Cuba and Africa: The International Politics of the Liberation Struggle: A Documentary Essay

Author(s): Gordon Adams

Reviewed work(s):
Source: Latin American Perspectives, Vol. 8, No. 1, The Caribbean and Africa (Winter, 1981),
pp. 108-125
Published by: Sage Publications, Inc.
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CUBAANDAFRICA:
POLITICSOF THE
THE INTERNATIONAL
STRUGGLE
LIBERATION
A Documentary
Essay
by

Gordon Adams*

INTRODUCTION
Forthepast severalyears,Cuba's rolein Africahas been thefocusof severe criticismin the U.S. governmentand the American media. Cuba's
Africanpolicy,especiallyin Angola and Ethiopia,has been attackedin the
and "militarism";
Cuban actionshave been
UnitedStates as "adventurism"
portrayedas mercenarysteps carriedout at Sovietrequestin orderto "take
AfricaunderSoviet
advantage"of Africanconflictsand bringresource-rich
domination.PresidentCarterhas stated,for example:
We are doing the best we can to acquaint the world with the hazards and the
of the Sovietsand the Cubans in Africa.I think
consequencesof increasinginvolvement
it's accurateto say that theytake advantageof local disturbancesand move in with
bloodshedamong
bothofmilitary
to further
weapons,whichcontribute
massiveintrusion,
theysend in
and whentheyare permitted
by thelocal governments,
Africansthemselves,
large quantitiesof troops (New YorkTimes,June15, 1978).1

A Cuban presencein Africaof nearly40,000troopsand largeSovietarms

in the
have constituted,
to theEthiopianand Angolangovernments
shipments
eyes of U.S. policymakersand analysts,a major threatto U.S. strategic
interests:
*The author is a political scientistin New York City.This article is froma paper presented at the
Twenty-firstAnnual Meeting of the African Studies Association, Baltimore,Maryland, November 1, 1978,and is based in part on an introductionto Cuba Review (November,1978), coauthored
by Michael Locker. The author wishes to express his gratitudeto several people who helped him
work throughthe materials in this paper and especially to Michael Locker forhis close assistance
and support. The author also wishes to think Michael Shuster, George Houser, JenniferDavis,
Hobart Spalding, and Barbara Durr for their comments and assistance.
1 The overall tough line toward Cuban policy can be found frequentlyin the pages of such publi-

cations as the Georgetown UniversityCenter for Strategicand InternationalStudies' Washington

Review of Strategic and International Studies and in Strategic Review.
108

ADAMS: CUBA AND AFRICA

109

The generalizedsearchby Moscow and Havana forinfluencein Africarelatesto more

to Westernshippinglanes, exploitationof
specificinterests:access to bases, proximity
at theexpenseoftheWest,denialofmineralresourcesto
SouthernAfricanracialconflicts
of a
of Marxistand radicalregimes,and development
the West throughencouragement
1978:14;
as theonlyreliableand crediblechampionof Africancauses (Crocker,
reputation
see also Bouchey,1978).

urgedmembersof the Non-Aligned

Early in 1978 the U.S. Government
Movementto expel Cuba forviolatingthe normsof the movement.Although
such attacksdiminishedafterthe May, 1978,Katanganinvasionof Zaire's
1978),theyhave reinforcedU.S. stereotypesof
Shaba province(Oberdorfer,
have foryearsservedas a
Cuban policygoals and behavior.Such stereotypes
the normalizationof relationsbetweenthe
convenientrationalepreventing
in
have also concealedU.S. intervention
two countries.These misperceptions
the developingworld and U.S. effortsto bluntthe impactof Cuban foreign
policy.
This articlearguesthatthe U.S. responseto Cuba's actionsis blindto global divisionsforwhichthe UnitedStatesis moreresponsiblethanCuba and
which predate the Cuban revolution.The divided world and Western
resistanceto changeswhichstemfromthatdivisionare thesourceof violence
and conflictin the developingcountries.Militaryassistance fromoutside
Africaforliberationmovementsand regimesis entirelyconsistentwiththe
principlesof the Non-AlignedMovementand countershistoricand continuin thesecountries.It is Cuba's awarenessof thisdiingWesternintervention
to the process of change,not Cuban
vision and its historiccommitment
subservienceto Sovietinternational
policyobjectiveswhichis at the rootof
to liberationstrugglesis
Cuban policy decisions.The Cuban commitment
withtheheritageof theCuban revolution
and is activelysupported
consistent
by the Cuban population.
In contrastto the officialU.S. position,eventsin Africaare not part of
the Cold War butthe resultof decades of colonialismand historicliberation
Cuba's rolein Africamustbe understoodin thiscontextifit is to be
struggles.
realisticallyevaluated.
THE REALITY OF THE LIBERATION STRUGGLE
At the heart of U.S.-Cuban conflictsover Africa lies a profound
over global economicand politicalrealities.Althoughthe U.S.
disagreement
recognizesthatthe worldis dividedbetweenwealthyand poor
government
peoples,it arguesthat U.S. policies encouragedevelopmentand change to
pointofview,notonlyis theU.S.
reducethisdivision.Fromthegovernment's
neutralwithregardto the divisionbetweenrichand poor,butits actionsare
a positiveforcefor reducingthe gap.
The keyto the U.S. positionis thatchangesshouldtake place peacefully
in a stable internationalcontext.Carter administration
policy statements
to orderly,peaceful change in
underscoredthe declared U.S. commitment
areas as Zimbabwe,Namibia,and SouthAfrica.Secretary
suchconflict-laden
of State CyrusVance stated in June1978,for example:
of a positiveAfricanpolicy?Simplystated,theyare: a strong
Whatare the ingredients
to social justiceand economicdevelopmentin Africa;effortsto help
U.S. commitment

LATIN AMERICAN PERSPECTIVES

110

supportforlegitimate
respectforAfricannationalism;
resolveAfricandisputespeacefully;
Africandefenseneeds; and finally,helpingto fosterrespectfor human rights,which
the politicalfabricof Africannations.
strengthens
factthat
Africaproceedsfromtheunmistakable
Our policytowardtheregionof southern
changeis coming.The greatquestionis whetherpeace or violencewill be theinstrument
of change.Forthesake of thepeoplesin theregionand forthesake of our own interests
we are workingforpeacefulchange.Violencein southernAfricabearsmanycosts
there,
- in humanterms,
in damageto economicprogress
in a legacyof politicalpolarization,
in theharmdone to othernationsin thearea,and in the
and our own economicinterest,
. . .
excuse it presentsforoutsideinterference
It is essentialto thesuccessof ourpoliciesthatAfricansknowthatwe sharetheirgoal of
in ways thatbenefit
This meansincreasingtradeand investment
economicdevelopment.
bothAfricanand theU.S. (New YorkTimes,June21,1978[emphasismine],quotingfroma
June20).2
speech in AtlanticCity,New Jersey,

