A look into the Paradigm of Islamic thought and its relationship with Radicalism

Historical development of ISLAM in the Philippines prior to 9-11

Islam has a long period of history in the Philippines, although not as long as
the Middle East or South Asia but a significant one, dating four centuries back
when Shariff Karimul Makdum, the first Muslim-Sufi Missionary trader came into
the Philippines and settled in Simunul Island Tawi-Tawi. Then came the other six
Shariff's who were from Hadramaut Yemen and gave birth to the Sharifite lineage
present in the Southern part of the Philippines.

It is notable to mention ironically that unlike common notion, Islam in the

Philippines came through traveling businessmen who were Alawi-Sufi Muslims as
well as Kiysaniyyah Shia's, both pluralist and moderate manifestations of Islam
notably. The old Tarsilas and Kissah's document this by mentioning the of lineage
Alawi missionaries in the Philippines. The natives were both impressed by the
charm as well as the character of the businessmen eventually being married off to
the daughter of the local ruler.

The Sultanates of Sulu and North Borneo as well as the Sultanate of

Maguindanao both are related to the Royal houses of North Borneo and Malaysia
(all being the product of the Pre-Islamic Shri Vishaya and Madjapahit empires as
well as the intermarriages of the rulers of these areas).

Upon the arrival of the western colonialists, notably the Spanish, the
Portuguese, Dutch and other colonialist explorers who were both in guise of
conversion,consumption and colonization; this brought to focus either the defense
and demise of muslim communities. Among those caught and eventually
destroyed communities were the areas of Rajah Sulayman in Tondo and Rajah
Matanda as well as the community of Kagi Pulaku (commonly known name to the
Maguindanons and called as Maas Pulun by the Tausugs) who was responsible for
the Spanish retreat in 1521 under the command of Magellan.

The entry of the Colonialists ushered the Moro wars both during the three
centuries Spanish occupation as well as the short-lived American occupation and
the Commonwealth republic. It is notable that altogether this turn of collective
events has led the Moro to a evolution of their consciousness from the very
moderate and spiritual personality that Sufi and Alawi Islam brought to a psyche
that accepted war as a part of their personality...the Pathani Psyche.1

Acceptance of war as a cycle of life eventually hardened the Moro Psyche

and thus allowed the justification of Parang Sabil, Luwas Lungsad2 as religious
mechanisms for the defense of Agama3 came into being.

The traditional source of Ulama during this period was Malaysia and
Indonesia, where Pesantrens and Madrassahs existed and thus Bahasa was a
standard religious textual language next to Arabic during these era, supplying a
regular dose of Sunni Shafii-Sufi Islam4 prior to the Commonwealth period and
thus extremism didn't manifest itself in those days.

The first ingredient to the entry of extremism in the country began in the
Commonwealth era when the flow of Hajj pilgrims started to flow into Saudi Arabia
who was gradually being penetrated by Salafi Islam due to the Saud Dynasty who
was gathering its control over the Najd. The second ingredient was when Senator
Damocao Alonto became ambassador to Egypt and opened the door to
scholarships to Al-Azhar university. Since the Salafi Movement under Rashid Rida
and eventually Hassan al-Banna and Sayyid Qutb was gaining sway, ome of the
scholars eventually adopted the literalist interpretation of Wahabbism, although a
huge percentage went mainstream Sunni Islam.

1 Garcia, Joel,”The 1992 FPA, “a sine non-qua non “ to the Peace process. 2006
2 Moro terms for a a religious battle and/or fight against the spiritual enemies of the faith
3 A Malay term for religion or faith
4 The predominant School of Law in Southeast Asia is the Shafii School as well as the school of Philosophy is Sufism,
owing to the Alawi from Hdramaut Yemen
 The biggest twist towards the entry of Salafi Islam in the Philippines was
during the period of economic crisis during the Marcos era when we started to
send OFW's en masse to the Middle East, where both Moros as well as converts to
Islam where influenced by Salafi islam which was the prevalent form in the Gulf
Countries where our OFW's were sent.

And since the globalization of the Islamic movement, both Islamic

revolutionary liberation movements in the Philippines, the Moro National
Liberation front as well as its splinter group the Moro Islamic Liberation front both
derived inspiration from Islamic liberation movements world over it attracted a
number of Salafi adherents who were part of global network of Militants. The
evolution of Salaf inspired movements and groups which came out of both disgust
from the MNLF and the inspiration from the MILF led to the formation of the Al-
Haraqatul Islamiyyah and the Rajah Sulaiman Movement respectively.

