Cebu Institute of Technology (CIT)

vs
Hon. Blas Ople
GR No. L-58870 December 18, 1987
FACTS:
This is a consolidation of six cases involving various private schools as well as the then Minister of Labor and
Employment inorder to dispose uniformly the common legal issue raised namely the allocation of the incremental
proceeds of authorized tuition fee increases of private schools provided for in section 3 (a) of Presidential Decree No. 451,
and thereafter, under the Education Act of 1982 (Batas Pambansa Blg. 232).
3(a) of Pres. Decree No. 451 which states:
SEC. 3. Limitations. The increase in tuition or other school fees or other charges as well as the new fees or
charges authorized under the next preceding section shall be subject to the following conditions;
(a) That no increase in tuition or other school fees or charges shall be approved unless sixty (60%)per centum of
the proceeds is allocated for increase in salaries or wages of the members of the faculty and all other employees of
the school concerned, and the balance for institutional development, student assistance and extension services,
and return to investments: Provided That in no case shall the return to investments exceed twelve (12%) per
centum of the incremental proceeds;
This case originated from a Complaint filed with the Regional Office No. VII of the Ministry of Labor against petitioner
Cebu Institute of Technology (CIT) by private respondents, Panfilo Canete, et al., teachers of CIT, for non-payment of: a)
cost of living allowances (COLA) b) thirteenth (13th) month pay differentials and c) service incentive leave.
CIT contended that it had paid the allowances mandated by various decrees but the same had been integrated in the
teacher's hourly rate. It alleged that the payment of COLA by way of salary increases is in line with Pres. Dec. No. 451. It
also claimed in its position paper that it had paid thirteenth month pay to its employees and that it was exempt from the
payment of service incentive leave to its teachers who were employed on contract basis.
Minister of Labor and Employment held that the basic hourly rate designated in the Teachers' Program is regarded as the
basic hourly rate of teachers exclusive of the COLA, and that COLA should not be taken from the 60% incremental
proceeds of the approved increase in tuition fee.
Petitioner assails the aforesaid Order in this Special Civil Action of certiorari with Preliminary Injunction and/or
Restraining Order. The Court issued a Temporary Restraining Order on December 7, 1981 against the enforcement of the
questioned Order of the Minister of Labor and Employment.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the alleged implementing rules and regulations promulgated by the then MECS to the effect that
allowances and other benefits may be charged against the 60% portion of the proceeds of tuition fee increases
provided for in Section 3(a) of Pres. Dec. No. 45 1 were issued ultra vires, and therefore not binding upon this
Court
NO.
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2. Whether or not the questioned rules and regulations contravene the statutory authority granted to the Minister of
Education as a valid exercise of rule-making authority
NO
RULING:
1. Court cannot go beyond what the legislature has laid down. Its duty is to say what the law is as enacted by the
lawmaking body. That is not the same as saying what the law should be or what is the correct rule in a given set of
circumstances. It is not the province of the judiciary to look into the wisdom of the law nor to question the policies
adopted by the legislative branch. Nor is it the business of this Tribunal to remedy every unjust situation that may
arise from the application of a particular law. It is for the legislature to enact remedial legislation if that be necessary
in the premises. But as always, with apt judicial caution and cold neutrality, the Court must carry out the delicate
function of interpreting the law, guided by the Constitution and existing legislation and mindful of settled
jurisprudence. The Court's function is therefore limited, and accordingly, must confine itself to the judicial task of
saying what the law is, as enacted by the lawmaking body.

The alleged implementing rules and regulations promulgated by the then MECS to the effect that allowances and
other benefits may be charged against the 60% portion of the proceeds of tuition fee increases provided for in Section 3(a)
of Pres. Dec. No. 45 1, suffice it to say that these were issued ultra vires, and therefore not binding upon this Court.
The rule-making authority granted by Pres. Dec. No. 451 is confined to the implementation of the Decree and to the
imposition of limitations upon the approval of tuition fee increases, to wit:
SEC. 4. Rules and Regulations. The Secretary of Education and Culture is hereby authorized, empowered and
directed to issue the requisite rules and regulations for the effective implementation of this Decree. He may, in
addition to the requirements and limitations provided for under Sections 2 and 3 hereof, impose other requirements
and limitations as he may deem proper and reasonable.
The power does not allow the inclusion of other items in addition to those for which 60% of the proceeds of
tuition fee increases are allocated under Section 3(a) of the Decree.
Rules and regulations promulgated in accordance with the power conferred by law would have the force and effect of
law if the same are germane to the subjects of the legislation and if they conform with the standards prescribed by the
same. Since the implementing rules and regulations cited by the private schools adds allowances and other benefits to the
items included in the allocation of 60% of the proceeds of tuition fee increases expressly provided for by law , the same
were issued in excess of the rule-making authority of said agency, and therefore without binding effect upon the courts. At
best the same may be treated as administrative interpretations of the law and as such, they may be set aside by this Court
in the final determination of what the law means.
2. The petitioners' insistence that the questioned rules and regulations contravene the statutory authority granted to the
Minister of Education, the Court finds that there was a valid exercise of rule-making authority.
The statutory grant of rule-making power to administrative agencies like the Secretary of Education is a valid
exception to the rule on non-delegation of legislative power provided two conditions concur, namely: 1) the statute is
complete in itself, setting forth the policy to be executed by the agency, and 2) said statute fixes a standard to which the
latter must conform.
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The Education Act of 1982 is "an act providing for the establishment and maintenance of an integrated system for
education " with the following basic policy:
It is the policy of the State to establish and maintain a complete, adequate and integrated system of education
relevant to the goals of national development. Toward this end, the government shall ensure, within the
context of a free and democratic system, maximum contribution of the educational system to the attainment of
the following national development goals:
xxx
With the foregoing basic policy as well as, specific policies clearly set forth in its various provisions, the Act is
complete in itself and does not leave any part of the policy-making, a strictly legislative function, to any
administrative agency.
Coming now to the presence or absence of standards to guide the Minister of Education in the exercise of rulemaking power, the pronouncement in Edu v. Ericta [G.R. No. L-32096, October 24, 1970, 35 SCRA 481, 497] is
relevant:
The standard may be either expressed or implied. If the former, the non-delegation objection is easily met. The
standard though does not have to be spelled out specifically. It could be implied from the policy and purpose of the
act considered as a whole. In the Reflector Law, clearly the legislative objective is public safety. What is sought to be
attained as in Calalang v. Williams is "safe transit upon the roads." (Italics supplied).
The policies and objectives on the welfare and interests of the various members of the educational community are
found in section 5 of B.P. Blg. 232. which states:
SEC. 5. Declaration of Policy and Objectives.
xxx
3. Promote the social and economic status of an school personnel, uphold their rights, define their
obligations, and improve their living and working conditions and career prospects.
xxx
Given the abovementioned policies and objectives, there are sufficient standards to guide the Minister of Education
in promulgating rules and regulations to implement the provisions of the Education Act of 1982, As in
the Ericta and Tablarin cases, there is sufficient compliance with the requirements of the non-delegation principle
______________________
Administrative agencies are not strictly bound by the technical rules of procedure. Hence, formal investigative and
arbitration proceedings need not be conducted. "While a day in court is a matter of right in judicial proceedings, in
administrative proceedings it is otherwise since they rest upon different principles.

JANICE P. BORJA
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