are
Fromthisperspective,Cuban and Sovietactions,especiallymilitary,
as efforts
to overthrow
the established
portrayedas externalencroachments,
Africannationsfromcarrying
out peacefulchange.
orderby force,preventing
PresidentCarterin an April 13, 1978, press conferencestated: "Castro is
acting contraryto peaceful settlementof disputes that are inevitablein
progressbetweenus and Cuba"
Africa,and thatis an obstacleto any further
(New YorkTimes,May 31,1978).And in Junehe notedat a pressconference,
otherthanactingin a way to acquainttheworldwiththeiractions,the
onlythingthatwe can do is throughpeacefulmeansto providesome strength
to nationsthatdo want to see Africanproblemssettledby Africanpeople
themselves"(New York Times,June15, 1978).
It is clearthattheUnitedStatesand themajornationsof WesternEurope
Cuban or Sovietpolihave a muchlargerstakein Africathanmerelyresisting
cy. For more than a decade, followingthe independenceof most African
nations, the United States acquiesced in Western Europe's continuing
dominance over the economies of much of Africa,both bilaterallyand
(Adams,1972). France,Britain,Germany
throughthe EuropeanCommunity
and Italy continuedto invest and to provide developmentaid in Africa
thatperiod(Adams,1970;see also Cuba Review,1978,and OECD,
throughout
in Africawere concentrated
n.d.). U.S. economicand financialinvolvements
in Nigeria,Zaire,and SouthAfrica(CorporateData Exchange,1978;Seidman,
1978; Wall StreetJournal,1978).3
Morerecently,
publicand privateU.S. spokespersonshave recognizedthe
2See also Directorof PolicyPlanning,AnthonyLake (1978:3):
I believethatthe
How can we bestworkforthepeacefulchangethatis so in ourinterest?
roleis one based on fourpremises:First,thatwe continueto makeit clear
mosteffective
thatwe are, indeed,forchangetowardracial justiceand the observanceof individual
human rights.

. .

. Second, that we tryto find and propose fair solutions, but recognize

also thatenduringanswersare those thatreflectthe wishes of the people in the area

*

. .Third, that we stick with our principles and not play favorites.

. .

. Elections, not

parties.Fourth,thatwe continueto
outsiders,or force,shoulddecide amongcontending
in favorof peacefulchange."
community
workwithand withinthe international
D.C., notedtheimportance
in
Washington,
of
Transafrica
3RandallRobinson,ExecutiveDirector
in Africais its
biggestinvolvement
in SouthAfrica:"Rightnow,thiscountry's
of U.S. investment
sees whenitlooks
theonlythingtheAdministration
in SouthAfrica.Unfortunately,
investments
(New YorkTimes,June2, 1978).
is Cuban and Sovietinvolvement"
at the restof the continent

ADAMS: CUBA AND AFRICA

111

growingimportanceof Africa'sresourcesto the U.S. economyitself.As E. F.

Andrewsof Allegheny-Ludlam
Industries,a major metal firm,stated:
- a power
. . .you've got decolonization.That has created- in Africaparticularly
vacuum.And thosethatchoseto stayafterdecolonization,
thewhites,createdracialstrife.
And a powervacuumwithracial strifeis fertilebreedingground.Then the Arabs came
to everybody
in theworldjusthow dependenttheWesternworld
alongand demonstrated
was, how much real serious impactit could have on jobs, balance of paymentsand
inflation(New York Times,July10, 1978).

Secretaryof State CyrusVance also acknowledgedthiseconomicreality

in a speech to the NationalAssociationfor the Advancementof Colored
People (NAACP) in July1977:
Africa'spotentialis tiedto our own . . . Africa'smineraland agricultural
wealthalready
as copper,cobalt,and
providesa substantialportionof our importsof such commodities
manganeseforour industriesand cocoa and coffeeforour homes.And Africasupplies
38% of our crude petroleumimports(New York Times,July2, 1977;see also Business
Week,October9, 1978;and Nickel,1978).

FormerPresidentGerald Ford also underlinedthe importanceof Africa's

resources:
Africawill loom everlargerin our lives forthe restof thiscentury.
The SovietUnionis
wagingan un-declaredwar,theresourceswar. Africais thebattleground
becausefromit
comemanyoftheresourcesand raw materialsessentialto Westernsocietyand especially
in certainessentialmineralsand raw
to the UnitedStates.We are not self-sufficient
we are dependentand will probablygrow moreso. If the
materials.On the contrary,
riches of Africaare denied us, not only industrybut our whole societywill suffer
(BusinessWeek,October9, 1978).

These pressuresof colonialand neocolonialinvolvement

are thesourceof
and
the
The
the dividedglobe
strugglesforliberation.
developingcountries
emergedhistoricallyin an atmosphereof domination,neocolonialintervention, and racism. The declarationsof the Non-AlignedMovementhave
continuallyrecognizedthe rightof liberationmovementsto struggleagainst
these forcesand to sever theirpoliticaland economicdependency.
This global dichotomyand the liberationstruggleswhichgrowout of it
would existindependentof Cuban foreignpolicyactionsor the existenceof
Cuba itself.The realityis shocking,
revolutionary
regardlessof Cuba's role,as
Fidel Castro has indicated:
Whatdid imperialism
and its ally,thefeudalregime,leave behindin Ethiopia?A totalof
14 millionpeople
six millionmalariavictims,
150,000lepers,400,000victimsoftuberculosis,
hundredsof thousandsof people who starvedto
withvarioustypesof eye infections,
a 95 percentilliteracy
rateand 125doctors,to givejustsomeexdeathduringthedroughts,
data show what imperialism
means forthe peoples of the soamples.These terrifying
called ThirdWorld (Granma,May 7, 1978,quotingfroman April26 speech).

The continualstruggle
fornationalliberationis a result,and Westernpowers,
includingthe United States, have consistentlyintervenedto limit such
conflictsin Algeria,Zaire,Angola,Chad, Chile and Vietnam.These military

LATIN AMERICAN PERSPECTIVES

112

to guaran(overtand covert)seek to protectWesterninterests,

interventions
Western
do
not
threaten
that
changes
will
mean
change
"peaceful"
tee that
positions.
Since it is clearfromactionsby the UnitedStatesand otherWesternnaand militaryviolence are part of the Western
tions that both nonmilitary
theycan hardlybe ruledout as dimensionsoftheliberation
policyrepertoire,
in assertingthe role of
struggle.The Cubans are far fromunrepresentative
In
thewordsof Samora
liberation.
to
route
violenceas partof the sanctioned
the
Machel,PresidentofMozambique:"We totallyreject idea thatthepathof
armed struggleand the path of negotiationsare eithermutuallyexclusive
in the process of national liberation"(press
alternativesor contradictions
Service,September15, 1978).4
release,Mozambique Information
The rightof recourseto violence in a struggleto achieve or defend
sanctionedas farback as theU.S.
in fact,has been historically
independence,
Revolutionof 1776. Moreover,it is clear that nations involved in such
had the rightto appeal forforeignsupport,as the
have historically
struggles
century.In the modernera, Cuba
UnitedStates itselfdid in the eighteenth
was one of the firstnationsto achieve nationalliberationand has played a
leading role for some years in aiding other countriesand movementsin
parallel struggles(see Dominguez,1978). Cuban assistance has been both
and military.As Cuban ForeignMinisterIsidor Maleconomic/technical
miercapointedoutto the1978BelgradeConferenceof theMovementof NonAligned:
and theiralliesand servantsnevermentiontheoldestand mostimportant
The imperialists
Cuba has givenotherpeoples,especiallytheAfricanpeoples.Thousandsupon
cooperation
thousandsof our doctors,teachers,constructionworkers,techniciansand civilian
for15 yearsto
theirknowledgeand efforts
specialistsof all kindshave been contributing
thepeoplesof Africa(Granma,August13, 1978,quotingfromspeechof July28; see also
Bender,1978,on Cuba's historicaid to Angola).5

