Citation: 2016 SKPC 121

Date:
September 20, 2016
File:
449 [2015]
Location:
Saskatoon
_____________________________________________________________________________
Between:

Sheila Tataquason
- and Saskatoon Board of Police Commissioners, James Phillip Sean Bonynge, J. Jeffrey Broadbent,
and Joel Lalonde

Heath Smith
Anna Singer

For the Plaintiff

For the Defendants

_____________________________________________________________________________
JUDGMENT
V.L. MONAR ENWEANI, J
_____________________________________________________________________________
Introduction

[1]

The Plaintiff, Sheila Tataquason (the Plaintiff) is a resident of the City of Saskatoon. The

Defendants, Constables James Phillip Sean Bonynge, J. Jeffrey Broadbent, and Joel Lalonde (the
Individual Defendants) are members of the Saskatoon Police Service. The Defendant, Saskatoon
Board of Police Commissioners (the Board) is the entity responsible for the delivery of policing
services within the City of Saskatoon.
[2]

On August 16, 2013, at approximately 3:00 a.m., the Individual Defendants responded to a

call from dispatch concerning a robbery with a knife at 20th Street and Avenue H in Saskatoon. The
Plaintiff lived at a home near the location of the robbery. She was sitting outside in her backyard

2016 SKPC 121 (CanLII)

IN THE PROVINCIAL COURT OF SASKATCHEWAN

CIVIL DIVISION

with a friend, when police service dog Diego entered the yard, and bit her. The Plaintiff brings this
action against the Defendants seeking damages for personal injuries.

[3]

The Plaintiff testified that on August 16, 2013, at approximately 2:00 a.m., she and her friend,

Joshua Desnomie, walked from the Lighthouse to her home at 310 Avenue H South. As they were
sitting outside in her backyard, she saw a dog, and then was bitten on the side of her stomach. She
was on a chair, and the dog dragged her down. She was in pain and asked the police officer to get
the dog off her. She said the police officer waited for assistance to come before he released the dog.
[4]

The Plaintiff was taken by ambulance to hospital and was seen by a doctor. The dog bite

required three stitches. From the hospital, the Plaintiff was taken to the police station. She testified
that she was in police custody for six and a half hours before being released. She had no involvement
in the robbery.
[5]

With respect to her injuries, the Plaintiff had an ultrasound and was prescribed medication

for pain. In total, she attended at the doctor on four occasions. She testified that she experienced
pain inside her stomach, and that she has nerve damage. She missed five days of work. Since the
incident, she has suffered panic attacks, stress, and sleepless nights trying to get over what happened
to her. She is now scared of dogs and is afraid to walk down the street alone.
[6]

Joshua Desnomie was called as a witness on behalf of the Plaintiff. Mr. Desnomie testified

that he heard a noise in the bushes and then a dog jumped on the Plaintiffs back. She was screaming
and crying. He tried to get the dog off her by opening its mouth. He said he got punched in the side
of the head and got into a tussle with an individual who later identified himself as a police officer.
Joshua asked the police officer to get the dog off the Plaintiff. He testified that the officer was on top
of him, and that he did not take the dog off the Plaintiff until other police officers arrived. He said
he was arrested and taken to jail. He too was later released as he had no involvement in the robbery.
[7]

Constable Joel Lalonde testified that he has been a constable with the Saskatoon Police

Service since January, 2003. He is currently a canine handler, having completed the certification
process to become a canine officer in 2008. He testified that police dogs undergo a four month

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2016 SKPC 121 (CanLII)

Evidence

period of intense training before they are validated for service. At the time of the incident, he was
certified with police dog Diego.
[8]

Constable Lalonde testified that he was on duty on August 16, 2013 when he got a call from

resources at the time and he was the only car to respond. He met the complainant at the Fas Gas
parking lot and took a description of the suspects. He was told that the suspects, a male wearing
darker clothing and a female wearing lighter clothing, had fled into the lane.
[9]

Constable Lalonde stated that almost ten minutes had passed since the robbery, and he was

approaching the critical time for having success with tracking. Since it would be several minutes
before any other officers arrived, he pulled into the lane and harnessed Diego. Diego located an
odor and pursued south down the lane, past three or four houses. Diego pulled through a fence, along
a garage, and rounded a corner when Constable Lalonde felt a lunge on the line. Constable Lalonde
could hear yelling and knew someone had been bitten. The yard was dark and he took out his
flashlight while continuing to hold the leash. Constable Lalonde testified that Mr. Desnomie was
frantic and was pulling at Diego. Constable Lalonde got between Mr. Desnomie and Diego, ordered
Diego to let go with the command oust, and yelled at Mr. Desnomie to lay on the ground. Once
he had compliance, he called in to say he had the suspects.
[10]

