CHINA'S NEW POLICIES IN XINJIANG:

OBJECTIVES, RESULTS, CHALLENGES

introduction
This essay examines the People's Republic of China (PRC) new policies in Xinjiang:
objectives, results, challenges. This essay will start from the facts of unrest involving
ethnic Uighur / Uyghur, Uyghur position between XUAR or East Turkestan, China's
Minority and Religious Affairs Policy and ends on China's new policies in Xinjiang with
Xinjiang Work Forum (Xinjiang Gongzuo Zuotanhui).
Unrest involving Uyghurs have occurred on July 5, 2009, in the city of Urumqi, capital of
Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR) of China. Initially Uyghurs participating
in a peaceful protest against government inaction in response to the murder of at least two
migrant workers Uyghurs by Han Chinese at a toy factory in Shaoguan city in southern
Guangdong province. The demonstrators reportedly initially numbered at least a thousand,
mostly young men and women, and they demanded a murder investigation in Shaoguan.
On the evening of July 5, 2009, the protests turned violent, causing the death of 197 people
and injured more than 1,600 people (Rayila, 2011).
Violence, armed with knives occurred in February 2012 and March 2014. In February
2012, at least twelve people were killed after being attacked by a knife-wielding Muslims
near Kashgar in western Xinxiang that located near the Chinese border with PakistanKashmir. On March 1, 2014 group people armed with knives also attacked passengers at
the train station in Kunming, capital of Yunnan province of south-western China. Twentyeight people were killed and 113 injured. On the following day the government seriously
describes this incident as an act of separatism carried out by terrorists from Xinjiang. The
attack in Kunming is a series of violent incidents in China are called Three Evils of
terrorism, separatism and religious extremism. These actions usually occur around the
Xinjiang region, but in January-February of the same year there has been a similar
violence out from Xinjiang region (Holdstock, 2014).
Related with Uyghurs, in July 2015, about 300 lawyers and human rights activists have
been arrested, detained or put under surveillance. Some analysts said the arrest is
unprecedented, exceeding the crackdown on lawyers in 2011. Many of the lawyers were
released after receiving a warning to stop their activities, but more than 20 people remain
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in custody. Chinese authorities have accused the lawyer of Fengrui Law Firm in Beijing,
which has represented Ilham Tohti for sensitive cases it stands for, disturbing public order,
spreading rumors, and paying people to get involved in the demonstration. Prominent
lawyers including Wang Yu and Zhou Shifeng of Law Firm Fengrui, Li Heping, who
represents activist Chen Guangcheng, and the Guangzhou-based Sui Muq ing were also
arrested (Lum, 2015).
Most recently, a few days before Christmas in December 2015, Detachment 88, the police
counter-terrorism squad from Indonesia, arrested 11 militants were planning to carry out
bombing operations in Indonesia. Among them was a trio of Uyghur militants. At that time
they have been trained to become a suicide bomber. Earlier, seven Uyghurs entered
Indonesia illegally with three of them are believed to have joined the militant group in
Poso, Indonesia. Indonesian security officials in his research also indicate that Uyghur
groups have linkages with terror bombings in Bangkok, Thailand at August 2015 that
killed 27 people and injured 120 people (Singh, 2016).
The events that occurred in Xinjiang to arrest ethnic Uyghurs in Bangkok and Jakarta is
part of a new development in regional terrorist landscape in Asia. In response to these
events, the Chinese government has issued a new policy with namely, Second Central
Xinjiang Work Forum in 2014 (Famularo, 2015). In this essay the author will refer to
some of the resources available to analyze the Xinjiang and Chinese government policies.
Uyghur position between XUAR, or East Turkestan?
According to the official 2010 census data among 1.3 billion people, China has 1505
minority comprising only 8.4% of the total population, where the number of Muslims
accounted for only 1.7%, from ten Muslim minorities including Hui, Uyghur, Kazak,
Dongxiang, Kyrgyz, Salar, Tajik, Uzbek, Bonan and Tatar. From the ten minorities, only
Hui and Uyghur populated with more than ten million, eight other minority groups only
0.1 percent or less of the total population of China. Furthermore, a Muslim minority
concentrated in the Northwest (30% percent of the total China area), including the three
provinces of Shaanxi, Gansu, Qinghai and the two autonomous regions of Ningxia and
Xinjiang (Lee, 2015). Although there are about 23-50 million Muslims in China from ten
Muslim minorities ethnic group, claims for state separatism and concerns about terrorism
only focus on the Uyghurs, who are geographically concentrated in Xinjiang. Besides that,