The dilemna of Islam in the current century.

A look at trends within the Islamic traditions within today's backdraft.

Fourteen centuries after the Prophethood of the last Messenger Muhammad

(salawatullahi Alayhi), and after the formal closing of the gates of ijtihad of the
four madhahibs within the Sunni Tradition, the evolution of Islamic Philosophical
Thought, plus Colonialist and Post-colonialist thought, the evolution of shiite
philosophical and intellectual trends and the evolution of an Islamic movement
that culminated into the Salafi Ideology (Aquidatul Salaf as-Salih) has made many
inroads and debates within the islamic community. What Islam are we all aiming
to achieve?

This is a very much debatable issue, with each camp springing to memory ayahs
and hadiths to determine his theological legitimacy, and to claim that the other
group is either deviant (rawafid),idolater (mushrik) or unbeliever (mushrik).

This has been the cause of more than simply bloodshed and discord, and that this
has been used against us in the colonial era to partition the Ummah as we see it.

Currently we already are seeing the fruits of this dilemna. The damnation of
other people who even believe in the same things we believe, only differring in
details of practice and juridical rendering. But where do we all agree?

All agree within the Ahlu Sunna wal Jama'ah tradition, that the tariqahs, the
sufi orders are part of the grand theological legacy left by our beloved Prophet
Muhammad (salawatullahi alayhi). The Major Shiite Traditions acknowledge Sufism
to a certain extent. Calling it the interior manifestation of Islam. A new theological
countermovement coming from Saudi and initiated by Muhammad Ibn Abdul
Wahab currently known as Salafism and wahabbism by their detractors, argue it is
one of the different manifestations of Kufr.

One would then argue, in a Philippine Context, if Sufism is indeed a

manifestation of Islam, why is it not being widely known or why is there
information or publicity against it? Perhaps understanding the underlying
historical context would allow us to understand why we do not hear it.

The Philippines actually became Muslim by “Islam by Pressence”. Islam was

a way of life for the Sharifite (Tassawuff) groups and Kiysaniyyah (Shia) groups
that eventually got intermarried with the local rajahships. This in itself eventually
became the manifestation of homegrown Islam.

Antropologically speaking Islam is able to embed itself both in the

consciousness of the people once it applies a process of indigenization, in which
local non-Muslim attitudes, mindssts and mindframes are “Islamized”, in short...
added an Islamic underpinning to it. This character has been manifested to both
the marriage practices of “Kawin” and Aquiqah practice of “Paggunting”, where an
indigenous element is present. This indigenization is not only present in the
Philippines but in other parts of South East Asia as well as other parts of the
Muslim world.

A new manifestation of Islam, dubbed by others as an extreme and

perverse ideology in the minds of fanatics specifically, Wahhabi/Salafi ideology
(although a minority fundamentalist religious cult fueled by petrodollars.) Yet
underlying, enabling and exacerbating this threat of religious extremism is a
global crisis of misunderstanding.

All too many Muslims fail to grasp Islam, which teaches one to be lenient
towards others and to understand their value systems, knowing that these are
tolerated by Islam as a religion. The essence of Islam is encapsulated in the words
of the Quran, "For you, your religion; for me, my religion." That is the essence of
tolerance. Religious fanatics--either purposely or out of ignorance--pervert Islam
into a dogma of intolerance, hatred and bloodshed. They justify their brutality with
slogans such as "Islam is above everything else." They seek to intimidate and
subdue anyone who does not share their extremist views, regardless of nationality
or religion. While a few are quick to shed blood themselves, countless millions of
others sympathize with their violent actions, or join in the complicity of silence.

This crisis of misunderstanding--of Islam by Muslims themselves--is

compounded by the failure of governments, people of other faiths, and the
majority of well-intentioned Muslims to resist, isolate and discredit this dangerous
ideology. The crisis thus afflicts Muslims and non-Muslims alike, with tragic
consequences. Failure to understand the true nature of Islam permits the
continued radicalization of Muslims world-wide, while blinding the rest of
humanity to a solution which hides in plain sight5.

