
the
legitime of Cipriano's other heir,
Gervasio Lagua. The donation was
thus declared inofficious, and
defendants-appellees were ordered
to reconvey to plaintiff Gervasio
Lagua a portion of 494.15 square
meters to be taken from any
convenient part of the lots.

ISSUE: W/N the donation to Alejandro of 2

lots prejudiced the legitime of Gervasio.
HELD: Yes
The infirmity in the above course of action
lies in the fact that in its Article 908 the
new Civil Code specifically provides as
follows:
ART. 908.
To determine the legitime,
the value of the property left at the death
of the testator shall be considered,
deducting all debts, and charges, which
shall not include those imposed in the will.

To the net value of the hereditary estate,

shall be added the value of all donations
by the testator that are subject to
collation, at the time he made them.

In other words, before any conclusion

about the legal share due to a compulsory
heir may be reached, it is necessary that
certain steps be taken first. The net estate
of the decedent must be ascertained, by
deducting an payable obligations and
charges from the value of the property
owned by the deceased at the time of his
death; then, all donations subject to
collation would be added to it. With the
partible estate thus determined, the
legitimes of the compulsory heir or heirs
can be established; and only thereafter
can it be ascertained whether or not a
donation had prejudiced the legitimes.
Certainly, in order that a donation may be
reduced for being inofficious, there must
be proof that the value of the donated
property exceeds that of the disposable
free portion plus the donee's share as
legitime in the properties of the donor.
-Since
no
evidence
to
rule
on
inofficiousness Trial court decision uphelp,
w/o prejudice to parties litigating on issue
of inofficiousness.

Cornelia
Matabuena
Cervantes
38 SCRA 284
March 31, 1971

Petronila

1. CIVIL LAW; PROPERTY RELATIONS

BETWEEN
HUSBAND
AND
WIFE;
DONATIONS BY REASON OF MARRIAGE;
PROHIBITION
AGAINST
DONATION
BETWEEN SPOUSES DURING MARRIAGE;
APPLICABLE
TO
COMMON
LAW
RELATIONSHIP. While Art. 133 of the
Civil Code considers as void a "donation
between
the
spouses
during
the
marriage", policy considerations of the
most exigent character as well as the
dictates of morality require that the same
prohibition should apply to a common-law
relationship. A 1954 Court of Appeals
decision Buenaventura v. Bautista, (50
O.G. 3679) interpreting a similar provision
of the old Civil Code speaks unequivocally.
If the policy of the law is, in the language

of the opinion of the then Justice J.B.L.

Reyes of that Court, "to prohibit donations
in favor of the other consort and his
descendants because of fear of undue and
improper pressure and influence upon the
donor, a prejudice deeply rooted in our
ancient law; porque no se engaen
despojandose el uno al otro por amor que
han de consuno, [according to] the
Partidas (Part. IV, Tit. Xl, LAW IV),
reiterating the rationale Ne mutuato
amore invicem spoliarentur of the
Pandects (Bk 24, Tit. I, De donat, inter
virum et uxorem); then there is every
reason to apply the same prohibitive
policy to persons living together as
husband and wife without benefit of
nuptials. For it is not to be doubted that
assent to such irregular connection for
thirty years bespeaks greater influence of
one party over the other, so that the
danger that the law seeks to avoid is
correspondingly increased. Moreover, as
already pointed out by Ulpian (in his lib.
32 ad Sabinum, fr. 1), it would not be just
that such donations should subsist lest the
condition of those who incurred guilt
should turn out to be better. So long as
marriage remains the cornerstone of our
family law, reason and morality alike
demand that the disabilities attached to
marriage should likewise attach to
concubinage.
2.
ID.;
SUCCESSION;
INTESTATE
SUCCESSION; SURVIVING SPOUSE; RULE
WHERE A SISTER SURVIVES WITH THE
WIDOW. The lack of validity of the
donation made b~ the deceased to
defendant Petronila Cervantes does not
necessarily result in plaintiff having
exclusive right to the disputed property.
Prior to the death of Felix Matabuena, the
relationship
between him and the
defendant was legitimated by their
marriage on March 28. 1962. She is
therefore his widow. As provided in the
Civil Code, she is entitled to one-half of
the inheritance and the plaintiff, as the
surviving sister to the other half
Facts:
- Petitioners
brother,
Felix
Matabuena, donated a piece of lot

in 1956 to his common-law spouse

herein respondent.
Felix and Petronila only got married
on 1962, 6 years after the deed of
donation
was
executed.
Five
months later, Felix died.
Petitioner, being the only sister and
nearest collateral relative of Felix,
filed a claim over the property by
virtue of an affidavit of selfadjudication executed by her in
1962, had the land declared in her
name and paid the estate and
inheritance taxes thereon.
Lower court of Sorsogon declared
at the donation was valid because
it was made at the time when Felix
and Petronila were not yet spouses,
rendering Art. 133 of the Code
inapplicable.

Issue:
- W/N the ban on donation between
spouses during a marriage applies
to a common-law relationship.
Held:
- Yes. As a fundamental principle
that what is within the spirit of the
law is as much a part of the law as
what is written. The reason for the
ban on donations between spouses
during the marriage is to prevent
the possibility of undue influence
and improper pressure being
exerted by one spouse on the
other, there is no reason why this
prohibition shall not apply also to
common-law relationships.
- Court however said that the lack of
the
donation
made
by
the
deceased to Respondent does not
necessarily mean that Petitioner
will have exclusive rights to the
disputed property because the
relationship between Felix and
respondent were legitimated by
marriage.
- Article 1001, Civil Code: Should
brothers and sisters or their
children survive with the widow or
widower, the latter shall be entitled
to one-half of the inheritance and
the brothers and sisters or their
children to the other half.

SSS v Davac G.R. No. L-21642 July 30,

1966
J. Barrera
FACTS: The late Petronilo Davac, a former
employee of Lianga Bay Logging Co., Inc.,
became a member of the SSS. He
designated Candelaria Davac as his
beneficiary and indicated his relationship
to her as that of a "wife" sometime in
1957. He died in 1959; thereupon, each of
the respondents (Candelaria Davac and
Lourdes Tuplano) filed their claims for
death benefit with the SSS. The deceased
contracted two marriages, the first, with
claimant Lourdes Tuplano and the second
with Candelaria Davac. The processing
was withheld. The Social Security System
(SSS) filed this petition praying that the
two parties be required to litigate their
claims. Through the Social Security
Commission (SSC), it further issued the
resolution naming Davac (the second
partner) as the valid beneficiary. Not
satisfied with the resolution, Lourdes
Tuplano (the first partner) brought the
appeal to the Court.
ISSUE: Whether or not the SSC acted
correctly
in
declaring
respondent
Candelaria Davac as the person entitled to
receive the death benefits in question
HELD/RATIO: Yes. SSS resolution affirmed.
Section 13, Republic Act No. 1161,
provides: (1) SEC. 13. Upon the covered
employee's death or total and permanent
disability under such conditions as the
Commission
may
define,
his
beneficiaries, shall be entitled to the
following benefitThe beneficiary "as
recorded" by the employee's employer is
the one entitled to the death benefits. The
appellant (the first partner) contends that
the designation made in the person of the
second and bigamous wife is null and void

because (1) it contravenes the provisions

of the Civil Code, and (2) it deprives the
lawful wife of her share in the conjugal
property as well as of her own and her
child's legitime in the inheritance. As to
the first point, appellant argues that a
beneficiary under SSS partakes of the
nature of a beneficiary in life insurance
policy
and,
therefore,
the
same
qualifications and disqualifications should
be applied. Article 739 and 2012 of the
Civil Code prohibits persons who cannot
receive donations from being beneficiaries
of a policy. The provisions mentioned in
Article 739 are not applicable to
Candelaria Davac because she was not
guilty of concubinage; there was no proof
that she had knowledge of the previous
marriage of her husband, Petronilo.
Regarding the second point raised by
appellant, the benefits accruing from
membership in SSS do not form part of the
properties of the conjugal partnership of
the covered member. They are disbursed
from a public special fund created by
Congress in pursuance to the declared
policy of the Republic "to develop,
establish gradually and perfect a social
security system which ... shall provide
protection
against
the
hazards
of
disability, sickness, old age and death."
The sources of this special fund are from
salary
contributions.
Under
other
provisions, if there is a named beneficiary
and the designation is not invalid, it is not
the heirs of the employee who are entitled
to receive the benefits (unless they are
the designated beneficiaries themselves).
It is only when there is no designated
beneficiaries, or when the designation is
void, that the laws of succession are
applicable.
Furthermore,
the
Social
Security Act is not a law of succession.

SUMBAD v. CA
[G.R. No. 106060]

[June 21, 1999]

FACTS:

of sale, and recovery of possession

with damages
Alleged
that
they
were
the
children/heirs of George and Agata
Spouses owned property in Otucan,
which was sold by George after Agata
died and used the proceeds to buy the
residential lot in Sum-at (supported by
witness Dalino, sister of Agata)
Maria sold lots within said property
without their knowledge/consent. They
only discovered in 1988
Prior to the sale, respondents were
warned that the property didnt belong
to Maria but to them. They proceeded
with the purchase and refused to meet
with petitioners
Petitioners Witnesses

Petitioners
were
children
and
compulsory heirs Agata and George
Tait, Sr.
After the death of Agata in 1936,
George maintained a common-law
relationship with Maria to whom on Apr
2, 1974, he donated a parcel of
unregistered land in Sitio Sum-at,
Bontoc.
Dec 24, 1977: George died
1982-1983: Maria sold lots included
within the Sum-at property in favor of
private respondents
1988: Maria died
Jul 24, 1989, the petitioners filed an
action for quieting of title, nullification
of deeds of sale and recovery of
possession with damages claiming that
Maria sold the Sum-at property without
their knowledge and consent
o she had no right to sell the
same considering that the
money used to purchase the
said property came from the
proceeds
of
the
inherited
Utocan property of their mother
which was sold by George;
o the deed of donation between
George and Maria was null and
void for being a forgery
Petitioners perspective

TOPIC:
Marriages

Donations in Common Law

PETITIONER: Emilie T. Sumbad, Beatrice

B. Tait
RESPONDENT:
etc.
PONENTE:

Court

of

Appeals,

Mendoza, J. (2nd Div)

Jul 24, 1989: petitioners action to

quieting of title, nullification of deeds

Dalino: George sold the Otucan

property after Agatas death and used
the proceeds to buy the Sum-at
property
Lanoy: when George acquired the Sumat property, he was already married to
Maria. Money used to purchase came
from the sale of the house at Bauko
Court deemed this to be not
conclusive of the fact that the
money came from the proceeds
of the Otucan sale
Atty. Papa: she was the register of
deeds of Bontoc since Feb 1987. She
did not recall receiving a letter from
Emelie. She issued a certification that
there was no deeds of sale between
Maria and private respondents
Shirley: she was boardmates during
college with Raquel Tait (Georges
ward). She saw the latter forge a deed
of donation and George's and Marias
signature at the time when George
was already dead
Deemed
rehearsed,
vague,
incredible, and unconvincing by
the Court. No evidence as well
(handwriting experts)
Respondents perspective

denied
to
being
informed
of
petitioners claim
alleged that the property didnt belong
to the conjugal partnership of George
and Agata (since the latter died 30

years before the issuance of the Tax

Declaration)
Maria (deceased) didnt need the
consent of petitioners to sell the
property
Respondents witnesses

Felipa: Rosita demanded additional

money from Felipas son, who paid
for the lot. Emilie was there when
she demanded.
Julio: They verified from the records
of the municipal office that Maria
was the owner.
Glenn: Also verified from the
Municipal Assessors office that the
property was owned by Maria. He
also testified that after he received
a letter from Petitioners, they held
a conference in Rocitas house,
wherein they were asked for more
money
Edward: deed of sale was registered
with the Register of Deeds of Bondoc
Private respondents arguments
o they were purchased in good
faith and for value as they
purchased the lots on the
strength of a Tax Declaration
over the Sum-at property
showing the seller, Maria, to be
the owner of the property
o the action was barred by laches
trial court dismissed the complaint
(affirmed by CA)

ISSUES:
3. WON the deed of donation is void due
to it being a forgery
4. WON Deed of Donation is invalid under
Art 749 of the Civil Code
5. WON Deed of Donation is contrary to
Art 133 of the Civil Code
6. WON the claim that they werent
aware of the sale until 1988 is credible
RULING:
Petition DENIED. Petitioners
have not sufficiently shown the
nullity of respondents title to the
lots. CA decision AFFIRMED.

1. No merit.
The fact finding of the CA shall
not be disturbed on appeal
unless the court has overlooked
or
ignored
some
fact/
circumstance
of
sufficient
weight or significance which
would alter the result of the
case.
Forgery should be proved by
clear and convincing evidence,
the burden of which lies with
alleger
Petitioner had not shown that
the deed of donation was
invalid. It was presumed that
the deputy clerk of court who
notarized
the
deed
was
authorized by the clerk of
court.
Shirleys testimony is difficult to
believe (rehearsed as she
anticipated the question of
petitioners
counsel,
and
sometimes said more than was
called for by the question.)
Petitioners
should
have
presented handwriting experts
to support their claim that
Georges signature on the deed
of donation was indeed a
forgery
2. Deed is Valid under Art 749
Art 749, CC requires a public
instrument as a requisite for the
validity
of
donations
of
immovable property
Person who notarized it was
the deputy clerk of court who
acted for and in the absence
of the Clerk of Court
In accordance with Sec
21,
Revised
Administrative Code
(which
lists
officials
authorized to administer
oaths, among which is
the Clerk of Court and
people who act in the
capacity of the listed
officers)
3. Deed is Valid under Art 133

Art 133: donation between

spouses during marriage shall
be void. This prohibition doesnt
apply when the donation takes
effect after the death of the
donor. Nor does it apply to
moderate gifts which spouses
may give each other on the
occasion of any family rejoicing.
Now Art 87 of the FC:
prohibition applies to people
living as husband and wife
without valid marriage
This point is being raised for the
first time, which the petitioners
cannot do on appeal
Even assuming that they arent
thus
precluded,
petitioners
werent
able
to
present
evidence in support of such
no showing of George
and Marias marriage
and if so, when it took
place
or that at the time of
donation, George and
Maria were maintaining
common-law relations
evidence showing that at the
time the deed was executed,
their father and Maria were still
maintaining
common-law
relations should have been
presented. Beatrices testimony
is only to the effect that in 1941
Maria
became
their
stepmother. No evidence on
record that George and Maria
continuously
maintained
common-law relations until Apr
2, 1974 when the donation
was made

4. Nope.
Petitioners mother died in
1936, father on 1974, yet they
waited 12 years before claiming
their inheritance?
Petitioners are guilty of Laches
Laches is the failure for
an unreasonable length
of time to do that which
shouldve been done
earlier

precluded them from

assailing the donation
made their father in
favor of Maria
ARCABA vs.
BATOCAEL

TABANCURA

VDA.

DE

GR No. 146683
November 22, 2001

FACTS:

Francisco Comille and his wife Zosima

Montallana became the registered owners
of Lot No. 437-A located at Balintawak St.
and Rizal Avenue in Dipolog City,
Zamboanga del Norte in January 1956.
Zosima died in 1980 hence Francisco and
his mother in law executed a deed of
extrajudicial partition with waiver of rights,
where the latter waived her share
consisting of of the property in favor of
Francisco. Since Francisco do not have
any children to take care of him after his
retirement, he asked Leticia, his niece,
Leticias cousin, Luzviminda and Cirila
Arcaba, the petitioner, who was then a
widow and took care of Franciscos house
as well as the store inside.

According to Leticia, Francisco and Cirila

were lovers since they slept in the same
room.
On the other hand, Erlinda
Tabancura, another niece of Francisco
claimed that the latter told her that Cirila
was
his
mistress.
However,
Cirila
defensed herself that she was a mere
helper who could enter the masters
bedroom when Francisco asked her to and
that Francisco was too old for her. She

denied having sexual intercourse with

Francisco. When the nieces got married,
Cirila who was then 34 year-old widow
started working for Francisco who was 75
year old widower. The latter did not pay
him any wages as househelper though her
family was provided with food and
lodging. Franciscos health deteriorated
and
became
bedridden.
Tabancura
testified that Franciscos only source of
income was the rentals from his lot near
the public streets.

In January 1991, few months before

Francisco died, he executed a Deed of
Donation Inter Vivos where he ceded a
portion of Lot 437-A composed of 150 sq
m., together with his house to Cirila who
accepted the same. The larger portion of
268 sq m. was left under his name. This
was made in consideration of the 10 year
of faithful services of the petitioner. Atty
Lacaya notarized the deed and was later
registered by Cirila as its absolute owner.

In Octoer 1991, Francisco died and in

1993, the lot received by Cirila had a
market value of P57,105 and assessed
value of P28,550.
The decedents
nephews and nieces and his heirs by
intestate succession alleged that Cirila
was the common-law wife of Francisco.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the deed of donation inter

vivos executed by Francisco in Arcabas
favor was valid.

HELD:

The court in this case considered a

sufficient
proof
of
common
law
relationship wherein donation is not valid.
The conclusion was based on the
testimony of Tabancura and certain
documents bearing the signature of Cirila
Comille such as application for business
permit, sanitary permit and the death
certificate of Francisco. Also, the fact that
Cirila did not demand her wages is an
indication that she was not simply a
caregiver employee.

Cohabitation means more than sexual

intercourse, especially when one of the
parties is already old and may no longer
be interested in sex at the very least,
cohabitation is a public assumption of men
and women holding themselves out to the
public as such.
Hence, the deed of donation by Francisco
in favor of Cirila is void under Art. 87 of
the Family Code.

Willem Beumer Vs Avelina Amores

G.R. No. 195670 December 3, 2012

Issue: Can a foreigner reimburse his

investment in the purchase of Filipino
land

Facts of the Case: Willem Beumer, a

Dutch National, and Avelina Amores, a
Filipina, were married in March 29, 1980.
In November 10, 2000, the RTC of Negros
Oriental, Branch 32, declared the nullity of
their marriage on the basis of Beumers
psychological incapacity as contemplated
in Article 36 of the Family Code. Beumer
filed a Petition for Dissolution of Conjugal
Partnership on December 14, 2000 asking
for the distribution of their properties
claimed to have been acquired during the
subsistence of their marriage.
The
properties
include
several
lots
of
Dumaguete Cadastre (lot 1, lot 2142, lot
5845, lot 4, lot 2055-A and lot 2055-I.
Amores claimed that, with the exception
of their two (2) residential houses on Lots
1 and 2142, she and Beumer did not
acquire any conjugal properties during
their marriage, the truth being that she
used her own personal money to purchase
Lots 1, 2142, 5845 and 4 out of her
personal funds and Lots 2055-A and 2055-I
by way of inheritance. Amores submitted
a joint affidavit executed by her and
petitioner attesting to the fact that she
purchased
Lot
2142
and
the
improvements thereon using her own
money. Accordingly, Amores sought the
dismissal of the petition for dissolution as
well as payment for attorneys fees and
litigation expenses.

During trial, Beumer testified that while

Lots 1, 2142, 5845 and 4 were registered
in the name of Amores, these properties
were acquired with the money he received
from the Dutch government as his
disability benefit, since Amores did not
have sufficient income to pay for their
acquisition. Beumer also claimed that the
joint affidavit they submitted before the
Register of Deeds of Dumaguete City was
contrary to Article 89 of the Family Code,
thus it is invalid. Amores maintained that
the money used for the purchase of the
lots came exclusively from her personal
funds.

The RTC Negros decided that the source of

funds for the acquisition of said lots,
Beumer could not have acquired any right
over these properties as Beumer still
attempted
to
acquire
them
not
withstanding his knowledge of the
constitutional prohibition against foreign
ownership of private lands.
This was
made evident by the sworn statements
petitioner executed purporting to show
that said lots were purchased from the
exclusive funds of his wife. Beumers plea
for reimbursement for the amount he had
paid to purchase said properties on the
basis of equity was likewise denied. Court
of Appeals affirmed the RTC decision.
Beumer filed a petition for review on the
CA ruling to the SC.

Decision: The SC held that the petition

lacks merit. The issue to be resolved is
not of first impression. In Re: Petition For
Separation
of
Property-Elena
Buenaventura Muller v. Helmut Muller, the
Court had already denied a claim for
reimbursement of the value of purchased
parcels of Philippine land instituted by a
foreigner Helmut Muller, against his

former
Filipina
spouse,
Elena
Buenaventura Muller. It held that Helmut
Muller cannot seek reimbursement on the
ground of equity where it is clear that he
willingly and knowingly bought the
property despite the prohibition against
foreign
ownership
of
Philippine
land enshrined under Section 7, Article XII
of the 1987 Philippine Constitution.

Beumers statements regarding the real

source of the funds used to purchase the
subject parcels of land dilute the veracity
of his claims: While admitting to have
previously executed a joint affidavit that
respondents personal funds were used to
purchase Lot 1, he likewise claimed that
his personal disability funds were used to
acquire the same. Evidently, these
inconsistencies show his untruthfulness.
Thus, Beumer has come before the Court
with unclean hands; he is now precluded
from seeking any equitable refuge. In any
event, the Court cannot, even on the
grounds of equity, grant reimbursement to
Beumer given that he acquired no right
whatsoever over the subject properties by
virtue of its unconstitutional purchase. It is
well-established that equity as a rule will
follow the law and will not permit that to
be done indirectly which, because of
public policy, cannot be done directly. The
ruling of the CA is affirmed.

Respondents filed with SEC against

Abrenica and state to return
partnership funds from a sale of a
parcel of land in Batangas. The
other case was regarding the
return the retainer fees Abrenica
received and the balance of cash
advance of Abrenica way back in
1997.
SEC transferred the case to RTC
QC. The decision was:
CIVIL CASE NO. Q01-42948
1.
Ordering
the
respondent Atty. Erlando
Abrenica to render full
accounting of the amounts
he received as profits from
the sale and resale of
the Lemeryproperty
in
the
amount
of
4,524,000.00;
2.
Ordering
the
respondent Atty. Erlando
Abrenica to remit to the law
firm the said amount of
4,524,000.00 plus interest
of 12% per annum from the
time he received the same
and converted the same to
his own personal use or
from September 1997 until
fully paid; and
3.
suit.

To pay the costs of

CIVIL CASE NO. Q01-42959

Abrenica vs. Abrenica
Facts:

Petitioner Erlando Abrenica is a

partner in the law firm Abrenica,
Tungol
and
Tibayan.
Respondentsare his two partners
Danilo
Tungol
and
Abelardo
Tibayan.

1.
Ordering
Atty.
Erlando Abrenica to render a
full
accounting
of
the
amounts he received under
the
retainer
agreement
between
the
law
firm
and Inc. and Atlanta Land
Corporation in the amount
of 320,000.00.
2.
Ordering
Atty.
Erlando Abrenica to remit to

the law firm the amount

received by him under the
Retainer Agreement with
Atlanta
Industries,
Inc.
andCorporation in
the
amount of 320,000.00 plus
interests of 12% per annum
from June 1998 until fully
paid;

III.
The lower court
erred in not ruling that the
real
estate
transaction
entered
into
by
said
petitioners
and
spouses
Roman and Amalia Aguzar
was a personal transaction
and not a law partnership
transaction.

3.
Ordering
Atty.
Erlando Abrenica to pay the
law firm his balance on his
cash advance in the amount
of 25,000.00 with interest
of 12% per annum from the
date this decision becomes
final; and

IV.
The lower court
erred in ruling that the
testimonies
of
the
respondents are credible.
V.
The lower court
erred in ruling that the
purchase price for the lot
involved was 3 million and
not 8 million.

4.
To pay the costs of
suit. SO ORDERED.
Petitioner filed an appeal to CA and
CA rendered a decision saying that
petitioner filed a wrong remedy
and
dismissed
the
case.
Respondents were able to seek
judgment as the decision in G.R.
No. 169420 became final and
executory.
Erlando who was not happy with
the decision filed with the CA along
with his wife Joena a petition for
annulment of judgment on the
previous case. They said that the
court erred on the following
grounds:
The lower court erred in
concluding
that
both
petitioners and respondents
did
not
present
direct
documentary evidence to
substantiate
[their]
respective claims.
II.
The lower court
erred in concluding that
both
petitioners
and
respondents relied mainly
on testimonial evidence to
prove
their
respective
position[s].

VI.
The lower court
erred
in
ruling
that
petitioners
retainer
agreement
with
Atlanta
Industries, Inc. was a law
partnership transaction.
VII.
The lower court
erred when it failed to rule
on
said
petitioners
permissive
counterclaim
relative to the various
personal loans secured by
respondents.
VIII.
The lower court not
only erred in the exercise of
its jurisdiction but more
importantly it acted without
jurisdiction or with lack of
jurisdiction

We

note

that

petitioners

were

married on 28 May 1998. The cases

filed

with

the

Securities

and

Exchange Commission (SEC) on 6

May 1998 and 15 October 1998
were

filed

against

petitioner

Erlando only. It was with the filing

of CA-G.R. SP No. 98679 on 24 April

2007 that Joena joined Erlando as a

co-petitioner.
The CA dismissed the case again as
final and executory but both
Abrenica and Joena cannot be
stopped and filed again another
petition. This time, they injected
extrinsic fraud which was also
discussed on the dismissed case.
The CA dismissed the case again
for being insufficient in form and
substance.
On September 13, 2007, petitioner
Erlando filed an Urgent Omnibus
Motion with Branch 226, alleging
that the sheriff had levied on
properties belonging to his children
and petitioner Joena. On that same
day, Joena also filed an affidavit of
third party claim on the same
branch alleging that she and her
stepchildren owned a number of
personal properties sought to be
levied. She insisted that she owns
the two motorcycles as well as the
house and lot to be which formed
part of the absolute community of
property. She also alleged that it
being a family home were exempt
from execution in pursuant of Rule
39, Section 13 of the Rules of
Court. She now sought the
discharge
and
release
and
remittance to her half of the
proceeds.
Petitioner moved to withdraw his
motion on the RTC scheduled
supposedly on Oct. 17, 2007
because of ongoing negotiations
with respondents.
Both
Abrenica
and
TIbayan
witnessed by Sheriff Nardo de
Guzman Jr. of RTC QC executed an
agreement to postpone the auction
sale of said property in anticipation
of an amicable settlement of
money judgment.

A sheriffs certificate was issued on

Jan. 3, 2008 in favour of the law
firm for the said property at 5M.
Petitioner elevated the case to SC
as they say that they were denied
due process by CA when they filed
a second case for annulment of
judgment of the decision of RTC.
Respondents alleged that petitioner
performed
an
act of
forum
shopping and filed a motion for
contempt against Abrenica.

Issue:
1. W/N Joena had a right to the claim
2. W/N petitioner committed forum
shopping and can be filed for
contempt
Ratio:

1. No. Joena turned out to be a

second wife. From the records,
Erlando Abrenica was first married
to MA. Aline Lovejoy Padua on Oct.
13, 1983. They had three children:
Patrik Erlando (born on 14 April
1985), Maria Monica Erline (born on
9 September 1986), and Patrik
Randel (born on 12 April 1990).
After the dissolution of the first
marriage of Erlando, he and Joena
got married on 28 May 1998.In her
Affidavit, Joena alleged that she
represented her stepchildren; that
the levied personal properties were
owned by the latter. We note that
two of these stepchildren were
already of legal age when Joena
filed her Affidavit. As to Patrik
Randel, parental authority over him

belongs to his parents. Absent any

special

power

authorizing

attorney

to

represent

Joena

Erlandos
cannot

of

children,

be

her

sustained.

claim

Petitioner

Joena also asserted that the two (2)

motor vehicles purchased in 1992
and 1997, as well as the house and
lot covered by TCT No. 216818
formed

part

of

the

absolute

community regime. However, Art.

92, par. (3) of the Family Code
excludes

from

property

the

the

community

property

acquired

before the marriage of a spouse

who has legitimate descendants by
a former marriage; and the fruits
and the income, if any, of that
property. Neither

these

two

vehicles nor the house and lot

belong to the second marriage.

2. No. Petitioners are not guilty of

successively,
for
the
purpose of obtaining a
favorable judgment. Thus, it
has been held that there is
forum-shopping
(1) whenever as a result of
an adverse decision in one
forum, a party seeks a
favorable decision (other
than by appeal or certiorari)
in another, or
(2) if, after he has filed a
petition before the Supreme
Court, a party files another
before the Court of Appeals
since in such case he
deliberately splits appeals
in the hope that even as
one case in which a
particular remedy is sought
is dismissed, another case
(offering a similar remedy)
would still be open, or
(3) where a party attempts
to obtain a preliminary
injunction in another court
after failing to obtain the
same from the original
court.

forum shopping.Respondents claim

that petitioners and their present

Civil Case No. 09-1323-MK was filed

counsel, Atty. Antonio R. Bautista,

to

were

undertaken

guilty

of

forum

shopping

question

the
by

the

proceedings
sheriff

in

when the latter filed Civil Case No.

executing the judgment in Civil

09-1323-MK

of

Case Nos. Q01-42948 and Q01-

Marikina City while the case was

42959. On the other hand, the

still

with

pending

In Executive
Gordon, we

the

RTC

before

us.

present case questions the merits

Secretary

v.

of the Decision itself in Civil Case

explained

shopping in this wise:

forum

Nos.

Q01-42948

and

Q01-

42959. These cases have different

causes of action. Thus, it cannot be

Forum-shopping consists of
filing multiple suits involving
the same parties for the
same cause of action, either
simultaneously
or

said that petitioners were clearly

guilty of forum shopping when they
filed the Complaint before the RTC
of Marikina City.

Held: Petition denied.

Luzon Surety Co., Inc. vs De Garcia

30 SCRA 111

Facts:

Luzon Surety granted a crop loan to

Chavez based on a surety bond executed
in favor of Philippine National Bank. Garcia
was one of the guarantors of the
indemnity agreement. On April 1957, PNB
filed complaint against Luzon Surety. This
subsequently prompted Luzon Surety,on
August of the same year, to file a
complaint against the guarantors (one of
which was Garcia). The lower court ruled
in favor of PNB in the first case and
ordered the guarantors in the second case
to pay Luzon Surety. July 30, 1960, CFI
issued a writ of execution for Garcia to pay
the amount of P3,839. On August, the
sheriff levied his sugar quedans, conjugal
property of the Garcia spouses.The
Garcias filed a suit of injunction which the
lower court found in their favor based on
Art. 161 of the CC. Luzon Surety appealed
to the CA which affirmed the lower courts
decision Review through SC.

Issue:

WON the signing of the indemnity

agreement redounded to the benefit of the
family and thus,should fall under the
liabilities of the conjugal partnership.

Ruling:

No. The administrators obligations are

only chargeable to the conjugal property if
he believes it is done for the benefit of the
family. No proof was presented that
Vicente Garcia, acting as surety or
guarantor, did so for the benefit of the
family. Luzon Surety claims that the surety
did benefit the family because it added to
Garcias reputation as being trustworthy
and enhanced his standing in the
community. This is too remote/fanciful a
benefit to be considered in terms of what
is provided for in Art. 161.

Gelano v CA
FACTS
Insular Sawmill, Inc
o Private respondent
o With a corporate life of 50
years (September 1945September 1995)
o general lumber and sawmill
business
o leased
the
paraphernal
property of petitioner-wife
Guillermina M. Gelano in
Paco, Manila
o its officers and directors had
come to know petitionerhusband Carlos Gelano
who received from the
corporation cash advances
on account of rentals to be
paid by the corporation on
the land
Carlos
Gelano
obtained
from
private respondent cash advances
of P25,950.00
o said sum was taken and
received on the agreement
that
private
respondent
could deduct the same from
the monthly rentals of the
leased premises until said
cash advances are fully paid
o was able to pay only
P5,950.00 thereby leaving
an
unpaid
balance
of
P20,000.00
Petitioner Guillermina M. Gelano
refused to pay on the ground that

said amount was for the personal

account of her husband asked for
by, and given to him, without her
knowledge and consent and did not
benefit the family
Petitioners husband and wife also
made credit purchases of lumber
materials from private respondent
with a total price of P1,120.46 in
connection with the repair and
improvement
of
petitioners
residence
o partial payment was made
by petitioners in the amount
of P91.00
o in view of the cash discount
in favor of petitioners in the
amount of P83.00, the
amount
due
private
respondent on account of
credit purchases of lumber
materials is P946.46
which
petitioners
failed to pay
Joseph Tan Yoc Su, executed a joint
and several promissory note with
Carlos Gelano in favor of China
Banking Corp
o In order to accommodate
and help petitioners get a
loan
o However, petitioners failed
to pay
o Respondent was made to
pay P9,106
Carlos Gelano was
able to pay private
respondent
the
amount of P5,000.00
but the balance of
P4,106.00 remained
unsettled.
Guillermina
M.
Gelano refused to
pay on the ground
that she had no
knowledge about the
accommodation
made
by
the
corporation in favor
of her husband.
Corporation filed a case for
collection against petitioner

Private respondent amended its

Articles of Incorporation to shorten
its term of existence up to
December 31, 1960 only
o duly field with the SEC
o the trial court was, however,
not informed of the said
shortening of period
On November 20, 1964 and almost
four (4) years after the dissolution
of the corporation, the trial court
rendered a decision in favor of
private respondent

ISSUE:
whether a corporation, whose corporate
life had ceased by the expiration of its
terms of existence, could still continue
prosecuting and defending suits after its
dissolution and beyond the period of three
(3) years provided for under Act No. 1459,
otherwise known as the Corporation Law,
to wind up its affairs, without having
undertaken any step to transfer its assets
to a trustee or assignee.
HELD:
In American corporate law, upon which our
Corporation Law was patterned, it is well
settled that, unless the statutes otherwise
provide, all pending suits and actions by
and against a corporation are abated by a
dissolution of the corporation.[5]
Section 77 of the Corporation Law
provides that the corporation shall be
continued as a body corporate for three
(3) years after the time when it would
have been dissolved, for the purpose of
prosecuting and defending suits by or
against it, so that, thereafter, it shall no
longer enjoy corporate existence for such
purpose. For this reason, Section 78 of the
same law authorizes the corporation, at
any time during said three years to convey
all of its property to trustees for the
benefit
of
members,
stockholders,
creditors and other interested, evidently
for the purpose, among others, of enabling
said trustees to prosecute and defend
suits by or against the corporation begun
before the expiration of said period.

When Insular Sawmill, Inc. was dissolved

on December 31, 1960, under Section 77
of the Corporation Law, it still has the right
until December 31, 1963 to prosecute in
its name the present case. After the
expiration of said period, the corporation
ceased to exist for all purposes and it can
no longer sue or be sued. However, a
corporation that has a pending action and
which cannot be terminated within the
three-year period after its dissolution is
authorized under Section 78 to convey all
its property to trustees to enable it to
prosecute and defend suits by or against
the corporation beyond the three-year
period. Although private respondent did
not appoint any trustee, yet the counsel
who prosecuted and defended the interest
of the corporation in the instant case and
who in fact appeared in behalf of the
corporation may be considered a trustee
of the corporation at least with respect to
the matter in litigation only. Said counsel
had been handling the case when the
same was pending before the trial court
until it was appealed before the Court of
Appeals and finally to this Court. We
therefore hold that there was a substantial
compliance with Section 78 of the
Corporation Law and as such, private
respondent Insular Sawmill, Inc. could still
continue prosecuting the present case
even beyond the period of three (3) years
from the time of its dissolution.
From the above quoted commentary of
Justice Fisher, the trustee may commence
a suit which can proceed to final judgment
even beyond the three-year period. No
reason can be conceived why a suit
already commenced by the corporation
itself during its existence, not by a mere
trustee who, by fiction, merely continues
the legal personality of the dissolved
corporation should not be accorded similar
treatment allowed to proceed to final
judgment and execution thereof.
The word trustee as used in the
corporation statute must be understood in
its general concept which could include
the counsel to whom was entrusted in the
instant case, the prosecution of the suit
filed by the corporation. The purpose in
the transfer of the assets of the
corporation to a trustee upon its

dissolution is more for the protection of its

creditor and stockholders. Debtors like the
petitioners herein may not take advantage
of the failure of the corporation to transfer
its assets toa trustee, assuming it has any
to transfer which petitioner has failed to
show, in the first place. To sustain
petitioners contention would be to allow
them to enrich themselves at the expense
of another, which all enlightened legal
systems condemn.
The last two assigned errors refer to the
disposition of the main case.
Petitioners contend that the obligations
contracted by petitioner
Carlos Gelano from November 19, 1947
until August 18, 1950 (before the
effectivity of the New Civil Code) and from
December 26, 1950 until July 14, 1952
(during the effectivity of the New Civil
Code) were his personal obligations,
hence, petitioners should not be held
jointly and severally liable. As regards the
said issues, suffice it to say that with the
findings of the Court of Appeals that the
obligation
contracted
by
petitionerhusband Carlos Gelano redounded to the
benefit of the family, the inevitable
conclusion is that the conjugalproperty is
liable for his debt, pursuant to paragraph
1, Article 1408,
Civil Code of 1889 which provision
incidentally can still be found in paragraph
1, Article 161 of the New Civil Code.
Only the conjugal partnership is liable, not
joint and several as erroneously described
by the Court of Appeals, the conjugal
partnership being only a single entity.

G Tractors Inc. v CA
GR L-57402
February 28, 1985

Topic: Charges upon the ACP and CPG w/

consent

Facts:

Private Respondent Luis R. Narciso,

legally married to Josefina S. Narciso, is a
businessman engaged in the production
and exportation of Philippine mahogany
logs.

The Petitioner, G-Tractors Inc. is in

the business of leasing heavy equipment
such as tractors and bulldozers

On Feb. 26, 1973 Luis entered into a

Contract of Hire of heavy Equipment with
G-Tractors.

Luis was not able to pay his

obligations to G-Tractors, so they filed a
case against him to collect his obligation.

Luis was declared in default,

however a compromise agreement offered
by Luis was accepted by G-Tractors. It
stated that Luis will pay thru instalments.
Again Luis failed to comply, so G-Tractors
filed a motion for execution. Luis asked for
the suspension of the writ of execution on
claims that he had a pending loan w/ a
bank. The RTC denied his petition for
suspension & the writ of execution was
issued.

Levy was accordingly made by the

City Sherriff on certain personal properties
of the Narciso couple and an auction was
held on Mar. 7, 1975.

Likewise, on February 12, 1975, the

Sheriff also made a levy on all rights,
interest, title, participation which Luis may
have over a parcel of residential land,
which parcel of land is allegedly the
conjugal property of the spouses Luis R.
Narciso and Josefina Salak Narciso.

Auction date for the real estate

property was set for Mar. 25, 1975 wherein
G-Tractors won all these auctions.

Luis entered into another

agreement (a contract of lease over the
aforementioned property) with G-Tractors,
wherein he would pay P1,000 monthly
rental fee. Luis paid P12,000 for 1year
rental.

Narciso couple then filed a

complaint for declaration of nullity of levy
on the residential property on the ground
that it is a conjugal property. Luis entered
into a contract with G-Tractor which she
was not informed of and which she did not
benefit from. That the Sherriffs sale
clearly stated that only properties under
Luis Narciso would be sold. And that
Josefina could not be bound by the
judgment rendered in said case.

G-Tracors moved to have a transfer

of certificate, which Luis opposed their
motion on account of his complaint to
nullify the said auction of the said land.
RTC granted G-Tractors petition, Luis
moved to reconsider, and the Judge
dismissed his motion. A motion for
preliminary injunction was filed by Luis,
which was also dismissed.

On Oct. 2, 1976 Narcisio Couple

filed a petition for certiorari w/ preliminary
injunction before the CA. The CA reversed
the RTC.

Issue

Whether or not the judgment debt of

private respondent Luis R. Narciso is a
conjugal
debt
for
which
the
conjugalpartnership property can be held
answerable.

should not be made to suffer and answer

alone.
So that, if he incurs an
indebtedness in the legitimate pursuit of
his career or profession or suffers losses in
a legitimate business, the conjugal
partnership must equally bear the
indebtedness and the losses, unless he
deliberately acted to the prejudice of his
family. Such is the nature of the judgment
debt of private respondent Luis R. Narciso
to petitioner. Consequently, the conjugal
partnership
of
gains
of
private
respondents Narcisos, must answer for the
same. Necessarily the sale at public
auction by the Sheriff of Quezon City of
TCT No. 120923 belonging to the conjugal
partnership of gains of the private
respondents Narcisos in order to satisfy
the judgment debt of the private
respondent Luis R. Narciso with petitioner,
was validly and legally made in
accordance with law and not legally
assailable.

Held:

Yes.

Article 161 of the New Civil Code provides

that the conjugal partnership shall be
liable for:

(1) All the debts and obligations

contracted by the husband for the benefit
of the conjugal partnership, and those
contracted by the wife, also for the same
purpose, in the cases where she may
legally bind the partnership

There is no question that private

respondent Luis R. Narciso is engage in
business as a producer and exporter of
Philippine mahogany logs. He operates a
logging concession and holds office right
in the conjugal where he and his family
resides. His account with petitioner GTractors, Inc. represents rentals for the use
of petitioner's tractors which he leased for
the purpose of constructing switchroads
and hauling felled trees at the jobsite of
the logging concession which is not his
exclusive property but that of his family.
There is no doubt then that his account
with the petitioner was brought about in
order to enhance the productivity of said
logging business, a commercial enterprise
for gain which he had the right to embark
the conjugal partnership.

The husband is the administrator of the

conjugal partnership and as long as he
believes he is doing right to his family, he

Francisco v Gonzales
9/17/2008
Topic: Charges upon ACP: Family Expenses

FACTS:
Petition for review on certiorari on CA
decision, affirming RTC decision, to deny
petitioners motion to stop execution sale
This motion to stop execution sale was on
a property that was covered by the
Compromise Agreement in the Declaration
of Nullity of Marriage entered by the
parents of the Petitioners (Petitioners here
are the minor children, Cleodia and
Ceamantha of the Francisco spouses,
represented by their Grandmother)
Compromise agreement states that in the
spouses desire to manifest concern for
their children, the title and ownership of a
conjugal property in Ayala Alabang
(located in Taal St.) are to be transferred
to the children by way of deed of donation
when they reach 18 and 19 yrs old

Meanwhile, the other property of their

mom (Michele) who was cohabiting with
her partner (Matrai, not the biological
father of the children), also in Ayala
Alabang in Lanka Drive, was subject in a
case for Unlawful Detainer and to which
MTC Muntinlupa ordered mom and Matrai
to vacate and pay rentals, unpaid bills etc.
Pending appeal on this case, a notice of
sale by execution was issued by the sheriff
covering the property of the spouses in
Taal St. (!)
When petitioners grandmother learned
about this, she, as guardian-in-fact of
petitioners, filed with the RTC an Affidavit
of 3rd party claim and a very urgent motion
to Stop Sale by Execution which was
DENIED hence this petition
Petitioners argue that they are the rightful
owners of the property; that their parents
already waived in their favor the rights
over the property; the adjudged obligation
of the mom in the ejectment case did not
redound to the benefit of the family; and
that the moms obligation is a joint
obligation between her and the guy and
not joint and solidary
ISSUE:
W/N the RTC erred in proceeding with the
execution, levy and sale of the Taal St.
property under such circumstances

HELD:
RTC erred the power of the court in
executing judgments extends only to
properties
unquestionably belonging to the
judgment debtor alone. In this case,
to Michele and Matrai One mans
goods shall not be sold for another
mans debts
RTC should not have ignored that the Taal
St. property was in the name of the dad
(Cleodualdo) and Michele, and not Michele
and Matrai
Cleodualdo and Michele marriage was in
1986, prior to effectivity of the Family
Code,
their
property
relations
are
governed by the Civil Code on conjugal
partnership gains

CA acknowledged conjugal in nature

however it ruled that since Micheles
obligation was not proven to be a personal
debt, it must be inferred that it is conjugal
and redounded to the benefit of the
family, and hence the property may be
held answerable for it Court DOES NOT
agree (!)
A wife may bind the conjugal
partnership only when she purchases
things necessary for the support of
the
family,
or
when
she
borrows money for that purpose upon
her husband's failure to deliver the
needed sum; when administration of
the
conjugal
partnership
is
transferred to the wife by the courts
or by the husband; or when the wife
gives moderate donations for charity.
Failure to establish any of these
circumstances
means
that
the
conjugal asset may not be bound to
answer for the wife's personal
obligation.
Furthermore, prior to the issuance of the
Notice of Levy on Execution, already
attached in the title was that it shall be
transferred to the petitioners (children,
Cleodia and Ceamantha) by Deed of
Donation should have put the RTC and
sheriff on guard
The subject in question here is that which
is leased by Matrai and Michele who was
already living separately from Cleodualdo
and purported to be wife of Matrai
To hold the property in Taal St. liable for
the obligations of Michele and Matrai
would be going against the spirit and
avowed objective of the Civil Code to give
the utmost concern for the solidarity and
well-being of the family as a unit
- GRANTED, CA and RTC decision are SET
ASIDE

Roberto and Venus Buado vs. Court of

Appeals and Romulo Nicol

FACTS:


Mr. and Mrs. Buado filed a civil case
against Erlinda Nicol for the latters civil
liability arising from the criminal offense of
Slander

After 3 years, the trial court

rendered a decision ordering Erlinda to
pay civil damages; this decision was
likewise affirmed by the CA. In 1992, the
court issued a Writ of Execution ordering
Nicol to pay the spouses from his estates
the amount of P40k for moral damage,
Attys fees and litigation expenses within
60 days upon the courts issuance.
However, upon finding that Erlindas
properties were insufficient, the Deputy
Sheriff issued a notice of levy on real prop
addressed to the Registry of Deeds of
Cavite

In line with this, an auction sale was

held with the petitioners as the highest
bidder. A certificate of sale was issued in
favor of Mr.and Mrs. Buado.

After almost one year, the husband

of Erlinda, Romulo Nicol, filed a complaint
for the annulment of certificate of sale and
damages with preliminary injunction
against petitioners and deputy sheriff.- He
argued that there was no proper
publication and posting for the auction
sale. He also claimed that the judgment
obligation of Erlinda Nicol amounted to
P40,000 only. The spouses Buado obtained
the P500,000 worth of property for only
P51,685.

The Regional Trial Court dismissed

the petition of Romulo Nicol.

The Court of Appeals reversed the

decision of the RTC and held that Branch
21 has jurisdiction to act on the complaint
filed by the respondent in this case.

The petitioners filed a petition

where they said that the Court of Appeals
committed a grave abuse of discretion for
reversing the decision given by the RTC.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the obligation of Erlinda
Nicol arising from her criminal liability is
chargeable to the conjugal partnership.

HELD:

NO. Erlinda Nicols liability is not

chargeable to the conjugal partnership.
Unlike the system of absolute community
where liabilities incurred by either spouse
by reason of a crime or quasi-delict is
chargeable to the absolute community of
property, in the absence or insufficiency of
the exclusive property of the debtorspouse, the same advantage is not
accorded in the system of conjugal
partnership of gains.

The conjugal partnership of gains

has no duty to make advance payments
for the liability of the debtor-spouse.
Petitioners argue that the obligation of the
wife arising from her criminal liability is
chargeable to the conjugal partnership.

The Supreme Court does not agree

to the contention of Mr. and Mrs. Buado
that in Guadalupe v. Tronco, this Court
held that the car which was claimed by
the third party complainant to be conjugal
property was being levied upon to enforce
"a judgment for support" filed by a third
person, the third-party claim of the wife is
proper since the obligation which is
personal to the husband is chargeable not
on the conjugal property but on his
separate property. Hence, the filing of a
separate action by Romulo Nicol was
proper. The decision of the Court of
Appeals is affirmed.

MR. & MRS. RONNIE DAR, MR. & MRS.

RANDY ANGELES, MR. & MRS. JOY

CONSTANTINO and MR. & MRS.

LIBERTY CRUZ, petitioners, vs. HON.
ROSE
MARIE ALONZO-LEGASTO,
in her
capacity as the Presiding Judge in the
Metropolitan Trial Court of Metro
Manila, Branch 41, Quezon City and
NENITA CO BAUTISTA represented by
VICTORIO A. BAUTISTA, respondents.

for unlawful detainer against petitioners in

2000-08-30 | G.R. No. 143016

spouses can sign the petition. Court finds

the Metropolitan Trial Court, Quezon City.

They were sued as "Mr. and Mrs." in the
said case. Petitioners now contend that
since what is involved in the instant case
is their common rights and interest to
abode

under

the

system

of

absolute

community of property, either of the

merit in the petition.

If the petitioners are husband and wife

and only one of them signs the petition
(for review on certiorari and mandamus),
is the petition dismissible for violation of
the Rule on Certification of Non-Forum
Shopping requiring all petitioners to certify
it under oath? This is the sole issue raised
by petitioners Mr. and Mrs. Ronnie Dar, Mr.
and Mrs. Randy Angeles, Mr. and Mrs. Joy
Constantino, and Mr. and Mrs. Liberty
Cruz.
In a resolution, dated January 25, 2000,
the Court of Appeals ruled in the
affirmative. [Resolution of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 56748 entitled
"Mrs. Ronnie Dar, Mr. & Mrs. Randy
Angeles, Mr. and Mrs. Joy Constantino and
Mr. & Mrs. Liberty Cruz, Petitioners, vs.
Hon. Rose Marie Alonzo-Legasto, in her
capacity as the Presiding Judge in the
Metropolitan Trial Court in Metro Manila,
Branch 41, Quezon City and Nenita Co
Bautista, represented by Victorio a.
Bautista, Rollo, pp. 24-25.] Said court
dismissed petitioners' petition for review
on certiorari and mandamus for failure to
comply with the Rule on Certification of
Non-Forum Shopping after finding that the
petition "was signed only by Ronnie Dar,
Randy Angeles, Joy Constantino, and
Liberty Cruz, without authority attached
thereto to sign for and in behalf of their
co-petitioners."
Facts of the case shows that private
respondent Nenita Co Bautista filed a case

Administrative Circular No. 04-94 issued

by the Supreme Court on February 8, 1994
provides, among others:
Revised Circular No. 28-91, dated February
8, 1994 applies to and governs the filing of
petitions in the Supreme Court and the
Court of Appeals and is intended to
prevent the multiple filing of petitions or
complaints involving the same issues in
other tribunals or agencies as a form of
forum shopping.
Complementary thereto and for the same
purpose, the following requirements, in
addition to those in pertinent provisions of
the Rules of Court and existing circulars,
shall be strictly complied with in the filing
of complaints, petitions, applications or
other initiatory pleadings in all courts and
agencies other than the
Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals
and shall be subject to the same sanctions
provided hereunder.
1. The plaintiff, petitioner, applicant or
principal party seeking relief in the
complaint, petition, application or other
initiatory pleading shall certify under oath
in such original pleading, or in a sworn
certification
annexed
thereto
and
simultaneously filed therewith, to the truth
of the following facts and undertakings:
(a) he has not theretofore commenced any
other action or proceeding involving the
same issues in the Supreme Court, the

Court of Appeals, or any other tribunal or

agency; (b) to the best of his knowledge,
no such action or proceedings is pending
in the Supreme Court, the Court of
Appeals, or any other tribunal or agency;
(c) if there is any such action or
proceeding which is either pending or may
have been terminated, he must state the
status thereof; and (d) if he should
thereafter learn that a similar action or
proceedings has been filed or is pending
before the Supreme Court, the Court of
Appeals or any other tribunal or agency,
he undertakes to report that fact within
five (5) days therefrom to the court or
agency wherein the original pleading and
sworn certification contemplated herein
have been filed.
The complaint and other initiatory
pleadings referred to and subject of this
Circular are the original civil complaint,
counter-claim, cross-claim, third (fourth,
etc.) party complaint, or complaint-inintervention,
petition,
or application
wherein a party asserts his claim for relief.
xxx
With respect to the contents of the
certification which the pleader may
prepare, the rule of substantial compliance
may be availed of. While this section
requires that it be strictly complied with, it
merely underscores its mandatory nature
in that it cannot be altogether dispensed
with or its requirements completely
disregarded but it does not thereby
prevent substantial compliance on this
aspect of its provisions under justifiable
circumstances. Circular No. 28-91 was
designed to serve as an instrument to
promote and facilitate the orderly
administration of justice and should not be
interpreted with such absolute literalness
as to subvert its own ultimate and
legitimate objective or the goal of all rules
of procedure - which is to achieve

substantial justice as expeditiously as

possible.
In the instant case, the Court of Appeals
should have taken into consideration the
fact that the petitioners were sued jointly,
or as "Mr. and Mrs." over a property in
which they have a common interest. Such
being the case, the signing of one of them
in the certification substantially complies
with the rule on certification of non-forum
shopping.
The resolutions of the Court of Appeals,
dated January 25, 2000 and April 24,
2000, are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The
case is hereby REMANDED to the Court of
Appeals for proper disposition.
Uy
GR 109557

CA

Incapacity

Dr. Ernesto Jardelaza suffered stroke that

rendered him comatose. Gilda, wife of the
latter, filed a petition in RTC Iloilo to be
allowed as sole administrator of their
conjugal property and be authorized to sell
the same as her husband is physically
incapacitated to discharge his functions.
She further contest that such illness of the
husband necessitated expenses that
would require her to sell their property in
Lot 4291 and its improvement to meet
such necessities. RTC ruled in favor of
Gilda contending that such decision is
pursuant to Article 124 of FC and that the
proceedings thereon are governed by the
rules on summary proceedings.
The son of the spouses, Teodoro, filed a
motion for reconsideration contending that
the petition made by her mother was
essentially a petition for guardianship of
the person and properties of his father. As
such it cannot be prosecuted in
accordance with the provisions on
summary proceedings instead it should

follows the ruled governing special

proceedings in the Revised Rules of Court
requiring
procedural
due
process
particularly the need for notice and a
hearing on the merits.
He further
reiterated that Chapter 2 of the FC comes
under the heading on Separation in Fact
Between
Husband
and
Wife
contemplating a situation where both
spouses are of disposing mind. Hence, he
argued that this should not be applied in
their case.

guardians, and not the summary judicial

proceedings under FC. SC further held
that such incapacity of the trial court to
provide for an opportunity to be heard is
null and void on the ground of lack of due
process.

During the pendency of the motion, Gilda

sold the property to her daughter and son
in law. Upon the appeal by Teodoro, CA
reversed the decision of the lower court.

February 29, 2008

ISSUE: WON Gilda as the wife of a

husband
who
suffered
stroke,
a
cerebrovascular accident rendering him
comatose, without motor and mental
faculties, may assume sole powers of
administration of the conjugal property
and dispose a parcel of land with
improvements.

HELD:
SC ruled in favor of Teodoro. The rule on
summary proceedings does not apply to
cases where the non-consenting spouse is
incapacitated or incompetent to give
consent. In this case, trial court found
that subject spouse was incompetent who
was in a comatose condition and with a
diagnosis of brain stem infract. Hence,
the
proper
remedy
is
a
judicial
guardianship
proceeding
under
the
Revised Rules of Court. The law provides
that wife who assumes sole powers of
administration has the same powers and
duties as a guardian. Consequently, a
spouse who desires to sell real property as
administrator of the conjugal property,
must observe the procedure for the sale of
the wards estate required of judicial

Ugalde v Ysasi
GR No. 130623

Facts
-

Ugalde and Ysasi got married

before the MTC. They did not
execute
any
ante-nuptial
agreement, and had a son.

In 1957, petitioner and respondent

separated. Respondent allegedly
contracted another marriage with
Smith. At the same time, petitioner
alleges that respondent and Smith
had been acquiring and disposing
of real and personal properties to
her prejudice as the lawful wife.

She alleges that she has been

defrauded of rental income, profits
and
fruits
of their
conjugal
properties.

December 1984, petitioner filed a

petition for dissolution of the
conjugal partnerships of gains
against respondent. Petitioner asks
for
her
conjugal
share
in
respondents inheritance as per the
settlement
of
the
state
of
respondents parent

Respondent countered that he and

petition entered into an agreement
which provided that their conjugal
partnership of gains shall be
deemed dissolved as of April 1957
(Amicable settlement). That the
Amicable settlement was approved.
Respondent also alleges petitioner

obtained a divorce in Mexico and

contracted a second marriage with
Galoway.
-

Finally respondent alleges that

their marriage was void because it
was executed without the benefit
of a marriage license.

RTC ruling dismissed the petition,

considering that the marriage was
void without a marriage license.
Also, there was no proof that
petitioner and respondent acquired
properties during their union.

Court of Appeals affirmed the

decision of the RTC. This lead to the
instant petition

Issue
-

W/N CA committed a reversible

error in affirming the RTCs decision
which dismissed the action for
dissolution of conjugal partnership
of gains.

Held: No
-

Regarding
the
dissolution
of
conjugal partnership of gains, the
existence of conjugal partnership
of gains is predicated on a valid
marriage, which petitioner and
respondent dont have due to the
absence of a marriage license.

Petitioner
and
respondents
marriage was held on February
1951, and the applicable law was
the Civil Code. So when the RTC
decided their case, the conjugal
partnership was already dissolved.

DIO v. DIO G.R. No. 178044

19, 2011 CARPIO, J.

January

DOCTRINE: Article 50 of the Family Code

does not apply to marriages which are
declared void ab initio under Article 36 of
the Family Code, which should be declared

void without waiting for the liquidation of

the properties of the parties. In this case,
petitioners marriage to respondent was
declared void under Article 36 of the
Family Code and not under Article 40 or
45. Thus, what governs the liquidation of
properties owned in common by petitioner
and respondent are the rules on coownership.
FACTS: Alain M. Dio (petitioner) and Ma.
Caridad L. Dio(respondent) got married
on 14 January 1998 before Mayor Vergel
Aguilar of Las Pias City. On 30 May 2001,
petitioner filed an action for Declaration of
Nullity of Marriage against respondent,
citing psychological incapacity under
Article 36 of the Family Code.Dr. Nedy L.
Tayag
(Dr.
Tayag)
submitted
a
psychological report establishing that
respondent was suffering from Narcissistic
Personality Disorder which was incurable
and deeply ingrained in her system since
her early formative years. The trial court
granted the petition on the ground that
respondent
was
psychologically
incapacitated to comply with the essential
marital obligations at the time of the
celebration of the marriage and declared
their marriage void ab initio. It ordered
that a decree of absolute nullity of
marriage shall only be issued upon
compliance with Articles 50 and 51 of the
Family Code. Trial court, upon motion for
partial reconsideration of petitioner,
modified its decision holding that a decree
of absolute nullity of marriage shall be
issued after liquidation, partition and
distribution of the parties properties
under Article 147 of the Family Code.
ISSUE: Whether the trial court erred when
it ordered that a decree of absolute nullity
of marriage shall only be issued after
liquidation, partition, and distribution of
the parties properties under Article 147 of
the Family Code
HELD/RATIO: YES. The trial courts decision
is affirmed with modification. Decree of
absolute nullity of the marriage shall be
issued upon finality of the trial courts
decision
without
waiting
for
the
liquidation, partition, and distribution of
the parties properties under Article 147 of
the Family Code. The Court has ruled in

Valdes v. RTC that in a void marriage,

regardless of its cause, the property
relations of the parties during the period
of cohabitation is governed either by
Article 147 or Article 148 of the Family
Code. Article 147 of the Family Code
applies to union of parties who are legally
capacitated and not barred by any
impediment to contract marriage, but
whose marriage is nonetheless void, such
as petitioner and respondent in the case
before the Court.In this case, petitioners
marriage to respondent was declared void
under Article 36 of the Family Code and
not under Article 40 or 45. Thus, what
governs the liquidation of properties
owned in common by petitioner and
respondent are the rules on co-ownership.
In Valdes, the Court ruled that the
property relations of parties in a void
marriage during the period of cohabitation
is governed either by Article 147 or Article
148 of the Family Code. The rules on coownership apply and the properties of the
spouses
should
be
liquidated
in
accordance with the Civil Code provisions
on co-ownership. Under Article 496 of the
Civil Code, [p]artition may be made by
agreement between the parties or by
judicial proceedings. x x x. It is not
necessary to liquidate the properties of
the spouses in the same proceeding for
declaration of nullity of marriage.

FACTS:

DELIZO v. DELIZO
[G.R. No. L-32820-21]
[January 30, 1976]
TOPIC:
Absolute
Community
Property for marriages before FC
PETITIONER: Dorotea De Ocampo vda.
Delizo + 9 children (Appellants)
RESPONDENT:
Urbana
Delizo,
Ambrocio Flora, Severino Delizo, Heirs of
Francisco Delizo (Appellees)
PONENTE:

Antonio, J.

Nicolas Delizos 1st marriage was with

Rosa Villasfer (from Apr. 20, 1981 to
Rosas death on Dec 7, 1909)
2nd marriage was with Dorotea De
Ocampo (from Oct 1911 until Nicolas
death on May 3, 1957)
Action for partition of the conjugal
partnership properties initiated by
Respondents (children and g.children
from 1st marriage) against their father
and petitioner
o Defendants
opposed
this,
claiming that the properties in
the complaint were of the 2nd
marriage
o May 3, 1957: Nicolas died and
was substituted by his children
from the 2nd marriage
o June 3, 1957: In the meantime,
Special proceedings were filed
by petitioner
o Involved are the properties
acquired by Nicolas
RTC distributed the properties as
follows:
o pro indiviso to 3 children
(and heir of the deceased
sibling) of 1st marriage
o pro indiviso to surviving
spouse Dorotea
o pro indiviso, in equal shares
to
the
children
of
both
marriages 13 parts
Petitioners appealed to the CA, which
affirmed with modifications the RTCs
decision
o Caanawan lands
married to Dorotea in
the Original Certificate
of Title doesnt mean
that the property is
owned
by
the
2nd
conjugal
partnership,
but simply indicates the
civil status of Nicolas
Acquisition
of
the
properties took place
during the existence of
the 1st marriage (1905)

No showing that this

exclusively belonged to
Nicolas,
it
should
correspond to the 1st
conjugal partnership
of the fruits of the
property which should
pertain to the heirs of
Rosa refers only to of
the net after deducting
the expenses of clearing
the land, cultivating,
gathering,
and
preservation
Other properties
No controversy that they
were acquired during
the 2nd marriage
of the conjugal properties of
1st
marriage
=
separate
property of the husband in the
2nd conjugal partnership
Fruits of the Caanawan
property were acquired
through the labor of
Nicolas and Dorotea
If left to itself, it cannot
bear any fruits since
there
werent
any
improvements on it
Whatever is produced
via the spouses labor &
industry belongs to the
conjugal partnership
2nd marriage is entitled
to reimbursement for
the increase in value of
the 47 ha. portion which
was
cleared
and
developed heirs of 2nd
marriage couldnt be
entitled to more than
30%
of
the
gross
produce
Munoz property
purchased with a loan
(belonging to the 2nd
conjugal
partnership)
and the fruits (gross
production)
of
the
Caanawan property
FINAL
20% of all properties
acquired during the 2nd

marriage
(including
Munoz) to the children of
1st marriage
of Caanawan
and house and
lot at 562 P
Campa
St.,
Manila (1/6 for
each child)
20% of all other
properties (1/15
for each child)
80% of all properties
acquired during the 2nd
marriage constitute the
2nd conjugal partnership

to
Nicolas,
divided
among
his heirs (2/65 for
each)
to Dorotea (or
2/5 thereof)
To Nicolas Delizo:
Caanawan property and
house and lot on P.
Campa
Due to death,
divided
among
surviving spouse
and all of his
children (1/26 for
each heir)
Petitioners appeal to the SC
o 67-ha. Caanawan property cant
be a property of the 1st
marriage
they were public lands
being
homesteads
during the 1st marriage
only during the 2nd
marriage were the reqts
of
public
land
law
complied with, resulting
in
the
confirmation,
registration, & issuance
of the Torrens title to
Nicolas & Dorotea
o respondents claim for partition
shouldve been barred
by
acquisitive
&
extinctive prescription,
laches, and estoppel
legal presumption of all
properties
of
the

marriage belong to the

2nd conjugal partnership
wasnt rebutted
these properties were in
adverse
possession
under claim of title of
petitioners for 47 years
It
wouldve
been
more
equitable if the 1st partnership
properties
were
divided
between different partnerships
in proportion to the duration of
each and the capital of the
spouses (Art 189, NCC)

ISSUE:WON
the
67-ha.
Caanawan
property are of the 1st marriage
RULING:
RTC

No. Case REMANDED to the

Purchase of lands during the period of

the 1st marriage doesnt automatically
mean that they should be considered
as properties of the 1st marriage
They were homesteads, part of the
public domain
Did not show that all of the
requirements of the Homestead Law
were complied with to warrant a grant
of patent to the homesteader prior to
the 1909 death of Rosa
Art 926: the right of the homesteader
to the patent doesnt become absolute
until after he has complied with all
requirements of the law.
Required that the land be
cultivated for 5 years before the
filing of application
3 years after, applicant shall
prove by 2 credible witnesses
that he has resided and
cultivated the land
Determination of whether a parcel of
land acquired by homestead is
conjugal property of the 1st or 2nd
marriage is the time of the
fulfillment of the requirements of
the public land law for the acquisition
of such right to the patent
20 ha were cultivated and rendered
productive from 1905-1909

Equity demand that the rights

to
said
properties
be
apportioned to the parties in
proportion to the extent to
which the requirements of the
public land laws had been
complied
with
during
the
existence of each conjugal
partnership
No
controversy
with
the
other
properties, on their being acquired
during the 2nd marriage
Since the capital of either marriage or
the contribution of each spouse cannot
be determined with precision
Should be divided between the
2 conjugal partnerships in
proportion to the duration of
each partnership
2nd conjugal partnership entitled
to 46/64 or 23/32 of total mass
of properties
1st conjugal partnership to
18/64 or 9/32 thereof pro
indiviso
to Nicolas delizos estate
to be distributed in equal
shares to the estate

Belcodero vs CA
GR No. 89667
October 20, 1993
Facts:
- Alayo Bosing married Juliana Oday
on July 27, 1927, they had three
children. In 1946, Alayo left the
conjugal home and then lived with
Josefa Rivera, they had a child,
Josephine Belcodero (petitioner)
- In 1949, Alayo bought a parcel of
land on installment basis from the
Magdalena Estate, Inc where he
indicated in the deed that he was
married to Josefa. The Transfer
Certificate of Title was later named
to Josefa. In 1958, Alayo married
Josefa even with a subsisting
marriage with Juliana.

In 1967, Alayo died. After three

years, Josefa executed a document
of extrajudicial partition and sale of
the lot which was then described as
their conjugal property.
In 1980, Juliana and her three
legitimate children filed an action
for reconveyance of the property.
The lower court and the CA both
ruled in favor of Juliana and
ordered petitioner to execute a
deed of reconveyance of the
property.

Issue:
- WON CAs decision is correct
Ruling:
- Yes,
property
remained
as
belonging
to
the
conjugal
partnership of Alayo and his
legitimate wife
- Under NCC Article 160, all
property of the marriage is
presumed to belong to the conjugal
partnership, unless it be proved
that it pertains exclusively to the
husband or to the wife.
- Since the property was acquired by
Alayo and Josefa was merely
authorized to have title to the
property transferred to her name,
the latter had no right to the
property. Moreover, she recognized
Alayos ownership when she and
Joosephine executed the deed
ofextrajudicial partition and sale.
- The applicable prescriptive period
for the reconveyance of the
property by the beneficiaries is 10
years.

Estrella Orpiano Vs Spouses Tomas

G.R. No. 178611 January 14, 2013

Issue: whether there is indeed forum

shopping?

Facts of the case: In 1979, a Decision

was rendered by the defunct Juvenile and
Domestic Relations Court (JDRC) of Quezon
City
declaring
Estrella
Orpiano
an
absent/absentee spouse and granting
Alejandro Orpiano the authority to sell the
lot. The JDRC Decision was annotated on
the back of TCT No. RT-23468. On March
19, 1996, Alejandro Orpiano sold the lot on
installment basis to Antonio and Myrna
Tomas for P12, 170,283. A new title TCT
No. N-152326 was issued in the name of
the Tomas spouses despite the fact that
the purchase price has not been paid in
full. On October 28, 1996, Alejandro filed
a civil case in RTC of Quezon City, Branch
226 seeking collection of the balance of
the price in the amount of P4,314,100
supposedly left unpaid by the Tomas
spouses, with damages.
During the
pendency of the collection case, Alejandro
died. His heirs, Estrella included, were
substituted in his stead in the collection
case. Estrella moved to amend the
Complaint to one for rescission/annulment
of sale and cancellation of title, but the
court denied her motion. She next moved
to be dropped as party plaintiff but was
again rebuffed.

On June 11, 2005, Estrella filed a civil case

for annulment of the March 1996 sale and
cancellation of TCT No. N-152326, with
damages, against the Tomas spouses and
the Register of Deeds of Quezon City
which was impleaded as a nominal party.
Estrella claimed that the 1979 declaration
of her absence and accompanying
authority to sell the lot were obtained by

Alejandro
through
misrepresentation,
fraud and deceit, adding that the May
1979 JDRC Decision was not published as
required by law and by the domestic
relations court. Thus, the declaration of
absence and Alejandros authority to sell
the lot are null and void. Correspondingly,
the ensuing sale to the Tomas spouses
should be voided, and TCT No. N-152326
cancelled.
In their answer to the
annulment Complaint, the Tomas spouses
prayed for the dismissal thereof on the
ground of forum shopping, arguing that
the filing of the annulment case was
prompted by the denial of Estrellas
motion initiated in the collection case to
amend the Complaint to one for
annulment of sale. After pre-trial in the
annulment case, the court proceeded to
tackle the issue of forum shopping. The
parties
submitted
their
respective
memoranda touching on the sole issue of
whether Estrella is guilty of forum
shopping.