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there is also a Uyghur population significant transboundary in Kazakhstan (220,000),

Uzbekistan (55,000) and Kyrgyzstan (49,000). (Holdstock, 2014).
Xinjiang is the largest administrative region in China, but because of the mountains and
the desert, this area is relatively sparsely populated. In China 2010 census, Uyghur people
accounted for 44% of Xinjiang's population and rest for 41% from the Han Chinese. In
northern Xinjiang, which includes the capital city of Urumqi, Han is the majority of the
population, while in the south, where Kashgar is the major urban centers, Uyghur
dominate. This area also formally divided into a number of titular ethnic areas (Holdstock).
In Xinjiang which covers one-sixth of the total territory of China, from 19 million people
there, among the 8 million people speak Uyghur. Human rights organizations abroad,
Uyghur diaspora and exiles have called the XUAR as East Turkestan, which refers to the
independent countries formed during the 20th century (Rayila, 2011).
The idea of Xinjiang as a unified political entity is a relatively modern concept. As
reflected in its name, during the Qing Dynasty (1644-1912) Xinjiang name can be
translated as new territory or new frontier began to be known. For most of its history
the area is effectively outside the control of the political center of China, only since the
founding of the People's Republic of China in 1949, the arrangement was fully inserted
Xinjiang. In 1949 the Han Chinese comprise only 5% of the population in Xinjiang, but
their number is increasing rapidly as a result of state-sponsored migration from other
provinces. During the first few decades most migrants are incorporated into the Xinjiang
Production and Construction Corp (XPPC), an organization set up under the control of the
People's Liberation Army to absorb the remnants of the Defeated KMT (Nationalist)
forces. The XPCC is still organized into military-style units called Bingtuan that are
Involved in both agricultural and industrial production, most Notably in the extractive
industries. Also they have a paramilitary role - most major Cities in Xinjiang are
surrounded by Bingtuan.during protests in Yining in 1997 and Riots in Urumqi in 2009,
Thousands of Bingtuan troops were brought into the city (Holdstock, 2014).
The idea that Xinjiang should be regarded as part of China, has faced challenges from
some of the Uyghurs, especially those active in diaspora organizations (mainly
concentrated in the US, Germany and Canada). The term that preferred for this XUAR
region is East Turkestan, a term first coined by Russian Turkologists in the 19th century,
who felt an affinity between nations in Tarim Basin (desert region that covers most of
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southern Xinjiang) and those West Turkestan, the region of Central Asia which correspond
with the countries of post-Soviet Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan and
Turkmenistan. In East Turkestan name of Xinjiang reached its peak in the 1930s, when the
region was controlled by a series of warlords, which supported by the Soviet Union
(Holdstock, 2014).
After a successful rebellion by gold miners in 1933 in Hotan, a city in southern Xinjiang,
East Turkestan Republic was established around the southern city of Kashgar. However,
lack of resources and isolation (no other country agreed to admit it) means that the country
was short-lived. In 1934 Commander Sheng Shicai regains control in this new country.
Another Republican with the same name (usually referred to as the Second East Turkestan
Republic) was established in 1944 in the north-west of the region. This is supported by the
Soviet Union and is an entity that is more stable, which lasted until 1949, when its key
leaders died in a plane crash while on their way to Beijing to negotiate with Mao Zedong,
later, leaders that surviving In Xinjiang agree to hand over control of the territory to the
regime of communist (Holdstock, 2014).
Since 1949 the term of East Turkestan has often been used by those who consider the
territory as a separate political entity from China and seek independence. Although it is not
possible to ascertain how much of this ambition is owned by the Uyghurs in Xinjiang,
given the sensitivity of the topic, we can say that the formation of Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan,
Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan following the breakup of the Soviet Union tended to have had
some impact on the aspiration to establish their own state. (Holdstock, 2014).
In order to ward off the threat of the independence movement of cross-border between
Uyghurs and other ethnic groups in China and former Soviet republics that newly
independent, China formed an intergovernmental organization in 1996 known as the
Shanghai Five, whose members are China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and
Russia. This organization was renamed the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) in
2001, when Uzbekistan joined. The goal of SCO that time included make joint efforts to
maintain and ensure peace, security and stability in the region. In addition to its member
states, the SCO has given observer status to Iran, Afghanistan, India, Mongolia and
Pakistan, and the dialogue partner status to Belarus, Sri Lanka and Turkey (Holdstock,
2014).