Why is this ideology so influential? Other than the financing that

proseletizers of this creed, according to Sami Catovic, one of the Teachers at Al-
Madina Institute, “Salafi Doctrine is so empowering. You just let them memorize a
few verses and read a few books, they are told to go forward and teach. Imagine
the impact.” Although Traditional Islam hasn't made a direct head-on response to
this, there were actions to to mitigate the effects, but since Salafi doctrine has a
clearcut definition of them and us, and the definitive delineation that if you're not
with us or don't do what we do you're considered non-Muslim, such a
consciousness is seen dangerous.

Considering the bloodshed that began with Abdulwahab when he teamed up

with the Saud House and started removing traditionalists from Hijaz and
embedding his version of Islam despite opposition from members of his own
family who were acknowledged scholars of Ahlu Sunnah wa Jama'ah.

So, one of the dangers with conversion is conversion is an extremely

powerful experience. And Gandhi once noted about Mohammed (inaudible), an
Englishman who became Muslim, he said he was that rare breed of man who was
capable of adopting a new religion without becoming a fanatic. So unfortunately
it’s quite common for people who have strong conversion experiences to enter
with a lot of zeal. And because of that, they’re susceptible at that period in their
life to whatever ideas they happen to be exposed to at the time, believing them to

5 Wahid, Abdurahman;Right Islam vs. Wrong Islam , “Muslims and non-Muslims must unite to
defeat the Wahhabi ideology.”Friday, December 30, 2005 12:01 a.m. EST
http://www.libforall.org/news-WSJ-right-islam-vs.-wrong-islam.html
be the sound ideas or principles of this new adopted religion6.

And the other very serious concern is in the prison population, because
many of the people that adopt Islam within the prisons are coming from
dysfunctional homes and already had criminal tendencies, and if they come into
Islam and are exposed to an extreme form of Islam, which is very, very possible,
[the German convert to Islam] being a good example of that, then I think it’s
potentially extremely dangerous. So if we don’t have really well trained scholars
in the United States that can argue a sound orthodox and moderate Islam that
preaches coexistence and also is able to be adaptive to the needs of modern
society. I think that if we don’t do that, it’s going to really be a major problem, I
think, for a burgeoning population in the West. So I’ll leave it at that. 7

We need to recognize the fact that Imams now must be more fluent with
the discourse in the West and of modernization, with the very specific conditions
that Muslims find themselves Today whether in the secular West or somewhere in
a third world country. Because we are in need of exceptional scholars other than
having experiences and backgrounds of both the East and the West but also of
recognizing that we do have unique conditions.

In the Philippines there is a crisis of Islamic scholarship. Although generally

Islam is not huge monolithic monotonic ideological structure but a collage of
interwoven cultural traditions interwoven with Islam as it is seen in the localities.

6 Yusuf, Sheik Hamza, Interviewed Transcript; "Religion and Foreign Policy Conference
Call with Hamza Yusuf .Islamic Education in America. "September 11, 2007.Council on
Foreign Relations.

http://www.cfr.org/publication/14289/religion_and_foreign_policy_conference_call_with
_hamza_yusuf.html?breadcrumb=%2Fbios%2Fbio%3Fid%3D25%26page%3D2
7 Ibid..
Although indigenization of Islam has occurred due to the more than four centuries
here, there appears to be a strong undercurrent towards forcing the adoption of
an alien face of Islam that has made a rather significant imprint by a vocal
minority.

Among the influx of scholars that have arrived here, there are those who
come from India who graduate in what are called Darul Uloom that are based on
the Indian model from Deoband that do provide a certain level of scholarship.

But the scholarship tends to be very provincial and limited in its scope, and
certainly is unable in many ways to address a lot of the very sophisticated
problems that our community is facing as a minority community and a religious
community. There are those that come from the local madrassahs that provide a
semblance of theological education but highly influenced by who is financing the
madrassah.

We also have graduates from Libya, Syria, Iran, Pakistan and Saudi Arabia
who by varying degrees differ not only in the methods of academic discipline, but
also try to imprint a version of Islam that is synonymous with where they were
trained. What we are unaware that these Ulama has become political vehicles for
Middle Eastern politics or something like that, which it often has been made into,
unfortunately, because of theological graduates bringing Middle Eastern baggage
and other baggage.

Traditionally Ulama in the Philippines come from Malaysia and Indonesia

from Pesantren and Traditional Madrrasah institutions that have the same level of
indigenization as the Filipino Muslims. It was in the 1960's when the process of de-
indigenization occurred as a result of the Muslim Filipinos sending their children
abroad for higher theological studies as well as those who come from the Middle
East after finishing overseas work contracts carrying with them Arab Islam. As a
result you see a collage of Islam in the Philippines, each particular mould seeking
to imprint its own image.