Constable Lalonde testified that police dogs are used to track on serious offences, and that

there is a high probability of harm at the end of a track for a police officer. Diego was pursuing an
odor, and the source of the odor was in the Plaintiffs yard. Constable Lalonde confirmed that police
dogs are trained to bite on locating the source of the odor, and that this often is the end result of a
track, except in circumstances where an officer can see the source of the odor first, or gain
compliance from the suspect. Unfortunately, the Plaintiff was out of sight until Diego located the
odor.
[11]

Constable Lalonde testified that at the time of the incident he thought the Plaintiff and Mr.

Desnomie were his suspects and that one of them possibly had a knife. He estimated that Diego was
engaged on the Plaintiff for approximately five to ten seconds.
[12]

On cross-examination, Constable Lalonde acknowledged that there was incentive for him to
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2016 SKPC 121 (CanLII)

dispatch regarding a robbery with a knife at Avenue H and 20th Street. There were limited police

act quickly in order for there to be a greater chance of success in tracking the suspects. When it was
suggested to him that the complainant was intoxicated and provided only a vague description of the
suspects, Constable Lalonde said that many of the complainants he deals with are intoxicated, and

dogs used by the Saskatoon Police Service are trained in the bite and hold technique. In ideal
circumstances, a canine officer would identify a suspect, communicate with them, and gain
compliance before a police dog engages.
[13]

Constable James Phillip Sean Bonynge testified. He was working on August 16, 2013 and

responded to a call from dispatch regarding a robbery. The Canine Unit was the first to respond. He
and his partner, Constable Broadbent, arrived soon afterwards. Constable Bonynge testified that
when he arrived in the yard, the Plaintiff and Mr. Desnomie were near the patio, and Mr. Desnomie
was on the ground. Mr. Desnomie was already in handcuffs. He did not recall where police dog
Diego was. It was dark in the yard and he needed to use his flashlight. He placed Mr. Desnomie
under arrest and put him in the patrol car.
[14]

Constable J. Jeffrey Broadbent testified that he was on duty on August 16, 2013 when he

responded to a call regarding a robbery with Constable Bonynge. Constable Broadbent spoke with
the complainant at the Fas Gas station on 20th Street, and took a witness statement from him. On
cross-examination, he acknowledged that it appeared the complainant had been drinking, and may
have had some intellectual limitations. However, he did not feel that the complainant was being
dishonest, or misleading the police. The robbery suspects were described as an aboriginal male
wearing dark clothing and a female wearing lighter clothing in their 20s. He acknowledged that the
Plaintiff appeared to be in her 40s. He said that he and his fellow officers thought they had the right
individuals, as they were found close to the incident, the dog tracked them, and their clothes loosely
matched the description given.
Issues
1.

Are the Individual Defendants liable to the Plaintiff

for damages for personal injuries?

2.

Is the Board liable to the Plaintiff for damages for personal injuries?
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2016 SKPC 121 (CanLII)

this would not have changed his actions. The complainant was distraught. He confirmed that police

Analysis

[15]

Are the Individual Defendants liable to the Plaintiff for

damages for personal injuries?

The Plaintiff claims damages from the Individual Defendants for negligence, and for the torts

of assault, battery and trespass. The Plaintiff says that the Individual Defendants acted unreasonably
and unlawfully, with the conduct of Constable Lalonde beginning to resemble gross negligence. In
these circumstances, the Plaintiff says that the defence of good faith under s.10(3) of The Police Act,
1990 S.S. 1990-91, c. P-15.01 (The Police Act) does not apply to the Individual Defendants.
[16]

The Individual Defendants allege that they acted in good faith in the performance of their

duties, that their actions were reasonable in the circumstances, and that no more force than necessary
was applied. The Individual Defendants assert that they are protected from liability by both s. 10(3)
of The Police Act and s. 25 of the Criminal Code.
[17]

The determination of liability in this matter turns on s. 10 of The Police Act. The Police Act

addresses the liability of police officers in the execution of their duties and reads as follows:

10(3) No action lies or shall be instituted against a member or a

civilian member where the member or civilian member is acting
pursuant to the authority of this Act, the regulations or an order made
pursuant to this Act, or pursuant to any other Act, an Act of the
Parliament of Canada, the common law, a regulation or a bylaw, for
any loss or damage suffered by any person by reason of anything in
good faith done, caused, permitted or authorized to be done, attempted
to be done or omitted to be done, by any of them, pursuant to or in the
exercise or supposed exercise of any power conferred by this Act or
the regulations, or any other Act, an Act of the Parliament of Canada,
the common law, a regulation or a bylaw, or in the carrying out or
supposed carrying out of any order made or duty imposed pursuant to
this Act or the regulations, or any other Act, an Act of the Parliament
of Canada, the common law, a regulation or a bylaw

[18]

Section 10 of The Police Act is a good faith immunity clause. Recently, in Lemisko v

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2016 SKPC 121 (CanLII)

1.

[48] Statute based good faith immunity defences are not uncommon,
particularly relating to civic employees such as police officers,
paramedics, firefighters, court officers and municipal workers to name
a few. The intention in all cases is to provide legal protection to such
agencies and its servants when carrying out duties in an honest
fashion within the scope of their employment duties.
[19]

The Individual Defendants are all members of the Saskatoon Police Service. Section 36 of

The Police Act provides that a member of a police service has, among other things, the power and
responsibility to perform all duties that are assigned to constables in relation to the preservation of
peace, the prevention of crime and offences against the laws in force in the municipality, and the
apprehension of criminals, offenders and others who may lawfully be taken into custody.
[20]

The concept of good faith and police liability was considered by the Saskatchewan Court of

Appeal in Lang v Burch and Carlson, 1982 CanLII 2648 (SKCA) [Lang], a case involving a civil
action for damages for wrongful imprisonment against two police officers. The Court of Appeal
considered the good faith immunity clause in s. 7 of the The Summary Offences Procedure Act which
read as follows:
7. No action lies against a peace officer or other person for anything
done in good faith with respect to the apprehension, custody or
release of a person pursuant to s. 5.
[21]

At paragraph 29 of Lang, Cameron J.A. referred to the following passage from the decision

of the Supreme Court of Canada in Chaput v Romain, [1955] SCR 834, as a correct statement of the
law in Canada regarding legislative protection of public officers acting in good faith in the execution
of their duties:
What is required in order to bring a defendant within the terms of a
statute as this is a bona fide belief in the existence of a state of facts
which, had they existed, would have justified him in acting as he did.
...
The contrast is with an act of such nature that it is wholly wide of any
statutory or public duty, i.e. wholly unauthorized and where there
exists no colour of supposing that it could have been an authorized
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2016 SKPC 121 (CanLII)

Saskatchewan Watershed Authority, 2016 SKPC 107, Jackson J. explained as follows:

one. In such a case, there can be no question of good faith or an

honest motive.

[22]

In Lang, the Court of Appeal agreed with the trial judge that the actions of the police officers

no assistance, because the officers did not act on reasonable and probable grounds. However, that
did not end the matter. In particular, the Court of Appeal noted that even if the actions of the officers
were unlawful, they could still be immune from civil liability if the officers acted in good faith. The
Court of Appeal clarified that whether apprehension and detention is lawful, and whether it is made
in good faith, are two separate issues. Further, the presence or absence of good faith is essentially
a subjective matter, concerning the state of mind of the actor. Cameron, J.A. held as follows:
[31] . . . Whether the apprehension and detention were lawful is one
question. Whether they were made in good faith is another. If the
answer to the first is positive, there is no need to address the second.
If not, if the actions complained of were unlawful, then the question
is: were they nevertheless done in good faith. And the basis for
determination of the two issues is different. The first - the legality of
the action taken - will depend on whether the facts apparent to the
policeman, at the time, were such as to warrant his opinion, that the
respondent was drunk. The second - the presence or absence of good
faith - turns on whether the policeman had a bona fide belief in facts,
which if true, would make his conduct lawful. The former is an
objective issue involving the determination of the nature and effect of
apparent facts - going to the existence of the power to act; the latter
is essentially a subjective matter, concerning the state of mind of the
actor - directed to whether he should be relieved from liability for his
actions. . . .
[23]

While the Court of Appeal in Lang found the trial judge had mixed these two questions, it

upheld his conclusion that the police officers were not acting in good faith, and therefore were not
shielded from civil liability.
[24]