As Malmierca'sstatementimplies,assistancein the contextof national

independenceand liberationwas simplynotparallelto Westernintervention
to preventsuch liberation:
4See also, AngolanMethodistBishop Emilio de Carvalho:"There will be no peace without
theAfricanchurchesshouldbe in thefrontlinesofthesearchfor
Therefore,
completeliberation.
peace" (Daily World,August15, 1978).
in Africa(3,000in Angola)and thehistoryof theCu5Theworkof over7,000Cubantechnicians
areas was describedin the Los AngelesTimes(June12,
in economic/technical
ban commitment
Santiago Alvarez also movinglydiscussed this role in a recent
1978: 4). Cuban filmmaker
you
interviewwithJohnHuddyof the Miami Herald who asked: " . . . in thatdocumentary
madeaboutVietnamtherewereverymovingpicturesofchildrenwiththeirfacesshotoff.IfCuon it?"
ban bulletsand bombersdo thatto Africanchildren,would you make a documentary
The bombsdroppedby U.S.
No. Because Cubanbombsare notaimedat Africanchildren.
pilots on Hanoi were. That's the difference.

. .

. We are saving children .

. .

. We sent

1,000doctorsand 1,000teachersto Angola.Because Portugesecolonialism- thedictator

in Angola.And also
Salazar thattheU.S. and Francehelpedso much- left87%illiteracy
theyhad enslaved.We senddoctors,teachersand solin Mozambique.In all theterritories
diers- because soldiersare also needed.We send whatwe do nothave! We are stilla
peopleunderblockade.We needmedicine.Butwe sendmedicineto Africa.We needmore
doctorsin Cuba,butwe send doctorsto Africa.Thatis thekindof bulletswe shootat Africanchildren(In These Times,August16-22,1978).

ADAMS: CUBA AND AFRICA

113

Beingagainstwhat has been describedas divisionintomilitaryblocs,doesn'timply,as

somewouldlead us to believe,distorting
themeaningofhistoryand acceptingthatthesoand socialismare
are equal, thatimperialism
cial systemsthatthosetwo forcesrepresent
an equal shareof theblameon each forthe
on an equal footing.
This wouldmeanputting
on an equal footingthosewho supplied
originof thedivision. . . It wouldmeanputting
modernweaponsofall kindsto thePortugesecolonialistsand thosewho aided thefighters
who opposed them (Granma,August13, 1978).

to assist such strugglesstems,in part,fromits own

Cuba's commitment
experience.The Cubans know all too well the violentrealitybehind the
benign appearance of U.S. internationalpolicy - the real meaning of
"peaceful change" with U.S. support. Cuba's owjn revolutionaryhistory
evolved from a national uprisingagainst the Spanish in the nineteenth
century,
throughpoliticalindependencein 1898,to liberationfromthe United
States in 1959.
readyto atSufficeitto recallthatwhentheGovernment
oftheUnitedStateswas getting
tack Cuba militarily,
when officialU.S. institutions
such as the CIA and the Pentagon
hatchedall kindsofplans- rangingfromtheassassinationof Cubanleadersto theuse of
- themass mediaunder
chemicaland bacteriological
meansto undermine
ouragriculture
aid
theircontrolclamoredhysterically
that Cuba should reject all extrahemispheric
(Malmiercaspeech, Granma,August13, 1978).6

CUBA AND THE PRINCIPLES OF THE NON-ALIGNEDMOVEMENT

Cuba's justificationfor its militarycommitmentsin Africa tends to
conformwiththe principlesof the Non-AlignedMovement,of which Cuba
was foundingmemberin 1961,and in whichthe Cubans have continuously
countriesdo not
playeda leadingrole(Roberts,1976).Mostofthenon-aligned
as "interference"
or "advenconsiderCuban assistance,economicor military,
turism."Cuban actions,rather,are describedas consistentwith one of the
principleobjectivesof the Non-AlignedMovement:the end of colonialism,
and racism.Cuba has defendedthisprincipleamongthenonneocolonialism,
alignedsince the early1960s.As thenCuban PresidentOsvaldo Dorticosput
it in the 1964 Cairo conference:
We rejecta neutralattitudetowardscolonialismon theone hand,and thefreedomof the
and the trueeconomicand
people on the other;towardneocolonialismand imperialism,
social independence. . We rejecta neutralattitudetowardsthequestionsof thetrue
on theother. . . We reequalityof all menon theone hand,and racialdiscrimination
to overcomeunderdevelopment
jecta neutralattitudetowardstheproblemsofthestruggle
. ...
whichsubsistson thisunderdevelopment
and theimperialist
policyof exploitation
(Roberts,1976:14).

The language of the original1961 Belgrade Declaration of the NonAlignedMovementconfirmsthatthisgoal was centralto the concernsof the
membercountries:
on Non-AlignedCountries. . .
The Heads of State of Government

Cuban dependenceon the

6Thereare now many publisheddiscussionsof pre-revolutionary
A briefdiscussionis to be foundin FaU.S. interference.
UnitedStatesand ofpost-revolutionary
gen (1978:68-81).
LatinAmericanPerspectives:
Issue 28, Winter1981, Vol. Vill, No. 1

114

LATIN AMERICAN PERSPECTIVES

Consideringthat the dynamicprocessesand formsof social change oftenresultin or

a conflictbetweentheold establishedand thenew emerging
nationalistforces;
represent
thata lastingpeace can be achievedonlyifthisconfrontation
leads to a world
considering
of colonialism-imperialism
and neocolonialism
in all theirmanifeswherethedomination
tationsis radicallyeliminated. . .
. . .that to eradicatebasicallythesourceof conflictis to eradicatethecolonialismin all
in theworld
and to acceptand practicea policyofpeacefulco-existence
itsmanifestations
in theConference
The participants
emphasize,in thisconnection,
thatthepolicyofco-extowardstheelimination
ofhistoricalinjusticesand the
istenceamountsto an activeeffort
at the same time,to everypeople their
liquidationof nationaloppression,guaranteeing
independentdevelopment. . .
in the Conference. . . recommendthe immediateunconditional,
total
The participants
to put an
and finalabolitionof colonialismand [are]resolvedto makea concertedeffort
end to all types of new colonialismand imperialistdominationin all its formsand
manifestations
The participantsin the Conferenceconsiderthat effortsshould be made to remove
fromcolonialismand imperialism
economicimbalanceinherited
Movement,
(Non-Aligned
1973: 15-18).