On September 25, 2006, the trial court

issued an Order dismissing the annulment
case. It sustained the view taken by the
Tomas spouses that Estrella filed the
annulment case only because the
collection court denied her motion to
amend the case to one for annulment of
the sale, and thus the annulment case was
Estrellas attempt at obtaining a remedy
which she could not secure in the
collection case. On December 27, 2006,
Estrella filed with the CA a Petition for
Certiorari questioning the September 25,
2006 Order, the CA found that Estrella was
indeed guilty of forum shopping in filing
the annulment suit while the collection
case was pending. The CA held that a
final judgment in the collection case
ordering the Tomas spouses to pay the
supposed balance of the price will
necessarily result in a finding that the sale

between Alejandro and the Tomas spouses

is a valid sale. This then would prevent a
declaration of nullity of the sale in the
annulment case. Thus, a petition to the
SC was filed.

Decision: Forum shopping is defined as

an act of a party, against whom an
adverse judgment or order has been
rendered in one forum, of seeking and
possibly getting a favorable opinion in
another forum, other than by appeal or
special civil action for certiorari. It may
also be the institution of two or more
actions or proceedings grounded on the
same cause on the supposition that one or
the other court would make a favorable
disposition.
Although the Court believes that Estrella
was not prompted by a desire to trifle with
judicial processes, and was acting in good
faith in initiating the annulment case, still
the said case should be dismissed
because it produces the same effect which
the rule on forum shopping was fashioned
to preclude. If the collection case is not
dismissed and it, together with the
annulment case, proceeds to finality, not
only do we have a possibility of conflicting
decisions being rendered; an unfair
situation, as envisioned by the Tomas
spouses, might arise where after having
paid the balance of the price as ordered
by the collection court, the cancellation of
the TCT and return of the property could
be decreed by the annulment court.
Besides, allowing the two cases to remain
pending makes litigation simply a game of
chance where parties may hedge their
position by betting on both sides of the
case, or by filing several cases involving
the same issue, subject matter, and
parties, in the hope of securing victory in
at least one of them.

While Estrella correctly made use of the

remedies available to her amending the
Complaint and filing a motion to drop her
as a party she committed a mistake in
proceeding to file the annulment case
directly after these remedies were denied
her by the collection court without first
questioning or addressing the propriety of
these denials. While she may have been
frustrated by the collection courts
repeated rejection of her motions and its
apparent inability to appreciate her plight,
her proper recourse nevertheless should
have been to file a petition for certiorari or
otherwise question the trial courts denial
of her motion to be dropped as plaintiff,
citing just reasons which call for a ruling to
the contrary. Issues arising from joinder or
misjoinder of parties are the proper
subject of certiorari. The SC reiterates
that considerations of expediency cannot
justify a resort to procedural shortcuts.
The end does not justify the means; a
meritorious case cannot overshadow the
condition that the means employed to
pursue it must be in keeping with the
Rules. The Petition is denied for lack of
merit.

Castro vs. Miat

Castro vs miat
Facts:

Moises and Concordia Miat, a married

couple bore two children, Alexander
and Romeo. Both parents bought two
parcels of land. The first lot is at Wawa
La Huerta, Airport Village, Paranaque
Manila and the second lot is at Paco,
Manila. Concordia died on April
30,1978.
When Moises was at Dubai, he agreed
that both lots will be given to his two
children, Romeo and Alexander. When

he returned in 1984, he changed his

mind and said that he'll have the
Paranque lot and both Romeo and
Alexander can have the Paco lot
through an agreement to which both
agreed.
Regarding the Paco property, Moises
and Concordia bought it on installment
basis on May 17, 1977. It was only in
Dec.4, 1984 that Mooses was able to
pay for the balance. The title was
secured under his name as widower.
Romeo, his son, said that his father
violated the agreement they had before
that once the property was paid in full,
the title will be placed under the name
of Romeo and Alexander. When this was
demanded from Moises, he gave a
duplicate copy of the title to Romeo.
Both sons lived and duly paid the taxes
and insurance premiums. In August
1985, Alexander and his first wife left
the Paco property and in April 1988,
Alexander sold his share in the Paco
property for PHP42,750. Alexander
received an amount of Php6000 as
downpayment from Romeo. No deed of
assignment was made in favor of
Romeo because of loads of work and
tight schedule was assailed plus the
possession of the title of Romeo.
In Feb. 1988, Romeo discovered from
his godmother in his wedding Mrs.
Rosalina Castro, mother of Virgilio
Castro (petitioner) that she had given
Moises
Php30,000
downpayment
regarding the Paco Property for her son
Virgilio Castro.
In Dec, 1988, the status of Paco
property was discussed in MTC Manila
in the chamber of Judge Anunciacion.
On Dec. 16, 1988, the lawyer of Virgilio
sent a letter to Romeo for a conference.
Romeo was also informed that the Paco
property was sold last Dec. 5, 1988 by
Moises through a deed of sale to Virgilio
for PHP95,000.
Ceferino Miat, brother of Moises
testified that even the death of
Concordia, there was already an
agreement that the Paco property will
go to Romeo and Alexander. This was
reiterated
on
the
deathbed
of
Concordia. When Moises returned to
Manila for good, the agreement was

repeated again with the relatives of

Miat. Alexander sold his share to Romoe
which was corroborated by Pedro
Miranda and Virgilio Miat. Pedro Miranda
worked with Moises at Bayview Hotel
and Hotel Filipinas. Pedros wife is the
cousin of Romeo and Alexander.
Romeo borrowed the title because he
will mortgage it to his friend Lorenzo.
When Moises ran into a financial
constraint, he mortgaged said property
to Virgilio Castro for PHP30,000.
Moises said to Romeo and Alexander
that he will be forced to sell the
property if they will not pay the
mortgage. They all then went to Manila
City Hall along with Virgilio and his
parents to discuss the sale of the
property with a judge and lawyer
present. After the conference, Moises
proceeded with the sale of the property
to Castro.
Alexander got 2/3 of the sale while his
father got 1/3 of it. Romeo did not
receive anything but was permitted to
till their Nueva Ecija property.
Virgilio testified that Romeo was
informed of the selling of property with
Romeo replying in one of the
conversations bahala ka. Also he said
that Romeo was again informed in MTC
Manila.
The events forced Romeo to file an
action to nullify the sale between
Moises and Virgilio, compel Moises and
Alexander for a deed of conveyance or
assignment of PAco property to him
upon payment and make them pay for
damages. After trial in RTC, the decision
states:
"WHEREFORE, in view of the
foregoing, the Court hereby orders
the
following:
1)
Defendant
Alexander V. Miat to execute a
deed of sale of his share in the
property upon payment by plaintiff
Romeo of the balance of the
purchase
price
in
the
sum
of P36,750.00; 2) Plaintiff Romeo V.
Miat to recognize as valid the sale
of defendant Moises share in the
house and lot located at No. 1495C Fabie Estate, Paco, Manila; 3) the

dismissal of defendants counterclaim; and 4) defendants to pay the

costs of suit."

Both parties appealed to

decision was modified as:

CA

and

(1) The deed of sale entered into

between
defendants-appellants
Moises Miat and spouses Virgilio
and Michelle Castro is hereby
NULLIFIED.
(2) Defendant-appellants Moises
Miat and Alexander Miat are
ordered to execute a deed of
conveyance over the Paco property
with TCT No. 16383 (sic) in favor of
plaintiff-appellant
Romeo
Miat,
upon payment by Romeo Miat of
the balance of the purchase price
in the sum of P36,750.00.
(3)
Defendants-appellants
are
ordered, jointly and severally, to
pay plaintiff-appellant attorneys
fees in the amount of P30,000.00
and to pay the costs of suit."

Hence, the petition in this court.

Issue:
1. W/N Paco property is conjugal or
capital?
2. W/N there was a valid oral partition
covering said property?
3. W/N spouses Castro were buyers in
good faith?
Ratio:
1. The Paco property is conjugal
property
of
Moises
and
Concordia.The provisions of the
New Civil Code will apply to Moises
and Concordia as they got married
before the Family Code took effect.
In Art. 153 (1) of thw New Civil
Code, it states that:
"The following
partnership property:

are

conjugal

(1) Those acquired by onerous title

during the marriage at the expense of
the common fund, whether the
acquisition be for the partnership, or
for only one of the spouses; x x x."

SA MGA KINAUUKULAN,

The records show that said

property was purchased when they
were married using their common
fund. Petitioners also overlook
Article 160 of the New Civil Code. It
provides that "all property of the
marriage is presumed to belong to
the conjugal partnership; unless it
be
proved
that
it
pertains
exclusively to the husband or to
the wife." This article does not
require proof that the property was
acquired
with
funds
of
the
partnership.
The
presumption
applies even when the manner in
which the property was acquired
does not appear
2. Yes. The oral partition was valid
and the Court affirmed the
acceptance of the CA of said pieces
of evidence presented. The portion
of letter of Moises to Romeo:

Na kami ay mga saksi sa kasunduan nina

G. MOISES B. MIAT, asawa ng yumao na,
na si Gng. CONCORDIA VALENZUELA MIAT,
at mga anak nitong sina G. ROMEO V. MIAT
at G. ALEXANDER V. MIAT:

Kami, na nakalagda sa ibaba, ay

nanunumpa sa harapan ng Punong
Barangay, na si G. REYNALDO P. WONG:

Na
ang
kasunduan
sumusunod:

"Pebrero 18, 1989

SINUMPAANG SALAYSAY

ang

mga

1. Na ang pag-aaring lupa (132 sq. m.) ng

mag-asawa (MOISES at CONCORDIA) sa
Airport Village sa Paraaque, Metro Manila
ay mapupunta kay G. MOISES B. MIAT;
2. Na ang pag-aaring lupa at bahay (70 sq.
m.) ng mag-asawa ring nabanggit ay sa
magkapatid na ROMEO at ALEXANDER
mapupunta at ito ay nasa address na
1495-C FABIE, PACO, MANILA.
MGA SUMUMPA:58

"KAYA PAG-USAPAN LANG NINYONG

MABUTI ANG ANONG BALAK AT
1)
Ceferino
GUSTO NINYONG PAGHATI
SA
(kapatid
ni Moises)
BAHAY,
AT
YAN
AY
PAGPAPASIYAHAN KO KONG (sic)
MAKAKABUTI SA INYONG DALAWA.
AT
WALA
AKONG
HIGIT
NA
2)
Avelina
PAPABURAN SA INYONG
DALAWA
(asawa
Ceferino)
PAREHO KAYONG MAHAL
SA ni
AKIN,
HINDI AKO TULAD SA IBANG
MAGULANG NA HINDI PAREHO ANG
PAGTINGIN SA MGA ANAK. ANG
BAHAY56 AY
PARA 3)
SA
INYONG Virgilio
(kapatid niMAY
Moises)
DALAWA, LALO NA NGAYONG
ASAWA NA KAYONG PAREHO. x x x"
[All caps in the original]
4)
Aurea
(kapatid
ni
Moises)
Another one when there was a
written agreement:

ay

B.

Miat

(Sgd.)
6)
Lorenzo
C.
(kapatid ni Concordia)

Vale

J.

Miat

(Sgd.)
7)
Patricio
C.
(kapatid ni Concordia)

Vale

Miat

(Sgd.)
8)
Victor
C.
(kapatid ni Concordia)

Vale

Miat-Joson

(Sgd.)
5)
Jose
(asawa ni Aurea)

(Sgd.)
9) Elsa P. Miranda

A.

Joson

(Sgd.)
REYNALDO
Kapitan ng Barangay

P.

went to Judge Anunciacion of

Manila in order to find out if Romeo
has a right over the property.
Romeo told Virgilio in that meeting
that Romeo has a right over the
Paco property by virtue of an oral
partition and assignment. Virgilio
even admitted that he knew Romeo
was in possession of the title and
Romeo then insisted that he is the
owner of the property. In fact,
Virgilio Castro is fully aware that
Romeo owns the property, they
being neighbors.

WONG

The consideration for the grant to

Romeo and Alexander of the said
property was best expressed in a
letter of Moises to Romeo:
"Labis akong nagpapasalamat at
nauunawaan
ninyo
ang
mga
pagkakamali ko at mga kasalanan
kong nagawa sa inyong mag-iina,
huwag kayong mag-alala at lahat
nang naipundar namin nang (sic)
inyong nanay ay sa inyong
dalawang magkapatid mapupunta."
We also hold that the oral partition
between Romeo and Alexander is not
covered by the Statute of Frauds. It is
enforceable for two reasons. Firstly,
Alexander accepted the six thousand
( P6,000.00) pesos given by Romeo as
downpayment for the purchase of his
share in the Paco property. Secondly,
Romeo and his witnesses, Ceferino Miat
and
Pedro
Miranda,
who
testified
regarding the sale of Alexanders share to
Romeo, were intensely questioned by
petitioners counsel.
3. No. The buyers were not in good
faith. A purchaser in good faith is
one who buys property and pays a
full and fair price for it at the time
of the purchase or before any
notice of some other persons claim
on or interest in it. The rule is
settled that a buyer of real
property, which is in the possession
of persons other than the seller,
must
be
wary
and
should
investigate the rights of those in
possession.
Otherwise,
without
such inquiry, the buyer can hardly
be regarded as buyer in good faith.
"In the case at bench, the said
spouses have actual knowledge of
the adverse claim of plaintiffappellant. The most protuberant
index that they are not buyers in
good faith is that before the sale,
Virgilio Castro talked with Romeo
Miat on the supposed sale. Virgilio
testified that together with Romeo,
Alexander and Moses Miat, they

Held:
The decision of the appellate court in CAG.R. CV No. 43053 is affirmed.

Titan v David
G.R. No. 169548
March 15, 2010

Facts:

Manuel and Martha David were married on

March 25, 1957. In 1970, they acquired a
602 sq.m. lot at White Plains, Quezon City,
registered in the name of "Martha David,
married to Manuel David". In 1976, they
separated and no longer communicated
with each other.

In March 1995, Manuel

Martha had sold the said
Construction Corporation
already been placed to in

discovered that
property to Titan
and the title had
the name of it.

He filed a complaint for Annulment of

Contract & Reconveyance against Titan,
alleging that such sale was made without
his consent and knowledge, and therefore
void. He also prayed to have the property
reconveyed to them and a new title be
issued in their names.

the SPA itself indicated that Martha &

Manuel lived in the same street in
Navotas. So, the court:
1. invalidated the Deed of Sale as well as
the title that was issued in the name of
Titan
2. ordered Titan to reconvey the property
to Martha and Manuel

Titan filed a counterclaim praying for the

dismissal of the complaint because the
property was bought in good faith and for
value as it relied on a Special Power of
Attorney (SPA) signed by Manuel, which
authorized Martha to dispose the property.

3. directed the Registry of Deeds of

Quezon City to issue a new title in the
names of Manuel and Martha.

CA Decision: RTC decision affirmed

Manuel replied claiming that the SPA was
spurious and that his signature was
forged, thus Martha had no authority to
sell the property.

The court granted Manuel's motion to

amend the complaint, impleading Martha
as a co-defendant, however, despite
personal service of summons, she failed to
file an answer. Thus, she was declared in
default.

RTC Decision:
> The property was conjugal in character
as it was purchased by Manuel and Martha
with conjugal funds during their marriage
> The SPA was spurious, and that
Manuel's signature was forged. The
genuineness and due execution of the SPA
was placed in doubt since it did not
contain Manuel's residence certificate, and
was not presented for registration with the
Register of Deeds, which is in violation of
Sec. 24 of Presidential Decree No. 1529.
Moreover, it was doubtful that an SPA
would have even been necessary, since

ISSUE: WON the property in question is

part of the Spouses' conjugal partnership

SC Decision: The property is part of the

spouses' conjugal property.

Based on the law in force at time of the

celebration of the marriage between
Martha and Manuel in 1957, which is the
Civil Code of the PH:

Article 160. All property of the marriage

is presumed to belong to the conjugal
partnership, unless it be proved that it
pertains exclusively to the husband or to
the wife.

Article 153. The following are conjugal

partnership property:

(1) That which is acquired by

onerous title during the marriage at the
expense of the common fund, whether the
acquisition be for the partnership, or for
only one of the spouses;

The said provisions were carried over to

the Family Code, Art. 117 in particular, and
was made even more unequivocal in Art.
116, which said , all property acquired
during
the
marriage,
whether
the
acquisition appears to have been made,
contracted or registered in the name of
one or both spouses, is presumed to be
conjugal unless the contrary is proved..

Therefore, since the property was part of

the conjugal property, the sale to Titan
required the consent of both spouses.

EVANGELINE
METROPOLITAN
COMPANY

D.
IMANI
vs.
BANK
&
TRUST

G.R. No. 187023

November 17, 2010
NACHURA, J.:
Facts:

Evangeline D. Imani (petitioner)

signed a Continuing Suretyship Agreement
in favor of respondent Metropolitan Bank
& Trust Company (Metrobank), with Cesar
P. Dazo, Nieves Dazo, Benedicto C. Dazo,
Cynthia C. Dazo, Doroteo Fundales, Jr., and
Nicolas Ponce as her co-sureties. As
sureties, they bound themselves to pay
Metrobank whatever indebtedness C.P.
Dazo Tannery, Inc. (CPDTI) incurs, but not
exceeding
Six
Million
Pesos
(P6,000,000.00).
Later,
CPDTI
obtained
loans
of P100,000.00
and P63,825.45,
respectively. The loans were evidenced by
promissory notes signed by Cesar and
Nieves Dazo. CPDTI defaulted in the
payment of its loans. Metrobank made
several demands for payment upon CPDTI,
but to no avail. This prompted Metrobank
to file a collection suit against CPDTI and
its sureties, including herein petitioner.
After due proceedings, the RTC rendered a
decision4 in favor of Metrobank. This was
affirmed by the CA.
Metrobank then filed with the RTC a
motion for execution,
which was
granted A writ of execution was issued
against CPDTI and its co-defendants. The
sheriff levied on a property covered and
registered in the name of petitioner. A
public auction was conducted and the
property was awarded to Metrobank, as
the highest bidder.
Metrobank
undertook
to
consolidate the title covering the subject
property in its name, and filed a
Manifestation and Motion, praying that
spouses Sina and Evangline Imani be
directed to surrender the owners copy of
TCT No. T-27957 P(M) for cancellation.
Petitioner opposed the motion arguing
that the subject property belongs to the
conjugal partnership; as such, it cannot be
held answerable for the liabilities incurred

by CPDTI to Metrobank. The RTC denied

Metrobanks motion.
Metrobank filed a motion for
reconsideration and was granted by the
RTC. But on petitioners motion for
reconsideration, the RTC reinstated its
previous order declaring the property
levied upon as conjugal, which cannot be
held answerable for petitioners personal
liability.The CA reversed the RTC ruling.
Petitioner takes exception to the CA
ruling that she committed a procedural
gaffe in seeking the annulment of the writ
of execution, the auction sale, and the
certificate of sale instead of the remedy
under Rule 39. The issue on the conjugal
nature of the property, she insists, can be
adjudicated by the executing court; thus,
the RTC correctly gave due course to her
motion. She asserts that it was error for
the CA to propose the filing of a separate
case to vindicate her claim.
Issue:
Whether or not the remedy
provided under Section 16, Rule 39 is the
proper remedy

Held:
No. When the sheriff thus seizes
property of a third person in which the
judgment debtor holds no right or interest,
and so incurs in error, the supervisory
power of the Court which has authorized
execution may be invoked by the third
person. Upon due application by the third
person, and after summary hearing, the
Court may command that the property be
released from the mistaken levy and
restored to the rightful owner or
possessor. What the Court can do in these
instances however is limited to a

determination of whether the sheriff has

acted
rightly
or
wrongly
in
the
performance of his duties in the execution
of the judgment, more specifically, if he
has indeed taken hold of property not
belonging to the judgment debtor. The
Court does not and cannot pass upon the
question of title to the property, with any
character of finality. It can treat the matter
only in so far as may be necessary to
decide if the Sheriff has acted correctly or
not. The sheriff in the execution
proceedings is made by a party to the
action, not a stranger thereto, any relief
therefrom may only be applied with, and
obtained from, only the executing court;
and this is true even if a new party has
been impleaded in the suit.
The filing of the motion by petitioner to
annul the execution, the auction sale, and
the certificate of sale was, therefore, a
proper remedy. The remedy of terceria or
a separate action under Section 16, Rule
39 is no longer available to Sina Imani
because he is not deemed a stranger to
the case filed against petitioner: [T]he
husband of the judgment debtor cannot be
deemed a "stranger" to the case
prosecuted and adjudged against his wife.
Thus, it would have been inappropriate for
him to institute a separate case for
annulment of writ of execution.
Dewara v Lamela
GR 179010
April 11, 2011

Topic: Presumption of CPG

Facts:

Eduardo Dewara and Elenita

Magallanes Dewara married before the

enactment of the FC. Thus, the CC

governed their marital relations. Husband
and wife were separated-in-fact because
Elenita wentto work in California, while
Eduardo stayed in Bacolod City.

Eduardo, while driving a private

jeep registered in the name of Elenita, hit
respondent Ronnie Lamela. Ronnie filed a
criminal case for serious physical injuries
through reckless imprudence against
Eduardo before the Municipal Trial Court in
Cities (MTCC), Bacolod.

MTCC - Eduardo guilty of the charge

and sentenced imprisonment and to pay
civil indemnity of P62,598.70 actual
damages and P10,000 moral damages.

RTC junked appeal affirmed the

decision of the MTCC and it became final
and executory.

The writ of execution on the civil

liability was served on Eduardo, but it was
returned unsatisfied because he had no
property in his name. Levy on execution
on a Lot named after Elenita.

Petitioner - levy on execution of Lot

was illegal because the said property was
her paraphernal or exclusive property and
could not be made to answer for the
personal
liability
of
her
husband.
Furthermore, as the registered owner of
the property, she received no notice of the
execution sale. She sought the annulment
of the sale and the annulment of the
issuance of the new TCT in the name of
respondent spouses.

Respondent - subject lot was the

conjugal property of petitioner Elenita and
Eduardo. They asserted that the property
was acquired by Elenita during her
marriage to Eduardo; that the property
was acquired with the money of Eduardo
because, at the time of the acquisition of
the property, Elenita was a plain
housewife; that the jeep involved in the

accident was registered in the name of

petitioner; and that Elenita did not
interpose any objection pending the levy
on execution of the property.

The RTC decided in favor of

petitioner. The RTC declared that said
property was paraphernal in nature.

RTC gave credence to the testimony

of
Elenita
on
the
circumstances
surrounding the sale of the property. First,
it was sold to her by her father and her
aunt so that the family would remain on
the lot. Second, the minimal and
inadequate consideration for the 1,440 sq
m property was for the purpose of helping
her expand her capital in her business at
the time. Thus, the sale was essentially a
donation and was therefore gratuitous in
character.

Having declared that the property

was the paraphernal property of Elenita,
RTC ruled that civil liability of Eduardo,
which was personal to him, could not be
charged to exclusive property of his wife.

On appeal, the CA reversed the

decision of the RTC. The gross inadequacy
of the price alone does not affect a
contract of sale, except that it may
indicate a defect in the consent, or that
the parties really intended a donation or
some other act or contract. Except for the
assertions of Elenita, there was nothing in
the records that would indicate a defect in
Jesus and Concepcion Magallanes consent
to the sale. The CA ruled that Elenita and
Eduardo acquired the property by onerous
title during their marriage through their
common fund. Thus, it belonged to the
conjugal partnership of gains and might
be levied upon to answer for civil liabilities
adjudged against Eduardo.
Issue:
WON the subject property is the
paraphernal/exclusive property of Elenita

or the conjugal property of Elenita and

Eduardo.
Held:
All property of the marriage is presumed
to belong to the conjugal partnership,
unless it be proved that it pertains
exclusively to the husband or to the wife.
Registration in the name of the husband or
the wife alone does not destroy this
presumption.
The
separation-in-fact
between the husband and the wife without
judicial approval shall not affect the
conjugal partnership. The lot retains its
conjugal
nature.
Moreover,
the
presumption of conjugal ownership applies
even when the manner in which the
property was acquired does not appear.
The use of the conjugal funds is not an
essential requirement for the presumption
to arise.
There is no dispute that the subject
property was acquired by spouses Elenita
and Eduardo during their marriage. It is
also undisputed that their marital relations
are governed by the conjugal partnership
of gains, since they were married before
the enactment of the Family Code and
they did not execute any prenuptial
agreement as to their property relations.
Thus, the legal presumption of the
conjugal nature of the property applies to
the lot in question. The presumption that
the property is conjugal property may be
rebutted only by strong, clear, categorical,
and convincing evidencethere must be
strict proof of the exclusive ownership of
one of the spouses, and the burden of
proof rests upon the party asserting it.

The SC stated that Elenita has not

sufficiently proven that the prices involved
in the sales in question were so
inadequate for the Court to reach a
conclusion that the transfers were in the
nature of a donation rather than a sale.

That even after having declared that the

Lot is the conjugal property of spouses
Elenita and Eduardo, it does not
necessarily
follow
that
it
may
automatically be levied upon in an
execution to answer for debts, obligations,
fines, or indemnities of one of the
spouses. Before debts and obligations may
be
charged
against
the
conjugal
partnership, it must be shown that the
same were contracted for, or the debts
and obligations should have redounded to,
the benefit of the conjugal partnership.
Fines and pecuniary indemnities imposed
upon the husband or the wife, as a rule,
may not be charged to the partnership.
However, if the spouse who is bound
should have no exclusive property or if the
property should be insufficient, the fines
and indemnities may be enforced upon
the partnership assets only after the
responsibilities enumerated in Article 161
of the Civil Code have been covered.

In this case, it is just and proper that

Ronnie be compensated for the serious
physical injuries he suffered. It should be
remembered that even though the vehicle
that hit Ronnie was registered in the name
of Elenita, she was not made a party in the
said criminal case. Thus, she may not be
compelled to answer for Eduardos liability.
Nevertheless, their conjugal partnership
property may be held accountable for it
since Eduardo has no property in his
name.
The
payment
of
indemnity
adjudged by the RTC of Bacolod City in
Criminal Case No. 7155 in favor of Ronnie

may be enforced against the partnership

assets of spouses Elenita and Eduardo
after the responsibilities enumerated
under Article 161 of the Civil Code have
been covered. This remedy is provided for
under Article 163 of the Civil Code.

Lim v Equitable PCI Bank

1/15/2014

Topic: Conjugal Partnership of Gains: What

is included in the CPG

FACTS:
Petition for review on certiorari on CA
decision
Nov 17, 1988 petitioner Francisco Lim
executed Irrevocable Special Power of
Attorney (ISPA) in favor of his brother
Franco
Lim,
authorizing
Franco
to
mortgage his share in the property which
they co owned
Feb 9, 1989 BDO Savings and Mortgage
bank release a loan of Php8.5M by virtue
of the ISPA
Dec 28, 1992 Loan was paid by Franco
June 14, 1996 petitioner Francisco,
Franco and their mother Victoria Lim
obtained from Equitable PCI Bank (EPCI) a
loan of Php30M in favor of Sun Paper
Products Inc. To secure the loan, petitioner
and Franco executed in favor of Equitable
PCI Bank a Real Estate Mortgage over
same property
Sept 29, 1999 a Tax Declaration was
issued in the name of EPCI for another
property (property #2)
Thereafter, a Writ of Possession in favor of
EPCI was issued by the RTC
Jan 11, 2011 petitioner Franco filed
before the RTC a Motion for the Issuance
of Temporary Restraining Order and a
Complaint for Cancellation of SPA,
Mortgage Contract, Certificate of Sales,
TCT 9370 (property #2), and the Tax
Declaration, with Damages and Issuance
of
Preliminary
Mandatory
Injunction
against ECPI, his brother Franco, and his
mother Victoria
Alleging that he did not authorize Franco
to mortgage property #2 to ECPI and that

his signatures in the Reasl Estate

Mortgage and Surety Agreement were
forged
RTC granted petitioners Motion for the
issuance of TRO and application for
injunctive relief
That there is sufficient reason to believe
that grave and irreparable injury will result
on petitioner before the main case can be
heard on notice.
Respondent (EPCI) in an Answer Cum
Motion to Dismiss contend that the trial
court has no jurisdiction; that it is not
privy to the execution of the ISPA; that
there is no allegation that the foreclosure
was defective or void, no reason to cancel
tax dec and TCT Franco and Victoria did
not participate in proceedings
On appeal, CA reversed RTC decision, that
petitioners mere allegation that his
signature in the mortgage contract was
forged is not sufficient to overcome the
presumption of regularity of the notarized
document
- hence this petition wherein he claims
respondents negligence in approving the
loan and accepting the subject property
AND insists that respondent should
have been alerted by the fact that
the mortgage contract was executed
without the consent of his wife
ISSUE:
W/N the petiioner was able to prove his
signature was forged and that respondent
bank exercised diligence in the subject
mortgage transaction

HELD:
- Petition is bereft of merit
He failed to prove his signature was forged
Allegations
of
forgery
cannot
be
presumed, must be proved by clear,
positive and convincing evidence
He failed to prove negligence on the part
of the respondent
No evidence was presented
Nature of the property was never raised as
an issue, so petitioner cannot undermine
the contract by saying that he is now
American and married when it was written
that him and Franco were single Filipino
citizens

Absence of wifes signature also has no

bearing in the case
We are not unaware that all property of
the marriage is presumed to be conjugal,
unless it is shown that it is owned
exclusively by the husband or the wife;
that this presumption is not overcome by
the fact that the property is registered in
the name of the husband or the wife
alone; and that the consent of both
spouses is required before a conjugal
property may be mortgaged.
-- However, we find it iniquitous to apply
the foregoing presumption especially
since the nature of the mortgaged
property was never raised as an issue
before the RTC, the CA, and even before
this Court. In fact, petitioner never alleged
in his Complaint that the said property
was conjugal in nature. Hence, respondent
had no opportunity to rebut the said
presumption.
Philippine National Bank v. Court of
Appeals:
Article 160 of the Civil Code: All property
of the marriage is presumed to belong to
the conjugal partnership, unless it be
proved that it pertains exclusively to the
husband or to the wife.
The presumption applies to property
acquired during the lifetime of the
husband and wife. In this case, it appears
on the face of the title that the properties
were acquired by Donata Montemayor
when she was already a widow. When the
property is registered in the name of a
spouse only and there is no showing as to
when the property was acquired by said
spouse, this is an indication that the
property belongs exclusively to said
spouse. And this presumption under
Article 160 of the Civil Code cannot prevail
when the title is in the name of only one
spouse and the rights of innocent third
parties are involved.
- DENIED
Laperal v Republic of the Philippines
GR No L-18008
10/30/1962

FACTS:

May 1960, Laperal filed in CFI Baguio a

petition for change of name/ to resume
using her maiden name
That she and her husband were given a
decree of legal separation and that she
has ceased to live with him for many years
now
Petition was opposed by the City Attorney
of Baguio on the ground that it violates Art
372 of the Civil Code and that it is
sanctioned by the Rules of Court
Court denied petition on the same ground
Art 372. When legal separation has been
granted, the wife shall continue using her
name and surname employed before legal
separation
In motion for recon, it was granted
ISSUE: WON Laperal after having obtained
legal separation may be granted to
resume using her maiden name

HELD:
Art 372, language of the statute is
mandatory because her marriage status is
unaffected by the legal separation, there
being no severance of the vinvulum
Rule 103 of the Rules of Court for change
of name may be observed HOWEVER, her
only reason for change of name was her
legal separation which alone is not a
sufficient ground to justify a change of
name, for to do so would circumvent the
mandatory provisions of Art 372
- DISMISSED

TERESITA C. FRANCISCO,
COURT OF APPEALS, et al,

vs. HON.

FACTS:

Petitioner, the legal wife of private

respondent Eusebio Francisco (Eusebio) by
his second marriage allege that the ff
properties were acquired during their
marriage and that the same was

administered by her husband until he was

invalidated by Tubertulosis:
1.
Sari sari store, a residential house
and lot and an apartment house in
Rodriguez, Rizal and;
2.

A house in Rodriguez, Rizal

She also claim that private

respondent succeeded in convincing their
father to sign a genra power of Attorney
which
thereby
authorized
Conchita
Evangelista to administer the rouse and
apartment in Rizal.

In line with this, she filed a suit for

damages and for annulment of general
power of attorney authorizing Conchita
Evangelista (Eusebios daughter in his first
marriage) to administer the house and lot
together with the apartments allegedly
acquired by petitioner and Eusebio during
their conjugal partnership.

The trial court rendered judgment in

favor of private respondents due to
petitioners failure to establish proof that
said properties were acquired during the
existence
of
the
second
conjugal
partnership, or that they pertained
exclusively to the petitioner. As such, the
CA ruled that those properties belong
exclusively to Eusebio, and that he has the
capacity to administer them.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the appellate court
committed reversible error in affirming the
trial court's ruling that the properties,
subject matter of controversy, are not
conjugal but the capital properties of
Eusebio exclusively.
RULING:

Indeed, Art 158 and 160 of the New

Civil Code has been repealed by the
Family Code however, since the real of the

aforementioned articles does not operate

to prejudice or affect the rights which
have become vested while the said
provisions were in force. In order to
resolve the issue we will deal with it on the
nature of the contested properties based
on the provisions of the New Civil Code.

Art 160 of the New Civil Code

provides that: All property of the
marriage is presumed to belong to the
conjugal partnership, unless it be proved
that it pertains exclusively to the husband
or the wife ; However, the burden of
proving this presumption must first be
proven by the one contending which
necessitate the presentation of the proof
of acquisition during the coverture it being
a condition sine qua non for the operation
of the presumption.

In this case, the petitioner failed to

adduce ample evidence to show that the
properties were acquired their marriage.
Whether Eusebio succeeded to the
property prior or subsequent to his second
marriage is inconsequential. The property
should be regarded as his own exclusively,
as a matter of law, pursuant to Article 148
of the NCC which essentially provides that
properties already owned by a spouse
prior to the marriage and brought into the
marriage is considered his or her separate
property.

Insofar as the administrations of the

properties are concerned, Eusebio shall
retain control thereof considering that the
assets are exclusively his capital.

Petition is denied. The Decision of

the CA is affirmed

(G.R No. 171904) TAN, Petitioner, - V GRACE ANDRADE, ET AL

(G.R No. 172017) GRACE ANDRADE,
ET AL, Petitioners, ' - V - BOBBY TAN,

Respondent. 2013-08-07
171904/G.R. No. 172017

G.R.

No.

This is a consolidated petitions for review

on certiorari assailing the Decision 2 dated
July 26, 2005 and Resolution 3 dated
March 3, 2006 of the Court of Appeals (CA)
in CA-G.R. CV No. 7 1987 which affirmed
with modication the Judgment 4 dated
April 6, 2001 of the Regional Trial Court of
Cebu City, Branch 19 (RTC) in Civil Case
No. CEB 20969.
The Facts
Rosario Vda. De Andrade (Rosario) was the
registered owner of four parcels of land
known as Lots 17, 18, 19, and 20 5
situated in Cebu City (subject properties)
which she mortgaged to and subsequently
foreclosed by one Simon 6 Diu (Simon).
When the redemption period was about to
expire, Rosario sought the assistance of
Bobby Tan (Bobby) who agreed to redeem
the subject properties. Thereafter, Rosario
sold the same to Bobby and her son,
Proceso Andrade, Jr. (Proceso, Jr.), for
E100,000.00 as evidenced by a Deed of
Absolute Sale dated April 29, 1983
(subject deed of sale). On July 26, 1983,
Proceso,
Jr.
executed
a
Deed
of
Assignment, ceding unto Bobby his rights
and interests over the subject properties
in consideration of 1350,000.00. The Deed
of Assignment was signed by, among
others, Henry Andrade (Henry), one of
Rosarios sons, as instrumental witness.
Notwithstanding the aforementioned Deed
of Assignment, Bobby extended an Option
to Buy the subject properties in favor of
Proceso, Jr., giving the latter until 7:00 in
the evening of July 31, 1984 to purchase
the same for the sum of P310,000.00.
When Proceso, Jr. failed to do so, Bobby
consolidated his ownership over the
subject properties, and the TCTs therefor
were issued in his name.

On October 7, 1997, Rosarios children,

namely, Grace, Proceso, Jr., Henry,
Andrew, Glory, Miriam Rose, Joseph (all
surnamed Andrade), Jasmin Blaza, and
Charity A. Santiago Andrade, led a
complaint
for
reconveyance
and
annulment of deeds of conveyance and
damages against Bobby before the RTC,
docketed as Civil Case No. CEB 20969. In
their complaint, they alleged that the
transaction between Rosario and Bobby
(subject transaction) was not one of sale
but was actually an equitable mortgage
which was entered into to secure Rosarios
indebtedness with Bobby. They also
claimed that since the subject properties
were inherited by them from their father,
Proceso Andrade, Sr. (Proceso, Sr.), the
subject properties were conjugal in nature,
and thus, Rosario had no right to dispose
of their respective shares therein. In this
light, they argued that they remained as
co-owners of the subject properties
together with Bobby, despite the issuance
of the TCTs in his name.
In his defense, Bobby contended that the
subject properties were solely owned by
Rosario per the TCTs issued in her name
and that he had validly acquired the same
upon Proceso, Jr.s failure to exercise his
option to buy back the subject properties.
He also interposed the defenses of
prescription and laches against the
Andrades.
The RTC Ruling
On April 6, 2001, the RTC rendered a
Judgment
dismissing
the
Andrades
complaint. It ruled that the subject
transaction was a bona fide sale and not
an equitable mortgage, noting further that
the subject deed of sale was not even
questioned by the Andrades at the time of
its execution. As Proceso, Jr. failed to
exercise his option to buy back the subject
properties, the titles thereto were validly

consolidated in Bobbys favor, resulting to

the issuance of TCTs in his name which are
deemed to be conclusive proof of his
ownership thereto. As regards the nature
of the subject properties, the RTC found
that they appeared to be the exclusive
properties of Rosario. Finally, it found that
the Andrades claim over the subject
properties had already prescribed and that
laches had already set in. The Andrades
then filed an appeal.
The CA Ruling
On July 26, 2005, the CA rendered the
assailed Decision upholding in part the
RTCs ruling.
It found that the subject deed of sale was
indeed what it purports to be, i.e., a bona
fide contract of sale. In this accord, it
denied the Andrades claim that the
subject transaction was an equitable
mortgage since their allegation that the
purchase price was unusually low was left
unsupported by any evidence. Also, their
averment that they have been in
continuous possession of the subject
properties was belied by the testimony of
Andrew Andrade (Andrew) who stated that
Bobby was already in possession of the
same.
Nevertheless, the CA ruled that the
subject properties belong to the conjugal
partnership of Rosario and her late
husband, Proceso, Sr., and thus, she coowned the same together with her
children, the Andrades. In this respect,
the sale was valid only with respect to
Rosarios pro-indiviso share in the subject
properties and it cannot prejudice the
share of the Andrades since they did not
consent to the sale. In effect, a resulting
trust was created between Bobby and the
Andrades and, as such, prescription and/or
laches has yet to set in so as to bar them
from
instituting
the
instant
case.
Accordingly, the CA ordered Bobby to

reconvey to the Andrades their share in

the subject properties.
In View of the CAs pronouncement, the
parties led their respective motions for
reconsideration. For the Andrades part,
they sought the reconsideration of the
CAs ruling as to its characterization of the
subject transaction as one of sale,
insisting that it is actually an equitable
mortgage. As for Bobbys part, he
maintained that the sale should have
covered the entirety of the subject
properties and not only Rosarios proindiviso
share.
Both
motions
for
reconsideration were, however, denied by
the CA in a Resolution 30 dated March 3,
2006. Hence, the present consolidated
petitions.
Issues Before the Court
The present controversy revolves around
the CAs characterization of the subject
properties as well as of the subject
transaction between Rosario and Bobby. In
GR. No. 172017, the Andrades submit that
the CA erred in ruling that the subject
transaction is in the nature of a sale, while
in GR. No. 171904, Bobby contends that
the CA erred in ruling that the subject
properties are conjugal in nature.
T
he
Co
urt
s
Rul
ing
A.

Ch
ara
cte
riz
ati
on
of
the
su
bje
ct
tra
nsa
cti
on.

Settled is the rule that when the trial

court's factual findings have been affirmed
by the CA, said findings are generally
conclusive and binding upon the Court,
and may no longer be reviewed on Rule 45
petitions. While there exists exceptions to
this rule such as when the CAs and
RTCs finndings are in conflict with each
other the Court observes that none
applies with respect to the ruling that the
subject transaction was one of sale and
not an equitable mortgage. Records
readily reveal that both the RTC and the
CA observed that there is no clear and
convincing evidence to show that the
parties agreed upon a mortgage. Hence,
absent any glaring error therein or any
other compelling reason to hold otherwise,
this finding is deemed conclusive.
Consequently,
Andrades

the

petition

in

G.R. No. 172017 must

therefore be denied. B.
Characterization
the

of

subject

properties.
With respect to the nature of the subject
properties, the courts a quo were at
variance such that the RTC, on the one
hand, ruled that the said properties were
exclusive properties of Rosario, while the
CA, on the other hand, pronounced that
they are conjugal in nature. In this regard,
the consequent course of action would be
for the Court to conduct a re-examination
of the evidence if only to determine which
among the two is correct.
Pertinent to the resolution of this second
issue is Article 160 of the Civil Code 38

which states that [a]ll property of the

marriage is presumed to belong to the
conjugal partnership, unless it be proved
that it pertains exclusively to the husband
or to the wife. For this presumption to
apply, the party invoking the same must,
however, prove that the property was
indeed acquired during the marriage.
As a condition sine qua non for the
operation of [Article 160] in favor of the
conjugal partnership, the party who
invokes the presumption must first prove
that the property was acquired during the
marriage. The presumption in favor of
conjugality does not operate if there is no
showing of when the property alleged to
be conjugal was acquired. Moreover, the
presumption may be rebutted only with
strong, clear, categorical and convincing
evidence. There must be strict proof of the
exclusive ownership of one of the spouses,
and the burden of proof rests upon the
party asserting it.
In this case, records reveal that the
conjugal partnership of Rosario and her
husband was terminated upon the latters
death on August 7, 1978 43 while the
transfer certificates of title over the
subject
properties were
issued on
September 28, 1979 and solely in the
name of Rosario Vda. de Andrade, of
legal age, widow, Filipino. No evidence
was adduced by the Andrades to establish
that the subject properties were procured
during the coverture of their parents or
that the same were bought with conjugal
funds. Moreover, Rosarios declaration that
she is the absolute owner of the disputed
parcels of land in the subject deed of sale
was not disputed by her son Proceso, Jr.,
who was a party to the same. By virtue of
these incidents, the Court upholds the
RTCs finding that the subject properties
were exclusive or sole properties of
Rosario.

The Court further observes that laches had

already set in, thereby precluding the
Andrades from pursuing their claim. Case
law defines laches as the failure to assert
a right for an unreasonable and
unexplained length of time, warranting a
presumption that the party entitled to
assert it has either abandoned or declined
to assert it.
Records disclose that the Andrades took
14 years before filling their complaint for
reconveyance in 1997.
The argument that they did not know
about the subject transaction is clearly
belied by the facts on record. It is
undisputed that Proceso, Jr. was a covendee in the subject deed of sale, while
Henry was an instrumental witness to the
Deed of Assignment and Option to Buy
both dated July 26, 1983. Likewise,
Rosarios sons, Proceso, Jr. and Andrew,
did not question the execution of the
subject deed of sale made by their mother
to Bobby. These incidents could only lead
to the conclusion that they were wellaware of the subject transaction and yet
only pursued their claim 14 years after the
sale was executed. Due to the abovestated reasons, Bobbys petition in G.R.
No. 171904 is hereby granted.
The Court (a) GRANTS the petition of
Bobby Tan in G.R. No. 171904; and (b)
DENIES the petition of Grace Andrade,
Charity A. Santiago, Henry Andrade,
Andrew Andrade, Jasmin Blaza, Miriam
Rose Andrade, and Joseph Andrade in GR.
No. 172017. The Decision dated July 26,
2005 and Resolution dated March 3, 2006
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No.
71987 are hereby REVERSED and SET
ASIDE, and the April 6, 2001 Decision of
the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City,
Branch 19 in Civil Case No. CEB 20969 is
REINSTATED.
Veloso

Martinez

Administration of exclusive property by

the other spouse.

1914 case.The respondent, Lucia

Martinez, is the widow of Domingo
Franco, and after the death of her
husband
she
was
appointed
administratrix of his estate. Jewelry
belonged to her personally and was
inherited from her mother.
A short time before the death of
Domingo Franco he borrowed from
the petitioner the sum of P4,500
and gave as security for the
payment of said sum the jewelry
described in the complaint. The
money
was
borrowed
under
promise to repay the same, with 12
per cent interest
It is not clear whether or not the
jewelry, at the time of the
execution of said document, was in
fact delivered to the petitioner. It
states that the jewelry was
contained in a box which remains
closed after the jewels were shown
to Mariano Veloso. The document
further admits the key shall remain
in possession of Domingo Franco.
After the death of Domingo Franco
it appears that said jewelry was
found in the same "caja" and that
the key was in the possession of
the respondent.
During the trial of the cause the
petitioner attempted to show that
the jewels in question were pawned
to him by Domingo Franco, with the
full knowledge and consent of the
respondent. And not only that, the
petitioner further attempts to show
that after the death of Domingo
Franco, the respondent promised to
pay the amount for which the said
jewels
were
pawned.
The
respondent positively denies that
she knew that her husband had
pawned her jewels or that she

promised to redeem the same by

paying the amount due.
W/N jewelry belongs to the petitioner.
No.

In view of the fact the record shows

that the jewels were the sole and
separate property of the wife,
acquired from her mother, and in
the absence of further proof, we
must
presume
that
they
constituted
a
part
of
her
paraphernal property. As such
paraphernal property she exercised
dominion over the same. (Article
1382, Civil Code.) She had the
exclusive control and management
of the same, until and unless she
had delivered it to her husband,
before a notary public, with the
intent that the husband might
administer it properly. (Article
1384, Civil Code.) There is no proof
in the record that she had ever
delivered the same to her husband,
in any manner, or for any purpose.
That being true, she could not be
deprived of the same by any act of
her husband, without her consent,
and without compliance with the
provisions of the Civil Code above
cited.

PLATA V. YATCO
AMALIA
PLATA, petitioner, vs.
HON.
NICASIO YATCO, Judge, CFI of Rizal, Branch
V; BENITO MACROHON, Sheriff of Quezon
City and The Spouses CESAREA E.
VILLANUEVA
and
GREGORIO
LEAO respondents.

Nature: Petition for certiorari on an Order

issued by CFI Rizal citing Plata in contempt

of court for refusing to vacate certain

property
Ponente: Reyes, JBL
Date: 28 Dec 1964

(2) That which is obtained by the

industry, or work, or as salary of
the spouses, or of either of them;
(3) The fruits, rents or interests
received or due during the
marriage,
coming
from
the
common property or from the
exclusive property of each spouse.
(1401)

DOCTRINE:
Where a property was acquired by the
woman while she was still single, the
subsequent conveyance thereof to a third
person, and the reconveyance of her
several months afterward of the same
property, did not transform it from
paraphernal to conjugal property, there
being no proof that the money paid to the
vendor came from common or conjugal
funds (Civ. Code, Art 153).

The illegal detainer judgment against the

husband alone cannot bind nor affect the
wife's possession of her paraphernal,
which by law she holds and administers
independently, and which she may even
encumber
or
alienate
without
his
knowledge or consent.

FACTS:

Art. 136. The wife retains the ownership

of the paraphernal property. (1382)

Art. 137. The wife shall have the

administration
of
the
paraphernal
property, unless she delivers the same to
the husband by means of a public
instrument empowering him to administer
it.
In this case, the public instrument shall be
recorded in the Registry of Property. As for
the movables, the husband shall give
adequate security. (1384a)

Art. 140. A married woman of age may

mortgage,
encumber,
alienate
or
otherwise dispose of her paraphernal
property, without the permission of the
husband, and appear alone in court to
litigate with regard to the same. (n)

Relevant Provision of Law:

NCC Art. 153 ; 136, 137, 140
Facts:
Art. 153. The following
partnership property:

are

conjugal

(1) That which is acquired by onerous

title during the marriage at the
expense of the common fund,
whether the acquisition be for the
partnership, or for only one of the
spouses;

In 1954 Amalia Plata purchased a parcel of

land in Caloocan, Rizal, for which the
Provincial RD issued TCT No. 25855 in the
name of Amalia Plata, single, Filipino
citizen.

On 13 Feb 1958, she sold the property to

one Celso Saldaa who obtained TCT No.
40459 therefor.

On 24 Sep 1958, after 7 mos, Saldaa

resold the same property to Amalia Plata,
married to Gaudencio Begosa," a new
TCT No. 43520 was issued to the vendee,
Amalia Plata.

She is not bound by detainer judgment

because she is not lawfully married to
Gaudencio Begosa, and that she had
acquired the property while still single,
and was in possession thereof when the
Sheriff attempted to enforce the writ of
ejectment.

ISSUE:
Also on 24 Sep 1958, "Amalia Plata, xxx
married to Gaudencio Begosa," in
consideration of a loan of P3,000,
mortgaged to Cesarea Villanueva, the
same property and its improvements "of
which the mortgagor declares to be hers
as the absolute owner thereof." Begosa,
signed as co-mortgagor.

The property was foreclosed, and sold in

an auction sale to Villanueva, the highest
bidder. on 13 May 1961, the Sheriff issued
a final deed of sale; the RD issued the
buyer TCT, No. 55949.

Subsequently, Villanueva sued Begosa

alone for illegal detainer, and obtained
judgment against the latter, which
became final and executory.

A writ of execution was duly issued, but

Amalia Plata resisted all efforts to eject
her from the property, and she filed a third
party claim, averring ownership of the
property. Upon motion, CFI cited both
Plata and Begosa in contempt.

Platas contention:

W/N Amalia Plata is bound by the detainer

judgment against Gaudencio Begosa.
More specifically, W/N the subject property
is a conjugal property of Plata and Begosa.

RULING:
NO. The subject property is a paraphernal
property of Amalia Plata and, therefore,
she cannot be bound by the detainer
judgment against Begosa.

Since the property was paraphernal, and

the creditors and purchasers were aware
of it, the fact being clearly spread on the
land records, it is plain that Plata's
possession
was
not
derived
from
Gaudencio Begosa. The illegal detainer
judgment against the husband alone
cannot bind nor affect the wife's
possession of her paraphernal, which by
law
she
holds
and
administers
independently, and which she may even
encumber
or
alienate
without
his
knowledge or consent (Civ. Code, Arts.
136. 137, 140). Hence, as she was not
made party defendant in the eviction suit,
the petitioner-wife could validly ignore the
judgment of eviction against her husband,
and it was no contempt of court for her to
do so, because the writ of execution was
not lawful against her.

RATIO:
-

SC presumed the validity of marriage

between Plata and Begosa based on
the ff:
i.
the admissions of married
status in public documents;
ii.
the presumption that persons
openly
living
together
as
husband and wife are legally
married to each other, and
iii.
the prior marriage of Begosa to
someone
else
does
not
necessarily
exclude
the
possibility of a valid subsequent
marriage to Plata.

The property was acquired by Plata

while still single, as shown in the TCT.
The subsequent conveyance thereof to
Celso Saldaa, and the reconveyance
of her several months afterward of the
same property, did not transform it
from paraphernal to conjugal property,
there being no proof that the money
paid to Saldaa came from common or
conjugal funds (Civ. Code, Art 153).
The deed of mortgage in favor of
respondents Villanueva actually recites
that the petitioner was the owner of
the tenement in question and so does
the conveyance of it by Saldaa to her.

Begosas signing as a co-mortgagor,

by itself alone, would not suffice to
convert
the
land
into
conjugal
property, considering that it was
paraphernal
in
origin.
This
is
particularly the case where the
addition of Begosa as co-mortgagor
was clearly an afterthought, the text of
the deed showing that Plata was the
sole mortgagor.

LAURENA v. CA
G.R. No.
September 22, 1988 CARPIO, J.

159220

FACTS: Darlene and Jesse Lauro Laurena

met in January 1983 and were married in
the same year. They have two children. In
1993, she filed a petition for declaration of
nullity of marriage, alleging that he was
psychologically
incapacitated,
which
existed at the time of the celebration of
the marriage although she discovered it
only after the marriage. She alleged that
after their wedding, they went to Baguio
City for their honeymoon. They were
accompanied by a 15-year old boy, the
son of one of his house helpers, who he
invited to sleep in their hotel suite; this
she
found
as
weird.
After
their
honeymoon, they settled in his house in
Paranaque City. She became pregnant in
1984,
but
suffered
a
miscarriage.
According to her, she almost bled to death
while he continued watching a television
show at the foot of their matrimonial bed.
He gave priority to the needs of his
parents; would come home past midnight;
and even tried to convert her to his
religion. In addition, he was a womanizer.
She lived in Batangas for three years,
tending to their gasoline station while he
remained
in
Paranaque
City.
She
discovered that he had been living a
bachelor's life while she was away. She
also noticed that he had feminine
tendencies. They would frequently quarrel
and one time, he hit her face. She alleged
that in September 1990, he abandoned
their
conjugal
home
and
stopped
supporting their children. She further
alleged that during their marriage, she
and
respondent
acquired
several
properties which were all part of their
conjugal partnership of gains. She prayed
for the dissolution of the conjugal
partnership of gains, for custody of their
children, and for monthly support of
P25,000.
He
denied
petitioner's
allegations, asserting that she was
emotionally immature and extremely
jealous. He alleged that some of the
properties were not part of their conjugal
partnership of gains. He prayed for the
dismissal of the petition. The trial court
denied the petition for declaration of
nullity, the conjugal partnership of gains
dissolved, the children being over 7 years
of age can choose whose custody theyd
be, and support of said minors shall be

borne by the parents in proportion to their

respective incomes. Petitioner appealed
insofar as the trial court denied her
petition for declaration of nullity of
marriage. The Court of Appeals ruled that
she failed to prove that the root cause of
his psychological incapacity, noting that
Dr. Lapuz, the psychiatrist that she
presented, was not able to talk to him and
simply based her conclusions and
impressions of him from her two-hour
session with Darlene. It further ruled that
she was not able to prove that his alleged
psychological incapacity was existing at
the time of the celebration of their
marriage.
Also,
in
her
complaint,
petitioner's bases were his irresponsibility,
insensitivity, and infidelity, but during the
trial, she claimed that it was his
homosexuality. Her allegations lacked
factual and evidentiary bases. It could not
lead to the conclusion that it was
incurable. The Court of Appeals excluded
also some properties, which belonged to
the parents of Jesse.
ISSUE:
1.
Is
he
psychologically
incapacitated to comply with the essential
marital obligations? 2. Were the properties
excluded by the Court of Appeals form
part of the conjugal partnership of gains?
HELD/RATIO: 1. NO. The totality of the
evidence presented by petitioner failed to
show that respondent was psychologically
incapacitated and that such incapacity
was grave, incurable, and existing at the
time of the solemnization of their
marriage. 2. NO. The ancestral house and
lot in Tanauan, Batangas and the
properties
acquired
through
the
operations of the Jeddah Caltex Station
and Jeddah Trucking belong to the
respondent alone since in the Conjugal
Partnership of Gains, only those properties
acquired DURING the marriage, shall be
the properties of both the husband and
wife. The said properties originally
belonged to the respondents parents
which was transferred to the respondent in
his favor. However, the duplex house and
lot on Dayap Street, Makati City belongs to
both the petitioner and respondent since
they are paying for this property during
their marriage.

MANOTOK REALTY, INC. v. COURT OF

APPEALS
[G.R. No. L-45038]
[April 30, 1987]

TOPIC:
property

Administration of exclusive

PETITIONER: Manotok Realty, Inc. (MRI)

RESPONDENT:
Felipe Madlangawa
PONENTE:

Court

of

Appeals,

Gutierrez, Jr., J.

LAW:
Civil Code

Art. 136. The wife retains the

ownership of the paraphernal property.
Art. 137. The wife shall have the
administration of the paraphernal
property, unless she delivers the same
to the husband by means of a public
instrument
empowering
him
to
administer it.
In
this
case,
the
public
instrument shall be recorded in the
Registry of Property. As for the
movables, the husband shall give
adequate security.

Rules of Court

Rule 89, Sec. 1. Order of sale of

personalty. Upon the application of
the executor or administrator, and on
written notice to the heirs and other
persons interested, the court may
order the whole or a part of the
personal estate to be sold, if it appears
necessary for the purpose of paying
debts, expenses of administration, or
legacies, or for the preservation of the
property
FACTS:

Felipe claims that he has been

occupying a lot in the Clara de
Tambunting de Legarda Subdivision
since 1949
o Permitted
by
Andres
(subdivision overseer at the
time) on the condition that
Felipe would buy it later
Apr 2, 1950: Clara (lot owner), died
and her entire estate, including her
paraphernal properties (which included
the lot) were placed under custodia
legis
Apr 22, 1950: Felipe made a P1,500.00
deposit for the lot which was received
by Vicente (husband of Clara)
o lot had an area of 240 sq m and
was sold at P30.00 per sq m
o P5,700.00
unpaid
balance
(Felipe did not pay after Claras
death no further payments
from 1950)
o Claras heirs could not settle
their differences
Apr 28, 1950: Vicente appointed as a
special admin. of the estate. Felipe
remained in possession of the lot
Mar 1959: MRI became the successful
bidder and vendee of the Tambunting
de Legarda Subd.
o 44 parcels of land spread out in
the districts of Tondo and Sta.
Cruz, Manila (lot in dispute
included)
o pursuant to the deeds of sale
executed in its favor by the
Philippine Trust Company (PTC)
as administrator of the testate
estate of Clara in Spec.
Proceeding 10809 of the Manila
probate court
o Deed of Sale, among others,
provided for the following terms
and conditions:
1. The
VENDEE
(MRI)
assumes the risk and
expenses of ejecting the
tenants
or
squatters
xxx. Any rentals or
damages that may be
due or collectible from
them for the period
subsequent to the date
of this deed of sale shall

belong to the VENDEE

but rentals due from
them
prior
to
the
execution of this deed of
sale shall belong to the
VENDOR.
xxx

3. The VENDEE renounces

the right to warranty in
case of eviction with the
knowledge of the risks of
eviction and assumes its
consequences
with
respect not only to the
lots subject-of the above
mentioned cases and
claims but also with
respect to any other lots
subject of contracts of
sale or promises to sell
that may have been
executed
by
the
deceased, Clara and/or
Vicente, and it hereby
relieves the estate of
Clara and the PTC, in its
capacity
as
Administrator thereof, of
any and all liability with
respect thereto in case
of eviction. All sums of
money that have been
paid to the deceased
Clara
and/or
Vicente
and/or the administrator
of Clara on account of
the purchase price of
said lots shall belong to
the estate, but any sums
of money that are or
may be due as the
balance of the purchase
price of said lots shall
belong to the VENDEE.
In a bid to clear the Subd. of squatters
and occupants, MRI sent circulars to
the occupants and published notices in
the Manila
Times
and
the Taliba
advising them to vacate, otherwise,
court action would follow
o Felipe was one of the many
occupants who refused to
vacate, and filed an action to
recover the lot

Trial Court dismissed the action after

finding that the Identity of the land
described in the complaint had not
been sufficiently established as the
same one in Felipes material and
physical possession
CA ruled that the only right remaining
to MRI is to enforce the collection of
the balance
o found the Identity of the lot to
be recovered by MRI to be the
same as that in Felipes
possession
o MRI stepped into into its
predecessors shoes. Since the
area involved in this case is
only 115 sq m, the balance
(minus the P1.5K deposit) is
P2,551.85 (to be paid in 18
equal monthly installments)
MRI filed this petition for certiorari,
seeking to set aside the CA decision
upholding
the
dismissal
of
its
complaint for reinvidicatory action with
damages vs. Felipe and ordering it to
accept the payment of the P2,551.85
balance from him and to execute the
deed of sale of the in favor of the latter
after
o no dispute that the property in
question was the paraphernal
property of Clara (died on Apr
2, 1950)
o Vicente had no authority to sell
the lot to the Felipe on May 12,
1950 since the former was
appointed as administrator of
Claras estate only on Aug 28,
1950
o Sale could not have bound
Clara's estate because Vicente
neither acted as the owner nor
the administrator of the lot
when it took place
o On provision # 2 (MRI bound
itself to respect the contracts of
sale / promises to sell Vicente
executed and renounced the
right to warranty in case of
eviction): only valid sales
executed by the deceased Clara
and by persons vested with
authority to act on behalf of her
estate are to be respected

Felipes arguments
o questioned provisions of the
deed
of
sale
are
a
declaration/admission against
the interest of MRI, and shows
that the acts of Vicente had
been ratified by the PTC and
approved by the probate court
o MRI
is
estopped
from
questioning the authority of
Vicente in selling the property
in dispute
ISSUE:WON the sale by Vicente in favor of
Felipe is valid, binding, and
enforceable against MRI (in what
capacity did Claras husband act in
disposing of the lot?)
RULING:
CA decision is REVERSED
and SET ASIDE. Felipe is ordered to
SURRENDER the material and
physical possession of the lot to
MRI and to pay the latter the
rentals from May 1950 until he
surrenders the lot. MRI shall
reimburse Felipe the P1,500.00
with legal interest from May 1950
or offset it from the rentals due.
Costs against Felipe.

Sale between Vicente and Felipe

is void ab initio, Vicente being neither
an owner nor admin. of the property
o Vicente couldnt have validly
disposed of the lot as a
continuing admin. of Claras
paraphernal properties as there
is no evidence that he was such
during her lifetime
o Thus, it cannot be said that the
sale between MRI and Vicente
had its inception before Claras
death and was entered into by
the Vicente for and on behalf of
Clara = consummated only
after her death
probate court appointed Vicente as
administrator of the estate only on Aug
28, 1950 more than 3 months after
the questioned sale took place

As such, the sale cannot be the subject

of the ratification by PTC or the
probate court
A void contract is inexistent from the
beginning and cannot be ratified or the
right to set up the defense of its
illegality be waived. (Art. 1409, NCC)
o The right to set up the nullity of
a void or non-existent contract
is not limited to the parties as
in the case of annuable /
voidable contracts it is
extended to 3rd persons who
are directly affected
o Any person may invoke the
contracts
inexistence
if
juridical affects founded there
are asserted v. him
Sec 1, Rule 89, RoC provides for the
procedure on how a property in
custodia legis can be disposed of by
sale
o After Vicentes appointment as
administrator of the Claras
estate, he should have applied
before the probate court for
authority to sell the disputed
property in favor of the Felipe.
o If the probate court approved
this, then Vicente would have
been able to execute a valid
deed of sale
o No effort on Vicentes part to
comply with the rule of
procedure nor on that of the
respondent to protect his
interests or to pay the balance
of the installments to the court
appointed administrator
o Kline v. Shoup: The law
recognizes the issuance of an
order
of
sale
as
an
indispensable
requisite
in
effecting a valid sale of the
property of a decedent's estate
Considering the lots location, we find
a monthly rental of P0.20/sq m to be
more than fair to Felipe for his use of
the premises. MRI, should return the
P1.5K received by Vicente, with legal
interest, to Felipe

Ong vs CA

GR No. L-63025
November 29, 1991
Facts:
- Petitioner seeks to annul the
auction sale of parcel of land,
allegedly
owned
by
petioner
Ramon Ong and his former wife
Teodora Ong, which was awarded in
favor of Boix in a public bidding
conducted
by
Deputy
Sheriff
Camino. The title of the property
was later registered in the Office of
the Register of Deeds of Camarines
Norte.
- It is said that the parcel of land was
rendered in favor of Boix because
petitioners wife, Teodora, was not
able to pay the promissory notes
she gave to Boix in relation to her
loan for her logging business. The
decision
became
final
and
executory and Boix was able to
secure a writ of possession.
- However, petitioner filed a motion
to quash the writ of possession
because he claims that the
property was conjugal and thus
could not be held liable for
personal debts contracted by the
wife and that there was no valid
publication
thus
making
the
auction void.
- Lower court and CA both denied
the motion filed by petitioner, thus
this instant case.
Issue:
- WON the property can be validly
subject to auction
Ruling:
- Yes, the publication in the local
newspaper with regard to the
notice of auction was in accordance
with the law. Further, the said
property was acquired prior to their
marriage.

The lot was named after Teodora

Ong while the house erected was
declared to be conjugal. The use of
the name Teodora Ong in the title
is not a sufficient proof that said
property was acquired during the
marriage. SC hold that the lot in
question is paraphernal or owned
by the wife therefore is liable for
her personal debts.
The property is named after the
name of the wife only unlike the
house which was named after the
two spouses.
Petition is dismissed for lack of
merit.

Dewara v Lamela
GR 179010
April 11, 2011

Topic: Presumption of CPG

Facts:

Eduardo Dewara and Elenita

Magallanes Dewara married before the
enactment of the FC. Thus, the CC
governed their marital relations. Husband
and wife were separated-in-fact because
Elenita wentto work in California, while
Eduardo stayed in Bacolod City.

Eduardo, while driving a private

jeep registered in the name of Elenita, hit
respondent Ronnie Lamela. Ronnie filed a
criminal case for serious physical injuries
through reckless imprudence against
Eduardo before the Municipal Trial Court in
Cities (MTCC), Bacolod.

MTCC - Eduardo guilty of the charge

and sentenced imprisonment and to pay

civil indemnity of P62,598.70 actual

damages and P10,000 moral damages.

RTC junked appeal affirmed the

decision of the MTCC and it became final
and executory.

The writ of execution on the civil

liability was served on Eduardo, but it was
returned unsatisfied because he had no
property in his name. Levy on execution
on a Lot named after Elenita.

Petitioner - levy on execution of Lot

was illegal because the said property was
her paraphernal or exclusive property and
could not be made to answer for the
personal
liability
of
her
husband.
Furthermore, as the registered owner of
the property, she received no notice of the
execution sale. She sought the annulment
of the sale and the annulment of the
issuance of the new TCT in the name of
respondent spouses.

Respondent - subject lot was the

conjugal property of petitioner Elenita and
Eduardo. They asserted that the property
was acquired by Elenita during her
marriage to Eduardo; that the property
was acquired with the money of Eduardo
because, at the time of the acquisition of
the property, Elenita was a plain
housewife; that the jeep involved in the
accident was registered in the name of
petitioner; and that Elenita did not
interpose any objection pending the levy
on execution of the property.

The RTC decided in favor of

petitioner. The RTC declared that said
property was paraphernal in nature.

RTC gave credence to the testimony

of
Elenita
on
the
circumstances
surrounding the sale of the property. First,
it was sold to her by her father and her
aunt so that the family would remain on
the lot. Second, the minimal and
inadequate consideration for the 1,440 sq

m property was for the purpose of helping

her expand her capital in her business at
the time. Thus, the sale was essentially a
donation and was therefore gratuitous in
character.

Having declared that the property

was the paraphernal property of Elenita,
RTC ruled that civil liability of Eduardo,
which was personal to him, could not be
charged to exclusive property of his wife.

On appeal, the CA reversed the

decision of the RTC. The gross inadequacy
of the price alone does not affect a
contract of sale, except that it may
indicate a defect in the consent, or that
the parties really intended a donation or
some other act or contract. Except for the
assertions of Elenita, there was nothing in
the records that would indicate a defect in
Jesus and Concepcion Magallanes consent
to the sale. The CA ruled that Elenita and
Eduardo acquired the property by onerous
title during their marriage through their
common fund. Thus, it belonged to the
conjugal partnership of gains and might
be levied upon to answer for civil liabilities
adjudged against Eduardo.
Issue:
WON the subject property is the
paraphernal/exclusive property of Elenita
or the conjugal property of Elenita and
Eduardo.
Held:
All property of the marriage is presumed
to belong to the conjugal partnership,
unless it be proved that it pertains
exclusively to the husband or to the wife.
Registration in the name of the husband or
the wife alone does not destroy this
presumption.
The
separation-in-fact
between the husband and the wife without
judicial approval shall not affect the
conjugal partnership. The lot retains its
conjugal
nature.
Moreover,
the

presumption of conjugal ownership applies

even when the manner in which the
property was acquired does not appear.
The use of the conjugal funds is not an
essential requirement for the presumption
to arise.
There is no dispute that the subject
property was acquired by spouses Elenita
and Eduardo during their marriage. It is
also undisputed that their marital relations
are governed by the conjugal partnership
of gains, since they were married before
the enactment of the Family Code and
they did not execute any prenuptial
agreement as to their property relations.
Thus, the legal presumption of the
conjugal nature of the property applies to
the lot in question. The presumption that
the property is conjugal property may be
rebutted only by strong, clear, categorical,
and convincing evidencethere must be
strict proof of the exclusive ownership of
one of the spouses, and the burden of
proof rests upon the party asserting it.