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Rayila (2011) has done research on the Uyghurs living in China that can be divided into
the following categories:
1) Uyghurs who was born and raised in China, who is fluent in Chinese, but cannot
speak properly in their native language Uyghur;
2) Uyghur students studying at universities in China, most of whom are fluent in both
Chinese and Uyghur;
3) Uyghurs who is fluent Uyghur but difficult to speak Chinese and have a very
limited education; and
4) Uyghur who worked in factories in cities such as Beijing and Tianjin and the
provinces of Zhejiang and Shandong, most of whom are young people who are
fluent in Uyghur but only completed compulsory education and thus have a very
limited ability in speaking Chinese language.
There are also the problems faced by Uyghurs in China as follows (Rayila, 2011):
1) Serious Health Problems
2) Access to Housing
3) Access to Employment
4) Routine and special checks before the big event
5) domestic law does not protect and fulfill the rights of same
Despite the problems, however Guangyao Wang examines the culture changes in
Xinjiang's globalization. In their study, Wang discovered facts about the magnitude of the
influence of Han culture in Uyghur minority culture in terms of language, lifestyle and
ideology. Similarly, the same thing perceived as a minority culture influence on the culture
of the Han (Wang, 2009).
In general, the migration and mobility promote cultural exchanges between the various
races constant, then the interior cultural diversification occurs, it makes the race to inherit
their traditions and learn from others. Only by absorbing foreign culture and incorporate
new things into one's own can it achieve cultural integration of the races themselves
(Wang, 2009).

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China's Minority and Religious Affairs Policy

Since the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) formed the power structure of China in 1950,
the minority policy can be characterized by three principles: (1) All ethnic groups belong
to the great Chinese nation, the which includes 56 peoples, and its political unity is
Inseparable. (2) Under the grand Chinese nation, all ethnic groups have equal status. The
'equal status' Refers to all kinds of rights and obligations Regardless of ethnic difference,
language, religion, customs, etc ... (3) Due to different historical, geographic, climatic, and
other conditions, the central government should adopt preferential measures in economic,
cultural, social, educational, and other arenas to increase of the well-being of Reviews
those underprivileged minorities (Lee, 2015).
General policy of China in matters of religion, on the other hand, can be summarized into
five following principles: (1) CCP party members and PRC Government Officials should
stick to Marxism-Leninism and adhere to atheism (2) All PRC citizens have the right to
believe or not believe in organized religion (3) All religions have equal legal status, and
their purposes should all promote national unity. (4) All religious organizations
domestically and activities should be organized under state regulation, and any form of
foreign influence in religious activities is strictly forbidden. (5) Religions should be
separate from education and politics. Under no circumstance should anyone use religious
causes to influence education and politics (Lee, 2015).
State regulations made by certain authorities at all levels of government, central / federal,
provincial, and local. At the level of central government, the State Ethnic Affairs
Commission and the State Administration of Religious Affairs, under the command of the
PRC State Council, are the highest agencies in the running of minority and religious
affairs. At the provincial level and below, unit administrative affairs and religious
minorities combined, which shows that the policy of minority and religious policies
through the same administrative unit. Based on the above principles, China claims it will
guarantee all of which include freedom of religion for all citizens, but stressed that state
regulation should be tight to secure compliance with the law, especially to prevent
challenges to the authority of the state or threat to national unity, it is this which might
restrict the way organized religion evolved (Lee, 2015).
That is, minorities and religions should develop a political identity that is competitive with
state identity, all organizations and religious activities should be under state regulations,
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and religious leaders do not have to build a network of religious and transnational political,
religion becomes a privacy issue despite the state authorities guarantee the freedom of all
citizens to practice religion or to reject it, regardless of ethnic background.
Restrictions on religion are a major source of tensions in the XUAR. This includes
increased surveillance of Muslims during Ramadan, especially students and those working
in state institutions, which are prohibited from fasting or attend the mosque. Police also
prohibits or burdensome to the religious component of cultural events such as festivals that
occur at local places of worship. There were also arrests imam, mosque closures, and,
recently, prosecution for spreading materials promoting religious extremism on the
Internet (Lee, 2015).
Although the Chinese government rarely offers much explanation about what defined as
religious extremism, the term is generally taken to refer to the Islamic faith that has at
least an affinity for the appropriate compliance. The extent to which religious beliefs had
motivated the confrontation between the Uyghurs and the state in Xinjiang, the presence of
religious elements in this incident should be interpreted with caution. Lee quotes from
Bovingdon found, Uyghurs have often used religion as a vehicle to express complaints
with state repression sample width or wider religiosity (Lee, 2015).
Concerning Uyghur complaints against the Chinese government, is actually similar
complaint was also submitted by other ethnic minorities in other places in China. China's
judicial system is opaque and less independence, while dismantling traditional
environment has become almost universal feature of the last three decades in the country's
modernization. Different from the other, complaints were more frequent in the
combination that seems to underlie much of disturbances occurred in Xinjiang over the last
two decades (Lee, 2015).
The most famous is the riots in Urumqi in 2009, when a protest over the assassination of
Uyghur migrant workers. The government claims that the violence was instigated and
directed from abroad, and carried out by criminals in this country. According to the
Chinese government instigator is actually because Uyghur Congress World (WUC), an
organization based in Washington DC, led by Uyghur businessman Rebiya Kadeer, in this
regard The WUC has denied responsibility and blamed the violence on the government's
refusal to recognize the Uyghurs . However, the fact in the field then developed that the