The subjective test set out by the Court of Appeal in Lang was followed by Mr. Justice

Baynton in Nelson v Saskatchewan, 2003 SKQB 265 [Nelson]. Here, Baynton J. considered the
effect of a statutory good faith immunity clause in the context of a negligence action against
Saskatchewan Water Corporation. He reviewed the definition of good faith and also rejected the

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2016 SKPC 121 (CanLII)

were unlawful, and constituted false imprisonment. Therefore, s. 25 of the Criminal Code was of

[107]
I prefer the logical approach taken in the last two cases
cited. Section 74 most certainly does not limit liability for a
deliberate or grievous wrong. But if it does not limit liability for
simple negligence, it is difficult to envisage its purpose or to conceive
a set of circumstances to which it would apply. The distinction
between negligence and bad faith might be somewhat analogous to the
distinction between negligence and gross negligence, a distinction that
was maintained for several years in our tort law. In any event, I
conclude that s. 74 prevents a claim against Sask Water for negligence
provided it acted in good faith. By good faith I mean that it had a
bona fide belief in facts, which if true, would make its conduct (or
omission) lawful in the sense that it would be reasonable and thereby
not negligent.

[108]
I realize that the distinction between the duty to act
reasonably (i.e. not negligently) and the duty to act in good faith may
be one of semantics rather than substance. It may simply be the
difference between a subjective and an objective consideration of
whether ones conduct or omission was reasonable. Blacks Law
Dictionary, 5th ed. (St. Paul, Minn.: West Pub. Co., 1979), defines in
part the term good faith as follows:
Good faith is an intangible and abstract quality with
no technical meaning or statutory definition, and it
encompasses, among other things, an honest belief,
the absence of malice and the absence of design to
defraud or to seek an unconscionable advantage . . . .

[109]
The meaning of good faith is somewhat expanded in
the 7th edition as follows:
A state of mind consisting in (1) honesty in belief or
purpose, (2) faithfulness to ones duty or obligation,
(3) observance of reasonable commercial standards of
fair dealing in a given trade or business, or (4) absence
of intent to defraud or to seek unconscionable
advantage. . . .

[25]

More recently, in Enterprises Sibeca Inc. v Frelighsburg, [2004] 3 SCR 304 [Frelighsburg],

the Supreme Court of Canada considered the concept of good faith and stated at paragraph 26 that
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2016 SKPC 121 (CanLII)

argument that one could not be negligent and yet still act in good faith. He stated as follows:

. . . the concept of bad faith can encompass not only acts committed deliberately with intent to harm,
which corresponds to the classical concept of bad faith, but also acts that are so markedly
inconsistent with the relevant legislative context that a court cannot reasonably conclude that they

[26]

In addition to the cases cited above, the concept of good faith has also been considered by

Saskatchewan courts in the context of the liability of police officers for injuries arising out of the use
of police dogs.
[27]

In Schuler v Bergen, 2010 SKQB 153, the plaintiff commenced an action against the

defendant police officer for injuries sustained when he was bitten by a police dog while attempting
to escape apprehension. Acton, J. found that the officer was acting in good faith in the execution of
his duties at the relevant time. Accordingly, he concluded that s. 10 of The Police Act was a full and
complete defence to the plaintiffs claim. He held as follows:
[16] It is acknowledged that the defendant was acting as a police
officer in the exercise of his duties and authority. So long as the
defendant was acting in good faith, s. 10 of The Police Act, 1990,
would, in fact, be a full and complete defence.
[17] The case law in Saskatchewan, including Arnault v. Prince
Albert (City) Police Commissioners, 1995 CanLII 5629 (SK QB),
[1996] 4 W.W.R. 38 (Sask. Q.B.); Carr v. Forbes (1980), 1980
CanLII 2330 (SK CA), 7 Sask. R. 123 (Q.B.); Morrissette v.
Salagubas (1984), 1981 CanLII 2260 (SK QB), 32 Sask. R. 25; Lang
v. Burch (1983), 1982 CanLII 2648 (SK CA), 140 D.L.R. (3d) 325
(Sask. C.A.), all conclude that The Police Act, 1990, and its
predecessor, The Police Act, R.S.S. 1978, c. P-15, as repealed by The
Police Act, 1990, supra, is a complete defence if the officer was
acting in good faith. Lack of malice is a sign of good faith.