The paradigm of fundamentalism and radicalism

Islamic Fundamentalism

Singapore's religious rehabilitation group (RRG) defines the paradigm of

Islamic fundamentalism as the belief in the accuracy and literal interpretation of
the Noble Quran. It is an unembellished or plain acceptance of the Islamic creed
without question or analysis.

This can be seen in several angles; first, there are those fundamentalists
who view modernity as the enemy of the representation of evil and opposes
modernity as expressed in contemporary western morals and social values. These
people in one way or another look into the golden age of Islam, imagining its
pristine purity and wishes to return to it. There is a conflict and confluence of
ideas in this angle: there are those who view it within the light of their own
understanding and interpretation of how the pristine form of Islam is. Second,
there are those who literally “go back to the beduin traditions of pre-Islamic
Arabia and seek to acculturate “bedouin culture and traditions” to be part of the
original pristine Islamic milieu that is Islam.

Seyyed Hossein Nasr in one of his interviews, said that modernity is the
value system wherein the values is placed more in the individual need rather than
on society. And as our society becomes more involved in individualistic tendencies
and orientations, this is where Islamic fundamentalism is primarily against.
Because it values the society as a whole as important to the development of man
and most vice versa.
 That in the words of one khatib,he says, “the purpose of society is to make
man more mutaqqi and not man's role is to make society “mutaqqi”.

One must understand that all Muslims are fundamentalists but not all are
extremists. Ahtough, the RRG of Singapore may use such a definition from a
Western Perspective, one must understand that the context of the word
fundamentalism focuses on the nature that Muslims who all basically share the
same fundamental beliefs and practices.

Islamic radicalism and extremism

Several scholars view Muslims in Southeast Asia as being more moderate

than their counterparts elsewhere in the world. More than any other Muslim
community in the world, southeast asian muslims are known to be extraordinarily
moderate in the practice of their religion and are tolerant of other people's
religions.

Scholars agree that certain conditions impel southeast asia's moderates to turn
radicals. Among the factors noted include:

1. Reaction to the resultant tension between tradition and modernity. As earlier

mentioned, Islamism is a reaction of Muslims stemming from their inability
to cope with Westernization.

2. Infusion of Saudi money and ideology into Southeast Asia through

Mohamad Jamal Khlifa, Osama bin laden's brother in law

3. Consequences of the Afghan War,

4.Organized networks and sophisticated recruitment techniques of radicals

Particular to the Philippines, meanwhile, include: Muslims' frustration over

the continued non-resolution to the Bangsamoro problem (Lingga,2006); Anti-
Muslim bias, which has resulted to lesser opportunities for Muslims (UNDP,2005);
the presence of radical Muslims in Mindanao such as the members of the JI;
government deep penetration agents who may unwittingly introduce militant
ideas and methods to gain confidence of sources; and, CPP/NPA/NDF recruitment
of muslims to be guerillas of the moro resistance and liberation organization.

Meanwhile, Rohan Gunaratna notes that the early years of the JI, in an effort
to seek the additional funding for their cause, JI leaders Abdullah Sungkar and Abu
Bakr Ba'asyir went to saudi arabia to establish contact with the mujahidin in
Afghanistan. This opened the gateway for JI members to be politicized and
radicalized – JI members were trained militarily and exposed to armed jihad
(Gunaratna,2005)

According to Rabasa, there are several indicators of Islamic radicalism

(Rabasa,2006).

1. A willingness to use or justify violence to attain religious and objectives;

2. Insistence in a form of government, such as an Islamic state or other non-

sectarian form;

3. Preference for a political or legal orientation, such as the strict application

of Islamic law; and,

4. A partiality against the rights of women and religious minorities, w/c

would involve denying them of political rights. Education and advancement,
or their basic freedom to worship.

Although radical groups – compared to extremist – may not advocate

violence, they nonetheless exhibit a lower tolerance for the beliefs of other people
or cultures, which may in turn lower their reluctance to acquiesce or take part in
the use of violence for Islamist ends (Rabasa, 2006).

Radicalism and violent extremism are related but distinct phenomena. There
are stages of radicalization that do not incorporate violence but have the potential
to lead individuals to violence (Rabasa, 2006).