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riots in Urumqi is the result of the difficulties of life that allows radical Islamic
organizations play here (Lee, 2015).
Holdstock underlined that the level of support among the Uyghur separatists for ideas is
still unclear, although there must be widespread resentment against Chinese policies in the
region. For example, under the rules of family planning, Han have only one child, while
the Uyghurs (and other minorities) in the province is allowed to have two, but many
Uyghurs still regard this as an unfair restriction. Additional complaints including economic
exclusion, arbitrary detention, ruling from the Uyghur language education and cultural
oppression. Examples of the latter include imprisonment Uyghur writers, historians,
scholars and musicians named Ilham Tohti, who has been accused of conspiring against
the state. In addition, books, music, and public leaflets alleged Uyghur a separatist from
the traditional environment in all regions, especially in Kashgar has been destroyed
(Holdstock, 2014).
Hongyi discussed of ways the main ethnic policy in more depth. China's ethnic policies are
spelled out mainly in the Regional Ethnic Autonomy Law. First promulgated in 1984, it
was amended in 2001. It allows the setting up of ethnic autonomous areas (Article 12) of
regions (provinces), prefectures and counties if one or more minorities live in concentrated
communities there. By the end of 2000 the PRC had 154 ethnic autonomous Localities,
Including five provincial-level autonomous regions (zizhiqu), 30 autonomous prefectures
(zizhizhou) and 119 autonomous counties or leagues (zizhixian or zizhiqi). In addition,
there were 1,256 ethnic townships (xiang Minzu). 44 of the 55 ethnic minorities have set
up Reviews their own autonomous areas. Three quarters of ethnic minorities reside in
autonomous areas the which together account for 64% of the national territory (HongYi,
2010).
The core of regional ethnic autonomy is administrative autonomy. According to the Law,
in the ethnic autonomous areas, the administrative chief, including the chairman of an
autonomous region, the prefect of an autonomous prefecture or the head of an autonomous
county, as well as the chairman or vice chairman of the standing committee of the
Legislature (people's congress) shall be a citizen of the ethnic group exercising regional
autonomy (Article 17). As of 1998, the top legislative and administrative leaders of 154
autonomous regions and areas in the reform era were ethnic minorities (HongYi, 2010).