The U.S. government

assertsthatCuban militaryactionsin Africaviolate
Movementbecause theyhave been takenat
theprinciplesof the Non-Aligned
the requestand serve the interestsof an alignedcountry,the Soviet Union.
The natureof Soviet-Cubanrelationsis discussed furtherbelow; what is
hereis to notethatCuba (a nonmemberof the Warsaw Pact) and
important
between
the Non-AlignedMovementhave regularlyinsistedthat neutrality
of non-alignment.
As stated
definition
thetwo superpowersis an insufficient
by Mozambican PresidentSamora Michel:
To preventthe anti-imperialist
contentof the Movementfrombecomingmoreprofound,
theenemyhas revivedtheold ployoftrying
to defineNon-Alignment
as a positionofneuor equidistancein theconflict
betweenthepeoplesand imperialism.
This ployis estrality
sentiallyaimed at isolatingthe Non-Alignedfromthe socialistcamp . . .
must be the joint fightof the countriesstill dependentin relationto
Non-alignment
thefightforeffective
forrecoveryand use
politicaland economicliberation,
imperialism;
of theirnaturalresourcesin the interestsof the prosperityof theirpeoples and of
humanity(FRELIMO,1978).

If thisstruggleis the centralgoal of the Non-AlignedMovement,thenit

follows that socialist countriesare not excluded frommembershipwhile
colonial or neocolonial countriesare. As stated by Cuban Vice-President
Carlos Raphael Rodriguezat a press conferencein Belgrade duringthe
meetingsof the Non-AlignedMovementon July29, 1978:
It is a factthatwhilethenon-aligned
countriesmayat thesame timebe socialistand nonaligned- as Yugoslaviaand Cuba have beenfromthestartand so otherslaterproclaimed
as in the case of Vietnam,Korea and manyotherswho have recentlyjoined
themselves,
norany countrythatsupportsor approvesof imtheMovement- no imperialist
country,
couldbe a
perialistpolicy,whichhas been repeatedlycondemnedby all our Conferences,
memberof this movement(Granma,August13, 1978:11).

ADAMS: CUBA AND AFRICA

115

Althoughpact membershipis excluded among the non-aligned,neutrality

towardscolonialismand neocolonialismis simplyimpossible.
A second majorprincipleof the Non-AlignedMovementwhichrelatesto
the attitudesof the non-alignedtowardCuba's actionsis thatmovementsor
have the rightto call upon othermembersforsupportin their
governments
integrity.
struggleforindependenceand in the protectionof theirterritorial
As statedby the BelgradeConferenceof 1961:
for
The non-aligned
countriesprovideencouragement
and supportto all peoplesfighting
theirindependenceand equality. . .
of all states
integrity
The participating
countriesrespect. . . scrupulously
the territorial
(and) oppose by all means any aims of annexationby othercountries(Non-Aligned
Movement,1973:16-17).

The Organizationof AfricanUnity(OAU) also has supportedthe rightof

to appeal for outside assistance in the defenseof
threatenedgovernments
their territorialintegrity(see Article III of the OAU Charter on the
integrity).
importanceof territorial
In accordancewith these principles,for over eighteenyears Cuba has
provided aid to liberationmovementsand independentgovernmentsin
Algeria, the Belgian Congo (Zaire), Zimbabwe, Namibia, South Africa,
Mozambique, Angola, Ethiopia, and Guinea-Bissau.The Cuban military
de Angola
commitments
requestedby the MovimentoPopularde Libertagiao
in Angola and by the governingDerguein Ethiopia,are
(MPLA) government
consistentwith these principles:
. . . Cuba's actionsin Africa,frommid-1975to mid-1978have generallyhad both the
strategicand politicalsupportof mostAfricancountries.This was clearlythe case with
Cuba's supportforthe MPLA againstthe SouthAfrican-backed
movements,
duringthe
Angolan civil war. Cuban oppositionto the Somali invasion of Ethiopia was quite
to mediatebetweenSomalia
effort
consistent
withOAU policies,as was theunsuccessful
and Ethiopiapriorto the war. Cuban supportfor movementsagainstthe whiteruled
regimesin Zimbabweand Namibiais also well in line with majorityAfricanpolicies
(Dominguez,1978).

An overwhelming
numberof Africangovernments
and movements,
many
of whichdo not necessarilyshare Cuba's socialistpolitics,have recognized
and have " . . .
and approvedof the natureof Cuban militarycommitments
praisedthe Republicof Cuba and the otherstatesthathelpedthe people of
the expansionist,colonialiststrategyof the racistregime
Angolato frustrate
of SouthAfricaand itsallies" (Non-Aligned
Movement,as quotedin Granma,
August 13, 1978). The followingviews have been expressed by African
leaders:
I've not changed my views about him [Carter],but he is concernedwith East-West
problems,with the superpowerproblems,and when it comes to this reactionof one
of whatone superpoweris up to
superpowerto anothersuperpoweror theinterpretation
in thisinterpretation
of whattheRusand we have thedifference
in Africa,we can differ
sians are up to and whattheCubans are up to in Ethiopiaand in Africagenerally. . ..
We welcomedtheirinvolvement
in Angolaand Ethiopia(PresidentJuliusK. Nyerere,of
Tanzania,ABC, 1978).
Lat,,n
AmericanPerspectives:
Isse 28, Winter1981, Vol. VIII, No. 1

116

LATIN AMERICAN PERSPECTIVES

I am notsurethereis a singleCubanon theAfricancontinent

who has notbeeninvitedby
somememberof thecontinent.
So longas thisis thecase, it is noteasy to condemntheir
presence.Sistersand Brothers,
let us deal withthecause ratherthantheeffectwhenwe
deal withtheseveryseriousmattersof lifeand death (PresidentKennethD. Kaunda of
Zambia, New YorkTimes,May 18, 1978).7
On an almostdailybasis,Carterhas been expressingconcernoverCuba's role in Africa
*

. .

. Cubans have never attacked any sovereign state or crossed an internationally

recognizedboundary.Whattheyhave doneis to assistoppressedpeoplegaintheirself-defromcolonial masters(NigerianAmbassadorto the UnitedNationsLeslie

termination
Harriman,interviewin NairobiTimes,quoted in Miami Herald,July10, 1978).
I wantto assureyouthatmycountry
has absolutesupportforCuba becausewe knowthat
Cuba's activitiesin Africaare honestand just.Cuba has no investments
in Africaand this
is proofit is notthereforany benefit.I ask theCubansto continuetheirgood work. . .
(NigerianAmbassadorto Cuba, The Guardian,August30, 1978).8
We did notthinkCuba was such a greatthreatto imperialist
interests
untiltheimperialist
powersbeganto harpon the presenceof Cuba in Africa.Then we knewthatCuba was
playingan effective
roleand thatimperialism
had discoveredit (OliverTambo,President,
AfricanNationalCongress,The Guardian,August30, 1978).
is afraidof Cuba becauseit is afraidtherevolution
Imperialism
willspreadthroughout
Africa and people will be liberatedand thusput an end to our economicexploitation
(Sam
Nujoma,President,SouthwestAfricanPeople's Organization[SWAPO], The Guardian,
August30, 1978).