The IPI view indicates a lesser threshold. It notes that being “radical” is the
mere possession of extremist views and a willingness to use violence in the
pursuit of extremist, racist, or political objectives. They are those who advocate or
use violence against the will of the larger social body or enforce the will on a
social body (RRG, 2008).

Furthermore, a religious radical is an extreme, violent version of a religious

fundamentalist. Instead of opting for gradual change, a radical prefers a “more
revolutionary strategy” for changing society in the shortest time possible
(Ramakrishna, 2006).

Terrorism

There is much debate on terrorism and when a violent act consist one.
Terrorism is defined in a lot of ways by different people, varying mostly from a
cultural perspective. However, there are two common points among the
definitions. These are the causing of widespread or extraordinary fear among the
populace and the objective of coercion of the government to give in to the
terrorist group's demands (Republic Act 9372 s. 2007).
 Terrorism is the use or threatened use of violence for the purpose of
inducing extreme fear. Under this definition, terrorism is a tactic or strategy-- one
that can be employed by a state, as well as by a sub-state, a non-state, or
individual actors. This second subset terrorism activity is what governments and
readers ordinarily have in mind when referring to terrorism. It excludes state
supported terrorism, which is addressed by the laws of war, international
condemnation of repression, and other activities outside what is usually
considered to be counter-terrorism (Davis, et.al., 2009).

Usual characteristics of that type include (Hoffman, 1998)

1. The existence of a terrorist organization with a chain of command or cell

structure;

2. Actual or imminent threats or acts of violence against noncombatants;

3. Intended repercussions beyond immediate targets, and,

4. The pursuit of political goals.

Necessary requisites for the act of terrorism include the sowing of

uncontrollable fear for the purpose of achieving political purpose (RA 9273 s.
2007).

Radicalization

Radicalization is the process of becoming a radical. It often occurs when

ideology is powerful enough to motivate and propel ordinary human beings into
action. Jihadi ideologues and group leaders craft their ideology by interpreting,
reinterpreting or misinterpreting religion and politics (Gunaranta, 2005).
 Radicalization is the process of wanting to engage in a terrorist act (Barret
and Bokhain, 2002), which is spurred by:

1. Group socialization processes which assure individuals that their chosen path is
correct, build up socially-motivated courage, and help to dehumanize selected
targets.

2. Expected rewards for participation in terrorism which does not only delve on
heavenly gains of martyrdom, but also friendships and camaraderie solidified in
the terror cell or organization, the social status derived from membership and
financial rewards.

Religious rewards include forgiveness of the martyr's sins, access to heaven

and communion with God, the ability to guarantee access to paradise for 70
relatives or friends, and the belief that the martyr will be greeted in heaven to
enjoy the sexual pleasure of 72 virgins (Soibelman, 2004).

Participation in terrorist activity is also considered a fulfillment of a divine

mandate. Membership in the JI, that called for self-sacrifice was seen as a “'no
fuss' path to heaven”' as JI members believe that they could not be involved in
any wrong as their leaders were noted to be quoting religious texts before any
activity (Gunaranta, 2005).

Financial rewards are seen as the main recruitment incentive for the ASG,
where money from kidnappings has led to an increase in the number of recruits,
who “spanned the spectrum from out of work farmers to opportunistic youths
looking to make 'a fast buck'' (Cragin et al., 2006).

3. A felt need to respond to grievances based on a strong sense of necessity

which is a perceived duty to defend people or achieve revenge for either personal
or collective wrong. Such need to respond stems from perceived alienation and
discrimination, which may be social, economic or political in nature.

In the Philippines, individuals predisposition to radicalism is attributed to

discrimination factors with purported historical basis, such as economic neglect by
the Filipino government, dispossession of ancestral Muslim lands by Christians,
and attempts to forcibly assimilate Muslim communities into wider Catholic
Philippine polity (Cragin et al., 2006)

4. A passion for change which might be religious (as in establishing an Islamic

caliphate) or political 9as in revolution against repression).