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The state also allows ethnic minorities to have a higher representation in the Legislature
and at various levels of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference than their
shares in population. The Party devotes considerable resources to the training and
grooming of Cadres from ethnic minorities. According to official statistics, in 1998, there
were 2.7 million Cadres of ethnic minorities, accounted for 6.9% of Cadres nationwide, 54
times that in the early years of the PRC. The share of ethnic minorities in the cadre corps
in Tibet was 73.9%, 47% in Xinjiang, 34% in Guangxi, 23.4% in Inner Mongolia and
17.5% in Ningxia (HongYi, 2010).
The Law leaves it to the ethnic autonomous regions to decide on the implementation of
regulations and policies from higher authorities. The decision, however, is subject to the
approval of the higher authorities who are given 60 days to respond (Article 20). In
practice there are indications that the higher authority sometimes sits on the request
without giving a timely reply. The Law empowers Also autonomous areas with the right to
enact self-governing regulations and separate regulations and ethnic tailored to local
conditions. Again, reviews these regulations need to be submitted to the Legislature of the
next higher level for approval (Article 19). Autonomous areas can also organize local
public security forces for local need and with national approval (Article 24) (HongYi,
2010).
China's new policies in Xinjiang
At a meeting in December 2013, President Xi Jinping to report the Political Bureau of the
Communist Party Central Committee (Politburo) that party officer should focus on
maintaining stability in the Xinjiang, marking a strategic shift of the official emphasis on
promoting regional development that has taken place since 2010. January 2014, the
government of XUAR released plans to increase spending on public safety area by 24
percent to 6.1 billion yuan (US $ 1 billion), which includes an increase of 100 per cent in
the budget of XUAR public security bureau to combat terrorism. In late April 2014, during
a visit to the military and paramilitary post in the city of Kashgar, the President Xi stated
that the Kashgar region would form a front line against terror (Lum, 2015).
At the Third Plenum of the 18th Party Congress, held in Beijing in November 2013,
officials report from central government has established a new Central State Security
Committee, which will be very focused on security measures in the country, including in
XUAR. At the annual meeting of the National People's Congress and Chinese People's
Azmi Muharom 9

Political Consultative Conference in March 2014, the legislator has also established
centers of the anti-terrorism nation. Also in March, an expert on Chinese law urged
lawmakers to be careful when drafting anti-terrorism legislation to achieve a balance
between the fight against extremism and protect the rights of civilians (Lum, 2015).
Both domestic and foreign media and rights advocates criticized the lack of transparency
of Chinese officials about the incidents of violence involving Uyghurs that occurred during
this reporting year. Journalists and rights groups reported the detention authority on
journalists, denial of journalists to visit areas associated with violent clashes or attacks,
restrictions on social media comments, and publication of official directives to proscribe
media organizations reporting that deviates from the official narrative (CECC, 2015).
In early 2002, citing Dr. Chaudhuri C. Gladney, an expert on Chinese Islam warned that
... if China does not explore other options besides repression, restriction, and investment,
millions

of Uyghur Muslims MIGHT

Become Increasingly marginalized and

disenfranchised, encouraging some to look to the intifada ... and a West Bank-type
situation would emerge in the region. Although comparison with the West Bank is too
excessive, but the main purpose of Gladney is to stress that Xinjiang towards long-term
instability and ethnic divisions between Uyghurs and Han communities. Early warning
about the situation in Xinjiang should be understood in the context of the escalation of
violence in recent years (Chaudhuri, 2014).
Second Xinjiang Work Forum objectives
In response to the instability and unrest in Urumqi, capital of Xinjiang in July 2009, the
authorities have made Xinjiang Work Forum in May 2010 for the first time in the history
of Xinjiang under the PRC. Forum is working to set goals to promote leapfrog
development to ensure lasting political stability. Work Forum basically reiterated the
economic solution to the problem of Xinjiang. In addition, the basic emphasis was also
made on the maintenance of stability, development measures and the inclusion of other
provinces to reach remote areas under the pretext of rescue strategies Xinjiang (Chaudhuri,
2014).
During 2014, the central government and officer from XUAR launched the initiative largescale development to prioritize the integration of XUAR with the Chinese state and
countries, including through the launch of high-speed trains first in the region, new toll
roads, and projects designed to develop the area as a center economics for the New Silk
Azmi Muharom 10