[28]

In Carr v Forbes, 1980 CanLII 2330 (SKQB), Johnson, C.J.Q.B. concluded that the defendant

officers acted in good faith and were not liable to the plaintiff for damages, for using a police dog to
apprehend to him. Here, the plaintiff was moving into his residence. The police were investigating
an incident involving three men who had abandoned a stolen car and were seen to disperse in the
same area. The police officers used a police dog to restrain and apprehend the plaintiff, and in the
process, his jacket was torn and he suffered some minor abrasions to his right forearm. After
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2016 SKPC 121 (CanLII)

were performed in good faith.

investigation, it was determined that the plaintiff was not one of the suspects and he was released.
Johnson, C.J.Q.B. found that s. 19 of The Police Act, R.S.S. 1978 c. P-15 applied and he held as

[4] There is not one shred of evidence to indicate that the defendants
did anything except in good faith and s. 19 of the Police Act, under
which it is acknowledged the defendants were acting, is in my
respectful opinion a complete answer to the plaintiffs claim.
Although the judgment of Corporal Fores in sending police dog
King to apprehend the plaintiff may be questioned (I do not do so)
nevertheless nothing indicates bad faith on his part or on the part of
the other two police officers who detained the plaintiff until it was
determined he was not involved in the incident under investigation in
that area.
[5] Police officers have difficult duties to perform and must often
make quick decisions but if the society in which we live is to maintain
its peace and tranquility, there will be occasions when innocent
citizens will be put to some trouble and inconvenience by the actions
of police officers acting in good faith. This is one of the small prices
that we must pay for our freedom. Jury service, likewise, imposes
inconvenience and loss of income on many who so serve but I feel
sure that the majority of our citizens would not for that reason seek to
have the jury system eliminated. There are, of course, occasions when
police officers exceed their authority and arrogate to themselves
powers and privileges which legally they do not have. In those
situations such officers must be deal with according to law.
[6] In the case at hand it was most unfortunate that Mr. Carr was
apprehended by police dog King and suffered inconvenience and
embarrassment. However, because of the statue the claim against the
defendants must be dismissed, but under the circumstances without
costs.
[29]

As the decisions in Schuler and Carr make clear, if the Individual Defendants were acting

in good faith in the course of their duties, the protection from liability afforded to them by s. 10(3)
of The Police Act is a full and complete defence to the Plaintiffs claim, whether that claim is
founded in negligence, assault, battery or trespass.
[30]

On August 16, 2013, the individual defendants were acting in response to a complaint of a

robbery with a knife. They were seeking to apprehend two suspects who had reportedly fled on foot

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follows:

down an alley less than ten minutes before. Police dog Diego located an odor in the alley, and
pursued until he located the source.
[31]

The Plaintiff was sitting in her own backyard on August 16, 2013 when she was bitten by

Of course, this was not known by the Individual Defendants at the time.
[32]

Constable Lalonde presented as a credible witness. I accept his testimony that at the time of

the incident, he thought the Plaintiff and Mr. Desnomie were his suspects and that one of them
possibly had a knife. He acted on the information provided to him by dispatch and by the
complainant. I find that he followed his usual procedure in deploying Diego and acted reasonably
in doing so.
[33]

I also accept the evidence of Constable Lalonde that Diego was engaged on the Plaintiff for

a period of approximately five to ten seconds, and not for several minutes. This was the time it took
for him to take out his flashlight, get between Diego and Mr. Desnomie, order Diego to let go and
Mr. Desnomie to get on the ground. While the entire incident was undoubtedly terrifying and painful
for the Plaintiff, I find that she is simply mistaken with respect to her recollection that Constable
Lalonde waited for assistance to arrive before calling off Diego. When Constable Bonynge arrived
in the yard, Mr. Desnomie was already in handcuffs. Further, had Diego been engaged on the
Plaintiff for a priod of several minutes, the Plaintiffs injuries would likely have been more severe.
[34]

It was clear from the evidence that Constable Bonynge had limited interaction with the

Plaintiff, and Constable Broadbent had no involvement with the Plaintiff.