The SC stated that Elenita has not

sufficiently proven that the prices involved
in the sales in question were so
inadequate for the Court to reach a
conclusion that the transfers were in the
nature of a donation rather than a sale.

That even after having declared that the

Lot is the conjugal property of spouses
Elenita and Eduardo, it does not
necessarily
follow
that
it
may
automatically be levied upon in an
execution to answer for debts, obligations,
fines, or indemnities of one of the
spouses. Before debts and obligations may
be
charged
against
the
conjugal
partnership, it must be shown that the
same were contracted for, or the debts
and obligations should have redounded to,

the benefit of the conjugal partnership.

Fines and pecuniary indemnities imposed
upon the husband or the wife, as a rule,
may not be charged to the partnership.
However, if the spouse who is bound
should have no exclusive property or if the
property should be insufficient, the fines
and indemnities may be enforced upon
the partnership assets only after the
responsibilities enumerated in Article 161
of the Civil Code have been covered.

In this case, it is just and proper that

Ronnie be compensated for the serious
physical injuries he suffered. It should be
remembered that even though the vehicle
that hit Ronnie was registered in the name
of Elenita, she was not made a party in the
said criminal case. Thus, she may not be
compelled to answer for Eduardos liability.
Nevertheless, their conjugal partnership
property may be held accountable for it
since Eduardo has no property in his
name.
The
payment
of
indemnity
adjudged by the RTC of Bacolod City in
Criminal Case No. 7155 in favor of Ronnie
may be enforced against the partnership
assets of spouses Elenita and Eduardo
after the responsibilities enumerated
under Article 161 of the Civil Code have
been covered. This remedy is provided for
under Article 163 of the Civil Code.

Mendoza Vs Reyes

ISSUE: Whether or not the disputed

properties are conjugal properties.

Facts of the case: Ponciano and Julia

were married in 1915. The properties in
question consisting of Lots 5 and 6, were bought
on installment basis. Thus, the spouses jointly
obtained a loan to pay their balance.
The
corresponding deed of absolute sale was
executed where the vendee named is 'Julia de
Reyes'. Her signatures appear over the caption
vendee and those of Ponciano under the phrase:
'with my marital consent. As a result of these
sales, TCTs were issued in the name of "JULIA
REYES married to PONCIANO REYES." While
Ponciano was absent attending his farm in
Pampanga, Julia sold absolutely the lots in
question to Efren Mendoza and Inocencia De
Mendoza, as vendees, without the knowledge
and consent of Ponciano. At the same time the
spouses were living separately and were not in
speaking terms. Ponciano filed a complaint for
the annulment of a deed of sale of two parcels of
land contending that said properties were
conjugal properties of himself and his wife and
that she had sold them to petitioners "all by
herself" and without his knowledge or consent.

Petitioner Mendozas alleged that the properties

were paraphernal properties of Julia and that they
had purchased the same in good faith and for
adequate consideration .Julia testified that she
bought the two parcels of land on installment
basis and that the first payment came from her
personal funds. The deed of sale is declared
null and void with respect to one- half
share of Ponciano. Article 153 of the Civil
Code provides that the following are
conjugal partnership property: That which is
acquired by onerous title during the marriage at
the expense of the common fund, whether the
acquisition be for the partnership, or for only
one of the spouses; It is sufficient to prove that
the property was acquired during the marriage in

order that the same may be deemed conjugal

property. In its decision, the Court of First Instance
of Rizal dismissed the complaint and declared the
properties in question exclusive and paraphernal
properties of Julia De Reyes. It ruled that she could
validly dispose of the same without the consent of
her husband and that the Mendozas are innocent
purchasers. The Court of Appeals reversed the
decision of the CFI.

Decision: The SC ruled that the disputed

property was acquired by onerous title during the
marriage. Records show that the funds
came from loans obtained by the spouses.
Under Article 161 of the Civil Code, all debts and
obligations contracted by the husband and the
wife for the benefit of the conjugal partnership are
liabilities of the partnership. Julias claim of
exclusive ownership is belied by the Income Tax
Returns which she herself prepared and filed in
behalf of the conjugal partnership wherein she
made the statement that the rentals paid to her
were income of the conjugal partnership, and she
made to appear the properties in question as
capital assets of the conjugal partnership.
Property acquired during a marriage is presumed
to be conjugal and the fact that the land is later
registered in the name of only one of the spouses
does not destroy its conjugal nature. If the fact
that property acquired during marriage was
registered in the name of the husband alone does
not affect its conjugal nature, neither does
registration in the name of the wife.
Joe E. Ros (deceased) and Estrella
Aguete vs. PNB
Facts:

Petition for review assailing the

decision of CA last Oct. 17,2005.
On January 13 1983, Jose Ros and
Estrella Aguete filed a complaint for
annulment of mortgage and all
legal proceedings of PNB Laoag on
the CFI Ilocos Norte.
It was raffled later then in RTC
Laoag City.
The complaint indicates that Jose
Ros obtained a loan from PNB in an
amount
of
PHP115,000
and

executed an estate mortgage with

a parcel of land and improvements
thereon under Title No. T-9646.
Upon maturity of the loan, they
remained with balance causing PNB
to make foreclosure proccedings on
the property. After extrajudicial
sale, it ruled in favour of PNB as
the highest bidder. After one year
without anyone redeeming said
property, it was registered in the
name of PNB Laoag on Aug. 10,
1978.
Aguete then stated that she has no
knowledge of the loan obtained by
Jose Ros neither consented to the
mortgage
of
their
conjugal
property. A complaint was filed to
annul the proceedings, sale and
consolidation of property saying
that her signatures were forged
and the loan did not result any
benefit to the family.
RTC rendered a decision on June
29, 2001 part of it read:
WHEREFORE, premises considered,
judgment is hereby rendered:
1. DECLARING the Deed of Real
Estate Mortgage (Exhibit C) and
the
subsequent
foreclosure
proceedings conducted thereon
NULL and VOID;
2. ORDERING the Register of Deeds
of the City of Laoag to cancel
TCT No. T-15276 in the name of
defendant PNB and revert the
same in the name of plaintiffs
spouses Joe Ros and Estrella
Aguete;
3. ORDERING defendant to vacate
and turnover the possession of the
premises of the property in suit to
the plaintiffs; and
4. ORDERING defendant to pay
plaintiffs
attorneys
fee
and
litigation expenses in the sum of
TEN
THOUSAND
(P10,000.00)
PESOS.

PNB filed for Notice of Appeal on

Sept. 13, 2001. Petitioner on the
same month filed for motion for
execution
pending
appeal.
Petitioners added that they obliged
themselves to make the house
habitable at a cost of not less
P50,000.00. The repair cost would
accrue to PNBs benefit should the
appellate court reverse the trial
court. PNB continued to oppose
petitioners motion

In an Order12 dated 8 May 2002,

the trial court found petitioners
motion for execution pending
appeal
improper
because
petitioners have made it clear that
they were willing to wait for the
appellate
courts
decision.
However, as a court of justice and
equity, the trial court allowed
petitioners to occupy the subject
property with the condition that
petitioners would voluntarily vacate
the premises and waive recovery of
improvements introduced should
PNB prevail on appeal.

On Oct. 17, 005, the appellate

court rendered a decision, reversed
the trial courts decision and
dismissed petitioners complaint.
The appellate court ruled in favour
of respondents

Issue:
1. WN Honorable Court of Appeals
erred in not giving weight to the
findings and conclusions of the trial
court, and in reversing and setting
aside such findings and conclusions
without stating specific contrary
evidence;
2. W/N The Honorable Court of
Appeals erred in declaring the real
estate mortgage valid;
3. W/N the Honorable Court of
Appeals erred in declaring, without
basis, that the loan contracted by
husband Joe A. Ros with respondent
Philippine National Bank Laoag

redounded to the benefit of his

family, aside from the fact that
such had not been raised by
respondent in its appeal
Ratio:
1. No. The CA did not err in reversing
the RTC decision. The application of
the provision is the Civil Code since
mortgage was done in 1968 and
they were married already.
Art. 153. The following are conjugal
partnership property:
(1) That which is acquired by onerous title
during the marriage at the expense of the
common fund, whether the acquisition be
for the partnership, or for only one of the
spouses;
(2) That which is obtained by the industry,
or work or as salary of the spouses, or of
either of them;
(3) The fruits, rents or interest received or
due during the marriage, coming from the
common property or from the exclusive
property of each spouse.
Art. 160. All property of the marriage is
presumed to belong to the conjugal
partnership, unless it be proved that it
pertains exclusively to the husband or to
the wife.
Art. 161. The conjugal partnership shall be
liable for:
(1) All debts and obligations contracted by
the husband for the benefit of the conjugal
partnership, and those contracted by the
wife, also for the same purpose, in the
cases where she may legally bind the
partnership;
(2) Arrears or income due, during the
marriage,
from
obligations
which
constitute a charge upon property of
either spouse or of the partnership;
(3) Minor repairs or for mere preservation
made during the marriage upon the
separate property of either the husband or
the wife; major repairs shall not be
charged to the partnership;
(4) Major or minor repairs upon the
conjugal partnership property;
(5) The maintenance of the family and the
education of the children of both husband
and wife, and of legitimate children of one
of the spouses;

(6) Expenses to permit the spouses to

complete a professional, vocational or
other course.
Art. 166. Unless the wife has been
declared a non compos mentis or a
spendthrift, or is under civil interdiction or
is confined in a leprosarium, the husband
cannot alienate or encumber any real
property of the conjugal partnership
without the wifes consent. If she refuses
unreasonably to give her consent, the
court may compel her to grant the same.
Art. 173. The wife may, during the
marriage, and within ten years from the
transaction questioned, ask the courts for
the annulment of any contract of the
husband entered into without her consent,
when such consent is required, or any act
or contract of the husband which tends to
defraud her or impair her interest in the
conjugal partnership property. Should the
wife fail to exercise this right, she or her
heirs after the dissolution of the marriage
may demand the value of the property
fraudulently alienated by the husband.
Art. 173 allows Aguete to question Ros
encumbrance of property but the article
does
not
guarantee
annulment
of
contract. This will only be declared upon
the finding that Aguete indeed gave
consent to the encumbrance of the
property.
2. No. The real estate mortgage is
valid. The documents disavowed by
Aguete are acknowledged before a
notary public, hence they are
public
documents.
Every
instrument duly acknowledged and
certified as provided by law may be
presented in evidence without
further proof, the certificate of
acknowledgment being prima facie
evidence of the execution of the
instrument or document involved.
The execution of a document that
has been ratified before a notary
public cannot be disproved by the
mere denial of the alleged signer.
PNB was correct when it stated that
petitioners omission to present
other
positive
evidence
to

substantiate their claim of forgery

was fatal to petitioners cause.
Petitioners did not present any
corroborating witness, such as a
handwriting expert, who could
authoritatively
declare
that
Aguetes signatures were really
forged.
3. No. The loan contracted by the
husband redounded to the benefit
of his family.The application for
loan shows that the loan would be
used exclusively for additional
working [capital] of buy & sell of
garlic & virginia tobacco. In her
testimony,Aguete confirmed that
Ros engaged in such business, but
claimed to be unaware whether it
prospered. Aguete was also aware
of loans contracted by Ros, but did
not know where he wasted the
money.Debts contracted by the
husband for and in the exercise of
the industry or profession by which
he contributes to the support of the
family cannot be deemed to be his
exclusive and private debts.If the
husband himself is the principal
obligor in the contract, i.e., he
directly received the money and
services to be used in or for his
own
business
or
his
own
profession, that contract falls
within the term x x x x obligations
for the benefit of the conjugal
partnership. Here, no actual
benefit may be proved. It is enough
that the benefit to the family is
apparent at the signing of the
contract. From the very nature of
the contract of loan or services, the
family stands to benefit from the
loan facility or services to be
rendered to the business or
profession of the husband. It is
immaterial, if in the end, his
business or profession fails or does
not succeed. Simply stated, where

the husband contracts obligations

on behalf of the family business,
the law presumes, and rightly so,
that such obligation will redound to
the
benefit of the
conjugal
partnership.
Held:
Petition denied. Decision of the CA is
affirmed.
Jovellanos v CA
G.R. No. 100728
June 18, 1992
Facts:
Sept. 2, 1955 - Daniel and Philamlife
entered into a Contract of lease and
conditional sale agreement over the a
property located at Philamlife Homes, QC.
During that time, he was married to
Leonor Dizon, who died on Jan. 2, 1959.
May 30, 1967 - Daniel married Annette.
Dec. 18, 1971 - Mercy, Daniel and Leonor's
daughter, married Gil Martinez. They built
a house on the back portion of the
premises, at the behest of Daniel.
Jan. 8, 1978 - Philamlife executed to
Daniel a Deed of Absolute Sale.
The next day, Daniel donated to his
children (petitioners) with Leonor all his
rights, title, and interests over the lot and
bungalow thereon.
Sept. 8, 1985 - Daniel died.
Annette filed a petition claiming that
said property was acquired by
husband while their marriage was
subsisting, which forms part of
conjugal property of the 2nd marriage.

the
her
still
the

Petitioners, on the other hand, contend

that the property were acquired by their
parents during the existence of the first
marriage.
RTC Decision:

1. declared Annette and her minor

children with Daniel as pro-indiviso owners
of the property
2. declared Gil and Mercy Martinez as the
exclusive owners of the 2-storey house at
the back of the said bungalow, with all the
rights vested in them as builders in good
faith
CA Decision: RTC decision affirmed
Issue: to which marriage does the
property belong to as conjugal property?
SC Decision: The said property belongs
to the second marriage, but also proclaims
that reimbursements should be made to
the children of the first marriage (in line
with ART 118 of the FC).
The contract entered into by Daniel and
Philamlife is specifically denominated as a
"Lease and Conditional Sale Agreement"
with a lease period of twenty years.
During the twenty-year period, Daniel had
only the right of possession over the
property. The lessor transfers merely the
temporary use and enjoyment of the thing
leased. Generally, ownership is transferred
upon delivery, however, the ownership
may still be with the seller until full
payment of the price is made.
Only at the time when the payments are
made in full will the deed of absolute sale
be given, entitling the buyer (Daniel) as
the true owner, rather than just having
inchoate rights to the property. The time
when he was able to pay the remaining
balance, he was already married to his
second wife, Annette, which makes the
said property as their conjugal property.
ART 118: any amount advanced by the
partnership or by either or both spouses
shall be reimbursed
Depriving the children from the first will be
unfair due to the fact that the lease was
contracted during the first marriage,
wherein a portion of the payment came
from.
Tarrosa v. De Leon, G.R. No. 185063,
July 23, 2009

FACTS: On July 20, 1965, Bonifacio De

Leon, then single, and the Peoples
Homesite and Housing Corporation (PHHC)
entered into a Conditional Contract to Sell
for the purchase on installment of a lot
situated in Quezon City. On April 24,
1968, Bonifacio married Anita de Leon.
They had two children, Danilo and Vilma.
On June 22, 1970, PHHC executed a Final
Deed of Sale in favor of Bonifacio upon full
payment of the price of the lot. TCT was
issued on February 24, 1972 in the name
of Bonifacio, single. On January 12,
1974, Bonifacio sold the lot to his sister,
Lita, and her husband, Felix Tarrosa. The
Deed of Sale did not bear the written
consent and signature of Anita. On
February 29, 1996, Bonifacio died.
Three months later, Tarrosa spouses
registered the Deed of Sale. Anita, Danilo,
and Vilma filed a reconveyance suit
allegeing that Bonifacio was still the owner
of the lands. Tarrosa spouses averred that
the lot Bonifacio sold to them was his
exclusive property because he was still
single when he acquired it from PHHC.
They further alleged that they were not
aware of the marriage between Bonifacio
and Anita at the time of the execution of
the Deed of Sale.
The RTC ruled in favor of Anita De Leon et
al stating that the lot in question was the
conjugal property of Bonifacio and Anita.
The CA affirmed the decision of the RTC.
Hence, this petition.
ISSUE: W/N the property that Bonifacio
has purchased on installment before the
marriage although some installments were
paid during the marriage would be
considered conjugal property
HELD: Yes. The subject lot which was once
owned by PHHC and covered by the
Conditional Contract to Sell was only
transferred during the marriage of
Bonifacio and Anita. The title to the

property was only passed to Bonifacio

after he had fully paid the purchase price
on June 22, 1970. This full payment was
made more than 2 years after his
marriage to Anita on April 24, 1968. In
effect, the property was acquired during
the existence of the marriage. Hence,
ownership to the property is presumed to
belong to the conjugal partnership.
Munoz v Ramirez
GR 156125
August 25, 2010
Topic: Improvements on CPG
Facts: Respondent-spouses mortgaged a
residential lot (which the wife inherited) to
the GSIS to secure a housing loan (200k).
Thereafter, they used the money loaned to
construct a residential house on said lot.
It is alleged that the petitioner Munoz
granted the spouses a 600k loan, which
the latter used to pay the debt to GSIS.
The balance of the loan (400k) will be
delivered by Munoz upon surrender of the
title over the property and an affidavit of
waiver of rights (over the property) to be
executed by the husband. While the
spouses were able to turn over the title,
no affidavit was signed by the husband.
Consequently, Munoz refused to give the
400k balance of the loan and since the
spouses could no longer return the 200k
(which was already paid to GSIS), Munoz
kept the title over the property and
subsequently, caused the issuance of a
new one in his own name.
The spouses then filed a case for the
annulment of the purported sale of the
property in favor of Munoz. The RTC ruled
that the property was the wifes exclusive
paraphernal property (since she inherited
it from her father) and as such, the sale is
valid even without the husbands consent.
The CA reversed and ruled that while the
property
was
originally
exclusive
paraphernal property of the wife, it
became conjugal property when it was
used as a collateral for a housing loan that
was paid through conjugal funds. Hence,
the sale is void.

ISSUE
(1):
Is
the
paraphernal or conjugal?

property

Held: PARAPHERNAL. As a general rule,

all property acquired during the marriage
is presumed to be conjugal unless the
contrary is proved. In this case, clear
evidence that the wife inherited the lot
from her father has sufficiently rebutted
this presumption of conjugal ownership.
Consequently, the residential lot is the
wifes exclusive paraphernal property
(pursuant to Article 92 and 109 of FC).
It was error for the CA to apply Article 158
of the CC and the ruling on CalimlimCanullas. True, respondents were married
during the effectivity of the CC and thus
its provisions should govern their property
relations. With the enactment of the FC
however, the provisions of the latter on
conjugal partnership of gains superseded
those of the CC. Thus, it is the FC that
governs the present case and not the CC.
And under Article 120 of the FC (which
supersedes Article 158 of the CC), when
the cost of the improvement and any
resulting increase in the value are more
than the value of the property at the time
of the improvement, the entire property
shall belong to the conjugal partnership,
subject to reimbursement; otherwise, the
property shall be retained in ownership by
the owner-spouse, likewise subject to
reimbursement
for
the
cost
of
improvement.

unusually inadequate; (b) vendor remains

in possession as lessee or otherwise; (c)
upon or after the expiration of the right to
repurchase, another instrument extending
the period of redemption is executed; (d)
purchase retains for himself a part of the
purchase price; (e) vendor binds himself to
pay the taxes on the thing sold; and, (f) in
any other case it may be fairly inferred
that the real intention of the parties is for
the transaction to secure the payment of a
debt.
In this case, considering that (a) the
spouses remained in possession of the
property (albeit as lessees thereof); (b)
MUNOZ retained a portion of the purchase
price (200k); (c) it was the spouses who
paid real property taxes on the property;
and, (d) it was the wife who secure the
payment of the principal debt with the
subject property the parties clearly
intended an equitable mortgage and not a
contract of sale.

G.R. No. L-51283 June 7, 1989

LOURDES
MARIANO, petitioner,
vs.
COURT
OF
APPEALS,
and
DANIEL
SANCHEZ, respondents.

In this case, the husband only paid a small

portion of the GSIS loan (60k). Thus, it is
fairly reasonable to assume that the value
of the residential lot is considerably more
than the contribution paid by the husband.
Thus, the property remained the exclusive
paraphernal property of the wife at the
time she contracted with MUNOZ; the
written consent of the husband was not
necessary.
ISSUE (2): Was the transaction a sale
or equitable mortgage?

The proceedings at bar concern (1) an

attempt by a married man to prevent
execution against conjugal property of a
judgment rendered against his wife, for
obligations incurred by the latter while
engaged in a business that had admittedly
redounded to the benefit of the family,
and (2) the interference by a court with
the proceedings on execution of a coequal or coordinate court. Both acts being
proscribed by law, correction is called for
and will hereby be effected.

Held: EQUITABLE MORTGAGE. Under

Article 1602 of the CC, a contract is
presumed an equitable mortgage when:
(a) price of sale with right to repurchase is

FACTS:

The proceedings originated from a suit

filed by Esther Sanchez against
Lourdes Mariano in the Court of First
Instance at Caloocan City, for
recovery of the value of ladies ready
made dresses allegedly purchased by
and delivered to the latter.
o

Rendered in favor of defendant

Mariano,
ordering
Veritas
Insurance
Company
(which
issued attachment bond) pay
Mariano full coverage 11k

Pending appeal by Sanchez,

Mariano filed a motion for
immediate execution

In virtue of the writ of

execution, Sheriff garnished the
11k from Veritas and levied real
and
personal
property
belonging to the conjugal
partnership of Esther and her
husband

Esthers petition for certiorari at

the CA was dismissed

appliances
and
utensils
necessarily used in the conjugal
dwelling, were exempt from
execution

CFI QC then issued an order to desist

from proceeding

Mariano instituted a special civil action

of certiorari with CA
o

CA ruled: that the Quezon City

Court had not interfered with
the execution process of the
Caloocan Court because Daniel
Sanchez's action in the former
court
raised
an
issue-the
validity of the sheriffs levy on
the conjugal partnership assets
of
the
Sanchez
spouses
different from those adjudicated
in the Caloocan Court, and
Sanchez was not a party to the
case tried by the latter.

Dismissed her petition

ISSUE:

Daniel Sanchez, Esthers husband, now

made his move
o

filed a complaint for annulment

of the execution in the Court of
First Instance at Quezon City
in his capacity as administrator
of the conjugal partnership

alleged that the conjugal assets

could not validly be made to
answer
for
obligations
exclusively contracted by his
wife, and that, moreover, some
of the personal property levied
on,
such
as
household

W/N the claim that property levied on in

execution of a judgment is not property of
the judgment debtor, Daniel Sanchezs
wife, but of the conjugal partnership of the
Sanchez Spouses

HELD:

In the case at bar, the husband of

the judgment debtor cannot be
deemed a stranger to the case
prosecuted and adjudged against
his wife

In
any
case,
whether
by
intervention in the court issuing the
writ, or by separate action, it is
unavailing
for
either
Esther
Sanchez or her husband, Daniel, to
seek preclusion of the enforcement
of the writ of possession against
their conjugal assets
For it being established, as
aforestated, that Esther had
engaged in business with her
husbands consent, and the
income derived therefrom had
been expended, in part at
least, for the support of her
family, the liability of the
conjugal assets to respond for
the wifes obligations in the
premises cannot be disputed
CA decision is reversed and set
aside

Ayala Investment & Development Corp

and Abelardo Magsajo vs CA an Sps.
Alferdo and Encarnacion Ching
GR 118305
February 12, 1998
Topic: Conjugal Property of Gains-Charges
upon and Obligations of CPG
Facts:
Alfredo Ching, former EVP of
Philippine Blooming Mills (PBM)
executed a security agreement
with herein petitioner when his
former
company
obtained
a
P50,300,000.00
loan
from
petitioner Ayala Investment and
Development Corporation (AIDC);
said agreement made him joint and
severally
answerable
to
the
companys debt.
However, due to PBMs failure to
pay the loan, AIDC filed a
complaint against both PBM and
Alfredo Ching.

Trial court ordered both defendants

to pay their debt to AIDC in the
amount of P50,300,000.00 with
interests; pending the appeal of the
judgment, RTC issued writ of
execution.
Thereafter, Magsajo, appointed
deputy sheriff, caused the issuance
and service upon respondent
spouses of the notice of sheriff sale
on 3 of their conjugal properties on
May 1982.
Respondent
spouses
filed
injunction against petitioners on
the ground that subject loan did
not redound to the benefit of the
said conjugal partnership. CA
issued a TRO enjoining lower court
from enforcing its order paving way
for the scheduled auction sale of
respondent
spouses
conjugal
properties;
Since,
only
AIDC
participated in the said bidding,
they got the property.
The following year AIDC filed for
the dismissal of the petition for
injunction arguing that the same
has already been moot and
academic upon the consummation
of the sale. They further pointed
our that by the wording in Art 161
of the NCC there is no need to
prove
that
actual
benefit
redounded to the benefit of the
partnership
as
long
as
the
transaction was entered into for
the
benefit of the
conjugal
partnership.Respondent filed their
opposition and after presenting
witnesses, the trial court declared
the sale on execution null and void.

Issue: WON the debt which the

husband entered alone considered for
the
benefit
of
the
conjugal
partnership which would make it
chargeable
against
the
conjugal
partnership
Ruling: No.
Contrary
to
the
petitioners
assertion, the Court clarified that
the terms redounded to the
benefit of or benefited from as
contemplated in Art 161 of the NCC

and Art 122(1) of the FC

respectively are one and the same.
The Court agreed in the decision of
the respondent court when they
ruled that the loan procured from
AIDC was for the advancement of
PBM and not for the benefit of the
conjugal partnership considering
that PBM has a distinct personality
from the family. And that the debt
is clearly a corporate debt and
AIDCs right of recourse against
Alfredo as surety is only to the
extent
of
his
corporate
stockholding and does not extend
to the CPG of the family.
It was also emphasized that in all
the courts decision involving the
accommodation of contracts, they
underscore the requirement that
there must be the requisite
showing advantages which clearly
accrued to the welfare of the
spouses or benefits to his family;
However, AIDC failed to satisfy this
evidentiary requirement.
The Court likewise agreed that the
proper law applicable to the case at
bar is the Family Code specifically
Art 122 (1) which explicitly states
that:
The payment for personal debt
contracted by the husband or the wife
before or during the marriage shall not
be charged to the conjugal partnership
except insofar as they redounded to
the benefit of the family
Said
provision
highlights
the
underlying concern of the law for the
conservation
of
the
conjugal
partnership.
Court was also of the view that no
matter how often an executive
acted or was persuaded to act, as
surety for his own employer, this
should not be taken to mean that
he had thereby embarked in the
business of guaranty.
ALFREDO CHING vs. THE HONORABLE
COURT OF APPEALS
Facts:

By virtue of a sale of a parcel of land to

Ching Leng Transfer Certificate of Title No.
91137 was issued on September 18, 1961.
On October 19, 1965, Ching Leng died in
Boston, Massachusetts, United States of
America. His legitimate son Alfredo Ching
filed with the Court of First Instance of
Rizal (now RTC) Branch III, Pasay City a
petition for administration of the estate of
deceased Ching Leng . Thirteen (13) years
after Ching Leng's death, a suit against
him was commenced on December 27,
1978 by private respondent Pedro Asedillo
for reconveyance of the abovesaid
property and cancellation of T.C.T. No.
91137 in his favor based on possession.
The RTC favored the Asedillo and the
decision was publish in a newspaper.
Issue:
Whether or not an action for reconveyance
of property and cancellation of title is
in personam, and if so, would a dead man
and/or his estate be bound by service of
summons and decision by publication.
Held:
An action to redeem, or to recover title to
or possession of, real property is not an
action in rem or an action against the
whole world, like a land registration
proceeding or the probate of a will; it is an
action in personam, so much so that a
judgment therein is binding only upon the
parties properly impleaded and duly heard
or given an opportunity to be heard.
Private
respondent's
action
for
reconveyance and cancellation of title
being in personam, the judgment in
question is null and void for lack of
jurisdiction over the person of the
deceased defendant Ching Leng. The real
purpose of the Torrens system is to quiet
title to land and to stop forever any
question as to its legality. Once a title is
registered, the owner may rest secure,
without the necessity of waiting in the

portals of the court, or sitting on the

"mirador su casa," to avoid the possibility
of losing his land (National Grains
Authority v. IAC, 157 SCRA 388 [1988]). A
Torrens title is generally a conclusive
evidence of the ownership of the land
referred to therein (Section 49, Act 496).
The instant petition is hereby GRANTED.
HOMEOWNERS SAVINGS & LOAN BANK vs.
MIGUELA
C.
DAILO
G.R. No. 153802. March 11, 2005
Charges upon and obligatins of conjugal
partnership.

The aforequoted provision does not qualify

with respect to the share of the spouse
who
makes
the
disposition
or
encumbrance in the same manner that the
rule on co-ownership under Article 493 of
the Civil Code does. Where the law does
not
distinguish,
courts
should
not
distinguish
DISMISSED

FACTS

provision of Article 124 of the Family Code,

in the absence of (court) authority or
written consent of the other spouse, any
disposition or encumbrance of the
conjugal property shall be void.

Spouses Dailo purchased a house

in San Pablo city.
Marcelo Dailo executed SPA to
Gesmundo authorizing to obtain
loan from petitioner in the amount
of 300k and executed as mortgage
above property without consent
and knowledge of respondent.
Upon maturity petitioner instituted
extrajudicial
foreclosure
proceedings. Certificate issued in
favour of petitioner as highest
bidder.
In the meantime Marcelo died.
Claiming
no
knowledge
of
mortgage,
his
wife
Miguela
instituted for Nullity of Mortgage
and Sale.
RTC and CA granted Miguelas
petition.

W/N Mortgage of Marcelino is valid to his

undivided share.
NO.
The basic and established fact is that
during his lifetime, without the knowledge
and consent of his wife, Marcelino Dailo, Jr.
constituted a real estate mortgage on the
subject property, which formed part of
their conjugal partnership. By express

Ayala Investment v Ca
February 12, 1998 (286 SCRA 272)
FACTS:
Philippine Blooming Mills (PBM) obtained
P50,300,000.00 loan from petitioner Ayala
Investment and Development Corporation
(AIDC). Respondent Alfredo Ching, EVP of
PBM, executed security agreements on
December 1980 and March 1981 making
him jointly and severally answerable with
PBMs indebtedness to AIDC. PBM failed to
pay the loan hence filing of complaint
against PBM and Ching. The RTC rendered
judgment ordering PBM and Ching to
jointly and severally pay AIDC the principal
amount with interests. Pending the appeal
of the judgment, RTC issued writ of
execution. Thereafter, Magsajo, appointed
deputy sheriff, caused the issuance and
service upon respondent spouses of the
notice of sheriff sale on 3 of their conjugal
properties on May 1982. Respondent
spouses filed injunction against petitioners
on the ground that subject loan did not
redound to the benefit of the said conjugal
partnership. CA issued a TRP enjoining
lower court from enforcing its order paving
way for the scheduled auction sale of
respondent spouses conjugal properties. A
certificate of sale was issued to AIDC,
being the only bidder and was registered
on July 1982.
ISSUE:
What debts and obligations contracted by
the husband alone are considered for the

benefit of the conjugal partnership which

are chargeable against the conjugal
partnership?
HELD
If the husband himself is the
principal obligor in the contract, i.e., he
directly received the money and services
to be used in or for his own business or his
own profession, that contract falls within
the term . . . . obligations for the benefit of
the conjugal partnership. Here, no actual
benefit may be proved. It is enough that
the benefit to the family is apparent at the
time of the signing of the contract. From
the very nature of the contract of loan or
services, the family stands to benefit from
the loan facility or services to be rendered
to the business or profession of the
husband. It is immaterial, if in the end, his
business or profession fails or does not
succeed. Simply stated, where the
husband contracts obligations on behalf of
the family business, the law presumes,
and rightly so, that such obligation will
redound to the benefit of the conjugal
partnership Is a surety agreement or an
accommodation contract entered into by
the husband in favor of his employer
within the contemplation of the said
provision?
On the other hand, if the money or
services are given to another person or
entity, and the husband acted only as a
surety or guarantor, that contract cannot,
by itself, alone be categorized as falling
within the context of obligations for the
benefit of the conjugal partnership. The
contract of loan or services is clearly for
the benefit of the principal debtor and not
for the surety or his family. No
presumption can be inferred that, when a
husband enters into a contract of surety or
accommodation agreement, it is for the
benefit of the conjugal partnership. Proof
must be presented to establish benefit
redounding to the conjugal partnership.
Alfredo Ching signed as surety for the
P50M loan contracted on behalf of PBM.
petitioner should have adduced evidence
to prove that Alfredo Chings acting as
surety redounded to the benefit of the
conjugal partnership.
The petitioners claim that the
benefits were: employment of Ching would

be prolonged, his shares would appreciate,

and it would enhance his career. However,
these are not the benefits contemplated
by Article 161 of the Civil Code. The
benefits must be one directly resulting
from the loan. It cannot merely be a byproduct or a spin-off of the loan itself.
In the second assignment of error,
the petitioner advances the view that
acting as surety is part of the business or
profession of the respondent-husband.
Signing as a surety is certainly not an
exercise of an industry or profession . The
court are likewise of the view that no
matter how often an executive acted or
was persuaded to act, as a surety for his
own employer, this should not be taken to
mean that he had thereby embarked in
the business of suretyship or guaranty.
*We do not agree with petitioners
that there is a difference between the
terms redounded to the benefit of or
benefited from on the one hand; and
for the benefit of on the other. They
mean one and the same thing. Article 161
(1) of the Civil Code and Article 121 (2) of
the Family Code are similarly worded, i.e.,
both use the term for the benefit of. On
the other hand, Article 122 of the Family
Code provides that The payment of
personal debts by the husband or the wife
before or during the marriage shall not be
charged to the conjugal partnership
except insofar as they redounded to the
benefit of the family. As can be seen, the
terms are used interchangeably.
ARTICLE 105 Conjugal Partnership of
Gains (What is excluded?)
Security Bank and Trust Company,
petitioner v. Mar Tierra Corporation,
Wilfredo Martinez, Miguel Lacson and
Ricardo Lopa, respondents
PONENTE: Corona, J.
FACTS:

On May 7, 1980, Mar Tierra

Corporation
through
its
president, Wilfredo Martinez,
applied for a P12M credit
accommodation with Security
Bank and Trust Company, which
the bank approved.

On July 2, 1980, the credit line

was increased to P14M and
Martinez, Lacson and Lopa
executed a new Indemnity
Agreement in favour of the
bank.
On September 25, 1981, Mar
Tierra Corp availed of the credit
line and received the sum of
P9,952,000, which it undertook
to pay on November 30, 1981.
It was able to pay P4,648,000 of
the principal and over P2.7M on
interest and other charges. The
corporation was not able to pay
the balance because it suffered
a loss and eventually closed
operations in 1984.
Security Bank filed a complaint
for the sum of money with
prayer for attachment against
the respondent corporation and
individual
respondents.
Security Bank subsequently
dismissed the case with respect
to Lacson and Lopa leaving
Martinez as the remaining
individual respondent.
On August 10, 1982, the RTC
issued a writ of attachment on
the real and personal property
of
Mar
Tierra
Corp
and
Martinez. As a consequence,
the
conjugal
dwelling
of
Wilfredo and Josefina Martinez
in Caloocan City was levied on.
On June 20, 194, RTC held that
Mar Tierra Corp and Martinez
are jointly and severally liable
to Security Bank the amount of
P5,304,000 plus 12% interest
and 5% penalty starting June
21, 1982, plus attorneys fees.
It however found that the
obligation
contracted
by
Martinez did not redound to the
benefit of his family, hence, it
ordered the lifting of the
attachment on the conjugal
home of Martinez.
Security Bank filed an appeal
but CA affirmed RTCs decision,
hence,
this
petition
for
certiorari.

ISSUE:

HELD:

RATIO:

Whether or not the conjugal

property/dwelling of Wilfredo
Martinez can be attached by
Security Bank against the
unpaid credit line obtained by
Mar Tierra Corporation, secured
by an Indemnity Agreement
(surety or guaranty) signed by
Wilfredo Martinez.
No,
the
conjugal
property/dwelling of Wilfredo
Martinez cannot be attached by
Security Bank against the
unpaid credit line.
If the money or services are given
to another party or entity and the
husband acted only as a surety or
guarantor, the transaction cannot
by itself be deemed an obligation
for the benefit of the conjugal
partnership. It is for the benefit of
the principal debtor and not for the
surety
or
his
family.
No
presumption is raised that, when a
husband enters into a contract of
surety
or
accommodation
agreement, it is for the benefit of
the conjugal partnership.
Proof
must be presented to establish the
benefit redounding to the conjugal
partnership. In the absence of any
showing of benefit received by it,
the conjugal partnership cannot be
held liable on an indemnity
agreement
executed
by
the
husband to accommodate a third
party/entity
(Mar
Tierra
Corporation).
To hold the conjugal partnership
liable for an obligation pertaining to
the husband alone defeats the
objective of the Civil Code to
protect the solidarity and well
being of the family as a unit. The
underlying concern of the law is the
conservation
of
the
conjugal
partnership. Hence, it limits the
liability of the conjugal partnership
only to debt and obligations
contracted by the husband for the
benefit of the conjugal partnership.


COSTUNA v. DOMONDON

[G.R. No. 82753]

[December 19, 1989]
TOPIC:
Charges
upon
obligations of CPG without consent

and

RESPONDENT:
Laureana Domondon
(Presiding Judge, QC RTC); CA Presiding
Justices

PETITIONER: Estela Costuna

PONENTE:

Sarmiento, J.

FACTS:

Spouses Amadeo and Estela Costuna

acquired three parcels of land during
theirmarriage.
1976: Aged 68, Amadeo made his last
will and testament. After this, Amadeo
and Estela were beset with marital
problems.
1977: Amadeo sustained third degree
burns and had to be treated in
different
hospitals.
His
relatives
requested that he be brought to his
hometown in Samar because his
signatures are needed (re: his other
properties there). Amadeo never
returned to his wife Estela, despite
demand, even a petition for habeas
corpus.
Amadeo filed a petition for the
partition of properties, with the
Juvenile Domestic and Relations Court.
Because he failed to get Estelas
consent to the partition despite
repeated demands/requests, Amadeo
was constrained to sell half of the
undetermined portion of the conjugal
property, without the wifes consent. It
was sold to Laureana Domondon.
1978: Amadeo died.

Estela instituted a special proceeding

for the allowance of Amadeos Will.
However, Domondon opposed it,
claiming that half of the conjugal
property was already sold to her by
Amadeo prior to his death. The probate
court did not rule on this, but it
allowed the will.
Domondon filed a case with the RTC to
compel Estela to comply with the Deed
of Sale executed by Amadeo before his
death, that is, to convey to Domond on
the properties already sold to her. The
RTC ruled in favour of Domondon.
Estela appealed to the CA, but the CA
ruled the same. Ergo, the present
case.
Estela argues that the sale of the half
of the conjugal properties (not
yetdetermined
what
properties
because the Court was not able to
proceed with the partition due to lack
of Estelas consent) was prejudicial to
her rights as sole heir of Amadeo and
as spouse.

ISSUE(S):
7. W/N the sale of 1/2 of the conjugal
property by Amadeo is valid without
Estelas consent
8. W/N the CPG should be made liable for
the payment of the hospital and
medicalexpenses of Amadeo who
allegedly abandoned the conjugal
home and his wife
RULING:
(insert Dispositive portion
here; e.g. Petition DENIED / x is
DISBARRED / x is SUSPENDED)
3. The sale is valid
As a general rule, the other
spouses consent is necessary.
However, in this case, the consent
of
Estela
was
unreasonably
withheld by her. The Court is
constrained
to
relax
the
application of the law, and
consider the sale fallingwithin the
legal exceptions to the general
rule.

The Court cannot overlook

the vital fact that Amadeo
executed a lastwill and
testament
designating
Estela as his sole heir. In
thisconnection,
we
find
merit
in
Damondon's
assertion
that
no
othermotive
could
be
attributed to Estela but her
greed.
4. CPG is liable
NCC 161 (now FC 121) provides
that the conjugal partnership shall
be
liable forall
debts
and
obligations contracted by the
husband
for
the
benefit
of
theconjugal partnership, and those
contracted by the wife, also for the
samepurpose, in the cases where
she
may
legally
bind the
partnership.
o In this case, the shares of
Amadeo was sold by him to
cover
thehospitalization,
medical and other expenses
necessary
for
his
survival.He was old and
gravely
ill.
His
other
relatives in Samar are also
notthat well in financial
resources
o The health and well-being of
both or either of the
spouseswould
undeniably
redound to the benefit of
their
conjugalpartnership.
The advancement of the
interests
of
the
conjugalpartnership
depends in great measure
on the soundness of the
body
and
mind
of the
partners.
o Ergo, the cost of the
hospitalization of Amadeo is
chargeable to the CPG, it
being to the benefit of their
conjugal partnership
o

Villanueva Vs Chiong
G.R. No. 159889 June 5, 2008

Issue: Whether or not the property is an

exclusive lot of Florentino or a conjugal
property and was the sale of the property
valid without the consent of Elisera?
Facts of the case: Florentino and Elisera
Chiong were married since Jan 1960 but
were separated in 1975. During their
marriage, they acquired a certain lot.
During their marriage, they acquired Lot
No. 997-D-1 situated at Poblacion, Dipolog
City and covered by Transfer Certificate of
Title (TCT) No. (T-19393)-2325, issued by
the Registry of Deeds of Zamboanga del
Norte. Sometime in 1985, Florentino sold
the one-half western portion of the lot to
Walter and Aurora Villanueva for P8,000,
payable
in
installments.
Thereafter,
Florentino
allowed
petitioners
to
occupy the lot and build a store, a shop,
and a house thereon. Shortly after their
last installment payment on December 13,
1986,
the
Villanuevas
petitioners
demanded from the Chiongs the execution
of a deed of sale in their favor. Elisera,
however, refused to sign a deed of sale.
RTC-Dipolog City annulled the deed of
absolute
sale
and
demanded
the
petitioners to vacate the lot and remove
all the improvements that they have
introduced. CA affirmed the RTC decision.
The CA decision was appealed to the SC.
Decision:
The SC stated that the
petitioners' contention that the lot belongs
exclusively to Florentino because of his
separation in fact from his wife, Elisera, at
the time of sale dissolved their property
relations, is bereft of merit. Respondents'
separation in fact neither affected the
conjugal nature of the lot nor prejudiced
Elisera's interest over it. Under Article
178 of the Civil Code, the separation in
fact between husband and wife without
judicial approval shall not affect the
conjugal partnership. The lot retains its
conjugal nature. The SC added that under
Article 160 of the Civil Code, all property
acquired by the spouses during the
marriage is presumed to belong to the
conjugal partnership of gains; unless it is
proved that it pertains exclusively to the
husband or to the wife. Petitioners' mere
insistence as to the lot's supposed
exclusive
nature
is
insufficient
to

overcome such presumption when taken

against all the evidence for respondents.
The SC held that applying Article 166, the
consent of both Elisera and Florentino is
necessary for the sale of a conjugal
property to be valid. In this case, the
requisite consent of Elisera was not
obtained when Florentino verbally sold the
lot in 1985 and executed the Deed of
Absolute Sale on May 13, 1992.
Accordingly, the contract entered by
Florentino is annullable at Elisera's
instance, during the marriage and within
ten years from the transaction questioned,
conformably with Article 173. Fortunately,
Elisera timely questioned the sale when
she filed Civil Case No. 4383 on July 5,
1991, perfectly within ten years from the
date of sale and execution of the deed.
Petitioners
contend
that,
assuming arguendo the property is still
conjugal, the transaction should not be
entirely voided as Florentino had one-half
share over the lot. Petitioners' stance
lacks merit. In Heirs of Ignacia AguilarReyes v. Mijares citing Bucoy v. Paulino, et
al., a case involving the annulment of sale
executed by the husband without the
consent of the wife, it was held that the
alienation must be annulled in its entirety
and not only insofar as the share of the
wife in the conjugal property is concerned.
Although the transaction in the said case
was declared void and not merely
voidable, the rationale for the annulment
of the whole transaction is the same.
Because the property is conjugal, consent
of the spouse is needed before the other
spouse can alienate the property. The
contract was annulled and the petitioners
were asked to return to the respondents
the land with its fruits and respondents
were asked to return the sum of P8,000
with legal interest.

Ravina vs. Abrille

Facts:

Respondent Mary Ann Abrille and

Abrile are husband and wife having
four children, all parties in the
case.

1982: Spouses acquired a 555

square meter parcel of land a Lot 7
Kamuning St. Juna Subdivision,
Matina, Davao City covered in TCT
(transfer ertificate of title) T-88674.
Said lot was adjacent to the lot
Pedro Abrille bought when e was
still single registered in his name
TCT No. T-26471.
Through joint efforts and from a
loan from Bank of the Philippines,
spouses were able to build a house
on both lots. They continued to
build
improvements
eventually
building a poultry house and an
annex.
1991: Pedro got himself a mistress
and started neglecting his family. In
effect, Mary Ann was forced to sell
or mortgage their movables to
support family and continuance of
studies of their children.
Pedro, alone in the transaction with
petitioners offered both lots for sale
to them. Mary Ann objected and
addressed this to the petitioners
but Pedro Abrille still pushed
through with the Selling of the
properties.
Pedro was able to sell said lots
without Anns consent supported
by a deed of sale dated June 21,
1991. It also appears on the said
deed hat Mary Ann did not sign on
top of her name.
One day, when Mary Ann was out
and the children were in school,
Pedro along with armed members
of the Civilian Armed Forces
Geographical Unit in connivance to
petitioners
transferred
the
belongings of Mary Ann to an
apartment.
Upon coming home, Mary Anne and
her daughter were prevented from
going into the said properties. They
waited outside until the evening
and eventually rained. They went

to the police station only to be

denied of help saying that the
police are not in a position to
intervene in regard of a family
matter. Mary Ann contends that
one of her children was greatly
affected by the situation so much
that the child flunked in school.
Mary Ann filed a complaint of
Annulment
of
Sale,
Specific
Performance,
Damages
and
Attorneys Fees with Preliminary
Mandatory Injunction[7] against
Pedro and herein petitioners (the
Ravinas) in the RTC of Davao City.

On Sept. 26, 1995, RTC ruled in

favour of the respondent rendering
the following:
1.The sale of lot 8 covered by TCT No.
26471
by
defendant
Abrille
appearing in the Deed of Sale marked
as Exh. E is void as to one half or
277.5 square meters representing the
share of plaintiff Mary Villa Abrille.
2. That sale of Lot 7 covered by TCT
No. [88674] by defendant Pedro Villa
Abrille in the Deed of Sale (Exh. A)
is valid as to one half or 277.5 square
meters of the 555 square meters as
one half belongs to defendant Pedro
Abrille but it is void as to the other half
or 277.5 square meters as it belongs to
plaintiff Mary Abrille who did not sell
her share nor give her consent to the
sale.
3. That sale of the house mentioned in
the Deed of Sale (Exh. A) is valid
as far as the one half of the house
representing the share of defendant
Abrille is concerned but void as to the
other half which is the share of plaintiff
Mary Abrille because she did not give
her consent/sign the said sale.
4. The defendants shall jointly pay the
plaintiffs.
4. A. Seventeen Thousand Pesos
(P17,000.00) representing the value of the
movables and belonging[s] that were lost
when unknown men unceremoniously and
without their knowledge and consent
removed their movables from their house
and brought them to an apartment.

4. B. One Hundred Thousand Pesos (P

100,000.00) to plaintiff Mary Abrille as
moral damages.
4.
C.
Fifty
Thousand
Pesos
(P50,000.00) to each of the four children
as moral damages, namely:
a) Ingrid Villa Abrille Fifty Thousand
Pesos (P50,000.00), b) Ingremark Villa
Abrille

Fifty
Thousand
Pesos
(P50,000.00), c) Ingresoll Villa Abrille
Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) and
d) Ingrelyn Villa Abrille Fifty Thousand
Pesos (P50,000.00).
5. Ten Thousand Pesos (P10,000.00) as
exemplary damages by way of
example and correction for the public
good.
6. The costs of suit.

The CA on appeal, modified the

decision.
1. The sale of lot covered by TCT No.
26471 in favor of defendants spouses
Wilfredo and Patrocinia Ravina is
declared valid.
2. The sale of lot covered by TCT No.
88674 in favor of said defendants
spouses Ravina, together with the
house thereon, is declared null and
void.
3. Defendant Pedro Abrille is ordered
to return the value of the consideration
for the lot covered by TCT No. 88674
and the house thereon to codefendants spouses Ravina.
4. Defendants spouses Ravina [a]re
ordered to reconvey the lot and house
covered by TCT No. 88674 in favor of
spouses Pedro and Mary Villa Abrille
and to deliver possession to them.
5. Plaintiffs are given the option to
exercise their rights under Article [450]
of the New Civil Code with respect to
the improvements introduced by
defendant spouses Ravina.
6. Defendants Pedro Villa Abrille and
spouses Ravina are ordered to pay
jointly and severally the plaintiffs as
follows:
a) One Hundred Thousand Pesos
(P100,000.00) to plaintiff Mary Villa Abrille
as moral damages.
b) Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00)
as moral damages to each of the four
children, namely: Ingrid Villa Abrille,

Ingremark Villa Abrille, Ingresoll Villa

Abrille and Ingrelyn Villa Abrille.
c) Ten Thousand (P10,000.00) as
exemplary damages by way of
example and correction for the public
good.
Issue:
1. W/N the subject property covered
by TCT NO. 88674 is an exclusive
property of Pedro or conjugal
property
2. W/N its sale by Pedro was valid
considering the absence of Mary
Anns consent
3. W/N petitioners are buyers in good
faith
4. W/N
the
decision
awarding
damages to respondents is not
supported by evidence onrecord.
Ratio:
1. No. The property is not the
exclusive
property
of
Pedro.
Allegedly, Pedro and her sister
Carmelita agreed to exchange their
exclusive lots T-26479 and T26472.
Pedro was able to sell T-26472 to
Francisco The Ting and purchased
Carmelitas property from the
proceeds of sale. A new title of
T88674 was issued. Petitioners
insist that said property be an
exclusive
property
of
Pedro.
However, Art. 160 states: All
property of the marriage is
presumed to belong to the conjugal
partnership; unless it be proved
that it pertains exclusively to the
husband or to the wife. The lot
covered by T88674 was acquired in
1982 during the marriage of Pedro
and Mary Ann. No evidence was
presented to prove that subject
property was purchased through
exchange
or
barter.
The
presumption of the conjugal nature
of the property subsists in the
absence of clear, satisfactory and
convincing evidence to overcome
said presumption or to prove that
the subject property is exclusively

owned by Pedro. Petitioners bare

assertion would not suffice to
overcome the presumption that
TCT No. T-88674, acquired during
the marriage of Pedro and Mary
Ann, is conjugal. Likewise, the
house built thereon is conjugal
property, having been constructed
through the joint efforts of the
spouses, who had even obtained a
loan from DBP to construct the
house.
2. No. The sale of Pedro was not valid.
Since the sale happened in 1991,
the Family Cod shall be applied in
this case. Art. 124 states that:
The administration and enjoyment
of
the
conjugal
partnership
property shall belong to both
spouses
jointly.
In
case
of
disagreement,
the
husbands
decision shall prevail, subject to
recourse to the court by the wife
for proper remedy which must be
availed of within five years from
the
date
of
the
contract
implementing such decision.
In the event that one spouse is
incapacitated
or
otherwise
unable to participate in the
administration of the conjugal
properties, the other spouse
may assume sole powers of
administration. These powers
do not include the powers of
disposition or encumbrance
which must have the authority
of the court or the written
consent of the other spouse. In
the
absence
of
such
authority or consent, the
disposition or encumbrance
shall be void. However, the
transaction shall be construed
as a continuing offer on the part
of the consenting spouse and
the third person, and may be
perfected as a binding contract
upon the acceptance by the
other spouse or authorization
by the court before the offer is
withdrawn by either or both
offerors.
Hence, just like the rule in absolute
community of property, if the

husband, without knowledge and

consent of the wife, sells conjugal
property, such sale is void. If the
sale was with the knowledge but
without the approval of the wife,
thereby
resulting
in
a
disagreement,
such
sale
is
annullable at the instance of the
wife is given five years from the
date of the contract implementing
the decision of the husband to
institute the case. Mary Ann timely
filed the action for annulment of
sale within five years.
3. No. Petitioners are not buyers in
good faith. A purchaser in good
faith is one who buys the property
of another without notice that
some other person has a right to,
or interest in, such property and
pays a full and fair price for the
same at the time of such purchase,
or before he has notice of the claim
or interest of some other person in
the property but for a person
dealing with land registered in the
name of and occupied by the seller
whose capacity to sell is restricted,
such as by Articles 166 and 173 of
the Civil Code or Article 124 of
the Family Code, he must show
that he inquired into the latters
capacity to sell in order to establish
himself as a buyer for value in
good faith. In the said case,
petitioners knew that at the time of
the sale, Mary Ann did not consent
to the selling as they were apprised
by the lawyer of Mary Ann. They
knew at the time also that Mary
Ann did not conform to the deed of
sale.
4. No. It is supported by evidence. In
Civil Law, Every person must, in
the exercise of his rights and in the
performance of his duties act with
justice, give everyone his due, and
observe honesty and good faith.
When such right is exercised in a
manner that is not within the legal
norms, there is a legal wrong in
which the wrong doer must pay for
its damages. The manner the
family of Mary Ann was removed
from their house is contrary to

morals, good customs or policy and

petitioner as the wrongdoer must
pay for is damages.
Held:
Petition denied. Decision of CA is
affirmed.
Fuentes v Roca
GR No. 178902
April 21, 2010
Facts:
- Oct 11, 1982, Tarciano Roca bought a
358-square meter lot in Zambales from his
mother, Sabina.
- Six years later in 1988, Tarciano offered
to sell the lot to the petitioners Manuel
and Leticia Fuentes spouses through the
help of Atty. Plagata, who would prepare
the documents and requirements to
complete the sale.
- In the agreement, there will be a P60,000
down-payment and a P140,000, which will
be paid upon the removal of certain
structures on the land and after obtaining
the consent of Tarcianos estranged wife,
Rosario.
- Since Tarciano and Rosario had been
estranged spouses already and the latter
was already living in Manila and the
former still in Zamboanga, the lawyer thus
went to complete such tasks and claimed
that he went to see Rosario in on of his
trips in Manila and had her sign an
affidavit of consent, and had such
notarized in Zamboanga City.
- Jan. 11, 1989, Tarciano executed a deed
of absolute sale in favor of Fuentes
spouses and a new title was issue in their
name, who immediately constructed a
building on the lot.
- Eight years later in 1997, the children of
Tarciano and Rosario filed a case to annul
the sale and to reconvey the property on
the ground that the sale was void since
Rosario did not give her consent to it and
that her signature on the affidavit was
forged.
RTC Decision: Dismissed.

> The action had already prescribed since

the ground cited by the Rocas for
annulling the sale, forgery or fraud,
already prescribed under Art. 1391 of the
Civil Code, 4 years after its discovery.
Rocas filed their action in 1997, almost
nine years after the title was issued to the
Fuentes spouses on January 18, 1989.
> Rocas failed to present clear and
convincing evidence of the fraud. Mere
variance in the signatures of Rosario was
not conclusive proof of forgery.
> Atty. Plagatas defective notarization of
the affidavit of consent did not invalidate
the sale. The law does not require spousal
consent to be on the deed of sale to be
valid.
CA Decision: RTC decision reversed.
> CA found sufficient evidence of forgery
and did not give credence to Atty.
Plagatas testimony that he saw Rosario
sign the document in Quezon City. Its jurat
said differently.
> the property relations were governed by
the Civil Code under which an action for
annulment of sale on the ground of lack of
spousal consent may be brought by the
wife during the marriage within 10 years
from the transaction. Consequently, the
action that the Rocas, her heirs, brought in
1997 fell within 10 years of the January
11, 1989 sale.
> Considering that the sale between the
parties was merely voidable, Fuentes
spouses are entitled to reimbursement.
Issues:
1. Whether or not Rosarios signature on
the document of consent to her husband
Tarcianos sale of their conjugal land to the
Fuentes spouses was forged;
2. Whether or not the Rocas action for the
declaration of nullity of that sale to the
spouses already prescribed; and
3. Whether or not only Rosario, the wife
whose consent was not had, could bring
the action to annul that sale.

SC Decision:
1. Yes. Rosarios signature strokes on the
affidavit appears heavy, deliberate, and
forced. Her specimen signatures, on the

other hand, are consistently of a lighter

stroke and more fluid. The way the letters
"R" and "s" were written is also
remarkably different. The variance is
obvious even to the untrained eye. Also,
Atty. Plagata admittedly falsified the jurat
of the affidavit of consent. That jurat
declared that Rosario swore to the
document and signed it in Zamboanga
City on January 11, 1989 when, as Atty.
Plagata testified, she supposedly signed it
about four months earlier at her residence
in Paco, Manila on September 15, 1988.
While a defective notarization will merely
strip the document of its public character
and reduce it to a private instrument, that
falsified jurat, taken together with the
marks of forgery in the signature, dooms
such document as proof of Rosarios
consent to the sale of the land. That the
Fuentes spouses honestly relied on the
notarized affidavit as proof of Rosarios
consent does not matter. The sale is still
void without an authentic consent.
2. Contrary to the ruling of the Court of
Appeals, the law that applies to this case
is the Family Code, not the Civil Code.
Although Tarciano and Rosario got married
in 1950, Tarciano sold the conjugal
property to the Fuentes spouses on
January 11, 1989, a few months after the
Family Code took effect on August 3,
1988.
In contrast to Article 173 of the Civil Code,
Article 124 of the Family Code does not
provide a period within which the wife who
gave no consent may assail her husbands
sale of the real property. It simply provides
that without the other spouses written
consent or a court order allowing the sale,
the same would be void. Under the
provisions of the Civil Code governing
contracts, a void or inexistent contract has
no force and effect from the very
beginning. And this rule applies to
contracts that are declared void by
positive provision of law, as in the case of
a sale of conjugal property without the
other spouses written consent. A void
contract is equivalent to nothing and is
absolutely wanting in civil effects. It
cannot be validated either by ratification
or prescription. But, although a void

contract has no legal effects even if no

action is taken to set it aside, when any of
its terms have been performed, an action
to declare its inexistence is necessary to
allow restitution of what has been given
under it. This action, according to Article
1410 of the Civil Code does not prescribe.
Here, the Rocas filed an action against the
Fuentes spouses in 1997 for annulment of
sale and reconveyance of the real property
that Tarciano sold without their mothers
(his wifes) written consent. The passage
of time did not erode the right to bring
such an action.
3. No. The sale was void from the
beginning.
Consequently,
the
land
remained the property of Tarciano and
Rosario despite that sale. When the two
died, they passed on the ownership of the
property to their heirs, namely, the Rocas.
As lawful owners, the Rocas had the right,
under Article 429 of the Civil Code, to
exclude any person from its enjoyment
and disposal.
In fairness to the Fuentes spouses,
however, they should be entitled, among
other things, to recover from Tarcianos
heirs, the Rocas, the P200,000.00 that
they paid him, with legal interest until fully
paid, chargeable against his estate.
People v. Lagrimas, G.R. No. L-25355,
August 28, 1969
FACTS: Froilan Lagrimas was charged for
the murder of Pelagio Cagro. Thereafter,
the heirs of Cagro filed a motion for the
issuance of a writ of preliminary
attachment on the property of the
accused, which was granted. Lagrimas
was convicted and sentenced to suffer the
penalty of reclusion perpetua and to
indemnify the appellants. The judgment
became final. The lower court issued a
writ of execution to cover the civil
indemnity. A levy was had on 11 parcels of
land declared for tax purposes in the
name of the accused and the sale thereof
at public auction was scheduled. However,

the wife of the accused, Mercedes

Lagrimas, filed a petition to quash the said
attachment contending that the property
belonged to the conjugal partnership and
could not be held liable for pecuniary
indemnity the husband was required to
pay. Her petition was granted. Another
judge set aside the said order. But upon
Mercedes
filing
a
motion
for
reconsideration, a third judge revived the
original order, declaring such attachment
and the writ of execution thereafter issued
null and void.
ISSUE: WON properties from the conjugal
properties of Mercedes and Froilan can be
held liable for the pecuniary indemnity
incurred by the latter.
HELD: Yes. Fines and indemnities imposed
upon either husband or wife may be
enforced against the partnership assets
after the responsibilities enumerated in
article 161 have been covered, if the
spouse who is bound should have no
exclusive property or if it should be
insufficient; xxx.
It is quite plain, therefore, that the period
during which such a liability may be
enforced presupposes that the conjugal
partnership is still existing for the law
speaks of partnership assets. That upon
complying
with
the
responsibilities
enumerated in article 161, the fines and
indemnities imposed upon a party of the
conjugal partnership will be satisfied.
GUIANG v CA
GR. No. 125172
June 26, 1998
Facts: Gilda Corpuz and Judie Corpuz are
legally married spouses. The spouses has
3 children.
The Corpuz couple, with plaintiff-wife Gilda
Corpuz as vendee, bought a lot located in
South Cotabato, and particularly from
Manuel Callejo who signed as vendor
through a conditional deed of sale.
Later, the Corpuz spouses sold one-half
portion of their Lot spouses Guiang. The

latter have since then occupied the onehalf portion [and] built their house thereon
.They are thus adjoining neighbors of the
Corpuzes.
Gilda left for Manila trying to look for work
abroad and her departure was with the
consent of her husband. She was not able
to go abroad though. She stayed for
sometime in Manila.
After his wifes departure for Manila,
defendant Judie seldom went home to the
conjugal dwelling. Sometime in 1990,
Harriet Corpuz learned that her father
intended to sell the remaining one-half
portion including their house, of their
homelot to defendants Guiangs. She wrote
a letter to her mother informing her. She
[Gilda Corpuz] replied that she was
objecting to the sale. Harriet, however, did
not inform her father about this; but
instead gave the letter to Mrs. Luzviminda
Guiang so that she [Guiang] would advise
her father
However, in the absence of his wife Gilda
defendant Judie pushed through the sale
of the remaining one-half portion. He sold
to defendant Luzviminda Guiang thru a
document known as Deed of Transfer of
Rights the remaining one-half portion of
their lot and the house standing
.Transferor Judie Corpuzs children Junie
and Harriet signed the document as
witness.
Four (4) days, obviously to cure whatever
defect in defendant Judie title over the lot
transferred, defendant Luzviminda Guiang
as vendee executed another agreement
over the lot , this time with Manuela
Jimenez Callejo, a widow of the original
registered owner from whom the Corpuz
spouses originally bought the lot , who
signed as vendor . Judie signed as a
witness to the sale. The new sale
described the lot differently but it is
obvious from the mass of evidence that
the correct lot is the very lot earlier sold to
the corpus spouses.
Plaintiff then returned home. She found
her
children
staying
with
other
households. Only Junie was staying in their
house. Gilda gathered her children
together and stayed at their house. Her
husband was nowhere to be found. She
was informed by her children that their
father had a wife already.

For staying in their house sold by her

husband, plaintiff was complained against
by defendant Luzviminda Guiang and her
husband before the Barangay authorities
for trespassing. The parties thereat signed
a
document
known
as
amicable
settlement. In full, the settlement
provides for, to wit:
That respondent, Mrs. Gilda Corpuz and
her three children, namely: Junie, Hariet
and Judie to leave voluntarily the house of
Mr. and Mrs. Antonio Guiang, where they
are presently boarding without any
charge, on or before April 7, 1990
Believing that she had received the
shorter end of the bargain, Gilda went to
the Barangay Captain to question her
signature on the amicable settlement. She
was referred however to the Office-InCharge at the time, and the latter in turn
told her that he could not do anything on
the matter.
This particular point not rebutted. The
Barangay Captain who testified did not
deny that Mrs. Gilda Corpuz approached
him for the annulment of the settlement.
We thus conclude that Mrs. Corpuz really
approached the Barangay Captain for the
annulment of the settlement. Annulment
not having been made, plaintiff stayed put
in her house and lot.
Defendant-spouses Guiang followed thru
the amicable settlement with a motion for
the execution of the amicable settlement,
filing the same with the MTC of Koronadal.
The proceedings [are] still pending before
the said court, with the filing of the instant
suit.
As a consequence of the sale, the spouses
Guiang spent for the preparation of the
Deed of Transfer of Rights, as the amount
they paid to Mrs. Manuela Callejo, having
assumed the remaining obligation of the
Corpuzes to Mrs. Callejo and expenses
particularly the taxes and other expenses
towards the transfer of the title to the
spouses Guiangs were incurred for the
whole lot.
Private Respondent Gilda Corpuz filed an
Amended
Complainant
against
her
husband Judie and Petitioner-Spouses
Guiang. The said Complaint sought the
declaration of a certain deed of sale,
which involved the conjugal property of

private respondent and her husband, null

and void.
The trial court rendered a judgment is
rendered for Gilda and against the
defendants therein, declaring both the
Deed of Transfer of Rights amicable
settlement as null void and of no effect;
Recognizing as lawful and valid the
ownership and possession of plaintiff Gilda
over the remaining one-half portion of
subject lot 9; and ordering plaintiff Gilda to
reimburse defendants Luzviminda Guiang
the amount corresponding to the payment
made by defendants Guiangs to Manuel
Callejo for the unpaid balance of the
account of plaintiff in favor of Manuel
Callejo.
Dissatisfied, petitioners-spouses filed an
appeal with the CA. Respondent Court
affirmed the decision of the trial court
Reconsideration was similarly denied by
the same court, hence this petition.
ISSUE:
1.
WON the assailed Deed of Transfer
of Rights was a void or a voidable contract
2.
WON
the
execution
of
the
amicable settlement can validly rectify
the defect in the assailed Deed of Transfer
of Rights
HELD:
1.
VOID CONTRACT.
The Guiang spouses allege that absence
of Gildas consent merely rendered the
Deed voidable under Article 1390 of the
Civil Code, which provides:
Art. 1390. The following contracts are
voidable or annullable, even though there
may have been no damage to the
contracting parties
(2) Those where the consent is vitiated by
mistake, violence, intimidation, undue
influence or fraud.
These contracts are binding, unless they
are annulled by a proper action in court.
They are susceptible of ratification.(n)
The error in petitioners contention is
evident. Article 1390, par. 2, refers to
contracts visited by vices of consent, i.e.,
contracts which were entered into by a
person whose consent was obtained and
vitiated
through
mistake,
violence,
intimidation, undue influence or fraud. In
this
instance,
private
respondents
consent to the contract of sale of their

conjugal property was totally inexistent or

absent.
The said contract properly falls within the
ambit of Article 124 of the Family Code,
which was correctly applied by the lower
court:
Art.
124.
The
administration
and
enjoyment of the conjugal partnership
properly shall belong to both spouses
jointly. In case of disagreement, the
husbands decision shall prevail, subject
recourse to the court by the wife for
proper remedy, which must be availed of
within five years from the date of the
contract implementing such decision.
In the event that one spouse is
incapacitated or otherwise unable to
participate in the administration of the
conjugal properties, the other spouse may
assume sole powers of administration.
These powers do not include the powers of
disposition or encumbrance which must
have the authority of the court or the
written consent of the other spouse. In the
absence of such authority or consent, the
disposition or encumbrance shall be void.
However,
the
transaction
shall
be
construed as a continuing offer on the part
of the consenting spouse and the third
person, and may be perfected as a binding
contract upon the acceptance by the other
spouse or authorization by the court
before the offer is withdrawn by either or
both offerors.
Furthermore, it must be noted that the
fraud and the intimidation referred to by
petitioners were perpetrated in the
execution of the document embodying the
amicable settlement. Gilda Corpuz alleged
during trial that barangay authorities
made her sign said document through
misrepresentation and coercion. In any
event, its execution does not alter the void
character of the deed of sale between the
husband and the petitioners-spouses, as
will be discussed later. The fact remains
that such contract was entered into
without the wifes consent.
In sum, the nullity of the contract of sale is
premised on the absence of private
respondents consent. To constitute a valid
contract, the Civil Code requires the
concurrence of the following elements: (1)
cause, (2) object, and (3) consent, 14 the

last element being indubitably absent in

the case at bar.
2.
NO. Insisting that the contract of
sale was merely voidable, petitioners aver
that it was duly ratified by the contending
parties through the amicable settlement
they executed.
The position is not well taken. The trial
and the appellate courts have resolved
this issue in favor of the private
respondent. The trial court correctly held:
By the specific provision of the law [Art.
1390, Civil Code] therefore, the Deed to
Transfer of Rights cannot be ratified, even
by an amicable settlement. It cannot be
denied that the amicable settlement
entered into by plaintiff Gilda spouses
Guiang is a contract. It is a direct offshoot
of the Deed of Transfer of Rights. By
express provision of law, such a contract is
also void:
Art. 1422. A contract which is the direct
result of a previous illegal contract, is also
void and inexistent. (Civil Code of the
Philippines).
In summation therefore, both the Deed of
transfer of Rights and the amicable
settlement are null and void.
A void contract cannot be ratified.

G.R. No. 92245 June 26, 1991

MELANIA
A.
ROXAS, petitioner,
vs.
THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS and
ANTONIO M. CAYETANO, respondents.