Road. The government also makes a guarantee to improve living standards and address the
unequal distribution of wealth in the region. Officials promised to provide employment for
at least one person from each family, eliminate fees for high school students in the
southern regions XUAR, ordered state-owned enterprises in the XUAR to hire 25 percent
of staff from ethnic minorities, and a plan to develop the traditional textile industry. Some
commentators have observed that the launch of a new development initiative may be a
tacit acknowledgment of the role of economic and social inequality exacerbates regional
instability (CECC, 2015).
Four years after the Xinjiang Work Forum, Second Xinjiang Work Forum has done in
Urumqi May 28-29, 2014. It is interesting to note that the Second Work Forum was held
within a week of deadly blasts in the morning market in Urumqi that killed 31 people and
injured 94. Interest otherwise Forum is the latest work is to maintain long-lasting social
and political stability. The question is whether this shift in emphasis will improve the
political situation in the region (Chaudhuri, 2014).
At the Second Xinjiang Work Forum, the President Xi Jinping has been decisive policy
measures to better assimilate Uyghurs and Han people in the XUAR to China's cultural
and economic fields. In addition to advice on investment of the state in promoting
employment opportunities and reduce poverty in the region, President Xi stressed the
importance of ethnic unity to realize stability in the XUAR. Government and party
officials have historically used initiative ethnic unity to impose its interpretation of state
identity. In toward the goal of ethnic unity, President Xi advocated the promotion of
bilingual education, as well as the expansion of the program to send an ethnic minority
XUAR to other areas in China to study, work, and life. In addition, the President Xi called
on religious leaders in order to teach patriotism (CECC, 2015).
On February 14, 2014, the Xinjiang regional officials continued with the launch of the
campaign Down to the Grassroots. Officers and state media have promises to promote
development, improve people's livelihood, and improve the stability and the ethnic unity.
In March 2014, more than 70,000 party cadres in the XUAR conduct this campaign in the
villages XUAR, as part of a regional plan three years to send 200,000 cadres
grassroots'. Furthermore, The Cadre shows initiative efforts in the areas of agriculture,
environment and religious XUAR Communist Party Secretary Zhang Chunxian reportedly
that this campaign will not pass through any villages in XUAR (CECC, 2015).

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Second Xinjiang Work Forum results

The second Xinjiang Work Forum has marked subtle but significant developments in the
approach of the CPC's ethnic policies. Economic development remains a top priority; but a
new generation of Party leaders understands that money alone will not mollify be religious
and ethnic tensions in Tibet and Xinjiang. Instead, the President of China Xi Jinping
looking for a more comprehensive solution, to the problems that was facing (Leibold,
2014).
The official Xinhua summary Xinjiang Work Forum process is described as follows:

Increasing the employment and income levels among the Uyghurs in XUAR
through a new round of fiscal transfers and investment.

Urbanization and migration aimed at expanding contacts and cooperation between

different ethnic groups.

Enter of the Party organizations at the grassroots level to eliminate the three evil
forces (separatism, extremism and terrorism) and sustain social stability.

Strengthening the state education and bilingual instruction so that all minority
youth are fluent in the language and national culture.

None of these proposals is a new thing. However, the work of this Forum set a new
strategic goal which is to eliminate ethnic differences, the removal of obstacles to the free
mingling (jiaorong) and the forging of national identity together (Leibold, 2014).
The second Xinjiang Work Forum, which was attended by the entire Politburo and more
than three hundred party officials in Beijing at May 2014, is slightly different to the
Central Work Forum on Tibet, which has been held five times since the 1980s. The
process that took place in Xinjiang is much newer, and more urgent. For more than a
decade, a group of intellectuals and party officials have called ethnic policy adjustments
such as this, some even talk about the need for a second generation of ethnic policy that
would eliminate ethnic-based rights and autonomy. From Xinjiang Work Forum can be
revealed that their influence has grown on the leaders of the Party, but it remains unclear
how far the new government China is willing or able to pursue the agenda of this dispute
(Leibold, 2014).
Since the 18th Party Congress in November 2012, Xi Jinping has led seven of the
Politburo meeting in Xinjiang, at the same time he also spent more than thirty direction on
Azmi Muharom 12