Africansupportof thiskindmade it difficult

forthe U.S. government
to
make its case to Africanleaders againstCuban commitments:
"Neither[the
Ford nor the Carter]administration
succeededin buildinga case againstthe
Cuban presencein Angolathatis viewed as credibleby mostotherAfrican
countries- includingNigeria,as Carterdiscoveredin March [1978]- or
even by some Westernallies" (Bender,1978: 11-12).
As Louis Halasz reported,
afterdiscussionsat theU.N. Special Session on
Disarmament in New York: " . . . the salient fact emergingfrom conversa-

tions with leading Africandiplomatshere is that much of black Africa

approvestheSoviet-Cubanactivitieson thecontinent"(BaltimoreSun,June4,
1978).
CUBAN VERSUS WESTERN INTERVENTION
Cuba's involvement
in Africain thepast eighteenyearshas notmeantindiscriminate
supportforall armedstruggles.
Cuban policyhas generallybeen
a sophisticatedunderstanding
restrained,reflecting
of the characterof the
and governments
movements
it agreesto support.Noteverymovementwhich
declares itselfanticolonialistgenuinelyhas this character.Cuban commitmentsappearto reflecttheattitudethatnationalindependencealone,without
a strongcommitment
to internaleconomic and social change to combat
neocolonialism,is not sufficient
automaticallyto attractCuban support.
It is genuineinternalliberationmovements
whichrequiresuch assistance,
forit is preciselythesemovements
whichhave provokedthegreatestWestern
7Duringhis Washingtonvisit (BusinessWeek,June26, 1978:63).
8StephenRosenfeldreportedin the Washington
Post (May 12, 1978)thatduringhis 1978visit,
PresidentCarterwas toldby theNigeriansthattheyapprovedCuban actionsin supportof the
Angolanand Ethiopiangovernments.

ADAMS: CUBA AND AFRICA

117

intervention.
It is Westernintervention,
seekingto defeatliberationstruggles,
a requestforCuban assistance.This directly
which has normallytriggered
the U.S. assertionthatCuban and Sovietinvolvement
contradicts
represents
in the internaldisputesof Africanstates.The U.S.
new,outsideinterference
governmentand the media tend to gloss over or conceal such Western
the justification
intervention,
conveniently
undermining
forCuban commitments.
As has been noted,the Westernpoliticaland economicstakein Africais
immense.Internalchanges which threatencontrolover that stake have
generallybroughtsharpovertand covertarmedresponse.Frenchinterjection
of troopsintoits formercoloniesin westernand equatorialAfrica,as well as
in Zaire, is perhapsthe most blatantexample.
The Cuban militarypresence in both Angola and Ethiopia postdates
Westerneffortsto overthrowlegitimategovernments
apparentlyhostileto
Westerninterests.In Angola,it was clear long beforeany Cuban military
thatthe UnitedStates,Zaire,and SouthAfricawere all actively
commitment
supportinginternalguerrillaeffortsto overthrowthe MPLA government
(Stockwell,1978).9PresidentJuliusNyerereof Tanzania confirmedthis
rationalein June,1978,to Bob Clark of ABC's "Issues and Answers":
Thefirstcausewas thatcooperation
between
thewestern
powers,
including
theUnited
toprevent
theMPLAfrom
thegovernment
ofa country
StatesandSouthAfrica,
assuming
fortenyears. . . Thesecondreasonis whythey[the
forwhichtheyhadbeenfighting
. . . are
Cubans]arestillthere.
TheyarestilltherebecauseuntilnowtheSouthAfricans
to theoverthrow
stillfinancing
of theMPLA
organizations
opposedto and committed
government(Nyerere, ABC, 1978).10

In Ethiopia,the Somali invasionof the Ogaden regionin the summerof

1977was the sourceof the Dergue'srequestforCuban militarysupport.This
the weak socialistregime,was encouraged
externalintervention,
threatening
and aided by
by a U.S. promiseofmilitary
supportto theSomaligovernment,
directsupportfromWest Germany,Saudi Arabia,and otherU.S. Arab allies
(Power,1978;Myers,1978:58; Francis,1977:164; New YorkTimes,July18,
1977).

The eventsof Apriland May,1978,in Zaire also demonstrate

Westerninto preventthedeclineof regimesfriendly
to Westerninterests.
The
tervention
Pan-Africanforce,
Frenchwent so far as to propose a French-sponsored
muchresistedby theAfricans:"I believethe Frenchhave two reasons;one is
the domination of our continent . . . The other is the division of the OAU

(JuliusNyerere,ABC, 1978).
Manynonsocialistleadersin Africaappearwillingto acceptthesupposed
riskof Cuban assistance.In theface of greaterdangers,"thedangerto Africa
does not come just fromnationsin the Easternbloc. Currentdevelopments

9Nathaniel Davis (1978: 120-122),then Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs,confirms
that Cuban and Soviet militaryinvolvementfollowed covert CIA involvement.Domfnguez (1978:
97) confirmsSouth Africa's threatto the MPLA as the startingpoint for the governmentrequest
to Cuba.
loBender(1978: 12) confirmsthat withoutCuban support the MPLA would have fallen to the U.S.
and South African-backed forces.
LatinAmericaon
Perspectives:
Issue 28, Winter1981, Vol. Vill, No. 1

LATIN AMERICAN PERSPECTIVES

118

show that the greaterimmediatedanger to Africa'sfreedomcomes from

nationsin the Westernbloc" (Nyerere,WashingtonPost,June9, 1978).
involvedin Cuban policycan be seen when Cuba's
The carefulrestraint
in
are contrastedwithCuban restraint
Angolanand Ethiopiancommitments
clearly
internalsituations,such as Eritrea.Althoughthe Cuban government
prefersthatEritrearemainpartof Ethiopia,Cuban troopshave notsupported
and Cuba has
the Ethiopianmilitaryeffortagainstthe Eritreanmovements,
urgednegotiationstowarda peacefulsettlementon both sides:
The Cubansare refusing
to send troopsand planesto help putdown a stubbornrebellion
fromEthiopia'sprovinceofEritrea,and thebeleagueredEthiopiansnow face
byguerrillas
thatcrushedSomaliinsurgents
a stalemate.Cuba joinedEthiopiain theOgadenoffensive
theCubansarguethattheEritreancampaignis an interlastwinter,
butthatwas different;
externalaggression(Newsweek,October23,
nal matterratherthana case of thwarting
1978:17)

Fidel Castrohas statedCuba's positionon the Eritreanstruggleas follows:

The UnitedStates itselfhad a bitterhistoricalexperienceon the issue of secessionism
statesof the Southtriedto leave the Unionin thesecondhalfof
whentheslave-owning
the last century.A peacefulman of Lincoln'sstatureand noble naturehad to resortto
forceto preventthis.Now theytryto denyEthiopiatherightto defenditsterritorial
integrity (Granma, May 7, 1978).11

CUBAN POLICY AND SOCIALISM

WhentheprinciplesoftheNon-Aligned
Movementand Cuban irresponsibilityproved inadequate as critiquesof Cuban policy in Africa,President
Carterhad recourseto a moretraditionalcharge:labellingCuba a puppetof
the Soviet Union:
There'sno doubtin mymindthatCuba is used bytheSovietUnionas surrogates
in several places in Africa(press conferenceforHispanicMedia, May 12, 1978).
Thereis no othercountry
oftheSovithatactsin harmonywithand underthedomination
ets any morethan the Cubans do (New YorkTimes,May 14, 1978).
Many countriesare becomingveryconcernedthat the nonalignedmovementis being
subvertedby Cuba, which is obviouslyclosely aligned with the Soviet Union and
dependentupon the Soviets for economicsustenanceand for militaryand political
guidanceand direction(speech at Annapolis,New YorkTimes,June8, 1978).