FACTS:
Petitioner, Wife, Melanie is living
separately with her husband,
Antonio Roxas
o Recently discovered that
her
estranged
husband,
defendant Antonio S. Roxas,
had entered into a contract
of lease with defendant
Antonio M. Cayetano
o She had planned to put up
her flea market and minimart for which she had filed
an
application
for
the

corresponding
Mayor's
Permit
and
Municipal
License which had been
approved since 1986, but
when she attempted to
renew it for 1986, the same
was disapproved last month
due to the complaint lodged
by defendant Antonio M.
Cayetano whose application
for renewal of Mayor's
Permit and License for the
same business of putting up
a flea market, had been
allegedly earlier approved
o For the planning and initial
construction to put up her
own business, she had
spent some P135,000.00 for
the
said
construction,
including
materials
and
labor,
where
she
had
expected to earn as daily
net income in the minimum
amount of P500.00 daily
o That due to the illegal lease
contract
entered
into
between
the
herein
defendants
and
the
resultant
unlawful
deprivation of plaintiff from
operating
her
own
legitimate business on the
same lot of which she is a
conjugal owner, plaintiff has
been compelled to seek
redress and ventilate her
grievance to the court for
which she has to engage
the services of counsel with
whom she agreed to pay as
and for attorney's fees the
sum of P10,000.00; plus the
amount equivalent to 20%
of whatever damages may
be awarded to her in
addition to the sum of
P500.00 per appearance in
court.
Antonio Cayetano move to dismiss
complaint which the court resolved
stating that Melanies complaint
failed to satisfy the state of
sufficiency CA affirmed decision

ISSUE:
W/N a husband, as the administrator of
the conjugal partnership, may legally
enter into a contract of lease involving
conjugal real property without the
knowledge and consent of the wife.

at the instance of the aggrieved wife.

(Art. 173 of the Civil Code)

In the case at bar, the allegation in

paragraph 2 of the complaint indicates
that petitioner's estranged husband,
defendant Antonio S. Roxas had
entered into a contract of lease with
defendant
Antonio
M.
Cayetano
without her marital consent being
secured as required by law under Art.
166 of the Civil Code. Petitioner,
therefore, has a cause of action under
Art. 173 to file a case for annulment of
the contract of lease entered into
without her consent. Petitioner has a
cause of action not only against her
husband but also against the lessee,
Antonio M. Cayetano, who is a party to
the contract of lease.

CA decision is set aside, remanded to

RTC for further proceedings

HELD:
Under the New Civil Code (NCC), "Art.
165. The husband is the administrator
of the conjugal partnership," in view of
the fact that the husband is principally
responsible for the support of the wife
and the rest of the family.

The husband is not an ordinary

administrator, for while a mere
administrator has no right to dispose
of, sell, or otherwise alienate the
property being administered, the
husband can do so in certain cases
allowed by law. He is not required by
law to render an accounting. Acts done
under administration do not need the
prior consent of the wife.
However, administration does not
include acts of ownership. For while
the husband can administer the
conjugal assets unhampered, he
cannot alienate or encumber the
conjugal realty. Thus, under Art. 166 of
NCC "unless the wife has been
declared a non-compos mentis or a
spendthrift, or is under civil interdiction
or is confined in a leprosarium, the
husband cannot alienate or encumber
any real property of the conjugal
partnership the wife's consent. If she
refuses unreasonably to give her
consent, the court may compel her to
grant the same." This rule prevents
abuse on the part of the husband, and
guarantees the rights of the wife, who
is partly responsible for the acquisition
of the property, particularly the real
property. Contracts entered into by the
husband in violation of this prohibition
are voidable and subject to annulment

Antonio Docena and Alfreda Docena vs

Hon. Ricardo Lapesura, in his capacity as
Presiding Judge of the RTC, Branch III,
Guian, Eastern Samar; Rufino M. Garado,
Sheriff IV; and Casiano Hombria
GR 140153
March 28, 2001
Topic: Conjugal Partnership of GainsOwnership, Administration and EnjoymentJoint Administration
Facts:
Spouses
Antonio
and
Alfreda
Docena were allegedly lessees of
Casiano Hombria of a parcel of land
located in Eastern Samar. Hombria
filed a complaint for the recovery of
the said land by reason of the
spouses failure to pay rent. The
spouses however argue that they
own
the
land
since
time
immemorial.
In November 1989, Judge Ricardo
Lapesura issued an order in favor
of the spouses Docena. The
decision was later reversed by the

Court of Appeals and the latter

court ordered the spouses to
vacate the premises. When the
order of the Court of Appeals
became
final
and
executory,
Hombria
filed
a
Motion
for
Execution which Judge Lapesura
granted and a Writ of Execution
was issued.
The court sheriff, Rufino Garado,
after some other clarification by
the trial court, issued a Writ of
Demolition against the spouses.
The spouses then filed a Motion to
Set Aside the Writ of Demolition
which was denied by Lapesura. The
spouses
filed
a
Motion
for
Reconsideration but the same was
denied too.
Undeterred, the spouses filed a
Petition
for
Certiorari
and
Prohibition before the Court of
Appeals imputing grave abuse of
discretion against Lapesura in
issuing his orders denying the
spouses motions
The Court of Appeals however
denied the Petition for Certiorari
and Prohibition as it turned out that
only the husband (Antonio Docena)
signed the attached Certification of
Non-Forum Shopping. Petitioner
then argued that since they re
spouses with joint interest over the
alleged conjugal property the
signature of one of them would be
sufficient requirement with the
provision of the Rules of Court
Issue: WON the Court of appeals correcty
dismissed the Petition for Certiorari on the
grounds that only one of the petitioners
signed the certification on non-forum
shopping
Ruling:
First, the Court ruled that the
subject property is conjugal and
stated that whether it is the Civil
Code or the Family Code which
governs over it the signatory
requirements
on
non-forum
shopping certification has been
sufficiently complied with.
Under the Civil Code, the husband
is the sole administrator of the

conjugal partnership. Corollarily,

the husband alone may execute
necessary certificate of non-forum
shopping
to
accompany
the
pleadings. The husband as the
statutory administrator of the
conjugal property may file a
petition for certiorari without the
concurrence of the wife.
Under the Family Code, the
administration of the conjugal
property belongs jointly to the
husband and wife. However, unlike
an
act
of
alienation
or
encumbrance where the consent of
both spouses is required, joint
management does not require that
the spouses always act together.
As provided for in Article 124 of the
Family Code, it is believed that the
husband may indeed file the
petition
even
without
the
attestation of the wife and that the
signing of the non-forum shopping
certification by the husband is not
a fatal defect.
Also, the Court also held that the
rules on forum shopping should not
be
construed
with
absolute
literalness as to subvert its own
ultimate and legitimate objective.

SPOUSES ONESIFORO and ROSARIO

ALINAS versus SPOUSES VICTOR and
ELENA ALINAS
G.R. No. 158040 04/14/2008
Facts:
Spouses Onesiforo and Rosario Alinas
(petitioners) separated sometime in 1982.
They left behind two lots identified, one
with a bodega standing on it and the other
with petitioners' house. Respondent Victor
Alinas is the brother of petitioner.
Petitioners alleged that they entrusted
their properties to respondents. Sometime
in 1993, petitioners discovered that their
two lots were already titled in the name of
the respondent spouses. Onesiforos
signature appeared in an Absolute Deed of

Sale selling one of the lots to respondent

spouses. Records also show a notarized
document
whereby
petitioner
acknowledged that his brother used his
own money to redeem one of the lots
mortgaged and foreclosed and thus his
brother became the owner. Petitioners
filed with the RTC a complaint for the
recovery of possession and ownership of
their conjugal properties with damages
against respondent spouses.

Issue:

Whether or not the sale of conjugal

property by the husband petitioner to
respondent spouses isvalid despite the
lack of consent on the part of the wife.
Ruling:
Pursuant to Article 124 of the Family Code
and jurisprudence, the sale of petitioners'
conjugal property made by petitioner
Onesiforo alone is void in its entirety. It
should be noted that respondent spouses
were well aware that the property is a
conjugal property of petitioners. They also
knew that the disposition being made by
Onesiforo is without the consent of his
wife, as they knew that petitioners had
separated, and the sale documents do not
bear the signature of petitioner Rosario.
The fact that Onesiforo had to execute the
Absolute Deed of Sale and a notarized
Agreement reveals that they had full
knowledge of the severe infirmities of the
sale. Such being the case, no injustice is
being foisted on respondent spouses as
they risked transacting with Onesiforo
alone despite their knowledge that the
subject property is a conjugal property.

Aggabao
v
Parulan
G.R. No. 165803/September 1, 2010
Ownership, admin & enjoyment - Joint

Estranged spouses Maria Elena A.

Parulan and Dionisio Z. Parulan own
2 parcels of land sold to Spouses
Aggabao by Elena using forged SPA
of her husband.
Petitioners after payment of 20k
earnest
money,
130k
down
payment 650k to Los Banos Rural
bank and final payment of 700k
TCT was not turned over by Elena
claiming copy is in the possession
of a relative in Hong Kong and will
be turned over in one week.
TCT was not turned over, all along
it was in the custody oof Atty
Parulan who appeared to hold an
SPA executed by his brother
Dionisio authorizing him to sell
both lots.
RTC & CA annulled deed of sale for
want
of
written
consent
of
husband.

W/N sale to petitioners is valid.

No.
Secondly, the sale was made on March 18,
1991, or after August 3, 1988, the
effectivity of the Family Code. The proper
law to apply is, therefore, Article 124 of
the Family Code, for it is settled that any
alienation or encumbrance of conjugal
property made during the effectivity of the
Family Code is governed by Article 124 of
the Family Code.
FC Article 124. The administration and
enjoyment of the conjugal partnership
property shall belong to both spouses
jointly.xx
In the event that one spouse is
incapacitated or otherwise unable to
participate in the administration of
the conjugal properties, the other
spouse may assume sole powers of
administration. These powers do not
include disposition or encumbrance

without authority of the court or the

written consent of the other spouse. In the
absence of such authority or consent, the
disposition or encumbrance shall be
void. However, the transaction shall be
construed as a continuing offer on the part
of the consenting spouse and the third
person, and may be perfected as a binding
contract upon the acceptance by the other
spouse or authorization by the court
before the offer is withdrawn by either or
both offerors.
Buyers of conjugal property must observe
two kinds of requisite diligence, namely:
(a) the diligence in verifying the validity of
the title covering the property; and (b) the
diligence in inquiring into the authority of
the transacting spouse to sell conjugal
property in behalf of the other spouse.
Frenzel v Catito
FACTS:
Petitioner Alfred Fritz Frenzel is an
Australian citizen of German descent. He
arrived in the Philippines and engaged in
businesses. After two years, he married
Teresita Santos, a Filipino citizen. In 1981,
Alfred and Teresita separated from bed
and board without obtaining a divorce.
Sometime in 1983 he arrived in Sydney
and met Ederlina Catito, a Filipina and a
native of Bajada, Davao City. Unknown to
Alfred, she was married to Klaus Muller
when she was in Germany. Alfred was so
enamored with Ederlina that he persuaded
her to stop working, move to the
Philippines and get married. They bought
several properties in Manila and Davao
using the money of Alfred. He also sold all
his properties in Australia before moving
in the country. They also opened an HSBC
Savings Account in Hong Kong in the name
of Ederlina.Ederlina went to Germany to
file a divorce however Ederlina had not
been able to secure a divorce from Klaus.
The latter could charge her for bigamy and
could even involve Alfred, who himself
was still married. Alfred and Ederlinas
relationship started deteriorating. They
lived
separately.
Alfred
filed
a
Complaint[1]dated October 28, 1985,

against Ederlina, with the Regional Trial

Court of Quezon City, for recovery of real
and personal properties located in Quezon
City and Manila. Alfred alleged, inter alia,
that Ederlina, without his knowledge and
consent, managed to transfer funds from
their joint account in HSBC Hong Kong, to
her own account with the same bank. In
the meantime, on November 7, 1985,
Alfred also filed a complaint against
Ederlina with the Regional Trial Court,
Davao City, for specific performance,
declaration of ownership of real and
personal properties, sum of money, and
damages. Quezon City Trial Court decided
in favor of Alfred but the Davao Trial Court
is in favor of Ederlina. The trial court ruled
that based on documentary evidence, the
purchaser of the three parcels of land
subject of the complaint was Ederlina.
The court further stated that even if Alfred
was the buyer of the properties, he had no
cause of action against Ederlina for the
recovery of the same because as an alien,
he was disqualified from acquiring and
owning lands in the Philippines. The sale
of the three parcels of land to the
petitioner was null and void ab initio.
Applying the pari delicto doctrine, the
petitioner was precluded from recovering
the properties from the respondent. CA
affirmed the decision of Davao City Court.
ISSUE:
WON ERRED IN APPLYING THE RULE OF IN
PARI DELICTO IN THE INSTANT CASE
HELD:
The petition is bereft of merit.
Section 14, Article XIV of the 1973
Constitution provides, as follows:
Save in cases of hereditary succession, no
private land shall be transferred or
conveyed
except
to
individuals,
corporations, or associations qualified to
acquire or hold lands in the public domain.
[2][50]
Lands of the public domain, which include
private lands, may be transferred or
conveyed only to individuals or entities
qualified to acquire or hold private lands
or lands of the public domain. Aliens,
whether individuals or corporations, have
been disqualified from acquiring lands of
the public domain. HencHenHence, they

have also been disqualified from acquiring

private lands.[3][51]
Even if, as claimed by the petitioner, the
sales in question were entered into by him
as the real vendee, the said transactions
are in violation of the Constitution; hence,
are null and void ab initio. A contract that
violates the Constitution and the law, is
null and void and vests no rights and
creates no obligations. It produces no legal
effect at all. The petitioner, being a party
to an illegal contract, cannot come into a
court of law and ask to have his illegal
objective carried out. One who loses his
money or property by knowingly engaging
in a contract or transaction which involves
his own moral turpitude may not maintain
an action for his losses. To him who moves
in deliberation and premeditation, the law
is unyielding. The law will not aid either
party to an illegal contract or agreement;
it leaves the parties where it finds them.
Under Article 1412 of the New Civil Code,
the petitioner cannot have the subject
properties deeded to him or allow him to
recover the money he had spent for the
purchase thereof. Equity as a rule will
follow the law and will not permit that to
be done
indirectly which, because of
public policy, cannot be done directly.
Where the wrong of one party equals that
of the other, the defendant is in the
stronger position it signifies that in such
a situation, neither a court of equity nor a
court of law will administer a remedy. The
rule is expressed in the maxims: EX DOLO
MALO NON ORITUR ACTIO and IN PARI
DELICTO
POTIOR
EST
CONDITIO
DEFENDENTIS

VICENTE G. VILLARANDA vs Spouses

HONORIO G. VILLARANDA and ANA MARIA
Y.
VILLARANDA;
and
COLORHOUSE
LABORATORIES, INC.
February 23, 2004

Topic: Ownership, administration and

enjoyment disposition and encumbrance

*Without
the
wifes
consent,
the
husbands alienation or encumbrance of
conjugal property prior to the efectivity of
the Family Code is not void, but merely
voidable.

FACTS:
Petitioner and respondent, as brothers,
inherited from their parents a 471-square
meter land located in Divisoria, CDO
(Divisoria lot). Honorio leased 124 sq m of
the property while Vicente inherited 64.22
sq m of the property not leased to
Honorio.

In 1976, the brothers executed a Deed of

Exchange (NOTE: Anas signature was not
on the Deed.) Vicente agreed to convey
his 64.22 sqm portion to Honorio in
exchange for a 500 sqm property in
Macasandig,
CDO
(Macasandig
lot).
Honorio then took possession of the
Divisoria lot and constructed a building. In
1992, a subdivision plan was completed
over the inherited lots, and a new title was
issued in Vicentes name for the Divisoria
sqm lot. Other heirs were also issued their
own TCTs.

Honorio and his wife Ana filed an action to

compel Vicente to comply with his
obligations under the Deed of Exchange,
alleging that they could not fully use the
Macasandig lot because Vicente had yet to
delineate his undivided portion of the
property. While the case was pending,
Honorio conditionally sold the Divisoria lot
to
Colorhouse
Laboratories,
Inc.
(Colorhouse - intervenor).

Yes. Absence of the signature only makes

the Deed voidable (Art. 166 NCC read with
Art. 173)
RTC and CA were both in favor of the
respondents. CA held that the NCC
provisions apply as the Deed of Exchange
has been entered into prior to the
enactment of the FC, hence, the absence
of Anas signature on the Deed only made
it voidable, not void. Since Ana was aware
of the execution of the deed yet brought
no action for its annulment within 10 years
from its execution, her omission/refusal to
rescind the deed, as well as joining her
husband in filing the case against Vicente,
gave rise to the conclusion that she
assented to the Deed. CA also held that
the spouses cause of action accrued from
the moment Vicente refused to cause the
transfer of title to Honorio, two months
before the filing of the case.

(Extra: With respect to the capacity of the

parties to enter into the Deed of
Execution, CA held that the reckoning
point was its moment of execution. Since
Honorio only acquired his American
citizenship in 1992, he may still own
private lands.)

ISSUE:
Whether the Deed of Exchange, which was
not signed by the wife of Honorio, is valid
and enforceable.

HELD/RATIO:

The Deed was entered into on July 6,

1976, while the FC took effect only on
August 1988. As a rule, laws should be
prospectively applied [] Thus, the NCC
provisions are applicable to this case.

The Macasandig lot was part of Honorio

and Anas conjugal properties. The
relevant provisions on the disposition of
real properties of the conjugal partnership
are the ff:
Article 166. Unless the wife has been
declared a non compos mentis or a
spendthrift, or is under civil interdiction or
is confined in a leprosarium, the husband
cannot alienate or encumber any real
property of the conjugal partnership
without the wifes consent. x x x
Article 173. The wife may, during the
marriage, and within ten years from the
transaction questioned, ask the courts for
the annulment of any contract of the
husband entered into without her consent,
when such consent is required, or any act
or contract of the husband which tends to
defraud her or impair her interest in the
conjugal partnership property. Should the
wife fail to exercise this right, she or her
heirs, after the dissolution of the marriage,
may demand the value of the property
fraudulently alienated by the husband.

Reading Art. 166 in conjunction with Art.

173, the lack of consent on the wifes part
will not make the husbands alienation or
encumbrance of real property of the

conjugal partnership void, but merely

voidable. Thus the Deed is valid until and
unless annulled.

In this case, there was no evidence from

the records showing any action to annul
the transfer made by Honorio was brought
by Ana within 10 years from the
transaction questioned. Her right to bring
an action to annul the contract has thus
prescribed. Deed is valid and enforceable.

(Papa v. Montenegro) the legal prohibition

against the disposition of the conjugal
property by one spouse was established
for the benefit not of third persons but
only of the other spouse, for whom the law
desires to save the conjugal partnership
from damages that might be caused. Not
being the proper party, Vicente cannot
avail himself of the remedy prescribed
under Art. 173.

PETITON DENIED.

SIOCHI v. GOZON
[G.R. No. 169900]
[March 18, 2010]
TOPIC:
CPG

Ownership,
Administration and Enjoyment (Disposition
and Encumbrance)
PETITIONER: Mario Siochi
RESPONDENTS:
Alfredo & Winifred
Gozon, Gil Tabije, Inter-

PONENTE:

Dimensional
Elvira Gozon
Carpio, J.

Realty,

Inc.,

FACTS:
30 sq.Km. parcel of land in Malabon
registered
in
the
name
of
Alfredo Gozon, married
to
Elvira Gozon.
Dec 23 1991: Elvira filed with
the Cavite City RTC a petition for legal
separation against Alfredo
o Jan 2, 1992: She filed a notice
of lis pendens, which was then
annotated on TCT no. 5357.
While the legal separation case was
still pending, Alfredo and Mario Siochi
entered into an agreement to buy and
sell the property for P18 M
o Despite demands from Mario,
Alfredo failed to comply with
the
stipulations
of
the
agreement.
o After paying P5 M earnest
money
as
partial payment,
Mario took possession of the
property
o Sept 6, 1993: the agreement
was
annotated on TCT
no.
5357.
Cavite
RTC:
granted
the
legal
separation
and
dissolved
and
liquidated the CPG of the spouses (Jun
29 1994)
o As regards the property, it held
that it is deemed conjugal
property.
Alfredo executed a deed of donation
over the property in favor of their
daughter, Winifred
o Later, Alfredo through an SPA
executed by Winifred, sold the
property to IDRI who paid the
purchase price in full. A new
TCT was issued by the Register
of Deeds in favor of IDRI.
Mario then filed with the Malabon RTC
a complaint for specific performance
and damages, annulment of donation
and sale, with preliminary mandatory
and prohibitory injunction and/or TRO.
Malabon RTC: upheld the original
agreement to buy and sell between
Mario and Alfredo and declared void

the sale by Alfredo and Winifred to

IDRI.
CA:
agreement between Mario and
Alfredo is VOID because
o it was entered into without the
consent of Elvira, Alfredos wife;
and,
o Alfredos undivided share has
been forfeited in favour of
Winifred by the grant of legal
separation by the Cavite RTC.

ISSUE:WON Alfredo may sell the conjugal

property,
being
the
sole
administrator of the same without
obtaining the consent of Elvira?
Held: NO. Petitions DENIED. CA Decision
AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS:
deleting the portions regarding the
forfeiture of Alfredo Gozons onehalf undivided share in favor of
Winifred Gozon and the grant of
option to Winifred Gozon whether
or not to dispose of her undivided
share
in
the
property;
and
ordering Alfredo and
Winifred Gozon to pay IDR jointly
and severally the P18 M (amount
paid by IDRI for the property) with
legal interest computed from the
finality of this Decision
conjugal property of Alfredo and Elvira:
since the disposition of the property
occurred after the effectivity of the
Family Code, the applicable law is the
FC Art 124:
o Art. 124. The administration
and enjoyment of the conjugal
partnership
property
shall
belong to both spouses jointly.
In case of disagreement, the
husbands
decision
shall
prevail, subject to the recourse
to the court by the wife for a
proper remedy, which must be
availed of within five years from
the date of the contract
implementing such decision.
In the event that one
spouse is incapacitated or
otherwise
unable
to
participate
in
the
administration
of
the
conjugal
properties,
the
other spouse may assume

sole
powers
of
administration.
These
powers do not include the
powers of disposition or
encumbrance which must
have the authority of the
court or the written consent
of the other spouse. In the
absence of such authority or
consent, the disposition or
encumbrance
shall
be
void. However, the transaction
shall be construed as a
continuing offer on the part of
the consenting spouse and the
third person, and may be
perfected as a binding contract
upon the acceptance by the
other spouse or authorization
by the court before the offer is
withdrawn by either or both
offerors.
In this case, Alfredo was the sole
administrator of the property
o Elvira, with whom Alfredo was
separated in fact, was unable to
participate in the administration
of the conjugal property
o BUT, as sole administrator,
Alfredo still cannot sell the
property without the written
consent of Elvira or the
authority of the court. Without
such consent or authority, the
sale is VOID.
o Even if the other spouse
actively
participated
in
negotiating for the sale of the
property, that other spouses
written consent to the sale is
still required by law for its
validity
o Agreement entered into by
Alfredo and Mario was without
the written consent of Elvira =
VOID
o As regards Marios contention
that the Agreement is a
continuing offer which may be
perfected
by
Elviras
acceptance before the offer is
withdrawn, the fact that the
property
was
subsequently
donated by Alfredo to Winifred
and then sold to IDRI indicates

that the offer was already

withdrawn.
Disagree with the CA that the 1/2
undivided share of Alfredo in the
property was already forfeited in favor
of Winifred, based on the ruling of
the Cavite RTC in the legal separation
case
o CA misconstrued the ruling of
the Cavite RTC that Alfredo,
being the offending spouse, is
deprived of his share in the net
profits and the same is awarded
to Winifred

Fuentes v Roca
GR No. 178902
April 21, 2010
Facts:
- Oct 11, 1982, Tarciano Roca bought a
358-square meter lot in Zambales from his
mother, Sabina.
- Six years later in 1988, Tarciano offered
to sell the lot to the petitioners Manuel
and Leticia Fuentes spouses through the
help of Atty. Plagata, who would prepare
the documents and requirements to
complete the sale.
- In the agreement, there will be a P60,000
down-payment and a P140,000, which will
be paid upon the removal of certain
structures on the land and after obtaining
the consent of Tarcianos estranged wife,
Rosario.
- Since Tarciano and Rosario had been
estranged spouses already and the latter
was already living in Manila and the
former still in Zamboanga, the lawyer thus
went to complete such tasks and claimed
that he went to see Rosario in on of his
trips in Manila and had her sign an
affidavit of consent, and had such
notarized in Zamboanga City.
- Jan. 11, 1989, Tarciano executed a deed
of absolute sale in favor of Fuentes
spouses and a new title was issue in their
name, who immediately constructed a
building on the lot.
- Eight years later in 1997, the children of
Tarciano and Rosario filed a case to annul

the sale and to reconvey the property on

the ground that the sale was void since
Rosario did not give her consent to it and
that her signature on the affidavit was
forged.
RTC Decision: Dismissed.
> The action had already prescribed since
the ground cited by the Rocas for
annulling the sale, forgery or fraud,
already prescribed under Art. 1391 of the
Civil Code, 4 years after its discovery.
Rocas filed their action in 1997, almost
nine years after the title was issued to the
Fuentes spouses on January 18, 1989.
> Rocas failed to present clear and
convincing evidence of the fraud. Mere
variance in the signatures of Rosario was
not conclusive proof of forgery.
> Atty. Plagatas defective notarization of
the affidavit of consent did not invalidate
the sale. The law does not require spousal
consent to be on the deed of sale to be
valid.
CA Decision: RTC decision reversed.
> CA found sufficient evidence of forgery
and did not give credence to Atty.
Plagatas testimony that he saw Rosario
sign the document in Quezon City. Its jurat
said differently.
> the property relations were governed by
the Civil Code under which an action for
annulment of sale on the ground of lack of
spousal consent may be brought by the
wife during the marriage within 10 years
from the transaction. Consequently, the
action that the Rocas, her heirs, brought in
1997 fell within 10 years of the January
11, 1989 sale.
> Considering that the sale between the
parties was merely voidable, Fuentes
spouses are entitled to reimbursement.
Issues:
1. Whether or not Rosarios signature on
the document of consent to her husband
Tarcianos sale of their conjugal land to the
Fuentes spouses was forged;
2. Whether or not the Rocas action for the
declaration of nullity of that sale to the
spouses already prescribed; and
3. Whether or not only Rosario, the wife
whose consent was not had, could bring
the action to annul that sale.

SC Decision:
1. Yes. Rosarios signature strokes on the
affidavit appears heavy, deliberate, and
forced. Her specimen signatures, on the
other hand, are consistently of a lighter
stroke and more fluid. The way the letters
"R" and "s" were written is also
remarkably different. The variance is
obvious even to the untrained eye. Also,
Atty. Plagata admittedly falsified the jurat
of the affidavit of consent. That jurat
declared that Rosario swore to the
document and signed it in Zamboanga
City on January 11, 1989 when, as Atty.
Plagata testified, she supposedly signed it
about four months earlier at her residence
in Paco, Manila on September 15, 1988.
While a defective notarization will merely
strip the document of its public character
and reduce it to a private instrument, that
falsified jurat, taken together with the
marks of forgery in the signature, dooms
such document as proof of Rosarios
consent to the sale of the land. That the
Fuentes spouses honestly relied on the
notarized affidavit as proof of Rosarios
consent does not matter. The sale is still
void without an authentic consent.
2. Contrary to the ruling of the Court of
Appeals, the law that applies to this case
is the Family Code, not the Civil Code.
Although Tarciano and Rosario got married
in 1950, Tarciano sold the conjugal
property to the Fuentes spouses on
January 11, 1989, a few months after the
Family Code took effect on August 3,
1988.
In contrast to Article 173 of the Civil Code,
Article 124 of the Family Code does not
provide a period within which the wife who
gave no consent may assail her husbands
sale of the real property. It simply provides
that without the other spouses written
consent or a court order allowing the sale,
the same would be void. Under the
provisions of the Civil Code governing
contracts, a void or inexistent contract has
no force and effect from the very
beginning. And this rule applies to
contracts that are declared void by

positive provision of law, as in the case of

a sale of conjugal property without the
other spouses written consent. A void
contract is equivalent to nothing and is
absolutely wanting in civil effects. It
cannot be validated either by ratification
or prescription. But, although a void
contract has no legal effects even if no
action is taken to set it aside, when any of
its terms have been performed, an action
to declare its inexistence is necessary to
allow restitution of what has been given
under it. This action, according to Article
1410 of the Civil Code does not prescribe.
Here, the Rocas filed an action against the
Fuentes spouses in 1997 for annulment of
sale and reconveyance of the real property
that Tarciano sold without their mothers
(his wifes) written consent. The passage
of time did not erode the right to bring
such an action.
3. No. The sale was void from the
beginning.
Consequently,
the
land
remained the property of Tarciano and
Rosario despite that sale. When the two
died, they passed on the ownership of the
property to their heirs, namely, the Rocas.
As lawful owners, the Rocas had the right,
under Article 429 of the Civil Code, to
exclude any person from its enjoyment
and disposal.
In fairness to the Fuentes spouses,
however, they should be entitled, among
other things, to recover from Tarcianos
heirs, the Rocas, the P200,000.00 that
they paid him, with legal interest until fully
paid, chargeable against his estate.
Partosa-Jo Vs Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 82606 December 18, 1992
Issue:
Whether
or
not
there
is
abandonment on the part of Jose Jo to
warrant judicial separation of conjugal
property
Facts of the case: Prima Partosa-Jo
(petitioner) is the legal wife of Jose Jo
(respondent). Prima had an agreement
with Jose for her to temporarily live with
her parents during the initial period of her

pregnancy and for him to visit and support

her. However, in 1942, when Prima returned,
private respondent refused to accept her and
denied her admission to their conjugal
home. Moreover at the onset of 1968 until
1988, Jose refused to give financial
support to the petitioner.
Jose also
admitted to have cohabited with two other
women and sired fifteen children. In 1980,
Prima filed a complaint against the
husband for judicial separation of conjugal
property in addition to an earlier action
for support, which was consolidated into
one case.
November 29, 1983, the RTC
decision was a definite disposition of the
complaint for support in favor of the
petitioner but none of that for the judicial
separation of conjugal property.
Jose
elevated the decision to CA, which
affirmed rulings of the trial court on the
complaint on support and dismissed the
complaint on the separation of property
for lack of cause of action and on the
ground that the separation of the parties
was due to their agreement and not
because of abandonment.
CA stated
that separation
by
agreement
was
not covered in Article 178 of the Civil
Code.
Prima contested that the
agreement between her and Jose to live
separately was only temporary and that they
never agreed to be separated permanently. She
even returned to Jose but rejected her.
Decision: The SC stated that under
Article 128 of the Family Code, which
superseded Article 178 (3) of the Civil
Code invoked by the petitioner, states that
if a spouse without just cause abandons the
other or fails to comply with his or her
obligations to the family, the aggrieved
spouse may petition the court for
receivership, for judicial separation of
property, of for authority to be the sole
administrator of the conjugal partnership
property, subject to such precautionary
conditions as the court may impose. The
SC noted that the physical separation of
the parties, coupled with the refusal by
the private respondent to give support to
the petitioner, sufficed to constitute
abandonment as a ground for the judicial
separation of their conjugal property. The
SC reiterated that the petitioner may also
invoke the second ground allowed by

Article 128, for the fact is that he has failed

without just cause to comply with his obligations
to the family as husband or parent.
The SC decision emphasized that the
record shows that as early as 1942, the
private respondent had already rejected
the petitioner, whom he denied admission
to their conjugal home in Dumaguete City
when she returned from Zamboanga. The
fact that she was not accepted by Jo
demonstrates all too clearly that he had
no intention of resuming their conjugal
relationship. Moreover, beginning 1968
until the determination by this Court of the
action for support in 1988, the private
respondent refused to give financial
support to the petitioner. The physical
separation of the parties, coupled with the
refusal by the private respondent to give
support to the petitioner, sufficed to
constitute abandonment as a ground for
the judicial separation of their conjugal
property.
WHEREFORE, the petition is
GRANTED and the assailed decision of the
respondent court is MODIFIED. Civil Case
No. 51 is hereby decided in favor the
plaintiff, the petitioner herein, and the
conjugal property of the petitioner and the
private respondent is hereby ordered
divided between them, share and share
alike. This division shall be implemented
by the trial court after determination of all
the properties pertaining to the said
conjugal partnership, including those that
may have been illegally registered in the
name of the persons.

Art. 135. Any of the

following
shall
be
considered sufficient cause
for judicial separation of
property: (6) that at the
time of the petition, the
spouse
have
been
separated in fact for at least
one year and reconciliation
is highly improbable.
Art. 128. If a spouse
without just cause abandons
the other or fails to comply
with his or her obligations to

the family, the aggrieved

spouse may petition the
court for receivership, for
judicial
separation
of
property, of for authority to
be the sole administrator of
the conjugal partnership
property, subject to such
precautionary conditions as
the court may impose.
The obligations to the family
mentioned in the preceding
paragraph refer to martial,
parental
or
property
relations.
A spouse is deemed to have
abandoned the other when
he or she has left the
conjugal dwelling without
any intention of returning.
The spouse who has left the
conjugal dwelling for a
period of three months or
has failed within the same
period
to
give
any
information as to his or her
whereabouts shall be prima
facie presumed to have no
intention of returning to the
conjugal dwelling.
Art. 178. The separation in
fact between husband and
wife
without
judicial
approval, shall not affect
the conjugal partnership,
except that:
(3) If the
husband has abandoned the
wife without just cause for
at least one year, she may
petition the court for a
receivership,
or
administration by her of the
conjugal
partnership
property or separation of
property.

Petitioners
contend
that
the
allowance sought is not applicable
as private respondents has stopped
schooling and are of majority age
already. They allege that the
administrator
does
not
have
sufficient funds to pay for the
allowance as the fund as are held I
trust for the benefit of who will be
adjudged as the owner of the Kawit
property where it is only the main
source
of
funds
of
the
administrator.
Petitioners:
Princesita
SanteroMorales, Federico Santero,Winy
Santero children of Pablo with
Felixberta Pacusa
Respondents:
Victor,
Rodrigo,
Anselmina and Miguel who were
granted
with
the
allowance).
Juania, Estrelita, and Pedritochildren of Pablo with Anelma Diaz.
Both carry the surname of Santero
but neither mother was married to
Pablo. Pablo Santero who died on
Nov. 30, 1973 was the only
legitimate son of Pascual Santero
and Simona Pamuti Vda. De
Santero
who
were
already
deceased.
Petition was granted by respondent
court.

On Mar. 25, 1985, respondents filed

another motion t include Juanita,
Estelita
and
Pedrito
in
the
allowance from estate of Pablo
Santero. The respondent court
granted the motion but petitioners
asked for a reconsideration of
order.

On October 15, 1985, petitioners

herein
filed
their
Motion
to Admit Supplemental
Petition
opposing the inclusion of three (3)
more heirs. We denied that "Motion
for Extension of Time to file their

SANTERO VS CFI
Facts:

Petition for certiorari granting the

motion for allowance filed by
private respondents

Supplemental Petition" as per Our

Resolution dated October 23, 1985.

On November 11, 1985, another

Order
was
issued
by
the
respondent court directing the
administrator of the estate to get
back the allowance of the three
additional recipients or children of
Anselma Diaz apparently based on
the oppositors' (petitioners herein)
"Urgent Motion to Direct the
Administrator
to
Withhold
Disbursement of Allowance to the
Movants."

Issue:
1. W/N respondent court acted with abuse
of discretion amounting to lack of
jurisdiction in granting the allowance to
the
respondents
Victor,
Rodrigo,
Anselmina and Miguel-P2,000.00 each
despite the fact that all of them are not
minors and all are gainfully employed with
the exception of Miguel or that the above
named wards are still schooling and they
are in actual need of money to defray their
school expenses for 1982-83 when the
truth is that they are no longer schooling.
3. W/N respondent Court acted with abuse
of discretion in granting the motion for
allowance without conducting a hearing
thereon, to determine the truth of
allegations of the private respondents.
Ratio:
1. No. The respondent court did not
act with abuse of discretion
amounting to lack of jurisdiction
regarding the said grant of
allowance. In regards with e said
allowance, only the intestate estate
of Pablo shall be given note and not
of the intestate state of Pablos

parents. According to Art. 992, "An

illegitimate child has no right to
inherit ab
intestato from
the
legitimate children and relatives of
his father or mother; nor shall such
children or relatives inherit in the
same manner from the illegitimate
child." This was already settled I
the case of Anselma Diaz vs.
Simona Pamuti. The controlling
provision of law is not Rule 83, Sec.
3 of the New Rules of Court but
Arts. 290 and 188 of the Civil Code
reading as follows:
Art.
290.
Support
is
everything
that
is
indispensable
for
sustenance,
dwelling,
clothing
and
medical
attendance, according to
the social position of the
family.
Support also includes the
education of the person
entitled to be supported
until he completes his
education or training for
some profession, trade or
vocation, even beyond the
age of majority.
Art. 188. From the common
mass of property support
shall be given to the
surviving spouse and to the
children
during
the
liquidation
of
the
inventoried property and
until what belongs to them
is delivered; but from this
shall be deducted that
amount received for support
which exceeds the fruits or
rents pertaining to them.

The fact that private respondents are of

age, gainfully employed, or married is of
no moment and should not be regarded as
the determining factor of their right to
allowance under Art. 188. While the Rules
of Court limit allowances to the widow and
minor or incapacitated children of the
deceased, the New Civil Code gives the
surviving spouse and his/her children
without distinction. Hence, the private
respondents Victor, Rodrigo, Anselmina
and Miguel all surnamed Santero are
entitled to allowances as advances from
their shares in the inheritance from their
father Pablo Santero. Since the provision
of the Civil Code, a substantive law, gives
the surviving spouse and to the children
the right to receive support during the
liquidation of the estate of the deceased,
such right cannot be impaired by Rule 83
Sec. 3 of the Rules of Court which is a
procedural rule. Be it noted however that
with respect to "spouse," the same must
be the "legitimate spouse" (not commonlaw spouses who are the mothers of the
children here).

2. It is not true that no hearing was

conducted upon granting the
motion for allowance judging from
the records given. A notice of
hearing was attached on the grant
addressed to one of petitioners
lawyer with a schedule of hearing
on July 8, 1982 at 9AM. Atty.
Beltran even filed an opposition on
the same date of the hearing. Even
the instant petition admits that the
wards (respondents, petitioners
represented by their guardians)
have been granted allowance for 8
years already. The CFI of Cavite
merely followed the precedent of
the court which granted a similar
motion last year.
Held:
Petition is dismissed. Assailed judgment is
affirmed.

Maquilan vs Maquilan
June 8, 2007

Facts:

Virgilio Maquilan filed a criminal case

against spouse Dita Maquilan and her
paramour on the ground of adultery. The
two
accused
were
convicted
and
sentenced to suffer imprisonment for 1
year and 8 months to 3 years, 6 months
and 21 days. On Jan. 15, 2001, after the
adultery case has been decided, Virgilio
filed a Petition for Declaration of Nullity of
Marriage, Dissolution and Liquidation of
Conjugal Partnership of Gains and
Damages with RTC on the ground of Ditas
psychological incapacity. However, during
the pre-trial of the case, the Maquilan
spouses voluntarily entered into a
Compromise Agreement partially dividing
their properties among themselves and
their only son. On Jan. 2, 2002, the
Compromise Agreement was given a
Judicial Imprimatur by RTC but on Jan.5,
Virgilio filed an Omnibus Motion to
repudiate the agreement and reconsider
the judgment rendered on the ground that
his former lawyer failed to intelligently and
judiciously apprise him of the agreements
consequential effects.

The RTC judge denied the motion.

Maquilan
filed
a
Motion
for
Reconsideration but was also denied so he
filed a Petition for Certiorari and
Prohibition to CA claiming that the RTC
committed a grave error and abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of

jurisdiction in holding the validity of the

agreement; when it held that the
agreement was made during cooling off
period; when it denied his Motion to
Repudiate the Compromise Agreement
and to consider the judgment rendered;
and when it conducted the proceedings
without the appearance and participation
of the Office of the Solicitor General and
/or the Provincial Prosecutor. CA dismissed
the petition for lack of merit.

Thereafter, Virgilio filed a Petition for

Review on Certiorari with SC seeking to
assail the judgment rendered by CA on the
agreement which he sought to nullify.

Issue:
W/N
the
partial
voluntary
separation of property made by the
spouses pending the petition for the
declaration of nullity of marriage valid

The Court also held that the purpose of

the active participation of the public
prosecutor or the Solicitor General in
cases of annulment and declaration of
nullity of marriage is to ensure that the
interest of the State is protected by
preventing the collusion of the parties,
and the fabrication or suppression of
evidence . Although the appearances of
the SG and/or the Public Prosecutor are
mandatory, the failure of the RTC to
require their appearance does not per se
nullify the agreement as it is just an
agreement between the parties to partially
separate their properties and does not
include anything in the merits of the case
of Declaration of Nullity of Marriage for the
Court to wary any possible collusion.

The conviction of adultery does not carry

the accessory penalty of civil interdiction
which deprives the person from the right
to manage his property and dispose such
inter vivos as provided for in the RPC.

Ruling: Petition - Denied.

SC ruled that the agreement entered into

by the parties is an example of a
separation of property allowed by law. Art.
143 of FC provides that separation of
property may be effected voluntarily or for
sufficient
cause subject to judicial
approval. Such is applicable even if the
proceeding for the declaration of nullity of
marriage is still pending. However,
pursuant to Art. 136 of FC, voluntary
separation of property is subject to the
rights of all creditors of the conjugal
partnership of gains and other persons
with pecuniary interest.

Maquilans contention that he was not

intelligently and judiciously informed of
the
consequential
effects
of
the
agreement is also untenable. As stated in
Salonga v. CA, the Court ruled that
negligence of the counsel binds the client
and the recognized exceptions to this rule
are cases where there is reckless gross
negligence of the counsel thereby denying
the client of the due process of law or
when it application results in the outright
deprivation of ones property through
technicality. Such exceptions are not
evident in the case.

Source:
http://ustlawreview.com/pdf/cases/2007/Ju
ne/Maquilan_v._Maquilan.pdf

were- Marywin has no share

in the properties she
identified
because
these were the fruits solely
of his industry- Not a coownership

Sales vs. Sales

did not live together as

husband and wife- Marywin
appropriated rentals of his
properties
and
disposed some of
them
without
his
consent- PRAYED for deferra
l of the resolution of the
motion
for execution

issues he raised should be

resolved first

GR No. 174803 | Julky 13, 2009 | J.

Quisumbing
FACTS
Marywin Albano Sales filed for the
dissolution of the conjugal partnership and
separation
of properties
against
her
husband, Mayor Reynolan T. Sales.
Reynolan filed for the declaration of the
nullity of the their marriage
Consolidated and tried jointly

Sept 3, 2003
o

Jan 4, 2004
o

RTC declared marriage void

due to mutual psychological
incapacity, and directed
them to
liquidate,
partition,
and
distribute
their common property (FC
147) within 60 days from
receipt
of
decision,
and comply with FC 50,
51,and 52 as may be
applicable

June 16, 2003

o

After the decision became

final, Marywin filed for
execution
and
a
manifestation listing her
assets with Reynolan
for partition

Reynolan
opposed
motion- RTC already ordered
the distribution of their com
mon
properties
without
specifying
what
these

Nov 24, 2003

o

Marywin filed a reiterative

motion for execution to
implement the decision and
to order
partition
of
common properties

Copy was furnished

Reynolans counsel

to

Nov 28, 2003

o

RTC set the case for hearing

on Sept 25, 2003 and
ordered the reception of
evidence on claims

Reiterative motion heard in

the absence of Reynolan
and his counsel; RTC issued
an order
approving the
proposed
project
of
partition; clerk of court
ordered to execute deeds of
conveyance
to
distribute
8
townhouse
units

Dec 16, 2003

Reynolan
reconsider

RTCs Order, prayed for its

reversal, and reinstatement
of Sept 25, 2003 Order
(reception of evidence
before partition)-Grant of
Marywins
motion
preempted issues he raised

Marywin
motion
o

to

Reynolans

Issues of alleged fraudulent

sale and non-accounting of
rentals are already waived
by Reynolan when
he
failed to set them up as
compulsory
counterclaims
in
the
case- Court ordered l
iquidation and distribution;
already a resolved issue

April 12, 2004

o

opposed

moved

RTC denied Reynolans MR

July 26, 2006

o

CA ruled in favor of Nolan;

remanded case to lower
court
for
reception
of evidence

ISSUE
Whether or not CA erred when it
entertained respondents appeal from an
order granting the issuance of a writ of
execution

HELD
NO.
1) There were matters of genuine concern
that had to be addressed prior to the
dissolution of the property relations of the

parties as a result of the declaration

of nullity of their marriage. Allegations
regarding the collection of rentals without
proper
accounting,
sale
of common
properties without the husbands consent
and
misappropriation of the proceeds thereof,
are factual issues which have to be
addressed in order to determine with
certainty the fair and reasonable division
and distribution of properties due to each
party.2) The extent of properties due to
respondent is not yet discernible without
further presentation of evidence on the
incidental matters he had previously
raised before the RTC. Since the RTC
resolved
these
matters
in itsOrders dated November 28, 2003 and
April 12, 2004, disregarding its previous
order calling for the reception of evidence,
said orders became final orders as it
finally disposes of the issues concerning
the partition of the parties common
properties.
As such, it may be appealed by the
aggrieved party to the Court of Appeals
via ordinary appeal.
DISPOSITION
CA decision AFFIRMED
Remanded
evidence

to

RTC

for

reception

of

Laperal v Katigbak
GR 1699
March 31, 1964
FACTS: CFI Manila declared the property
covered by TCT No.57626 as separate or
paraphernal property of Evelina KalawKatigbak. The spouses Laperal disagree
with this finding reiterating that its
improvements and income are conjugal
assets of the Spouses Katigbak.
When the spouses Katigbak got married,
neither of them brought properties unto

the
marriage.
Ramons
occupation
rendered him a monthly income of
P200.00. The property in question was
registered in the name of Evelina KalawKatigbak married to Ramon Katigbak.
The latter declared that her mother was
the one who bought the property for her
and had placed it only in her name as the
practice of her mother in buying
properties and placing them directly in the
names of her children. The husband
having no interest with the property only
signed the document for the purpose of
assisting his wife.
In August 1950, the Laperals filed a case
and was granted by the trial court against
the Katigbaks in recovery of P14,000 and
jewelry amounting to P97,500 or in lieu
thereof, to pay such amount. A month
after the decision was rendered, Evelina
filed a complaint against her husband for
judicial separation of property and
separate
administration
which
was
granted by the court and was sought for
annulment by the Laperals.
ISSUE: WON the property in question
constitutes the paraphernal property of
Evelina.
HELD: YES. All properties acquired during
the marriage are presumed conjugal. It is
however not conclusive but merely
rebuttable, unless it be proved that the
property belong exclusively to the
husband and wife. In the case at bar, the
deed of the land is under the name of the
wife. At the time it was purchased, the
property was of substantial value and as
admitted, the husband by himself could
not have afforded to buy considering the
singular source of income.
Hence, the property covered by TCT 57626
is considered a paraphernal property of
the wife.
Laperal v Katigbak
GR 1699
March 31, 1964
FACTS: CFI Manila declared the property
covered by TCT No.57626 as separate or
paraphernal property of Evelina KalawKatigbak. The spouses Laperal disagree
with this finding reiterating that its
improvements and income are conjugal
assets of the Spouses Katigbak.

When the spouses Katigbak got married,

neither of them brought properties unto
the
marriage.
Ramons
occupation
rendered him a monthly income of
P200.00. The property in question was
registered in the name of Evelina KalawKatigbak married to Ramon Katigbak.
The latter declared that her mother was
the one who bought the property for her
and had placed it only in her name as the
practice of her mother in buying
properties and placing them directly in the
names of her children. The husband
having no interest with the property only
signed the document for the purpose of
assisting his wife.
In August 1950, the Laperals filed a case
and was granted by the trial court against
the Katigbaks in recovery of P14,000 and
jewelry amounting to P97,500 or in lieu
thereof, to pay such amount. A month
after the decision was rendered, Evelina
filed a complaint against her husband for
judicial separation of property and
separate
administration
which
was
granted by the court and was sought for
annulment by the Laperals.
ISSUE: WON the property in question
constitutes the paraphernal property of
Evelina.
HELD: YES. All properties acquired during
the marriage are presumed conjugal. It is
however not conclusive but merely
rebuttable, unless it be proved that the
property belong exclusively to the
husband and wife. In the case at bar, the
deed of the land is under the name of the
wife. At the time it was purchased, the
property was of substantial value and as
admitted, the husband by himself could
not have afforded to buy considering the
singular source of income.
Hence, the property covered by TCT 57626
is considered a paraphernal property of
the wife.
Francisco Gonzales vs. Erminda Gonzales
GR 159521
December 16, 2005
Topic: Property Regimes of Unions without
marriage- Unions under the Family Code
Facts:

In 1979, after 2 years of cohabiting

together as husband and wife,
petitioner and respondent got
married; their union bore 4
children.
In 1992, the wife herein respondent
filed for the annulment of their
marriage on the ground of her
husbands psychological incapacity
as shown through his acts of
beating her with no justifiable
reasons,
humiliating
and
embarrassing her and denying her
love, sexual comfort and loyalty.
She also argued that prior to their
marriage they acquired properties
and one of which is a pizza
business which she managed. In
addition to the annulment of their
marriage she also prays for the
dissolution of their CPG and prayer
for support pendente lite.
In his defense, the husband herein
petitioner averred that it was
respondent
who
was
psychologically incapacitated and
that he exclusively owned their
properties including the pizza
business.
In compliance to the order f the
trial court the public prosecutor
conducted an investigation and
found out that there is no collusion
between the parties, hence the trial
proceeded wherein each parties
submitted a list of their properties
with
proper
valuation
which
includes 9 land properties and 11
vehicles(Please refer to the original
text for the specifics)
During the trial, it was shown that
petitioner
was
afflicted
with
Satyriasis, a personality disorder
characterized by excessive and
promiscuous
sex
hunger
manifested by his indiscriminate
womanizing.
Trial court rendered their decision
declaring the marriage void ab
initio; awarding the custody of the
3 minor to the wife and right of
visitations under an agreement;
dissolution of cocnjugal partnership
of gains; ordering the husband to

give 40k support at a date not later

than the 5th of every month to be
delivered to the wifes residence;
CA affirmed the decision of the trial
court, hence, the instant petition.
Issue: WON the CA erred in ruling that the
properties should be divided equally
between the parties
Ruling: Petition was DENIED and
assailed decision was AFFIRMED.

the

In ruling over the case, the SC

pointed out that the property
relations in this case shall be
governed by the provisions of
Article 147 of the Family Code
which states that:
ART 147. When a man and woman
who are capacitated to marry each
other, live exclusively with each other
as husband and wife without eh
benefit of marriage or under a void
marriage, their wages and salaries
shall be owned by them in equal
shares and the property acquired by
both of them through their hardwork or
industry shall by governed by the rules
of co-ownership.
In the absence of proof to the
contrary, properties acquired while
they lived together shall be presumed
to have been obtained by their joint
efforts, work, industry and shall be
owned by them in equal shares

The
aforementioned
provision
creates
a
presumption
that
properties acquired during the
cohabitation of the parties have
been acquired through their joint
efforts.
In this case, the petitioner himself
admitted that the wife helped him
in the management of their
business as attested to by a letter
dated 09/06/1989 saying youve
helped me for what we are now
and I wont let it be destroyed
It also appeared that even prior to
their
cohabitation,
petitioner
already offered respondent to be
his partner in the pizza business .

Bienvenido vs CA
Donations in common law marriages

1942 Aurelio Camacho married

Consejo Velasco.
1962 Without 1st marriage being
dissolved
contracted
another
marriage with respondent Luisita
Camacho
1967, common law relationship
with petitioner Nenita Bienvenido
1982 Aurelio bought house and lot
in w/c Nenita and him were staying.
TCT described him as single.
1984 Aurelio executed Deed of Sale
in favour of Nenita in consideration
of P250k.
After Aurelios death Luisita and
son Chito brought case seeking
annulment of sale of property
claiming as his wife.
RTC granted.
CA reversed on ground that
property was conjugal property of
Luisita and Aurelio; sale to Nenita
void.

W/N sale of property to Nenita is valid.

YES.
Marriage to Luisita was bigamous. There is
no holding that property was conjugal.
Until otherwise shown in an appropriate
action, the sale to petitioner must be
presumed.
Petitioner's
ownership
is
evidenced by a deed of absolute sale
executed with all the solemnity of a public
document and by Transfer Certificate of
Title No. 326681 issued in due course in
her name. Petitioner is in possession of
the property. It was error for the Court of
Appeals to annul petitioner's title at the
instance of one whose marriage to the
seller is void.
Nenita was purchaser in good faith. The
property in question was acquired by

Aurelio
during
a
long
period
of
cohabitation with petitioner which lasted
for twenty years (1968-1988). While
petitioner knew respondent Chito to be
Aurelio's son way back in 1976, there is
nothing to show that she knew Aurelio to
be married to Luisita. To the contrary,
Aurelio represented himself to be single.
Tumlos v Fernandez
FACTS:
Spouses Fernandez filed an action for
ejectment against the Tumlos. Said
spouses alleged that they are the absolute
owners of an apartment building located
in Valenzuela, Metro Manila; that they
allowed the Tumlos to occupy the
apartment building since 1989, without
any payment of any rent. It was agreed
that
Guillerma
Tumlos
would
pay
P1,600/mo while the other defendants
promised to pay P1,000/mo for the rental,
which was not fulfilled by the Tumlos.
When the Fernandez demanded the
payment from the Tumlos of P84,000 from
Toto and Gina Tumlos as unpaid rentals for
7 years and P143,600.00 from Guillerma
as unpaid rentals for 7 years, but said
demand were unheeded. Then they
prayed that the Tumlos be ordered to
vacate the property in question and to pay
the stated unpaid rentals, as well as to
jointly
pay
P30,000
in
attorney's
fees.Guillerma filed an answer to the
complaint, claiming that she is also the coowner and co-vendee of the apartment in
question together with Mario Fernandez,
as evidenced by a Contract to Sell. MTC
promulgated its decision in January 1997.
Upon appeal to the RTC Guillerma et al
alleged
that
Mario
Fernandez
and
Guillerma had an amorous relationship,
and that they bought the property as their
love nest; that they lived together in the
property with their 2 children and that
Guillerma administered the property by
collecting rentals, until she discovered
that Mario deceived her as to the
annulment of his marriage.
RTC affirmed with the judgment of the
MTC. CA reversed the RTC Decision.
ISSUE:

Whether or not that petitioner is the coowner of the apartment.

RULING:
No. SC rejected the claim that Guillerma
and Mario were the co-owners of the
disputed property.
Under Article 148, proof of actual
contribution must be presented to be
deemed as co-owner of the property
acquired during the cohabitation. In this
case, Guillerma failed to present any
evidence that she had made an actual
contribution to purchase the apartment
building. She merely anchors her claim of
co-ownership on her cohabitation with
Mario Fernandez. No other evidence was
presented to validate such claim, except
for the said affidavit/position paper. Her
claim of having administered the property
during
their
cohabitation
is
unsubstantiated, for there is nothing in the
Article 148 of the FC provides that the
administration of the property amounts to
the contribution in its acquisition.
[G.R. No. 124118. March 27, 2000]
MARINO,
RENATO,
LETICIA,
IMELDA,
ALICIA,
LIGAYA,
and
ZENAIDA,
all
surnamed ADRIANO, petitioners, vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, CELESTINA, MANOLO
and AIDA, all surnamed ADRIANO,
respondents. Mi sedp
DGONZAGA_REYES, J.
FACTS:
On October 29, 1933, the testator, Lucio
Adriano, also known as Ambrocio Adriano,
married Gliceria Dorado. They had three
children, namely, Celestina, Manolo, and
Aida, private respondents in this case.
Sometime in 1942 or prior thereto, Lucio
and Gliceria separated, and Gliceria
settled in Rizal, Laguna where she died on
June 11, 1968. Also in 1942 or even
earlier, Lucio cohabited with Vicenta Villa,
with whom he had eight children: Marino,
Renato, Leticia, Imelda, Maria Alicia,
Ligaya, Jose Vergel, and Zenaida, all
surnamed Adriano. All his children by
Vicenta Villa are the named petitioners in
the instant case, with the exception of Jose
Vergel, who died before the inception of

the proceedings. Five months after the

death of Gliceria, Lucio married Vicenta.
Lucio and Vicenta and their children lived
in Candelaria, Quezon until the spouses
separated in 1972.
On October 10, 1980, Lucio executed a
last will and testament disposing of all his
properties, and assigning, among others,
his second wife Vicenta and all his children
by his first and second marriages as
devisees and legatees therein. The
properties were disposed of in the
following
manner:
(1)
to
private
respondents, Lucio's children by his first
wife, 10,000 square meters of the
disputed
property,
including
the
warehouse, rice mill, and equipment
situated thereon; (2) to Vicenta and
petitioners, his children by his second
marriage, the remaining 35,000 square
meters; and (3) to private respondents,
the residential house also within the same
property
On February 11, 1981, Lucio died and
private respondent Celestina Adriano, who
was instituted in Lucio's will as its
executrix, filed a petition for the probate
of the will on February 18, 1981 before the
RTC of Lucena City. The RTC allowed the
probate of the will and directed the
issuance of letters testamentary to
petitioner-executrix Celestina Adriano in
an Order dated August 22, 1983. On
November 10, 1983, Vicenta appealed
said Order to the then Intermediate
Appellate Court, which in turn affirmed the
probate of the will. Vicenta died on July 2,
1985.
On August 17, 1988, and while the
proceedings for settlement of estate were
pending before the RTC, petitioners
instituted an action for annulment of Lucio
Adriano's will. Plaintiffs-petitioners alleged
that before the marriage of Lucio and their
mother, Vicenta, on November 22, 1968,
the two lived together as husband and
wife and as such, acquired properties
which became the subject of inventory
and administration in Spec. Proc. No.
4442. Thus, the will sought to be probated
should be declared void and ineffective
insofar as it disposes of the rightful share
or properties of Vicenta.

The trial court favored the evidence of

private respondents, which indicated that
the purchase money for the contested
properties came from the earnings of
Lucio in a business partnership that he
entered into in 1947, or during the
subsistence of his marriage to Gliceria.
The trial court further found that Lucio's
initial capital infusion of P15,000.00 in the
business partnership was in fact obtained
from the conjugal fund of his first
marriage.
It likewise appears from the evidence of
the defendants that by the end of 1953,
the total capital investment of Lucio
Adriano
taken
from
his
conjugal
partnership with his first wife, Gliceria
Dorado,
reached
the
amount
of
P94,744.88. In the late part of 1954,
however, the same partnership was
dissolved
by
means
of
a
verbal
agreement. When the partnership was
finally dissolved in 1955, the total capital
investment of Lucio Adriano therein was
P110,994.88, consisting of the fruit or
income of his common fund with Gliceria
Dorado.
The
Court
of
Appeals
dismissed
petitioners' appeal for lack of merit, and
affirmed in toto the Joint Order of the RTC
of Lucena City.

acquired in 1964, or while Lucio's

marriage with Gliceria subsisted, such
property is presumed to be conjugal
unless it be proved that it pertains
exclusively to the husband or to the wife.

MALLILIN v. CASTILLO
[GR No. 136803]
[June 16, 2000]

TOPIC: Property Regime of Unions Without

Marriage - Unions under FC 148 of FC 50 in
rel. to FC 49(2) and FC 50, 37, 38, and 44
PETITIONER: Eustaquio Mallilin, Jr.
RESPONDENT: Ma. Elvira Castillo
PONENTE:

J.

FACTS:

ISSUE:
Whether or not the questioned property
should belong to the co-ownership of
Vicenta and Lucio since they cohabited as
husband and wife and since Vicenta was
designated as co-vendee in the TCT
HELD/RATIO:
NO. The petitioners' insistence that a coownership of properties existed between
Lucio and Vicenta during their period of
cohabitation before their marriage in 1968
is without lawful basis considering that
Lucio's marriage with Gliceria was then
subsisting. The co-ownership in Article 144
of the Civil Code requires that the man
and woman living together as husband
and wife without the benefit of marriage
must not in any way be incapacitated to
marry. Considering that the property was

Mendoza,

Petitioner and respondent were alleged

to be both married and with children
but separated from their respective
spouses.
o They cohabited in 1979 while
respective
marriages
still
subsist
o They established Superfreight
Customs Brokerage Corporation
during their union (petitioner
was
the
President
and
Chairman; respondent was the
Vice President and Treasurer)
o They acquired real and personal
properties
which
were
registered
solely
in
respondents name
Due to irreconcilable conflict, the
couple separated in 1992
o Petitioner then demanded his
share from respondent in the
subject properties
o latter refused, alleging that said
properties had been registered
solely in her name

respondent denied that they

lived as husband and wife, as
they were still legally married
at the time of cohabitation
Petitioner filed complaint for partition
of co-ownership shares (DISMISSED by
Trial Court)
o Respondent claimed to be the
exclusive owner of all real and
personal properties involved in
petitioners action for partition
on the ground that they were
acquired entirely out of her own
money and registered solely in
her name
Respondent
filed
a
motion
for
summary judgment (GRANTED by Trial
Court)
o Respondent
argued
that
petitioners issues in
the
pleadings were sham and not
genuine
WON plaintiff can validly
claim
the partition
and/or payment of coownership share,
accounting
and
damages, considering
that
plaintiff
and
defendant
are
admittedly
both
married
to
their
respective
spouses
under still valid and
subsisting marriages
respondent
contended
that
even if she and
petitioner
actually
cohabited,
petitioner could
not validly claim
a part of the
subject real and
personal
properties
because NCC Art.
144 (the rules on
co-ownership
shall govern the
properties
acquired by a
man
and
a
woman
living
o

o
o

together
as
husband and wife
but not married,
or
under
a
marriage which is
void ab
initio)
applies only if the
parties are not in
any
way
incapacitated to
contract
marriage
In the parties
case, their union
suffered the legal
impediment of a
prior
subsisting
marriage
WON the plaintiff be
considered
as
an
unregistered
coowner of the real
properties under the
Transfer Certificates
of
Title
duly
registered solely in
the
name
of
defendant Ma. Elvira
Castillo
respondent
argued
that
petitioner cannot
be considered an
unregistered coowner
of
the
properties
titles to the land
are solely in her
name
to
grant
petitioners
prayer would be
to
allow
a
collateral attack
on the validity of
such titles
Trial court held that the issues
involved were purely legal
petitioners action for partition
was a collateral attack on the
validity of the certificates of
title covering the properties
even if the parties really had
cohabited,
the
action
for

partition could not be allowed

because an action for partition
among co-owners ceases to be
so and becomes one for title if
the defendant, as in the present
case,
alleges
exclusive
ownership of the properties in
question
CA ordered the case remanded to the
court of origin for trial on the merits
o Roque
v.
Intermediate
Appellate Court: an action for
partition is at once an action for
declaration of co-ownership and
for segregation and conveyance
of a determinate portion of the
properties involved
o If
the
defendant
asserts
exclusive
title
over
the
property,
the
action
for
partition
should
not
be
dismissed,
but
should
be
resolved by the court
But if the plaintiff is
unable to sustain his
claimed status as a coowner, the court should
dismiss
the
action
because no basis exists
to require the defendant
to submit to partition
o since petitioner sought to
compel respondent to execute
documents necessary to effect
transfer of what he claimed was
his share, petitioner was not
actually attacking the validity of
the titles but in fact, recognized
their validity
o upheld petitioners position that
Art. 144 of the Civil Code had
been repealed by Art. 148 of
the Family Code
CA granted respondents MR
o Absent any cause or prayer for
the
alteration,
cancellation,
modification or changing of the
titles involved, the desired
declaration of co-ownership and
partition will utterly be an
indirect or collateral attack on
the subject titles in this suit
o Case at bench appears to have
been prematurely filed. Plaintiff-

appellant should have first

pursued such remedy or any
other relief directly attacking
the
subject
titles
before
instituting the present partition
suit.
ISSUE: WON petitioner can validly claim
his share in the acquired properties
registered under the name of the
respondent considering they both
have subsisting relationship when
they started living together.

HELD: CA decision is REVERSED. Case is

REMANDED to RTC for further proceedings
on the merits.

trial court erred in holding that it was

impossible for a co-ownership to exist
parties who are not capacitated to
marry each other and were living
together could not have owned
properties in common.
o NCC Art 144 does not cover
parties living in an adulterous
relationship
o Now FC Art 148 provides for a
limited
co-ownership
in
cases where the parties in
union are incapacitated to
marry
properties acquired by
them through their joint
contribution, property or
industry, shall be owned
by them in proportion to
their
contributions
which, in the absence of
proof to the contrary, is
presumed to be equal.
When
CA
dismissed
petitioners
complaint for partition on grounds of
due process and equity, his right to
prove ownership over the claimed
properties was denied.
o Such dismissal is unjustified
since both ends may be served
by simply excluding from the
action
for
partition
the
properties registered in the
name of Steelhouse Realty and

Eloisa Castillo, not parties in the

case.
The case was remanded to lower court
for further proceedings.

SIGNEY vs SSS
GR No. 173582 January 28, 2008
Issue: Whether or not petitioner has a
superior legal right over the SSS benefits
as against the illegitimate minor children
of the deceased?
Facts of the case: Rodolfo Signey Jr. a
member of the SSS, died on May 21, 2001.
In his members records, he had
designated petitioner Yolanda Signey as
primary beneficiary and his four children
with
her
as
secondary
beneficiaries. Petitioner filed a claim for
death benefits with the public respondent
SSS. She revealed in her SSS claim that
the deceased had a common-law wife,
Gina Servano, with whom he had two
minor children.
Petitioners declaration
was confirmed when Gina herself filed a
claim for the same death benefits which
she also declared that both she and
petitioner were common-law wives of the
deceased and that Editha Espinosa was
the legal wife. In addition, in October
2001, Editha also filed an application for
death benefits with the SSS stating that
she was the legal wife of the deceased.
SSS denied the death benefit claim of the
petitioner and found that the marriage
between the deceased and the petitioner
is null and void because of a prior
subsisting marriage contracted between
the deceased and Editha as confirmed
by the
local civil registry
of Cebu.
However, it recognized Ginalyn and
Rodelyn, the minor children of the
deceased with Gina as the primary
beneficiaries
under
the
SSS
law.
Thereafter, petitioner filed a petition with
the Social Security Commission (SSC) in
which she attached a waiver of rights
executed by Editha whereby the latter
waived any/all claims from Social Security
System (SSS), among others due to the

deceased Rodolfo Signey Sr. The SSC

affirmed the decision of the SSS. The SSC
gave more weight to the SSS field
investigation
and
the
confirmed
certification of marriage showing that the
deceased was married to Editha, than to
the afore stated declarations of Editha in
her waiver of rights.
Decision: The SC ruled not to disturb the
findings of fact of the SSS which are
supported by substantial evidence and
affirmed by the SSC and the Court of
Appeals. Moreover, petitioner ought to be
reminded of the basic rule that this Court
is not a trier of facts. The SC stated that it
is a well-known rule that in proceedings
before administrative bodies, technical
rules of procedure and evidence are not
binding. The important consideration is
that both parties were afforded an
opportunity to be heard and they availed
themselves of it to present their
respective positions on the matter in
dispute. It must likewise be noted that
under Section 2, Rule 1 of the SSC Revised
Rules of Procedure, the rules of evidence
prevailing in the courts of law shall not be
controlling. In the case at bar, the
existence of a prior subsisting marriage
between the deceased and Editha is
supported
by
substantial
evidence.
Petitioner, who has fully availed of her
right to be heard, only relied on the waiver
of Editha and failed to present any
evidence to invalidate or otherwise
controvert
the
confirmed
marriage
certificate registered under LCR Registry
No. 2083 on 21 November 1967. She did
not even try to allege and prove any
infirmity in the marriage between the
deceased and Editha.
As to the issue of who has the better right
over the SSS death benefits, Section 8(e)
and (k) of R. A. No. 8282 is very clear.
Section
8 Terms
Defined.
(e) Dependents The dependent shall be
the following:
(1) The legal spouse
entitled by law to receive support from the
member; 2) The legitimate, legitimated,
or legally adopted, and illegitimate child
who is unmarried, not gainfully employed
and has not reached twenty-one years
(21) of age, or if over twenty-one (21)

years of age, he is congenitally or while

still a minor has been permanently
incapacitated and incapable of selfsupport, physically or mentally; and 3) The
parent who is receiving regular support
from
the
member.
Under
(k) Beneficiaries The dependent spouse
until he or she remarries, the dependent
legitimate, legitimated or legally adopted,
and illegitimate children, who shall be
the primary
beneficiaries of
the
member: Provided, That the dependent
illegitimate children shall be entitled to
fifty percent (50%) of the share of the
legitimate, legitimated or legally adopted
children: Provided, further, That in the
absence of the dependent legitimate,
legitimated or legally adopted children of
the
member,
his/her
dependent
illegitimate children shall be entitled to
one hundred percent (100%) of the
benefits, in their absence, the dependent
parents who shall be the secondary
beneficiaries of
the
member.
In
the absence of all of the foregoing, any
other person designated by the member
as his/her secondary beneficiary.

entitled to the death benefits as primary

beneficiaries. The SSS Law is clear that for
a minor child to qualify as a dependent,[
the only requirements are that he/she
must be below 21 years of age, not
married nor gainfully employed. In this
case,
the
minor
illegitimate
children Ginalyn and Rodelyn were
born
on 13 April 1996 and 20 April 2000,
respectively. Had the legitimate child of
the deceased and Editha survived and
qualified as a dependent under the SSS
Law, Ginalyn and
Rodelyn would
have
been entitled to a share equivalent to only
50% of the share of the said legitimate
child. Since the legitimate child of the
deceased
predeceased
him, Ginalyn and Rodelyn, as the only
qualified primary beneficiaries of the
deceased, are entitled to 100% of the
benefits. WHEREFORE, the petition is
DENIED. The Decision of the Court of
Appeals is AFFIRMED. Cost against
petitioner.