Xinjiang. In April, he personally toured the region. Fellow members of the Politburo
Standing Committee Yu Zhengsheng, has made four official visit to Xinjiang, compared to
only one for the Tibet Autonomous Region (Leibold, 2014).
Several times over the last few months, Xi Jinping has emphasized that: the job of
Xinjiang has a position of strategic importance specialized in the work of the Party and the
state and long-term stability of the autonomous regions are very important for the entire
state of reform, development and stability and national unity, harmony ethnic and national
security.
As former work Forum, economic development is the main agenda. But in the new
working forum is more difference because guarantees resolve difficulties in Xinjiang,
related to issues of ethnicity and religion. In Forum work clearly confirms: the problem is
most sustainable Xinjiang is a problem of unity of ethnic, and Xi Jinping urged all ethnic
groups to show mutual understanding, respect, tolerance and respect, and to learn and help
each other, so they are intimately tied together -Same as pomegranate seeds (Leibold,
2014).
Second Xinjiang Work Forum challenges
In 2016, the success of Second Xinjiang Work Forum already started visible. It can be seen
from the positive reaction of the Government and People of Xinjiang in Early Month of
Ramadan 2016. Zhang Chunxian, secretary of the regional committee of the CPC, and
Shohrat Zakir, chairman of the Xinjiang regional government, visiting teachers and
students in Xinjiang Islamic Institute on Sunday. During a visit they do greetings to
Muslims of different ethnic groups in the event and expressed Economic Development in
Xinjiang Happens (http://en.people.cn/n3/2016/0606/c90785-9068326.html)
On the other side, there is a recommendation, initiative and serious implementation
challenges in the field. In the past, interest and poor governance has blocked reform
efforts, with, for example, access to housing which inhibit large-scale ethnic migration. In
addition, there are at least two important points in Xinjiang challenges:
First, an increase in inter-ethnic contacts workforce will intensify competition between
Uyghur and Han workers more directly compete for limited resources and opportunities in
urban areas together. There are a lot of social scientific evidence shows how ethnic rivalry

Azmi Muharom 13

fortifies ethnic boundaries and, in appropriate situations, increasing ethnic conflict and
violence. (Leibold, 2014).
Party, for example, recently announced a new recruitment quota mandating that stateowned enterprises in Xinjiang employs seventy percent of their new staff consisting of
local residents, including twenty-five per cent of ethnic minorities. However, the policy of
this party along with the size of the sector of Xinjiang's state-owned sector is shrinking,
and thus undermining the difficulties of implementation of quotas. China's political and
legal environment does not currently have the necessary safeguards to ensure that these
reforms favorable Xinjiang ethnic communities.
Second, a new approach Xi Jinping failed to address the underlying racism in Chinese
society. Despite Lofty statements about a unified, inclusive, and harmonious nation-state,
most Uyghurs feel unwelcome and unwanted in China. Their language, religion and
cultural traditions are alien to the mainstream Chinese society, and despite Efforts to create
multicultural spaces, Party-defined pluralism is colorful yet largely hollow. Uyghurs, in
the eyes of most Han, are dangerous criminals and thieves to be avoided, the Han, for most
Uyghurs, are dirty and infidel invaders who cannot be trusted. Faced with this suspicion,
the public is unlikely to welcome the migration of other communities to live side-by-side
in the same community, let alone united through contact, cooperation and
marriage. (Leibold, 2014).
From outside the country, adding that the Thomas Lum (2015) also included Second
Xinjiang Work Forum challenges is:
1) The National Security Law
2) Foreign NGO Management
3) Legislation of Nongovernmental organizations
4) Legislation of Internet
5) Education and Employment
Conclusion
Unrest involving Uyghurs have occurred on 2009 in Xinjiang and on 2015 in Beijing,
Bangkok and Jakarta. In response to these events, the Chinese government has issued a
Central Xinjiang Work Forum in 2010 and Second Xinjiang Work Forum in 2014.

Azmi Muharom 14

Work Forum basically reiterated the economic solution to the problem of Xinjiang. In
addition, the basic emphasis was also made on the maintenance of stability, development
measures and the inclusion of other provinces to reach remote areas under the pretext of
rescue strategies in Xinjiang.
In 2016, the success of Second Xinjiang Work Forum already started visible, although
inter-ethnic contacts, Xi Jinping new approach, The National security law, Foreign NGO
Management, Legislation of NGO, Legislation of Internet and Education and
Unemployment became big challenges for efforts to maintain and ensure peace, security
and stability in the region.

Azmi Muharom 15

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