According to a process framework of the New York City Police Department,

individual or personal radicalization is a gradual process that goes through four
phases:

1. Pre-radicalization, which consists of the individual's personal situation

before exposure to, and adaptation of the jihadi-Salafi Islam. Many leaders
of radical groups began as unremarkable individuals. ASG leader Abdurajak
Janjalani studied in a conservative Catholic school; Erstwhile MILF leader
Ustadz Hashim Salamat attended public schools; RSM Leader Hilarion
“Ahmad” Santos was an Ilocanno from Pangasinan (Saez interview, 26 June
2009).
2. Self-identification is the phase where individuals, influenced by both
internal and external factors, begin to explore Salafi Islam, and gradually
veer away from their old identity, associate with like-minded
individuals/groups whose ideology they adopt as their own. There are many
factors that facilitate this stage. In addition to the personal expression of
faith are other factors. For Janjalani, it was a sense of alienation because of
his perception that the government was not doing anything to respond to
the Muslim's request for self-determination. For Salamat, his
conservativeness was highlighted in his exposure to Islamic culture and
civilization during his education in Mecca. On the part of Santos, his spiritual
awakening was a catalyst (Saez interview, 26 June 2006). Santos studied
several religions but was drawn to Islam above all because of the beautiful
passages in the Noble Qur'an 9Santos interview, 9 June 209).

3. Indoctrination is the phase where belief are enriched, where a person

adopts jihadi-Salafi ideology and is convinced that the conditions exist to
justify any action required to support and further the cause. It is actually a
“turning point” when one becomes more alienated from his previous life and
enters the “new life”. Janjalani was expected to wahabbism as he
established ties with other mujahideen as he established ties with other
mujahideen in the Middle East and Pakistan. For Salamat, it was his
education at the Al-Azhar University in Cairo, Egypt. Meanwhile, Santos'
exposure to Islamists in Qur'anic centers in Saudi Arabia where he worked
as an overseas Filipino worker (OFW) ensured that he imbibed the Salafi
brand of Islam ( Saez interview, 26 June 2009).

4. Jihadization is the phase where members of a cluster accept their individual

duty to participate in jihad and self-discipline and self-designate themselves
as mujahideen. It is usually at this stage where personalities, who started
remarkably organize organizations through which their avowed adherence
to jihad would be realized. Thus, the establishment of the ASG, MILF, and
the RSM .

` Professor Sarlito Sarwono of the Center of Psychological Research,

University of Indonesia motes of a similar process. In this paper titled,
“Analysis of Indonesian Terrorists”, Professor Sarwono says hat
radicalization in wahabi-salafi Islamic pesantrens in Indonesia starts with a
radical teacher spotting potential mujahideen from among students who
want only to learn normal Arabic schooling. These potential mujahideen are
then separated from other students to attend more advanced classes.
1. Orientation Phase which normally takes around six months.
During this phase , the students or “talib” are briefed on the
general precepts. There is much affirmation at this stage as the
student is constantly assured that he is on the apth of
becoming a full-pledged “mumin” (faithful believer) and that his
continuance in the training will make him a hero or a leader.
2. The experience Phase during which the student is exposed to a
series of lessons on why the world is “kuffar” ( unbeliever) and
why it has turned its back on the beauty of Islam . This
normally takes another six months.
3. The Indoctrination Phase which is characterized by subtle
brainwashing and indoctrination. Islamic theory is merged with
ideology. Students are eventually required to write articles and
make stirring speeches on why the world is wrong in
abandoning the truth.
4. The Execution Phase which is post – orientation phase. After
orientation and indoctrination, this students are generally put in
a pre-operative trip or mission test where they implement what
they have learned in their previous training or phases. This is
where they are on mission test where they sometime link up
with a terror group.
 The duration for radicalization is not definite and may vary from person to
person. In 2008, the British MI-5 estimated that it took roughly 18 months on
average for an individual to become radicalized enough to conduct an attack.

Meanwhile, the process from radicalization to violence also happens by

stages, some triggering a change beyond which there may be less chance of
return, or for some, no return at all. This is the precisely the reason why some
counter-terrorists experts firmly view that once a radicalized individual crosses
into violence, there is no point in trying to rehabilitate him and that any
appearance of rehabilitation will be deceitful and short-lived, i.e. De-radicalization
or even disengagement are of no moment (Barrett and Bokhari, 2005).

De-radicalization is a process that leads an individual (or group) to change

his attitudes about violence – specifically bout the appropriateness of violence
against civilians. It can be ideological which results from a change in beliefs,
behavioral which emphasizes changes in actions , or organizational which is a
group level phenomenon that, if successful, would move the entire group away
from terrorism (Noricks,2009). It may be voluntary (Personal decision) or
involuntary (demobilization, incarceration or death)

De-radicalization or the process of eliminating radicalism may be a long

drawn process that would result into the willingness of key participants to turn
state witness against his group, reduction in the number of potential recruits
through media campaigns featuring former members, and reduction in size of
violent groups through defections, among others.