Section 13: Death Benefits. Upon the

death of a member who has paid at least
thirty-six (36) monthly contributions prior
to the semester of death, his primary
beneficiaries shall be entitled to the
monthly pension: Provided, That if he has
no primary beneficiaries, his secondary
beneficiaries shall be entitled to a lump
sum benefit equivalent to thirty-six (36)
times the monthly pension. If he has not
paid the required thirty-six (36) monthly
contributions, his primary or secondary
beneficiaries shall be entitled to a lump
sum benefit equivalent to the monthly
pension times the number of monthly
contributions paid to the SSS or twelve
(12)
times
the
monthly
pension,
whichever is higher.

Facts:
Wilhelm Jambrich, an Austrian, met
Antonietta Descallar (respondent), a
Filipina, while the former was working in
the Philippines sometime in 1983. The two
became sweetheart, and later cohabited
as husband and wife without the benefit of
marriage. During their cohabitation, the
two acquired some real properties in the
Philippines composed of several houses
and lots which they bought from AgroMacro Development Corporation. The
deed of sale of said real properties were
placed in the name of both Jambrich and
Descallar as buyers, but were registered
under the Torrens system in the name of
Descallar alone as Jambrich is disqualified
to own real properties in the country. It is
sufficiently established though that the
funds used to buy said properties
came solely from Jambrich, as Descallar
has no sufficient source of income.
After their relationship has turned sour
and the two went their separate ways,
Jambrich sold his rights and interests in
the Agro-Macro properties to Camilo
Borromeo
(the
petitioner),
a

Whoever claims entitlement to the

benefits provided by law should establish
his or her right thereto by substantial
evidence. Since petitioner is disqualified to
be a beneficiary and because the
deceased has no legitimate child, it
follows that the dependent illegitimate
minor children of the deceased shall be

Borromeo v. Descallar

Filipino,evidenced by a Deed of Absolute

sale/Assignment. When Borromeo, the
buyer, tried to register the properties in
his name, he discovered that it is
registered in the name of Descallar,
and that it has already been mortgaged.
Borromeo filed a complaint for recovery of
real property against Descallar.

citizen or transfers it to a Filipino, the flaw

in the original transaction is considered
cured and the title of the transferee is
rendered valid.

Issues:
1. Having established that the true
buyer of the disputed properties
was the Austrian Wilhelm Jambrich,
what is the effect of registration of
the properties in the name of
respondent Descallar0
2. Whether the sale or assignment
made by Jambrich to Borromeo is
valid considering that the former as
alien is disqualified to own real
properties in the Philippines.
Held:
1. The registration of the properties in
question in the name of Descallar
does not make her the owner of the
said properties. It is settled that
registration is not a mode of
acquiring ownership, it is only a
means of confirming the fact of its
existence with notice to the world
at large. Certificates of title are not
a
source
of
right
The
mere possession of a title does not
make one the true owner of the
property. Thus, the mere fact that
respondent has the titles of
the disputed properties
in
her
name
does
not
necessarilly,
conclusively and absolutely make
her the owner#4(Borromeo &
Descallar)
ibid.
2. GIven that aliens are disqualified to
own real properties in the country,
therefore, in the instant case, the transfer
of land from Agro-Macro Development
Corporation to Jambrich, who is an
Austrian, would have been declared ivalid
if challenged, had not Jambrich conveyed
the properties to petitioner who is a
Filipino citizen. In United Church Board for
World Ministries, the Court reiterated the
consistent ruling in a number of cases that
if land is invalidly transferred to an alien
who subsequentl'y becomes a Filipino

Facts:
Petitioners were the legitimate wife
and children of Loreto Maramag
(Loreto), while respondents were
Loretos illegitimate family.
Loreto designated respondents as
beneficiaries in his life insurance
policies from Insular Life Assurance
Company, Ltd. (Insular) and Great
Pacific Life Assurance Corporation
(Grepalife).
Petitioners instituted in the RTC a
petition for revocation and/or
reduction of insurance proceeds for
being void and/or inofficious, with
prayer for a temporary restraining
order (TRO) and a writ of
preliminary injunction.
Pursuant to the motion to dismiss
incorporated
in
Insular
and
Grepalifes respective answers, the
TC dismissed the complaint with
respect
to
the
illegitimate
children,who
are
the
the
designated primary beneficiaries in
the life insurance policies, for lack
of cause action. However, trial
court ruled that the action may
proceed against the concubine,
Insular Life, and Grepalife.
Insular and Grepalife filed their
respective
motions
for
reconsideration, arguing, in the
main, that the petition failed to
state a cause of action against
them.
RTC granted, and dismissed the
case against them. In doing so, the
TC court considered the allegations
found in Insulars answer.
CA dismissed petitioner's appeal
for lack of jurisdiction, holding that
the decision of the trial court
dismissing the complaint for failure
to state a cause of action involved

Heirs of Maramag vs De Guzman

GR 181132, June 5, 2009

a pure question of law. Further, it

found that due to petitioners
failure to timely file a motion for
reconsideration,
the
dismissal
against Insular and Grepalife had
already attained finality.

the parties or in the course of the hearings

related to the case.
It is evident from the face of the complaint
that petitioners are not entitled to
afavorable judgment in light of Article
2011 of the Civil Code which expressly
providesthat insurance contracts shall be
governed by special laws, i.e.t, the
InsuranceCode.
Section
53
of
the
Insurance Code states that the insurance
proceeds shall be applied exclusively to
the proper interest of the person in whose
name or for whose benefit it is made
unless otherwise specified in the policy.
From the petition filed before the trial
court that, it is clear that although
petitioners are the legitimate heirs of
Loreto,they
were
not
named
as
beneficiaries in the insurance policies
issued by Insular and Grepalife. Thus, they
are not entitled to the proceeds thereof.
Accordingly, respondents Insular and
Grepalife have no legal obligation to turn
over the insurance proceeds to petitioners

Issue: WON the TC erred in granting the

motion to dismiss?
SC

Decision:

NO.

Arguments:
Petitioners:The finding that Eva was either
disqualified as a beneficiary by the
insurance
companies
or
that
her
designation was revoked by Loreto was
raised only in the answers and motions for
reconsideration of both Insular and
Grepalife. For a motion to dismiss to
prosper on that ground, only the
allegations in the complaint should be
considered.
Ratio:
When a motion to dismiss is premised on
Sec. 1(g) of Rule 16 of the Rules of Court,
the ruling thereon should be based only on
the facts alleged in the complaint. The
Court must resolve the issue on the
strength of such allegations, assuming
them to betrue. The test of sufficiency of a
cause of action rests on whether,
hypothetically admitting the facts alleged
in the complaint to be true, the court can
render a valid judgment upon the same, in
accordance with the prayer in the
complaint.However, this rule is subject to
well-recognized exceptions, such that
there is no hypothetical admission of the
veracity of the allegations if:
1.the falsity of the allegations is subject to
judicial notice;
2.such allegations are legally impossible;
3.the allegations refer to facts which are
inadmissible in evidence;
4.by the record or document in the
pleading,
the
allegations
appear
unfounded; or
5.there is evidence which has been
presented to the court by stipulation of

Lacbayan vs. Samoy

Facts:

Betty Lacbayan (petitioner) and

Bayani S. Samoy (respondent) had an
illicit relationship.

During their relationship, they,

together with three more incorporators,
were able to establish a manpower
services company.

The company acquired five parcels

of land were registered in petitioner and
respondents
names,
ostensibly
as
husband and wife.

When their relationship turned

sour, they decided to divide the said
properties and terminate their business
partnership by executing a Partition
Agreement.

Initially, respondent agreed to

petitioners proposal that the properties in
Malvar St. and Don Enrique Heights be
assigned to the latter, while the ownership
over the three other properties will go to
respondent.

However, when Lacbayan wanted

additional demands to be included in the
partition agreement, Samoy refused.

Feeling aggrieved, petitioner filed a

complaint for judicial partition of the said
properties.

Petitioners
contention:
She
claimed that they started to live together
as husband and wife in 1979 without the
benefit of marriage and worked together
as business partners, acquiring real
properties amounting to P15,500,000.00.

Respondents
contention:
He
purchased the properties using his own
personal funds.

RTC and CA ruled in favor or

respondent.
Issues:
1. WON an action for partition precludes a
settlement on the issue of ownership.
2. Would a resolution on the issue of
ownership subject the Torrens title issued
over the disputed realties to a collateral
attack?
Held:
1. No.
While it is true that the complaint involved
here is one for partition, the same is
premised on the existence or nonexistence of co-ownership between the
parties. Until and unless this issue of coownership
is
definitely
and
finally
resolved, it would be premature to effect a
partition of the disputed properties. More
importantly, the complaint will not even lie
if the claimant, or petitioner in this case,
does not even have any rightful interest
over the subject properties.
A careful perusal of the contents of the socalled Partition Agreement indicates that
the document involves matters which
necessitate prior settlement of questions
of law, basic of which is a determination
as to whether the parties have the right to
freely divide among themselves the
subject properties.

2. No.
There is no dispute that a Torrens
certificate of title cannot be collaterally
attacked, but that rule is not material to
the case at bar. What cannot be
collaterally attacked is the certificate of
title and not the title itself. The certificate
referred to is that document issued by the
Register of Deeds known as the TCT. In
contrast, the title referred to by law means
ownership which is, more often than not,
represented by that document.
Moreover, placing a parcel of land under
the mantle of the Torrens system does not
mean that ownership thereof can no
longer be disputed. Mere issuance of the
certificate of title in the name of any
person does not foreclose the possibility
that the real property may be under coownership with persons not named in the
certificate, or that the registrant may only
be a trustee, or that other parties may
have acquired interest over the property
subsequent to the issuance of the
certificate of title. Needless to say,
registration does not vest ownership over
a property, but may be the best evidence
thereof.
Other topic:
Whether respondent is estopped from
repudiating co-ownership over the subject
realties.
YES. Petitioner herself admitted that she
did not assent to the Partition Agreement
after seeing the need to amend the same
to include other matters. Petitioner does
not have any right to insist on the
contents
of
an
agreement
she
intentionally refused to sign.
Moreover, to follow petitioners argument
would be to allow respondent not only to
admit against his own interest but that of
his legal spouse as well, who may also be
lawfully entitled co-ownership over the
said properties.
Go-Bangayan v Bangayan Jr.

Facts: In September 1979, Benjamin

Bangayan, Jr. married Azucena Alegre. In
1982, while Alegre was outside the
Philippines,
Benjamin
developed
a
romantic relationship with Sally Go. Sallys
father was against this. In order to
appease her father, Sally convinced
Benjamin to sign a purported marriage
contract in March 1982.
In 1994, the relationship between Sally
and Benjamin soured. Sally filed a bigamy
case against Benjamin. Benjamin on the
other hand filed an action to declare his
alleged marriage to Sally as non-existent.
To prove the existence of their marriage,
Sally presented a marriage license
allegedly issued to Benjamin.
ISSUE: 1. Whether or not the marriage
between Sally and Benjamin is bigamous.
2. What is the property relation of Sally
and Benjamin
HELD: 1. No. The elements of bigamy are:
a. That the offender has been legally
married.
b. That the marriage has not been legally
dissolved or, in case his or her spouse is
absent, the absent spouse could not yet
be presumed dead according to the Civil
Code.
c. That he contracts a second or
subsequent marriage.
d. That the second or subsequent
marriage has all the essential requisites
for validity.
In this case, the fourth element is not
present. The marriage license presented
by Sally was not authentic as in fact, no
marriage license was ever issued to both
parties in view of the alleged marriage.
The marriage between them was merely in
jest and never complied with the essential
requisites of marriage. Hence, there is no
bigamous marriage to speak of.
2. The CA correctly ruled that the property
relation of Benjamin and Sally is governed
by Art. 148 of the FC which provides:
Art. 148. In cases of cohabitation not
falling under the preceding Article, only
the properties acquired by both of the
parties
through
their
actual
joint
contribution of money, property, or
industry shall be owned by them in
common in proportion to their respective
contributions. In the absence of proof to
the contrary, their contributions and

corresponding shares are presumed to be

equal. The same rule and presumption
shall apply to joint deposits of money and
evidences of credit.
If one of the parties is validly married to
another, his or her share in the coownership shall accrue to the absolute
community
of
conjugal
partnership
existing in such valid marriage. If the party
who acted in bad faith is not validly
married to another, his or her share shall
be forfeited in the manner provided in the
last paragraph of the preceding Article.
The foregoing rules on forfeiture shall
likewise apply even if both parties are in
bad faith.
Benjamin and Sally cohabitated without
the benefit of marriage. Thus, only the
properties acquired by them through their
actual joint contribution of money,
property, or industry shall be owned by
them in common in proportion to their
respective contributions.
PACIFIC ACE VS YANAGISAWA GR 175303
04.11.12
(INTERNET DIGEST)

FACTS
R (Japanese) and Evelyn married
Evelyn then bought a townhouse unit
which was registered in her name.
R filed a Petition for Declaration of Nullity
against Evelyn on the ground of bigamy.
During the pendency of the case, R filed a
Motion for the Issuance of a Restraining
Order against Evelyn and an Application
for a Writ of a Preliminary Injunction to
enjoin her from disposing or encumbering
all of the properties registered in her
name.
Rs petition became moot because Evelyn
committed in open court that she will not
dispose of the property during the
pendency of the case.
Evelyn obtained a loan from P (PAFIN) and
executed a REM (real estate mortgage) in
favor of P over the townhouse unit
R filed for an annulment of the REM.
MAKATI RTC DECISION: (at the time of the
mortgage)
dissolved
the
marriage
between Rand Evelyn and ordered the
liquidation of their properties.

PARANAQUE RTC DECISION:- a foreign

national,
cannot possibly
own
the
mortgaged property.- Without ownership,
or any other law or contract binding the
defendants to him, Eiji has no cause of
action that may be asserted against
Evelyn and P.
CA DECISION: annulled the REM executed by
Evelyn in favor of PAFIN.
ISSUE
WON pque rtcs decision was improper
HELD
YES.
The issue of ownership and liquidation
of properties
acquired
during
the
cohabitationof Eiji and Evelyn has been
submitted for the resolution of the Makati
RTC, and is pending appeal before the CA.
The doctrine of judicial stability or
non-interference dictates that the
assumption by the Makati RTC over the issue
operates as an insurmountable barrier
to the subsequent assumption by the
Paraaque RTC.
.Jurisprudence holds that all acts done
inviolation of a standing injunction order
arevoidable as to the party enjoined and
thirdparties who are not in good faith.
The party,in whose favor the injunction is
issued, has acause of action to seek the
annulment of theoffending actions
Denied for lack of merit.

Pedro Gayon vs Silvestre Gayon and

Genoveva De Gayon
GR No.: L-28394
November 26, 1970
Topic: Family Relations- Effects on legal
Dispute
Facts:
Petitioners Allegation:
In 1952- Respondents executed a
deed and sold an unregistered
parcel of land in Guimbal, Ilolilo in
favour or Pedro Galera for P500.00
including
the
improvements
thereon, subject to redemption
within five (5) years or not later
than 1957 by either respondents or
their heirs.
After the 5 year period has lapsed
without the respondents exercising

their redemption, sid Pedro Galera

sold the property to herein
petitioner,
Pedro
Gayon
for
P614.00, introduced improvements
(P1,000.00) and fully paid the
taxes.
Respondents Defense:
Said that her husband, Silvestre
died before the institution of the
case and that the deed attached to
the complaint is fictitious because
according to her the signature
attached therein is not hers.
Also, she averred that being the
brother of the deceased Silvestre,
petitioner did not exert efforts for
the amicable settlement of the
case before filing the complaint.
Then likewise prayed for the
complaints dismissal.
Trial Court Ruling:
Case was dismissed after ruling
that it appearing from the evidence
presented that Silvestre is the
absolute owner of the land in
question and that the wife has
nothing to do with the subject
property.
Issue: Whether or not Mrs Gayons
argument that effort must first be exerted
to the amicable settlement of the dispute
has merit.
Ruling:
The Court ruled that as regards the
petitioners failure to seek a
compromise, Art 222 of the Civil
Code provides that:
No suit shall be filed or
maintained between members of
the same family unless it should
appears that earnest efforts toward
a compromise have been made,
but the same have failed, subject
to the limitations in Article 2035
It was emphasized that the phrase
members of the same family should be
construed in the light of Article 217 of the
FC which states that:
Family relations shall include those:
1.
Between husband and wife
2.
Between parent and child
3.
Among other ascendants and their
descendants

4.

Among

brothers

and

sisters;

In this case, Mrs Gayon is the petitioners

sister in law and her children are his
nephew/niece and inasmuch as none of
them is included in the enumeration
above, it follows that they must be
excluded as party in the case at bar

reconsideration but likewise denied by the

lower court]
Hence, this petition.
Issue:
WON Article 222 of the Civil Code will
apply in the instant case.
Held
: Decision of the lower court, reversed.

Wainwright vs Versoza
26 SCRA 7
Facts:
Margaret Ann Wainright Versoza, and three
minor children, Jose Ma. Versoza, Jr.,
Charles John Versoza and Virginia Felice
Versoza filed a complaint forP1,500.00
monthly support, support in arrears, and
damages, and custody of children, with a
petition for support pendente lite against Jose
Ma. Versoza.
Grounds for complaint: Abandoned
the plaintiff s without providing for
their support and maintains illicit relations with
another woman.
Defendant
answer:
The
claim
is
premature for it states no cause of action.
Article 222 of the Civil Code: "No
s u i t s h a l l b e fi l e d o r m a i n t a i n e d
between members of the same family
unless it should appear that earnest
eff orts toward a compromise have
been made, but that the same have
failed, subject to the limitations in article
2035."
Ground for dismissal of the instant case:
the suit is between members of the same
family and no earnest efforts towards a
compromise have been made."
Lower Courts decision: Dismissal of
the complaint upon the ground that
the re
was
no
showing
that
e ff o r t s h a v e b e e n e x e r t e d t o
s e t t l e t h e c a s e amicably before suit
was started. [There were to motion for

Article 222 is subject to the limitations in

Article 2035 of the Civil Code:
ART. 2035. No compromise upon the
following questions shall be valid:(1) The
civil status of persons;(2) The validity of a
marriage or a legal separation;(3) Any
ground for legal separation;
(4) Future support;(5) The jurisdiction of
courts;(6) Future legitime.
Magbaleta vs Gonong, 76 SCRA 511
Effect of family relationship on legal
disputes.
Petition for certiorari, Prohibition and
mandamus, with preliminary injunction,
against the orders of respondent judge in
(Civil Case No. 633-IV of the Court of First
Instance of Ilocos Norte dated August 31,
1916 and October 8, 1976 denying
petitioners'
motion
to
dismiss
the
complaint
filed
against
them
notwithstanding that private respondent is
the brother of petitioner Rufino Magbaleta,
the husband of the other petitioner
Romana B. Magbaleta, and the suit is to
have a parcel of land, covered by a Free
Patent Title in the name of Rufino,
declared to be the property of private
respondent, who claims in said complaint
that the third petitioner Susana G. Baldovi
is trying to take possession of said land
from his representative, contending she
had bought the same from the spouses
Rufino and Romana, said orders having
been issued allegedly in violation of Article
222 of the Civil Code and Section 1 of Rule
16 of the Rules of Court, there being no

allegation in respondent's complaint that

his suit, being between members of the
same family, earnest efforts towards a
compromise have been made before the
same was filed.
Respondent judge premised his refusal to
dismiss the complaint upon the sole
ground that one of the defendants,
petitioner Susana G. Baldovi, the alleged
buyer of the land in dispute, is a stranger.
hence
the
legal
provisions
abovementioned do not apply.
W/N deicision of judge is correct.
YES.
Art. 222. No suit shall be filed or
maintained between members of the
same family unless it should appear that
earnest efforts toward a compromise have
been made, but that the same have failed,
subject to the limitations in Article 2035.
While indeed, as pointed out by the Code
Commission "it is difficult to imagine a
sadder and more tragic spectacle than a
litigation between members of the same
family" hence, "it is necessary that every
effort should be made toward a
compromise before a litigation is allowed
to breed hate and passion in the family"
and "it is known that a lawsuit between
close
relatives
generates
deeper
bitterness
than
between
strangers"
(Report of the Code Commission, p. 18),
these considerations do not, however,
weigh enough to make it imperative that
such efforts to compromise should be a
jurisdictional
pre-requisite
for
the
maintenance of an action whenever a
stranger to the family is a party thereto,
whether as a necessary or indispensable
one. We find no cause in the reason for
being of the provisions relied upon by
petitioners to give it broader scope than
the literal import thereof warrants.

Articles 150 and 151 Members of

Family/Earnest Efforts to compromise
HIYAS SAVINGS and LOAN BANK, INC. vs
HON. EDMUNDO T. ACUA
G.R. NO. 154132
August 31, 2006
FIRST DIVISION
Facts:
On November 24, 2000, Alberto Moreno
(private respondent) filed with the RTC of
Caloocan City a complaint against Hiyas
Savings and Loan Bank, Inc. (petitioner),
his wife Remedios, the spouses Felipe and
Maria Owe and the Register of Deeds of
Caloocan City for cancellation of mortgage
contending that he did not secure any
loan from petitioner, nor did he sign or
execute any contract of mortgage in its
favor; that his wife, acting in conspiracy
with Hiyas and the spouses Owe, who
were the ones that benefited from the
loan, made it appear that he signed the
contract of mortgage; that he could not
have executed the said contract because
he was then working abroad.4
On May 17, 2001, petitioner filed a Motion
to Dismiss on the ground that private
respondent failed to comply with Article
151 of the Family Code wherein it is
provided that no suit between members of
the same family shall prosper unless it
should appear from the verified complaint
or petition that earnest efforts toward a
compromise have been made, but that the
same have failed. Petitioner contends that
since the complaint does not contain any
fact or averment that earnest efforts
toward a compromise had been made
prior to its institution, then the complaint
should be dismissed for lack of cause of
action.
On November 8, 2001, the RTC issued the
first of its assailed Orders denying the
Motion to Dismiss. In the present case,
petitioner failed to advance a satisfactory
explanation as to its failure to comply with
the principle of judicial hierarchy. There is
no reason why the instant petition could
not have been brought before the CA. On

this basis, the instant petition should be

dismissed.

PONENTE:

PEREZ, J. (2nd Div)

Issue:
Whether or not public respondent
committed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or in excess of
jurisdiction when he ruled that lack of
earnest efforts toward a compromise is not
a ground for a motion to dismiss in suits
between husband and wife when other
parties who are strangers to the family are
involved in the suit.

LAW:
Family Code

Held:
The Court is not persuaded. Article 151 of
the Family Code provides that No suit
between members of the same family
shall prosper unless it should appear from
the verified complaint or petition that
earnest efforts toward a compromise have
been made, but that the same have failed.
If it is shown that no such efforts were in
fact made, the case must be dismissed.
This rule shall not apply to cases which
may not be the subject of compromise
under the Civil Code.

1997 Rules of Civil Procedure

Petitioner also contends that the trial court

committed grave abuse of discretion when
it ruled that petitioner, not being a
member
of
the
same
family
as
respondent, may not invoke the provisions
of Article 151 of the Family Code.
Petition DISMISSED for lack of merit.

HEIRS OF FAVIS, SR., v. GONZALES

G.R. No. 185922; January 15, 2014

TOPIC:
Effects
relationship on legal disputes
PETITIONERS:
Favis, Sr.

of

Art. 151. No suit between members of

the same family shall prosper unless it
should appear from the verified
complaint or petition that earnest
efforts toward a compromise have
been made, but that the same have
failed. If it is shown that no such
efforts were in fact made, the same
case must be dismissed.
This rule shall not apply to cases
which may not be the subject of
compromise under the Civil Code.

Rule 9, Sec. 1. Defenses and objections

not
pleaded.

Defenses
and
objections not pleaded either in a
motion to dismiss or in the answer are
deemed waived. However, when it
appears from the pleadings or the
evidence on record that the court has
no jurisdiction over the subject matter,
that there is another action pending
between the same parties for the same
cause, or that the action is barred by a
prior judgment or by statute of
limitations, the court shall dismiss the
claim.
Rule 16, Sec. 1. Grounds. Within the
time for but before filing the answer to
the complaint or pleading asserting a
claim, a motion to dismiss may be
made on any of the following grounds:
j) That a condition precedent for
filing the claim has not been
complied with.

family

Heirs of Dr. Mariano

RESPONDENTS:
Juana
Gonzales,
Mariano G. Favis, Ma. Theresa Joana D.
Favis, James Mark D. Favis,

FACTS:

Dr. Mariano Favis, Sr. (Dr. Favis) was

married
to
Capitolina
Aguilar
(Capitolina) with whom he had 7
children

Capitolina died in Mar 1994. Dr.

Favis married Juana Gonzalez
(Juana), his common-law wife
with whom he sired Mariano
o He
executed
an
affidavit
acknowledging Mariano as one
of his legitimate children
o Mariano is married to Larcelita
D. Favis (Larcelita), with whom
he has four children.
Jul 29, 1995: Dr. Favis died intestate
o Oct 16, 1994: prior his death,
he allegedly executed a Deed of
Donation
transferring
and
conveying properties in favor of
his grandchildren with Juana
o Claiming the said donation
prejudiced their legitime, Dr.
Favis children with Capitolina
(petitioners), filed an action for
annulment of the Deed of
Donation, inventory, liquidation,
liquidation and partition of
property before the RTC vs.
Juana,
Sps.
Mariano
and
Larcelita
and
their
grandchildren
RTC nullified the Deed of Donation
o found that Dr. Favis, at the age
of 92 and plagued with illnesses
(advanced stage of Parkinsons
disease), could not have had
full control of his mental
capacities to execute a valid
Deed of Donation.
CA ordered the dismissal of the
petitioners nullification case
o motu proprio
ordered the
dismissal of the complaint for
failure of petitioners to make an
averment that earnest efforts
toward a compromise have
been made, based FC Art 151
o

HELD:

ISSUE:
WON the CA may dismiss
the order of dismissal of the
complaint for failure to allege
therein that earnest efforts towards
a compromise have been made

CA erred in dismissing the

complaint.
CA
decision
is
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. RTC
decision is AFFIRMED.

CAs decision hinged on FC Art 151, in

relation to Sec 1 (j), Rule 16 of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure
o reliance on this provision is
misplaced
o Rule 16 treats of the grounds
for a motion to dismiss the
complaint
It must be distinguished
from
the
grounds
provided under Sec 1,
Rule 9 which specifically
deals with dismissal of
the
claim
by
the
court motu proprio
Sec 1, Rule 9 provides
for
only
4 instances
when
the
court
may motu proprio
dismiss the claim:
a) lack
of
jurisdiction over
the
subject
matter
b) litis pendentia
c) res judicata and
d) prescription
of
action
o in this case, none of the 4
instances are present FC Art
151 (failure to allege earnest
but failed
efforts
at
a
compromise in a complaint
among members of the same
family) is not included in the list
nor a jurisdictional defect but
merely
a
defect
in
the
statement of a cause of action
Heirs of Domingo Valientes v. Ramas:
o the 2nd sentence of Sec 1, Rule
9
does
not
only
supply
exceptions to the rule that
defenses not pleaded either in
a motion to dismiss or in the
answer are deemed waived, it
also allows courts to dismiss
cases motu propio on any of the
enumerated grounds.

The tenor of the 2nd sentence of

the Rule is that the allowance of
a motu propio dismissal can
proceed
only
from
the
exemption from the rule on
waiver; which is but logical
because there can be no ruling
on a waived ground.
In this case, no motion to dismiss the
complaint based on the failure to
comply with a condition precedent was
filed in the trial court; neither was such
failure assigned as error in the appeal
that respondent brought before the
Court of Appeals.:
o Trial court proceedings ran the
full course
o Petitioners
complaint
was
answered
by
respondents without a prior
motion to dismiss having been
filed
o decision in favor
of the
petitioners was appealed by
respondents on the basis of the
alleged error in the ruling on
the merits, no mention having
been made about any defect in
the statement of a cause of
action
As such, the rule on deemed waiver of
the
non-jurisdictional
defense
or
objection is wholly applicable to
respondent
o If the respondents as partiesdefendants did not invoke the
objection of absence of the
required allegation on earnest
efforts at a compromise after
filing
their
answer
to
petitioners complaint, the CA
did not have any authority or
basis to motu propio order the
dismissal
of
petitioners
complaint
Trial court's factual finding, therefore,
stands unreversed
o respondents opted to rely only
on what the CA erroneously
considered
a
procedural
infirmity
o respondents did not provide us
with any argument to have it
reversed
o

The correctness of the finding

was not touched by the CA

Patricio vs. Dario [The Family Home;

Beneficiaries]
FACTS:
Marcelino Dario died intestate and was
survived by his wife and two children. The
surviving heirs extrajudicially settled his
estate. One of the properties he left was
the family home. A new title for the said
property was thereafter issued under the
name of the wife and the two children as
co-owners. After some time, the wife and
one of the sons expressed their desire to
partition the family home and terminate
the co-ownership. The other son opposed
the partition on the ground that the family
home should remain despite the death of
one or both the spouses as long as there is
a minor beneficiary thereof. The supposed
minor beneficiary is oppositor's son, the
grandchild of the decedent.
ISSUE:
Whether the partition of the family home
is proper where one of the co-owners
refuse to accede to such a partition on the
ground that a minor beneficiary still
resides in the said home.
HELD:
To be a beneficiary of the family home,
three requisites must concur: (1) they
must
be
among
the
relationships
enumerated in Art. 154 of the Family
Code; (2) they live in the family home; and
(3) they are dependent for legal support
upon the head of the family.
As to the first requisite, the beneficiaries
of the family home are: (1) The husband
and wife, or an unmarried person who is
the head of a family; and (2) Their
parents,
ascendants,
descendants,
brothers
and
sisters,
whether
the
relationship be legitimate or illegitimate.
The term 'descendants' contemplates all
descendants of the person or persons who
constituted the family home without
distinction; hence, it must necessarily
include the grandchildren and great

grandchildren of the spouses who

constitute a family home. Ubi lex non
distinguit nec nos distinguire debemos.
Where the law does not distinguish, we
should not distinguish. Thus, private
respondent's minor son, who is also the
grandchild of the deceased satisfies the
first requisite.
As to the second requisite, minor
beneficiaries must be actually living in the
family home to avail of the benefits
derived from Art. 159. The son of private
respondent and grandson of the decedent
has been living in the family home since
1994, or within 10 years from the death of
the decedent, hence, he satisfies the
second requisite.
However, as to the third requisite, the
grandson cannot demand support from his
paternal grandmother if he has parents
who are capable of supporting him. The
liability for legal support falls primarily on
his parents, especially his father, herein
private respondent who is the head of his
immediate family. The law first imposes
the obligation of legal support upon the
shoulders of the parents, especially the
father, and only in their default is the
obligation imposed on the grandparents.

judgment

in

favor

Premium:
WHEREFORE,
premises
considered,
judgment
is
hereby
rendered in favor of plaintiff
and
against
defendant
directing the latter to pay
plaintiff the following:
1)
P240,765.00
representing
the
total
overdue
account
plus
interest of 28% per annum
thereon
computed
from
their respective dates of
deliveries until the same
shall have been paid in full;

Facts:
Petition for review on the decision
of the CA last June 30, 2004
dismissing the petition for certiorari
for nullification of the rendered
decision of RTC QC. Assailed also is
the
denied
motion
for
reconsideration to CA.
Dec., 11, 1997: Premium Agro-Vet
Products, Inc. filed a complaint with
RTC QC or sum of money against
Honrado for his business J.E.
HOnrado
Enterprises.
The
complaint
wishes
to
collect
240,765 for all the veterinary
products purchased on credit by
Honrado.
Honrado with is counsel failed to
appear on pre-trial and were

On February 23, 1999, the RTC

rendered

Honrado vs. CA

declared in default. Premium was

allowed to show evidence ex parte.
On the other hand, spouses Jose
and Andrerita Honrado filed a
petition with RTC Calamba for
judicial constitution of a parcel of
land registered under Honrados
name and the house as their family
house.

2)
25% of the total
amount
awarded,
plus
acceptance
fee
of
P50,000.00 and additional
P1,500.00 for each day of
court
appearance,
as
attorneys fees; and
3)

Costs of this suit.

SO ORDERED.
Honrado filed a notice of
appeal but was dismissed
for failure to file brief as
appellant. Premium also
filed a motion for issuance
of writ of execution which
RTC granted.
Sheriff levied on the parcel
of land. The notice of levy
was annotated at the dorsal
portion of the title. Sheriff

of

scheduled
the
sale
of
property at a public auction
on April 4, 2001. Honrado
was given a copy but he
opposed such sale.
May 17, 2001: Highest
bidder was Premium and
sold
ar
650204.10.
A
certificate of sale was
issued and annotated at the
dorsal potion of the title.
Honrado failed to redeem
property.
RTC
Calamba
rendered
decision
and
declared
property as a family home.
May 3, 002: Honrado filed a
motion to declare properties
exempt from execution in
pursuant to Ar. 155 of the
Family Code. He said that
the property is exempt from
execution because it is a
family home which had
been constituted before he
incurred indebtedness with
Premium.
Premium opposed on the
ground that Honrado was
already stopped or barred
by laches from claiming
excemption ad that said
claim has been mooted by
the lapse of the redemption
period
for
Honrado
to
redeem property.

Possession asserting that the oneyear

period

had

already lapsed on May 23, 2002,

without
made

any

redemption

by

Honrado.

being

Honrado

opposed claiming that the RTC

Calamba had already rendered a
decision declaring the property a
family

home.

Honrado

further

averred that his family resided in

the house before the Family Code
became effective and was entitled
to the exemption under the Code.
[17]

On April 14, 2003, the respondent

Judge issued an Order[18] granting
the

motion

of

Premium

and

directing Honrado to: (1) execute a

final deed of conveyance over the
subject parcel of land covered by
TCT No. T-143175 of the Registry of

On September 18, 2002, the RTC

Deeds of Calamba, Laguna; and (2)

denied said motion on the ground

surrender of the subject title, TCT

that Honrado is deemed to have

No. T-143175.

waived the exemption considering

redemption

The respondent Judge also ordered

that he failed to object to the sale

that after execution of the deed of

of the property on execution on

conveyance, a writ of possession

May 17, 2001. Honrado did not

be

assail the said order.

property in favor of the plaintiff and

October 14, 2002: Premium filed a

against

Motion for Issuance of Final Deed of

successors-in-interest who are in

Conveyance

possession of the said premises.

and

Writ

of

issued

the

over

the

defendant

aforesaid

or

his

reasonable time before

the sale, or before the
sale has commenced,
but as to the last there
is contrary authority.
In the light of the facts
above summarized, it is selfevident that appellants did
not assert their claim of
exemption
within
a
reasonable time. We said
before, and We repeat it
now, that litigation must
end
and
terminate
sometime and somewhere,
and it is essential to an
effective administration of
justice
that,
once
a
judgment has become final,
the winning party be not,
through a mere subterfuge,
deprived of the fruits of the
verdict.
We
now
rule
that claims for exemption
from
execution
of
properties under Section 12
of Rule 39 of the Rules of
Court must be presented
before its sale on execution
by the sherif.

Honrado filed a petition for

certiorari with the CA but
petition was dismissed.

Issue:
W/N the property in question is a family
home that should be exempt from
execution
Ratio:
While it is true that the family
home is constituted on a house and
lot from the time it is occupied as a
family residence and is exempt
from execution or forced sale under
Article 153 of the Family Code,
such claim for exemption should be
set up and proved to the Sheriff
before the sale of the property at
public auction. Failure to do so
would estop the party from later
claiming the exemption. As this
Court ruled in Gomez v. Gealone:
Although the Rules of Court
does not prescribe the
period within which to claim
the exemption, the rule is,
nevertheless,
well-settled
that the right of exemption
is a personal privilege
granted to the judgment
debtor and as such, it must
be claimed not by the
sheriff, but by the debtor
himself at the time of the
levy or within a reasonable
period thereafter;
In the absence of
express provision it has
variously
held
that
claim (for exemption)
must be made at the
time of the levy if the
debtor is present, that it
must be made within a
reasonable
time,
or
promptly, or before the
creditor has taken any
step involving further
costs,
or
before
advertisement of sale,
or at any time before
sale,
or
within
a

Held:
Petition denied.
Cabang vs Basay
GR No. 180587
March 20, 2009
Facts:
Felix Odong was the registered owner of a
parcel of land Lot 7777 in Zamboanga the
OCT of which was issued in 1966. Odong
and his heirs never occupied the land. In
1987,the respondents bought the property
from the heirs of Felix but they also did
not occupy the property. Petitioners
Cabang were the awardees in a cadastral
proceedings, they were awarded Lot 7778
but instead of occupying Lot 7778,
petitioners occupied Lot 7777 because a
big portion of Lot 7778 was used by the
government as a public road.Respondents
filed a complaint for recovery of the land

against the petitioners. The case reached

the SC and judgment was for the
respondents. After the judgment became
final, the records were remanded to the
trial court for execution but the court
denied the motion for execution on the
ground that herein petitioners family
home may not be subject to an order of
execution.
Upon petition filed by respondents, the CA
reversed the order of the RTC. In the
present appeal, petitioners argued that
the property subject of the controversy is
their duly constituted family home and not
subject to execution.
Ruling:
SC ruled that while the family home is
exempt from execution, for the exemption
to apply, it must be constituted on
property
owned
by
the
persons
constituting it. It must be part of either the
ACP or the CPG or of the exclusive
properties of either spouse with the
latters consent or on the property of the
unmarried head of the family. In this case,
the alleged family home of petitioners
stood on a land owned by the respondents
and the question of ownership had long
been decided by the courts. Petitioners
continued stay on the property is only by
mere tolerance of the respondents. Thus,
SC denied the petition and ordered the
petitioner to vacate.

SPOUSES CHARLIE FORTALEZA and OFELIA

FORTALEZA vs. SPOUSES RAULLAPITAN
and RONA LAPITAN
G.R. No. 178288 August 15, 2012
Facts:
Spouses Charlie and Ofelia Fortaleza
obtained a loan from spouses Rolando and
Amparo Lapitan (creditors). As security,
spouses Fortaleza executed on January 28,
1998 a Deed of Real Estate Mortgage over
their residential house and lot situated in
Barrio Anos, Municipality of Los Baos,
Laguna (subject property). When spouses
Fortaleza failed to pay the indebtedness

including the interests and penalties, the

creditors
applied
for
extrajudicial
foreclosure of the Real Estate Mortgage
before the Office of the Clerk of Court and
Ex-Officio Sheriff of Calamba City. The
public auction sale was set on May
9, 2001. At the sale, the creditors
son Dr. Raul Lapitan and his wife Rona em
erged as the highestbidders. Then, they
were issued a Certificate of Sale that was
registered with the Registry of Deeds of
Calamba City. The one-year redemption
period expired without the spouses
Fortaleza redeeming the mortgage. Thus,
spouses Lapitan executed an affidavit of
consolidation
of
ownership
on
November20, 2003 and the registration of
the subject property in their names on
February 4, 2004. Despite the foregoing,
the spouses Fortaleza refused spouses
Lapitans formal demand to vacate and
surrender possession of the subject
property.
Issue:
Whether or not the Honorable court of ap
peals gravely erred in not holding that the
petitioners were prevented by the
respondent from exercising their right of
redemption over the foreclosed property
by demanding a redemption over the
foreclosed property by demanding a
redemption price of a highly equitable and
more than double the amount of the
foreclosed property, especially that the
foreclosed mortgaged property is the
family home of petitioners and their
children.
Ruling:
The Supreme Court held that Article
155(3) of
the Family
Code explicitly
allows the forced sale of a family home
"for debts secured by mortgages on the
premises
before
or
after
such
constitution." In this case, there is no
doubt that spouses Fortaleza voluntarily

executed on January28, 1998 a deed of

Real Estate Mortgage over the subject
property, which was even notarized by
their original counsel of record. And
assuming that the property is exempt from
forced sale, spouses Fortaleza did not set
up and prove to the Sheriff such
exemption from forced sale before it was
sold at the public auction.

JUANITA TRINIDAD RAMOS vs. DANILO

PANGILINAN
Facts:
Respondents filed a complaint for illegal
dismissal against E.M. Ramos Electric, Inc.,
a company owned by Ernesto M. Ramos,
the patriarch of herein petitioners. The
labor arbiter ordered Ramos and the
company to pay the respondents backwages, separation pay, 13th month pay &
service incentive leave pay. The decision
became final and executory so a writ of
execution was issued which the Deputy
Sheriff of the National Labor Relations
Commission (NLRC) implemented by
levying a property in Ramos name
situated in Pandacan.
Alleging that the Pandacan property was
the family home, hence, exempt from
execution to satisfy the judgment award,
Ramos and the company moved to quash
the writ of execution. Respondents argued
that it is not the family home there being
another one in Antipolo and that the
Pandacan address is actually the business
address. The motion was denied and the
appeal was likewise denied by the NLRC.
Issue: Whether or not the levy upon the
Pandacan property was valid.
Ruling: Yes. For the family home to be
exempt from execution, distinction must
be made as to what law applies based on
when it was constituted and what
requirements must be complied with by
the judgment debtor or his successors
claiming such privilege. Hence, two sets of
rules are applicable. If the family home
was constructed before the effectivity of
the Family Code or before August 3, 1988,
then it must have been constituted either
judicially or extra-judicially as provided

under Articles 225, 229-231 and 233 of

the Civil Code. Meanwhile, Articles 240 to
242 governs extrajudicial constitution.
On the other hand, for family homes
constructed after the effectivity of the
Family Code on August 3, 1988, there is no
need to constitute extra judicially or
judicially, and the exemption is effective
from the time it was constituted and lasts
as long as any of its beneficiaries under
Art. 154 actually reside therein. Moreover,
the family home should belong to the
absolute
community
or
conjugal
partnership, or if exclusively by one
spouse, its constitution must have been
with consent of the other, and its value
must not exceed certain amounts
depending upon the area where it is
located. Further, the debts incurred for
which the exemption does not apply as
provided under Art. 155 for which the
family home is made answerable must
have been incurred after August 3, 1988.
In both instances, the claim for exemption
must be proved.
In the present case, since petitioners claim
that the family home was constituted prior
to August 3, 1988, or as early as 1944,
they must comply with the procedure
mandated by the Civil Code. There being
absolutely no proof that the Pandacan
property was judicially or extra judicially
constituted as the Ramos family home,
the law protecting the family home cannot
apply thereby making the levy upon the
Pandacan property valid.
Equitable PCI Bank vs. OJ- Mark
trading G.R. No. 165950, August 11,
2010
(INTERNET DIGEST)
Facts:
Respondent-spouses
Oscar
and
Evangeline Martinez obtained loans from
petitioner Equitable PCI Bank, Inc. in the
aggregate amount of P4,048,800.00. As
security for the said amount, a Real Estate
Mortgage (REM) was executed over a
condominium unit where the spouses are
residing.
Respondent Oscar Martinez signed the
REM both as principal debtor and as
President of the registered owner and

third-party mortgagor, respondent OJ-Mark

Trading, Inc.
Respondent-spouses defaulted in the
payment of their outstanding loan
obligation; thus, they offered to settle
their indebtedness with the assignment to
the Bank of a commercial lot, which at
that time, was not transferred in their
name.
While petitioner s officers held a meeting
with respondent Martinez, the latter
however failed to submit the required
documents such as certificates of title and
tax declarations so that the bank can
evaluate his proposal to pay the mortgage
debt viadacion en pago.
Consequently,
petitioner initiated
the
extrajudicial foreclosure of the real estate
mortgage.
On the other hand, respondents filed a
civil case for TRO and annulment of the
extrajudicial sale. They alleged, among
others, that the REM is void for having
been illegally notarized; that the petitioner
acted in BAD FAITH because it did not
officially inform them of the denial or of
their proposal to settle the loan obligation
by dacion.
The RTC ruled in favor of respondents and
issued the TRO.
The same was affirmed by the CA, holding
that respondents have sufficiently shown
their
proprietary
right
over
the
condominium unit sought to be foreclosed,
entitling it to the questioned TRO.
Thus, petitioner filed a petition for review
on certiorari under Rule 45 contending as
follows:
1) it has a clear right to foreclose the
mortgage because the respondents failed
to settle their obligations;
2) there respondents have no right to an
injunction because they have no clear
right to a dacion en pago.
Issue:
Whether or not the respondents have
shown a clear legal right to enjoin the
foreclosure and public auction of the thirdparty mortgagor s property
Held:
The Court REVERSED the decision of the
CA. The Court held that respondent
spouses

are NOT entitled to an injunctive writ beca

use their rights are merely contingent and
not in esse (?).
According to the Court: Respondents failed
to show that they have a right to be
protected and that the acts against which
the writ is to be directed are violative of
the said right. On the face of their clear
admission that they were unable to settle
their obligations which were secured by
the mortgage, petitioner has a clear right
to foreclose the mortgage. Foreclosure is
but a necessary consequence of nonpayment of a mortgage indebtedness.
In a real estate mortgage when the
principal obligation is not paid when due,
the mortgagee has the right to foreclose
the mortgage and to have the property
seized and sold with the view of applying
the proceeds to the payment of the
obligation.
This Court has denied the application for a
Writ of Preliminary Injunction that would
enjoin an extrajudicial foreclosure of a
mortgage, and declared that foreclosure is
proper when the debtors are in default of
the payment of their obligation.
Spouses Araceli Oliva-De Mesa and
Ernesto S. De Mesa vs. Spouses Claudio
D. Acero, JR. and Ma. Rufina D. Acero,
Sheriff Felixberto L. Samonte and Registrar
Alfredo Santos
GR No. 185064
January 16, 2012
Topic: Family Home- Rights of Creditors
Facts:
The case involves a parcel of land
located in No. 3 Forbes Street,
Mount Carmel Homes Subdivision,
Iba,
Meycauayan,
Bulacan
registered under Aracelis name.
Property was jointly acquired while
Petitioners were still cohabiting
before their marriage. Later on a
house has been erected in the
property and thereafter became
their family home.
In September 1988, De Mesa
obtained a loan from Claudio D.
Acero, Jr. worth P100,000.00, which
was secured by a mortgage over
the property. However, because of
Aracelis failure to pay (her issued

check was dishonoured), Acero

filed a complaint for violation of BP
22, Trial Court acquitted Araceli but
ordered her to pay her loan with
legal interest.
On March 15, 1993, a writ of
execution was issued and Sheriff
Samonte levied upon the property
by selling it on public auction. The
following the year, the property
was sold on public auction where
Claudio was the highest bidder.
The certificate of sale was issued to
Acero. In 1995, Clauidio leased the
property to petitioners and a
certain Juanito Oliva for P5,500.00/
month.
However,
petitioners
defaulted
on
the
payment
(P170,500.00) so Acero filed a
complaint for ejectment. On July
1999, MTC rendered a decision
favouring the Aceros and ordering
the petitioners to vacate the
property.
Petitioner filed a petition to nullify
the TCT asserting that the subject
property, which is exempt under
the Family Code and thus, could
not have been validly levied upon
for the purpose of satisfying the
Writ of Execution
Issues:W/N the lower court erred in
refusing to cancel Aceros Torrens title TCT
No. T-221755 (M) over the subject
property.
Ruling: The petition is DENIED
The Decision of the Regional Trial Court is
AFFIRMED
Rules on Constitution
o
FIRST, Family residences
constructed
before
the
Family Code or before
August 3, 1988 must be
constituted as a family
home wither judicially or
extra-judicially
in
accordance with the Civil
Code in order to be exempt
from execution.
o SECOND, Family residences
constructed after the Family
Code
are
automatically
deemed to be family homes
and exempt from execution

from the time it was

constituted and lasts as
long
as
any
of
its
beneficiaries
actually
resides therein;
THIRD, Family residences
which were not judicially or
extra- judicially constituted
as a family home prior to
the effectivity of the Family
Code, but were existing
thereafter, are considered
as
family
homes
by
operation of law and are
prospectively entitled to the
benefits accorded to a
family home under the
Family Code.
Applying this to the present
case, the subject property
became a family home in
1987 and there being no
showings that the property
was judicially or extrajudicially constituted as a
family home under the Civil
Code. Still the Family Code,
the
subject
property
became a family home by
operation of law and is
prospectively entitled to the
benefits accorded to a
family home under the
Family Code.
The Court agreed with the
CA that the petitioners
should have asserted that
the subject property being a
family home and its being
exempted from execution at
the time it was levied or
within a reasonable time
thereafter.
It is also ruled that the
settled rule is that the right
to exemption or forced sale
under Article 153 of the FC I
a personal privilege granted
to the judgement debtor
and as much, it must be
claimed not by the sheriff,
but by the debtor himself
before the sale of the
property at a public auction;
Family home is a real right,

which
is
gratuitous,
inalienable and free from
attachment. It cannot be
seized by creditors except in
certain
special
cases.
HOWEVER, this right can be
waived or be barred by
laches by the failure to set
up and prove the status of
the property as a family
home at the time of the levy
or
a
reasonable
time
thereafter.
For all intents and purposes,
the petitioners negligence
or mission to assert their
right within a reasonable
time gives rise to the
presumption that they have
abandoned,
waived,
declined to assert it.

Belen
Sagad
ANGELES
vs
Aleli
Corazon Angeles MAGLAYA
(G.R. No. 153798; Sept 2, 2005; J.
Garcia)
FACTS:
Francisco Angeles died intestate on
January 21, 1998 in the City of Manila,
leaving behind 4 parcels of land and a
building, among other valuable properties.
Respondent Corazon claims that as the
sole legitimate child of the deceased and
Genoveva
Mercado
has
all
the
qualifications
and
none
of
the
disqualifications
required
of
an
administrator. Petitioner Belen claims, as
Franciscos second wife
and surviving spouse, that she should be
made administratix of Franciscos estate.
She claims that respondent could not be
the daughter of Francisco for, although
she was recorded as Franciscos legitimate
daughter,
the
corresponding
birth
certificate was not signed by him. Further
she said that respondent, despite her
claim of being the legitimate child
of Francisco and Genoveva Mercado, has
not presented the marriage contract
between
her
supposed
parents
or produced any acceptable document to
prove such union. She also said that she
and Francisco adopted a child. Respondent

in turn alleged that per certification of the

appropriate offices, the January to
December 1938 records of marriages of
the Civil Registrar of Bacolor, Pampanga
where the alleged 1938 FranciscoGenoveva wedding took place, were
destroyed. She also dismissed the
adoption as of little consequence, owing to
her having interposed with the Court of
Appeals a petition to nullify the decree of
adoption entered by the RTC at Caloocan.
Respondent testified having been in open
and continuous possession of the status of
a legitimate child. Four other witnesses
testified on her behalf, and she also
offered in evidence her
birth cerTificate which contained an
entry stating that she was born at the
Mary Johnston Hospital, Tondo, Manila, to
Francisco Angeles and Genoveva mercado
and whereon the handwritten word Yes
appears on the space below the question
Legitimate? (Legitimo?). Pictures taken
during respondents wedding as bride to
Atty. Guillermo T.Maglaya; a copy of her
marriage contract, andher scholastic
and government service records, were
also offered as evidence. RTC ruled in
favour of Petitoner, CA ruled in favor of
respondent.
ISSUE:
WoN respondent is the legitimate child of
decedent Francisco M. Angeles and
Genoveva Mercado?
HELD: NO
CA erred in giving respondent presumptive
legitimacy. A legitimate child is a product
of, and, therefore, implies a valid and
lawful marriage (FC Art 146). However,
the
presumption
of
legitimacy
under Art 164 may be availed only
upon convincing proof of the factual
basis therefor , i.e., that the childs
parents were legally married and that
his/her conception or birth occurred during
the
subsistence
of
that
marriage.
Respondent failed to present evidence of
Franciscos marriage to Genoveva, thus
she cannot be presumed legitimate.
Further, the Birth Certificate presented
was not signed by Francisco against whom

legitimate filiation is asserted. Not even by

Genoveva. It was only signed by the
attending physician making it only proof of
the fact of the birth of a child. The
legitimate filiation of a child is a
matter fixed by law itself, it cannot be
made dependent on the declaration of the
attending physician or midwife, or that of
the mother of the new born child. None of
the evidence respondent presented is
enough to prove filiation or recognition.
Further, RTC Caloocan in the case
respondent filed to nullify the adoption of
Francisco and Belen of their child, said
that respondent is NOT a legitimate
child of Francisco and Genoveva;
following the rule on conclusiveness of
judgment, herein respondent is precluded
from claiming that she is the legitimate
daughter of Francisco and Genoveva
Mercado. In fine, the issue of herein
respondents
legitimate
filiation
to
Francisco and the latters marriage to
Genoveva,
having
been
judicially
determined in a final judgment by a court
of competent jurisdiction, has thereby
become res judicata and may not again be
resurrected or litigated between herein
petitioner and respondent or their privies
in a subsequent action, regardless of the
form of the latter. Finally, it should be
noted that on the matter of appointment
of administrator of the estate of the
deceased , the surviving spouse is
preferred over the next of kin of the
deceased
SSS vs. Aguas, G.R. 165546, Feb. 27, 2006
Legitimate children
Facts: Pablo Aguas, SSS pensioner, died on
December 8, 1996. His surviving spouse
Rosanna Aguas filed a claim with the SSS
for death benefits. In her claim, Rosanna
indicated that Pablo was survived by his
minor child Jeylnn. Her claim was
approved on February 13, 1997.
In April 1997, deceased sister, Leticia
Aguas-Macapinlac contested Rosannas
claim, saying that Rosanna abandoned the
family abode about 6 years earlier and

that she was living with another man.

Leticia further alleged that Pablo did not
have any children with Rosanna but
Rosanna had several children with a
certain Romeo dela Pena. SSS suspended
the payment of the pension and
conducted
an
investigation.
The
investigation confirmed that Pablo did not
have any children with Rosanna and that
Pablo was incapable of having children
based on the certification of Dr. Manuel
Macapinlac that Pablo was infertile.
It was on this ground that the SSS denied
Rosannas request to resume payment and
ordered Rosanna to refund to SSS the
Php10,350.00 death benefits already
released to her and Jeylnn.
When Rosanna filed a petition with the
Social Security Commission, Janet H.
Aguas also claiming to be a child of the
deceased, joined Rosanna and Jeylnn as
claimants. As proof, the petition included a
photocopy
of
Jeylnn
and
Janets
certificates of live birth. SSS denied their
claims but decided to conduct hearings.
During the hearings, the SSC found
sufficient proof that Rosanna contracted
marriage with Romeo dela Pena while still
being married to Pablo; that Rosanna had
a child with Romeo dela Pena while still
married to Pablo (as evidenced by the
baptismal certificate presented to the
court for Jenelyn H. dela Pena showing
that the showing that she was the child of
Rosanna Hernandez and Romeo dela Pena)
The SSC ruled that because of her
adultery, Rosanna was no longer entitled
to support from Pablo. As for Jeylnn, the
SCC ruled that Jeylnn was not Pablos
legitimate child, even if her birth
certificate was signed by Pablo. The SSC
deduced from the records that Jeylnn and
Jenelyn was one and the same person.
Janet on the other hand was only adopted
by Pablo and Rosanna but with no legal
papers.

The Court of Appeals reversed the ruling

based on the birth certificates of Janet and
Jeylnn showing that they were children of
the deceased.
Issue: Whether or not the petitioners may
be considered primary beneficiaries of the
deceased for his SSS pension and
therefore entitled to the SSS death
benefits.
Held:
Only
Jeylnn
has
established her right to
pension.

sufficiently
a monthly

Jeylnns claim is justified by the photocopy

of her birth certificate showing the
signature of Pablo as her father
authenticating that Jeylnn was born on
October 29, 1991. Records show that
Rosanna and Pablo were married on
December 4, 1977 which continued, as far
as the records are concerned, until the
death of Pablo on December 8, 1996.
Based on the records, Jeylnn was born
during the marriage of Rosanna and Pablo.
Since Jeylnn was conceived or born during
the marriage of the parents, she is
considered legitimate.
Petitioner Rosanna married Romeo dela
Pena during her marriage to Pablo. A wife
who is already separated de facto from
her husband cannot be said to be
dependent from support upon the
husband
Even if the records show that the spouses
adopted Janet, there were no legal papers
to prove it. She therefore does not qualify
as a primary beneficiary
Rivera v. Villanueva
Facts:
Petitioners- half brothers, half sister and
children of the half brother of the
deceased, Pacita Gonzales.
Respondents are the Heirs of Villanueva,
represented by Melchor.
They were
allowed to be substitute for Villanueva

upon
his
death.
The
remaining
respondents are Angelina and her
husband Victorino, are allegedly the
daughter and son-in-law of the late
Villanueva.
From 1927 until 1980, Gonzales cohabited
with Villanueva without the benefit of
marriage because the latter was married
to Amanda Musngi who died in 1963. In
the course of their cohabitation, they
acquired several properties including the
properties contested in this case.
Gonzales died without a will. In 1980,
Villanueva and Angelina executed a deed
of extrajudicial partition with sale, that is,
an extrajudicial settlement of Gonzales
estate comprising a number of the
aforementioned
properties.
In
this
document, Villanueva, for the amount
of P30,000, conveyed his interests in the
estate to Angelina.
Later on, the Petitioners filed a case for
partition
of
Gonzales
estate
and
annulment of titles and damages with the
RTC of Sto. Domingo, Nueva Ecija.
RTC- 2 Findings:
1. Gonzales was never married to
Villanueva and
2. Respondent Angelina was her
illegitimate child by Villanueva
and therefore her sole heir, to
the exclusion of petitioners
Petitioners appealed to the CA and the
latter affirmed the RTC decision.
Issue:
Whether or not respondent Angelina was
the illegitimate daughter of the decedent
Gonzales
Held:
No.
According to the assailed decision, the
birth certificate clearly discloses that
Pacita Gonzales was the mother of
Angelina proof that respondent Angelina
was Gonzales illegitimate child.
It is well-settled that a record of birth is
merely a prima facie evidence of the facts

contained therein.
It is not conclusive
evidence of the truthfulness of the
statements made there by the interested
parties. Following the logic of Benitez v.
CA, respondent Angelina and her codefendants in SD-857 should have
adduced evidence of her adoption, in view
of the contents of her birth certificate. The
records, however, are bereft of any such
evidence.
There are several parallels between this
case and Benitez-Badua v. CA that are
simply too compelling to ignore. First, both
Benitez-Badua and respondent Angelina
submitted birth certificates as evidence of
filiation. Second, both claimed to be
children of parents relatively advanced in
age. Third, both claimed to have been
born after their alleged parents had lived
together childless for several years.
There
are,
however,
also
crucial
differences
between Benitez-Badua and
this case which ineluctably support the
conclusion that respondent Angelina was
not
Gonzales
daughter,
whether
illegitimate or adopted. Gonzales, unlike
Benitez-Baduas
alleged
mother
Chipongian, was not only 36 years old but
44 years old, and on the verge of
menopause at the time of the alleged
birth. Unlike Chipongian who had been
married to Vicente Benitez for only 10
years, Gonzales had been living childless
with Villanueva for 20 years. Under the
circumstances, we hold that it was not
sufficiently established that respondent
Angelina
was
Gonzales
biological
daughter,
nor
even
her
adopted
daughter. Thus, she cannot inherit from
Gonzales. Since she could not have
validly participated in Gonzales estate,
the extrajudicial partition which she
executed with Villanueva on August 8,
1980 was invalid.

Suntay vs. Suntay GR No. 132524

Petitioner Federico is the oppositor to
respondent Isabels Petition for Letters of
Administration over the estate of Cristina
A. Suntay who had died without leaving a

will. The decedent is the wife of Federico

and the grandmother of Isabel. Isabels
father Emilio, had predeceased his mother
Cristina.
The marriage of Isabels parents had
previously been decalred by the CFI as
null and void. Federico anchors his
oppostion on this fact, alleging based on
Art. 992 of the CC, that Isabel has no right
to succeed by right of representation as
she is an illegitimate child. The trial court
had denied Federicos Motion to Dismiss,
hence this petition for certiorari. Federico
contends that, inter alia, that the
dispositive portion of the the decision
declaring the marriage of Isabels parents
null and void be upheld.
Issue:
In case of conflict between the body of the
decision and the dispostive portion
thereof, which should prevail? Related
thereto, was the marriage of Isabels
parents a case of a void or voidable
marriage?
Whether or not Isabel is an legitimate
child?
Ruling: Petition dismissed
Art. 10 of the Civil Code states that in case
of doubt in the interpretation and
application of laws, it is presumed that the
lawmaking body intended right and justice
to prevail. This is also applicable and
binding upon courts in relation to its
judgment. While the dispositive portion of
the CFI decision states that the marriage
be declared null and void, the body had
shown that the legal basis was par. 3 Art.
85 of the Civil Code, which was in effect at
the time. Art. 85 enumerates the causes
for which a marriage may be annulled. As
such the conflict between the body and
the dispositive portion of the decision may
be reconcilable as noted by the Supreme
Court.
The fundamental distinction between void
and voidable marriages is that void
marriage is deemed never to have taken
place at all. The effects of void marriages,
with respect to property relations of the
spouses are provided for under Article 144
of the Civil Code. Children born of such
marriages who are called natural children
by legal fiction have the same status,
rights and obligations as acknowledged
natural
children
under
Article
89

irrespective of whether or not the parties

to the void marriage are in good faith or in
bad faith.
On the other hand, a voidable marriage, is
considered valid and produces all its civil
effects, until it is set aside by final
judgment of a competent court in an
action for annulment. Juridically, the
annulment of a marriage dissolves the
special contract as if it had never been
entered into but the law makes express
provisions to prevent the effects of the
marriage from being totally wiped out. The
status of children born in voidable
marriages is governed by the second
paragraph of Article 89 which provides
that:
Children conceived of voidable marriages
before the decree of annulment shall be
considered
legitimate;
and
children
conceived thereafter shall have the same
status,
rights
and
obligations
as
acknowledged natural children, and are
also called natural children by legal fiction.
In view thereof, the status of Isabel would
be covered by the second paragraph of
Article 89 of the Civil Code which provides
that children conceived of voidable
marriages before the decree of annulment
shall be considered legitimate.

PONENTE:

FACTS:
Sps. Anselmo Baloyo and Macaria
Lirazan had 5 children, all are dead
now

ARBOLARIO v. COURT OF APPEALS

[G.R. No. 129163; April 22, 2003]
TOPIC:
Who are considered
legitimate children Conceived during
marriage Valid marriage
PETITIONERS:
Voltaire
Arbolario,
Lucena Arbolario Ta-Ala, Fe
Arbolario,
Exaltacion
Arbolario, Carlos Arbolario,
And
Spouses
Rosalita
Rodriguez,
and
Carlito
Salhay
RESPONDENTS:
Court of Appeals,
Irene Colinco, Ruth Colinco,
Orpha Colinco,nd Goldelina
Colinco

Panganiban, J. (3rd Div)

Child

FACTS A

Agueda Colinco

1.Antonio
Orpha an
2. (respo

Catalina Baloyo - Juan Arbolario

Juans
children
with
Francisca
(petitioners) Voltaire, Lucena, Taala, Fe,
Exaltacion

Purificac

Eduardo Baloyo sold his entire

interest to his sister Agueda by
virtue of a notarized document
acknowledged before Notary Public
Deogracias Riego.
Gaudencia Baloyo, conveyed her
interest in the said lot in favor of her
two nieces, Irene Colinco to 1/2 and
Purificacion Arbolario to the other half.
Julian Baloyo died without any issue
Respondents contend that they
are the only heirs of Anselmo
Baloyo and Macaria Lirazan, executed
a Declaration of Heirship and Partition
Agreement,
The Colincos filed a civil case
against spouses Rosalita Salhay
and Carlito Salhay to recover
possession of a portion of the aforesaid
lot occupied by [respondent] spouses
(Salhays hereinafter) since 1970.
o

Salhays alleged in their defense

that they have been the lawful
lessees of the late Purificacion

Arbolario since 1971 up to

1978; and that said spouses
allegedly
purchased
the
disputed portion of Lot No. 323
from the
deceased lessor
sometime in [September] 1978.
The petitioners filed a Civil Case for
the cancellation of title with Damages
against the Colincos
They
contend
that
the
Declaration of Heirship and
Partition Agreement executed
by the Colincos was defective
and thus voidable as they
(Arbolarios)
were
excluded
therein
o Arbolarios claim that they
succeeded intestate to the
inheritance of their alleged halfsister, Purificacion Arbolario;
and, as forced heirs, they
should be included in the
distribution of the aforesaid lot
RTC ruled in favour of the
Abolarios declaring them as heirs
of Purificacion Arbolario
o

Their 1987 Declaration of

Heirship
and
Partition
Agreement was made in bad
faith, because they knew all
along the existence of, and
their relationship with, the
Arbolarios.
o
The Salhays, on the other
hand, had no document to
prove their acquisition and
possession of a portion of the
disputed lot.
CA declared the Arbolarios as are
illegitimate half-brothers and halfsisters of Purificacion, the daughter of
Juan and Catalina.
o They were born before the
death of Catalina, under the
extramarital affair of Juan
and Francisca
o

Illegitimate children are barred

by Article 992 of the Civil Code
from inheriting intestate from
the legitimate children and
relatives of their father or
mother.
no clear and reliable evidence
to support the allegation of the
Salhays that they purchased
from the decedent,

ISSUE:
WON the petitioners have a
right in the lot in question.
HELD: Petition
is DENIED,
and
the
appealed
Decision AFFIRMED. Costs
against petitioners.
Once a valid marriage is established, it
is deemed to continue until proof that
it has been legally ended is presented
o mere
cohabitation
of
the
husband with another woman
will not give rise to a
presumption of legitimacy in
favor of the children born of the
second union
o until and unless there be
convincing proof that the first
marriage had been lawfully
terminated; and the second,
lawfully entered into
Illegitimacy of Petitioners
A marriage certificate or other
generally accepted proof is necessary
to establish the marriage as an
undisputable fact.
o No marriage certificate was
shown, petitioners relied on the
fact that they were born after
the first wife died
Evidence of Purchase
SC agreed with CA that no supporting
evidence was presented to prove the
sale
Partition

the partition of the property had not

been contemplated by the parties,

because respondents merely sought

recovery of possession of the parcel
held by the Salhays, while petitioners
sought the annulment of the Deed of
Partition respondents had entered into.

The purpose of partition is to put

an end to co-ownership. It seeks a
severance
of
the
individual
interests of co-owners, vesting in
each of them a sole estate in a
specific property and a right to
enjoy the allotted estate without
supervision or interference
Petitioners
were
unable
to
establish any right to partition
o Failed to establish that they
were legitimate brothers and
sisters of Purificacion
Questions as to the determination of
the heirs of a decedent, the proof of
filiation, and the determination of the
estate of a decedent and claims
thereto should be brought up before
the proper probate court or in special
proceedings
instituted
for
the
purpose. Such
issues
cannot
be
adjudicated in an ordinary civil action
for the recovery of ownership and
possession

Rivera vs. Ramirez Who are considered

legitimate children? [Adopted Children]

Respondents
Robert
and
Raymond
claimed that they were children of Adolfo
by another woman. Robert moved to
quash the subpoena. RTC denied.
Robert elevated the matter to CA. CA
ruled that Eleuterio was not Rositas heir
since she had an adopted child, Raymond,
the respondent.
Eleuterio filed this petition before the SC.
Issue: Whether or not Eleuterio was the
heir of Rosita
Ruling:
The Court pointed out that the RTC did not
resolve the essential issue whether
Raymond was judicially adopted, to
consequently determine if he could be
considered as a legitimate heir or not.
The SC was bound to upheld the matter of
fact used by CA that Eleuterio was not the
heir of Rosita.

ELAINE A. MOORE vs. REPUBLIC OF

THE PHILIPPINES
GR No. L-18407 June 26, 1963

Facts:
Adolfo Ramirez and Rosita Rivera were
married. They acquired the Sta. Teresita
General Hospital. They died.
Eleuterio Rivera [Eleuterio] filed a petition
for issuance of letters of administration
with the RTC. He claimed that he was
Rositas nephew, being the son of her
brother. RTC granted him to be the
administrator.
Eleuterio

examination and production of documents

relating to the Sta. Teresita General
Hospital that respondent Robert Ramirez
[Robert] had been managing.

filed

for

the

subpoena

the

Issues: (1) whether under our laws a

minor may be permitted to adopt and use
the surname of the second husband of his
mother; (2) whether justifiable reasons
exist to allow such change of name; and
whether petitioner, as mother of the
minor, has the authority or personality to
ask for such a change.