Clearly,it was in the interestsof the UnitedStates to tryto make this

thepossiblelegitimacy
of Cuban actionsas responsesto
case. Acknowledging
or
liberation
movement
needs
would have underminedthe
Africanrequests
of
the
U.S.
stance.
Cuba's historic
Nevertheless,
policy
apparentneutrality
to
the
African
liberation
have
commitments
generallyprecededand
struggle
than
of
more
consistent
those
the
Soviet
considerbeen
Union,demonstrating
Dolicvmakin2
indeDendence.
first-hand
exDerience
of
liberation
able
Cuba's
"Vanneman and James (1978: 35) and Domfnguez (1978: 100). Spokespersons for the Eritrean
Peoples LiberationFront (EPLF) have also noted Cuba's restrain (New York Times,June22, 1978).
The Christian Science Monitor,(July7, 1978), indicated Cuban troop cutbacks and restraintin
Eritrea as did John Darnton (New York Times, November 12, 1978) and Dan Connell (The
Guardian, December 20, 1978).

ADAMS: CUBA AND AFRICA

119

strugglesagainst neocolonialismand close Cuban ties to the Non-Aligned

Movementhave providedthe Cubans with a morethan adequate basis for
makingtheir own comprehensiveand sophisticatedanalysis of specific
countriesand movements.Analystsboth friendlyand hostileto the Cuban
have agreedforsome timethatto equate Cuban actionwithSoviet
revolution
even riskilyerroneous,view of Cuban
demandswas a vastlyoversimplified,
(see Dominguez,1978;Fagan, 1978).
policymaking
This assertionof Cuban foreignpolicyindependencedoes not mean that
Cuban policyis in constantconflictwiththatof the SovietUnion.Rather,it
assessmentand ofmeansthatCuba can and does makeitsown international
At a
or involvement.
ten takes actionsthatprecedeany Sovietcommitments
laterpoint,Cuban and Sovietactionsare coordinatedin manycases. Cuban
analysisof Africaneventsmay have actuallyinfluencedthe SovietUnionto
it mighthave avoided,ratherthanthe Sovietsdemanding
makecommitments
Cuban action.12
Most observers,friendlyand hostile,agree thatthe Cuban government
situation,and decides on its
makes its own assessmentof the international
"It shouldbe stressedagainthatthe Cubans are not mere
own commitments:
the extraordinary
coordination
puppetsof the SovietUnion,notwithstanding
of the militarytacticsof the two powers.Cuba probably
and orchestration
would have intervenedin Angola even withoutSoviet support,though
perhaps on a lesser scale" (Vannemanand James,1978: 36). The Cubans
themselveshave assertedthis view frequently:
AreCubansconcernedthattheymaybe seen simplyas servingas Sovietlackiesin Africa,
who notethat
as is oftenchargedin some Westerncircles?Notmuch,say thesetravelers,
in
Cubanstendto regardthedecisionto go intoAfricaas unrelatedto any Sovietstrategy
Africa.
One diplomatwho roamedall overthe islandlast monthsaid he repeatedlymetCubans
"We wentintoAfricaand thentheRussiansdecidedto supportus, for
who said,in effect,
which we are grateful.But we would be therewhetherthey supportedus or not."
(ChristianScience Monitor,July29, 1978).

Fidel Castro stated:

Do you want to know if the Soviets asked us to go there(to Angola)? The Soviets
absolutelydid notask us. Theyneversaid a singlewordin thatsense.It was exclusivelya
Cuban decision(interviewwithBarbaraWalters,ABC, June18, 1978).

And ForeignMinisterCarlos Rafael Rodriguezhas observed:

withtheRussians.Butwhenwe first
Look,it's obviousthatwe have a close relationship
in theoperation.
senttroopsto Angolawe did notrelyon a possibleSovietparticipation
fashionwitha groupofpeoplepackedin a ship
We starteditin a risky,almostimprobable
of ours.Eventually,
theoperationwas coordinated
and in thoseBritishBritanniaaircraft
with the Russians,who were beginningto send militarysupplies to help President
in Angola.Butthethingstartedoffas a purelyCubanopMPLA Government
Agostinho's
eration. .
Cuba will go on givingthe Africanliberationmovementsthe help theyneed with or
withoutcoordinationwith other countries.It will be accordingto what we decide
(Observer,London,February26, 1978).
12Clearlysome Washington policymakers agree with this assessment, though theirviews did not
seem to prevail in the Carter administration(see John Goshko, 1978: 3).
LatinAmericaon
Perspectives:
Issue 28, Winter1981, Vol. Vill, No. 1

120

LATIN AMERICAN PERSPECTIVES

Cuba's responsesto Africanrequestsforassistance,in otherwords,are

decided in the frameworkof a complex series of considerations:external
the Cuban analysisof theimportanceof theirresponse
Westernintervention,
to such a request,and the politicalcontextin the requestingcountryin
question.RichardFagan underlinesthis:
influenced
manner,and scope of
thetiming,
It is clear thatthe Soviet-Cubanrelationship
theCubanpresencein Angolasince1975.This is notto say thattheSoviets"told"theCuforpast
bans whatto do, or thatthe Cuban actionsweresome kindof cruderepayment
and presentSovietsupport.Rather,the way in which Cuba enteredinto the Angolian
withoutSovietpoliticaland military
supportof the
equationwould have been different
MPLA and withoutU.S., Chinese,and West Europeansupportof otherfactions- notto
giventhe Cuban leadership's
mentionthe SouthAfricaninvasion.But almostcertainly,
values,and past actions,the Cubanswouldhave been on thescene,
policycommitments,
withor withoutthe Soviets(1978:76).

Fagen continues:
In assessingthe Cuban rolein Angola,it shouldbe recalledthatFidelCastrohad offered
to sendtroopsto NorthVietnamduringtheearly1960's- an offerthatwas refusedbythe
NorthVietnameseand thattheSovietsprobablyopposedwhenit was made.Furthermore,
to the MPLA was long-standing,
datingfromthe mid-1960's
the Cuban commitment
theSovietcommitment),
and themajorcostsof theCuban presencein
(actuallypredating
Angola,in bothhumanand materialterms,wereborneby Cuba and itscitizens,notbythe
Soviet Union (1978:76).

Independentof Cuba's relationshipwiththe USSR, Cuban commitments

to linkthe struggleforsocialismwiththe strugglefornarepresentan effort
tional liberation,a connectionof vital importancein Cuba's view. The
socialist countriesare not responsiblefor the world's division between
wealthyand poor nations.Socialism,in Cuba's view,is a naturalally of the
poornationsin thatdivision.The Non-AlignedMovementin 1965recognized
thatnonmemberprogressivecountriescould and shouldbe allied withsuch
struggles:
The heads of stateor government
of thenon-aligned
countriesare unanimousin believing
that the policy of non-alignment,
togetherwith other peace-loving,democraticand
an important
forthe
and irreplaceable
factorin thestruggle
forces,constitutes
progressive
freedomand independenceof peoplesand countries(quotedin Granma,August13,1978).