[35]

In all of the circumstances, I find that the Individual Defendants were members of the

Saskatoon Police Service, acting in good faith in the course of their duties, on August 16, 2013 when
the Plaintiff suffered her injuries. They had a bona belief in the existence of facts, which if true,
would make their conduct lawful. It cannot be said that their conduct was so markedly inconsistent
with the relevant legislative context that a court could not reasonably conclude that they were
performed in good faith.
[36]

In fact, there was nothing in the evidence before me to suggest that the Individual Defendants

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Diego. The evidence is clear that neither she nor Mr. Desnomie had any involvement in the robbery.

acted in bad faith or with malice. Rather, in exigent circumstances, they acted in good faith upon the
information available to them. While the result of the investigation was truly unfortunate, I find there
was no bad faith or improper motive on the part of any of the Individual Defendants.
Accordingly, s. 10 of The Police Act affords the Individual Defendants a full and complete

defence to the Plaintiffs claim.

[38]

Finally, it should be noted that the Plaintiff also claimed against the Individual Defendants

for false imprisonment. However, given s. 3(9) of The Small Claims Act, 1997, S.S. 1997, c. S50.11, this Court has no jurisdiction to deal with such a claim.
2.

[39]

Is the Board liable to the Plaintiff for damages for personal

injuries?

The Plaintiff further claims that the Board, as the owner of police dog Diego, is liable to her

for damages for negligence, for the torts of assault, battery and trespass, and on the basis of strict
liability. In argument, the Plaintiffs submissions were focused solely on the issue of whether the
Board is strictly liable for the Plaintiffs injuries pursuant to the common law doctrine of scienter.
[40]

The responsibilities of the Board are set out in s. 31 of The Police Act and include, amongst

other things, responsibility for the delivery of policing services withing the municipality, and for
providing general direction, policy and priorities.
[41]

Section 10 of The Police Act also addresses the liability of the Board. In particular, s. 10(2)

provides as follows:
10(2) No action lies or shall be instituted against a
board or a member of that board, where the board or
member is acting pursuant to the authority of this Act,
the regulations or an order made pursuant to this Act,
for any loss or damage suffered by any person by
reason of anything in good faith done, caused,
permitted or authorized to be done, attempted to be
done or omitted to be done, by any of them, pursuant
to or in the exercise of or supposed exercise of any
power conferred by this Act or the regulations or in
the carrying out or supposed carrying out of any order
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[37]

made pursuant to this Act or any duty imposed by this

Act or the regulations.
[42]

The Board conceded that it was the owner of police dog Diego at the time of this incident on

dogs, that Diego received this training, and was validated for service.
[43]

There was no evidence at trial to establish any lack of good faith on the part of the Board.

Section 10(2) of The Police Act provides the Board with a full and complete defence to the
Plaintiffs claim. Further, there is no basis for vicarious liability on the part of the Board. See, for
example: Munir v Martin, 2015 SKQB 250.
[44]

Finally, there is no basis for the application of the doctrine of scienter on the facts of this

case. Scienter is a form of strict liability. It relates to animals, particularly dangerous ones and the
liability that attaches to the owner of the animal that caused the injury.
[45]

It is clear that a police dog is a tool, or a weapon, that is used by police on occasion.

However, numerous cases have made it clear that the doctrine of scienter properly has no application
in the context of police dogs. See, for example: Myers v Graham, 2005 BCSC 5; McQuillan v
Wong, 2008 BCSC 536, and Sam v British Columbia (Ministry of Public Safety), 2005 BCSC 331.
[46]

I find that the doctrine of scienter has no application to the instant case. If it were otherwise,

strict liability would attach to the Board every time injuries were caused by deployment of a police
dog, including when apprehending dangerous individuals attempting to flee. Furthermore, the
application of the doctrine would clearly be at odds with the intention of the Legislature, as expressed
in s. 10(2) of The Police Act, to provide immunity to the Board when carrying out its duties in good
faith.
Conclusion

[47]

The injuries suffered by the Plaintiff are truly unfortunate and regrettable. It is clear from the

evidence that the Plaintiff had no involvement in the robbery. It is also clear that the incident caused
her physical pain and emotional trauma. It is understandable that she feels she has been wronged.
The Court has considerable sympathy for the Plaintiff.
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2016 SKPC 121 (CanLII)

August 16, 2013. The evidence at trial indicated that there is a training protocol in place for police

[48]

The Defendants acted in good faith in the course of their duties. Accordingly, in the

circumstances of this case, s. 10 of The Police Act applies and constitutes a bar to the Plaintiffs
claim for damages.
The Plaintiffs claim is dismissed. There will be no order as to costs.

_________________________
V.L. Monar Enweani, J

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[49]