Facts of the Case: Elaine A. Moore filed a

petition before the Court of First Instance
of Rizal praying that her child by a former
marriage, William Michael Velarde, be
permitted to change his name so as to
read William Michael Velarde Moore. After
publishing the petition as required by law,
trial was held during which the parties
submitted
a
stipulation
of
facts.
Thereafter, the trial court issued an order
denying the petition whereupon petitioner
interposed the present appeal. Petitioner
is an American citizen formerly married to
Joseph P. Velarde, also an American
citizen, out of whose wedlock a child by
the name of William Michael Velarde was
born. This child, now 14 years old, was
born on January 19, 1947 at Los Angeles,
California, U.S.A.
The marriage of
petitioner to Velarde was subsequently
dissolved by a decree of divorce issued by
the Superior Court of the State of
California on May 31, 1949. After said
decree became final, petitioner contracted
a second marriage with Don C. Moore on
September 29, 1956 at Los Angeles,
California, U.S.A., and thereafter the minor
lived continuously with the spouses up to
the present time. He was supported by
Moore who has always treated him with
love and affection as if he were his true
father. In view of this harmonious relation
it is petitioner's desire that the minor be
able to use the name Moore after his
family name Velarde.

Decision: Anent the first issue, the

government sustains a negative stand for
the reason that our laws do not authorize
a legitimate child to use the surname of a
person who is not his father, for, as a
matter of fact; Article 364 of Civil Code
specifically
provides
that
legitimate
children shall principally use the surname
of their father. Mention is also made of
Article 369 of the same Code which

provides that in case of annulment of

avoidable marriage the children conceived
before the annulment she principally use
the surname of the father, and considering
by analogy the effect of a decree of
divorce, it concluded that the children who
are conceived before such a decree should
also be understood as carrying the
surname of the real father, which, in this
case, is Velarde.

The SC stated that it finds tenable this

observation of government's counsel.
Indeed, if a child born out of a lawful
wedlock be allowed to bear the surname
of the second husband of the mother,
should the first husband die or be
separated by a decree of divorce, there
may result a confusion to his real
paternity. In the long run the change may
redound to the prejudice of the child in the
community. While the purpose which may
have animated petitioner is plausible and
may run along the feeling of cordiality and
spiritual relationship that pervades among
the members of the Moore family, our
hand is deferred by a legal barrier which
we cannot at present overlook or brush
aside. Another factor to be reckoned with
is the fact that the child concerned is still
a minor who for the present cannot
fathom what would be his feeling when he
comes to mature age. Any way, if the time
comes, he may decide the matter for
himself and take such action as our law
may permit. For the present we deem the
action taken by petitioner premature.

Naldoza VS. Republic

Facts: Zosima Naldoza married Dionesio
Divinagracia on 5/30/70. They had 2
children: Jr. and Bombi Roberto. Dionesio
abandoned conjugal home after Zosima
confronted him about his previous

marriage. Also, he allegedly swindled 50k

from Rep. Maglana and 10k from a certain
Galagar, etc.
Classmates of Jr. and Bombi were teasing
them because of their swindler father. To
obliterate any connection between her
children and Dionesio (thereby relieving
the kids of the remarks of classmates),
Zosima filed at CFI Bohol on 4/10/78 a
petition to change surname of her 2
children from Divinagracia into Naldoza
(her maiden name).
The Court dismissed petition saying that
aforementioned
reasons
(swindling,
abandoning, previous marriage of Dionesio
<but their marriage has not yet been
annulled nor declared bigamous> ) were
not sufficient grounds to invoke such
change of surname. Furthermore, change
of name would give false impression of
family relations.
Issue: WON two childrens prayer to drop
their fathers surname is justified
Held: NO. Following NCC 364, since Jr.
and Bombi are LC (legitimate children),
therefore they should use their fathers
surname. Said minors and their father
should be consulted about such, mothers
desire should not only be the sole
consideration. Change of name is allowed
only upon proper and reasonable cause
(Rule 103 Sec 5 ROC). Change of name
may even redound to the prejudice of the
children later on, may cause confusion as
to the minors parentage and might also
create the impression that said minors are
ICs, which is inconsistent with their legal
status.
In Oshita v. Republic and in Alfon v.
Republic, their petition to change names
have been granted, but petitioners in said
cases have already attained mature age.
In this case, when these minors have
attained the right age, then they can
already file said action for themselves.

Ong vs CA
GR No. L-63025

November 29, 1991

Facts:
- Petitioner seeks to annul the
auction sale of parcel of land,
allegedly
owned
by
petioner
Ramon Ong and his former wife
Teodora Ong, which was awarded in
favor of Boix in a public bidding
conducted
by
Deputy
Sheriff
Camino. The title of the property
was later registered in the Office of
the Register of Deeds of Camarines
Norte.
- It is said that the parcel of land was
rendered in favor of Boix because
petitioners wife, Teodora, was not
able to pay the promissory notes
she gave to Boix in relation to her
loan for her logging business. The
decision
became
final
and
executory and Boix was able to
secure a writ of possession.
- However, petitioner filed a motion
to quash the writ of possession
because he claims that the
property was conjugal and thus
could not be held liable for
personal debts contracted by the
wife and that there was no valid
publication
thus
making
the
auction void.
- Lower court and CA both denied
the motion filed by petitioner, thus
this instant case.
Issue:
- WON the property can be validly
subject to auction
Ruling:
- Yes, the publication in the local
newspaper with regard to the
notice of auction was in accordance
with the law. Further, the said
property was acquired prior to their
marriage.

The lot was named after Teodora

Ong while the house erected was
declared to be conjugal. The use of
the name Teodora Ong in the title
is not a sufficient proof that said
property was acquired during the
marriage. SC hold that the lot in
question is paraphernal or owned
by the wife therefore is liable for
her personal debts.
The property is named after the
name of the wife only unlike the
house which was named after the
two spouses.
Petition is dismissed for lack of
merit.

Republic of the Philippines

vs.
Court of Appeals and Cynthia Vicencio
G.R. No. 88202 December 14, 1998
Facts :
The petitioner was born at Capitol Medical
Center in Quezon City on January 19, 1971
to parents Pablo Castro Vicencio and Fe
Esperanza de Vega Leabres. On January
10, 1927, after a marital disagreement,
Vicencio left their Meycauayan Bulacan
conjugal property and never returned nor
gave support to his family. Leabres found
an ally in Ernesto Yu who would later end
up as her husband. On June 29, 1976,
Leabres filed a petition , known as Civil
case number E-02009 with the Juvenile
and Domestic Relations Court for the
dissolution of her conjugal partnership
with Vicencio. In a decision given by Hon
Regina C. Ordoez Benitez dated July 11,
1977, the petition was granted. The
petitioners mother filed another petition
in 1983 to drop the surname of her
husband therefrom and this, known as
Special Proclamation 8316346 was again

approved in a decision rendered by Hon.

Emeterio C. Cui of Branch XXV. Yet again,
under Special Proclamation number 8422605, Leabres filed a petition to declare
Pablo Vicencio an absentee. Hon. Corona
Ibay- Somera decided in favour of the
petitioners mother on April 26, 1984. The
positive results of these petitions paved
the way for the marriage of the
petitioners mother and Ernesto Yu on April
15, 1986.
Evidence was established that the
petitioner had not remembered much her
real father, Pablo Vicencio, and that in his
absence, it was Ernesto Yu who had taken
Vicencios place. Although petitioner uses
the surname Vicencio in her school and
other related activities, she contends that
in such situations, confusion arose as to
her parentage leading to inquiries as to
why she is using Vicencio as surname ;
causing much embarrassment on her part.
In two occasions when she ran as a beauty
contestant for Lions Club Affair and
Manila Red Cross, her name was
registered as Cynthia L. Yu. His stepfather
had given his consent thereto upon prior
consultation with him.
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) ,
having
participated
in
the
cross
examination of Cynthia Vicencio and her
witnesses, manifested opposition over the
petition. The court argued that there was
no valid cause for the denial of the
petition and that taking into account the
fact that the court cannot compel the
stepfather of the petitioner to consider
adoption , failure to observe the process
should not be a cause for disallowing
petitioner to legally change her name, in
addition to the opportunity of the
respondent to improve her personality and
welfare under a socially recognized
surname, that of her stepfather.
On
August 31, 1987, the Manila Regional Trial
Court
Branch
52
granted
private

respondent Cynthia Vicencios petition for

change of surname from Vicencio to Yu.
The same was affirmed by the decision of
the Court of Appeals dated April 28, 1989.

even the issue of inheritance should the

stepfather die.The OSG further argues that
change of name would be easy through
adoption which Ernesto Yu did not opt for.

Issue :

The court contends that though confusion

may arise with regard to parentage , more
confusion with grave legal consequences
could arise if private respondent is to use
his stepfathers surname even if she is
not legally adopted by him. Legal
constraints lead the court to reject private
respondents desire to use her stepfathers surname and no assurance exists
that the end result would not be even
more detrimental to her person, as it may
trigger deeper inquiries regarding her
parentage. It is also noteworthy that as a
result of Republic Act 6809, the private
respondent although already 18 when the
appellate court rendered its decision , was
still considered a minor.

Whether or not the appellate court made a

mistake or violated standards in affirming
the decision of the trial court to allow the
change in private respondents surname
to that of her stepfathers surname.
Decision :
Recognized inter alia in Republic vs.
Hernandez, the following are sufficient
grounds to warrant a change in name ; a)
when the name is ridiculous, dishonorable
or extremely difficult to write or pronounce
, b) when the change is a legal
consequence of legitimation or adoption ,
c. ) when the change will avoid confusion ,
d) when one has continuously used and
been known since childhood by a Filipino
name and was unaware of an alien
parentage, e) when the change is based
on sincere desire to adopt a Filipino name
to erase sign of former alienage, in good
faith without prejudice to anybody and f)
when the surname causes embarrassment
and there is no showing that desired
change of name was far a fraudulent
purpose or would prejudice public interest.
Private respondent asserts that she falls
under one of the justifiable grounds,
specifically under avoidance of confusion
since she has been recognized by society
as the daughter of Ernesto Yu although
she admits to having used Vicencio in
beauty pagents and in her debut.
In the argument of the Solicitor General , it
argues that change in surname might give
rise to legal complications since her
stepfather has two other children with her
mother and such complications may affect

The court reversed and set aside the

appealed decision to allow private
respondents change of name from
Vicencio to Yu and granted the instant
petition to retain surname due to lack of
legally justifiable cause for allowing such
change.
Digested By :
Karen G. Tolentino

Heirs of Loreto Maramag v. Maramag

GR 181132 6/5/2009
Facts:
Petitioners were the legitimate wife and
children of Loreto Maramag (Loreto), while
respondents were Loretos illegitimate
family.
Loreto designated respondents as
benefi ciaries in his life insurance

policies from Insular Life Assurance

Company, Ltd. (Insular) and Great
Pacifi c Life Assurance Corporation
(Grepalife).
Petitioners
insituted
in
the
RTC a p e t i t i o n f o r r e v o c a t i o n
and/or
reduction
o f insurance
proceeds for being void and/or
inoffi cious,
with
prayer
for
a
temporary restraining order (TRO) and a
writ of preliminary injunction.
Pursuant to the motion to dismiss
incorporated in Insular and Grepalifes
respective answers, the TC dismissed
the complaint with respect to the
illegitimate children, who are the the
designated primary benefi ciaries in
the life insurance policies, for lack of
cause action. However, trial court
ruled that the action may proceed
against the concubine, Insular Life, and
Grepalife.
Insular and Grepalife fi led their
respective
motions
for
reconsideration, arguing, in the main,
that the petition failed to state a cause of
action against them.
RTC g r a n t e d , a n d d i s m i s s e d
the
case
against
them.
In
doing
so,
the
TC
court
considered the allegations found in
Insulars answer.
CA dismissed petitioners appeal for lack
of jurisdiction, holding that the decision
of the trial court dismissing the complaint
for failure to state a cause of action
involved a pure question of law. Further, it
found that due to petitioners failure to
timely
file
a
motion
for
reconsideration,
the
dismissal
against Insular and Grepalife had
already attained finality.
Issue: WON the TC erred in granting the
motion to dismiss
Abswer

NOArguments:Petitioners:The finding that

Eva was either disqualified as a
beneficiary by the insurance companies or
that her designation was revoked by
Loreto was raised only in the answers and
motions for reconsideration of both Insular
and Grepalife. For a motion to dismiss
to prosper on that ground, only the
allegations in the complaint should be
considered.
Ratio:
Specifically, the allegations that Loreto
revoked the designation of the concubine
in one policy and that Insular disqualified
her as a beneficiary in the other policy
such that the entire proceeds would be
paid to the illegitimate children of Loreto
with Eva pursuant to Section 53 of the
Insurance Code.

When
a
motion
to
dismiss
is
premised on Sec. 1(g) of Rule 16 of
the Rules of Court, the ruling thereon
should be based only on the facts alleged
in the complaint. The court must
resolve the issue on the strength of
such allegations, assuming them to
be t r u e . T h e t e s t o f s u ffi c i e n c y o f
a
cause
of
action
re sts
on
whether,
hypothetically
admitting the facts alleged in
the complaint to be true, the
c o u r t c a n r e n d e r a v a l i d judgment
upon the same, in accordance with the
prayer in the complaint. However, this rule
is subject to well-recognized exceptions,
such that there is no hypothetical
admission of the veracity of the
allegations if: 1.the falsity of the
allegations is subject to judicial
notice;2 . s u c h
allegations
a re
legally
i m p o s s i b l e ; 3.the
allegations refer to facts which are
inadmissible in evidence;4 . b y t h e
record or document in the
pleading,
the
allegations
a p p e a r unfounded; or 5 . t h e r e
is
evidence
which
has
been
p re se nte d
to
the
court
by
s t i p u l a t i o n o f the parties or in the
course of the hearings related to the case.

It is evident from the face of the

complaint that petitioners are not
entitled to a favorable judgment in
light of Article 2011 of the Civil Code
which
expressly
provides
that
insurance
contracts
shall
be
governed
by
special
laws,
i.e.,
the
Insurance
Code.
Section 53 of the Insurance Code
states
that
the
insurance
p roce e ds
shall
be
applied
exclusive ly to the p ro pe r inte re st
of the person in whose name or
f o r w h o s e benefit it is made unless
otherwise specified in the policy. From the
petition filed before the trial court that,
it is clear that although petitioners
are the legitimate heirs of Loreto,
they
we re
not
named
as
b e n e fi c i a r i e s i n t h e i n s u r a n c e
policies
issued
by
Insular
a n d Grepalife. Thus, they are not entitled
to the proceeds thereof. Accordingly,
respondents Insular
and
Grepalife
have no legal obligation to turn over
the insurance proceeds to petitioners.
SECTION 1(g), Rule 16 of the Rules of
Court: Within the time for but before
filing the answer to the complaint or
pleading asserting a claim, a motion
to dismiss may be made on any of
the following grounds: x x x (g) That the
pleading asserting the claim states no
cause of action.

CASE # 103
G.R. No. 193161

August 22, 2011

DIOSDADO S. MANUNGAS, Petitioner,

vs. MARGARITA AVILA LORETO and
FLORENCIA
AVILAPARREO,
Respondents.

FACTS:

Engracia Manungas was the wife of

Florentino Manungas. They had no
children. They adopted Samuel David
Avila (Avila) on 8/12/1968. Florentino
Manungas died intestate on 5/29/1977,

while Avila predeceased his adoptive

mother.
Avila was survived by his wife Sarah
Abarte Vda. de Manungas.
Engracia Manungas filed a Motion for
Partition of Estate on 3/31/1980 in the
intestate
estate
proceedings
of
Florentino Manungas (she was the
administratrix). She stated that
there are no other legal and
compulsory heirs of Florentino
Manungas
except
for
herself, Avila and
a
Ramon
Manungas
whom
she
acknowledged as the natural son
of Florentino Manungas.
Avilas widow executed a Waiver of
Rights and Participation (10/29/1980)
renouncing her rights over the
separate property of her husband in
favor of Engracia Manungas.
A Decree of Final Distribution was
issued distributing the properties to
Engracia
Manungas
and
Ramon
Manungas, the surviving heirs.
The RTC appointed Parreo (niece of
Engracia), as the Judicial Guardian of
the properties and person of her
incompetent aunt.
Engracia, through Parreo, filed a Civil
Case against the spouses Diosdado
Salinas
Manungas
and
Milagros
Pacifico for illegal detainer and
damages with the MTC in Panabo City.
- Defense of the spouses: Diosdado is
the illegitimate son of Florentino
Manungas
- MTC issued a summary judgment in
favor of Engracia, ordering the
spouses to vacate the premises and
to restore possession to Engracia.
The Decision was appealed, but the
RTC affirmed the MTCs decision and
such became final on April 20, 1998.
Thereafter, Diosdado instituted a
petition for the issuance of letters of
administration over the Estate of
Engracia Manungas in his favor
before the RTC. He alleged that he,
being an illegitimate son of Florentino
Manungas, is an heir of Engracia
Manungas.
The petition was opposed by Loreto
and Parreo alleging that he was not

an heir of Engracia and that he was in

fact a debtor of the estate having
been found liable to Engracia
Manungas for PhP 177,000 by
virtue of the MTC Decision.
The RTC appointed Parreo as the
administrator
of
the
Estate
of
Manungas. Subsequently, Diosdado
filed a MR with a Prayer for TRP and PI,
arguing that Parreos appointment as
special administrator of the Estate of
Manungas was by virtue of her being
the judicial guardian of the latter but
which relation ceased upon Engracias
death and Parreo is a mere niece, a
collateral relative, of Engracia, while
he is the illegitimate son of Florentino
Manungas.
On 11/4/2002, the RTC reversed itself
and revoked the appointment of
Parreo while appointing Diosdado as
the Special Administrator on the
ground
that,
the
presence
of
illegitimate
children
precludes
succession by collateral relatives to his
estate; Diosdado Manungas, being the
illegitimate son of Florentino Manungas
inherits the latters property by
operation of law.
Parreo and Loreto filed a Petition for
Certiorari under Rule 65 with the CA.
The CA found that that the RTC acted
with grave abuse of discretion and
reinstated Parreo as the special
administrator of the estate.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the court
committed an error of annulling the
appointment of Diosdado Manugas as
judicial administrator of the estate of
Engracia Manugas?
RULING:

[COMMENT:
Diosdado alleges that
the respondents have made use of the
wrong remedy, having filed a PC under
Rule 65 when the respondents should
have appealed the RTC Order to the CA
through a PRC under Rule 45.
However, the RTC Order (11/4/2002) is
not a final order, but an interlocutory
order.]
The APPOINTMENT OF A SPECIAL
ADMINISTRATOR
IS
AN

INTERLOCUTORY OR PRELIMINARY
ORDER to the main case for the grant
of letters of administration in a testate
or intestate proceeding.
The appointment or removal of special
administrators, being discretionary, is
thus interlocutory and may be assailed
through a petition for certiorari under
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. While
respondent failed to move for the
reconsideration of the November 4,
2002 Order of the RTC, a petition for
certiorari may still prosper.
The fact that Diosdado is an heir to the
estate of Florentino Manungas does
not mean that he is entitled or even
qualified to become the special
administrator
of
the
Estate
of
Manungas.
The
appointment
of
a
special
administrator lies within the discretion
of the court.
The prior or preferred right of certain
persons to the appointment of
administrator under 1, Rule 81, as
well as the provisions as to causes for
removal
of
an
executor
or
administrator under 2, Rule 83, do not
apply to the selection or removal of
SPECIAL ADMINISTRATOR.
The probate court may appoint or
remove special administrators based
on
grounds
other
than
those
enumerated in the Rules at its
discretion, there is no need to first
pass upon and resolve the issues of
fitness or unfitness and the application
of the order of preference under 6 of
Rule 78.
However, while the trial court has the
discretion to appoint anyone as a
special administrator, such discretion
must be exercised with reason, guided
by the directives of equity, justice and
legal principles. The role of a special
administrator is to preserve the estate
until a regular administrator is
appointed. As stated in 2, Rule 80
Powers and duties of special
administrator.

Such
special
administrator shall take possession
and charge of the goods, chattels,
rights, credits, and estate of the
deceased and preserve the same for

the
executors
or
administrator
afterwards appointed, and for that
purpose may commence and maintain
suits as administrator. He may sell only
such perishable and other property as
the court orders sold. A special
administrator shall not be liable to pay
any debts of the deceased unless so
ordered by the court.
Given this duty, it would be prudent
and reasonable to appoint someone
interested in preserving the estate for
its eventual distribution to the heirs.
Such choice would ensure that such
person would not expose the estate to
losses that would effectively diminish
his or her share. While the court may
use its discretion and depart from such
reasoning, still, there is no logical
reason to appoint a person who is a
debtor of the estate and otherwise a
stranger to the deceased. To do so
would be tantamount to grave abuse
of discretion.
The
subject
of
the
intestate
proceedings is the estate of Engracia
Manungas.
The estate of Florentino Manungas was
already the subject of intestate
proceedings that have long been
terminated
with
the
proceeds
distributed to the heirs with the
issuance of a Decree of Final
Distribution. With the termination of
the intestate estate proceedings of
Florentino Manungas, Diosdado, as
an illegitimate heir of Florentino,
is still not an heir of Engracia
Manungas and is not entitled to
receive any part of the Estate of
Manungas.
Diosdado is a debtor of the estate and
would have no interest in preserving
its value. There is no reason to appoint
him as its special administrator. The
trial court acted with grave abuse of
discretion in appointing Diosdado as
special administrator of the Estate of
Manungas. The CA correctly set aside
the November 4, 2002 Order of the
RTC.

CHARLES GOTARDO, Petitioner, vs.

DIVINA BULING, Respondent.
G.R. No. 165166 August 15, 2012
SUMMARY
Single mother seeking child support
through establishing filiation with exfiancee
FACTS:
In 1995, respondent Divina Buling filed a
complaint with the RTC for compulsory
recognition and support pendente lite,
claiming that the petitioner is the father of
her child Gliffze, whose imputed paternity
the petitioner denied. Trial ensued. She
met the petitioner in 1992 in a bank where
they
both
worked.
They
became
sweethearts in the last week of January
1993. Sometime in September 1993, the
petitioner started intimate sexual relations
with the respondent in the formers rented
room in the boarding house managed by
Rodulfo, the respondents uncle. The
sexual encounters occurred twice a month
and became more frequent in June 1994;
eventually, on August 8, 1994, the
respondent found out that she was
pregnant. When told, the petitioner was
happy and made plans to marry the
respondent but eventually backed out. The
respondent gave birth to their son Gliffze
on March 9, 1995. When the petitioner did
not show up and failed to provide support
to Gliffze, the respondent sent him a letter
on demanding recognition of and support
for their child. When the petitioner did not
answer the demand, the respondent filed
her complaint for compulsory recognition
and support pendente lite. The petitioner
took the witness stand and testified for
himself. He denied the imputed paternity,
claiming that he first had sexual contact
with the respondent in the first week of
August 1994 and she could not have been
pregnant for 3 months when he was
informed of the pregnancy on September
1994. During the pendency of the case,
the RTC, on the respondents motion,
granted a P2,000.00 monthly child
support, retroactive from March 1995. RTC
dismissed the complaint for insufficiency
of evidence. The CA consequently set
aside the RTC decision and ordered the
petitioner to recognize his minor son
Gliffze. It also reinstated the RTC order for

monthly child support. The petitioner

argues that the CA committed a reversible
error in rejecting the RTCs ruling, and that
the evidence on record is insufficient to
prove paternity.

PONENTE:

ISSUE:
W/N the CA committed a reversible error
when it set aside the RTCs findings and
ordered the petitioner to recognize and
provide legal support to his minor son
Gliffze

HELD:
The Court DENIED the petition and
AFFIRMED the ruling of the CA, sustaining
the award of P2,000.00 monthly child
support, not finding any reversible error in
the CAs ruling. In this case, the
respondent established a prima facie case
that the petitioner is the putative father of
Gliffze through testimony that she had
been sexually involved only with one man,
the petitioner, at the time of her
conception. Rodulfo corroborated her
testimony that the petitioner and the
respondent had intimate relationship.
However,
the
petitioner
failed
to
substantiate his allegations of infidelity
and insinuations of promiscuity. His
allegations, therefore, cannot be given
credence for lack of evidentiary support.
The petitioners denial cannot overcome
the respondents clear and categorical
assertions. Since filiation is beyond
question, support follows as a matter of
obligation; a parent is obliged to support
his
child,
whether
legitimate
or
illegitimate. Support consists of everything
indispensable for sustenance, dwelling,
clothing, medical attendance, education
and transportation, in keeping with the
financial capacity of the family.

FACTS:

GRANDE v. ANTONIO
[G.R. No. 206248. February 18, 2014.]
TOPIC:
Children

Rights of Illegitimate

PETITIONER: Grace M. Grande

RESPONDENT:

Patricio T. Antonio

Velasco, Jr., J. (En Banc)

Grande and Antonio lived together as

husband and wife, although Antonio
was already married
o From this relationship, 2 sons
were born: Andre Lewis (Feb 8,
1998) and Jerard Patrick (Oct
13, 1999)
o The children were not expressly
recognized by respondent as
his own in the Record of Births
of the children in the Civil
Registry
o Their relationship turned sour,
and Grande left for the United
States with the children in May
2007
o As such, Antonio filed a Petition
for
Judicial
Approval
of
Recognition with Prayer to take
Parental
Authority,
Parental
Physical
Custody,
Correction/Change of Surname
of Minors and for the Issuance
of Writ of Preliminary Injunction
before
the
Cagayan
RTC,
appending a notarized Deed of
Voluntary
Recognition
of
Paternity of the children
RTC favored Antonio, ruling that the
evidence that the best interest of the
children can be promoted if they are
under the sole parental authority and
physical
custody
of
Antonio
is
overwhelming
o Grandes MR was denied for
being pro forma and for lack of
merit
o She then filed an appeal with
the CA, alleging that RTC erred
for allegedly ruling contrary to
the law and jurisprudence
respecting the grant of sole
custody to the mother over her
illegitimate children
CA granted the appeal
o CA modified in part the RTC
decision:

a. Offices of the Civil

Registrar General and
the Makati City Civil
Registrar are DIRECTED
to enter Antonio as the
childrens surname in
their certificates of live
birth and in the Register
of Births;
b. Antonio is ORDERED to
deliver
the
minor
children to the custody
of their mother, who by
virtue hereof is hereby
awarded the full or sole
custody of these minor
children;
c. Antonio
shall
have
visitorial rights at least
twice a week, and may
only take the children
out upon the written
consent of Grande; and
d. The
parties
are
DIRECTED to give and
share in support of the
minor children in the
amount of P30K/ month
(70% for Antonio; 30%
for Grande).
o

notwithstanding the fathers

recognition of his children, the
mother cannot be deprived of
her sole parental custody over
them
absent
the
most
compelling of reasons
Antonio failed to prove that
Grande committed any act that
adversely affected the welfare
of the children or rendered her
unsuitable to raise them, she
cannot be deprived of her sole
parental custody
Antonios recognition that he is
the father, in conjunction with
the universally protected "bestinterest-of-the-child"
clause,
compels the use by the children
of the surname "ANTONIO."
the grant is legally in order
considering that not only did
Antonio express his willingness
to give support, it is also a

consequence
of
his
acknowledging the paternity of
the minor children
o no
reason
to
deprive
respondent Antonio of his
visitorial right especially in view
of the constitutionally inherent
and natural right of parents
over their children
Grande interposed a partial MR
o assailed the order insofar as it
decreed the change of the
minors surname to "Antonio"
o Motion denied, hence this
petition
o FC Art 176, as amended by RA
9255, may not be invoked by a
father to compel the use by his
illegitimate children of his
surname without the consent of
their mother

ISSUE:
WON a father may compel
his illegitimate children to use his surname
upon his recognition of their filiation.
HELD:

No.
WHEREFORE,
the
instant
petition
is
PARTIALLY
GRANTED. CA decision is PARTIALLY
MODIFIED. Rule 7 and Rule 8 of the
Office of the Civil Registrar General
Administrative Order No. 1, Series
of 2004 are DISAPPROVED and
hereby declared NULL and VOID

Central to the core issue is the

application of Art. 176 of the Family
Code, originally phrased as follows:
o Illegitimate children shall use
the surname and shall be under
the parental authority of their
mother, and shall be entitled to
support in conformity with this
Code. The legitime of each
illegitimate child shall consist of
one-half of the legitime of a
legitimate child. Except for this
modification,
all
other
provisions in the Civil Code
governing successional rights
shall remain in force.

This provision was later amended on

March 19, 2004 by RA 9255 which now
reads:
o Art. 176. Illegitimate children
shall use the surname and shall
be under the parental authority
of their mother, and shall be
entitled
to
support
in
conformity with this Code.
However, illegitimate children
may use the surname of their
father if their filiation has been
expressly recognized by their
father through the record of
birth appearing in the civil
register, or when an admission
in a public document or private
handwritten instrument is made
by the father. Provided, the
father has the right to institute
an action before the regular
courts to prove non-filiation
during his lifetime. The legitime
of each illegitimate child shall
consist of one-half of the
legitime of a legitimate child.
General Rule: illegitimate child shall
use the surname of his or her mother.
The
o Exception: in case his or her
filiation is expressly recognized
by the father, the illegitimate
child may use the surname of
the father.
Parental authority over minor children
is lodged by Art. 176 on the mother;
hence, respondent's prayer has no
legal mooring. Since parental authority
is given to the mother, then custody
over the minor children also goes to
the mother, unless she is shown to be
unfit.
No legal basis for the court a quo to
order the change of the surname to
that of respondent
o The order will contravene the
unequivocal provision of FC Art.
176, as amended by RA 9255.
Art. 176 gives illegitimate children
the right to decide if they want to
use the surname of their father or
not.
o The use of the word "may" in
the provision readily shows that

an acknowledged illegitimate
child is under no compulsion to
use
the
surname
of his
illegitimate father and operates
to confer discretion upon the
illegitimate children.
o It is not the father or the
mother who is granted by
law the right to dictate the
surname
of
their
illegitimate children.
On its face, Art. 176, as amended, is
free from ambiguity
o where there is no ambiguity,
one must abide by its words
o Nothing is more settled than
that when the law is clear and
free from ambiguity, it must be
taken to mean what it says and
it must be given its literal
meaning
free
from
any
interpretation
An argument, however, may be
advanced advocating the mandatory
use of the father's surname upon his
recognition of his illegitimate children,
citing the IRR of RA 9255, 21 which
states:
Rule 7. Requirements for the
Child to Use the Surname of the
Father
7.1
For
Registered

Births

Not

Yet

7.1.1 The
illegitimate
child
shall use the surname of the
father if a public document is
executed by the father, either at
the back of the Certificate of
Live Birth or in a separate
document.
7.1.2 If admission of paternity
is made through a private
instrument, the child shall use
the surname of the father,
provided the registration is
supported by the following
documents:

xxx
xxx

xxx

8.2
For
Births
Previously
Registered under the Surname
of the Mother

7.2.
For
Births
Previously
Registered under the Surname
of the Mother

8.2.1 If admission of paternity

was made either at the back of
the Certificate of Live Birth or in
a separate public document or
in
a
private
handwritten
document, the public document
or AUSF shall be recorded in the
Register of Live Birth and the
Register of Births as follows:

7.2.1 If filiation has been

expressly recognized by the
father, the child shall use the
surname of the father upon the
submission of the accomplished
AUSF [Affidavit of Use of the
Surname of the Father].

"The surname of the child is

hereby changed from (original
surname) to (new surname)
pursuant to RA 9255."

7.2.2 If filiation has not been

expressly recognized by the
father, the child shall use the
surname of the father upon
submission of a public document
or
a
private
handwritten
instrument supported by the
documents listed in Rule 7.1.2.

The original surname of the child

appearing in the Certificate of
Live Birth and Register of Births
shall not be changed or deleted.

7.3
Except in Item 7.2.1, the
consent of the illegitimate child
is required if he/she has reached
the age of majority. The consent
may be contained in a separate
instrument duly notarized.
xxx
xxx

8.2.2 If
filiation
was
not
expressly recognized at the time
of
registration,
the
public
document or AUSF shall be
recorded in the Register of Legal
Instruments. Proper annotation
shall be made in the Certificate
of Live Birth and the Register of
Births as follows:

xxx

Rule 8. Effects of Recognition

8.1
For
Registered

Births

Not

Yet

8.1.1 The surname of the

father shall be entered as the
last name of the child in the
Certificate of Live Birth. The
Certificate of Live Birth shall be
recorded in the Register of
Births.
xxx
xxx

"Acknowledged by (name of
father) on (date). The surname
of the child is hereby changed
from (original surname) on
(date) pursuant to RA 9255."
(Emphasis supplied.)

xxx

Nonetheless, the hornbook rule is that

an administrative issuance cannot
amend a legislative act
o MCC Industrial Sales Corp. v.
Ssangyong Corporation: the
power of administrative officials
to promulgate rules in the
implementation of a statute is
necessarily limited to what is
found
in
the
legislative

enactment itself. The IRR of a

law cannot extend the law or
expand its coverage, as the
power to amend or repeal a
statute is vested in the
Legislature. If a discrepancy
occurs between the basic law
and its IRR, it is the former that
prevails, because the law
cannot be broadened by a mere
administrative issuance an
administrative agency certainly
cannot amend an act of
Congress.
To conclude, the use of the word
"shall" in the IRR of RA 9255 is of no
moment. The clear, unambiguous, and
unequivocal use of "may" in Art. 176
rendering the use of an illegitimate
father's
surname
discretionary
controls, and illegitimate children are
given the choice on the surnames by
which they will be known.
CA decision modified to read as
follows:
a. [Antonio] is ORDERED to deliver
the minor children Jerard Patrick
and Andre Lewis to the custody of
their mother herein appellant,
Grace Grande who by virtue hereof
is hereby awarded the full or sole
custody of these minor children;
b. [Antonio] shall have visitation
rights 28 at least twice a week, and
may only take the children out
upon the written consent of
[Grande];
c. The parties are DIRECTED to give
and share in support of the minor
children Jerard Patrick and Andre
Lewis in the amount of P30,000.00
per month at the rate of 70% for
[Antonio] and 30% for [Grande];
and
d. The case is REMANDED to the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 8 of
Aparri, Cagayan for the sole
purpose
of
determining
the
surname to be chosen by the
children Jerard Patrick and Andre
Lewis.

Reyes vs Mauricio [Action to impugn

legitimacy]

FACTS:
Eugenio Reyes owns a parcel of land in
Turo, Bocaue, Bulacan (covered by a TCT
--- property was adjudicated to Eugenio by
virtue of an extrajudicial settlement
among the heirs following the death of his
parents).
Librada Mauricio (Librada, DECEASED) and
her daughter Leonida Mauricio (Leonida)
filed a complaint before the DARAB of
Malolos, Bulacan alleging that theyre the
legal heirs of Godofredo Mauricio who was
the lawful and registered tenant of
Eugenio through his predecessors-ininterest to the subject land (that from
1936
until
his
death
in
May
1994,Godofredo had been working on the
subject land and introduced improvements
consisting of fruit-bearing trees, seasonal
crops, a residential house and other
permanent improvements; that through
fraud, deceit, strategy and other unlawful
means, Eugenio caused the preparation of
a document denominated as Kasunduan
dated 28 September 1994 to eject
respondents from the subject property,
and had the same notarized by Notary
Public in Pasig,Metro Manila; that Librada
never appeared before the Notary Public;
that Librada was illiterate and the
contents of the Kasunduan were not read
nor explained to her; that Eugenio took
undue advantage of the weakness, age,
illiteracy, ignorance, indigence and other
handicaps of Librada in the execution of
the Kasunduan rendering it void for lack of
consent; and that Eugenio had been
employing all illegal means to eject
respondents from the subject property)
Leonida and Librada prayed for the
declaration of nullity of the Kasunduan
and for an order for Eugenio to maintain
and place them in peaceful possession
and cultivation of the subject property.
According
to
Eugenio,
Godofredos
occupation of the subject premises was
based on the formers mere tolerance and
accommodation. Eugenio denied signing a
tenancy agreement, nor authorizing any
person to sign such an agreement. He
maintained that Librada, accompanied by
a relative, voluntarily affixed her signature
to the Kasunduan and that she was fully
aware of the contents of the document.
Moreover, Librada receivedP50,000.00

from Eugenio on the same day of the

execution of the Kasunduan. Eugenio also
questioned the jurisdiction of the DARAB
since the principal relief sought by
respondents is the annulment of the
contract, over which jurisdiction is vested
on the regular courts.
Provincial Adjudicator Godofredo was
the tenant of Eugenio, and Librada, being
the surviving spouse, should have
peaceful possession of the land.
DARAB - Mauricios are former tenants of
Spouses Reyes and declared the contract
as null and void
CA - affirmed the decision and resolution
of the DARAB.
On appeal, Leonidas legal standing as a
party was also assailed by Eugenio.
Eugenio submitted that the complaint was
rendered moot with the death of Librada,
Godofredos sole compulsory
heir. Eugenio contended that Leonida is a
mere ward of Godofredo and Librada, thus,
not a legal heir.
ISSUE: WON Eugenio can question the
filiation of Leonida in a case regarding
land dispute.
HELD:
No. It is settled law that filiation cannot be
collaterallyattacked. Well-known civilista
Dr. Arturo M. Tolentino, in his book Civil
Code of the Philippines, Commentaries
and Jurisprudence, noted that the
aforecited doctrine is rooted from the
provisions of the Civil Code of the
Philippines. He explained thus:
The legitimacy of the child cannot be
contested by way of defence or as a
collateral issue in another action for a
different purpose. The necessity of an
independent action directly impugning the
legitimacy is more clearly expressed in the
Mexican code (article 335) which provides:
The contest of the legitimacy of a child
by the husband or his heirs must be made
by proper complaint before the competent
court; any contest made in any other way
is void. This principle applies under our
Family Code. Articles 170 and 171 of the
code confirm this view, because they refer
to the action to impugn the legitimacy.
This action can be brought only by the
husband or his heirs and within the
periods fixed in the present articles.

The legitimacy and filiation of a child

cannot be contested by way of defence or
as collateral issue in another action for a
different purpose. They can be questioned
only in a direct action seasonally filed by
the proper party, and not through a
collateral attack. This is confirmed by
Articles 170 and 171 of the Family Code
which refer to the action to impugn the
legitimacy.
The same rule is applied to adoption. It
cannot also be assailed collaterally in a
proceeding for the settlement of a
decedents estate. The legality of adoption
by a testatrix can be assailed only in a
separate action brought for that purpose
and cannot be subject to collateral attack.
Andal vs Macaraig 89 Phil 165
Issue: Whether or not the child
considered as the legitimate son
Emiliano.

is
of

Facts: Mariano Andal, assisted by his

mother Maria Dueas, as guardian ad
litem, brought an action in the CIF of
Camarines Sur for the recovery of the
ownership and possession of a parcel of
land situated in Camarines Sur. The
complaint alleges that Mariano Andal
is the surviving son of Emiliano Andal and
Maria Dueas and that Emiliano was the
owner of the parcel of land in question
having acquired it from his mother
Eduvigis Macaraig by virtue of a donation
propter nuptias executed by the latter in
favor of the former.
The lower court
rendered judgment in favor of the
plaintiffs (a) declaring Mariano Andal the
legitimates on of Emiliano Andal and such
entitled to inherit the land in question; (b)
declaring Mariano Andal owner of said
land; and (c) ordering the defendant to
pay the costs of suit. Defendant took the
case to this Court upon the plea that only
question of law are involved.
Emiliano
Andal
became
sick
of
tuberculosis. Sometime thereafter, his
brother, Felix, went to live in his house to
help him work his house to help him work
his farm. His sickness became worse, he
became so weak that he could hardly

move and get up from his bed. Maria

Duenas, his wife, eloped with Felix, and
both went to live in the house of Maria's
father. Felix and Maria had sexual
intercourse and treated each other as
husband and wife. Emiliano died without
the presence of his wife, who did not even
attend his funeral. Maria Dueas gave
birth to a boy, who was given the name of
Mariano Andal.
Decision: The Supreme Court held that
there was no evidence presented that
Emiliano Andal was absent during the
initial period of conception, especially
during the period comprised between
August 21, 1942 and September 10, 1942,
which is included in the 120 days of the
300 next preceding the birth of the child
Mariano Andal. On the contrary, there is
enough evidence to show that during that
initial period, Emiliano Andal and his wife
were still living under the marital roof.
Even if Felix, the brother, was living in the
same house, and he and the wife were
indulging in illicit intercourse since May,
1942, that does not preclude cohabitation
between Emiliano and his wife. We admit
that Emiliano was already suffering from
tuberculosis and his condition then was so
serious that he could hardly move and get
up from bed, his feet were swollen and his
voice hoarse. But experience shows that
this does not prevent carnal intercourse.
There are cases where persons suffering
from this sickness can do the carnal act
even in the most crucial stage because
they are more inclined to sexual
intercourse. As an author has said, "the
reputation of the tuberculosis towards
eroticism (sexual propensity) is probably
dependent more upon confinement to bed
than the consequences of the disease."
(An Integrated Practice of Medicine, by
Hyman, Vol. 3, p.2202). There is neither
evidence to show that Emiliano was
suffering
from
impotency,
patent,
continuous and incurable, nor was there
evidence that he was imprisoned. The
presumption of legitimacy under the Civil
Code in favor of the child has not,
therefore, been overcome.
The Court added that the same result can
be obtained from viewing this case under

section 68, par. (c) of Rule 123, of the

Rules of Court, which is practically based
upon the same rai'son d'etre underlying
the Civil Code. Said section provides: The
issue of a wife cohabiting with the
husband who is not impotent, is
indisputably presumed to be legitimate, if
not born within one hundred eighty days
immediately succeeding the marriage, or
after the expiration of three hundred days
following its dissolution.
The SC
reiterated that it was manifested that
Emiliano and his wife were living together,
or at least had access one to the other,
and Emiliano was not impotent, and the
child was born within three (300) days
following the dissolution of the marriage.
Under these facts no other presumption
can be drawn than that the issue is
legitimate. We have also seen that this
presumption can only be rebutted by clear
proof that it was physically or naturally
impossible for them to indulge in carnal
intercourse. And here there is no such
proof. The fact that Maria Dueas has
committed adultery cannot also overcome
this
presumption
(Tolentino's
Commentaries on the Civil Code, Vol. I, p.
92). In view of all the foregoing, the SC
upheld that the lower court did not err in
declaring Mariano Andal as the legitimate
son of the spouses Emiliano Andal and
Maria Dueas.
Concepcion VS. CA
FACTS:
Gerardo Concepcion, the petitioner, and
Ma. Theresa Almonte, private respondent,
were married in December 1989, and
begotten a child named Jose Gerardo in
December 1990. The husband filed on
December 1991, a petition to have his
marriage annulled on the ground of
bigamy since the wife married a certain
Mario Gopiao sometime in December
1980, whom according to the husband
was still alive and living in Loyola Heights,
QC. Trial court ruled that the son was an
illegitimate child and the custody was
awarded to the wife while Gerardo was
granted visitation rights. Theresa argued
that there was nothing in the law granting
visitation rights in favor of the putative
father of an illegitimate child.
She

further wanted to have the surname of the

son changed from Concepcion to
Almonte, her maiden name, since an
illegitimate child should use his mothers
surname.
After the requested oral
argument, trial court reversed its ruling
and held the son to be not the son of
Gerardo but of Mario. Hence, the child
was a legitimate child of Theresa and
Mario.
Issue:
W/N the child is the legitimate child of
Theresa and Mario or the illegitimate child
of Theresa and Gerardo?
HELD:
Considering that Theresas marriage with
Gerardo was void ab initio, the latter never
became the formers husband and never
acquired any right to impugn the
legitimacy of the child.
Theresas
contention was to have his son be
declared as not the legitimate child of her
and Mario but her illegitimate child with
Gerardo. In this case, the mother has no
right to disavow a child because maternity
is never uncertain. Hence, she is not
permitted by law to question the sons
legitimacy. Under Article 167 of the Family
Code, the child shall be considered
legitimate although the mother may have
declared against its legitimacy or may
have been sentenced as an adulteress.
Having the best interest of the child in
mind, the presumption of his legitimacy
was upheld by the Court. As a legitimate
child, the son shall have the right to bear
the surnames of Mario and Theresa, in
conformity with the provisions of Civil
Code on surnames. Gerardo cannot then
impose his surname to be used by the
child, since in the eyes of the law; the
child is not related to him in any way.

Rosendo Herrera vs Rosendo Alba

FACTS:
In May 1998, Armi Alba, mother of minor
Rosendo Alba filed a suit against Rosendo
Herrera in order for the latter to recognize

and support Rosendo as his biological son.

Herrera denied Armis allegations. In the
year 2000, the trial court ordered the
parties to undergo a (deoxyribonucleic
acid )DNA testing to establish whether or
not Herrera is indeed the biological father
of Rosendo Alba. However, Herrera
questioned the validity of the order as he
claimed that DNA testing has not yet
garnered widespread acceptance hence
any result therefrom will not be admissible
in court; and that the said test is
unconstitutional for it violates his right
against self-incrimination.
ISSUE: Whether or not Herrera is correct.
HELD: No. It is true that in 1997, the
Supreme Court ruled in Pe Lim vs CA that
DNA testing is not yet recognized in the
Philippines and at the time when he
questioned the order of the trial court, the
prevailing doctrine was the Pe Lim case;
however, in 2002 there is already no
question as to the acceptability of DNA
test results as admissible object evidence
in Philippine courts. This was the decisive
ruling in the case of People vs Vallejo
(2002).
In the Vallejo Case, the Supreme Court
recognized DNA analysis as admissible
evidence. On the other hand, as to
determining the weight and probative
value of DNA test results, the Supreme
Court provides, which is now known as the
Vallejo Guidelines:
In assessing the probative value of DNA
evidence,
therefore,
courts
should
consider, among other things, the
following data:
1. how the
collected,

samples

were

2. how they were handled,

3. the
possibility
contamination
of
samples,

of
the

4. the procedure followed in

analyzing the samples,

5. whether
the
proper
standards and procedures
were followed in conducting
the tests,
6. and the qualification of the
analyst who conducted the
tests.
The
above
test
is
derived
from
the Daubert Test which is a doctrine
adopted from US jurisprudence (Daubert
v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.) The
Daubert Test is a test to be employed by
courts before admitting scientific test
results in evidence. More specifically, the
Daubert Test inquires:
1. Whether the theory or technique
can be tested,
2. Whether the proffered work has
been subjected to peer review,
3. Whether the
acceptable,

rate

of

error

is

4. Whether the method at issue

enjoys widespread acceptance
In this case, the Supreme Court declared
that in filiation cases, before paternity
inclusion can be had, the DNA test result
must state that the there is at least a
99.9% probability that the person is the
biological father.
However, a 99.9%
probability of paternity (or higher but
never possibly a 100% ) does not
immediately result in the DNA test result
being admitted as an overwhelming
evidence. It does not automatically
become a conclusive proof that the
alleged father, in this case Herrera, is the
biological father of the child (Alba). Such
result is still a disputable or a refutable
evidence which can be brought down if
the Vallejo Guidelines are not complied
with.
What if the result provides that there
is less than 99.9% probability that the
alleged father is the biological father?

Then the evidence is merely corroborative.

Anent the issue of self-incrimination,
submitting to DNA testing is not violative
of the right against self-incrimination. The
right against self-incrimination is just a
prohibition on the use of physical or moral
compulsion to extort communication
(testimonial evidence) from a defendant,
not an exclusion of evidence taken from
his body when it may be material. There is
no testimonial compulsion in the getting
of DNA sample from Herrera, hence, he
cannot properly invoke self-incrimination.

Estate of Ong v. Diaz

Facts:

Minor Joanne Diaz, represented by

her mother Jinky Diaz filed a complaint for
compulsory recognition with prayer for
support against Rogelio Ong before RTC
o February 1993: Jinky married Japanese
Hasegawa Katsuo
o November 1993: Jinky and Rogelio got
acquainted and fell in love
o January 1994-September 1998: Jinky
and Rogelio cohabited
o
February 1998: Joanne was born,
Rogelio paid all expenses, recognized child
as his
o September 1998: Rogelio abandoned
them
and stopped
giving support,
alleging that he is not the father of the
child

RTC ordered defendant to recognize

plaintiff as natural child and provide
monthly support

RTC granted Rogelios Motion for

New Trial (because he was declared in
default before)

RTC declared Joanne to be the

illegitimate child of Rogelio Ong with Jinky
Diaz. Support to continue until she
reaches majority age.

Rogelio appealed to CA but he died

in February 2005 during its pendency

December 2000: CA granted appeal

and remanded case to RTC for the
issuance of an order directing the parties
to make arrangements for DNA analysis
for the purpose of determining the
paternity of Joanne

Issue: WON CA erred in remanding the

case for DNA analysis despite the fact that
it is no longer feasible due to Rogelios
death
Held:
No, the death of the petitioner does
not ipso facto negate the application
of DNA testing for as long as there
exist appropriate biological samples
of his DNA

Even if Rogelio already died, any of

his biological samples may be used for
DNA testing

Biological sample means any

organic material originating from a
persons body, even if found in inanimate
objects, that is susceptible to DNA testing.
This includes blood, saliva, and other body
fluids, tissues, hairs, and bones.

Death of Rogelio cannot bar the

conduct of DNA testing. According to
jurisprudence,
DNA
testing,
which
examines genetic codes obtained from
body cells of the illegitimate child and any
physical residue of the long dead parent
could be resorted to. (People v. Umanito,
citing Tecson v. COMELEC)
Petition denied for lack of merit. CA
decision is affirmed.

JESSE U. LUCAS v. JESUS S. LUCAS

G.R. No. 190710, June 6, 2011,
SECOND DIVISION
(INTERNET DIGEST)
Although a paternity action is civil,
not criminal, the constitutional prohibition
against
unreasonable
searches
and seizures is still applicable, and a
proper showing of sufficient justification
under the particular factual circumstances
of the case must be made before a court
may order a compulsory blood test.
FACTS:
Jesse U. Lucas (Jesse), filed a Petition
to Establish Filiation with a Motion for the
Submission of Parties to DNA Testing
before the Regional Trial Court (RTC).
Jesse narrated his mothers account of her
history with Jesus S. Lucas (Jesus) and

attached several copies of his personal

documents.
Though Jesus was not summoned and was
not served a copy of the petition,
he nevertheless learned of it and obtained for
himself a copy. He then filed a Special
Appearance and Comment manifesting
among others that the petition was
adversarial in nature and therefore
summons should be served on him as
respondent. Unbeknownst to Jesus on the day
before he filed his Comment, Jesse filed a Very
Urgent Motion to Try and Hear the Case
which the RTC found to be sufficient in
form and hence set the case for hearing.
After
learning of
the RTCs
order, Jesus filed
a Motion
for Reconsideration arguing
that DNAtesting cannot be had on the basis of a
mere allegation pointing to him as Jesses father.
Acting on Jesus Motion for Reconsideration,
the RTC dismissed the caseand held that Jesse
failed to establish compliance with the
four procedural aspects for a paternity
action enumerated in the case of Herrera v.
Alba .
This prompted Jesse to file a Motion
for Reconsideration of his own which
the RTC granted.
A new hearing was scheduled where the
RTC held that ruling on the grounds relied
upon by Jesse for filing the instant petition is
premature considering that a full-blown trial has
not yet taken place. Jesus filed a Motion for
Reconsideration which was denied by the
RTC.
He then
filed
a
petition
forcertiorari with the Court of Appeals
(CA). The CA ruled in favor of Jesus, it
noted that Jesse failed to show that the four
significant aspects of a traditional paternity action
had been met and held that DNA testing should
not be allowed when the petitioner has failed to
establish a prima facie case.
ISSUE:
Whether or not aprima facie showing is
necessary before a court can issue a DNA
testing order.
HELD:
Petition
GRANTED.

Misapplication of Herrera v. Alba by

the Regional Trial Court and the Court
of Appeals.
The statement inHerrera v. Alba that
there are four significant procedural
aspects in a traditional paternity case
which parties have to face has been
widely misunderstood and misapplied in
this case. A party is confronted by these
so-called procedural aspects during trial,
when the parties have presented their
respective evidence. They are matters of
evidence that cannot be determined at this initial
stage of the proceedings, when only the
petition to establish filiation has been filed. The
CAs observation that petitioner failed to establish
a prima facie case, the first procedural
aspect in a paternity case, is therefore
misplaced. A prima facie
case is built by a partys evidence and not
by mere allegations in the initiatory
pleading.
Section 4 of the Rule on DNA
evidence.
The Rule on DNA Evidence was enacted
to guide the Bench and the Bar for the
introduction
and use of DNA evidence in the judicial system. It
provides the prescribed parameters on the
requisite elements for reliability and validity
( i.e.,the proper procedures, protocols,
necessary laboratory reports,etc.), the
possible sources of error, the available
objections to the admission of DNA test
results
as
evidence
as well as the probative value of DNA evid
ence. It seeks to ensure that the evidenc
e gathered, using various methods of DNA
analysis, is utilized effectively and
properly, [and] shall not be misused
and/or abused and, more importantly,
shall continue to ensure that DNA analysis
serves justice and protects, rather than
prejudice the public.
Not surprisingly, Section 4 of the Rule on
DNA Evidence merely provides for
conditions that are aimed to safeguard the
accuracy and integrity of the DNA testing.
Section 4 states: The appropriate court
may, at any time, either motu proprio or
on application of any person who has a
legal interest in the matter in litigation,
order a DNA testing. Such order shall issue
after due hearing and notice to the parties

upon a showing of the following: (a) A

biological sample exists that is relevant to
the case;(b) The biological sample: (i) was
not previously subjected to the type of
DNA testing now requested; or (ii) was
previously subjected to DNA testing, but
the results may require confirmation for
good reasons; (c) The DNA testing uses a
scientifically valid technique; (d) The DNA
testing has the scientific potential to
produce new information that is relevant to the
proper resolution of the case; and (e) The
existence of other factors, if any, which the
court may consider as potentially affecting
the accuracy or integrity of the DNA
testing. This Rule shall not preclude a DNA
testing, without need of a prior court
order, at the behest of any party, including law
enforcement agencies, before a suit or
proceeding
is
commenced. This does not mean,
however, that a DNA testing order will be i
ssued as a matter of right if, during the
hearing, the
said
conditions
are established.
Court order for blood testing equivalent to
search under the Constitution.
In some states, to warrant the issuance of
the DNA testing order, there must be a
show cause hearing wherein the applicant
must first present sufficient evidence to
establish
a prima facie case
or
a
reasonable possibility of paternity or good
cause for the holding of the test.
In these states, a court order for blood
testing is considered a search, which,
under their Constitutions (as in ours),
must be preceded by a finding of probable
cause in order to be valid. Hence, the
requirement of a prima facie case, or
reasonable possibility, was imposed in civil
actions as a counterpart of a finding of probable
cause. The Supreme Court of Louisiana
eloquently explained;
Although a paternity action is civil, not
criminal, the constitutional prohibition against
unreasonable searches and seizures is still
applicable, anda proper showing of sufficient
justification under the particular factual
circumstances of the case must be made
before a court may order a compulsory
blood test. Courts in various jurisdictions
have differed regarding the kind of
procedures which are required, but those
jurisdictions have almost universally found

that a preliminary showing must be made

before a court can constitutionally order
compulsory blood testing in paternity cases. We
agree, and find that, as a preliminary matter,
before the court may issue an order for
compulsory blood testing, the moving
party must show that there is a reasonable
possibility of paternity. As explained
hereafter, in cases in which paternity is
contested and a party to the action refuses
to voluntarily undergo a blood test, a show cause
hearing must be held in which the court can
determine whether there is sufficient evidence to
establish a prima facie case which warrants
issuance of a court order for blood
testing.
The same condition precedent should be
applied in our jurisdiction to protect the
putative father from mere harassment
suits. Thus, during the hearing on the
motion for DNA testing, the petitioner
must
present prima
facie evidence or
establish a reasonable possibility of paternity.

is
not
the
son
of
the
abovementioned couple astestified
by the mother herself.
Respondents Defense:
Res judicata: In an earlier case, it has
been declared that petitioner is not the
son of the spouses Chua BingGuan and Sy
Kao in S.P. No. Q-12592, for the settlement
of the estate of the late Chua Bing Guan.
Mothers testimonials: SY Kua
testified that she is not her son

herself

Petitioner: paternity and not the maternity

of the petitioner is to be decided.
Therefore, the testimony of the mother
should not be credited.
ISSUE:W/N Chua Keng Giap is the son of
Chua Bing and Sy Kua.

Chua Keng Giap v. IAC

HELD: No.
GR No. L-75377
February 17,1988
Topic: Action to impugn legitimacy- Effect
of a mothers declaration
Facts:

Chua Keng Giap filed on May 19,

1983, a petition for the settlement
of the estate of the late Sy Kao
inthe regional trial court of Quezon
City.

He claims that he is the son of

Chua Bing Guan and Sy Kao

The private respondent, moved to

dismiss for lack of a cause of action
and of the petitioner's capacity to
file the petition and that petitioner
has no cause of action because he

Who better than Sy Kao herself

would know of Chua Keng Giap was
really her son? More than anyone
else, it was Sy Kao who could say
---- as indeed she has said these
many years ---- that Chua Keng
Giap was not begotten of her
womb.

Petition Denied.

Gaspay v. CA, 238 SCRA 163

Prescription of action to impugn legitimacy

Flaviano Gaspay died without a last will

and testament on October 14, 1983 in
Tacloban City. He was then married to
Agueda Denoso. They were childless.

On July 6, 1988, private respondent

Guadalupe Gaspay Alfaro files a petition in
the trial court 1 alleging, among others,
that she is the acknowledged illegitimate
daughter of the deceased Flaviano
Gaspay, who died without a will and left
certain real and personal properties. She
identified her mother as Claudia Pason
with whom decedent allegedly had an
illicit relationship. She prayed for issuance
of letters of administration of the
decedent's estate.

petition was filed on July 26, 1988

petitioner was already over 51 years old,
having been born on December 12, 1936.
All these undisputed facts are sufficient
evidence that she consented to her
acknowledgment
by
the
decedent.
(Javelona, et al., vs. Monteclaro, 74 Phil.
393). Whether or not judicial approval of
such acknowledgment is required was
answered in the negative in Apacible, et
al. vs. Castillo, 74 Phil. 589, where the
Supreme Court held that such approval
may be supplied by the child's consent
given after reaching majority, which
obtained in the case at bar.

W/N Guadalupe Gaspay is entitled to letter

s of administration

In light of the above, the death of Flaviano

Gaspay, Sr., does not constitute a time bar
to private respondent's claim as his
acknowledged
illegitimate
daughter.
Settled is the rule that "actions based on
voluntary
acknowledgment
may
be
brought even after the father's death."

Court issatisfied that the evidence

profusely proved that private respondent
consented to her voluntary recognition as
an illegitimate child by the decedent.

In sum, private respondent has proved her

entitlement to be administrator of the
estate of Flaviano Gaspay, Sr., her father.
Section 6 of Rule 78 is in her favor, thus:

To begin with, petitioner has been sporting

the name Guadalupe Gaspay since
childhood up to the time she got married
to Bartolome Alfaro on May 22, 1953 and
even up to the present her acknowledged
name is Guadalupe Gaspay Alfaro.
(Exhibits J, J-1 and J-2). And then when she
filed the subject petition in this case she
used the same surname Gaspay after her
father and Alfaro after her lawful spouse
since her marriage, thereby accepting the
fact and telling the world that she is the
recognized daughter of the deceased
Flaviano Gaspay. At the time the present

Sec. 6. When and to whom letters of

administration granted. If no executor is
named in the will, or the executor or
executors are incompetent, refused the
trust, or fail to give bond, or a person dies
intestate, administration shall be granted:

Benitez-Badua vs. CA
GR No. 105625, January 24, 1994
FACTS:

Spouses Vicente Benitez and Isabel

Chipongian were owners of various
properties located in Laguna. Isabel died
in 1982 while his husband died in 1989.
Vicentes sister and nephew filed a
complaint for the issuance of letters of
administration of Vicentes estate in favor
of the nephew, herein private respondent.
The petitioner, Marissa Benitez-Badua,
was raised and cared by the deceased
spouses since childhood, though not
related to them by blood, nor legally
adopted. The latter to prove that she is
the only legitimate child of the spouses
submitted documents such as her
certificate of live birth where the spouses
name were reflected as her parents. She
even
testified
that
said
spouses
continuously
treated
her
as
their
legitimate daughter. On the other hand,
the relatives of Vicente declared that said
spouses were unable to physically
procreate hence the petitioner cannot be
the biological child. Trial court decided in
favor of the petitioner as the legitimate
daughter and sole heir of the spouses.
ISSUE:
WON petitioners certificate of live birth
will suffice to establish her legitimacy.
HELD:
The Court dismissed the case for lack of
merit. The mere registration of a child in
his or her birth certificate as the child of
the supposed parents is not a valid
adoption. It does not confer upon the
child the status of an adopted child and
her legal rights. Such act amounts to
simulation of the child's birth or
falsification of his or her birth certificate,
which is a public document.
It is worthy to note that Vicente and
brother of the deceased wife executed a
Deed of Extra-Judicial Settlement of the
Estate of the latter.
In the notarized

document, they stated that they were the

sole heirs of the deceased because she
died
without
descendants
and
ascendants.
In executing such deed,
Vicente
effectively
repudiated
the
Certificate of Live Birth of the petitioner
where it appeared that he was the
petitioners father.
Liyao, Jr. vs. Tanhoti-Liyao 378 SCRA
563
March 7, 2002

Fact of the Case:

Corazon G. Garcia is legally

married but has been living separately
from Ramon Yulo for more than 10 years.
She cohabited with William Liyao from
1965 upto his death. Some witnesses,
however, testified that Corazon and her
husband were seen in each others
company during the supposed time
Corazon cohabited with William Liyao.
On June 9, 1975, Corazon gave
birth to William Liyao Jr. Since birth,
William Jr, also known as Billy, had been in
continuous possession and enjoyment of
the status of a recognized and/ or
acknowledge child of William Liyao by the
latters direct and overt act.
During
William Liyao birthday he was carrying
Billy and told everybody present, including
his daughters, Look, this is my son, very
guapo and healty. He talked about
engrande plans for the baptism of Billy.
Unfortunately, it did not happen due to his
untimely death on December 2, 1975.
On November 29, 1976, William
Liyao, Jr, represented by his mother
Corazon G. Garcia filed a civil action for

compulsory
recognition
as
the
illegitimate son the late William Liyao. The
Regional Trial Court granted his petition,
however the Court of Appeals reversed the
decision saying that the law favors the
legitimacy rather than the illegitimacy of
the child. The petition was filed for review
on certiorari.

REPUBLIC
MAGPAYO

OF

THE

PHILIPPINES

v.

[G.R. No. 189476, February 2, 2011]

TOPIC:
ones legitimacy

Who

may

impugn

PETITIONER: Republic of the Philippines

Issue:
Whether or not the petitioner may
impugn his own legitimacy to be able to
claim from the estate of his supposed
father William Liyao.

RESPONDENT:
Julian
Edward
Emerson Coseteng-Magpayo (aka Julian
Edward Emerson Marquez-Lim Coseteng)
PONENTE:

Carpio-Morales, J.

FACTS:
Held:
No. Under the New Civil Code, a
child born and conceived during a valid
marriage is presumed to be legitimate.
Impugning the legitimacy of the child, is a
strictly personal right of the husband, or in
exceptional cases, his heirs for the simple
reason that he is the one directly
confronted with the scandal. Only in
exceptional cases may his heirs allowed to
contest such legitimacy. There is nothing
on the records to indicate that Ramon Yulo
has already passed away at the time of
the birth of the petitioner nor at the time
of the initiation of proceedings. The Court
held that it is settle that a child born
within a valid marriage is presumed
legitimate even though the mother may
have declared against its legitimacy or
may have been sentenced as an
adulteress; the child himself cannot
choose his own affiliation if the husband,
presumed to be the father does not
impugn the legitimacy of the child, then
the status of the child if fixed, and the
latter cannot choose to be the child of his
mothers paramour.

Mar 26, 1972: Fulvio M. Magpayo Jr.

and Anna Dominique Marquez-Lim
Coseteng
contracted
marriage
(according to respondents certificate
of live birth)
Sept 9, 1972: Resppondent was born in
Makati
Jul 22, 2008: Repondent filed before
the QC RTC a petition to change his
name to Julian Edward Emerson
Marquez Lim Coseteng
o Claimed that his parents were
never legally married
o petition, docketed as SPP No. Q0863058, was entitled "IN RE
PETITION FOR CHANGE OF
NAME OF JULIAN EDWARD
EMERSON COSETENG MAGPAYO
TO JULIAN EDWARD EMERSON
MARQUEZ-LIM COSETENG."
o In support of his petition,
respondent
submitted
a
certification from the NSO
stating that his mother "does
not appear in its National
Indices of Marriage.
o Respondent also submitted his
academic
records
from
elementary
up
to
college
showing that he carried the
surname "Coseteng," and the
birth certificate of his child

where "Coseteng" appears as

his surname.
1998, 2001 and 2004 Elections:
respondent was elected as Councilor of
QCs 3rd District using the petitioned
name
o On order of QC RTC, respondent
amended
his
petition
by
alleging therein compliance
with the 3-year residency
requirement under Sec 2, Rule
103, RoC.
o The notice setting the petition
for hearing on Nov 20, 2008
was published in the newspaper
Broadside in its Oct 31-Nov 6,
2008, Nov 7-13, 2008, and Nov
14-20, 2008 issues
o A copy of the notice was
furnished to the OSG
No opposition to the petition having
been filed, an order of general default
was entered by the trial court which
then allowed respondent to present
evidence ex parte By Decision of Jan 8,
2009,
the
trial
court
granted
respondents petition and directed the
Civil Registrar of Makati City to:
1. Delete the entry "March 26,
1972" in Item 24 for "DATE AND
PLACE
OF
MARRIAGEOF
PARTIES"
[in
herein
respondents Certificate of live
Birth];
2. Correct the entry "MAGPAYO" in
the space for the Last Name of
the
[respondent]
to
"COSETENG";
3. Delete the entry "COSETENG" in
the space for Middle Name of
the [respondent]; and
4. Delete
the
entry
"Fulvio
Miranda Magpayo, Jr." in the
space for FATHER of the
[respondent]
Petitioner filed an MR, but it was
denied by the trial court on Jul 2, 2009,
hence, it, thru the OSG, lodged the
present petition for review to the Court
on pure question of law.

ISSUES:

1. WON the petition for change of name

involving change of civil status should
be
made
through
appropriate
adversarial proceedings
2. WON the trial court exceeded its
jurisdiction when it directed the
deletion of the name of respondents
father from his birth certificate
HELD:
Petition
decision is NULLIFIED.

GRANTED.