President Samora Machel of Mozambique also underlinedthis natural

alliance:
Generallyspeaking,theOAU memberStatesdo notproduceweapons.Generallyspeaking,
Butit is not
used by ourarmiescomefromcountriesoutsideourcontinent.
thearmaments
the armamentsof many
by chance that the weaponryof the liberationmovements,
countrieswhichdefendthedignityof Africa,generallycomefromthesocialistcountries.
Justas it is notby chancethatit is theNATO memberswho suppliedtheweaponswhich
Portugalattackedus withand whichwere used by SouthAfricaand Rhodesiato attack
Africa(Machel,1978).

Close ties betweensocialism,Cuba and the non-alignedwould obviously

to tie Cupose a directthreatto U.S. interestsin Africa,hencethe U.S. effort

ADAMS: CUBA AND AFRICA

121

ban policyto thetailof Sovietwishes.One unsympathetic

observerhas noted
this risk: "But in winningthis second round [Ethiopiaversus Somalia] so
convincingly,
Cuba has all butlegitimized
its presencethereas a non-aligned
nationanxiousto help thoseThirdWorldnationsunderattackby imperialism and its agents"(Fontaine,1978:44). Fontainecould findno evidenceof
Soviet dominationof Cuban decisionson Africa.Fagan (1978: 78) tends to
agree with this assessment.
CUBAN POLICY AND THE CUBAN REVOLUTION
Were it truethatCuban actionsin AfricaresultedfromSovietopportunism and orders from Moscow, one mightexpect considerabledomestic
oppositionin Cuba of thekindthatWashingtonencountered
overVietnam.If
constituted
a
Cuban policy
in the internal
clear, unwelcomeinterference
- the same domestic
affairsof othernations- a new kindof "imperialism"
oppositionshould be seen. The absence of internaldissentand apparently
overwhelming
popularsupportforCuba's policysuggeststhattheCubans are
aware and informedabout the natureand importanceof the government's
commitments.
Cuban fatalitiesin Africahave been estimatedby the CentralIntelligence
Agencyat roughly1,500(New YorkTimes,July19, 1978).These fatalitiesas
well as nonfatalcasualtieshave been a highpriceforthe Cuban population.
Wide publicdiscussionabout the ties betweenCuba's own history,its Afroin Africaappear to have made the
Americanculture,and liberationstruggles
price worthpaying.
The Cubanshave clearlybeen willingto bear short-term
costsfortheirinas theirexperienceof a seventeenyear
ternationaldomesticcommitments
the need
U.S. blockademade clear. As the Cuban economygrowsstronger,
for such sacrificesmay become less necessary.
In part, the public's willingnessto support Cuba's African policy
and publicdiscussionprocess
commitments
grewout of the decisionmaking
in Cuba.13Cuba's decisions to make international
commitments
startwith
intensivediscussionsin the government
and in the party.The seriousnessof
such deliberationscontrastswiththe popularU.S. media view of the Cuban
as "Castro'sregime"or "whimsicalone-manrule." Once made,
government
ratherthan simplybeing handed down, such a decision undergoeswidespread public discussion in such organizationsas the trade unions, the
Federationof Cuban Women,the Peasant'sAssociation,and the Committees
forthe Defenseof the Revolution,as well as withinthe Cuban Communist
Party.On international
issues, the average Cuban possesses an unusually
and a sophistication
of analysisthatcontrastswith
highlevel of information
theoftenill-informed
populace of the UnitedStates.In contrastto luridtales
in the U.S. press of "volunteers"forAfricabeingdraggedfromtheirhomes
undercoverof dark,few Cubans have dissentedfromtheAfricanpolicyand
many have been enthusiastic,public volunteers.Althoughcorrespondents
have searchedfor disagreement,
it has been hard to find:
13Thefollowingevaluationof the Cuban decision-making
process,between1975 and 1978,is
based on extensiveinterviewing
in Cuba and withvisitorsto Cuba.
LatinAmericanPerpectives:Issue 28, Winter'1981, Vol. VIII. No. 1

122

LATIN AMERICAN PERSPECTIVES

Thereis almostuniversalagreement
amongrecentvisitorsto Cuba,as well as analystsoutside thecountry,
thatCastro'sAfricancommitment
has raisedno publicoppositioninside
the country. . Indeed, there is considerablenational pride among the heavily
propagandizedpopulationthat Cuba should be contributing
toward the anticolonial
strugglein Africa,the fightagainstracism,and to new grass-root
regimes.One gets the
- whichlikesverylittleof what
sense and one even getsit amongtheexile community
Castroand the government
do - of nationalpride(Sanders,1978).
Fromone end of theisland to theotherthereis a sense of nationalistprideovertheexploits in Africa.Over and over again, Cubans in all walks of life told me of their
fortheway in whichCuba is carvingoutan important
enthusiasm
worldrole.This comes
fromCubans who supportFidel and frommanywho have opposedhim over the years
(ChristianScience Monitor,quoting"a seasoned observerof Cuba," June29, 1978).

CONCLUSION
Far fromthe adventuristic
opportunismportrayedby the U.S. government,Cuba's Africanpolicyappearsto have been principled,
responsive,and
independent.Its limitshave been, to date, clear and consistentwithpolicy
statements.
Cuban restraint
in Eritreahas alreadybeen noted.In addition,it
is known that Cuba expended substantialeffortsin Havana, Colombo,
Somalia, Ethiopia and South Yemen to seek a peaceful solution to the
Ethiopian-Somali
disputebeforethe Somali invasionof the Ogaden (Carlos
Raphael Rodriguez,press conference,Granma,August13, 1978). Cuba has
continuedto guard the perimeterof the Gulf Oil installationsin Cabinda
Provinceof Angola,makingno effortto advocateor enforcea seizureby eitherthe Neto government
or its opponents.Cuba has also made continuous
publicstatements
supporting
peacefulsettlements
betweenZaire and Angola
and in both Zimbabwe and Namibia (WashingtonStar,June27, 1978,and
New York Times,November12, 1978).
It is equallyclearthatCuba's policyhas been closelytiedto a continuing
world liberationstruggle.To Cuba, peaceful solutionsare temporaryor
chimericalwithoutgenuine liberation.The Cuban statementat the U.N.
Special Session on Disarmamentreflectedthis view:
Whilereaffirming
Cuba's decisionto workforpeace and herfullsupportforthecause of
generaland completedisarmament
which,starting
withnucleardisarmament,
will make
detenteirreversible
as theissues in disputeare successivelysolved,we also wishto make
cleartheneed to acceptpeoples'legitimate
rightto organizetheirown defense,and to distinguishbetweenwars promotedfor economicor politicaldominationand wars that
peopleare forcedto wagein orderto imposetheirrightto independence
(Rodriguez,
1978).