Since ideology can be powerful enough to motivate and impel men to act,
to counter the threat posed by a group, its operational infrastructure must be
dismantled and its conceptual infrastructure eroded (Gunaratna, 2005).

De-radicalization vs Disengagement
 These are two aspects of de-radicalization: de-radicalization proper and
disengagement. Although used interchangeably, the IPI notes that de-
radicalization and disengagement are distinct social and psychological processes.

De-radicalization implies a cognitive shift, or a fundamental change in

understanding, while disengagement refers to a behavioral change, which
connotes the relinquishment of violence.. it means leaving a group or changing
one's role within it. De-radicalization is group-directed, while disengagement is
more person-oriented.

In both cases, however, a cognitive opening must arise where a

member/members become receptive to alternative views.

There is a need to clarify the distinction between de-radicalization

(attitudinal modification) and disengagement (behavioral modification). From
most counter terrorism perspectives, disengagement, is more important than de-
radicalization, since the former can occur without the latter (Horgan, 2008).

Push and Pull factors (Garfinkel, 2007)

There are certain push and pull factors that impact on the ability of a
person to de-radicalize.
Push factors are “negative circumstances or social forces that make
continued membership in an organization unattractive.” These include criminal
prosecution, parental or social disapproval, counter-violence from oppositional
groups, loss of faith in ideology or politics of group, discomfort with group's violent
activities, disillusionment with group's leadership, loss of confidence, status or
position in group, ejection from the group, exhausted from tension and
uncertainty as a member of a targeted group, or increased activity in a
“competing role,” for example, political activity that displaces the violent role.
 On the other hand, pull factors are “opportunities or social forces that
attract an individual to a more promising alternative.” These might include desire
for a normal life, desire to establish a family and take on parental and spousal
roles, other changing priorities, new employment or educational opportunities
that could be undermined if group membership were known, new role model or
social group or newer, more compelling ideology or belief structure.

The effect of push factors can be difficult to determine in advance (Bjorgo,

2006). Negative sanctions may lead more recent members to leave the group, but
those same sanctions could also increase members' solidarity within the group as
the group bonds together to meet outside threat. The latter is particularly at risk
when a negative sanctions are not matched with positive incentives.

De-radicalization vs Counter-radicalization

The CTITF defines de-radicalization as consisting of “programs that are

generally directed against individuals who have become radical with the aim of
reintegrating them into society or at least dissuading them from violence.

It further defines counter-radicalization as referring to “policies and

programs aimed at addressing some of the conditions that may propel some
individuals down the path of terrorism. It is used broadly to refer a package of
social, political, legal, educational and economic programs specifically designed to
deter disaffected (and possibly already radicalized) individuals from crossing the
line and becoming terrorists.”

Jihad

Probably among the most interpreted terms/concepts is that of jihad.

However, it is also probably the most misinterpreted.
 We will refrain from citing the verses in the Noble Qur'an relevant to jihad.
However, to provide some basis for discussion, the following definitions are
presented:

In Imam Raghib Al-Asfahani's Dictionary of the Qur'an, jihad means a

“struggle against a clear invading enemy, or against Satan by rejecting evil
desires, temptations and lust, or against nafs (Oneself) which is regarded as the
higher jihad.”

Singapore's RRG defines jihad as the “utmost striving to achieve a desired

goal or to abstain from despicable acts” (Mohamed, 2008). It further says that
Islamic law opposes all uses of force except in the case of war or punishment of
criminals in accordance with the Shari'a. Even in war, the infliction of violence on
women and children is forbidden as is the use of force against civilians.

To al Qaeda followers, jihad is justifiable in order to defend the dignity and

pride of the nation, a noble duty which had been neglected by the Muslim leaders.
Moreover, complementary to jihad is the belief in martyrdom. Al Qaeda's
operatives firmly believe that Allah guides and rewards those who sacrifice
themselves for a noble cause. A noble death thorough martyrdom has been firmly
embedded in their collective psyche. They view their acts as a sacrifice which is
needed in order to achieve the goal of establishing the religion of Allah on earth.
Their struggle yields one of the two things: victory or martyrdom (Gunaratna,
2005).

The word jihad literally means to struggle. It is often translated in English as

the “holy war”, but that is not the the Arabic meaning. For war in arabic is harb,
and fighting in qital (Emerick, 2002).