RTC

1. A person can effect a change of name

under Rule 103 (Change of Name)
using
valid
and
meritorious
grounds including
a) when the name is ridiculous,
dishonorable or extremely
difficult
to
write
or
pronounce;
b) when the change results as
a legal consequence such as
legitimation;
c) when the change will avoid
confusion;
d) when one has continuously
used and been known since
childhood by a Filipino
name, and was unaware of
alien parentage;
e) a sincere desire to adopt a
Filipino name to erase signs
of former alienage, all in
good faith and without
prejudicing anybody; and
f) when the surname causes
embarrassment and there is
no showing that the desired
change of name was for a
fraudulent purpose or that
the change of name would
prejudice public interest.***
Rule 103 then would not suffice to
grant respondents supplication.
o In
the
present
case,
however, respondent denies
his legitimacy and seeks to
change
it
to
that
of
illegitimacy
o The change being sought in
respondents petition goes
so far as to affect his legal
status in relation to his
parents

Labayo-Rowe v. Republic:
changes
which
may
affect the civil status
from
legitimate
to
illegitimate are substantial
and controversial alterations
which can only be allowed
after
appropriate
adversary proceedings
Since respondents desired change
affects his civil status from
legitimate to illegitimate, Rule 108
applies. It reads:
o Sec 1. Who may file
petition. Any person
interested in any act,
event, order or decree
concerning the civil status
of persons which has been
recorded
in
the
civil
register, may file a verified
petition for the cancellation
or correction of any entry
relating thereto, with the
RTC of the province where
the
corresponding
civil
registry is located.
o SEC.3. Parties. When
cancellation or correction of
an entry in the civil register
is sought, the civil registrar
and all persons who have or
claim any interest which
would be affected thereby
shall be made parties to the
proceeding.
o SEC.
4.
Notice
and
publication. Upon the filing
of the petition, the court
shall, by an order, fix the
time and place for the
hearing of the same, and
cause reasonable notice
thereof to be given to the
persons named in the
petition. The court shall also
cause the order to be
published once a week for
three (3) consecutive weeks
in a newspaper of general
circulation in the province.
o

2. Yes, it did.

Rule 108 directs that a petition

which concerns ones civil status
should be filed in the civil registry
in which the entry is sought to be
cancelled or corrected, and all
persons who have or claim any
interest which would be affected
thereby should be made parties to
the proceeding
o Respondents petition was
filed not in Makati where his
birth
certificate
was
registered but in Quezon
City.
o Also,
neither
the
civil
registrar of Makati nor his
father and mother were
made parties thereto.
Rule 103 regarding change of name
and in Rule 108 concerning the
cancellation or correction of entries
in the civil registry are separate
and distinct
o "A petition for a substantial
correction or change of
entries in the civil registry
should have as respondents
the civil registrar, as well as
all other persons who have
or claim to have any
interest that would be
affected thereby."
Rule 108 clearly mandates two sets
of notices to different "potential
oppositors."
o first notice is that given to
the "persons named in the
petition"
o second (which is through
publication) is that given to
other persons who are not
named in the petition but
nonetheless
may
be
considered interested or
affected parties, such as
creditors.
That two sets of notices are
mandated under the above-quoted
Sec 4 is validated by the
subsequent Sec 5, also abovequoted, which provides for two
periods (for the two types of
"potential oppositors") within which
to file an opposition (15 days from

notice or from the last date of

publication).
o The purpose precisely of
Sec 4, Rule 108 is to bind
the whole world to the
subsequent judgment on
the petition
o The sweep of the decision
would cover even parties
who should have been
impleaded under Sec 3,
Rule
108
but
were
inadvertently left out.
Diaz vs CA [Proof
Legitimate Children]
Facts:

of

Filiation

of

The main issue in this case is whether

Leodegario is the legitimate son of Isidro
Azarraga and Calixta Lozada.
Petitioner contends that Leodegario is the
legitimate son of Isidro and Calixta,
making the former to be the brother in full
blood of herein petitioners (Marias)
mother, Filomena, thus, making her
(Maria) entitled to inherit the properties
left by Leodegario when he died intestate,
leaving
no
surviving
spouse
nor
descendants.
Respondent counterclaims that Leodegario
was the illegitimate son of Isidro and
Valentina, hence the brother in full blood
of the other children of Isidro. In this
sense, the respondent, as the collateral
relatives, should be entitled to inherit the
properties.
Spanish Civil Code applies in this case.
Issue: Who should
intestate heir?

be

Leodegarios

Rulings:

legitimate filiation, they constitute strong

evidence thereof.
His Certificate of Admission to the
Philippine Bar on 1904 names him simply
as Leodegario Azarraga. It cannot be
concluded therefrom, however, that he
was not the legitimate son of Isidro
Azarraga and Calixta Lozada.
The several letters wherein he signed
simply as Leodegario Azarraga neither
disprove legitimacy. The dropping of the
maternal surname in correspondence or
written documents is commonplace for
convenience and brevity.
Respondent explained that the name
Lozada was used by Leodegario at the
instance of their father, Isidro, who was
anxious
to
cover
up
Leodegarios
illegitimacy from the priests of UST.
The last Will and Testament of Pastora
Azarraga, a daughter of Isidro, indicates
that
Pastora,
Filomena
(petitioners
mother), and Leodegario are brothers
and sister of the full blood they being
children of Isidro and Calixta. That Will
was later probated without objection. Also,
the Court of March 1950 mentioned
Pastora as the legitimate sister of
Leodegario and no objection was heard to
said declaration until 20 years later.
To offset Marias documentary evidence,
the respondent presented a copy of the
Decision of the then Court of First Instance
of Capiz in a case where it appears that
Maria was reffered to as the universal
heir of Isidro Azarraga. They concluded
that only Maria is the legitimate heir, and
not Leodegario. The Court ruled that this is
a false claim since universal heir is not
synonymous with sole forced heir.

SC Ruling:

Also, not only had Leodegario been

already given hi share of the inheritance
but that he was also appointed executor of
his father Isidros estate.

Leodegarios school records from UST

show that he was enrolled as Leodegario
Azarraga y Lozada. Although those
records by themselves are not proof of

In the overall, the presumption in

Leodegarios favor of legitimacy has not
been
successfully
contradicted
nor
overcome by the respondent.

RTC ruled in favor of Maria.

CA reversed RTCs decision.

CORAZON DEZOLLER TISON and RENE

R. DEZOLLER
vs CA G.R. No. 121027. July 31, 1997
Issues:
1.Whether or not a third
person
(private
respondent),
n o t t h e f a t h e r n o r a n h e i r, m a y
attack the legitimacy of the petitioners;
and 2.Whether or not the petitioners
are entitled to inherit one-half of the
property
in
question
by
right
of representation.
Facts:
The petitioners Corazon Tison and Rene D
ezoller are niece and nephew of
the
deceased Tedora Dezoller Guerrero, who
appears to be the sister of their father
Hermogenes
D e z o l l e r. Te o d o r a D e z o l l e r G u e r re r
o d i e d o n M a rc h 5 , 1 9 8 3 w i t h o u t a
n y a s c e n d a n t o r descendant, and was
survived only by her husband, Martin
Guerrero,
and
herein
petitioners.
Petitioners' father, Hermogenes, died on
October 3, 1973; hence they seek to
inherit from Teodora Dezoller Guerrero by
right of representation. The records reveal
that upon the death of Teodora Dezoller
Guerrero, her surviving spouse executed
an Affidavit of Extrajudicial Settlement
adjudicating unto himself, allegedly as
sole heir, the land in dispute. Martin sold
the lot to herein private respondent
Teodora Domingo and thereafter, a TCT
was issued
in
the
latters
name.
Martin Guerrero died. Subsequently, h
erein petitioners fi led an action for re
conveyanceclaiming that they are
entitled to inherit one-half of the
property
in
question
by
right
of representation.
Tedoro Domingo
however,
attacks
the legitimacy of Hermogenes. During
the
hearing,
petitioner
Corazon
Dezoller Tison was presented as the
lone
witness,
with
documentary
evidences offered to prove petitioners
filiations to their father and their aunt.
Petitioners thereafter rested their case and
submitted a written offer of the exhibits.
Subsequently, private respondent filed
a Demurrer to Plaintiffs Evidence on the
ground that petitioners failed to prove

their
legitimate
filiations
the deceased Teodora Guerrero.

with

The trial court dismissed the complaint for

reconveyance. Respondent Court of Appea
lsu p h e l d t h e d i s m i s s a l , d e c l a r i n g t
h a t t h e d o c u m e n t a r y e v i d e n c e p re
s e n t e d b y h e re i n petitioners, such as
the baptismal certifi cates, family
picture, and joint affi davits are all
inadmissible and insufficient to prove and
establish filiation.
Decision: T h e S C d e c i d e d t h a t t h e
private
re s p o n d e n t
is not the
p ro p e r
party
to impugn
the
l e g i t i m a c y o f herein petitioners.
There is no presumption of the law more fi
rmly established and founded on sounder
morality and more convincing reason than
the presumption that children born in
wedlock
a re l e g i t i m a t e . A n d w e l l s e t t l e d i s
the rule that the issue of legitima
c y c a n n o t b e attacked collaterally.Only
the
husband
can
contest
the
legitimacy of a child born to his wife.
He is the one directly confronted with
the scandal and ridicule which the
infidelity of his wife produces; and he
should decide whether to conceal that
infidelity or expose it, in view of the moral
and economic interest involved. It is only
in exceptional cases that his heirs are
allowed to contest such legitimacy.
Outside of these cases, none even
his heirs can impugn legitimacy; that
would amount to an insult to his memory.
The necessity of an independent action
directly impugning the legitimacy is more
clearly expressed in the Mexican Code
(Article 335) which provides: The contest of the
legitimacy of a child by the husband or his heirs
must be made by proper complaint
before
the competent court;
any contest made in any other way is
void. This principle applies under
our Family Code. Articles 170 and 171
of the code confi rm this view, because
they refer to the action to impugn the
legitimacy. This action can be brought
only by the husband or his heirs and within
the periods fixed by law. Upon the expiration
of the periods provided in Article 170, the

action to impugn the legitimacy of a child

can no longer be brought. The status
conferred by the presumption, therefore,
becomes fixed, and can no longer be
questioned. The obvious intention of the
law is to prevent the status of a child born
in wedlock from being in a state of
uncertainty for a long time. It also aims to
force early action to settle any doubt as to
the paternity of such child, so that the
evidence material to the matter, which
must necessarily be facts occurring during
the period of the conception of the child, may
still be easily available.
Upon the death of Teodora Dezoller
Guerrero, one-half of the subject property
was automatically reserved to the
surviving spouse, Martin Guerrero, as his
share
in
the
conjugal
partnership. Applying the aforequoted
statutory provisions, the remaining half
shall be equally divided between the
widowers and herein petitioners who are
entitled to jointly inherit in their own
right. Hence, Martin Guerrero could only
validly alienate his total undivided threefourths (3/4) share in the entire property
to herein private respondent. Resultantly,
petitioners and private respondent are
deemed co-owners of the property
covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No.
374012 in the proportion of an undivided
one-fourth (1/4) and three-fourths (3/4)
share thereof, respectively.
All told, on the basis of the foregoing
considerations, the demurrer to plaintiffs
evidence should have been, as it is
hereby,
denied. Nonetheless,
private
respondent may no longer be allowed to
present evidence by reason of the
mandate under Section 1 of revised Rule 3
of the Rules of Court which provides that
if the motion is granted but on appeal the
order of dismissal is reversed he shall be
deemed to have waived the right to
present evidence.
Wherefore, the
questioned judgment of respondent Court
of Appeals is hereby REVERSED and SET
ASIDE, and herein petitioners and private
respondent are declared co-owners of the
subject property with an undivided onefourth (1/4) and three-fourths (3/4) share
therein, respectively.

TRINIDAD VS. CA

Facts:
Arturio claimed that he is the child of the
Respondents brother Innocentes. These
were
his
evidences:
1.
Testimony
of
Gerardo
that
Inocentes and his wife cohabited and had
a child;
2.
Testimony of Meren that she was
present in the marriage of Arturio's
parents;
3.
His own baptismal certificate (his
birth certificate had been destroyed); and
4.
Family pictures and his own
testimony that he lived with Lourdes, until
he got married.
Issue:
Whether or not the the above evidences
are enough to prove that Arturio is the
legitimate child of innocentes.
Ruling:
Yes. In the absence of a marriage
certificate, any of the four can be
sufficient proof of marriage:
1.
Fact of marriage ceremony;
2.
Open cohabitation of the parties;
3.
Birth certificate of the child; and
4.
Other documents.
Arturio presented the first 3. For filiation,
when the birth certificate cant be
produced,
other evidence
like
the
baptismal certificate, is admissible. Use of
surname
without
objection
is
also
presumptive evidence of legitimacy.

Heirs of Conti v CA
G.R. No. 118464
December 21, 1998
Facts:
Lourdes Sampayo and Ignacio Conti were
the co-owners of the property in litigation
consisting of a 539-square meter lot at the
corner of Zamora and Abellanosa Streets,
Lucena City. After Lourdes Sampayo died,
private respondents filed an action for
partition and damages before the RTC of
Lucena City against Ignacio Conti. After
trial on the merits, the court declared
respondents as the rightful heirs of
Lourdes Sampayo and ordered both
parties to submit a project of partition of
the residential house and lot for
confirmation by the trial court.On appeal,
the Court of Appeals affirmed the RTC
decision ruling that a prior and separate
judicial declaration of heirship was not
necessary and that private respondents
became co-owners of the portion of the
property owned and registered in the
name of Lourdes Sampayo upon her death
and, consequently, entitled to the
immediate possession thereof and all
other incidents/rights of ownership as
provided for by law including the right to
demand partition under Art. 777 of the
Civil Code.
Issue/s:
(1) WON a prior settlement of the entire
estate is essential before heirs can
commence any action in behalf of
deceased.
(2)WON
private
respondents
could
establish
co-ownership
by
way
of
succession as collateral heirs of Sampayo
Decision:
(1) No. prior settlement of the estate is not
essential before the heirs can commence
any action originally pertaining to the
deceased as we explained in Quison v.
Salud, Claro Quison died in 1902. It was
proven at the trial that the present
plaintiffs are next of kin and heirs, but it is
said by the appellants that they are not
entitled to maintain this action because

there is no evidence that any proceedings

have been taken in court for the
settlement of the estate of Claro
Quison,and that without such settlement,
the heirs cannot maintain this action.
There is nothing in this point. As well by
the Civil Code as by the Code of Civil
Procedure, the title to the propertyowned
by a person who dies intestate passes at
once to his heirs. Such transmission is,
under the present law, subject to the
claims of administration and the property
may be taken from the heirsfor the
purpose of paying debts and expenses,
but this does not prevent an immediate
passage ofthe title, upon the death of the
intestate, from himself to his heirs.
Without some showing that a judicial
administrator had been appointed in
proceedings to settle the estate of Claro
Quison, the right of the plaintiffs to
maintain this action is established.
(2) Yes. In this case, it must be identified
whether
private
respondents,
by
preponderance of evidence, have been
able to establish that they are co-owners
by way of succession as collateral heirs of
the late Lourdes Sampayo as they claim to
be, a sister, a nephew or a niece. These,
private respondents were able to prove in
the trial court as well as before respondent
Court ofAppeals. So this petition was
denied.
JINKIE CHRISTIE A. DE JESUS and
JACQUELINE
A.
DE
JESUS,
minors,
represented by their mother, CAROLINA A.
DE JESUS, petitioners, vs. THE ESTATE OF
DECEDENT
JUAN
GAMBOA
DIZON,
ANGELINA V. DIZON, CARLOS DIZON,
FELIPE DIZON, JUAN DIZON, JR. and
MARYLIN DIZON and as proper parties:
FORMS MEDIA CORP., QUAD MANAGEMENT
CORP., FILIPINAS PAPER SALES CO., INC.
and AMITY CONSTRUCTION & INDUSTRIAL
ENTERPRISES, INC., Respondents.
Prayer of the Petitioner: Petitioners
maintain that their recognition as being
illegitimate children of the decedent,
embodied in an authentic writing, is in

itself sufficient to establish their status as

such and does not require a separate
action for judicial approval.
Facts: The case involves two illegitimate
children who having been born in a lawful
wedlock; claim to be the illegitimate
children of the decedent, Juan G. Dizon in
order to enforce their respective shares in
the latters estate under the rules on
succession.
Danilo B. de Jesus and Carolina Aves de
Jesus got married on August 23, 1964 and
during this marriage, herein petitioners,
Jacqueline A. de Jesus and Jinkie Christie A.
de Jesus were born.
However, in a notarized document dated
June
07,
1991,
Juan
G.
Dizon
acknowledged Jacqueline and Jinkie de
Jesus as being his own illegitimate children
by Carolina Aves de Jesus. Subsequently,
on the following year, Juan G. Dizon died
intestate leaving behind a considerable
amount of assets. Thus, on the strength of
his notarized acknowledgment, herein
petitioners filed a complaint for Partition
with Inventory and Accounting of the
Dizon estate.

On
the
other
hand,
herein respondents, the surviving spouse
and legitimate children of the decedent
Juan G. Dizon, including the corporations
of which the deceased was a stockholder,
sought the dismissal of the case. They
argued that the complaint, even while
denominated as being one for partition,
would nevertheless call for altering the
status of petitioners from being the
legitimate children of the spouses Danilo
de Jesus and Carolina de Jesus to instead
be the illegitimate children of Carolina de
Jesus and deceased Juan Dizon. But, the
trial court denied their motion to dismiss
as well as their motion for reconsideration,

which prompted the respondents to

elevate the issue before the Court of
Appeals but still the latter upheld the
decision of the lower court and ordered
that case be remanded for further
proceedings.
Years
later,
respondents,
notwithstanding with their submission of
their answers and several motions, they
filed an omnibus motion for the dismissal
of the complaint. They contend that the
action instituted was, in fact, made to
compel the recognition of petitioners as
being the illegitimate children of decedent
Juan G. Dizon and that the partition sought
was merely an ulterior relief once
petitioners would have been able to
establish their status as such heirs. They
also asserted that an action for partition
was not an appropriate forum to ascertain
the question of paternity and filiation
because the same could only be taken up
in an independent suit or proceeding. And
at this instance, the trial court favored
with the respondents and therefore
dismissed the complaint of the petitioners
for lack of cause of action and being
improper.

Issue: Whether petitioners are indeed the

acknowledged illegitimate offsprings of
the decedent.

Ruling: The
filiation
of
illegitimate
children, like legitimate children, is
established by (1) the record of birth
appearing in the civil register or a final
judgment; or (2) an admission of
legitimate filiation in a public document or
a private handwritten instrument and
signed by the parent concerned. In the
absence thereof, filiation shall be proved
by (1) the open and continuous possession

of the status of a legitimate child; or (2)

any other means allowed by the Rules of
Court and special laws. The due
recognition of an illegitimate child in a
record of birth, a will, a statement before a
court of record, or in any authentic writing
is, in itself, a consummated act of
acknowledgment of the child, and no
further court action is required. In fact,
any authentic writing is treated not just a
ground for compulsory recognition; it is in
itself a voluntary recognition that does not
require a separate action for judicial
approval. Where, instead, a claim for
recognition is predicated on other
evidence merely tending to prove
paternity, i.e., outside of a record of birth,
a will, a statement before a court of record
or an authentic writing, judicial action
within the applicable statute of limitations
is essential in order to establish the childs
acknowledgment.
However, based on the records presented,
they showed that petitioners were born
during the marriage of their parents. The
certificates of live birth would also identify
Danilo de Jesus as being their father.
There is perhaps no presumption of the
law more firmly established and founded
on sounder morality and more convincing
reason than the presumption that children
born in wedlock are legitimate. This
presumption
indeed
becomes
conclusive in the absence of proof that
there is physical impossibility of access
between the spouses during the first 120
days of the 300 days which immediately
precedes the birth of the child due to (a)
the physical incapacity of the husband to
have sexual intercourse with his wife; (b)
the fact that the husband and wife are
living separately in such a way that sexual
intercourse is not possible; or (c) serious
illness of the husband, which absolutely
prevents
sexual
intercourse.
Quite
remarkably, upon the expiration of the
periods set forth in Article 170, and in

proper cases Article 171, of the Family

Code (which took effect on 03 August
1988), the action to impugn the legitimacy
of a child would no longer be legally
feasible and the status conferred by the
presumption
becomes
fixed
and
unassailable.
In an attempt to establish their illegitimate
filiation to the late Juan G. Dizon,
petitioners, in effect, would impugn their
legitimate status as being children of
Danilo de Jesus and Carolina Aves de
Jesus. This step cannot be aptly done
because the law itself establishes the
legitimacy of children conceived or born
during the marriage of the parents.
Jurisprudence is strongly settled that the
paramount declaration of legitimacy by
law cannot be attacked collaterally, one
that can only be repudiated or contested
in a direct suit specifically brought for that
purpose. Indeed, a child so born in such
wedlock shall be considered legitimate
although the mother may have declared
against its legitimacy or may have been
sentenced as having been an adulteress.
WHEREFORE, the foregoing disquisitions
considered, the instant petition is DENIED.

Jison vs. CA
FACTS: Private respondent, Monina Jison,
instituted a complaint against petitioner,
Francisco
Jison,
for
recognition
as
illegitimate child of the latter. The case
was filed 20 years after her mothers
death and when she was already 39 years
of age.
Petitioner was married to Lilia Lopez Jison
since 1940 and sometime in 1945, he
impregnated Esperanza Amolar, Moninas
mother.
Monina alleged that since
childhood,
she
had
enjoyed
the
continuous, implied recognition as the
illegitimate child of petitioner by his acts
and that of his family. It was likewise
alleged that petitioner supported her and
spent for her education such that she

became a CPA and eventually a Central

Bank Examiner. Monina was able to
present total of 11 witnesses.
ISSUE: WON Monina should be declared
as illegitimate child of Francisco Jison.
HELD: Under Article 175 of the Family
Code, illegitimate filiation may be
established in the same way and on the
same evidence as that of legitimate
children. Article 172 thereof provides the
various forms of evidence by which
legitimate filiation is established.
To prove open and continuous possession
of the status of an illegitimate child, there
must be evidence of the manifestation of
the permanent intention of the supposed
father to consider the child as his, by
continuous and clear manifestations of
parental affection and care, which cannot
be attributed to pure charity. Such acts
must be of such a nature that they reveal
not only the conviction of paternity, but
also the apparent desire to have and treat
the child as such in all relations in society
and in life, not accidentally, but
continuously.
The following facts was established based
on the testimonial evidences offered by
Monina:
1.
That Francisco was her father and
she was conceived at the time when her
mother was employed by the former;
2.
That Francisco recognized Monina as
his child through his overt acts and
conduct.
SC ruled that a certificate of live birth
purportedly identifying the putative father
is not competence evidence as to the
issue of paternity. Franciscos lack of
participation in the preparation of
baptismal certificates and school records
render
the
documents
showed
as
incompetent to prove paternity. With
regard to the affidavit signed by Monina
when she was 25 years of age attesting
that Francisco was not her father, SC was
in the position that if Monina were truly
not Franciscos illegitimate child, it would
be unnecessary for him to have gone to
such great lengths in order that Monina
denounce her filiation. Moninas evidence
hurdles the high standard of proof
required for the success of an action to
establish ones illegitimate filiation in

relying upon the provision on open and

continuous possession. Hence, Monina
proved her filiation by more than mere
preponderance of evidence.
Since the instant case involves paternity
and filiation, even if illegitimate, Monina
filed her action well within the period
granted her by a positive provision of law.
A denial then of her action on ground of
laches would clearly be inequitable and
unjust. Petition was denied.
Heirs of Gabatan v CATOPIC: Proof
of filiation of illegitimate children
(INTERNET DIGEST)
FACTS:
The respondent alleges that she is the
sole owner of a land located in Cagayande
Oro City which she inherited from her
mother, Hermogena, the only child of Juan
Gabatan and his wife, Laureana Clarito.
Respondent alleged that upon the death
of Juan Gabatan, his land was entrusted to
his brother, TeOFIlo Gobatan and Tefilos wife, Rita
Gabatan, for administration.
It was also claimed that prior to her
death Hermogena demanded for the
return of the land but to no avail. After
Hermogenas death, respondent also did the
same but petitioners refused to heed the
numerous
demands
to
surrender
the
subject property.
Petitioners denied that respondents
mother Hermogena was the daughter
of Juan Gabatan with Laureana Clarito
and that Hermogena or respondent is
therightful heir of Juan Gabatan. They
further contend that Juan Gabatan died
single in 1934 and without any issue
and that Juan was survived by one brother
and two sisters, namely- Teofilo (Petitioners
predescesor in interest), Macaria and Justa.
These
siblings
and/or
their heirs,
inherited the subject land from Juan
Gabatan and have been in actual,
physical,
open,
public,
adverse,
continuous and uninterrupted possession
thereof in the concept of owners for more than 50
years and en'oyed the fruits of the improvements
thereon, to the exclusionof the whole world
including respondent.

 October 20, 1995 the RTC rendered a decision

in favor of respondent
CA affirmed such decision declaring that
respondents claim of filiation with Juan
Gabatan
was
sufficiently established
during trial.
- The proof was a deed of absolute
sale on July 30, 1966 containing
such declaration which was signed by
Teofilo and the latters nearest relatives
by
consanguinity,
is a
tangible proof
that
they acknowledged
Hermogenas
status as the daughter of Juan
Gabatan.
Teofilo
formally recognized
Hermogenas right to heirship from
Juan Gabatan which ultimately
passed on to respondent.
ISSUE:
W/N Hermogena Clareto GABATAN is the child
and sole heir of Juan Gabatan
HELD:
No.
Our laws dictate that the best
evidence of such familial tie was the
record of birth appearing the Civil Register,
or an authentic document or a final
judgment in the absence of these,
any proof that the child enjoyed the
continuous possession of the status
of a legitimate child only in the
absence of these two classes of
evidence is the anyone allowed to
present
other porrof
admissible
under the Rules of Court of the proof
of paternity and filiation
The Court has consistently ruled that the
trial court cannot make a declaration of
heirship in the civil action for the reason that such
a declaration can only be made in a special
proceeding.
To prove the relationship of respondents
mother to Juan Gabatan, our laws dictate
that the best evidence of such familial tie
was the record of birth appearing in
theCivil Register, or an authentic document or a
final judgment. In the absence of these,
respondent should have presented proof that her
mother enjoyed the continuous possession of
the status of a legitimate child. Only in the
absence of these two classes of evidence is the
respondent allowed to present other proof

admissible under the Rules of Court of her

mothers relationship to Juan Gabatan.
However,
respondents
mothers
(Hermogenas)
birth certificate,
which
would have been the best evidence
of Hermogenas
relationship
to
Juan
Gabatan, was never offered as evidence to
the RTC. Neither did respondent present any
authentic document or final judgment
categorically
evidencing
Hermogenas
relationship to Juan Gabatan.
Respondent relied on the testimony of her
witnesses but none of thesewitnesses had
personal knowledge of the fact of marriage of
Juan to Laureana or the fact of birth of
Hermogena to Juan and Laureana. They were not
yet born or were very young when Juan
supposedly married Laureana or when
Hermogena was born and they all admitted that
none of them were present at Juan and
Laureanas wedding or Hermogenas birth.
These witnesses based their testimony
on what they had been told by, or heard from,
others as young children. Their testimonies were
in a word, hearsay from the testimonies of
respondents witnesses, both the RTC and the CA
relied heavily on a photocopy of a Deed of
Absolute Sale presented by respondent and
which appeared to be signed by the siblings and
the heirs of the siblings of Juan Gabatan.
However, the admission of this Deed
of Absolute Sale, including its contents and
the signatures therein, as competent evidence
was vigorously and repeatedly objected to by
petitioners counsel for being a mere
photocopy
and
not
being
properly
authenticated. After a close scrutiny of the said
photocopy of the Deed of absolute sale, the
Court cannot uphold the admissibility of
the same. Under the best evidence rule,
when the subject of injury is the contents
of a document, no evidence shall
be admissible other than the original
document itself. Although the best evidence rule
admits of exceptions and there are instances
where the presentation of secondary evidence
would be allowed, such as when the original is
lost or the original is a public record, the basis for
the presentation of secondary evidence must
still be established. Thus, DepEd v Del
Rosario, we held that a party must first
satisfactorily explain the loss of the best or
primary evidence before he can resort to

secondary evidence & party must first

present to the court proof of loss or other
satisfactory explanation for non-production of
the original instrument.
In the case at bar, a perusal of the
transcript of the testimony of Felicisima
Nagac Pacana (who identified the photocopy of
the Deed of Absolute Sale) plainly shows that she
gave no testimony regarding the whereabouts of
the original, whether it was lost or whether it was
recorded in any public office

Antonio Perla, petitioner v. Mirasol

Baring and Randy Perla, respondents
GR I 72471 Nov. 12, 2012
Facts:
MIrasol (and Randy) filed before the RTC a
Complaint for support against Antonio.
According to Mirasol, she and Antonio had
a common law relationship for 2 years,
and that Randy was the result of their
affair.
Randy was made to testify in Court, he
said that he has been in the house of his
Aunt Lelita (sister of Antonio),, and that
the Perla family treated him as a member
of their family.
Antonio denied Mirasols allegations,
saying that Randy isnt his (he came in
Manila
only after his graduation in 1981 and He
claimed that he had sexual intercourse
with Mirasol only once which happened in
the month of September or October of
1981). Antonio also said that Randys birth
certificate has a lot of inaccuracies.
RTC ordered Antonio to support Randy (as
illegitimate child).

RATIO:
The rules for establishing filiation are
found in Articles 172 and 175 of the Family
Code which provide as follows: Article 172.
The filiation of legitimate children is
established by any of the following:(1) The
record of birth appearing in the civil
register or a final judgment; or (2) An
admission of legitimate filiation in a public
document or a private handwritten
instrument and signed by the parent
concerned. In the absence of the foregoing
evidence, the legitimate filiation shall be
proved by:(1) The open and continuous
possession of the status of a legitimate
child; or (2) Any other means allowed by
the Rules of Court and special laws.x x x
x Article 175. Illegitimate children may
establish their illegitimate filiation in the
same way and on the same evidence as
legitimate children.
Respondents presented the Certificate of
Live Birth of Randy identifying Antonio as
the father. However, said certificate has
no probative value to establish Randys
filiation to Antonio since the latter had not
signed the same. It is settled that [a]
certificate of live birth purportedly
identifying the putative father is not
competent evidence of paternity when
there is no showing that the putative
father
had a hand in the preparation of said
certificate.
The several unexplained discrepancies in
Antonios personal circumstances as
reflected in the subject birth certificate are
manifestations
of
Antonios
nonparticipation in its preparation. Most
important, it was Mirasol who signed as
informant thereon which she confirmed on
the witness stand.

CA upheld RTC decision.

ISSUE: WON Randy is entitled to receive
support from Antonio.HELD:
NO. Respondents failed to establish
Randys illegitimate filiation to Antonio.

People v Abella, G.R. No. 177295, January

6, 2010
Compulsory recognition, cf. RPC 345

Automatic
review
of
CA
decision
convicting
accused-appellant
Marlon
Barsaga Abella of the crime of rape,
defined and penalized under Articles 266A and 266-B of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended, sentencing him to suffer the
penalty of reclusion perpetua, ordering
him to pay civil indemnity and damages,
and further ordering him to acknowledge
and support his offspring with the private
offended party.

That sometime on December 1999, in the

afternoon, at Barangay San Vicente,
Municipality of Pamplona, Province of
Camarines Sur, Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, while armed with
"Balisong" and under the influence of
liquor, by means of force and intimidation
and with lewd design, did then and there
willfully and feloniously enter the house of
herein complainant and then and there
have sexual intercourse with AAA, a
woman of feeble mind, against her will to
her damage and prejudice.

SC: In the case before us, the prosecution

has established beyond reasonable doubt
that the accused-appellant had carnal
knowledge of AAA, a demented person,
through force, threat or intimidation. AAA
was psychiatrically evaluated as an adult
woman with the mental age of a 7 to 8year old child and that she gave birth to a
child despite her mental inability to give
her consent to a sexual relationship. These
facts support the allegation of sexual
abuse. AAA also identified without
uncertainty the accused-appellant as her
attacker and related distinctly that he
forcibly laid her down, held her at
knifepoint, and sexually abused her.

W/N child should be recognized by Abella.

Yes.

SC: We also accord high respect to the

ruling of the trial court, as well as to the
appellate courts deference thereto, that
the accused-appellant was the biological
father of the two-year old daughter of AAA
as a result of the rape incident and in view
of their "striking facial similarities and
features." The order to acknowledge and
support accused-appellants offspring is in
accordance with Article 345 of the Revised
Penal Code.

Abadilla vs. Tabiliran

AM No. MTJ-92-716, October 25, 1995
FACTS:
Ma. Blyth Abadilla, a Clerk of Court, filed a
complaint against Judge Tabiliran on the

grounds of gross immorality, deceitful

conduct, and corruption unbecoming of a
judge. With respect to the charge on
gross immorality, she contended that the
judge scandalously and publicly cohabited
with Priscilla Baybayan during subsistence
of his marriage with Teresita Banzuela.
Tabiliran and Priscilla got married in May
1986. On the other hand, with respect to
the charge on deceitful conduct, petitioner
claims that the judge caused his 3
illegitimate children with Priscilla be
registered as legitimate by falsely
executing separate affidavits stating the
delayed
registration
was
due
to
inadvertence, excusable negligence or
oversight when in fact, he knew these
children cannot be legally registered as
legitimate. The judge averred that 25
years had already elapsed since the
disappearance of her wife in 1966 when
he married Priscilla hence the cohabitation
was neither bigamous nor immoral.
However, as early as 1970, based on the
record, Priscilla had begotten her 3
children (1970, 1971 and 1975).
ISSUE:

disqualified by any impediment to marry

each other may be legitimated. Reasons
for this limitation:
1) The rationale of legitimation would be
destroyed;
2) It would be unfair to the legitimate
children in terms of successional rights;
3) There will be the problem of public
scandal, unless social mores change;
4) It is too violent to grant the privilege of
legitimation to adulterous children as it
will destroy the sanctity of marriage;
5) It will be very scandalous, especially if
the parents marry many years after the
birth of the child.

Lazatin Vs. Jose Campos (judge)

Facts:
1

WON the 3 children can be considered

legitimate.
HELD:
The 3 children cannot be legitimated nor
in any way be considered legitimate since
the time they were born, there was an
existing valid marriage between Tabiliran
and Teresita. Only natural children can be
legitimated.
Children born outside of
wedlock of parents who, at the time of the
conception of the former, were not
disqualified by any impediment to marry
each other, are natural.
Under Article 177 of the Family Code, only
children conceived and born outside of
wedlock of parents who, at the time of the
conception of the former, were not

Margarita de Asis died, leaving a

holographic will (a will and
testament that has been entirely
handwritten and signed by the
testator), providing for a legacy of
cash, jewelry, and stocks to
respondent Arlene de Leon, a
granddaughter; a legacy of support
to Rodolfo Gallardo, a son of her
late sister; and a legacy of
education to Ramon Sta. Clara, son
of petitioner Renato Lazatin.
During her lifetime, Margarita de
Asis kept a safety deposit box at
the bank which either she or
respondent Nora de Leon (adopted
daughter) could open. 5 days after
her death, Nora opened the safety
deposit box and removed its
contents: (a) shares of stock; (b)
her adoption papers and those of
her sister, respondent Irma L.
Veloso; and (c) jewelry belonging to
her and to her mother. Nora claims
that she opened the safety deposit

box in good faith, believing that it

was held jointly by her and her
deceased mother.
Respondents filed a petition to
probate (establish the validity) the
will. After having learned that the
safety box was opened, petitioner's
son, Ramon Sta. Clara, filed a
motion in the probate court,
claiming that the deceased had
executed a will subsequent to
that submitted for probate and
demanding its production. He
likewise prayed for the opening of
the safety deposit box. Respondent
Nora L. de Leon admitted that she
opened the box but there was no
will or any document resembling a
will therein.
Petitioner Renato to Lazatin
alias Renato Sta. Clara filed a
motion to intervene in the
estate of Margarita de Asis as
an adopted child, on the basis of
an affidavit executed by Benjamin
Lazatin (brother of the deceased
Dr. Mariano M. Lazatin), the
petitioner was an "illegitimate son"
of Dr. Lazatin and was later
adopted by him. This affidavit was
later modified to state that
petitioner was adopted by both
Mariano M. Lazatin and his wife
Margarita de Asis.
During
the
hearing,
Renato
presented no decree of adoption in
his favor. Instead, he attempted to
prove, over private respondents'
objections, that he had recognized
the deceased spouses as his
parents; he had been supported by
them until their death; formerly he
was known as "Renato Lazatin" but
was compelled to change his
surname to "Sta. Clara" when the
deceased spouses refused to give
consent to his marriage to his
present wife; that at first, he and
his wife stayed at the residence of
Engracio
de
Asis,
father
of
Margarita, but a few months later,
they transferred to the Mercy
Hospital at Taft Avenue, Manila,
owned by the deceased spouses,
where they continuously resided up

to the present. Photographs were

also intended to be presented by
petitioner, e.g., photograph of Irma
Veloso where she addressed herself
as sister of petitioner; photograph
of deceased Margarita de Asis and
petitioner when he was a boy;
document showing that petitioners
real name is "Renato Lazatin."
Respondent court first reserved its
ruling when petitioner could not
present evidence on the issue of
his
alleged
legal
adoption,
respondent court discontinued the
hearing and gave the parties time
to file memoranda on the question
of the admissibility of the evidence
sought to be introduced by
petitioner.

Issue: Whether or not renato has

established his status as an adopted child.
Held: NO.
Ratio: Adoption is a juridical act, a
proceeding which creates between two
persons a relationship similar to that
which results from legitimate paternity
and filiation. Only an adoption made
through the court, or in pursuance with
the procedure laid down under Rule 99 of
the Rules of Court is valid in this
jurisdiction. The fact of adoption is never
presumed, but must be affirmatively
proved by the person claiming its
existence. On the contrary, the absence of
a record of adoption has been said to
evolve a presumption of its non-existence.
The absence of proof of such order of
adoption by the court, as provided by the
statute, cannot be substituted by parol
evidence that a child has lived with a
person, not his parent, and has been
treated as a child to establish such
adoption.
Secondary
evidence
is
nonetheless admissible where the records
of adoption proceedings were actually lost
or destroyed. But, prior to the introduction
of
such
secondary
evidence,
the
proponent must establish the former
existence of the instrument. The correct
order of proof is as follows: Existence;
execution; loss; contents; although this
order may be changed if necessary in the
discretion of the court. As earlier pointed

out, petitioner failed to establish the

former existence of the adoption paper
and its subsequent loss or destruction.
Secondary proof may only be introduced if
it has first beer. established that such
adoption paper really existed and was lost.

(petitioners
Zenaida
and
Nelson) who took care and
custody of the child when she
was barely 2 weeks old
o

CERVANTES v. FAJARDO
[G.R. No. 79955; January 27, 1989]

TOPIC:

Adoption

PETITIONER: In the Matter of the Petition

for a Writ of Habeas Corpus
of Minor Angelie Anne C.
Cervantes,
Nelson
L.
Cervantes
and
Zenaida
Carreon Cervantes
RESPONDENT:
Gina
Fajardo, Conrado Fajardo
PONENTE:

Padilla, J. (2nd Div)

<RA #: Law>

Aug 20, 1987: The appropriate petition

for adoption was filed by petitioners
over the child before the Rizal RTC
(granted)

Carreon

LAW:

Sec. 1. xxx (no need to include in

the written digest)

Dec 3 1987: Executive Judge, Pasig

RTC submitted to the Court his report
and recommendation

Feb 14, 1987: the minor was born to

respondents who are common-law
husband and wife
o

Respondents offered the child

for adoption to Gina Carreon's
sister
and
brother-in-law

court ordered that the child be

"freed from parental authority
of her natural parents as well as
from
legal
obligation
and
maintenance to them and that
from now on shall be, for all
legal intents and purposes,
known
as
Angelie
Anne
Cervantes, a child of herein
petitioners and capable of
inheriting their estate ."

Mar or Apr 1987: petitioners Nelson

and Zenaida received a letter from the
respondents demanding to be paid
P150K, otherwise, they would get back
their child. Petitioners refused.
o

Sept 11, 1987: while petitioners

were
out
at
work,
the
respondent Gina took the child
from
her
"yaya"
at
the
petitioners' residence on the
pretext that she was instructed
to do so by her mother

Respondent Gina brought the

child to her house in Paraaque

Petitioners
demanded
the
return of the child, but Gina
Carreon refused, saying that

FACTS:

An Affidavit of Consent to the

adoption of the child by
petitioners was also executed
by respondent Gina

she had no desire to give up

her child for adoption and that
the affidavit she had executed
was not fully explained to her.
o

She will, however, return the

child to the petitioners if she
were paid P150K

Felisa Tansingco (social worker who

had conducted the case study and
report on the adoption) testified before
the Executive Judge, Pasig RTC in
connection with the present petition
o

property of children, the latter's

welfare is paramount

She declared that she had

interviewed respondent Gina
Carreon in connection with the
contemplated adoption
During
the
interview,
respondent
manifested
her
desire to have the child
adopted by the petitioners

ISSUE:WON respondent Gina may invoke

the provision stating that no mother shall
be separated from a child under 5 years of
age

There are compelling reasons for the

Court to rule that living with
respondents will be to the detriment of
the child
o

Conrado is legally married to

another woman; he and Gina
are
under
a
common-law
husband and wife relationship

This is not an atmosphere

where the minor can grow and
develop into an upright and
moral-minded person

respondent Gina had previously

given birth to another child by
another married man with
whom she lived for almost 3
years but who eventually left
her and vanished. For a minor
to grow up with a sister whose
father is not her true father,
could also affect the moral
outlook and values of said
minor

In contrast, petitioners who are

legally married appear to be
morally, physically, financially,
and
socially
capable
of
supporting the minor and giving
her a future better than what
the natural mother who is not
only jobless but also maintains

RULING:
No, she may not. Petition is
GRANTED. The custody and care of
the minor Angelie are hereby
granted to petitioners to whom
they
properly
belong,
and
respondents are ordered to deliver
her to the petitioners immediately

The provision that no mother shall be

separated from a child under 5 years
of age, will NOT apply where the Court
finds compelling reasons to rule
otherwise
o

In all cases involving the

custody, care, education and

In all controversies regarding

the custody of minors, the
foremost consideration is the
moral, physical and social
welfare of the child concerned,
taking
into
account
the
resources and the moral and
social standing of the parents

an illicit relation with a married

man, can most likely give her.

Besides, the minor has been legally

adopted by petitioners with the full
knowledge and consent of respondents
o

A decree of adoption has the

effect,
among
others,
of
dissolving the authority vested
in natural parents over the
adopted child, except where the
adopting parent is the spouse
of the natural parent of the
adopted,
in
which
case,
parental authority over the
adopted shall be exercised
jointly by both spouses. The
adopting parents have the right
to the care and custody of the
adopted
child and
exercise
parental
authority
and
responsibility over him

In re: Adoption of Michelle

[Requisites to be an adopter]

Lim

Facts:
Spouses Monina P. Lim and Primo Lim were
childless.
Subsequently,
two
minor
children, whose parents were unknown,
were entrusted to them by a certain Lucia
Ayuban. Being so eager to have children of
their own, Monina and Primo registered
the children to make it appear that they
were the childrens parents. The children
were named Michelle P. Lim and Michael
Jude P. Lim. The spouses reared and cared
for the children as if they were their own.
Unfortunately, in 1998, Primo died. On 27
December 2000, Monina married Angel
Olario, an American citizen.
Monina decided to adopt the children by
availing of the amnesty given under RA
8552 to individuals who simulated the
birth of a child. In 2002, she filed
separate petitions for adoption of Michelle

and Michael before the trial court. Michelle

was then 25 years old and already married
and Michael was 18 years and seven
months old. Michelle and her husband,
Michael and Olario gave their consent to
the adoption as evidenced by their
Affidavits of Consent.
On 15 September 2004, the trial
rendered
judgment
dismissing
petitions. The trial court ruled that
Monina had remarried, she should
filed the petition jointly with her
husband.

court
the
since
have
new

Monina appealed contending that the rule

on joint adoption must be relaxed because
it is the duty of the court and the State to
protect the paramount interest and
welfare of the child to be adopted.
Petitioner argues that the legal maxim
dura lex sed lex is not applicable to
adoption cases. She argues that joint
parental authority is not necessary in this
case since, at the time the petitions were
filed, Michelle was 25 years old and
already married, while Michael was
already 18 years of age. Parental authority
is not anymore necessary since they have
been emancipated having attained the
age of majority.
Issues:
1. Whether or not petitioner, who has
remarried, can singly adopt.
2. Whether or not joint parental authority
is not anymore necessary since the
children have been emancipated having
reached the age of majority.
Ruling:
1. No. The law is explicit. Husband and
wife shall jointly adopt except in the
following cases:
(i) if one spouse seeks to adopt the
legitimate son/daughter of the other; or
(ii) if one spouse seeks to adopt his/her
own illegitimate son/daughter: Provided,
however, That the other spouse has
signified his/her consent thereto; or
(iii) if the spouses are legally separated
from each other, which was not present in
the case at bar.

The use of the word shall means that

joint adoption by the husband and the
wife is mandatory. This is in consonance
with the concept of joint parental authority
over the child which is the ideal situation.
As the child to be adopted is elevated to
the level of a legitimate child, it is but
natural to require the spouses to adopt
jointly. The rule also insures harmony
between the spouses. Since the petitions
for adoption were filed only by petitioner
herself, without joining her husband,
Olario, the trial court was correct in
denying the petitions for adoption on this
ground.
Neither does petitioner fall under any of
the three exceptions enumerated in
Section 7.
The fact that Olario gave his consent to
the adoption as shown in his Affidavit of
Consent does not suffice. There are
certain requirements that Olario must
comply being an American citizen. He
must meet the qualifications set forth in
Section 7 of RA 8552 such as: (1) he must
prove that his country has diplomatic
relations with the Republic of the
Philippines; (2) he must have been living
in the Philippines for at least three
continuous years prior to the filing of the
application for adoption; (3) he must
maintain such residency until the adoption
decree is entered; (4) he has legal
capacity to adopt in his own country; and
(5) the adoptee is allowed to enter the
adopters country as the latters adopted
child. None of these qualifications were
shown and proved during the trial.
These requirements on residency and
certification of the aliens qualification to
adopt cannot likewise be waived pursuant
to Section 7. The children or adoptees are
not relatives within the fourth degree of
consanguinity or affinity of petitioner or of
Olario. Neither are the adoptees the
legitimate children of petitioner.

2. Petitioner's contention is untenable.

Parental authority includes caring for and
rearing
the
children
for
civic
consciousness and efficiency and the
development of their moral, mental and
physical character and well-being. The
father and the mother shall jointly exercise
parental authority over the persons of
their
common
children.
Even
the
remarriage of the surviving parent shall
not affect the parental authority over the
children, unless the court appoints another
person to be the guardian of the person or
property of the children.
It is true that when the child reaches the
age of emancipation that is, when he
attains the age of majority or 18 years of
age emancipation terminates parental
authority over the person and property of
the child, who shall then be qualified and
responsible for all acts of civil life.
However, parental authority is merely
just one of the effects of legal adoption.
Even if emancipation terminates parental
authority, the adoptee is still considered a
legitimate child of the adopter with all the
rights of a legitimate child such as: (1) to
bear the surname of the father and the
mother; (2) to receive support from their
parents; and (3) to be entitled to the
legitime and other successional rights.
Conversely, the adoptive parents shall,
with respect to the adopted child, enjoy all
the benefits to which biological parents
are entitled such as support and
successional rights.

i RULES OF COURT, Rule 3, Sec. 2

ii RULES OF COURT, Rule 2, Sec. 1.

iii 384 Phil. 661 (2000)

iv Roehr v. Rodriguez, 452 Phil. 608, 617 (2003)

v Republic v. Orbecido III, supra

vi Records, p. 7.

vii Id. at 5Carlos v. Sandoval

GR 179922
December 16, 2008

Facts:

> Spouses Felix B. Carlos and Felipa Elemia died intestate. They left six parcels of land to their compulsory heirs, Teofilo Carlos and petitioner Juan De Dios
Carlos

> During the lifetime of Felix Carlos, he agreed to transfer his estate to Teofilo. The agreement was made in order to avoid the payment of inheritance taxes.
Teofilo, in turn, undertook to deliver and turn over the share of the other legal heir, petitioner Juan De Dios Carlos.

>On May 13, 1992, Teofilo died intestate. He was survived by respondents Felicidad and their son, Teofilo Carlos II (Teofilo II). Upon Teofilo's death, Parcel Nos.
5 & 6 were registered in the name of respondent Felicidad and co-respondent, Teofilo II.

> In 1994, petitioner instituted a suit against respondents. The parties executed a deed of extrajudicial partition, dividing the remaining land of the first parcel
between them. Petitioner and respondents entered into two more contracts in August 1994. Under the contracts, the parties equally divided between them the
third and fourth parcels of land.

> In August 1995, petitioner commenced an action, docketed as Civil Case No. 95-135, against respondents before the court a quo with the following causes of
action: (a) declaration of nullity of marriage; (b) status of a child; (c) recovery of property; (d) reconveyance; and (e) sum of money and damages.

In his complaint, petitioner asserted that the marriage between his late brother Teofilo and respondent Felicidad was a nullity in view of the absence of the
required marriage license. He likewise maintained that his deceased brother was neither the natural nor the adoptive father of respondent Teofilo Carlos II.

RTC Decision:
1.
2.
1.

Marriage between Felicidad and Teofilos is void ab inito for lack of the requisite marriage license
Teofilo Carlos II is not the natural, illegitimate or legally adopted cvhild of the late Teofilo Carlos
The parcel of land less the portion adjudicated to plaintiffs and ordering the Registry of Deeds to cancel said title and to issue another title in the sole name of the
petitioner therein.

CA Decision: CA reversed and set aside RTC Decision.

Issue: Whether or not the capacity of one who is not a spouse can bring the action for nullity of marriage
While A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC declares that a petition for declaration of absolute nullity of marriage may be filed solely by the husband or the wife, it does not mean
that the compulsory or intestate heirs are without any recourse under the law. They can still protect their successional right, for, as stated in the Rationale of the
Rules on Annulment of Voidable Marriages and Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages, compulsory or intestate heirs can still question the validity of
the marriage of the spouses, not in a proceeding for declaration of nullity but upon the death of a spouse in a proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the
deceased spouse filed in the regular courts.

It is emphasized, however, that the Rule does not apply to cases already commenced before March 15, 2003 although the marriage involved is within the coverage
of the Family Code. This is so, as the new Rule which became effective on March 15, 2003 is prospective in its application.

The marriage having been solemnized prior to the effectivity of the Family Code, the applicable law is Civil Code which was the law in effect at the time of its
celebration.

But the Civil Code is silent as to who may bring an action to declare the marriage void. But that does not mean that any person can bring an action for the
declaration of nullity of marriage. The absence of provision on the Civil Code cannot be construed as license for any person to institute a nullity of marriage case.
The plaintiff must be the real party-in-interest. One having no material interest to protect cannot invoke the jurisdiction of the court as plaintiff in an action.

Therefore the case must be remanded to determine whether or not petitioner is a real-party-in-interest to seek the declaration of nullity of the marriage in
controversy.

Even though the petitioner is not among those considered as compulsory heirs, since he is the only sibling of Teofilo and that there are no ascendants who shall
succeed, as a collateral relative, he still has a right to succeed, in accordance with the ff. procedure:

if Teofilo II is finally found and proven to be not a legitimate, illegitimate, or adopted son of Teofilo, petitioner Juan succeeds to the other half of the estate of his
brother, the first half being allotted to the widow pursuant to Article 1001 of the New Civil Code. This makes Juan a real-party-interest to seek the declaration of
absolute nullity of marriage of his deceased brother with respondent Felicidad. If the subject marriage is found to be void ab initio, petitioner succeeds to the
entire estate.

RTC is strictly instructed to dismiss the nullity of marriage case for lack of cause of action if it is proven by evidence that Teofilo II is a legitimate, illegitimate, or
legally adopted son of Teofilo Carlos, the deceased brother of petitioner.

SC Decision:

A petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage may be filed SOLELY by the husband or wife. Exceptions: (1) Nullity of marriage cases commenced
before the effectivity of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC (March 15, 2003); and (2) Marriages celebrated during the effectivity of the Civil Code.

ISIDRO ABLAZA V. REPUBLIC

G.R. No. 158298, August 11, 2010
FACTS:
On October 17, 2000, the petitioner filed in the RTC in Cataingan, Masbate a
petition for the declaration of the absolute nullity of the marriage contracted on
December 26, 1949 between his late brother Cresenciano Ablaza and Leonila Honato. The
petitioner alleged that the marriage between Cresenciano and Leonila had been
celebrated without a marriage license, due to such license being issued only on January
9, 1950, thereby rendering the marriage void ab initio for having been solemnized
without a marriage license. He insisted that his being the surviving brother of
Cresenciano who had died without any issue entitled him to one-half of the real
properties acquired by Cresenciano before his death, thereby making him a real party in
interest; and that any person, himself included, could impugn the validity of the marriage
between Cresenciano and Leonila at any time, even after the death of Cresenciano, due
to the marriage being void ab initio.
On October 18, 2000, the RTC dismissed the petition on the ground that petition is
filed out of time and that petitioner is not a party to marriage. Motion for reconsideration
was likewise denied. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal order of the
RTC on the ground that the action must be filed by the proper party, which in this case
should be filed by any of the parties to the marriage.
ISSUE:
Whether the petitioner is a real party in interest in the action to seek the
declaration of nullity of the marriage of his deceased brother?
HELD:
Yes. The applicable law when marriage was contracted between Cresenciano and
Leonila on December 26, 1949, is the old Civil Code, the law in effect at the time of the
celebration of the marriage. Hence, the rule on the exclusivity of the parties to the
marriage as having the right to initiate the action for declaration of nullity of the marriage
under A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC had absolutely no application to the petitioner. The case was
reinstated and its records returned to RTC for further proceedings.

Section 2, paragraph (a), of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SCexplicitly provides the limitation

that a petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage may be filed solely by
the husband or wife. Such limitation demarcates a line to distinguish between marriages
covered by the Family Code and those solemnized under the regime of the Civil Code.
This specifically extends only to marriages covered by the Family Code, which took effect
on August 3, 1988, but, being a procedural rule that is prospective in application, is
confined only to proceedings commenced after March 15, 2003.
Assuming that the petitioner was as he claimed himself to be, then he has a
material interest in the estate of Cresenciano that will be adversely affected by any
judgment in the suit. Indeed, a brother like the petitioner, albeit not a compulsory heir,
has the right to succeed to the estate of a deceased brother under the conditions stated
in Article 1001 and Article 1003 of the Civil Code. The plaintiff must still be the party who
stands to be benefited by the suit, or the party entitled to the avails of the suit, for it is
basic in procedural law that every action must be prosecuted and defended in the name
of the real party in interest. Thus, only the party who can demonstrate a proper interest
can file the action. One having no material interest to protect cannot invoke the
jurisdiction of the court as plaintiff in an action. When the plaintiff is not the real party in
interest, the case is dismissible on the ground of lack of cause of action.
We note that the petitioner did not implead Leonila, who, as the late Cresencianos
surviving wife, stood to be benefited or prejudiced by the nullification of
her own marriage. She was truly an indispensable party who must be joined herein. We
take note, too, that the petitioner and Leonila were parties in Heirs of Cresenciano Ablaza,
namely: Leonila G. Ablaza, and Leila Ablaza Jasul v. Spouses Isidro and Casilda Ablaza, an
action to determine who between the parties were the legal owners of the property
involved therein. As a defendant in that action, the petitioner is reasonably presumed to
have knowledge that the therein plaintiffs, Leonila and Leila, were the wife and daughter,
respectively, of the late Cresenciano. As such, Leila was another indispensable party
whose substantial right any judgment in this action will definitely affect. The petitioner
should likewise implead Leila.
Marietta Ancheta v Rodolfo Ancheta
G.R. No. 145370
March 4, 2004

Topic: Safeguard against collusion

Facts:

Petitioner Marietta Ancheta and respondent Rodolfo Ancheta were married on March
5, 1959 and had eight children. After 33 years of marriage the petitioner left the
respondent and their children. Their conjugal properties were later separated through a
court-sanctioned compromise agreement where the petitioner got among others a resort

in Cavite.

When Rodolfo wanted to marry again, he filed before the Regional Trial Court a
petition for the declaration of nullity of his marriage with Marietta on the ground of
psychological incapacity.

Although he knew that the petitioner was already residing at the resort in Cavite, he
alleged in his petition that the petitioner was residing at BF Homes Las Pias, such that
the summons never reached her.

Nevertheless, substituted service was rendered to their son at his residence in Cavite.
Petitioner was then declared in default for failing to answer the said petition.

Just over a month after it was filed, the trial court granted the petition and declared
the marriage of the parties void ab initio.

Five years later, petitioner challenged the RTCs order, citing extrinsic fraud and lack
of jurisdiction over her person, among others. She alleged that the respondent lied on her
real address in his petition so she never received summons on the case, hence depriving
her of her right to be heard.

The CA dismissed her petition so she now comes to the Supreme Court for review on
certiorari.

Issue: Whether or not the declaration of nullity of marriage was valid?

Held:

No. The RTC and the public prosecutor violated Article 48 of the Family Code and Rule
18, Section 6 of the 1985 Rules of Court (now Rule 9, Section 3[e] of the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure).

A grant of annulment of marriage or legal separation by default is fraught with the

danger of collusion. Hence, in all cases for annulment, declaration of nullity of marriage
and legal separation, the prosecuting attorney or fiscal is ordered to appear on behalf of
the State for the purpose of preventing any collusion between the parties and to take
care that their evidence is not fabricated or suppressed.

If the defendant-spouse fails to answer the complaint, the court cannot declare him or
her in default but instead, should order the prosecuting attorney to determine if collusion
exists between the parties.

The prosecuting attorney or fiscal may oppose the application for legal separation or
annulment through the presentation of his own evidence, if in his opinion, the proof
adduced is dubious and fabricated.


In this case, the RTC immediately received the evidence of the respondent ex-parte
and rendered judgment against the petitioner without a whimper of protest from the
public prosecutor who even did not challenge the motion to declare petitioner in default.

The Supreme Court reiterates: The task of protecting marriage as an inviolable social
institution requires vigilant and zealous participation and not mere pro-forma compliance.
The protection of marriage as a sacred institution requires not just the defense of a true
and genuine union but the exposure of an invalid one as well.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, versus THE HON, COURT OF APPEALS
(NINTH DIVISION), AND EDUARDO C. DE QUINTOS, JR., Respondents
11/12/2012, Bersamin, J
TOPIC: Safeguards Against Collusion
PETITION: Appeal on the decision of the CA (7/30/2003) affirming RTC Pangasinan
declaration of the nullity between the marriage of respondent Eduardo De Quintos, Jr.
and Catalina Delos Santos-De Quintos based on the latters psychological incapacity
under Art 36 of the Family Code

o
o
o

o
o

FACTS
March 16, 1977 Marriage
No child due to Catalinas hysterectomy after her 2 nd miscarriage
April 6, 1998 Eduardos petition for the declaration of nullity of their marriage citing
Catalinas incapacity to comply with her essential marital obligations
Catalina did not object but prayed to be given her share in the conjugal house and lot
(Bacabac, Bugallon, Pangasinan)
Public prosecutor determined no collusion between Eduardo and Catalina
Eduardo testified that Catalina:
Leaves house without his consent
Petty arguments
Constant refusal to give into his sexual needs
Spends time gossiping with neighbors instead of house chores and caring for adopted
daughter
Squandered by gambling all remittances as an OFW in Qatar since 1993
Abandoned home in 1997 to live with Bobbie Castro, paramour
Eduardo presented results of the neuro-psychiatric eval of Dr. Annabelle Reyes
(psychiatrist)
Borderline Personality Disorder not treatable
Immaturity psychological incapacity (PI) to meet marital oblig
Catalina did not appear in trial but admitted her PI in her Answer/Manifestation
But denied leaving conjugal home without Eduardo/s consent and flirting with others
Insisted only 1 live-in partner
Would not give up her share on conjugal home -- intends to live there or receive share if
sold
August 9, 2000 RTC granted petition: declared nullity under Art 36
That Catalinas infidelity, spending more time with friends, gambling constituted PI
Results of Dr. Reyes was best evidence
CA, on appeal, raised that RTC erred: Catalinas PI not having proved to exist

o
o
o
o
o

July 30, 2013 CA eventually affirmed RTC judgment

That PI had been medically identified sufficiently proved and clearly explained
OSG argues that RTC and CA do not conform to the guidelines laid down by the court in
Republic v CA (Molina)
That Catalinas failures are not defects of psychological in nature but indications of her
difficulty, refusal neglect
That Catalinas infidelity, gambling, etc, had no proof and were not grounds under Art 36
FC
That Dr. Reyes did not show effort to look into Catalinas past life
That Eduardo admitted during trial that he had given Catalina Php50,000 in exchange for
non-appearance in the trial
That Eduardo being away as OFW and Catalinas in laws as unsupportive had created the
strain in their relationship
ISSUE
W/N there was sufficient evidence warranting the declaration of the nullity of Catalinas
marriage to Eduardo based on her PI under Art 36 FC

HELD
PI under Art 36 of the FC:
- Contemplates an incapacity or inability to take cognizance of and to assume basic marital
obligations, and is not merely the difficulty, refusal, or neglect in the performance of marital
obligations or ill will
Consists of:
(a) a true inability to commit oneself to the essentials of marriage;
(b) the inability must refer to the essential obligations of marriage, that is, the conjugal
act, the community of life and love, the rendering of mutual help, and the procreation
and education of offspring;
(c) the inability must be tantamount to a psychological abnormality.

Santos vs CA, PI is:

- Should refer to a mental incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic
marital covenants such as those enumerated in Article 68 of the Family Code and must be
characterized by gravity, juridical antecedence and incurability

CA vs Molina guidelines:

1.
2.
a.
b.
i.
ii.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.

Incapacity must be permanent or incurable

Root cause of psychological incapacity must be :
Medically or clinically identified
Alleged in the complaint
Sufficiently proven by experts
Clearly explained in the decision
Marital obligations refer to Art 68-71, 220, 221 and 225 of the FC
Plaintiff has burden of proof
Incapacity proven to be existing at the time of the celebration of marriage
Trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the SolGen to appear for the state
Interpretations of the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church of the
Philippines while not controlling should be given great respect: and
8. Illness is grave enough to bring about disability to assume essential marital obligations

The incapacity should be established by the totality of evidence presented during trial,
making it incumbent upon the petitioner to sufficiently prove the existence of the
psychological incapacity
Eduardos testimony were self-serving; presented no other witness, his claims were not

o
o

o
o

established
RTC and CA relied on the results of the neuro-psychological eval despite the paucity of
factual foundation to support the claim
The report is vague about the root cause, gravity and incurability
It was a general description of the symptoms and did not discuss the gravity of her
behavior
Only established that Catalina was childish and immature
Dr. Reyes only had 1 interview with Catalina and did not interview others except for
Eduardo
It lacks depth and objectivity; did not present the gravity and incurability
Suazo v Sauzo: there must be proof of a natal or supervening disabling factor that
effectively incapacitated the respondent spouses from complying with the basic mariatal
obligations
Only established was Catalinas abandonment of home w/c she admitted, however,
abandonment is not one of the grounds for nullity under the FC (only of legal separation
under Art 55 FC)
Her sexual infidelity was not a valid ground too, and Eduardo did not adduce such
evidence
Payment of 50K asserted by OSG was based on Eduardos admission during the trial that
he paid Catalina her conjugal home in order to convince her not to oppose his petition
That because Eduardo already paid Catalina Php50k which she was only after, she no
longer appeared in the trial she does not oppose to Eduardo
Not a manifest sign of collusion between her and Eduardo!
To recall, she did not interpose her objection to the petition to the point of conceding her
psychological incapacity, but she nonetheless made it clear enough that she was
unwilling to forego her share in the conjugal house. The probability that Eduardo willingly
gave her the amount of P50,000.00 as her share in the conjugal asset out of his
recognition of her unquestionable legal entitlement to such share was very high, so that
whether or not he did so also to encourage her to stick to her previously
announced stance of not opposing the petition for nullity of the marriage
should by no means be of any consequence in determining the issue of
collusion between the spouses.
(-- this is the only paragraph on the ruling that pertains to the topic this case is under!)
- GRANTED
Gloria Jocson vs. Ricardo Robles

Facts:
Petitioner filed a criminal case against Respondent alleging that prior to the
celebration of their marriage, respondent had already contracted a first marriage with
one Josefina Fausto[who has also instituted a criminal action for Bigamy against the same
defendant in the Court of First Instance]

 Petitioner likewise is seeking that she be paid for moral and exemplary damages, for
the maltreatment she received from Robles during their cohabitation which also resulted
to the premature birth of her 1st child, who subsequently died 3 days after.
In his response, Robles said that his marriage with Jocson should be void he was
compelled by Jocsons parents with force and intimidation to contract marriage with her;
Because of this, he filed a motion for summary judgement, but this motion was denied on
the ground that the evidentiary requirement was not met.

Issue: Whether or not the Court of Domestic Relations erred in dismissing respondents
motion for summary judgement

Ruling: No. Case was dismissed.

In accordance with the first paragraph of Article 88 and 1011 of the Civil Code, rendition
of decree of annulment of a marriage upon stipulation of facts of confession of judgement
is prohibited.

ROMULO TOLENTINO, petitioner, vs. HELEN VILLANUEVA

and HONORABLE CORAZON JULIANO AGRAVA, Judge of the
Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court, respondents.
G.R. No. L-23264, March 15, 1974
Facts:
-Petitioner prays for the nullification of the order dated July 29, 1963
of the respondent Judge of the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court
of Manila.
-On April 26, 1962, petitioner Romulo Tolentino filed a suit for
annulment of his marriage to private respondent Helen Villanueva,
alleging that his consent was obtained through fraud because
immediately after the marriage celebration, he discovered that private
respondent was pregnant despite the fact that he had no sexual
relations with her prior to the marriage ceremony; and that they did
not live as husband and wife as immediately after the marriage
celebration, Helen Villanueva left his house and her whereabouts
remained unknown to him until January, 1962 when he discovered
that she is residing in San Francisco, Cebu. Said marriage was
solemnized by Quezon City Judge Mariano R. Virtucio on September
28, 1959. Said case was docketed as Civil Case No, 43347 of the
Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court of Manila.
-Despite the fact that she was served with summons and copy of the
complaint, Helen failed to file a responsive pleading, for which reason
petitioner filed on June 13, 1962 a motion to declare her in default
and to set the date for the presentation of his evidence

On June 28, 1962, an order by the respondent Judge declared private

respondent in default, but, pursuant to the provision of Articles 88 and
101 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, referred the case to the City
Fiscal of Manila for investigation to determine whether collusion exists
between the parties, directing the City Fiscal to submit his report
within sixty (60) days from receipt thereof, and, in the event of a
negative finding, to represent the State at the trial of the case to
prevent fabrication of evidence; and likewise directed herein petitioner
to furnish the City Fiscal with copies of the complaint and such other
documents necessary for the City Fiscal's information and guidance.
-On July 3, 1962, thru counsel, petitioner submitted to the City Fiscal
only a copy of his complaint.
- A subpoena was issued to petitioner's counsel requiring him to bring
petitioner with him as well as copies of other documents in connection
with the annulment case on August 27, 1962 at 10:00 A.M.
-Plaintiff's counsel, in a letter dated August 24, 1962, informed
Assistant City Fiscal Jose that he could not comply with the subpoena
for it will unnecessarily expose his evidence.
-In a motion dated and filed on October 29, 1962, petitioner, thru
counsel, prayed the respondent Judge to set the date for the reception
of his evidence on the ground that the City Fiscal had not submitted a
report of his findings despite the lapse of sixty (60) days from July 10,
1962 when he submitted to the City Fiscal a copy of the complaint.
-On November 6, 1962, respondent Judge denied the aforesaid motion
of petitioner unless he submits himself for interrogation by the City
Fiscal to enable the latter to report whether or not there is collusion
between the parties.
-Order dated July 29, 1963 by the respondent Judge dismissing the
complaint in view of the fact that petitioner is not willing to submit
himself for interrogation by the City Fiscal pursuant to the provisions
of the second paragraph of Article 101 of the New Civil Code.
-Petitioners motions for the reconsideration of the aforesaid order had
been denied on July 29, 1963 and on April 11, 1964.
-Petitioner now files his petition to annul said order of July 29, 1963
and to compel the respondent Judge to receive his evidence.
Held/Ratio:
Articles 88 and 101 of the Civil Code of the Philippines expressly
prohibit the rendition of a decision in suits for annulment of marriage
and legal separation based on a stipulation of facts or by confession
of judgment and direct that in case of non-appearance of defendant,
the court shall order the prosecuting attorney to inquire whether or
not collusion between the parties exists, and if none, said prosecuting
attorney shall intervene for the State to prevent fabrication of
evidence for the plaintiff. Thus, Articles 88 and 101 state:
"ART. 88. No judgment annulling a marriage shall be promulgated
upon a stipulation of facts or by confession of judgment. "In case of
non-appearance of the defendant, the provisions of article 101,
paragraph 2, shall be observed."
"ART. 101.No decree of legal separation shall be promulgated upon a
stipulation of facts or by confession of judgment. "In case of nonappearance of
the defendant, the court shall order the prosecuting
attorney to inquire whether or not a collusion between the parties

exists. If there is no collusion, the prosecuting attorney shall intervene

for the State in order to take care that the evidence for the plaintiff is
not fabricated." Even the 1940 Rules of Court, which preceded the
1950 Civil Code of the Philippines, direct that actions for the
annulment of marriage or divorce shall not be decided unless the
material facts alleged in the complaint are proved (Sec. 10, Rule 35,
1940 Rules of Court). The same rule is reiterated in Section 1 of Rule
19 of the 1964 Revised Rules, with "legal separation" being substituted
for "divorce", obviously because the present Civil Code does not
authorize absolute divorce.
The prohibition expressed in the aforesaid laws and rules is predicated
on the fact that the institutions of marriage and of the family are
sacred and therefore are as much the concern of the State as of the
spouses; because the State and the public have vital interest in the
maintenance and preservation of these social institutions against
desecration by collusion between the parties or by fabricated
evidence. The prohibition against annulling a marriage based on the
stipulation of facts or by confession of judgment or by non-appearance
of the defendant stresses the fact that marriage is more than a mere
contract between the parties; and for this reason, when the defendant
fails to appear, the law enjoins the court to direct the prosecuting
officer to intervene for the State in order to preserve the integrity and
sanctity of the marital bonds.
Hence, the conclusion is that the petition is without merit. The ORDER
dated July 29, 1963 is hereby affirmed and the petition is hereby
dismissed with costs against petitioner
Mendoza v Republic GR no 157649
Topic: Participation of the OSG
Facts:

Wife Arabelle Mendoza appealing decision of CA in reversing decision of RTC

declaring her marriage with Dominic Mendoza as null and void.
Couple met in 1989. Next door neighbours in apartelle while still in college she at
Assumption College, he at San Beda College
After a month of courtship she became pregnant. Married on 8 th month of
pregnancy. They moved to her place although they remained dependent on their
parents. He remained jobless and dependent on his father until he finished college.
She took various jobs to meet family needs.
After graduation he sold Colliers Encyclopedia for 3 mos, then worked as car
salesman for Toyota Motors in Bel Air, Makati. She shouldered all household
expense & childs schooling because of his irregular income.
September 1994, she discovered his illicit relationship with Zaida, his co-employee.
Communication between them became rare until they started to sleep in separate
rooms, thereby affecting their sexual relationship
He gave her a brand new car as a birthday gift. Later on he asked her for two
blank checks allegedly for the cars insurance coverage. She found out that the
checks were not used for the car insurance but for Dennis personal needs. Worse,

she also found out that the car itself was not yet paid, forcing her to rely on her
father-in-law to pay part of the car cost with her shouldering the balance.
He was fired for running away with 164k and was arrested and incarcerated for
estafa. After they bailed him out they found out that he further swindled many
clients.
On October 15, 1997, Dominic abandoned the conjugal abode because petitioner
asked him for "time and space to think things over." A month later, she refused his
attempt at reconciliation, causing him to threaten to commit suicide. At that, she
and her family immediately left the house to live in another place concealed from
him.
On August 5, 1998, petitioner filed in the RTC her petition for the declaration of the
nullity of her marriage with Dominic based on his psychological incapacity under
Article 36 of the Family Code. The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) opposed the
petition.
She presented herself as a witness and testified that Dennis was immature,
deceitful, without remorse for his dishonesty and lacked affection. Also presented
were the psychiatrist and her findings based on what Amy told her that Dennis has
a personality which is inadequate, immature and irresponsible which are mere
extensions of his misconduct during childhood. Since Dennis did not even appear
and present his evidence, the RTC granted Amys petition and declared her
marriage to Dennis a nullity.