Cuba has historically

been and will continueto be allied withmovements
and nationsengagedin such conflicts.Fromthe Cuban perspective,Cuba's
futuredoes not lie with the United States, which is seen as the world's
leadingneocolonialpower.
Cuban supportforliberationand Cuba's responseto appeals for assistance, are far more importantthan the restorationof relationswith the
UnitedStates.The reestablishment
of diplomaticties will occurat some point
as a matterof course. It is not surprising,
then,that the Cubans fail to
appreciateU.S. effortsto linkrenewedrelationswithCuba's foreignpolicy.
As statedby Castroin his speechto the Second Assemblyof PopularPower
on December24, 1977:

123

ADAMS: CUBA AND AFRICA

What'sthepointof theUnitedStatestalkingabouttheCubantroopsin Angolaand Cuba's

solidaritywith Africa?What has thatgot to do withrelationsbetweenCuba and the
UnitedStates?What'sthisaboutthe UnitedStatestalkingabouttroopsbeingin another
ofAfrica
thepresenceofourtroopsin Angolaor in anyothercountry
and turning
country
theUnitedStateshas
intoan obstacleforsuchrelations.That'swhyI say thatapparently
itnordo theyunderstand
policy;theydon'tunderstand
ourprincipled
failedto understand
principles(Castro,1978).

are unlikelyto be hostage to the

Cuba's internationalcommitments
presumed(by the UnitedStates) Cuban need to end the U.S. blockadeand
restoretrade with the UnitedStates. U.S. policy towardCuba consistently
fails to understandthis reality;hence, littleprogresstowardnormalization
is infectedwitha bad
has been made. U.S. policytowardCuba, ultimately,
by the continuing
affronted
be
to
seems
Our
pride
lese-majeste.
of
case
to carryout an
dares
which
nation
island
of
a
small
and
influence
success
observerstake
U.S.
sympathetic
relatively
Even
policy.
foreign
independent
Cuba is,
adventurism.
Cuban
to
overreact
to
be
wrong
this tone: "It would
or the
can
it
forces
deploy
the
in
limited
severely
a
country,
afterall, puny
1978).
16,
June
New
York
in
the
Ball
Times,
losses it can accept." (George
adventuristic
from
the
personalistic,
in
far
Cuba's commitments Africa,
actions of a Soviet puppet have reflecteda coherentworld view and an
behavioraccepted
consistentpolicy,tiedto normsof international
historically
amongthe non-aligned.They have had widespreadsupportboth in Africa
and at home.
Cuban policyhas been based on an awarenesscommonamongdevelopingnationsthatthe worldhas been and remainsdividedby colonialismand
Despite persistentdenials,the UnitedStates
activeneocolonialintervention.
to block
actively,overtlyand covertly,
supportssuch a division,intervening
its
it
can
within
to do what
liberationmovements.Cuba appears committed
the
of
is
the
heart
problem.
means to assist such movements.Here, then,
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ABC (Network)
1978 BarbaraWalter'sinterviewwithFidel Castro,June18, 1978,"Issues and Answers"
(ABC unofficialtranscript),
June25
Adams,Gordon
1970 "PoliticalIntegration
in Europe:The AfricanAssociationto the EuropeanEconomic
Ph.D. dissertation,
Community,"
ColombiaUnitersity
1972 "Community
ForeignPolicy and PoliticalIntegration:
The Lessons of the African
in the1970s,New
Association,"
pp. 207-219in StevenWarnecke,The EuropeanCommunity
York:Praeger
Bender,Gerald
1978 "Angola,the Cubans and AmericanAnxieties,"ForeignPolicy,31 (Summer),3-30
Bouchey,FrancisL.
1978 "Dangeron our SouthernFlank,"DenverPost (July23), 19
BusinessWeek
1978 Special Advertising
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Castro,Fidel
1978 Cuba Update(CenterforCuban Studies),2 (February),3
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LatinAmericanPerspectives:

LATIN AMERICAN PERSPECTIVES

124

Corporate Data Exchange

1978 CDE Handbook:U.S. Bank Loans to South Africa,New York
Crocker, Chester
1978 "The African Setting,"pp. 12-22,in Georgetown Center for Strategicand International
Studies

Cuba Review

,1978 "Cuba and Africa," Cuba Review (Cuba Resource Center), VIII (October)

Davis, Nathaniel
1978 "The Angolan Decision of 1975: A Personal Memoir," Foreign Affairs(Fall), 109-124
Dominguez, Jorge
1978 "Cuban Foreign Policy," Foreign Policy, 32 (Fall), 83-108
Fagan, Richard
1978 "Cuba and the Soviet Union, Wilson Quarterly (Winter), 68-81
Fontaine, Roger
1978 "Cuba on the Horn," pp. 40-45, in Georgetown Center for Strategic and International
Studies
Francis, Samuel T.
1977 "Conflict in the Horn of Africa," Journalof Social and Political Studies, II (Fall), 155168
FRELIMO (Frente de Libertagcaode Mogambique)
1978 Report of the Standing Committee to the Fourth Session of the Central Committee of
FRELIMO (Press Release, Mozambique InformationService), August 16
Georgetown Center for Strategic and International Studies
Quarterly:
A Reviewof Strategicand
1978 "White Paper: The Horn of Africa," Washington
International Issues (May), special supplement
Goshko, John
1978 "U.S. Seen Powerless to contain Cuba in Third World," Washington Post, (May 25)
Lake, Anthony
1978 Speech in Chicago, April 25, CurrentPolicy (Departmentof State, Bureau of Public Affairs), April, 3
Machel, Samora
1978 Statementto the FifteenthSummitof the Organization for African Unity(July19), New
York: Mozambican Mission to the United Nations
Myers, Kenneth A.
1978 "Europe and Detente: Dilemmas of the Horn," pp. 57-63 in Georgetown Center for
Strategic and International Studies
Nickel, Herman
1978 "A Sharper Focus for U.S. Policy in Africa," Fortune (August 14), 132-140
Non-Aligned Movement, Secretariat for Informationof the Federal Executive Council
of the Non-AlignedCountries,
1973 Declarationof the Heads of State or Government
Belgrade
Oberdorfer,Don
1978 "Double Reverse: Chronicle of U.S. Policy on Africa," Washington Post (June 25)
OECD (Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development)
n.d. Annual Development Assistance Reviews, Paris
Power, Jonathan
1978 "Earning African Friends," New York Times (June 21)
Roberts, Ted
1976 "Cuba and the Non-Aligned Movement," Center for Cuban Studies Newsletter,III
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ADAMS: CUBA AND AFRICA

125

Rodriguez, Carlos Raphael

1978 "Speech to U.N. Special Session on Disarmament" (Speech May 30, 1978), Cuba
Update, 3 (Summer), 3
Sanders, Sol
1978 "Why Cuba is Waging War on Africa," Business Week (July3), 41
Seidman, Ann and Neva
1978 South Africa and U.S. Multinational Corporations,Westport, Connecticut: Laurence
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Stockwell, John
1978 In Search of Enemies: A CIA Story, New York: W. W. Norton
Vanneman, Peter and Martin James
1978 "Soviet Thrust into the Horn of Africa: The Next Targets," The Strategic Review, VI
(Spring), 33-38

Wall StreetJournal

1978 Advertising Supplement (November 10), 20-22

THIRD WORLD

InternationalBimonthly
A forumforfreediscussion of issues concerningthe Third
World.A journaldedicated to developingcountries.
We providealternative
information
on worldeventsfromThird
Worldangle. Our recentissues carriedinterviews
withSean
MacBride,Nobel Peace Prizewinnerand J. R. Jayawardene,
Sri Lankan President.
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Issue 28, Winter1981, Vol. Vill,No. 1