There are two kinds of jihad: the lesser jihad (against evil) and the greater
jihad (conquering one's self).
 Although there are other multiple and conflicting meaning to jihad, it is
governed by certain conditions: it cannot be pre-emptive, it must be declared by a
state or religious body, and it must not target civilians (Esposito and Mogahed,
2007; Emerick, 2002).

And on a humane level, it is but correct to straighten the notion that once
information gathering ends, each arrested person's usefulness likewise comes to
an end.

Leaving a terrorist group may take a long time. And that disengagement
may occur for the following reasons:

1. Personal trauma that includes combat experience or the loss of a

friend or colleague due to violent ideologies or hatred;
2. Disillusionment with the group's leadership;
3. Stress due to staying with the group of conforming to their discreet
ways;
4. Desire for a normal civilian life;
5. Competing social relationships or pressure by family or friends.

Former JI leader Abbas spoke of the first two reasons cited above (Abbas,
2006). At least two chapters of his book delve on what he called “falsehoods” and
“heresies” perpetrated by Imam Samudra, who has been identified as the field
commander of the Bali bombings in 2002 (Resa, 2003). Abbas had expressed
remorse when he saw photographs of the Bali bombings, showing innocent
civilians among the victims. Abbas said that jihad, as Islam provides, does not
include causing harm, injury or death to civilians, but only on armed combatants
(Abbas, 2006).

The book “Who speaks for Islam?”, written by John L. Esposito and Dalia
Mogahed, presents and discusses the results of the multi-year poll of the Muslim
World conducted by The Gallup Global Institute from 2001 to 2007. The poll
interviewed residents of more than 35 nations which are predominantly Muslim or
have a dominant Muslim population (Esposito and Mogahed, 2007).

The poll intended to obtain the views of what the book calls the silent
majority - the moderates – of Muslims worldwide on a variety of themes that
includes among others, “What makes a radical?”, “Is there a clash of cultures; i.e.
the West versus the Muslim world?”

Two reasons why terrorist groups usually end. These are: a group decision to
adopt non violent tactics and join the political process through amnesty, peace
talks or allowing leaders to seek public office; or, though the neutralization of key
members of the group. The study further notes ways in which terrorist groups
end: though police or military functions, splintering (competition with other
terrorist groups; combining with others), politics (running for an elective office)
and victory.

The study of Dr. Kumar Ramakrishna discusses the issues clearly in his paper
presented at the regional conference on radicalization of Muslim southeast Asia
organized by the Konrad Adenauer Stiftung and Philippine Council for Islam and
Democracy (PCID) held in 2006, he classified manifestations of islam in southeast
asia into six types:

*Nominal Muslims,who are essentially non practicing muslims who do not take
their faith seriously. they eat pork without any difficulty, or may not fast during
the holy month of Ramadan. (Rasul,2005)

*Liberal Muslims, who consider islam as important to their identity, but consider it
private affair w/c should not be imposed on others.

*Salafi muslims, whose faith is the primary determinant of all aspects og their
identity. for the Salafi muslims, islam must be guarded and protected.

*Islamists, who articulate a political agenda for restructuring society. They

maintain a binary world view of Darul islam (abode of peace) versus Darul Harb
(Abode of war). not necessarily violent, they arereligious fundamentalists who
lobby for an islamic state and for shariah to be applied to all. Many security
analysts fear that the islamists are the beginnings of radical islam.

*National radical muslims believe that the establishment of an islamic state and
the defense of muslim interests cn only be achieved through armed struggle or
violence.

*Global radical muslims are radical islamists who maintain that local souteast
asian jihadists should be part of the AI Qaeda struggle against the International
Crusade conspiracy led by the US, Israel, and their allies. The ASG is included in
thia group.

Islamism

Former national security adviser Jose T. Almonte notes that islamism is more an
effect that a cause. it is an expression of a muslim world rebellion over it's
inability to keep pace with modernization.Almonte aptly notes islamism as a
rebellion of the excluded. For his part, Dr. Ramakrishna notes that a necessary
requisite of islamism in its objective to transform society is the capture of state
power.

Meanwhile, islamists groups are those that endorse the re-establishment of a

caliphate, w/c would be governed by Shariah (Islamic law), including those who
support achieving this end state through the political process. Islamist groups do
not include all religious and practicing muslims in this category, as most do not
sign on to this broader vision and do not believe political systems and
governments need to be run according to these principles.

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