ISSUE: 1. W/N RTC ruling is correct.

2. W/N contention of petitioner that Court Resolution AM No 2-11-10 rendered appeals by
OSG is no longer required is correct.
HELD:
1. No
The experts testimony on Dominics psychological profile did not identify, much
less prove, the root cause of his psychological incapacity because said expert did
not examine Dominic in person before completing her report but simply relied on
other peoples recollection and opinion for that purpose. Court find the totality of
the evidence adduced by petitioner insufficient to prove that Dominic was
psychologically unfit to discharge the duties expected of him as a husband, and
that he suffered from such psychological incapacity as of the date of the marriage.
2. No.
On the contrary, the Resolution explicitly required the OSG to actively participate in
all stages of the proceedings The obvious intent of the Resolution was to require
the OSG to appear as counsel for the State in the capacity of a defensor vinculi
(i.e., defender of the marital bond) to oppose petitions for, and to appeal
judgments in favor of declarations of nullity of marriage under Article 36 of the
Family Code, thereby ensuring that only the meritorious cases for the declaration
of nullity of marriages based on psychological incapacity-those sufficiently
evidenced by gravity, incurability and juridical antecedence-would succeed.

Aurelio v. Aurelio
FACTS:

On March 23, 1988, petitioner Danilo and respondent Vida Ma. Corazon were
married, and had two sons, Danilo Miguel and Danilo Gabriel
On May 9, 2002, Vida filed with the RTC of QC Branch 94 a Petition for Declaration
of Nullity of Marriage
o In her petition, she alleged that both she and petitioner were psychologically
incapacitated in performing and complying with their respective essential
marital obligations
o She further alleged that such state of psychological incapacity was present
prior and even during the time of the marriage ceremony
o As such, she prays that her marriage be declared null and void under Art 36
of the FC
Said psychological incapacity was manifested by lack of financial
support from the husband, his lack of drive and incapacity to discern
the plight of his working wife, and he exhibited consistent jealousy
and distrust towards his wife
Vida Aurelio, on the other hand, is effusive and displays her feelings
openly and freely
Her feelings change very quickly from joy to fury to misery to
despair depending on her day-to-day experiences. She was
emotionally immature.
On November 8, 2002, petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss the petition
o He principally argued that the petition failed to state a cause of action and
that it failed to meet the standards set by the Court for the interpretation
and implementation of Art 36 of the FC
RTC denied the petitioners motion
On February 21, 2003, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration
On December 17, 2003, said motion was denied by the RTC
o In the ground that respondents petition for declaration of nullity of marriage
complied with the requirements of the Molina doctrine
On February 16, 2004, petitioner appealed the RTC decision to the CA via certiorari
under Rule 65 of the ROC
On October 6, 2005, CA dismissed the petition
On October 26, 2004, CA dismissed petitioners Motion for Reconsideration
o Affirming the ruling of the RTC and held that respondents complaint for
declaration of nullity of marriage when scrutinized in juxtaposition with Art
36 of the FC and the Molina doctrine revealed the existence of a sufficient
cause of action

ISSUE:
WON the CA violated the applicable law and jurisprudence when it denied the petitioners
action for certiorari despite the fact that the denial of his MTD by the trial court is
patently and utterly tainted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of

jurisdiction

HELD:

Given the allegations in respondents petition for nullity of marriage, the SC rules
that the RTC did not commit grave abuse of discretion in denying the petitioners
MTD
By grave abuse of discretion is meant capricious and whimsical exercise of
judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction
o Mere abuse of discretion is not enough, it must be grave abuse of discretion
as when the power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason
of passion or personal hostility, and must be so patent and so gross as to
amount to an evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the
duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law
Even assuming arguendo that the Court were to agree with petitioner that the
allegations contained in respondents petition are insufficient and that the RTC
erred in denying petitioners MTD, the same is merely an error of judgment
correctible by appeal and not an abuse of discretion correctible by certiorari
CA properly dismissed the petitioners petition
o As a general rule, the denial of a MTD, which is an interlocutory order, is not
reviewable by certiorari

Josielene Lara Chan v Johnny Chan

GR No 179786
July 24, 2013
Facts
- This case is about the propriety of issuing a subpoena duces tecum for the
production and submission in court of the respondent husband's hospital record in
a case for declaration of nullity of marriage where one of the issues is his mental
fitness as a husband.
- Josielene filed before the RTC a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage to
Johnny, as well as the dissolution of their conjugal partnership of gains and that
she be granted custody of their children. She claims that Johnny failed to care and
support for his family and that he was diagnosed as mentally deficient due to
incessant drinking and excessive use of prohibited drugs.
- Johnny resisted the action and claimed it was Josielene who failed in her wifely
duties. He agreed to a marriage counseling to save their marriage, but was held by
two men when he and Josielene arrived at the hospital and was given an injection.
- The marriage got worse when Josielene was temporarily detained for an unrelated
crime. At this time, their marriage relationship is irreparable.
- Josielene filed with the RTC a request for the issuance of a subpoena duces tecum
addressed to Medical City, covering Johnnys medical records when he was there
confined. The request was accompanied by a motion to be allowed to submit in
evidence the records sought by subpoena duces tecum.
- Johnny opposed the motion, arguing that the medical records were covered by
physician-patient privilege. RTC sustained the opposition and denied Josielenes
motion as well as her motion for reconsideration, prompting her to file a special
civil action of certiorari before the Court imputing grave abuse of discretion to the
RTC.

Court denied Josielenes petition on the ground that if courts were to allow the
production of medical records, then patients would be left with no assurance that
whatever relevant disclosures they may have made to their physicians would be
kept confidential. The prohibition covers not only testimonies, but also affidavits,
certificates, and pertinent hospital records. The CA added that, although Johnny
can waive the privilege, he did not do so in this case. He attached the Philhealth
form to his answer for the limited purpose of showing his alleged forcible
confinement.

Issue
- W/N CA erred in ruling that the trial court correctly denied the issuance of a
subpoena duces tecum covering Johnnys hospital records on the ground that these
are covered by the privileged character of the physician-patient communication.
Held
- Josielene requested the issuance of a subpoena duces tecum covering the hospital
records of Johnnys confinement,
- Respondent Johnny resisted her request for subpoena, however, invoking the
privileged character of those records. He cites Section 24(c), Rule 130 of the Rules
of Evidence which reads:
SEC. 24. Disqualification by reason of privileged communication. The
following persons cannot testify as to matters learned in confidence in the
following cases:
c) A person authorized to practice medicine, surgery or obstetrics cannot in
a civil case, without the consent of the patient, be examined as to any
advice or treatment given by him or any information which he may have
acquired in attending such patient in a professional capacity, which
information was necessary to enable him to act in that capacity, and which
would blacken the reputation of the patient.
- Physician-patient privileged communication rule essentially means that a physician
who gets information while professionally attending a patient cannot in a civil case
be examined without the patients consent as to any facts which would blacken the
latters reputation. It is intended to encourage the patient to open up to the
physician, relate to him the history of his ailment, and give him access to his body,
enabling the physician to make a correct diagnosis of that ailment and provide the
appropriate cure.
- The case presents a procedural issue, given that the time to object to the
admission of evidence, such as the hospital records, would be at the time they are
offered. The offer could be made part of the physicians testimony or as
independent evidence that he had made entries in those records that concern the
patients health problems.
- Offer of evidence is made at the trial, Josielenes request for subpoena duces
tecum is premature. She will have to wait for trial to begin before making a request
for the issuance of a subpoena duces tecum covering Johnnys hospital records. It
is when those records are produced for examination at the trial, that Johnny may
opt to object, not just to their admission in evidence, but more so to their
disclosure. Section 24(c), Rule 130 of the Rules of Evidence quoted above is about
non-disclosure of privileged matters.
- Josielene argues that since Johnny admitted in before the RTC that he had been
confined in a hospital against his will and in fact attached to his answer a
Philhealth claim form covering that confinement, he should be deemed to have
waived the privileged character of its records. Josielene invokes Section 17, Rule

132 of the Rules of Evidence that provides:

SEC. 17. When part of transaction, writing or record given in evidence, the
remainder hen part of an act, declaration, conversation, writing or record is
given in evidence by one party, the whole of the same subject may be inquired
into by the other, and when a detached act, declaration, conversation, writing
or record is given in evidence, any other act, declaration, conversation, writing
or record necessary to its understanding may also be given in evidence.
Trial in the case had not yet begun. Cannot be said that Johnny had already
presented the Philhealth claim form in evidence. Johnny was not yet bound to
adduce evidence in the case when he filed his answer. Any request for disclosure of
his hospital records would again be premature.
Petition DENIED

GR No. 141528 October 31, 2006

OSCAR P. MALLION, Petitioner

versus
EDITHA ALCANTARA, Respondent

AZCUNA, J.

FACTS:
On October 24, 1995, petitioner Oscar P. Mallion filed a petition with the Regional Trial
Court (RTC), Branch 29, of San Pablo City seeking a declaration of nullity of his marriage
to respondent Editha Alcantara under Article 36 of Executive Order No. 209, as amended,
otherwise known as the Family Code, citing respondent's alleged psychological incapacity.
After trial on the merits, the RTC denied the petition in a decision dated November 11,
1997 upon the finding that petitioner "failed to adduce preponderant evidence to warrant
the grant of the relief he is seeking. The appeal filed with the Court of Appeals was
likewise dismissed in a resolution dated June 11, 1998 for failure of petitioner to pay the
docket and other lawful fees within the reglementary period.
After the decision in civil case attained finality, petitioner filed on July 12, 1999 another
petition (second case) for declaration of nullity of marriage with the RTC of San Pablo City.
Tthis time alleging that his marriage with respondent was null and void due to the fact
that it was celebrated without a valid marriage license.
The respondent then filed an answer with a motion to dismiss dated August 13, 1999,
praying for the dismissal of the petition on the ground of res judicata and forum
shopping. In an order dated October 8, 1999, the RTC granted respondent's motion to
dismiss.

ISSUE:
W/N a previous final judgment denying a petition for declaration of nullity on the ground
of psychological incapacity bar a subsequent petition for declaration of nullity on the
ground of lack of marriage license

HELD/RATIO:
YES. Res judicata applies. Mallion is simply invoking different grounds for the same cause
of action which is the nullity of marriage. When the second case was filed based on
another ground, there is a splitting of a cause of action which is prohibited. He is
estopped from asserting that the first marriage had no marriage license because in the
first case he impliedly admitted the same when he did not question the absence of a
marriage license. He is not at liberty to split up his demands, and prosecute it by
piecemeal or present only a portion of the grounds upon which a special relief is sought
and leave the rest to the presentment in a second suit if the first fails. There would be no
end to litigation if such piecemeal presentation is allowed.

RULING:
The petition is DENIED for lack of merit. Costs against petitioner.

WIEGEL v. SEMPIO-DIY
[G.R. No. L-53703; August 19, 1986]
PETITIONER: Lilia Wiegel
RESPONDENT:
Hon. Alicia Sempio-Diy (Presiding Judge, Juvenile & Domestic Relations Court
of Caloocan City), Karl Wiegl
PONENTE:
Paras, J. (2nd Div)
LAW: Art 85, Civil Code (NCC)
FACTS:
In Family Case No. 483 filed before the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court of Caloocan City,
Karl asked for the declaration of Nullity of his marriage (celebrated on July, 1978) with
petitioner
o Petitioner has a previous existing marriage to Eduardo Maxion (June 25, 1972; Quezon
City)
o Petitioner claimed that said marriage was null and void, she and Eduardo were allegedly
forced marry
o In the pre-trial, the issue was the status of the first marriage. Assuming the presence of
force exerted against both parties, was the prior marriage void or voidable
o Petitioner contested the validity of the pre-trial order and asked to present evidence:
1. That the 1st marriage was vitiated by force exercised over her and her husband
2. That the 1st husband was already married to someone else at the time of their
marriage
o Respondent ruled against petitioners presentation of evidence, since the existence of
force exerted on both parties of the first marriage had already been agreed upon

Hence, the present petition for certiorari assailing respondents orders

ISSUE:WON petitioner should be allowed to present her evidence

RULING:
NO, she should not be allowed. Petition DISMISSED for lack of merit. Assailed orders
are AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner
no need for petitioner to prove that her first marriage was vitiated by force committed against
both parties because assuming this to be so, the marriage will not be void but merely voidable
o thus, it is VALID until ANNULLED
o No annulment has been made yet, so marriage with 1st husband is still valid
her marriage to respondent is VOID
o when she married respondent she was still validly married to her 1st husband
o accordingly, the marriage of petitioner and respondent would be VOID under the law
no need to introduce evidence about the existing prior marriage of her 1st husband at the time
they married each other
o such a marriage, though void, still needs a judicial declaration of such fact
o for all legal intents and purposes, she would still be regarded as a married woman at
the time she contracted her marriage with respondent Karl

Dorothy Terre vs. Atty. Jordan Terre

A.M. No. 2349 July 3, 1992
Topic: effect of final judgment declaring nullity. Effect on remarriage.
Facts of the case:
On December 24, 1981, complainant Dorothy B. Terre charged respondent Atty. Jordan Terre, with
grossly immoral conduct, consisting of contracting a second marriage and living with another
woman other than complainant, while his prior marriage with complainant remained subsisting.
That there was no judicial action having been initiated or any judicial declaration obtained as to
the nullity of such prior marriage of respondent with complainant.
Respondent was charged with abandonment of minor and bigamy by complainant. Dorothy Terre
was then married to a certain Merlito Bercenillo her first cousin, with this fact, Atty. Jordan Terre
successfully convinced complainant that her marriage was void ab initio and they are free to
contract marriage. In their marriage license, despite her objection, he wrote single as her status.
After getting the complainant pregnant, Atty. Terre abandoned them and subsequently contracted
another marriage to Helina Malicdem believing again that her previous marriage was also void ab
initio.
ISSUE:
(1) WON a judicial declaration of nullity is needed to enter into a subsequent valid marriage

Ruling:
Yes. There is still need a judicial declaration of nullity of marriage. The Court considers this claim
on the part of respondent Jordan Terre as a spurious defense. In the first place, respondent has not
rebutted complainants evidence as to the basic fact which underscores that bad faith of
respondent Terre. In the second place, the pretended defense is the same argument by which he
inveigled complainant into believing that her prior marriage or Merlito A. Bercenilla being
incestuous and void ab initio (Dorothy and Merlito being allegedly first cousins to each other), she
was free to contract a second marriage with the respondent. Respondent Jordan Terre, being a
lawyer, knew or should have known that such an argument ran counter to the prevailing case law
of the SC which holds that for purposes of determining whether a person is legally free to contract
a second marriage, a judicial declaration that the first marriage was null and void ab initio is
essential.

Domingo vs CA
GR No. 104818
Sept. 17, 1993
FACTS:
Roberto Domingo married Delia Soledad in 1976 while being married with Emerlina dela Paz.
He has been unemployed and completely dependent upon Delia, who has been working in Saudi
Arabia, for support and subsistence.
Delia only found out about the prior marriage when Emerlina sued them for bigamy in 1983.
In 1989, she found out that Roberto was cohabiting with another woman and he was disposing of
some of her properties without her knowledge and consent.
In May 1991, Delia filed a petition for judicial declaration of nullity of her marriage to Roberto and
separation of property.
ISSUE:
Whether or not a petition for judicial declaration of a void marriage is necessary. If in affirmative,
whether the same should be filed only for purpose of remarriage.
RULING:
Yes. A declaration of the absolute nullity of marriage is now explicitly required either as a cause of
action or a ground for defense. Where the absolute nullity of a previous marriage is sought to be
invoked for purpose of contracting a second marriage, the sole basis acceptable in law for the said
projected marriage be free from legal infirmity is a final judgment declaring the previous marriage
void.
The requirement for a declaration of absolute nullity of a marriage is also for the protection of the
spouse who, believing that his or her marriage is illegal and void, marries again. With the judicial
declaration of the nullity of his or her first marriage, the person who marries again cannot be
charged with bigamy.
Article 40 as finally formulated included the significant clause denotes that final judgment
declaring the previous marriage void need not be obtained only for purposes of remarriage. A
person can conceive of other instances other than remarriage, such as in case of an action for
liquidation, partition, distribution and separation of property between the spouses, as well as an
action for the custody and support of their common children and the delivery of the latters'
presumptive legitimes. In such cases, however, one is required by law to show proof that the

previous one was an absolute nullity.

Marriage is an inviolable social institution, is the foundation of the family; as such, it shall be
protected by the State. As a matter of policy, there should be a final judgment declaring the
marriage void and a party should not declare for himself or herself whether or not the marriage is
void.

Carino vs. Carino

Topic: Property regime of unions without marriage - Void and voidable
marriages

FACTS:
In 1969 SPO4 Santiago Carino married Susan Nicdao Carino. He had 2 children
with her. In 1992, SPO4 contracted a second marriage, this time with Susan Yee
Carino. In 1988, prior to his second marriage, SPO4 is already bedridden and he
was under the care of Yee. In 1992, he died 13 days after his marriage with Yee.
Thereafter, the spouses went on to claim the benefits of SPO4. Nicdao was able to
claim a total of P140,000.00 while Yee was able to collect a total of P21,000.00. In
1993, Yee filed an action for collection of sum of money against Nicdao. She
wanted to have half of the P140k. Yee admitted that her marriage with SPO4 was
solemnized during the subsistence of the marriage b/n SPO4 and Nicdao but the
said marriage between Nicdao and SPO4 is null and void due to the absence of a
valid marriage license as certified by the local civil registrar. Yee also claimed that
she only found out about the previous marriage on SPO4s funeral.

ISSUE: Whether or not the absolute nullity of marriage may be invoked to claim
presumptive legitimes.

HELD: The marriage between Nicdao and SPO4 is null and void due the absence
of a valid marriage license. The marriage between Yee and SPO4 is likewise null
and void for the same has been solemnized without the judicial declaration of the
nullity of the marriage between Nicdao and SPO4. Under Article 40 of the FC, the
absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for purposes of remarriage
on the basis solely of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void.
Meaning, where the absolute nullity of a previous marriage is sought to be
invoked for purposes of contracting a second marriage, the sole basis acceptable

in law, for said projected marriage to be free from legal infirmity, is a final
judgment declaring the previous marriage void. However, for purposes other than
remarriage, no judicial action is necessary to declare a marriage an absolute
nullity. For other purposes, such as but not limited to the determination of
heirship, legitimacy or illegitimacy of a child, settlement of estate, dissolution of
property regime, or a criminal case for that matter, the court may pass upon the
validity of marriage even after the death of the parties thereto, and even in a suit
not directly instituted to question the validity of said marriage, so long as it is
essential to the determination of the case. In such instances, evidence must be
adduced, testimonial or documentary, to prove the existence of grounds
rendering such a previous marriage an absolute nullity. These need not be limited
solely to an earlier final judgment of a court declaring such previous marriage
void.
The SC ruled that Yee has no right to the benefits earned by SPO4 as a policeman
for their marriage is void due to bigamy; she is only entitled to properties, money
etc owned by them in common in proportion to their respective contributions.
Wages and salaries earned by each party shall belong to him or her exclusively
(Art. 148 of FC). Nicdao is entitled to the full benefits earned by SPO4 as a cop
even if their marriage is likewise void. This is because the two were capacitated to
marry each other for there were no impediments but their marriage was void due
to the lack of a marriage license; in their situation, their property relations is
governed by Art 147 of the FC which provides that everything they earned during
their cohabitation is presumed to have been equally contributed by each party
this includes salaries and wages earned by each party notwithstanding the fact
that the other may not have contributed at all.

Valdez Vs. RTC Quezon City July 31, 1996

Issues: The use of Article 147 as governing the disposition of property in the case at bar
and its applicability to marriages declared null and void pursuant to Article 36
Facts of the case: Antonio Valdez and Consuelo Gomez were married on January 5,
1971 and later had five children. On June 22, 1992, Antonio sought the declaration of
nullity of the marriage pursuant to Article 36 of the Family Code. The RTC of Quezon
City rendered judgment and declared the marriage null and void under Article 36 of the
Family Code on the ground of their mutual psychological incapacity to comply with their
essential marital obligations. The RTC and ordered the liquidation of their common
properties as defined by Article 147 of the FC and to comply with the provisions of
Articles 50, 51and 52 of the Family Code. Consuelo sought a clarification of the order of
the court and asserted that the Family Code did not have provisions for the liquidation of
common property in unions without marriage.

The court explained in an order dated May 5, 1995 that the property including the
family home acquired during their union are presumed to have been obtained through
joined efforts and the property would be owned by them in equal shares and the
liquidation and partition of property would be governed by the regime of coownership. The court also explained that Article 102 does not apply since it refers to the
procedure for liquidation of conjugal partnership property. Article 129 also does not apply
because it refers to procedures for liquidation of the absolute community of
property. Antonio moved for a reconsideration of the order. The motion was denied.
Decision: The questioned orders, dated 05 May 1995 and 30 October 1995, of the trial
court are AFFIRMED. In void marriages, the property relations of the parties during the
cohabitation period are governed by the provisions of Article 147 or Article 1482. In the
case at bar, Article 147 apply because there was no legal impediment to their marriage
and they were capacitated wherein the word capacitated refers to legal capacity of
a party to contract marriage.
Dino v. Dino
G. Void Marriages 7. Effects of final judgments declaring nullity
(d) On the property regime of the marriage
(e) On legitimes of the common children
Dino vs. Dino

G.R No. 178044

January 19, 2011

Facts:
Alain Dino and Ma. Caridad l. Dino were childhood friends and became sweethearts
They started to live together in 1984 but eventually separated by 1994. In 1996, both
parties decided to live together again. On Jan. 14, 1998, they were married by Mayor
Vergel Aguilar of Las Pinas City.
On May30.2001,Alain filed for a declaration of nullity of marriage against Caridad Dino in
grounds of psychological incapacity, art.36 of the family code. Alain (petitioner) alleged
that Caridad (respondent) failed to do her marital obligations and chose to go shopping or
go out with her friends instead of showing love and support for her family.
Petitioner also says that the respondent was not always faithful and would usually turn
violent and hurt him.
Summons was given to respondent who was already in the United States of America.
Respondent did not answer the summons after receipt within the given period.It was later
discovered by petitioner that respondent has already filed for a divorce/dissolution of her
marriage with petitioner that was granted by the Supreme Court of California (May
25,2001).

 On Oct. 5, 2001, respondent married Manuel V. Alcantara. On April 30, 2002, office of Las
Pinas Prosecutor found that there were no facts leading to collusion of two parties and
case was set to trial.
Dr. Nedy L. Tayag, a clinical psychologist submitted a psychological report stating that
respondent has Narcissistic Personality Disorder that she has in her since her formative
years. Dr. Tayag also said that it the disorder is long-lasting and by nature is incurable.
In Oct. 18, 2006, the trial court granted the petition to nullify the marriage on the grounds
that respondent is psychologically incapacitated.
Trial court based on the evidence presented ruled psychological incapacity of respondent.
The court also averred that even with the absence of the clinical report, the allegations in
the complaint were substantial to prove psychological incapacity.
Trial court also found that respondent embarrassed petitioner and his family and failed to
give love, mutual respect and fidelity under art.68 of the family code. Trial court ruled
that respondent abandoned the petitioner after he obtained a divorce abroad and married
another man.

The dispositive portion of the trial court's decision reads: chanrob1esvirtwallawlibrary

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, judgment is hereby
rendered: chanrob1esvirtwallawlibrary
1. Declaring the marriage between plaintiff ALAIN M. DIO and defendant MA. CARIDAD L.
DIO on January 14, 1998, and all its effects under the law, as NULL and VOID from the
beginning; and
2. Dissolving the regime of absolute community of property.
A DECREE OF ABSOLUTE NULLITY OF MARRIAGE shall only be issued upon compliance
with Article[s] 50 and 51 of the Family Code.

After the decision of the trial court, petitioner filed for a partial reconsideration
questioning the dissolution of absolute community of property in compliance with art.
50&51 of the Family Code.
In March 12, 2007, trial court partially granted the motion and modified the Oct. 18, 2006
decision stated here in part: A DECREE OF ABSOLUTE NULLITY OF MARRIAGE shall be
issued after liquidation, partition and distribution of the parties' properties under Article
147 of the Family Code.
Hence, the petition before this Court.

Issue:
1. W/N the trial court erred when it ordered that a decree of absolute nullity of marriage
shall only be issued after liquidation, partition, and distribution of the parties' properties
under Article 147 of the Family Code.
Ratio:
1. Yes. Citing the case of Valdes vs. RTC that in a void marriage, regardless of its cause,
the property relations of the parties during the period of cohabitation is governed either
by Art. 147 or 148 of the Family Code. Said Art. 147 applies to union of parties who are
legally capacitated and not barred by any impediment to contract marriage, but whose
marriage is nonetheless void similar to the case of petitioner and respondent. Art. 147 of
the Family Code provide:
Article 147. When a man and a woman who are capacitated to marry each other, live
exclusively with each other as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage or under
a void marriage, their wages and salaries shall be owned by them in equal shares and the
property acquired by both of them through their work or industry shall be governed by
the rules on co-ownership.
For Article 147 of the Family Code to apply, the following elements must be
present: chanrob1esvirtwallawlibrary
1. The man and the woman must be capacitated to marry each other;
2. They live exclusively with each other as husband and wife; and
3. Their union is without the benefit of marriage, or their marriage is void.
All are present in the case of petitioner and respondent. Nonetheless, according to sec.
19 of Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Null Marriages and Annulment of Voidable
Marriages, what is applicable are Art. 50&51 of The Family Code. Stated in Sec. 19:
Sec. 19. Decision. - (1) If the court renders a decision granting the petition, it shall declare
therein that the decree of absolute nullity or decree of annulment shall be issued by the
court only after compliance with Articles 50 and 51 of the Family Code as implemented
under the Rule on Liquidation, Partition and Distribution of Properties.
Provided in Art. 50&51 of the Family code are:

Art. 50- The effects provided for in paragraphs (2),(3),(4) and (5) of Art. 43 and in Art. 44
shall also apply in proper cases to marriages which are declared void ab initio or annulled
by final judgment under Art. 40 and 45.
The final judgment in such cases shall provide for the liquidation, partition, and
distribution of the properties of the spouses, the custody and support of the common
children, and the delivery of their presumptive legitimes, unless such matters had been
adjudicated in previous judicial proceedings
All creditors of the spouses as well as of the absolute community or the conjugal
partnership shall be notified of the proceedings for the liquidation.
In the partition, the conjugal dwelling and the lot on which it is situated, shall be
adjudicated in accordance with the provisions of Art. 102 and 103
Art. 51- In said partition, the value of the presumptive legitimes of all common children,
computed as of the date of the final judgment of the trial court, shall be delivered in cash,
property, or sound securities, unless the parties, by mutual agreement judicially
approved, had already provided for such matters.
The children or their guardian, or the trustee of their property, may ask for the
enforcement of the judgment.
The delivery of the presumptive legitimes herein prescribed shall in no way prejudice the
ultimate successional rights of the children accruing upon the death of either or both of
the parents; but the value of the properties already received under the decree of
annulment or absolute nullity shall be considered as advances on their legitime.
It is then clear that according to Art. 50 of the Family Code, Rule 19 shall only be
applicable on void marriages that falls under Art. 40 and 45 of the Family Code. Art. 40
speaks about second or bigamous marriages while Art. 45 speaks about voidable
marriages. Both articles are governed either by absolute community of property or
conjugal partnership of gains while Art. 36 is governed by ordinary rules on co-ownership.
The case at bar was declared void not because of Art. 40 and 45 but of Art. 36 of the
Family Code. Citing the case of Valdes vs. RTC, the Supreme Court ruled that property
relations of parties in a void marriage during the period of cohabitation is governed by
Art. 147 or 148 of the Family Code. The rules on co-ownership apply and the properties of
spouses should be in accordance with the provisions on co-ownership of the Civil Code.

Art. 496 of the Civil Code provide in part:

Art. 496- partition may be made by agreement between the parties or by judicial
proceedings.
The court states that it is not necessary to liquidate properties of spouses in the same
proceeding for nullity of marriage.
Held:
Decision of trial court is affirmed with modification that declaration of absolute nullity
shall be issued upon finality of trial courts decision without waiting for liquidation,
partition, and distribution of the parties properties under Art. 147 of the Family Code.
Yu v Reyes-Carpio
GR 189207,
June 15, 2011

Original Petition: Declaration of nullity of marriage filed by petitioner Eric U. Yu against private respondent Caroline T. Yu

May 30, 2006 - Judge Leili Cruz Suarez of the RTC Branch 163 released an order - for the submission of Partial Offer of Evidence for resolution after certain
exhibits of petitioner have been remarked. But the exhibits were only relative to the issue of the nullity of marriage of the parties.

September 28, 2006, petitioner opposed private respondents Motion, claiming that the incident on the declaration of nullity of marriage cannot be resolved
without the presentation of evidence for the incidents on custody, support, and property relations.Petitioner, therefore, averred that the incident on nullity of
marriage, on the one hand, and the incidents on custody, support, and property relations, on the other, should both proceed and be simultaneously resolved.

March 21, 2007 - RTC Branch 163 issued an Order in favor of petitioners opposition = it would be more in accord with the rules if the Parties were first allowed
to present their evidence relative to the issues of property relations, custody and support to enable the Court to issue a comprehensive decision
thereon

Subsequently, private respondent was able to successfully cause the inhibition of Judge Cruz Suarez of the RTC Branch 163. Consequently, the case was re raffled
to Branch 261, presided by Judge Agnes Reyes Carpio.

May 21, 2008 - while the case was being heard by the RTCBranch 261, private respondent filed an Omnibus Motion, seeking:
1) the strict observation by the RTCBranch 261 of the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages, as codified in A.M. No. 02 1110SC, in the subject
proceedings
2) that the incident on the declaration of nullity of marriage be already submitted for resolution.
> Conversely, private respondent prayed that the incident on the declaration of nullity of marriage be resolved ahead of the incidents on custody, support, and
property relations, and not simultaneously.

> Petitioner opposed the Omnibus Motion, arguing that the issues that were the subject of the Omnibus Motion had already been resolved in the March 21, 2007

Order. Concurrently, petitioner prayed that the incidents on nullity, custody, support, and property relations of the spouses be resolved simultaneously.

August 4, 2008 - RTCBranch 261 granted the Omnibus Motion with Section 19 of A.M. No. 021110SC. It is more prudent prudent to rule the declaration of nullity
of marriage on the ground of each others psychological incapacity to perform their respective marital obligations first then if the Court eventually finds that the
parties respective petitions for declaration of nullity of marriage is indeed meritorious on the basis of either or both of the parties psychological incapacity, then
the parties shall proceed to comply with Article[s] 50 and 51 of the Family Court

August, 28, 2008 - petitioner moved for reconsideration. which was denied by Judge Carpio on October 24, 2008. She said Family Code is a substantive law and
rule of procedure cannot alter a substantive law, the provisions laid in Articles 50 and 51 relative to the liquidation and dissolution of properties are by nature
procedural, thus there are no substantive rights which may be prejudiced or any vested rights that may be impaired. It is the policy of the courts to give effect to
both procedural and substantive laws, as complementing each other, in the just and speedy resolution of the dispute between the parties.

> Petitioner filed a petition for Certiorari assailing both the RTC Orders dated August 4, 2008 and October 24, 2008 --> CA
> Petitioner filed a petition for Certiorari assailing both the RTC Orders dated August 4, 2008 and October 24, 2008 --> CA

CA DECISION: Dismissed. Absence any arbitrary or despotic exercise of judicial power as to amount to abuse of discretion on the part of respondent Judge in
issuing the assailed Orders

ISSUES:
1.
2.
3.

Whether or not the [CA] committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in holding that a petition for certiorari is not a proper remedy of
the Petitioner
Whether or not the [CA] committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack [or excess] of jurisdiction in upholding the Respondent Judge in submitting the
main issue of nullity of marriage for resolution ahead of the reception of evidence on custody, support, and property relations
Whether or not the reception of evidence on custody, support and property relations is necessary for a complete and comprehensive adjudication of the parties
respective claims and [defenses].

SC DECISION:

1) No because a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 is the proper remedy in assailing that a judge has committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction. The term grave abuse of discretion has a specific meaning. An act of a court or tribunal can only be considered as with grave abuse of
discretion when such act is done in a capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. that it must be so patent and gross as
to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation of law, as where the power is
exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion and hostility.

Pursuant to the definition, it is clear that the special civil action of certiorari under Rule 65 can only strike an act down for having been done with grave abuse of
discretion if the petitioner could manifestly show that such act was patent and gross. In the case at the bar, petitioner failed to prove and demonstrate that the
RTC Orders and the CA Decision were done in a capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment as the Orders in question are interlocutory orders, which does not
finally dispose of the case, and does not end the Courts task of adjudicating the parties contentions and determining their rights and liabilities as regards each
other, but obviously indicates that other things remain to be done by the Court. Petitioner even failed to prove that it was patently erroneous to satisfy the
requisites to strike down an interlocutory order.

2. No because the trial court, or more particularly the family court, shall proceed with the liquidation, partition and distribution, custody, support of common
children, and delivery of their presumptive legitimes upon entry of judgment granting the petition. Such act, which is in accordance with A.M. No. 021110SC, is
undoubtedly consistent with Articles 50 and 51 of the Family Code, contrary to what the petitioner asserts.

3. No. A.M. No. 021110-SC clearly allows the deferment of the reception of evidence on custody, support, and property relations. Conversely, the trial court may
receive evidence on the subject incidents after a judgment granting the petition but before the decree of nullity or annulment of marriage is issued. As correctly
pointed out by the CA, petitioners assertion that ruling the main issue without receiving evidence on the subject incidents would result in an ambiguous and
fragmentary judgment is certainly speculative and, hence, contravenes the legal presumption that a trial judge can fairly weigh and appraise the evidence
submitted by the parties.

G.R. No. 94986 February 23, 1995HATIMA C. YASIN, represented by her

Attorney-in-Fact, HADJI HASAN S. CENTI,
petitioner, vs.
THE HONORABLE JUDGE SHARI'A DISTRICT COURT THIRD SHARI'A JUDICIAL
DISTRICT, Zamboanga City,
respondent.
Article 370.
A married woman may use:(1) Her maiden first name and surname and add her
husband's surname, or(2) Her maiden first name and her husband's surname or(3) Her
husband's full name, but prefixing a word indicating that she is his wife, such as "Mrs."
Article 371.
In case of annulment of marriage, and the wife is the guilty party, she shall resume her
maiden name and surname. If she is the innocent spouse, she may resume her maiden
name and surname. However, she may choose to continue employing her former
husband's surname, unless: (1) The court decrees otherwise, or(2) She or the former
husband is married again to another person.
Rule 13 of Rules of Court - Change of Name
Section 1.
Venue
A person desiring to change his name shall present the petition to the Court of First
Instance of the province in which he resides, or, in the City of Manila, to the Juvenile and
Domestic Relations Court.
Section 2.
Contents of petition
A petition for change of name shall be signed and verified by the person desiring his
name changed, or some other person on his behalf, and shall set forth:(a) That the
petitioner has been a
bona fide
resident of the province where the petition is filed for at least three (3) years prior to the
date of such filing;(b) The cause for which the change of the petitioner's name is sought;
(c) The name asked for.
Section 3.
Order for hearing

If the petition filed is sufficient in form and substance, the court, by an order reciting the
purpose of the petition, shall fix a date and place for the hearing thereof, and shall direct
that a copy of the order be published before the hearing at least once a week for three
(3) successive weeks in some newspaper of general circulation published in the province,
as the court shall deem best. The date set for the hearing shall not be within thirty (30)
days prior to an election nor within four (4)month after the last publication of the notice.
Section 4.
Hearing
Any interested person may appear at the hearing and oppose the petition. The Solicitor
General or the proper provincial or city fiscal shall appear on behalf of the Government of
the Republic.
Section 5.
Judgment
Upon satisfactory proof in open court on the date fixed in the order that such order has
been published as directed and that the allegations of the petition are true, the court
shall, if proper and reasonable cause appears for changing the name of the petitioner,
adjudge that such name be changed in accordance with the prayer of the petition.
Section 6.
Service of judgment
Judgments or orders rendered in connection with this rule shall be furnished the civil
registrar of the municipality or city where the court issuing the same is situated, who
shall forthwith enter the same in the civil register.
FACTS:

Hatima C. Yasin, a Muslin Filipino was previously married to Hadji Idris Yasin, also
a Muslim Filipino in

On March 13, 1984, they were granted a decree of divorce by the Mindanao Islamic
CenterFoundation, Inc., in accordance with Islamic Law.

That, thereafter the former husband Hadji Idris Yasin contracted another marriage
to another woman.

The petitioner prayed to be allowed to resume the use of her maiden name

ISSUE:
WON a petition for resumption of maiden name and surname is also a petition for change
of name.
RULING:

NO. Petitioner doesnt seek to CHANGE her name but to RESUME use of it Divorce is
recognized in Muslim law as one that severs the marriage bond and where can again
contract another marriage. Petitioner is authorized to resume her maiden name and
surname. The onerous requirements of Rule 103 of the Rules of Court on change of name
should not be applied to judicial confirmation of the right of a divorced woman to resume
her maiden name and surname. In the absence of a specific rule or provision governing
such a proceeding, where sufficient facts have been alleged supported by competent
proof as annexes, which appear to be satisfactory to the court, such petition for
confirmation of change of civil status and/or to resume the use of maiden name must be
given due course and summarily granted as in fact it is a right conferred by law.

Re: Petition to use Maiden name in Petition to take the 2006 Bar Examinations,
Josephine P. Uy Timosa, Petitioner
B.M. No. 1625
July 18, 2006
Topic: On use of surnames
Facts:
The petitioner was a graduate of Bachelor of Laws in the UST and an examinee in the
2006 Bar examinations.
She alleged that she and her husband have been separated since May 2000 and that
a Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage is now pending before the RTC of
Manila.
That despite her marriage, she has continuously used her maiden name in all of her
transactions, except in her school records and those in the CHED and other offices.
However, all records in the UST reflected her maiden name.

Issue: Whether or not the petitioner is allowed to use her maiden name in the 2006 Bar
Examinations
Held:

Yes. Marriage does not change a womans name, it merely changes her civil status.
Her true and real name is that given to her and entered in the Civil Registry which she
may continue to use despite her marriage or cessation of marriage for whatever
reason she may have.
Art. 370 of the Civil Code, which pertains to the use of surname of a married woman,
clearly indicates that the wifes use of her husbands surname is optional, not
obligatory. The case of Yasin v Judge, Sharia Court District furthered this provision.

MARIA VIRGINIA V. REMO, Petitioner, versus THE HON. SEC. OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS,
Respondent

3/5/2010, Carpio, J
TOPIC: Effects of annulment on use of surnames
PETITION: Petition for review of the CA decisions (5/27/2005) and resolution (8/2/2005) affirming
the decision of the Office of the Pres, which affirmed the decision of the Sec. of Foreign Affairs,
denying petitioners request to revert to the use of her maiden name in her replacement passport
FACTS

Maria Virginia V. Remo Fil citizen, married to Francisco R. Rallonza, passport indicating (Rallonza,
Maria Virginia Remo) expiring on Oct 27, 2000
Prior to passport expiry, Maria applied renewal with DFA, Chicago, Illinois USA, requesting her
maiden name and surname in the passport (Remo, Maria Virginia V)
DFA denied
Having been denied, Atty. Joseph Bretana III (representing Maria) wrote Sec of Foreign Affairs
expressing a similar request
DFA, through Asst. Sec. Belen Anota, denied (Aug. 8, 2000)

Use of maiden name is allowed in passport application only if the married name has not been used in
previous application
Implementing Rules and Regulations for Philippine Passport Act of 1996
Clearly defines that a woman applicant may revert to her maiden name only in cases of annulment of
marriage, divorce and death of the husband
Ms. Remo's case does not meet any of these conditions

Petitioners motion for recon was also denied (Oct 10, 2000)
Petitioner files an appeal to the Office of the President (OP) Nov 15, 2000
OP dismissed the appeal (July 27, 2004)

That Section 5(d) of Republic Act No. 8239 (RA 8239) or the Philippine Passport Act of 1996 "offers no leeway
for any other interpretation than that only in case of divorce, annulment, or declaration [of nullity] of
marriage may a married woman revert to her maiden name for passport purposes."
That in case of conflict between a general and special law, the latter will control the former regardless of the
respective dates of passage
Civil Code should yield to RA 8239

o
o

OP denied motion for recon

Petition files with CA, petition for review under Rule 43 of the Rules of Civil Pro
CA denied (May 27, 2005)
CA denied motion for recon (Aug 2, 2005)

ISSUE
W/N petitioner, who originally used her husbands surname in her expired passport, can revert to
the use of her maiden name in the replacement passport, despite the susbsistence of her marriage

HELD
Title XIII of the Civil Code that governs the use of surnames:

ART. 370. A married woman may use:

(1) Her maiden first name and surname and add her husband's surname, or
(2) Her maiden first name and her husband's surname, or
(3) Her husband's full name, but prefixing a word indicating that she is his wife, such as "Mrs."

o
o

Yes, may is used, permissive, rather obligatory

As established in Yasin v Hon Judge Sharia District Court
But Petitioner cannot use Yasin v Hon Judge Sharia District Court because unlike in Yasin where the
divorcee is already married to another woman, Marias marriage is subsisting
Yasin case was to resume a maiden name in view of a dissolution on a marriage

o
o

The Phil Passport Act, RA 8239, Sec 5(d) limits the instances when a married woman may be
allowed to revert to the use of her maiden name in her passport: death of husband, divorce
decree, annulment or nullity of marriage
IRR of RA 8239, Sec 1 Art 12 also provides that amendment may be done in: marriage, death of
spouse, annulment or divorce by foreign spouse
Therefore, once a married woman has adopted her husbands surname in her passport, she may
not revert to the use of her maiden name, except in cases enumerated in Sec 5(d) RA8239
Even assuming that RA 8239 conflicts with Civil Code, STATCON: special law prevails over general
law
RA 8239 is not an implied repeal on Civil Code, petitioner failed to establish apparent conflict,
STATCON: two laws should be harmonized as much as possible
If petitioner, who consciously chose her husbands name in her previous applications, is allowed to
change back to her maiden name, nothing will prevent her in the future from requesting to revert
back
Such unjustified changes in ones name and identity in a passport, which is considered superior to
all cannot be countenanced
Confusion and consistency with records will arise
Acquisition of a passport is a privilege, recognizes right to travel. However, state is mandated to
protect the credibility and integrity of travel docs
- DENIED, CA decision is AFFIRMED

HEIRS VS SERVACIO - GR 157537 - 7 SEP 2011

Topic: Effects of final judgment declaring nullity- Effect of death

Facts:
Jesus Gaviola (Gaviola) sold two parcels of land with a total area of 17,140m2 to
Protacio Go, Jr. (Junior)

Eleven years later, Marta Go (Marta), wife of Protacio Go, Sr. (Senior), died

Twenty three years after the sale, Junior executed an Affidavit of Renunciation and
Waiver, affirming under oath that it was his father, Senior, who purchased the two parcels
of land.
Senior and his son, Rito (and wife Dina), sold a portion of the property (5,560m2) to
Ester Servacio (Servacio) for P5,686,768.00

Petitioners demanded the return of the property, but Servacio refused.

They failed to resolve the issue through the barangay proceedings, so the petitioners
sued Servacio and Rito in the RTC for annulment of the sale of the property.

Petitioners' Stand:

o After Junior's renunciation, the property became conjugal property

o Without the prior liquidation of the community property between Sr and Marta, th sale
of the property was null and void.<Article 130 of the Family Code>

Respondents' Stand:

o Senior purchased the land with his own money

RTC Decision:

o property was conjugal property of Senior and Marta (Article 160 of the Civil Code)
o Sale of the property was valid

Issue: Whether of not the sale by Protacio, Sr. to Servacio was void for being made
without prior liquidation?

Ruling: No.
Under Article 130 in relation to Article 105 of the Family Code, any disposition of the
conjugal property after the dissolution of the conjugal partnership must be made only
after the liquidation; otherwise, the disposition is void.

Protacio, Sr., although becoming a co-owner with his children in respect of Martas share
in the conjugal partnership, could not yet assert or claim title to any specific portion of
Martas share without an actual partition of the property being first done either by
agreement or by judicial decree. Until then, all that he had was an ideal or abstract quota
in Martas share. Nonetheless, a co-owner could sell his undivided share; hence, Protacio,
Sr. had the right to freely sell and dispose of his undivided interest, but not the interest of
his co-owners.

Consequently, the sale by Protacio, Sr. and Rito as co-owners without the consent of the
other co-owners was not necessarily void, for the rights of the selling co-owners were
thereby effectively transferred, making the buyer (Servacio) a co-owner of Martas share.
Article 105 of the Family Code, supra, expressly provides that the applicability of the rules
on dissolution of the conjugal partnership is "without prejudice to vested rights already
acquired in accordance with the Civil Code or other laws."

The proper action in cases like this is not for the nullification of the sale or for the
recovery of possession of the thing owned in common from the third person who
substituted the co-owner or co-owners who alienated their shares, but the DIVISION of
the common property as if it continued to remain in the possession of the co-owners who
possessed and administered it [Mainit v. Bandoy, supra] In the meanwhile, Servacio
would be a trustee for the benefit of the co-heirs of her vendors in respect of any portion
that might not be validly sold to her.

Oropesa v Oropesa
Insanity
FACTS:

Petition for Certiorari decision of CA affirming decision of RTC which dismissed

petitioner Nilo Oropesas petition for guardianship over the properties of his father.
It is alleged among others that the (respondent) has been afflicted with several
maladies and has been sickly for over ten (10) years already having suffered a
stroke, that his judgment and memory [were] impaired and such has been evident
after his hospitalization; that even before his stroke, the (respondent) was
observed to have had lapses in memory and judgment, showing signs of failure to
manage his property properly due to his age and medical condition and has
become an easy prey for deceit and exploitation by people around him, particularly
Ms. Ma. Luisa Agamata, his girlfriend.
The Court Social Worker subsequently submitted her report but without any finding
on the (respondent) who refused to see and talk.
The (petitioner) failed to file his written formal offer of evidence.
o Respondent denied the allegations made by petitioner and cited petitioners
lack of material evidence to support his claims.
o Report of Neuropsychological Screening submitted by petioner General
Oropesa spoke fluently in English and Filipino, he enjoyed and participated
meaningfully in conversations and could be quite elaborate in his responses
on many of the test items. He spoke in a clear voice and his articulation was
generally comprehensible. -- proves that he is indeed competent to run his
personal affairs and administer his properties.

ISSUE: W/N Gen Oropesa should be declared insane.

HELD: No

In a guardianship proceeding, a court may appoint a qualified guardian if the

prospective ward is proven to be a minor or an incompetent. A reading of Section
2, Rule 92 of the Rules of Court tells us that persons who, though of sound mind
but by reason of age, disease, weak mind or other similar causes, are incapable of
taking care of themselves and their property without outside aid are considered as
incompetents who may properly be placed under guardianship. The full text of the

said provision reads:

o Sec. 2. Meaning of the word incompetent. Under this rule, the word
incompetent includes personssuffering the penalty of civil interdiction or
who are hospitalized lepers, prodigals, deaf and dumb whoare unable to
read and write, those who are of unsound mind, even though they have lucid
intervals, and persons not being of unsound mind, but by reason of age,
disease, weak mind, and other similar causes,cannot, without outside aid,
take care of themselves and manage their property, becoming thereby an
easy prey for deceit and exploitation.
o Court have held in the past that a finding that a person is incompetent
should be anchored on clear, positive and definite evidence.
Even if we were to overlook petitioners procedural lapse in failing to make a formal
offer of evidence, his documentary proof were comprised mainly of certificates of
title over real properties registered in his, his fathers and his sisters names as coowners, tax declarations, and receipts showing payment of real estate taxes on
their co-owned properties, which do not in any way relate to his fathers alleged
incapacity to make decisions for himself.
Where the sanity of a person is at issue, expert opinion is not necessary[and that]
the observations of the trial judge coupled with evidence establishing the persons
state of mental sanity will suffice. -- It is the observation of the Court (RTC) that
oppositor is still sharp, alert and able.

DENIED.
Buccat v. Buccat 72 Phil 49
FACTS:

The lower courts decision revealed the following facts:

o Plaintiff met the defendant in March 1938 and were committed September
19 of that year
o On November 26 the same year, they got married in the Catholic cathedral
of Baguio City
o While living martially for 89 days, on February 23, 1939, defendant gave
birth to a child of nine months
o Following this event, the plaintiff abandoned the defendant and did not
return to their marital life
On March 20, 1939, plaintiff filed the present case, in which the defendant failed to
appear, despite having been duly summoned
o Plaintiff was thus allowed to present evidence, after which the lower court
decided in favor of the defendant
Hence this appeal

ISSUE:
WON the lower courts decision to maintain the marriage is according to law

HELD:

SC has no reason to vacate the judgment appealed

Plaintiffs allegation that he had not even suspected the gravid state of the
defendant who is highly advanced in her pregnant condition, therefore not
necessary to estimate the fraud that may have been committed by the appellant,
is improbable
Marriage is a most sacred institution, it is the foundation on which society rests,
and may be annulled only with clear and reliable evidence
o In this case, there is no such evidence
Finding the judgment appealed in accordance with law, the Court finds that it must
be affirmed

Fernando Aquino v Conchita Delizo

GR No L-15853
July 27, 2960
Facts:
- Petition for certiorari to review a decision of the Court of Appeals affirming that of
the Court of First Instance of Rizal which dismissed petitioner's complaint for
annulment of his marriage with respondent Conchita Delizo.
- Complaint was filed on the grounds of fraud, that Conchita Delizo, at the date of
her marriage to Fernando Aquino, on December 27, 1954, concealed from the
latter the fact that she was pregnant by another man, and four months after their
marriage, gave birth to a child. In her answer, she laimed that the child was
conceived out of lawful wedlock between the two of them.
- During trial, only Fernando testified and the only documentary evidence presented
was the marriage contract between the parties. Conchita neither appeared nor
presented any evidence despite the reservation made by her counsel that he
would present evidence on a later date.
- The complaint was dismissed on the grounds that no birth certificate was
presented to shown that the child was born 180 days after marriage and the
concealment of pregnancy does not constitute fraud.
- Petition to reopen for reception of additional evidence was filed by Fernando to
present the certificates of birth and delivery of the child born on April 26, 1955,
which documents, according to him, he had failed to secure earlier and produce
before the trial court thru excusable negligence. Petition was denied.
- Francisco filed a motion praying that the decision be reconsidered, or, if such
reconsideration be denied, that the case be remanded to the lower court for new
trial.
- Acting upon the motion, the Court of Appeals ordered the defendant Conchita
Delizo and Assistant Provincial Fiscal of Rizal, who was representing the
Government, to answer the motion for reconsideration, and deferred action on the
prayer for new trial until after the case is disposed of.
Issue:
- W/N Fernando can charge Conchita with fraud
Held:

Under NCC, concealment by the wife of the fact that at the time of the marriage,
she was pregnant by a man other than her husband constitutes fraud and is
ground for annulment of marriage. (Art. 85, par. (4) in relation to Art. 86, par. (3).
Appellate court held that that it was not impossible for plaintiff and defendant to
have had sexual intercourse before they got married and therefore the child could
be their own. This statement, however, is purely conjectural and finds no support
or justification in the record.
The Court of Appeals should, therefore, not have denied the motion praying for
new trial simply because defendant failed to file her answer thereto. Such failure of
the defendant cannot be taken as evidence of collusion, especially since a
provincial fiscal has been ordered to represent the Government precisely to
prevent such collusion.
Wherefore, the decision complained of is set aside and the case remanded to the
court a quo for new trial. Without costs.

Almelor vs. RTC, G.R. No. 179620, August

FACTS:
On January 29, 1989, petitioner Manuel and respondent Leonida were married, and had
three children
Manuel and Leonida are both medical practitioners, an anesthesiologist and pediatrician,
respectively
After 11 years of marriage, Leonida filed with the RTC of Las Pinas a petition to annul their
marriage on the ground that Manuel was psychologically incapacitated to perform his
marital obligations
She alleges that in the public eye, Manuel was the perfect picture of a husband and
father but that was not the case in their private life
She describes Manuel as a harsh disciplinarian, unreasonably meticulous, and easily
angered
Manuels unreasonable way of imposing discipline on their children was the cause of their
frequent fights as a couple
She says this is in stark contrast to the affection Manuel has for his mother
She also says that her husband is homosexual and that he concealed it from her
She caught him in a indiscreet telephone conversation manifesting his affection for a
male caller
She also found several pornographic homosexual materials in his possession
Furthermore she saw Manuel kiss another man, a certain Dr. Nogales, on the lips
When she confronted him about it, he denied everything

This brought her to take her children with her and leave the conjugal home
Since then, Manuel stopped giving support to their children
Dr. Valentina del Fonso Garcia, a clinical psychologist, was presented to prove Leonidas
claim
She testified that she conducted evaluative interviews and psychiatric tests on Leonida
She also had a one time interview with Manuel face to face
She concluded that Manuel is psychologically incapacitated and such incapacity is
marked by antecedence, existing even before the marriage and appeared to be incurable
Manuel countered that the true cause of Leonidas hostility against him was their
professional rivalry, Leonidas wife owning a hospital withing the same area as Manuels
RTC nullified the marriage, not on the ground of Art 36, but Art 45 of the FC
CA denied the appeal

ISSUE:
WON the marriage between the two can be declared as null and void due to fraud by
reason of Manuels concealment of his homosexuality

HELD:
Concealment of homosexuality is the proper ground to annul a marriage, not
homosexuality per se
It is not proven that Manuel is a homosexual
No sufficient proof was presented to substantiate the allegations that Manuel is a
homosexual and that he concealed this to Leonida at the time of their marriage
The lower court considered the public perception of Manuels sexual preference without
the corroboration of witnesses, and took cognizance of Manuels peculiarities and
interpreted them against his sexuality
These mush not be ruled as indications of his sexuality as they are not conclusive and are
not sufficient enough to prove so
Even granting that Manuel is homosexual, there was nothing in the complaint or
anywhere in the case was it alleged and proven that Manuel hid such sexuality from
Leonida and that Leonidas consent to the marriage had been vitiated by such.

1941-03-18 | G.R. No. 5986

JOSE RUIZ, plaintiff and appellant

vs.
PELAGIA ATIENZA, defendant and appellee
BENGZON, J.

FACTS:
Prior to February 1938, Jose Ruiz and Pelagia Atienza, both single, were sweethearts.
Loving perhaps too well, she allowed him, in a moment of weakness, to have his way,
with the result that nine months later she became an unmarried mother.
On November 14,1938, after the babys birth, Jose Atienza (Pelagias father), Atty.
Villavicencio (her cousin-in-law), and three other persons visited Jose Ruiz at the boarding
house where he lived, in Oregon street, Manila. After some discussion, they convinced
him to marry Pelagia.
Pelagia Atienza and Jose Ruiz were able to secure a marriage license at the Aglipayan
church at Maria Clara street, Manila and later returned to the same Aglipayan church
where the marriage was celebrated in the evening. Four days later, alleging that he had
been forced into wedlock, Jose brought a suit to secure its avoidance. His counsel has
'dramatized the visit of Jose Atienza and companions.
The plaintiff-appellant said he was "convinced" into the marriage by the following
arguments":
(a) the threats of the father supported by his "balisong";
(b) the unveiled intimidation by Atty.Villavicencio that if he would not marry Pelagia
Atienza, he would have difficulty when he would take the bar examinations because, as
he said, many have been rejected admission to the bar on the ground of immorality; and
(c) the promise of Atty. Villavicencio that Ruiz would be physically safe" if he would go
with them.

The Manila Court of First Instance denied the plaintiff's demand for the annulment of his
marriage with the defendant. Thus, he appealed for the said Courts decision.

ISSUE:
W/N violence or duress attended the marriage celebration

HELD/RATIO:
NO. First of all, it appears that in the course of the conversation during the visit, Ruiz
made the statement that he could not marry Pelagia because he was already a married
man. This so aroused Jose Atienza that he grabbed Ruiz' necktie, exclaiming: "So you
mean to fool my daughter! The flare of anger is easily understandable. But it is not
sufficiently established that Jose Atienza displayed any "balisong", or made any threat
against the life of Ruiz. In fact, only a one-and-a-half-inch knife was found in his
possession by the policeman whom the companions of Ruiz called upon seeing what they
believed to be the beginning of trouble.
As to the threat to obstruct his admission to the Bar, by filing charges against him for
immorality, the authorities are unanimous that it is not such a duress as to constitute a
reason for annulling the marriage.
As to the promise by Atty. Villavicencio, it is apparent that when defendant was invited to
go with them and marry Pelagia, he had some fears that he might be subjected to bodily
harm in retaliation for the dishonour inflicted upon her family. Appellant would make it
appear that that afternoon Ruiz was practically kidnapped by Pelagia's relatives until after
the marriage ceremony. That cannot be true. He had many occasions to escape, as
pointed out in appellee's brief. He had companions in the house whom he could have
asked for help. There was even the policeman.
The evidence does not warrant pronouncement Joses consent was obtained through
force or intimidation. Indeed, the provision of the Marriage Law (sec 30, Act No. 3613)
which, referring to "force or "violence", does not seem to include mere intimidation, at
least where it does noting legal effect amount to force or violence.

RULING:
Even though the appellant has presented his case in the best possible light, yet
appellees attorney has successfully met the issues, upholding the judge's conclusion of
fact that neither violence nor duress attended the marriage celebration. Thus, judgment
of the Manila Court of First Instance affirmed, with costs against the appellant.

SARAO v. GUEVARA

PLAINTIFF/APPELLEE:

B. Sarao

DEFENDANT/APPELLANT:

Pilar Guevara

NOTE: I couldnt find an online copy of the full case, so this was taken from an online
reviewer.

FACTS:

On the day of their marriage, plaintiff tried to have carnal knowledge of defendant
o latter showed reluctance and begged him to wait until evening
o Although he found the orifice of her vagina sufficiently large for his organ, she
complained of pains in her private part later that night
o Plaintiff also noticed oozing of some purulent matter offensive to the smell
coming from defendants vagina.
Every attempt to have carnal access to his wife proved to be futile because she
always complained of the same pains
Upon the advice of the physician, defendants uterus and ovaries were, with consent
of the plaintiff, removed due to the presence of a tumor, which rendered defendant
incapable of procreation
Plaintiff declared that from the time he witnessed the operation, he lost all desire to
have access with his wife and thus filed this complaint for annulment of marriage on
the ground of impotency.

ISSUE:

WON their marriage can be annulled on the ground of physical impotency.

HELD:

No. Judgment of the Court of First Instance affirmed.

Plaintiff wants to construe physically incapable of entering into the married state as
with the capacity to procreate.
o SC: Defect must be one of copulation and not of reproduction bareness will
not invalidate the marriage
o Impotency is not the ability to procreate but the ability to copulate
o the removal of the organs rendered her sterile but it by no means made her
unfit for sexual intercourse
o it was the memory of this first unpleasant experience with her that made him
give up the idea of having carnal knowledge of her
o Defendant was not impotent at the time she married the plaintiff for the
existence of tumor did not necessarily render her incapable of copulation.
Plaintiff also contends that his consent of the marriage was procured through fraud in
that the defendant did not reveal to him that she was afflicted with a disease in her
sex organs
o SC: contention is untenable since fraud is not alleged in the complaint and has
not been proved at the trial

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,

vs.
LIBERTY D. ALBIOS, Respondent.
G.R. No. 198780, October 16, 2013
Facts of the case:

On October 22, 2004, Fringer, an American citizen, and Albios were married before
Judge Ofelia I. Calo of the Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 59, Mandaluyong City. On
December 6, 2006, Albios filed with the RTC a petition for declaration of nullity of her
marriage with Fringer. She alleged that immediately after their marriage, they separated
and never lived as husband and wife because they never really had any intention of
entering into a married state or complying with any of their essential marital obligations.
She described their marriage as one made in jest and, therefore, null and void ab initio .
Summons was served on Fringer but he did not file his answer. On September 13, 2007,
Albios filed a motion to set case for pre-trial and to admit her pre-trial brief. The RTC
ordered the Assistant Provincial Prosecutor to conduct an investigation and determine the
existence of a collusion. On October 2, 2007, the Assistant Prosecutor complied and
reported that she could not make a determination for failure of both parties to appear at
the scheduled investigation.
After the trial, the RTC rendered a decision annulling the marriage of Fringer and
Albios. The RTC reasoned that the parties married each other for convenience only. Giving
credence to the testimony of Albios, it stated that she contracted Fringer to enter into a
marriage to enable her to acquire American citizenship; that in consideration thereof, she
agreed to pay him the sum of $2,000.00; that after the ceremony, the parties went their
separate ways; that Fringer returned to the United States and never again communicated
with her; and that, in turn, she did not pay him the $2,000.00 because he never
processed her petition for citizenship.
Petitioner Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Office of the Solicitor
General (OSG), filed a motion for reconsideration. The RTC issued the Order, 7 dated
February 5, 2009, denying the motion for want of merit. It explained that the marriage
was declared void because the parties failed to freely give their consent to the marriage
as they had no intention to be legally bound by it and used it only as a means to acquire
American citizenship in consideration of $2,000.00.
OSG appealed to the CA, but the CA affirmed the RTC ruling which found that the
essential requisite of consent was lacking. The CA stated that the parties clearly did not
understand the nature and consequence of getting married and that their case was
similar to a marriage in jest. It further explained that the parties never intended to enter
into the marriage contract and never intended to live as husband and wife or build a
family. It concluded that their purpose was primarily for personal gain, that is, for Albios
to obtain foreign citizenship, and for Fringer, the consideration of $2,000.00.
OSG then appealed to SC. It argued that that albeit the intention was for Albios to
acquire American citizenship and for Fringer to be paid $2,000.00, both parties freely
gave their consent to the marriage, as they knowingly and willingly entered into that
marriage and knew the benefits and consequences of being bound by it. According to the
OSG, consent should be distinguished from motive, the latter being inconsequential to
the validity of marriage.

The OSG also argues that the present case does not fall within the concept of a
marriage in jest. The parties here intentionally consented to enter into a real and valid
marriage, for if it were otherwise, the purpose of Albios to acquire American citizenship
would be rendered futile
ISSUE:
Is a marriage, contracted for the sole purpose of acquiring American citizenship in
consideration of $2,000.00, void ab initio on the ground of lack of consent.
RULING:
NO. It is still a valid marriage. The RTC and CA were INCORRECT. In ruling that
Albios marriage was void for lack of consent, the CA characterized such as akin to a
marriage by way of jest. A marriage in jest is a pretended marriage, legal in form but
entered into as a joke, with no real intention of entering into the actual marriage status,
and with a clear understanding that the parties would not be bound. The ceremony is not
followed by any conduct indicating a purpose to enter into such a relation. The
respondents marriage is not at all analogous to a marriage in jest. Albios and Fringer had
an undeniable intention to be bound in order to create the very bond necessary to allow
the respondent to acquire American citizenship. Only a genuine consent to be married
would allow them to further their objective, considering that only a valid marriage can
properly support an application for citizenship. There was, thus, an apparent intention to
enter into the actual marriage status and to create a legal tie, albeit for a limited
purpose. Genuine consent was, therefore, clearly present.
Also, consent was not lacking between Albios and Fringer. In fact, there was real
consent because it was not vitiated nor rendered defective by any vice of consent. Their
consent was also conscious and intelligent as they understood the nature and the
beneficial and inconvenient consequences of their marriage, as nothing impaired their
ability to do so. That their consent was freely given is best evidenced by their conscious
purpose of acquiring American citizenship through marriage. application for citizenship.
There was a full and complete understanding of the legal tie that would be created
between them, since it was that precise legal tie which was necessary to accomplish their
goal.
The petition is affirmed. The Respondents marriage to Fringer is still valid.

Chan-Tan vs. Tan

Topic: Effects of Annulment

Facts:

June 1989: Petitioner and respondent got married at the Manila Cathedral. They
had sons Justin (born inCanada in 1990) and Russel (born in the Philippines in
1993).

Susie Chan-Tan, petitioner, then filed a case of annulment under FC 36

(psychological incapacity) againstJesse Tan. The parties, thereafter, submitted a
compromise agreement.

July 31, 2003: trial court issued a partial judgment of approval of the said
compromise agreement.

March 30, 2004: trial court declared the marriage null and void, under FC 36, on
the ground of psychologicalincapacity of the parties. TC incorporated the
compromise agreement it previously approved in said decision.Petitioner then
cancelled the offer to purchase the Corinthian Hills Subdivision Lot No. 12, Block 2
property, andauthorized Megaworld Corp. to offer it to other interested buyers. It
also appeared that the petitioner left the countrywith the children. Respondent
then filed an omnibus motion, seeking the main custody of the children claiming
thatpetitioner brought the kids out of the country w/o his knowledge; that said
petitioner failed to settle the balance for theMegaworld property, w/c, if forfeited,
would prejudice the interest of the children; and that petitioner failed to turn over
to him documents and titles in his name.

May 17, 2004: TC awarded respondent custody of the children, ordered

petitioner to turn over to respondentdocuments and titles in his name, and
allowed respondent to stay in the family dwelling in Mariposa, QC.

June 28, 2004: Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, claiming that she
was denied due process, was notable to properly present evidence due to
negligence from her counsel, and said that she was forced out of thecountry due
to beating she received from the respondent. Petitioner also prayed for an
increase in the respondent'smonthly support obligation.

October 12, 2004: TC denied petitioner's motion for reconsideration, because it

was filed beyond the 15-dayreglementary period. TC also declared petitioner in
contempt of court for non-compliance with the July 31, 2003partial judgment and
the May 17, 2004 resolution. TC also denied the prayer for an increase in monthly
supportobligation, since petitioner was able to enroll the children to another
school by herself without respondent'sknowledge.

November 4, 2004: Petitioner filed a motion to dismiss and a motion for

reconsideration of the October 12, 2004resolution, claiming that she was no
longer interested in the suit, claiming that withdrawing from the case would be
inthe best interest of her children. She prayed to be vacated her from all prior
orders, and leave the parties at a statusquo ante the filing of the suit, or reinstating the parties to their conditions prior the filings.

December 28, 2004: TC denied both November 4, 2004 motions, declaring that
the March 30, 2004 and May17, 2004 decisions had become final and executory
upon lapse of the 15-day reglementary period..

February 15, 2005: TC again denied another motion for reconsideration of the
December 28, 2004 decision. TCthen issued a Certificate of Finality of the March
30 and May 17, 2004 decisions.

Issue: W/N the March 30, 2004 and May 17, 2004 decisions had become final and
executory despite allegations of denial of dueprocess.

Held: Petition has no merit, on the basis of lapse of the15-day reglementary

period.

Alleged negligence of counsel to inform the petitioner resulting in loss of

petitioner's right to appeal is not a ground for setting aside a judgment that is
valid and regular.

Petitioner cannot claim she was denied due process, since records showed that
she was very active in court. She alsocannot claim negligence on the part of her
counsel, since said counsel issued a manifest on May 3, 2004, saying that
saidcounsel made attempts to call the petitioner, but failed.